JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, iFirst, 116
The inferential chain makes the difference between
familiar and novel figurative expressions
Francesca M. Bosco, Marianna Vallana, and Monica Bucciarelli
Center for Cognitive Science and Department of Psychology, Turin University
The present investigation focuses on children’s ability to comprehend the communicative meaning of
figurative expressions. We advance a theoretical framework where the length of the inferential chain
accounts for the difference in difficulty of reconstructing the communicative meaning of familiar and
novel figurative expressions. The results of Experiment 1, involving 90 children from 7- to 10-year-olds,
confirm our prediction. Experiment 2, involving 54 children of the same age, does not support an
alternative, syntactic, explanation for our results. Experiment 3, also involving 54 children from 7 to 10
years old, replicates the results of the two previous experiments in a single experiment. The overall
results strengthen our assumptions: The length of the inferential chain, but not the syntactic complexity
involved, is the factor that better explains the difference in difficulty of reconstructing the communicative
meaning of the familiar and novel figurative expressions investigated. The overall results are discussed in
relation to the relevant experimental literature.
Keywords: Communicative meaning; Familiar figurative expressions; Inferential chains; Novel figurative
expressions.
Figurative expressions are widespread in our daily
life conversations and they are used quite successfully for communication purposes notwithstanding the fact that their literal meaning does not
correspond to their communicative meaning.
Consider, for example, the expression: [1] Mary
has eyes of ice,1 a familiar metaphor in many
cultural contexts, which can mean: to be impassive, inscrutable, hostile, or intimidating. How do
people comprehend the communicative meaning
of figurative expressions? Do they rely on different cognitive processes from those involved in
comprehending the communicative meaning of
1
Unless otherwise specified, all the examples in this paper
are the English translation of the Italian expressions we used
in our experiments.
literal, nonfigurative expressions? Following the
tenets of the Cognitive Pragmatics theory
(Airenti, Bara, & Colombetti, 1993; Bara, 2010),
we assume that the length of the inferential chain
involved contributes to determine the difficulty in
comprehending figurative expressions, as well as
literal expressions.
The classic pragmatics theory assumes the
priority of literal meaning in comprehending the
speaker’s communicative intention, which means
that listeners always process the literal meaning
of an utterance first and only when a literal
meaning makes no sense, do they derive the
figurative meaning (Grice, 1989; Searle, 1979).
Hence, this perspective outlines the differences
between the cognitive processes involved in
figurative and literal expressions. In line with
Correspondence should be addressed to Francesca M. Bosco, Department of Psychology, University of Turin, Via Po, 14-10123
Turin, Italy. E-mail: [email protected]
We thank Alessandra Laterza and Paola Roverio for their help in administering the experimental protocols. The first and second
authors were supported in this research by Regione Piemonte, Project: Institutions, Behaviour and Markets in Local and Global
Settings (Project IIINBEMA). The third author was supported in this research by Regione Piemonte of Italy, ATLAS project ID 44.
# 2012 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business
http://www.psypress.com/ecp
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2012.658156
2
BOSCO, VALLANA, BUCCIARELLI
this perspective, many studies have been concerned with how individuals reconstruct the literal
meaning of figurative expressions (see, e.g.,
Gentner, 2003; Johnson & Pascual Leone, 1989;
Miller, 1979; Ortony, 1979; Tversky, 1977). Several authors outlined the cognitive processes
common to the comprehension of both figurative
and literal expressions (see, e.g., Ortony,
Schallert, Reynolds, & Antos, 1978; Wilson &
Carston, 2006). They argued that the literal
meaning has no priority in comprehending the
speaker’s communicative meaning. Thus, for example, under certain conditions such as a strong
context, people can understand metaphors they
are not familiar with as quickly as the comparable
literal expressions (Blasko & Connine, 1993), and
indeed they both rely on the interlocutors sharing
a common ground that enables them to understand what a given communication act means
(Gibbs, 1994). Following the tenets of the Relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995),
Wilson and Carston (2006) argued that the
interpretation of figurative utterances results in
the attribution of emergent properties, a process
that does not involve special interpretative mechanisms, nor the interpretation of the literal
meaning. Within the Configuration Hypothesis
model (Cacciari & Tabossi, 1988), Cacciari,
Padovani, and Corradini (2007) studied the way
idioms are processed in online comprehension
and found that the words forming an idiomatic
sentence are processed as they are for any other
literal sentence in which they occur. Further, from
a developmental perspective, Levorato and
Cacciari (1995) found that children, in order to
comprehend and produce figurative language, do
not use any special strategies with respect to their
ordinary literal language (in support of this claim,
see also Gottfried, 1997; Ozcaliskan, 2005,
Pearson, 1990). In line with these results, Bosco,
Vallana, and Bucciarelli (2009) found that the
complexity of the mental representations involved contributes to determine children’s ability
to comprehend figurative language, as it does for
nonfigurative language (see Bosco & Bucciarelli,
2008).
Our study outlines how the length of the
inferential chain is one important factor accounting for the varying difficulty of comprehension
between different figurative expressions, as well as
for the varying difficulty of comprehension between different literal expressions, as formerly
demonstrated by Bosco and Bucciarelli (2008).
This issue is relevant to an ongoing debate
concerning the difference in difficulty of comprehending figurative expressions in relation to their
degree of familiarity, defined as the frequency with
which a figurative expression occurs (Nippold &
Taylor, 1995). Several studies have shown that
children, adolescents, and adults find more familiar figurative expressions easier to understand
than less familiar or novel ones (Levorato &
Cacciari, 1992, Nippold & Taylor, 1995, 2002).
Thus, we may expect a novel metaphor like: [2]
Marta has a stare that freezes, to be more difficult
to understand than [1] Mary has eyes of ice. In our
view, such a difference in difficulty can be
accounted for in terms of the length of the
inferential chain involved in their comprehension.
In particular, we argue that the length of the
inferential chain predicts differences in difficulty
of comprehension of familiar and nonfamiliar
figurative expressions (i.e., metaphors, idioms,
hyperboles, and similes), as it does for literal,
nonfigurative expressions (see later).
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN
COMPREHENDING COMMUNICATIVE
MEANINGS:
The role of the inferential chain
The pragmatic literature attributes a central role
to inferential ability in accounting for the difficulty in reconstructing a speaker’s communicative
meaning. Searle (1975) was the first author to
introduce the notion of inferential chain, based
upon the definition of indirect speech acts.
Through an indirect speech act the speaker
communicates to the listener more than what
he/she is actually saying, by relying on their
background of mutually shared information and
on the listener’s general powers of rationality and
inference. The classical example provided by
Searle is: [3] Could you pass me the salt?, which
is an example of a conventional indirect speech
act. The length of the inferential path is not the
same for each indirect speech act. For example,
[4] My soup is insipid is an example of a
nonconventional indirect speech act which requires a greater number of inferences than [3].
Searle claims that the primary illocutionary force
of an indirect speech act is derived from the literal
speech act via a series of inferential steps.
The listener’s inferential process is triggered by
the assumption that the speaker is following the
INFERENCES AND FIGURATIVE EXPRESSIONS
Cooperative Principle (Grice, 1975), together
with evidence of an inconsistency between the
utterance and the context of pronunciation. The
listener tries first to interpret the utterance
literally and only when this attempt fails, due to
the irrelevance of the literal meaning, does he/she
look for a different meaning, which conveys the
primary illocutionary force. It derives that, on the
basis of the inferential chain involved in its
comprehension, an indirect speech act is more
difficult to comprehend than a direct speech act.
Bara and Bucciarelli (1998) followed the
Cognitive Pragmatics theory (Airenti et al.,
1993; Bara, 2010) and claimed that the length of
the inferential chain is a factor determining the
difference in difficulty of comprehending several
pragmatic phenomena. A crucial assumption is
that the comprehension of the communicative
meaning of any kind of utterance depends on the
comprehension of the behavioural game bid by
the actor. A behaviour game is a stereotyped
pattern of interaction, namely an action plan
mutually shared by the participants in the interaction. According to the theory, each participant
in a dialogue interprets the interlocutor’s communication acts on a basis he/she assumes they
share. Consider, for example, the communicative
exchange: [5] Ann: ‘‘Could you please lend me
Benigni’s latest film on CD?’’ Ben: ‘‘Sorry, I want
to watch it again.’’ In order to fully understand
Ann’s communicative intention, Ben has to recognise the behaviour game she bids through the
communication act. Thus, conversational cooperation requires that Ann and Ben share the
knowledge of the behaviour game at play. That is,
in our example:
[6] [LEND-OBJECT]:
x gives the object to y;
y returns the object to x.
Bara and Bucciarelli (1998) proposed the
distinction between simple and complex communication acts: the former can be directly reconciled with the behaviour game, the latter require a
longer chain of inference. For example, let us
consider the following examples: [7] What time is
it? and [8] I don’t have my watch. In the case of [7]
the partner is immediately able to identify the
game [GIVE-INFORMATION] in that the communication act consists of a move of that game.
By contrast, in order to understand [8], the
partner has to go through a complex inferential
chain and consider, for instance, that if the actor
3
has not got a watch, she cannot know what time it
is, and that a way of finding out the time is to ask
somebody who has a watch. Only then can the
partner attribute the value of a move of the game
[GIVE-INFORMATION] to the utterance. Thus,
if the problem is the identification of the game bid
by the actor, the distinction between direct and
indirect speech acts is nonexistent. It is the
complexity of the inferential steps necessary in
order to refer the utterance to the game bid by
the actor that accounts for the difficulty in
comprehending the communication act.
Bara and Bucciarelli (1998) defined direct and
conventional indirect speech acts as simple communication acts because they immediately make
reference to a behavioural game shared by the
interlocutors. Nonconventional indirect speech
acts are defined as complex communication acts
because they do not make direct reference to a
behavioural game and require a longer inferential
chain in order to be understood. The length of the
inferential chain necessary to connect the communication act to the behavioural game shared by
the interlocutors is the factor which determines
the difference in difficulty of children’s comprehension of simple and complex speech acts.
Examples of simple and complex communication
acts (from Bosco & Bucciarelli, 2008) are:
[9] Manuela is in the classroom and is drawing
with her classmates. Manuela says to the teacher,
‘‘Miss, I’ve made a mistake in my drawing’’.
The teacher replies:
(a) Simple: ‘‘Rub it out then’’
(b) Complex: ‘‘Have you got an eraser?’’
The act in (a) makes direct reference to the game
[ASK-FOR-SUGGESTION] and can therefore
immediately be interpreted as a suggestion,
whereas in order to comprehend that the act in
(b) is a suggestion to rub the mistake out,
Manuela has to infer that erasers have this
function. Thus, a longer inferential chain must
be built to discriminate between complex and
simple communication acts.
Bara and Bucciarelli (1998) confirmed the
predictions derived from the assumptions of the
Cognitive Pragmatics theory within the realm of
standard communication acts; they found that
from the age of 2 upwards, children find it easier
to comprehend a simple rather than a complex
standard communication act. These predictions
have also been confirmed within the realm of
nonstandard communication acts. In particular,
4
BOSCO, VALLANA, BUCCIARELLI
Bosco and Bucciarelli (2008) studied children’s
ability to comprehend simple and complex deceits
and ironies, and found that children aged between
6;6 and 10 years find it easier to comprehend
simple rather than complex deceits and ironies.
Finally, the distinction between simple and complex standard communication acts and between
simple and complex nonstandard communication
acts has also been validated in the extralinguistic
domain, i.e., communication acts performed
through gestures (De Marco, Colle, & Bucciarelli,
2007).
Familiar and novel figurative
expressions: The inferential chain
makes the difference
A main assumption of our investigation is that, in
order to be fully understood, a communication
act, whether literal or figurative, has to be
referred to a specific behaviour game, or plan,
shared by the participants in the dialogue. Hence,
the length of the inferential chain necessary to
refer the act to the behaviour game is central to
the comprehension of both literal and figurative
expressions.
In the present study we focus on the difference
in difficulty of comprehension between familiar
and novel figurative expressions, and we propose
that the length of the inferential chain involved
can account for the different levels of difficulty in
their comprehension. Familiar figurative expressions directly refer to a behaviour game shared in
a specific cultural context; they can be considered
as simple standard expressions in that they refer
directly to a behaviour game. Novel figurative
expressions, instead, can only be referred to a
behaviour game through a chain of inferences,
which can vary in length. We argue that the need
to build a longer chain of inferences differentiates
high-inference novel from low-inference novel
figurative expressions.
More in general, in our view familiarity cannot
account for the difference in difficulty of comprehending figurative expressions. If that were the
case, the crucial difference ought to be between
familiar and unfamiliar (both low- and highinference) figurative expressions, since these constitute a homogeneous category in terms of
familiarity. By contrast, we predicted a trend of
difficulty in comprehension of figurative expressions, from the easiest to the most difficult:
familiar, low-inference (nonfamiliar) and highinference (nonfamiliar).
In particular, we focused on noncontextualised
familiar figurative expressions, that can be assumed to be standard communication acts, i.e.,
the speaker is sincere in proffering the act. We
compared familiar figurative expressions with
novel figurative expressions, the comprehension
of which presupposes the same world knowledge.
Thus, we excluded the possibility that any differences in difficulty in dealing with the two sorts
were due to the fact that they presupposed the
knowledge of different conceptual domains (see
Keil, 1986). Indeed, we know from the literature
that children rely on what the words forming
the figurative expressions convey, this being a
strong knowledge source used by children for
inferring what the expression is about (see, e.g.,
Levorato & Cacciari, 1999). Hence, our investigation does not provide data that should be interpreted directly in relation to those in the
literature; the novel figurative expressions investigated in the literature have figurative meanings
that are unrelated to the figurative meaning of the
familiar figurative expressions with which they
are compared (Nippold & Taylor, 1995, 2002).
We tested the predictions deriving from our
assumptions in three experiments. We adopted a
cognitive developmental perspective which involves studying mental processes not only as fixed
states*an approach that only considers adult
functioning*but rather concentrating on how a
given function develops from the infant to the
child and into adulthood (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).
For this reason, and also because difficulties in
reconstructing the communicative meaning of a
communication act are observed more frequently
in children than in adults, the participants in our
experiments were children.
EXPERIMENT 1: THE INFERENTIAL
CHAIN DISTINGUISHES FAMILIAR
FROM NOVEL FIGURATIVE
EXPRESSIONS
Our main assumption is that in figurative communication, as well as in nonfigurative communication, a main factor determining the difference
in difficulty of attributing communicative intentions is the length of the inferential chain necessary to reconcile the communication act to the
behaviour plan played by the participants in the
INFERENCES AND FIGURATIVE EXPRESSIONS
dialogue. We predicted the following trend of
difficulty in comprehension from the easiest to
the most difficult figurative expressions:
familiar 0 low-inference novel 0 highinference novel
According to the literature on reasoning development, inferential ability is not fully developed
in children, rather, it increases with age (Bara,
Bucciarelli, & Johnson-Laird, 1995; Bara,
Bucciarelli, & Lombardo, 2001); hence, we also
expected the ability to comprehend familiar and
nonfamiliar figurative expressions to increase
with age.
We created triplets of figurative expressions
(each consisting of one familiar, one lowinference and one high-inference expression)
making reference to the same knowledge domain.
In particular, for each familiar figurative expression (say A-familiar) we created two novel
versions, one low-inference (say A-lowinference), and the other high-inference (say Ahigh-inference). The novel expressions were all
transparent (Levorato & Cacciari, 2002) and
decomposable (Caillies & Butcher, 2007;
Titone & Connine, 1994). We created each lowinference figurative expression using the properties directly associable with either the entity or
the attributes of the entity mentioned in the
relative A-familiar. For example, starting from
the familiar figurative expression, Franco has a
warm heart, meaning he is kind, generous, amiable, we considered a property/element associable
with WARM, i.e., BURNS, and created the lowinference novel figurative expression, Dario has a
heart that burns. A theoretical question we need
to clarify is that although for each triplet we
derived the low-inference expression from the
familiar one, and the high-inference expression
from the low-inference one, we do not assume
that in comprehending the high-inference expression children would pass through the low-inference expression we devised, following the
identical path we followed in creating the material: We allowed for the possibility of children
following a different path. We assume, instead,
that the path from the high-inference expression
to the familiar one is longer than the path from
the low-inference expression to the familiar one.
This claim is grounded on the assumption that,
the properties/elements mentioned in the highinference expressions are less associable with the
properties/elements mentioned in the familiar
5
expression than, with the properties/elements
mentioned in the low-inference expressions.
Thus, for example, BRIGHT in the familiar
expression Francesca has a bright smile is less
associable with SUN-GLASSES (see the parallel
high-inference figurative expression) than SUN
(see the parallel low-inference figurative expression). Nonetheless, we admit the possibility that,
given each individual’s subjective experience, a
property we considered indirectly associable with
another one, e.g., BRIGHT with SUN-GLASSES,
may be more directly associable with that property than we thought. However, given the age and
the number of participants in the experiment, we
believe such effect to be minimum. Further, as we
constructed triplets of figurative expressions making reference to the same knowledge domain, we
also assume that in order to comprehend the
communicative meaning of our novel figurative
expressions (both low- and high-inference), the
corresponding familiar figurative expression must
also be known.
Method
Participants. Ninety children participated in the
experiment, with 30 in each of the following age
groups: 77;6 years (mean age: 7;3), 8;69 years
(mean age: 8;2), and 1010;6 years (mean
age:10;3). The children in each age group were
balanced by gender. They were pupils from two
primary schools in Piedmont and Liguria, Italy.
None of them were bilingual or had declared
behavioural or learning problems.
Material. The experimental material was in
Italian and consisted of six familiar figurative
expressions and six pairs of novel figurative expressions (for a total of 12 novel figurative
expressions). Each pair of novel expressions
presupposed the same world knowledge as one
of the familiar expressions. In particular, the
familiar figurative expressions were: two metaphors (To have a warm heart, To have eyes of ice),
two idioms (To have a bright smile, To feel heavylegged), and two similes (To have hair like a bush,
To have a moped that goes as fast as a missile).
Starting from each familiar expression, we created a parallel low- and a parallel high-inference
novel figurative expression. From an operational
point of view, the procedure we used to create
6
BOSCO, VALLANA, BUCCIARELLI
the low-inference figurative expression from the
familiar one consisted in answering the following
question: ‘‘Which properties/element can be directly associated with the entity or the attributes
of the entity mentioned in A-familiar?’’ In order
to create a high-inference novel figurative expression from the low-inference novel figurative
expression we used the property/element that
could be directly associated with either the entity
or the attributes of the entity mentioned in Alow-inference. Thus, for example, for the lowinference novel figurative expression Dario has a
heart that burns, we considered a property/element associable with BURNS, i.e., a STOVE, and
created the high-inference novel figurative expression Filippo has a heart that is a stove. As a
further example, starting from the familiar figurative expression Gianna has eyes of ice, meaning she is impassive, she is inscrutable, we
considered a property/element associable with
ICE, i.e., FREEZES, and created the lowinference novel figurative expression Marta has
a stare that freezes; for the low-inference novel
figurative expression Marta has a stare that
freezes, we considered a property/element associable with FREEZES, i.e., winter, and created the
high-inference novel figurative expression When
Lara looks at you it feels like winter. As a final
example, starting from the familiar figurative
expression Francesca has a bright smile, meaning
she has a happy smile, that conveys joy, we
considered a property/element associable with
BRIGHT, i.e., SUN, and created the low-inference novel figurative expression Maria’s smile is a
ray of sun; for the low-inference novel figurative
expression Maria’s smile is a ray of sun, we
considered a property/element associable with
SUN, i.e., SUN-GLASSES, and created the highinference novel figurative expression When Manuela laughs you need sun-glasses. In total, we
created six triplets, each consisting of a specific
familiar figurative expression, the parallel lowinference novel figurative expression, and the
parallel high-inference novel figurative expression (see Appendix A).
Having devised the experimental material, we
carried out a pilot study with a twofold aim: (1) to
ascertain whether the figurative expressions we
considered familiar were indeed familiar in the
children’s community, (2) to assess the perceived
familiarity of our novel figurative expressions in
order to exclude familiarity as the factor determining the difference in difficulty between lowand high-inference figurative expressions. It is
worth noting that we adopted a subjective rather
than an objective view of familiarity, considering
a figurative expression one that the child has
heard often. In the literature, instead, familiarity
is defined as the frequency with which a figurative
expression occurs.
Twenty children participated in the pretest: ten
77;6 year olds (mean age: 7;3) and ten 1010;6
year olds (mean age:10;4), attending a school in
Piedmont, Italy. They encountered all the 18
figurative expressions we intended to use in
Experiment 1, one at a time, each written on a
sheet of paper, and in random order. At the
beginning of the session the experimenter explained to the child that he/she would be presented with a series of utterances and that his/her
task was to say if and when he/she had ever heard
utterances like them. For each expression, the
experimenter asked the following questions to
evaluate the child’s familiarity with the saying:
(a)‘‘How often have you heard the saying
[FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION]?’’
Further, to establish the reliability of the child’s
response the experimenter also asked:
(b)‘‘When and where did you hear the saying
[FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION]?’’
The children’s responses were coded as follows. If
they had heard the figurative expression at least
once before and were able to mention an appropriate context of use, their response scored ‘‘1’’,
otherwise they scored ‘‘0’’.
The mean familiarity score for familiar expressions was 0.7 (SD 0.2), for low-inference novel
expressions it was 0.3 (SD 0.2), and for highinference novel expressions it was 0.2 (SD 0.2).
Considering all groups of participants, as well as
each group of participants separately, the results
revealed that the familiar expressions were more
familiar than the low-inference novel expressions
(Wilcoxon test: tied z-value ranging from 2.82 to
3.95, tied p-value ranging from B.0001 to B.005)
and high-inference novel expressions (Wilcoxon
test: tied z-value ranging from 2.53 to 3.70, tied pvalue ranging from B.0001 to B.01). Moreover,
there was no difference in familiarity between
low-inference novel expressions and highinference novel expressions (Wilcoxon test: tied
z-value ranging from 0.42 to 1.65, tied p-value
ranging from B.10 to B.67). To sum up, the
overall results of our pretest revealed that (1) the
figurative expressions we considered familiar
were indeed familiar in the children’s community,
INFERENCES AND FIGURATIVE EXPRESSIONS
(2) the figurative expressions we considered novel
were not familiar in the children’s community,
and (3) the novel low-inference and the novel
high-inference expressions did not differ in terms
of perceived familiarity. Thus, we proceeded with
the actual experiment, with a different population
of children.
Procedures. Two experimenters attended the
children’s schools for a couple of days in order to
familiarise with them. The experiment was carried
out individually, in a quiet room of the school, in
the sole presence of the experimenter and the
child. Each figurative expression was written on a
separate sheet of paper. The figurative expressions were presented in three different random
orders. At the beginning of the session the
experimenter explained to the child that he/she
would be presented with a series of utterances
and that his/her task was to say if and when he/she
had ever heard utterances like them. For each
figurative expression, the experimenter read the
figurative expression out loud and then gave
the sheet with the written figurative expression
to the child. After each figurative expression, the
experimenter asked the following questions:
Familiarity‘‘Have you ever heard the saying
[FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION]?’’
Accuracy‘‘What does it mean?’’ If the child
merely repeated the figurative expression, then
the experimenter asked:
‘‘What could we say instead of [FIGURATIVE
EXPRESSION]?’’
Each experimental session (mean duration: 20
minutes) was audiorecorded in order to transcribe
the child’s interpretations, and two independent
judges evaluated them. The judges were Italian
native speakers, students of psychology naı̈ve with
respect to the figurative language literature and
blind with respect to the experimental predictions. On their first judgements, and considering
the overall interpretation of all the different sorts
of figurative expressions, interrater agreement,
calculated using the Interclass Correlation Coefficient, was .94, indicating high interrater agreement (Altman, 1991). However, for the final score
the judges discussed any responses on which they
had not initially agreed, until reaching full concordance. For each item, the judges assigned a
score of 1 (correct interpretation) when the
children provided an appropriate explanation of
the figurative meaning of the figurative expres-
7
sion, and a score of 0 in case of erroneous
interpretation. For each figurative expression
within a triplet we considered a range of plausible
interpretations as correct; the children in the
experiment could envisage several plausible communicative meanings (see Appendix A). For
example, consider the figurative expressions
Franco has a warm heart (familiar), Dario has a
heart that burns (low-inference novel), and Filippo has a heart that is a stove (high-inference
novel). Examples of correct interpretations for
them, provided by the children in the experiment
are Franco is a kind person, Dario is generous,
Filippo’s heart is full of love. Examples of
erroneous interpretations are Franco was running,
ario has flu, Filippo is always busy. The Italian
translations of these erroneous interpretations do
not correspond with plausible interpretations of
the original expressions.
Results and discussion
Our statistical analyses used nonparametric tests
because the participants in our experiment had to
provide binary responses (correct/erroneous),
which cannot be regarded as metric variables
following a normal distribution. Table 1 illustrates
the percentages of correct interpretations as a
function of age and type of figurative expression.
Overall, children were more accurate with
familiar expressions than with low-inference expressions, and more accurate with low-inference
expressions than with high-inference expressions
(Page’s L test: L 1215.5, p B.03). The same
result holds if we consider the single age groups
separately (Page’s L test: L-value ranging from
TABLE 1
Means of correct interpretations for familiar, low-inference
novel, and high-inference novel figurative expressions in
Experiment 1
Age
7;07;6
(N30)
8;69;0
(N30)
10;010;6
(N30)
Overall
(N90)
Familiar
Low
inference
High
inference
M
M
M
SD
SD
SD
All
M
SD
0.57 0.04 0.32 0.05 0.18 0.04 0.36 0.04
0.71 0.03 0.53 0.04 0.31 0.05 0.52 0.03
0.82 0.02 0.66 0.04 0.42 0.05 0.63 0.03
0.70 0.03 0.50 0.04 0.30 0.04 0.50 0.03
8
BOSCO, VALLANA, BUCCIARELLI
403.5 to 406.5, p-value always B.003). A more
detailed analysis, in which two specific mean
values were compared, revealed that children
were more accurate with familiar expressions
than with low-inference expressions (Wilcoxon
test: tied z-value6.65, tied p-valueB.0001), and
they were more accurate with low-inference
expressions than with high-inference expressions
(Wilcoxon test: tied z-value 6.09, tied p-value
B.0001). The same results hold if we consider the
single age groups separately. In particular, children were more accurate with familiar expressions than with low-inference expressions
(Wilcoxon test: tied z-value ranging from 3.63 to
4.21, tied p-value ranging from B.0001 to .0003),
and they were more accurate with low-inference
expressions than with high-inference expressions
(Wilcoxon test: tied z-value ranging from 2.91 to
3.99, tied p-value ranging from .004 to B.0001).
For exploratory purposes we also conducted a
detailed analysis of the overall group of children
for each triplet and compared familiar expressions versus low-inference expressions, and lowinference expressions versus high-inference
expressions (see Appendix A for the percentages
of correct interpretations of each figurative expression). The results revealed that, for each
triplet, children were more accurate with familiar
expressions than with low-inference expressions,
and more accurate with low-inference expressions
than with high-inference expressions (Page’s L
test: L-value ranging from 1180.5 to 986, p-value
ranging from B.0001 to B.0008), with the
exception of triplet [5] (Page’s L test: Lvalue 1096.5, p-value.11). A more detailed
analysis, in which two specific mean values were
compared, revealed that children were more
accurate with familiar expressions (a) than with
low-inference expressions (b) in triplets [2], [4],
and [6] (Wilcoxon test: tied z-value ranging from
3.00 to 5.84, tied p-value ranging from .0001 to
.003), but not for triplets [1], [3], and [5] (Wilcoxon test: tied z-value ranging from 0.92 to 1.88, tied
p-value ranging from .06 to .80; see Appendix A).
As regards low-inference expressions (b) compared to high-inference expressions (c), we detected a significant statistical difference for all the
triplets (Wilcoxon test: tied z-value ranging from
3 to 5.77, tied p-value ranging from .0001 to .003),
with the only exception of triplet [1] (Wilcoxon
test: tied z-value 1.29, tied p-value .20) and
triplet [5] (Wilcoxon test: tied z-value 0.45, tied
p-value.66). It is important to underline that we
found no significant result that went against the
predicted trend and, in our view, we were unable
to replicate the overall results due to the fact that
we considered just one figurative expression at a
time.
The results also revealed that accuracy with
familiar figurative expressions (Jonckheere’s test:
z 4.45, p B.0001), low-inference figurative expressions (Jonckheere’s test: z 4.55, p B.0001),
and high-inference figurative expressions (Jonckheere’s test: z 3.95, p B.0001) increases with
age.
As regards the estimation of familiarity, Table
2 illustrates the rates of both correct and erroneous interpretations as a function of the children’s estimation of familiarity. A partial
correlation analysis removing the age effect
revealed that children’s performance with figurative expressions does not correlate with their
estimation of the familiarity of the figurative
expressions (Pearson’s correlation: r.080
p .674).
The overall results of Experiment 1 confirm
the predicted trend of difficulty in comprehension, from the easiest to the most difficult
figurative expressions: familiar, low-inference novel, high-inference novel. However, it could be
argued that the syntactic complexity of our
expressions may have influenced our experimental results. Indeed, our familiar, novel lowinference and novel high-inference figurative
expressions were characterised, respectively, by
increasing length and increasing syntactic com-
TABLE 2
Frequencies of both correct and erroneous interpretations as a function of children’s estimation of familiarity in Experiment 1 (total
items 1620)
Age
Correct interpretations
Erroneous interpretations
Participant in each group judging the figurative
expression familiar
Participant in each group judging the figurative
expression not familiar
7;07;6
8;69;0
10;010;6
Total
7;07;6
8;69;0
10;010;6
Total
57
40
105
50
144
36
306
126
140
303
173
212
191
169
504
684
INFERENCES AND FIGURATIVE EXPRESSIONS
plexity. As we wanted to exclude the possibility
that these factors could account for the difference
in difficulty of comprehending the three sorts of
figurative expressions, rather than the length of
the inferential chain, we devised Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2: EVALUATING A
POSSIBLE ROLE OF SYNTACTIC
COMPLEXITY
The aim of Experiment 2 was to examine whether
the difference in difficulty of comprehending
different figurative expressions could be due to
either the length or the syntactic complexity of the
expression itself. We created literal expressions
comparable with the figurative expressions used in
Experiment 1 in terms of length and syntactic
complexity (Gibson, 2000). We presented children
of the same age as those in Experiment 1 with such
literal expressions, and we invited them to explain
their meaning. We expected to find that the
difference in length and syntactic complexity of
our literal expressions would not result in any
difference in accuracy of comprehension.
Method
Participants. Fifty-four children participated in
the experiment, with 18 in each of the following
age groups: 77;6 years (mean age: 7;1) 8;69
years (mean age: 8;9), and 1010;6 years (mean
age: 10;3). The children were balanced by gender
in each age group. They were pupils from two
primary schools in Piedmont, Italy. None of the
children were bilingual or had declared behavioural or learning problems.
Material and procedure. The experimental material was in Italian. We created literal expressions
of the following types*basic syntax, low syntax,
and high syntax*comparable for length and complexity of syntactic structure with the familiar
figurative expressions, low-inference figurative expressions, and high-inference figurative expressions,
respectively. In particular, each nonfigurative expression matched the corresponding figurative expression on syntax as well as on number of syllables.
Consider the following examples:
Familiar figurative expression:(Franco (has (a
warm heart)))
9
Basic syntax expression:(Gianni (has (a warm
stove)))
[Gianni ha una stufa calda]
Low-inference figurative expression:(Dario (has
(a heart (that burns))))
Low-syntax expression: (Carlo (has (a stove
(that burns))))
[Carlo ha una stufa che scotta]
High-inference figurative expression:(Filippo
(has (a heart (that is (a stove)))))
High-syntax expression:(Massimo (has (a stove
(which is (made of ceramic)))))
[Massimo ha una stufa che è in ceramica]
In these examples, the number of parentheses on
the right represents the number of open syntactic
constituents closed by the final word (the material
used in the experiment is in Appendix B). In
total, we obtained six basic-syntax literal expressions, six low-syntax literal expressions, and six
high-syntax literal expressions. Each literal expression was written on a separate sheet of paper.
We created three different orders of presentation
for the expressions, which paralleled those created for the figurative expressions in Experiment
1. The participants were randomly assigned to one
of the three groups. The experiment was carried
out individually, in a quiet room of the school,
following the same procedure used in Experiment
1. For each literal expression, the experimenter
read the literal expression out loud and then gave
the sheet with the written figurative expression to
the child. Then, the experimenter asked the child:
‘‘What does this expression mean?’’If the child
merely repeated the literal expression, then the
experimenter asked: ‘‘What could we say instead of [LITERAL EXPRESSION]?’’
The experimental session was audiorecorded in
order to transcribe the child’s interpretations, and
two independent judges evaluated them. The
judges were Italian native speakers, students of
psychology blind with respect to the experimental
predictions. For each item, they assigned a score
of 1 (correct interpretation) when the children
provided an appropriate explanation of the literal
meaning of the expression, or a score of 0 in case
of erroneous interpretation. Examples of correct
interpretations for an item used in our protocol:
‘‘Water turns cold if you put ice in it’’ are: ‘‘Water
turns cold with ice’’ or ‘‘Cold water with ice’’.
Examples of erroneous interpretations are: ‘‘To
make ice I put the water in the fridge’’ or ‘‘The
10
BOSCO, VALLANA, BUCCIARELLI
water in the fridge turns cold’’. On their first
judgements, and considering the interpretations
for the different sorts of literal expressions overall, interrater agreement, calculated using the
Interclass Correlation Coefficient, was .74, indicating good interrater agreement (Altman, 1991).
For the final score the judges discussed any
interpretation on which they had not initially
agreed, until reaching full concordance.
Results and discussion
Table 3 illustrates the means of correct interpretations for the three types of literal expressions.
The results of the experiment revealed that,
overall for participants, there is no difference in
accuracy with the different types of literal expressions (Page’s L test: L-value.148 p-value.25).
The same result holds if we consider the single
age groups separately (Page’s L test: L-value
ranging from 215.5 to 220, p-value always .5).
A more detailed analysis, in which two specific
mean values are compared, revealed that children
were as accurate with literal basic syntax expressions as with literal low syntax expressions
(Wilcoxon test: tied z-value 1.36, tied pvalue.17), and they were as accurate with literal
low syntax expressions as with literal high syntax
expressions (Wilcoxon test: tied z-value 0.41,
tied p-value.68). The same results hold if we
consider the single age groups separately. In
particular, children were as accurate with literal
basic syntax expressions as with literal low syntax
expressions (Wilcoxon test: tied z-value ranging
from 0.33 to 1.15, tied p-value ranging from .25 to
.74), and they were as accurate with low syntax
expressions as with literal high syntax expressions
(Wilcoxon test: tied z-value ranging from 0.32
to 1.39, tied p-value ranging from .17 to .76).
Overall, the results revealed that the ability
to comprehend literal basic-syntax expressions
(Jonckheere’s test: z-value 0.56, p .57), literal
low syntax expressions (Jonckheere’s test: z 1.54,
p .12), and literal high syntax expressions (Jonckheere’s test: z0.19 p.85) does not increase
with age.
In sum, the length and syntactic complexity of
the utterance did not affect children’s comprehension of the literal expressions which parallel
the figurative expressions involved in Experiment
1. Thus, these results challenge the possibility that
the length and syntactic complexity account for
the difference in difficulty of comprehending the
familiar and novel figurative expressions of Experiment 1. Some might sceptically argue that a
limitation of Experiment 2 was that it was carried
out on a different population of children from
that of Experiment 1. Hence, we conducted a
third experiment to overcome this limit.
EXPERIMENT 3: THE ROLE OF THE
LENGTH OF THE INFERENTIAL CHAIN
AND THE ROLE OF SYNTACTIC
COMPLEXITY: A WITHIN SUBJECTS
STUDY
The children participating in the experiment were
presented with both the figurative expressions
used in Experiment 1 and with the literal expressions used in Experiment 2.
Method
Participants. Fifty-four children participated in
the experiment, with 18 in each of the following
age groups: 77;6 years (mean age: 7;2) 8;69
years (mean age: 8;7), and 1010;6 years (mean
age: 10;3). The children were balanced by gender
in each age group. They were pupils from two
primary schools in Piedmont, Italy. None of the
children were bilingual or had declared behavioural or learning problems.
TABLE 3
Means of correct interpretations for the three types of literal expressions in Experiment 2
Basic
Age
7;07;6 (N 18)
8;69;0 (N 18)
10;010;6 (N 18)
Overall (N 54)
Low syntax
High syntax
All
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
0.89
0.91
0.93
0.91
0.15
0.12
0.12
0.13
0.91
0.94
0.94
0.93
0.10
0.08
0.09
0.09
0.90
0.90
0.95
0.92
0.10
0.12
0.08
0.10
0.91
0.90
0.94
0.92
0.13
0.09
0.10
0.10
INFERENCES AND FIGURATIVE EXPRESSIONS
Material and procedure. The experimental material was the same as the material used for
Experiments 1 and 2. Apart from using a block
design (half of the participants encountered the
figurative expressions first and half encountered
the literal expressions first), we followed the same
experimental procedures previously described for
Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, each child dealt with
all the figurative expressions presented in Experiment 1 and all the literal expressions presented in
Experiment 2. Within the two blocks, the expressions were presented in two different orders,
resulting in two different experimental protocols.
The participants were randomly assigned to one
of the two protocols. The experiment was carried
out individually, in a quiet room of the school.
The experimenter read the expression out loud
and then gave the sheet with the written expression to the child, positing the same questions as
for the figurative expressions in Experiment 1 and
the literal expressions in Experiment 2. The
experimental session was audiorecorded. The
answers were coded as follows. Two independent
judges evaluated the children’s interpretations.
The judges were Italian native speakers, students
of psychology naı̈ve with respect to the figurative
language literature and blind with respect to the
experimental predictions. For each item, they
assigned a score of 1 (correct interpretation)
when the children provided an appropriate explanation of the meaning of the expression, or a
score of 0 in case of erroneous interpretation.
Children’s interpretations for the figurative and
literal expressions were coded following the same
criteria used in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2,
respectively.
Results and discussion
Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the means of correct
interpretations for the three types of figurative
and literal expressions, respectively.
The results for the figurative expressions
replicated those obtained in Experiment 1. Overall, children were more accurate with familiar
expressions than with low-inference expressions,
and they were more accurate with low-inference
expressions than with high-inference expressions
(Page’s L test: L 725 p B.00001). The same
result holds if we consider the single age groups
separately (Page’s L test: L-value ranging from
239.5 to 243, p-value ranging from B.0001 to
B.00001). A more detailed analysis by age group,
11
in which two specific mean values were compared, revealed that children were more accurate
with familiar expressions than with low-inference
expressions (Wilcoxon test: tied z-value ranging
from 2.72 to 3.46, tied p-value ranging from
B.0006 to B.007). Moreover, 8-year-old children
and 10-year-old children were more accurate with
low-inference expressions than with highinference expressions (Wilcoxon test: tied z-value
2.63 and 3.10, tied p-value B.009 and B.002,
respectively). For the youngest group of children,
however, we observed a floor effect: They performed poorly with both low-inference expressions and high-inference expressions, resulting in
a null difference in terms of accuracy (Wilcoxon
test: tied z-value 1.08, tied p-value.28). The
most plausible explanation is that the two inferential tasks were both very difficult for children
because, unlike familiar expressions, they can
only be referred to a behaviour game through a
chain of inference.
The results also revealed that accuracy with
familiar figurative expressions (Jonckheere’s test:
z4.30, p B.0001), low-inference figurative expressions (Jonckheere’s test: z4.20, p B.0001),
and
high-inference
figurative
expressions
(Jonckheere’s test: z 3.85, p B.0001) increases
with age.
Furthermore, the results for literal expressions
replicated those obtained in Experiment 2.
In particular, considering the overall group of
participants, we found no difference in accuracy
with the different types of literal expressions
(Page’s L test: L 653, p .32). The same result
holds when considering the single age groups
separately (Page’s L test: L-value ranging from
223.5 to 216, p-value ranging from .11 to .50). A
more detailed analysis for each group of children
revealed the same degree of accuracy with literal
basic syntax expressions as with literal low syntax
expressions (Wilcoxon test: tied z-value ranging
from 1.67 to 1.76, tied p-value ranging from .45 to
.09), and the same degree of accuracy with literal
low syntax expressions and literal high syntax
expressions (Wilcoxon test: tied z-value ranging
from 0.59 to 1.47, tied p-value ranging from .14 to
.55). Overall, the results revealed that the ability
to comprehend literal basic syntax expressions
(Jonckheere’s test: z1.93, p.054), literal low
syntax expressions (Jonckheere’s test: z0.81,
p.41), and literal high syntax expressions
(Jonckheere’s test: z 1.04 p.30) does not
increase with age.
12
BOSCO, VALLANA, BUCCIARELLI
TABLE 4
Means of correct interpretations for familiar, low-inference novel, and high-inference novel figurative expressions in Experiment 3
Familiar
Age
7;07;6 (N 18)
8;69;0 (N 18)
10;010;6 (N 18)
Overall (N 54)
Low inference
High inference
All
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
0.43
0.56
0.69
0.56
0.19
0.20
0.18
0.22
0.16
0.32
0.55
0.34
0.19
0.26
0.30
0.30
0.09
0.19
0.33
0.21
0.17
0.18
0.32
0.25
0.23
0.36
0.53
0.37
0.13
0.19
0.25
0.23
In sum, the results of Experiment 3 replicated
those of Experiments 1 and 2. As the children
who took part in the experiment performed
according to our predicted trend for the three
types of figurative expressions, but performed
equally well with the three parallel versions of
literal expressions, we concluded that an explanation for our results in terms of syntactic complexity is not viable.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of our investigation was to analyse young
children’s comprehension of the communicative
meaning of figurative expressions. We advanced
the theoretical framework of cognitive pragmatics
(Airenti et al., 1993; Bara, 2010) within which the
length of the inferential chain involved accounts
for the difference in difficulty of comprehending
familiar figurative expressions and novel figurative expressions. In Experiment 1 we investigated
familiar and novel figurative expressions which
presuppose the same world knowledge. Hence,
our results are not directly comparable with those
in the literature, which all compare novel figurative expressions with familiar figurative expressions which presuppose different world
knowledge. In particular, we investigated the
existence of a trend of increasing difficulty for
the comprehension of familiar figurative expressions (e.g., Franco has a warm heart), novel low-
inference figurative expressions (e.g., Dario has a
heart that burns), and novel high-inference figurative expressions (e.g., Filippo has a heart that is
a stove). The results of Experiment 1 confirmed
our expectation in full. Overall and in each single
age group, children understood familiar figurative
expressions more accurately than low-inference
figurative expressions. In turn, children understood low-inference figurative expressions more
accurately than high-inference figurative expressions. In addition, our results revealed that
children interpret figurative expressions more
accurately as they grow older. The results are
consistent with those reported by Cacciari and
Levorato (1989) and Johnson (1991), who pointed
out that children’s ability to interpret figurative
expressions increases significantly from 7 to 12
years of age.
One might suggest that the differences we
detected in the difficulty of comprehending familiar, low-inference, and high-inference figurative
expressions are due to differences in familiarity,
rather than to differences in the length of the
inferential chain. Our results do not support the
assumption that familiarity can predict and explain differences in difficulty of comprehension
between familiar, low-inference, and highinference figurative expressions. If that were the
case, the crucial difference ought to be between
familiar and unfamiliar (both low-inference and
high-inference) expressions, since these constitute
a homogeneous category in terms of familiarity.
However, as we predicted, the results of our
TABLE 5
Means of correct interpretations for the three types of literal expressions in Experiment 3
Basic
Age
7;07;6 (N 18)
8;69;0 (N 18)
10;010;6 (N 18)
Overall (N 54)
Low syntax
High syntax
All
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
0.82
0.89
0.86
0.86
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.17
0.90
0.95
0.89
0.91
0.10
0.11
0.18
0.14
0.84
0.92
0.87
0.88
0.13
0.13
0.19
0.15
0.83
0.90
0.87
0.87
0.11
0.13
0.18
0.14
INFERENCES AND FIGURATIVE EXPRESSIONS
investigation indicate a trend of increasing difficulty in the comprehension of familiar, lowinference, and high-inference expressions. This
result, along with the correlation analysis revealing that children’s performance in comprehending
figurative expressions does not correlate with
their familiarity judgements, is consistent with
the predictions derived from our assumptions.
A possible alternative explanation for our
results could be that figurative expressions vary
according to two specific dimensions, namely
transparent/opaque, and composable/decomposable. However, all the figurative expressions used
in Experiment 1 were transparent and decomposable. We carried out a second experiment to
rule out a further possible alternative explanation
for our results. In particular, we wanted to
ascertain that the length and syntactic complexity
of the different types of figurative expressions did
not account for the difference in difficulty of their
comprehension. The results of Experiment 2
revealed that the slight increase in the length
and syntactic complexity of the different figurative expressions used in Experiment 1 does not
account for children’s performance levels. In
particular, literal basic syntax expressions are
not easier to comprehend than literal low syntax
expressions, which, in turn, are not easier to
comprehend than literal high syntax expressions.
Furthermore, contrary to that observed with the
figurative expressions in Experiment 1, children’s
comprehension of their parallel literal versions
does not improve with age.
In conclusion, since Experiments 1 and 2 were
carried out with different samples of children, to
exclude any potential interference of confounding
variables, and to prove the reliability of our
results, we replicated Experiments 1 and 2 in
one single experiment. In line with the findings of
Experiments 1 and 2, the results of Experiment 3
revealed a trend of difficulty in comprehension of
the figurative expressions, but no trend of difficulty in comprehension of the literal expressions.
We can thus conclude that our results are genuine
and reliable. Concerning comprehension of the
figurative meanings, the only result of Experiment 1 that was not replicated in Experiment 3
was a difference in accuracy between lowinference and high-inference figurative expressions in the youngest group of children. Indeed, in
Experiment 3 we observed a floor effect: Children
achieved low scores with both kinds of expression. The most plausible explanation for this
13
discrepancy is that there were fewer participants
in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 1.
The results of the present investigation support
the theoretical framework we advanced as an
account of the cognitive processes underlying the
comprehension of familiar and novel figurative
expressions, as well as literal expressions. In
particular, we focused on the role of the inferential chain. In this respect, the difference in
difficulty between simple and complex communication acts parallels the difference in difficulty
between familiar and novel figurative expressions: complex communication acts and novel
figurative acts require longer chains of inference.
The inferential chain allows us to predict a
difference in difficulty of comprehension for
several instantiations of the same pragmatic
phenomenon: direct and indirect communication
acts, simple and complex deceits, simple and
complex ironies, simple and complex communicative mistakes, as well as simple and complex
recovery of communicative failures, in both
typical development (Adenzato & Bucciarelli,
2008; Bosco & Bucciarelli, 2008; Bosco,
Bucciarelli, & Bara, 2006; Bucciarelli, Colle, &
Bara, 2003) and atypical development (Bara,
Bosco, & Bucciarelli 1999; de Marco et al.,
2007). In conclusion, our approach offers a
unified theoretical perspective for explaining the
cognitive processes underlying the communicative use of both figurative and nonfigurative
communication acts. Future studies could investigate additional factors, which may affect the
difficulty of comprehending figurative expressions. In particular, it is likely that in some cases
the difficulty or uncertainty of individual steps in
an inferential chain could be more important than
its length. The degree to which inferential alternatives are present could also be a relevant factor.
All these factors could be strictly dependent on
the increase in encyclopaedic knowledge with age.
In particular, future studies might investigate the
role of encyclopaedic knowledge in the comprehension of novel figurative expressions.
Original manuscript received November 2009
Revised manuscript received November 2011
First published online May 2012
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APPENDIX A: THE FIGURATIVE
EXPRESSIONS USED IN EXPERIMENT
1 AND EXPERIMENT 3
Figurative expressions marked as (a) are familiar,
figurative expressions marked as (b) are lowinference novel, and figurative expressions
marked as (c) are high-inference novel. In parenthesis are the percentages of correct interpretations for each expression by the overall group of
participants in Experiment 1.
1. To be kind, generous, helpful, and
amiable
(a) Franco has a warm heart
[Franco ha il cuore caldo]
(b) Dario has a heart that burns
[Dario ha un cuore che scotta]
(c) Filippo has a heart that is a stove
[Filippo ha un cuore che è
una stufa]
(28%)
(29%)
(23%)
2. To have tangled hair, to have messy
hair, to have voluminous hair
(a) Roberta’s hair is a bush
(87%)
[I capelli di Roberta sono un cespuglio]
(b) Monica’s hair is a refuge for birds (47%)
[I capelli di Monica sono un rifugio
per gli uccellini]
(c) Birds feel at home in Rossana’s hair
[Tra i capelli di Rossana gli
uccellini si sentono a casa]
15
(30%)
3. To be tired, weary
(a) Today Sabrina’s legs feel heavy
(80%)
[Oggi Sabrina si sente le gambe
pesanti]
(b) Today Claudia’s legs feel like
cement
(76%)
[Oggi Claudia si sente le gambe
di cemento]
(c) Today Diana’s legs feel as if they
are stuck to the ground
(48%)
[Oggi Diana sente che le sue gambe
non si staccano da terra]
4. To be fast
(a) Stefano’s moped is a missile
(94%)
[Il motorino di Stefano è un missile]
(b) Antonio’s moped travels in space (42%)
[Il motorino di Antonio va in orbita]
(c) Paolo needs an astronaut’s helmet
to ride his moped
(20%)
[Per andare sul motorino di Paolo
serve un casco da astronauta]
5. To be impassive, inscrutable, to be
hostile, to be intimidating
(a) Gianna has eyes of ice
[Gianna ha gli occhi di ghiaccio]
(b) Marta has a stare that freezes
[Marta ha uno sguardo che gela]
(c) When Lara looks at you it feels
like winter
[Quando Lara ti guarda sembra
inverno]
(47%)
(37%)
(34%)
6 . To have a happy smile, that
transmits joy, to be a happy person
(a) Francesca has a bright smile
(83%)
[Francesca ha un sorriso luminoso]
(b) Maria’s smile is a ray of sun
(72%)
[Il sorriso di Maria è un raggio
di sole]
16
BOSCO, VALLANA, BUCCIARELLI
(c) When Manuela laughs you need
sun-glasses
(28%)
[Quando Manuela ride servono gli
occhiali da sole]
APPENDIX B: LITERAL EXPRESSIONS
USED IN EXPERIMENT 2 AND
EXPERIMENT 3
The literal expressions used in Experiments 2 and
3, and corresponding to the figurative expressions
used in Experiment 1. It is possible that the
translations in English change, in some items, the
syntactic structure or the length of the phrase. In
Italian, each literal expression matched the corresponding figurative expression for length and
number of syntactic constituents. Here we list the
Italian literal expressions in a word by word
translation. The expressions marked as (a) are
literal basic syntax expressions, the expressions
marked as (b) are literal low-syntax expressions,
and the expressions marked as (c) are literal highsyntax expressions.
3.
(a) Today Angiolina has a high fever
[Oggi Angiolina si sente la febbre alta]
(b) Today Lia has a pain in her back
[Oggi Lia si sente un dolore alla schiena]
(c) Today Marianna has a very bad stomachache
[Oggi Marianna si sente che la sua pancia
le fa molto male]
4.
(a) Stefano’s dog is a lovely poodle
[Il cane di Stefano è un bel barboncino]
(b) Antonio’s dog goes inside the red kennel
[Il cane di Antonio va nella cuccia rossa]
(c) You need a helmet to ride Paolo’s
motorbike so that you don’t get hurt
[Per andare sulla moto di Paolo serve
un casco per non farsi male]
5.
1.
(a) Ivo has some ice cubes
[Ivo ha dei cubetti di ghiaccio]
(b) The ice cubes make the water cold
[I cubetti di ghiaccio freddano l’acqua]
(c) Putting ice in the water will cool it down
[Se ci metti il ghiaccio l’acqua si fredda]
(a) Gianni has a warm stove
[Gianni ha una stufa calda]
(b) Carlo has a stove that burns
[Carlo ha una stufa che scotta]
(c) Massimo has a stove which is made
of ceramic
[Massimo ha una stufa che è in ceramica]
6.
2.
(a) Roberta’s roses form a bush
[Le rose di Roberta sono a cespuglio]
(b) Lots of birds sit in Genoveffa’s tree
[Sull’albero di Genoveffa si posano
tanti uccellini]
(c) Birds build their nest in Angelica’s tree
[Sull’albero di Angelica gli uccellini
si fanno il nido]
(a) The necklace has an emerald stone
[La collana ha una pietra di smeraldo]
(b) Marta’s necklace is a string of pearls
[La collana di Marta è un filo di perle]
(c) When Manuela wears the necklace she
is very beautiful
[Quando Manuela indossa la collana
è molto bella]