When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable? :
The Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops from the ‘Coalition of the Willing’
Atsushi TAGO *
Graduate School of Law, Kobe University
Forthcoming, Journal of Peace Research
* E-mail address: [email protected]. I thank Benjamin Fordham, Erik Gartzke, Atsushi
Ishida, Yoshiko Kojo, Douglas Lemke, Philip Streich, Risa Torii, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, and Frank
Wayman for their comments and support. I am also grateful to the editors and three anonymous
reviewers of JPR whose careful readings have greatly improved this article. Obviously, any
mistakes in the article are mine. The data used in this article can be found at
http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.
Abstract
Why do some democracies break their security commitments whereas others do not? This
study proposes a research strategy to answer the question by analyzing the timing of unilateral
exits from a coalition military operation. Coalition participants typically do not exit until a
military mission has been accomplished. However, in the case of the US-led coalition
occupying Iraq since May 2003, 16 states have unilaterally withdrawn their armed forces.
Despite the danger such defections may cause to the relationship of these states with the USA,
why and when do they exit? The author creates a dataset with a state-month unit of analysis
that contains information on 37 partner states and apply a Cox proportional hazard model. The
study finds that the occurrence of a national election serves as a strong driving force to
accelerate an exit from the coalition. An incumbent leader who faces a challenger who
opposes military contributions in Iraq would reverse the policy to support the USA and exit
the coalition to win an election, even at the risk of damaging a bilateral relationship with the
USA. A change in leadership after an election, on the other hand, failed to be a predictor of the
timing of defection. Furthermore, results reveal that the division of power within the
government and the constitutional rules that enable significant parliamentary control over
executive decisions to use force neither delay nor accelerate the timing of withdrawal. To
understand the conditions under which democracies break their security commitments, more
attention should be paid to election cycles than to a change in leadership and to types of
democratic institutional and constitutional arrangements.
Many studies have tested whether democracies are generally less reliable allies than
nondemocracies (Smith, 1996; Werner & Lemke, 1997; Choi, 2003, 2004; Leeds, 2003; Gartzke &
Gleditsch, 2004), but they hardly acknowledge the importance of looking at when democracies are
less reliable. This is probably because the most popular conventional research design using the
‘state-year’ unit of analysis is too highly aggregated to specify the timing and conditions under
which democracies abandon their security commitments. By studying unilateral withdrawal from a
coalition military operation, this study offers a different research strategy and elaborates the various
levels of reliability of commitments among different types and conditions of democracies.
The article specifically examines the military coalition assembled to occupy and rebuild
Iraq from May 2003 to May 2006. This case provides an opportunity for a rare empirical test of the
conditions under which democracies are less reliable coalition members. By remaining a member of
the US-led coalition forces in Iraq, a state creates a reputation as a loyal ally of the USA. Such a
reputation could be a crucial diplomatic asset and strong incentive for a state to remain in the
coalition. However, in the deadlocked and prolonged operation in Iraq, most partner states would
like to accelerate, and many actually have, the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, even though an early
departure could seriously harm their reputation as a good ally. To find the cause of the earlier exit of
some democratic states, I have created a dataset with a ‘state-month’ unit of analysis that contains
information about 16 states that have already left or have officially decided to leave Iraq by the end
1
of April 2006 and 21 remaining participants of the US-led coalition in Iraq (as of May 2006). A Cox
proportional hazard model is applied to this dataset.
This article focuses theoretically on three key factors that might determine the credibility
of a state’s security commitments. First, the division of power within the government is related to
how difficult it is for a leader of democracy to respect security commitments. A presidential system
divides power between independent executive and legislative branches (Verney, 1992; Stepan &
Skach, 1993). This division of power in a presidential system makes it harder to change an ongoing
policy, including a security commitment, because a president must persuade more veto players to do
so (Cowhey, 1993: 302). Indeed, Tsebelis (2002) argues that policy stability generally increases if
there are more effective veto players. On the other hand, we expect that leaders in parliamentary
systems will find it easier to change the status quo because there are fewer veto players to persuade.
Second, the type of constitution has a bearing on how difficult it is for a leader of a
democracy to respect security commitments. Under some constitutions, the legislative branch holds
the sole authority to start a military action beyond the borders of the state (Born & Urscheler, 2002;
Ku & Jacobson, 2002; Wagner, 2006). In a country with such a constitution, the executive branch
cannot break security commitments on its own; it must consult with key members of the parliament
and obtain (either explicit or implicit) permission to break the commitments. The existence of strict
constitutional control over the use of force abroad increases the transactions of domestic political
2
actors and makes it difficult to abandon commitments.
Third, the strategic position taking by an incumbent leader at the time of national
elections makes it harder to respect security commitments. In each national election, an incumbent
leader seeks an appropriate position to secure the support of a majority of voters (Canes-Wrone,
2004; Mayhew, 2004; Conley, 2005). A leader will attempt to maximize her/his chances for
reelection by announcing a change in a domestically unpopular commitment, even if the change
risks damaging the state’s reputation in international relations. We can expect that a national
election will accelerate a move to break a commitment, especially a costly one.
Statistical results from the case of the coalition in Iraq show that neither institutional
varieties among democracies nor strict constitutional control of using force abroad delays or
accelerates the timing of an exit. However, strategic position taking in a national election – but not
an actual change of leadership after an election – does accelerate an exit.
The study begins with a brief review of the literature on the reliability of democratic
commitments. I point out that scholars have asked whether democracies are more likely to respect
commitments, but they have rarely asked when. In the second section, hypotheses that connect key
features of democracies and the reliability of commitments are introduced. The third section
outlines why this study focuses, to test its hypotheses, on defection from the US-led coalition forces
in Iraq. The fourth section shows the results of the statistical analysis. The final section concludes
3
the article.
The Reliability of Democratic Security Commitments
Although Cowhey (1993) explains the differences between parliamentary and presidential
democracies in their ability to sustain international commitments, International Relations (IR)
scholars have mainly been concerned with whether democracies are generally more/less reliable
than nondemocracies. For instance, Gaubatz (1996) claims that liberal democracies are more
reliable alliance partners than nondemocracies are, and he finds that democratic alliances are
distinctively durable. Leeds (2003) maintains that democratic allies are more likely to respect their
commitments to help their alliance partners in interstate wars. This is confirmed by an analysis of
the alliance treaty obligations and provisions (ATOP) dataset for the period from 1816 to 1944.
Choi (2003, 2004) also elaborates why democracies are reliable allies. Choi argues that coalitions of
democracies are better at maintaining wartime commitments because their domestic institutions
include veto players, and the alliance commitments that come into force by overriding those veto
players’ oppositions must be substantive and respected (2003: 144). Autocratic governments are less
reliable because their commitments can be changed by a single or a limited number of decision
makers. This logic implies that once they have committed to a coalition, democracies are less likely
to defect. Smith (1996: 28-29) hypothesizes that democratic states face higher domestic costs for
4
failing to honor alliance commitments, and thus they should be more reliable. However, his
statistical analysis of a dataset of European wars and crises since 1815 does not confirm his
hypothesis.
Werner & Lemke (1997), on the other hand, provide evidence that democracies are not as
reliable as autocracies in intervening as a third-party disputant to help their partner states. Their
logit analysis of the militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) interventions between 1816 and 1986
may be biased because they decided to ignore potential interveners. Nevertheless, it suggests that
autocracies are more likely to assist their alliance partners, but democracies are not. Using the MIDs
dataset for the period from 1816 through 1992, Gartzke & Gleditsch (2004: 789) find that
democracies are about 2.5 times more likely to violate alliance obligations than autocracies. They
explain that democracies are less reliable for two reasons. First, democracies face a cycling problem
because commitments are subject to future challenges. An alliance treaty that requires a state to join
a war or militarized interstate disputes to help allies may not be respected in subsequent
administrations. Thus democracies may be less likely to keep promises to support their partners.
Second, complex foreign policy issues, such as the details of international treaties, are bound to be
less carefully followed and thus more easily approved by the citizens in democracies than is the
decision to go to war for other countries. If that is the case, domestic opposition to a decision to go
to war (i.e., the implementation of commitment) would be difficult, whereas it would not be so hard
5
to form a formal alliance commitment by signing a treaty.
A closer look at these studies suggests that there are various reasons why democracies tend
to honor/dishonor their commitments. Choi (2003, 2004) emphasizes institutional constraints and
the power of veto players in democracies when making international commitments. Smith (1996)
assumes that there are higher audience costs in democracies for not fulfilling international
agreements, including formal alliance commitments. Gartzke & Gleditsch (2004) pay more
attention to the democratic political cycle and the different amounts of information held by the
domestic audience about international treaties and war-making. These scholars base their arguments
on what they consider the key features of democracies.
In fact, these different arguments imply the need for a more precise specification of which
features of democracies increase or decrease the reliability of commitments. Previous studies have
failed to offer an empirical analysis that explains the varying levels of reliability of commitments
among different democracies. In reality, some democracies defect, whereas others are loyal partners
that fully respect their pledges. What causes such variation among democracies? Some hypotheses
to answer this question are introduced in the next section.
Various Causes of the Unreliability of Democracies
To discover the causes of the unreliability of democracies, the concepts of ‘commitment’
6
and ‘reliability’ must first be clarified. The word ‘commitment’ in this study is a pledge or promise
made by one state to engage in certain behaviors with other states for a shared aim. A defense pact
that assures mutual security cooperation in case of an offensive attack against a party state is a
commitment. A promise to host foreign bases of allied states, to send troops to a multilateral
operation and maintain a coalition, or to impose economic sanctions against a target state are
examples of commitments. Some of these promises may have a clear time limit; others may have no
predetermined deadline to cease contribution. Some may be formal commitments; but others may
not be. A state can commit (i.e., make a promise) to anything at any level of formality, but the
promise is expected to be fulfilled in terms of quality and length.
The length of a state’s contribution is strongly related to the level of ‘reliability’. The
longer a state continues a committed contribution, the more reliable the state becomes. In contrast, a
state is unreliable when it ends its contribution unilaterally while other states still maintain
international cooperation. It does not matter whether a commitment has a predetermined deadline.
As long as there is a need for international cooperation and other states continue their contributions,
a state is expected to consider extending its contribution. The reliability of a state will be increased
if the state sustains its ongoing commitment. At the very least, a sudden and unilateral termination
of ongoing cooperation policy constitutes an act of defection. In this study, I focus on the following
factors that may cause the sudden breaking of a commitment. First, a commitment can be broken
7
suddenly if there is a strong domestic incentive do so. The high material cost and low domestic
popularity of a commitment would decrease the incentive to maintain it. Second, a promise can
more easily be broken if there are few veto players who can efficiently and legitimately oppose and
prevent a leader’s policy initiative (Tsebelis, 2002). The larger the number of players who must be
persuaded by a leader, the more difficult it is to change the status quo, including an ongoing
commitment.
Given the above clarification of the key concepts, three specific features of democratic
systems would lead to the variations in the reliability of their security commitments. First, the
institutional structure of a regime cannot be ignored. A presidential system is one in which the
executive branch serves at the discretion of the elected president, whereas a parliamentary system is
one in which the government serves as long as it maintains the confidence of the legislature (Golder,
2005: 117). One would expect differences between the systems because institutional design is
closely related to the number of veto players in each system. Second, democratic constitutions
institutionalize a check-and-balance mechanism on executive power for the mobilization of troops
and termination of military actions. Some constitutions may give parliament the exclusive power to
decide the deployment and withdrawal of troops, whereas others may entrust such power to a
president or a prime minister. Differences in constitutions can lead to variation in the reliability of
security commitments. Third, the election cycle is a shared political feature of democratic regimes,
8
and each democratic state has its own election cycle. At each election, to secure her/his reelection, a
leader may be motivated to reverse domestically unpopular commitments. The difference in the
timing of elections may thus cause variations in democratic behavior in the unilateral defection of
commitments.
Institutional Design
In his seminal work, Cowhey (1993) argues that domestic institutional arrangements are
closely related to the credibility of international commitments. His case studies of US and Japanese
responses to multilateral regimes show how differences between presidential and parliamentary
systems (and their electoral systems) influence the credibility of their multilateral commitments.
The Japanese system is parliamentary. It is easier to undertake major policy initiatives in a
parliamentary system under the control of a majority party than it is in a presidential system
(Cowhey, 1993: 315). There are fewer chances for strong opposition to such a policy initiative to
emerge in a parliamentary system than in a presidential regime. The prime minister of Japan is
usually the leader of the majority party. He can easily initiate and break major foreign policy
pledges unless such decisions would threaten the crucial interests of veto-holding senior politicians
in the leading party (Cowhey, 1993: 317).1 Usually, there is no political incentive for senior
1
Choi (2003, 2004) also emphasizes the impact of veto players on the reliability of commitments.
9
politicians to rework policy on behalf of diffuse interests. In the USA, on the other hand, a president
often faces congressional opposition to his new political initiatives. It is probably more difficult for
a president to initiate and break international commitments than for a prime minister, who is backed
by a majority in the legislature and is thus less likely to be challenged about international
commitments.
Hypothesis 1a. A parliamentary system is less likely to sustain its security
commitments.
Furthermore, some may insist that the impact of veto players in the government should be
tested in a more direct manner (Tsebelis, 2002), because the number of veto players is not always
determined by institutional design. Certain types of parliamentary systems may have more veto
players, and some types of presidential systems may have fewer veto players. Indeed, there are
datasets to measure the size of veto players in each country. By using such a dataset, it is possible to
test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1b. A political system with more veto players is more likely to sustain
its security commitments.
Constitutions
The constitutional arrangement for executive decisions to use force varies from state to
state (Born & Urscheler, 2002; Ku & Jacobson, 2002; Wagner, 2006). For instance, in the United
10
Kingdom, prerogative powers, handed down directly from monarchs to ministers over many years,
allow the government to go to war and deploy armed forces in overseas operations without approval
from the parliament. New Zealand, which has a constitutional system similar to the one in the
United Kingdom, shares the feature that parliament does not tie the prime minister’s hands about
the deployment of armed forces abroad. In contrast, several states have strict constitutional rules
about parliamentary control of the initiation and termination of military action beyond territorial
boundaries. For instance, under section 19 of the 1953 Danish constitution, using armed forces
beyond Danish borders without the consent of parliament is prohibited except for the purpose of
defense against an armed attack on the realm or Danish forces. The Bulgarian constitution has a
similar mechanism to control troop deployments abroad. Article 84 maintains that the national
assembly must approve and control any deployment and use of Bulgarian armed forces outside the
country’s borders. The Japanese constitution prohibits the foreign deployment of its self-defense
forces (SDF). The SDF cannot be sent abroad unless the Diet authorizes it for peacekeeping and
humanitarian purposes.
Strict constitutional rules about the use of force abroad, like those in Denmark, Bulgaria,
and Japan, tie the hands of a political leader to decide if and when a state starts/breaks a security
commitment. It is especially true if the commitment requires the deployment of armed forces on
foreign soil. In a state with such rules, parliament has more legitimacy to intervene in executive
11
decisions regarding such commitments, and often must be persuaded before a major decision is
made. This implies that any change in a security commitment takes longer, and thus the
commitment is less likely to be broken. Moreover, the commitments are more likely to be respected
as a result of the selection process. The on-going commitments made by a state with strict
constitutional controls must be authorized by the parliament with support from the majority of
parliamentarians. It is very hard for a political leader to reverse security commitments that were
started with a broad political consensus.
Hypothesis 2. A state with strict constitutional legislative controls over the use of
force abroad is more likely to sustain its security commitments.
The Democratic Political Cycle
The democratic political cycle is closely related to the reliability of commitment. During
national elections, it is very important for a democratic political leader to secure the support of a
majority of voters and hold on to power (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow, 2003;
Mayhew, 2004). Therefore, to maximize her/his chances of winning the election, a leader may
terminate unpopular policies during the election campaign, including costly international
commitments.
International commitments often entail unavoidable material costs for a state and thus
sometimes come into disfavor among domestic audiences. A leader may reverse an ongoing
12
committed policy in exchange for additional electoral support from the public. For instance, the
South Korean (ROK) government’s pledge to host US military bases on its soil was not supported
by a majority of voters in the 1990s (Cooley, 2005: 213). Because voters did not support further
fortifications in the US-ROK alliance, before major elections, the South Korean government is
seeking a realignment of the alliance with more favorable conditions. A similar situation can be
observed in Japan. Okinawa hosts more than 70% of the US military base in Japan. When
Okinawa’s municipal elections were imminent, to obtain more votes in Okinawa, Tokyo’s central
government announced its willingness to open negotiations with the USA for transferring some of
the bases from the island (Mulgan, 2000). These episodes suggest that close attention should be
paid at the time of key elections to the incentives of a leader to break an international commitment
that is unpopular with the domestic audience.
There are two plausible explanations for connecting national elections with a political
leader’s decision to reverse a course of committed action. The first is the strategic position taking of
an incumbent leader (Canes-Wrone, 2004; Mayhew, 2004: 61-77; Conley, 2005). Opposition parties
usually politicize unpopular commitments and criticize the administration’s entanglement in costly
international obligations. An incumbent leader, facing a challenger who opposes an international
commitment, may announce the termination of the ongoing commitment policy to counter the
opposition parties’ campaigns. I hypothesize that democratic leaders value their re-elections above
13
all else, and thus there is a good chance that they will reverse an unpopular commitment to win
national election. An election may accelerate the timing of the abandonment of commitments.
Hypothesis 3a. Democracies are more likely to break their security commitments
at the time of national elections.
A change in leadership after an election can accelerate the reversal of an ongoing policy. A
newly elected leader must show that she/he is capable of conducting the business of the nation,
specifically by committing a decisive and newsworthy action. Accordingly, a domestic audience
may interpret an early reversal of an unpopular policy of the previous administration as proof of the
new leader’s political leadership and assertiveness. National elections may thus be related to a
swifter end to commitments.
Hypothesis 3b. Democracies are more likely to break their security commitments
at the time of leadership change after an election.
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2 focus on the fixed (or more accurately, very slowly changing)
institutional and constitutional features of a democracy, whereas hypotheses 3a and 3b focus on
dynamic features. Previous studies primarily examine the fixed features of democracy and discuss
how they are related to the reliability of security commitments. Garztke & Gleditsch (2004) are an
exception and call for attention to the dynamic features of a democracy even though they fail to
provide enough empirical evidence to support their argument (for instance, their analysis on MIDs
14
third party intervention does not directly test if an election cycle is related to the reliability of
security commitments). Thus, an important contribution of my study is to test empirically whether
static or dynamic features of a democracy do better in predicting when democratic states are reliable
security partners.
Research Design
To test the five hypotheses introduced in the previous section, I offer a new research
strategy. The reliability of a state’s security commitments should be tested not only during the
intervention phase (i.e., if a third-party state takes part in a militarized interstate dispute by siding
with an ally) – the focus of most previous studies – but also during the exit phase. Members of a
coalition, and especially the leader, consider the unilateral exit from an ongoing coalition operation
an act of defection (Kober, 2002). The contribution of troops in a coalition entails an explicit or
implicit promise to sustain the forces until the mission has been officially completed. Some
countries may state deadlines for their contributions, which are usually based on domestic legal and
procedural reasons. In many cases, the original deadlines are extended. Therefore, participants are
usually under strong pressure to remain in a coalition as long as most of the participants keep their
troops deployed. A contributing member to a coalition should not withdraw forces on its own before
the leader or most contributing states have decided to withdraw their forces, unless it is prepared to
15
face the negative reputation of a defector. A coalition leader will be dissatisfied by the early
withdrawal of forces by a contributing member, no matter what face the coalition leader displays
publicly when a contributor withdraws. An examination of when a state withdraws its troops from a
coalition is thus very helpful to explain the reliability of security commitments.
Moreover, an analysis of an exit from a multilateral operation is appropriate for a study of
when democratic states are reliable. Scholars who utilize the conventional unit of analysis – the
‘state-year’ – are largely silent about when a state is reliable. Most interventions into wars and
disputes occur simultaneously or within a very limited interval (Tago, 2007). It is a disaggregated
unit of analysis, such as the ‘state-month’ and ‘state-quarter’ that enables us to identify more
precisely under what conditions a state is reliable. In fact, the timing of an exit from a coalition
varies considerably by month from state to state. Therefore, it is preferable to utilize a more
disaggregated unit of analysis than the ‘state-year’ in a study of the exit from a coalition.
To test the reliability of security commitments at the exit phase, this study focuses on the
multinational forces in Iraq between May 2003 and May 2006. On May 20, 2006, Iraq’s first
permanent government since the fall of Saddam Hussein was approved by parliament and sworn in.
In this study, I use this as the cut-off point for data collection. I believe that May 2006 is the tipping
point that gives coalition partners a rationale to exit.
There are several good reasons for focusing on the coalition of the willing in Iraq. First, the
16
contribution to the coalition in Iraq has been costly in terms of combat fatalities and has thus been
extremely unpopular in participating countries.2 There has always been a strong incentive for
participants to withdraw troops unilaterally. This study examines a case in which coalition members
are under strong pressure to stop pledged contributions and defect. To study the incentives for
withdrawal, it is advantageous to use a case that includes a number of members with incentives to
leave; thus, the Iraq case is well suited for this study.
Second, the coalition of forces in Iraq is an ideal case to test hypotheses about democratic
features because most of the participants were democracies (89% of coalition members).3 The
democratic states have differences in their institutional and constitutional features, election cycles,
and the timing of changes in leadership. Among the 37 countries participating in the coalition, four Armenia, Bosnia, Georgia, and Tonga - were nondemocracies that do not fulfill the widely accepted
criterion of having a Polity democratic score of seven or larger.
Third, more practical, useful implications can be expected from a study aimed specifically
2
For instance, Italy lost ten soldiers in November 2003. Spain lost seven servicemen in the same
month. One month later, five Bulgarian soldiers were killed in action. As of July 30, 2006, there
have been 229 non-US coalition troop fatalities (Brookings Institution, 2006: 8). I control the
number of fatalities for each state later in estimations.
3
To code the regime type of each participating country, a Polity democracy score (Polity IV
Project: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/#data) is used.
17
at the coalition forces in Iraq than would be the case from a study of various multinational forces
with different contexts and conditions. Forming a coalition like the one in Iraq may be a popular
strategy for the USA in the coming decades (Tago, 2005: 596).
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in late April 2003, the USA called on its allies
and friendly nations to support a mission in Iraq. 37 countries joined the multinational force, and 16
(43%) withdrew their troops before May 2006. In this study, entry into the coalition is coded by the
formal order and announcement by a government to send armed forces to Iraq rather than by the
actual deployment of troops. The Japanese case is convenient for showing how the coding rule
works. In December 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi officially announced that Japan’s self-defense
forces would be sent to southern Iraq (thus Japan is included in the dataset), but the actual
deployment of the troops was not made until February 2004.
A government uses a similar public announcement to announce the withdrawal of its entire
force from Iraq and mark its exit from the coalition. In June 2005, the Dutch defense ministry
turned down an Iraqi government request to extend its contingent’s stay and announced the
withdrawal of its entire force from Iraq. The Italian prime minister, Berlusconi, announced in
January 2006 that he intended to withdraw the entire Italian contingent by the end of 2006 (thus it is
included in the dataset). In fact, all Italian troops departed from Iraq in November 2006. The
announcement of a partial reduction in the contingent is not regarded as an exit. Sources used to
18
create the dataset are listed in Appendix I with a detailed list of countries in the coalition
(http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets).
=================================================
Table I Order of Entry to the Coalition Forces in Iraq
=================================================
=================================================
Table II Order of Exit from the Coalition Forces in Iraq
=================================================
Tables I and II show chronologically the order of countries entering and exiting the
coalition forces in Iraq, respectively. The USA had recruited many of the coalition partners by the
end of 2003. 35 countries had announced and committed their armed forces to Iraq within seven
months after the coalition was formed in May 2003. The USA strongly pressured those countries to
support its military occupation and nation-building efforts in Iraq. Some countries covered their
expenses on their own, but others asked the USA to pay considerable costs for transportation and
military activities in Iraq. The Washington Post reported that the USA agreed to fund East European
countries to deploy their forces; the costs were expected to be more than $200 million (Weitsman,
2006).
Exits from the coalition began in February 2004. The first country to officially announce
19
the withdrawal of its armed forces from Iraq was Nicaragua, followed by Spain and Thailand.
Nicaragua announced in February 2004 that its 230 troops would not be replaced because of the
financial difficulty to continue the mission. In the case of Spain, newly elected Prime Minister
Zapatero fulfilled one of his campaign pledges and declared the end of the mission on April 28,
2004. Thailand’s prime minister officially announced in the same month that Thailand would not
continue the mission after the expiration of a predetermined date in September 2004. He added that
this was due to the deterioration of the situation of Iraq and more directly because of loss of Thai
servicemen in attacks by insurgents.
The spatial-temporal domain of this analysis, as mentioned, is the ‘state-month’. Entry
month and exit month to/from the coalition are coded. To analyze the timing of the unilateral exit,
duration analysis technique is used (Wooldridge, 2002: chap. 20; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004:
17-19). This study specifically uses a Cox proportional hazard model.
Before discussing the results of statistical analysis, I will explain how I code the
independent variables. The variable Parliamentary System is used to test if the nature of the
democratic institution is related to the credibility of its security commitments (hypothesis 1a). I use
the dataset by Golder (2005), available from his website (http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217). A
parliamentary democracy is coded one; otherwise it is coded zero.
To test hypothesis 1b, I include the variable Veto Players, taken from the World Bank’s
20
database of political institutions (Thorsten, Clarke, Groff, Keefer & Walsh, 2005).4 It counts the
number of political actors whose approval is necessary for a shift in policy from the status quo. In
fact, their dataset is based on a complicated coding rule. The variable Veto Players is increased by a
value of one if there is a chief executive and if she/he is competitively elected. Also, a value of one
is added if the opposition controls the legislature. In presidential systems, a value of one is given for
each chamber of the legislature unless the president’s party has a majority in the lower house and a
closed-list system is in effect, and one for each party coded as allied with the president’s party and
that has an ideological (left-right-center) orientation closer to that of the main opposition party than
to that of the president’s party. In parliamentary systems, the variable is increased by one for every
party in the government coalition as long as the parties are needed to maintain a majority, and for
every party in the government coalition that has a position on economic issues (right-left-center)
closer to the largest opposition party than to the party of the executive. In parliamentary systems,
the prime minister’s party is not counted if there is a closed rule in place – the prime minister is
presumed, in this case, to control the party fully. The higher the score, the more divided the
4
In particular, the Checks variable from the World Bank’s dataset is used. The database covers only
the period from 1975 to 2004. To avoid missing data, I code the score of the year 2004 for the
period after January 2005. Admittedly, this is not an ideal solution. However, I believe that the
imputation in this manner is somewhat acceptable since the score usually stays constant over time
but varies over countries.
21
government is.5
The variable Constitutional Control is used to test hypothesis 2. I use English-translated
versions of each country’s constitution, available from the University of Richmond Constitution
Finder (http://confinder.richmond.edu/country.php), to derive this variable. A list of states that have
constitutional provisions to limit executive power in the use of force abroad is presented in
web-based Appendix II. There are three types of states: states without any clear provisions for using
force (e.g., the United Kingdom); states in which parliament is the sole authority to declare war
although it cannot control the limited use of force abroad (e.g., Italy); and states in which any
military actions abroad, including war and the use of force short of war, must be approved and
supervised by parliament (e.g., Bulgaria). I consider the third group to have ‘strict’ control.
The variable Election Month is used to test hypothesis 3a. I use the ‘Electoral Calendar:
Elections around the World,’ available at http://electionworld.org. A value of one is coded for a
month when a state holds a national election; a value of zero is coded otherwise.6
5
Although Tsebelis (2002) has also created a dataset on veto players, I could not use it because it
covers only twenty-two countries in Europe and Asia.
6
I also coded an alternative variable for hypothesis 3a. The variable has a value of 0.1 and 0.5 for
the two and one months before the election month, respectively and a value of one for the election
month to see the effects of gradually increasing the chance for strategic position taking. It was
statistically significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test).
22
The variable Leadership Change is used to test hypothesis 3b. This variable is coded using
the ‘Electoral Calendar’ and Keesing’s Record of World News (various issues). A change in
leadership after an election is coded one; otherwise it is coded zero.
Besides the hypotheses about variations among democracies, the control variables Number
of Troops, Cumulative Casualty, Other Defectors, and Former Communists are included in the
estimations.7 The variable Number of Troops records the absolute number of troops deployed in
Iraq from a country in a given month. As more troops are deployed, it becomes more difficult to
terminate the contribution. I use Keesing’s Record of World News (various issues) and the
Congressional Research Studies (CRS) Report (RL32105). For the variable Cumulative Casualty, I
use the dataset offered by the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count (http://icasualties.org/oif/) and code the
cumulated number of combat deaths for a country in a given month. The number of killed in action
varies from state to state and must be related to the likelihood of withdrawal of troops. The variable
Other Defectors is included to see contagious effects. I count the number of other partner countries
that decided to exit in a given month. Finally, because they do not yet have a formal defense-pact
relationship with the USA, postcommunist states are expected to be more eager to obtain the
7
Furthermore, the United Kingdom and Australia had already entered the coalition at the start of
the war in March 2003. I included a dichotomous variable for those two states to control for this.
The results did not change substantially.
23
patronage of the USA, and thus they contributed to the coalition to secure a good relationship with
the USA. To control such a possible causal effect, the variable Former Communists is coded.
Former communists are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia,
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, and Ukraine. A value of one is given to these countries; otherwise zero is coded.
Results
Table III shows the results of Cox proportional hazard model analyses. Three estimations
are provided here. The left-hand side of the table (Model I) shows hazard ratios, coefficients and
standard errors of the estimation with all variables. The center of the table (Model II) shows hazard
ratios, coefficients and standard errors of the estimation without the variable Veto Players. The
right-hand side of the table (Model III) shows hazard ratios, coefficients and standard errors of the
estimation without the variable Parliamentary System. I show those three estimations for robustness
check. A hazard ratio larger than one indicates that there is a greater likelihood that there will be a
quick defection from the coalition.
=================================================
Table III
Result of Cox Proportional Hazard Analysis
=================================================
24
A parliamentary system is generally not different from a presidential or a mixed system in
terms of reliability of security commitments at the exit phase. The variable Parliamentary System
obtains hazard ratios higher than one (1.33 and 1.47), as expected, but fails to have a statistical
significance. Even when the alternative variable on veto players is used, it does not change. The
variable Constitutional Control’s coefficient predicts the direction of this variable correctly but fails
to have a statistical significance. This implies that democratic institutional design and constitutional
rules that enable parliamentary control over executive decisions to use force neither delay nor
accelerate the timing of unilateral defection. Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2 are all rejected. This is
partially because the variables basically do not change over the period. The explanations for the
reliability of security commitments that highlight the fixed features of democracy are not really
helpful.
On the other hand, the variable Election Month results in very high hazard ratios (8.33,
8.60 and 7.73, respectively) and has statistical significance, whereas the variable Leadership
Change failed to have statistical significance. Hypothesis 3a is supported with respect to the effects
of national elections, whereas hypothesis 3b - on change in leadership after an election - is rejected.
The result suggests that in a national election month, the leader of a democratic state is about eight
times more likely to decide on the termination of the state’s contribution than in a non-election
month because of its strategic position taking. This is an important finding for this study for three
25
reasons. First, it implies that a drastic shift in major security commitments does not require a
change in leadership after an election. An incumbent leader will willingly assume the risk of
damaging the state’s reputation, but the leader will not risk her/his re-election. Furthermore, it
suggests that the well-known Spanish withdrawal from the coalition is an anomaly. In Spain, the
incumbent leader risked his election and called for the continuation of coalition participation. The
opposition leader, on the other hand, campaigned against further deployment of Spanish troops in
Iraq, won the election, and decided to unilaterally terminate Spain’s contribution. However, the
statistical analysis reveals that such a risk-taking incumbent is rare. Strategic position taking leads
to the breaking of a commitment by an incumbent leader when a national election is held. Second,
strategic position taking seems to be a common feature of democratic leaders. Strategic position
taking has been studied mainly by scholars of American politics (Canes-Wrone, Herron & Shotts,
2001; Canes-Wrone, 2004; Mayhew, 2004: 61-77; Conley, 2005). However, this study suggests that
strategic position taking has been adopted by political leaders in various democratic states. Third, a
focus on the dynamic features of democracy is quite important to explain the variation of attitudes
toward the security commitments. Specific types of democratic institutions and constitutions can
delay the timing of withdrawal of troops from a coalition and make a state a more reliable security
partner; however, that was not the case in this study. The reliability of security commitments can be
more sensitive to election cycles than to fixed democratic features.
26
The number of troops killed in a mission matters considerably. The variable Cumulative
Casualty bears hazard ratios larger than one (1.63, 1.61 and 1.64, respectively) with statistical
significance. The results imply that one additional killed in action (KIA) for a state increases the
probability by more than 60% that its contingent will be withdrawn. Moreover, the number of
troops deployed cannot be ignored. The variable Number of Troops has a hazard ratio of 0.997 with
a statistical significance. This means that if a state sent 10,000 troops to Iraq, the state is 3% less
likely to terminate its contribution than a state with 100 troops in the coalition. Negative, contagious
effects of defection behavior were also found. The small hazard ratio (0.41, 0.42 and 0.40,
respectively) of variable Other Defectors indicates that as more countries defect, the probability of a
reliable partner staying in the coalition increases. The result suggests that the remaining participants
may feel strong pressure from the USA to remain in the coalition because Washington, D.C. fears
the dissolution of the coalition will result from the defection of more partner states. Finally, the
former communist states are less likely to defect. It is somewhat remarkable that the former enemy
states of the USA were 94% less likely to end their contributions than other states. The new allies
and friends in the US-led coalition are probably eager to show how reliable they are by remaining in
Iraq longer than others.
Conclusion
27
This study provides several interesting findings with theoretical implications. For instance,
we now know that democracies are less reliable friends of the USA when they are having national
elections. The election cycle influences the timing of the decision by democratic states to leave the
coalition. On the other hand, it is somewhat surprising that a change of leadership after an election
is unrelated to the likelihood of breaching commitments. Although more empirical tests are needed,
it is now more plausible from the analysis that democratic countries face higher incentives for
breaking international commitments at election time because of an incumbent’s strategic position
taking. In contrast, parliamentary, presidential, and mixed systems are generally similar in the exit
phase. The constitutional setting to control the use of force abroad does not govern decisions about
withdrawal from coalitions. Theoretically, this indicates that to explain the varied reliability of
states’ security commitments, more research is required on democratic election cycles rather than on
institutional variation among democracies. The conclusions support Gartzke & Gleditsch (2004),
who emphasize the impact of democratic election cycles on the alliance behavior of states, rather
than Cowhey (1993) and Choi (2003, 2004), who emphasize the power of veto players and
institutional constraints in democracies.
Furthermore, this study suggests that to improve cohesion in future coalitions, the USA
needs to pay close attention to the popularity of coalition forces inside participating democratic
states and their election cycles. It is also important to invite more states with the capability of
28
sending large numbers of troops and avoid an accumulation of combat causalities to one state.
However, differences in institutional and constitutional arrangements in democracies are not crucial
information for the USA. They are important practical implications of this scientific analysis on the
latest ‘coalition of the willing.’
This analysis suggests several avenues for future research. First, can the overall results of
the study be supported when the scope of the dataset is expanded? So far, this is a preliminary test
of the hypotheses. Although this study introduces a new research design to test the reliability of
security commitments by analyzing the timing of unilateral exit from a coalition, further empirical
testing is needed. Second, does variation in election systems matter? A natural theoretical extension
of this study would be an examination of different types of electoral institutions. If a leader can call
an election, she/he can take advantage of the system and time the election for when the opposition
is less likely to politicize ongoing unpopular commitments. If an election is predetermined, such
tactics are impossible, and a leader must consider reversing the commitments by taking a strategic
position. Third, is the exit decision influenced by a coalition leader’s conditions? In this study, the
USA was the coalition leader. The leading country’s conditions can be a potentially important
variable to explain unilateral exit in general. An expanded dataset is needed to answer this question
as well.
29
Tables and Figures
Table I
Order of Entry into the Coalition Forces in Iraq
Time of Entry Entry Number
Name of States
2003. 5
11
Australia; Albania; Bulgaria;
Denmark; Italy; Netherlands;
Poland; South Korea; Spain;
Ukraine; United Kingdom
2003. 6
2
Macedonia; Slovakia
2003. 7
18
Azerbaijan; Czech Rep.;
Dominican Rep.; El Salvador;
Estonia; Georgia; Honduras;
Hungary; Kazakhstan; Latvia;
Lithuania; Moldova; Mongolia;
New Zealand; Nicaragua;
Norway; Philippines; Romania
2003. 9
1
Thailand
2003.12
3
Japan; Portugal; Tonga
2004.12
1
Armenia
2005. 6
1
Bosnia
Table II Order of Exit from the Coalition Forces in Iraq
Time of Exit
Exit Number
Name of States
2004. 2
1
Nicaragua
2004. 4
2
Spain; Thailand
2004. 5
2
Dominican Rep.; Honduras
2004. 6
1
Philippines
2004. 7
1
Norway
2004. 9
1
New Zealand
2004.12
2
Hungary; Tonga
2005. 2
2
Moldova; Portugal
2005. 5
1
Bulgaria
2005. 6
1
Netherlands
2005.10
1
Ukraine
2006. 1
1
Italy
30
Table III
Results of Cox Proportional Hazard Analysis
Model I
(Full Model)
Parliamentary System
Veto Players
Constitutional Control
Election Month
Leadership Change
Number of Troops
Cumulative Casualty
Other Defectors
Former Communists
Number of Obs.
Prediction Success Rate
Log-likelihood
Haz. Ratio
1.33
1.08
0.75
8.33
0.47
0.997
1.63
0.41
0.06
Coef.
Std. Err.
0.29
0.75
0.08
0.25
-0.28
0.72
2.12
0.92
-0.76
0.95
-0.003
0.001
0.49
0.13
-0.89
0.46
-2.77
0.89
948
85.3%
-32.34
Model II
(without Veto Players)
Haz. Ratio
1.47
**
***
***
*
***
0.82
8.60
0.53
0.997
1.61
0.42
0.06
Coef.
0.39
-0.20
2.15
-0.63
-0.003
0.48
-0.86
-2.84
948
89.3%
-32.39
Model III
(without Parliamentary System)
Std. Err.
0.69
0.68
0.92
0.85
0.001
0.12
0.45
0.86
Haz. Ratio
**
***
***
*
***
1.13
0.76
7.73
0.39
0.997
1.64
0.40
0.06
Coef.
0.12
-0.27
2.04
-0.93
-0.003
0.49
-0.91
-2.76
948
87.2%
-32.41
Std. Err.
0.23
0.74
0.91
0.84
0.001
0.13
0.46
0.89
Note: Significance tests were two-tailed. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Stata 9 (stcox) was used for the analysis.
31
**
***
***
**
**
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ATSUSHI TAGO, b. 1976, PhD in Advanced Social and International Studies (University of Tokyo,
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34