04 April 2016
CCS COMMENTARY:
Sino-Arab, Sino Egyptian relation’s: 60 years on!
2016 marks the 60th year of Sino-Arab relations and the 60th anniversary of the establishment of SinoEgyptian bi-lateral relations where Egypt was the first Arab and first African country to establish
diplomatic relations with China. To begin the year, China issued its first Arab Policy Paper which uses
multilateralism by promoting different mechanisms and fora through which Arab states can cooperate with China. This commentary shows that China–Arab relations are beginning a process of
institutionalisation built on energy, infrastructure, and trade deals as well as on agreements in the
field of culture. Following that, Chinese President Xi Jinping published an article on Sino-Arab and Sino
-Egyptian relations in the Egyptian newspaper, Al Ahram, ahead of a state visit to the country – home
to the Headquarters of the Arab League. This commentary will focus on the contents of the two
aforementioned publications, placing Sino-Egyptian relations within the context of China’s Arab cooperation, and the 2016 China-Egypt cultural year within the context of China’s cultural diplomacy.
China’s Arab Policy Paper
Firstly, the Arab Policy paper speaks of the China-Arab States Co-operation
Forum (CASCF) established in 2004, and for which dialogue takes place at
the ministerial level. The first bi-annual Ministerial Conference in 2004
was held in Cairo, and the seventh is due to take place this year. In 2010,
on the occasion of the Fourth Ministerial Conference, China and the Arab
states formally established “strategic co-operative relations of
comprehensive co-operation and common development”. Since then, eight
of the 22 Arab League countries including Egypt have formed either a comprehensive strategic partnership,
strategic partnership or strategic co-operative partnership with China. While the concept of a strategic
partnership sounds fundamental, the Arab League and Egypt merely appear as part of a growing list of
international organisations and countries worldwide forming part of China’s strategic partnership diplomacy.
The other Arab League members that have formed strategic partnerships are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Jordan, and Iraq in the Middle East, and Algeria and Sudan in Africa.
Secondly, China's Arab Policy paper promotes the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime
Silk Road” initiative. On this subject, it reiterates that co-operation between China and the Arab states should
take the form of a “1+2+3” co-operation pattern. The 1+2+3 co-operation pattern is basically China’s strategy
for co-operation with the Arab states. It was initially proposed by China during the Sixth Ministerial
Conference of the CASCF held in Beijing in June 2014. The one refers to energy co-operation, which according
to the Arab Policy Paper should form the core of the relationship given that Arab countries as a whole have
become China’s biggest supplier of crude oil. The two refers to infrastructure construction between Chinese
companies and Arab countries in such areas as rail, roads, ports, aviation, power, and communications. It also
refers to trade and investment facilitation, and most substantially in this area, Chinese and Arab trade
authorities re-launched in 2016 the negotiations suspended since 2009 for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
between China and the countries of the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC). Finally, the three refers to cooperation in the high and new tech fields of nuclear energy, space satellite, and new energy.
Not all of China’s 1+2+3 co-operation strategy will be applicable to Sino-Arab relations on the bi-lateral level
because for example, Egypt is neither an energy exporter nor a member of the GCC. Nevertheless, in the area
of trade and investment, Sino-Egyptian bi-lateral trade reached a new high of US$ 11.6 billion in 2014, and
Chinese outward foreign direct investment in Egypt reached US$ 820 million in 2014. Some of these
investments relate to infrastructure, and others are slated for the area of new energy.
China’s cultural diplomacy
In terms of core contents, Xi’s article published in Al-Ahram is not substantially different than the Arab Policy
Paper. However, like in the Arab Policy Paper, we see China’s use of soft power at the bi-lateral level where Xi
evokes common historical ties between China and Egypt, and identifies Egypt like China as a great
civilization. In deploying simultaneously, “great power diplomacy”, as well as “soft power diplomacy”, the
article speaks of a Chinese civilization as well as an Arab Islamic civilization. In this regard, concrete
measures taken within the framework of the CASCF are the establishment of a Civilization Dialogue seminar
where China’s intention through such a Dialogue is to promote its strategic partnerships.
The article also encompasses China’s cultural diplomacy wherein it refers to the carrying forward of
traditional cultures and upholding cultural diversity. Thus, a second mechanism established within the
CASCF framework in the realm of culture and with the purpose of strengthening bi-lateral relations concerns
the implementation of cultural agreements. In the case of Sino-Egyptian relations, since the start of
diplomatic ties 60 years ago, they have signed numerous cultural agreements, and during the 2016 ChinaEgypt joint cultural year, more than 100 cultural events will be held with China alone holding more than 60.
Also, in the realm of China’s soft power and related to culture, as well as to human resources and education is
China’s training of personnel such as administrative and technical staff from the Arab States, and making
scholarships available for Arab students. In this sense, a frequent tool deployed by China is the promotion of
Chinese language learning for foreigners. In Arab countries, China has set up a total of 11 Confucius Institutes
(CIs). These include one in Bahrain and Lebanon; two in Jordan and the UAE, in the Middle East; and one in
Sudan, and two in both Morocco and Egypt, in Africa.
China’s Arab multilateralism
On that note, finally, both the Arab Policy Paper and Xi’s article actively use multilateralism because they
subtly promote different mechanisms and fora through which Arab states can co-operate with China. As an
Arab state, Egypt is a member of the CASCF, but also by identifying China-Egypt bi-lateral relations as a
shining example of South-South co-operation, Xi indirectly referred to Egypt as an African state, and as a
developing state like China, and therefore, as a member of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC).
The same picture emerges considering the reference to the GCC – as a six nation member body – for the
purposes of the FTA in the Arab Policy Paper.
Sixty years on, China–Arab relations are beginning a process of institutionalisation built on energy,
infrastructure, and trade deals as well as on agreements in the field of culture. But, they are still in their
infancy stages given that dialogue within the CASCF only takes places at the Ministerial level, and given that
interregional trade and investment is not significant as a proportion of the total. CIs in Arab states are
nowhere near the 169 set up in Europe or the 157 set up in America, and therefore, we may also conclude
that cultural ties have space for expansion.
Emma Scott
CCS Affiliates
Centre for Chinese Studies
Stellenbosch University
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