SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
v. JANE DOE
No. 99-62
Argued March 29, 2000
Decided June 19, 2000
Santa Fe Independent School District (SFISD) is located in a small community in Texas, close
to Houston . The school district, at the time of this case, included over four thousand students
and was governed by an elected, seven-person Board of Trustees. The "Does" were students
or former students who were or had been enrolled in SFISD schools and their parents . One
family belonged to the Mormon religion, and the other was Catholic.
In April, 1993, while one of the students was attending a seventh grade Texas History class,
her teacher handed out fliers advertising a Baptist religious revival. The student asked if nonBaptists were invited to attend, prompting the teacher to inquire about her religious affiliation.
On hearing that the student belonged to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
(Mormon), the teacher "launched into a diatribe about the non-Christian, cult-like nature of
Mormonism, and its general evils." The student's classmates entered the discussion with
comments such as "it's kind of like the KKK, isn't it?" The student was upset by the incident,
and her mother subsequently complained to the school board. As a result, the teacher was
given a written reprimand and directed to apologize to the student and to the class.
For a period of several years, SFISD allowed students to read Christian prayers at graduation
ceremonies and over the public address system at home football games. The prayers were
typically given by officers of the student council, but SFISD maintained complete control over
the programs and facilities during the reading of the prayers, and the text of the prayers was
screened by the school board for content.
In April1995, the "Does" filed suit against SFISD in the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, alleging that the district had engaged in several proselytizing practices, such
as promoting attendance at a Baptist revival meeting, encouraging membership in religious
clubs, chastising children who held minority religious beliefs and distributing Gideon Bibles on
school premises. They also alleged that the district allowed students to read Christian
invocations and benedictions from the stage at graduation ceremonies and to deliver overtly
Christian prayers over the public address system at home football games.
The district court ruled that student-selected, student-given, nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
nondenominational prayers could be permitted. The court cautioned that the school district
should play no role in selecting students or approving the content of the prayer.
In October 1995, in response to the court ruling, SFISD for the first time adopted a written
policy to address football game invocations. Its provisions authorized two student elections,
the first to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered and the second to select the
student to deliver them. The district policy provided for a "brief invocation and/or message to
be delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of home varsity football games." The school
was to provide no further guidance as to content.
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Both the Does and SFISD appealed the district court ruling to the United States Fifth Circuit
Court. The school district contended that the policy was permissible, and the Does argued
that the policy violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
In February 1999 a split Fifth Circuit Court determined that, even as modified by the district
court, the football prayer policy was invalid. This decision followed Fifth Circuit precedent set
in two cases. In Jones v. Clear Creek ISO (1992), the Fifth Circuit held that student-led prayer
approved by a vote of the students that was nonsectarian and nonproselytizing was
permissible at high school graduation ceremonies . On the other hand, in later cases the Fifth
Circuit made it clear that the Clear Creek rule applied only to high school graduations and that
school-encouraged prayer was unconstitutional at school-related sporting events. In Doe v.
Duncanville ISO (1995) the Fifth Circuit described a high school graduation as "a significant,
once in-a-lifetime event" to be contrasted with athletic events in "a setting that is far less
solemn and extraordinary."
On November 16, 1999, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case , limited to
the question of whether the district's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at
football games violates the Establishment Clause .
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ISSUE: Does a school district policy that allows "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing"
prayers at public high school football games violate the First Amendment
Establishment of Religion Clause? Do students have a right under the First
Amendment Free Speech Clause to include prayer at football games?
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SANTA FE ISO v. DOE (2000)
Decision
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court determined that the Santa Fe Independent School
District policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at footbal l games violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy , Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, wrote the majority decision . Justice Stevens first established
that the Court in this case was following its own precedent set in Lee v. Weisman ( 1992). Stevens
quoted Lee:
"The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not
supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. It is
beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in
a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.' quoting
Lynch v. Donnellv, 1984."
Stevens then answered arguments presented by the school district, the first of which was that the
district policy addressed private student speech instead of public speech. He quoted the Court opinion
in Westside v. Mergens (1990), which stated , "[T]here is a crucial difference between government
speech endorsing religion , which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion , which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect. " Stevens then explained that the
majority were "not persuaded that the pregame invocations should be regarded as 'private speech"'
because it was authorized by the school district and took place on school property at school-related
events.
The Court also disagreed with the provision in the policy that allowed a majority of the students to
determine if there would be prayer at football games that season. Stevens explained that earlier the
same year the Court had determined that student elections decided by a majority vote in a similar
matter violated the rights of students in the minority. He quoted Board of Regents of Univ. of
Wisconsin System v. Southworth (2000):
"To the extent the referendum substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint
neutrality it would undermine the constitutional protection the program requires. The
whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same
respect as are majority views. Access to a public forum, for instance, does not depend
upon majoritarian consent.
Therefore, because Santa Fe's election did nothing to protect the minority, it violated their rights.
Stevens was also disturbed by the words of the policy that stated the purpose of the invocation was "to
solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish the
appropriate environment for the competition." The Court clearly felt that the policy encouraged
religious messages, since a "religious message is the most obvious method of solemnizing an event,"
and "the only type of message that is expressly endorsed in the text is an 'invocation'-a term that
primarily describes an appeal for divine assistance."
Next, the Court examined the school district argument that attendance at football games was purely
voluntary, unlike attendance at graduation ceremonies or attending class. Stevens continued:
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There are some students ... such as cheerleaders, members of the band, and, of
course, the team members themselves, for whom seasonal commitments mandate their
attendance, sometimes for class credit. The district also minimizes the importance to
many students of attending and participating in extracurricular activities as part of a
complete educational experience. ... High school home football games are traditional
gatherings of a school community; they bring together students and faculty as well as
friends and family from years present and past to root for a common cause.
Undoubtedly, the games are not important to some students, and they voluntarily
choose not to attend. For many others, however, the choice between whether to attend
these games or to risk facing a personally offensive religious ritual is in no practical
sense an easy one. The Constitution, moreover, demands that the school may not
force this difficult choice upon these students for "[i]t is a tenet of the First Amendment
that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as
the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice."
Stevens explained that just because the school cannot conduct religious activities does not impose a
prohibition on religious activities in public schools. In fact, he went on to explain, there is "nothing in
the Constitution as interpreted by this Court" that "prohibits any public school student from voluntarily
praying at any time before, during, or after the school day. But the religious liberty protected by the
Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of
prayer."
Associate Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent. He wrote:
The Court distorts existing precedent to conclude that the school district's studentmessage program is invalid on its face under the Establishment Clause. But even
more disturbing than its holding is the tone of the Court's opinion; it bristles with hostility
to all things religious in public life. Neither the holding nor the tone of the opinion is
faithful to the meaning of the Establishment Clause, when it is recalled that George
Washington himself, at the request of the very Congress which passed the Bill of
Rights, proclaimed a day of "public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by
acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God."
The dissent expressed concern that the Court seemingly would require complete "content neutrality" in
public school actions with respect to speech. Rehnquist stated:
... Schools do not violate the First Amendment every time they restrict student speech
to certain categories. But under the Court's view, a school policy under which the
student body president is to solemnize the graduation ceremony by giving a favorable
introduction to the guest speaker would be facially unconstitutional. Solemnization
"invites and encourages" prayer and the policy's content limitations prohibit the student
body president from giving a solemn, yet non-religious, message like "commentary on
United States foreign policy."
NOTE: In May 2003, a federal judge awarded $1 in damages and attorney fees to
Marian Ward in the civil case that was filed.
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