Non‐Governmental Organizations and the Local Politics of Forest Governance Nathan Cooka, Glenn Wrightb, and Krister Andersson*a
Abstract How does the support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) influence the
responsiveness of local governments? Using a unique longitudinal dataset from 200
municipalities in Bolivia and Guatemala, We find evidence to support the idea that NGOs
often gain disproportionate influence over local policy processes by supporting local
governments financially. This influence can “crowd out” the voices of local citizens in
public decisions, leading to less responsive local governments. We also see evidence,
however, that the bottom-up political pressure on local government officials from
organized citizen groups can counteract this negative effect. These findings underscore
the importance of recognizing the local political contexts and its potential to moderate the
effects of interventions by NGOs and other external organizations.
Keywords: natural resources; forestry; NGOs; local politics; governance
a
Department of Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder. 333 UCB, Boulder,
CO 80309, USA.
b
Department of Social Sciences, University of Alaska Southeast. 11120 Glacier Hwy,
Juneau, AK 99801, USA.
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 303 492 1006. Email address:
[email protected].
1
Significance Concerned with the challenges of sustainable development, policy makers and scholars
often urge nongovernmental organizations to increase their efforts to support improved
governance of natural resources in developing countries. This paper questions the idea
that financial support from NGOs to local governance actors will always produce
improved resource governance. We present new evidence showing that nongovernmental organizations’ financial support to local governments often “crowd out”
the voices of local citizens in public decisions, leading to less responsive local
governments. We also see evidence, however, that bottom-up political pressure on local
government officials from organized citizen groups can counteract this negative effect.
2
\body I.
INTRODUCTION NGOs are increasingly important actors in local natural resource governance in
developing countries. With the goal of improving policy outcomes, these organizations
work with local communities in a variety of ways, including by donating financial
resources to cash-strapped local governments. In theory, these funds could allow local
officials to hire staff, establish offices for the governance of particular resources such as
forests or irrigation systems, and ultimately respond more effectively to the needs of local
natural resource users. However, the existing case study literature points to instances in
which external donor organizations, such as international NGOs and development
agencies, gained disproportionate influence over local policy processes and promoted
policies that ran contrary to the preferences of local people (1, 2). This study examines
the relationship between NGO funding and local governance responsiveness in the
forestry sector using a unique longitudinal dataset from 200 municipalities in Bolivia and
Guatemala. We formulate and test a theory to explain the conditions under which NGO
funding is likely to harm responsiveness, based on the particular local political contexts
in which they operate.
While scholars are paying increasing attention to the role of NGOs in local
governance, the interaction between external NGOs and local political contexts is
understudied in our opinion. In this paper we build on the existing literature on the role of
NGOs in environmental governance, recognizing the importance of financial and
technical support that external organizations can offer to local governments. Focusing on
the financial and technical resources alone, however, can be misleading because donors
3
often have their own policy preferences and goals, and may lack the local knowledge
necessary to promote responsive governance alone. Furthermore, the creation of
responsive institutions is primarily a political process, a process that is governed by local
politicians who are largely motivated by political rewards—such as staying in power,
getting re-elected, and protecting the interests of the ruling elite. The key contribution of
this research is to examine NGO funding in the context the local political incentive
structure.
We find that the effect of financial support from external NGOs on local
responsiveness depends upon the extent to which local politicians are motivated to be
involved in local resource policy and respond to local needs. For the specific purpose of
this study, this means that NGO funding can actually hinder responsiveness where local
officials are not politically motivated to address rural communities’ expressed needs
related to forestry. This is because donor NGOs earn disproportionate influence over
local policy processes, and this influence overpowers the involvement of local actors in
policymaking. However, this negative effect does hold where organized local groups
exert political pressure on the municipal government in the forestry sector. This is
because where the local leadership perceives political benefits from meeting citizen
demands and perceives NGO funding as a plausible instrument to achieve their political
goals, they are motivated to take an active role in natural resource policy and ensure that
external actors do not steer local policy away from the preferences of the community.
II. THE DRIVERS OF RESPONSIVE LOCAL GOVERNANCE 4
National governments in developing nations have increasingly transferred
responsibilities to local governments to manage natural resources. This trend is part of a
broader pattern of widespread decentralization and devolution reforms across a variety of
sectors in recent decades—reforms that appear justified on a number of theoretical
grounds. It has been argued that an excessively centralized regime is inefficient,
ineffective, and unresponsive to the specific needs of local people (3, 4), and that
decentralization can improve accountability (5), help to address poverty (6), improve
rural livelihoods (7), promote rural development (8), improve the provision of public
services (9), and foster equality and public participation (10). However, at the local level,
a growing literature shows highly variable outcomes from the decentralization of natural
resource governance in the developing world (11–14).
One of the key issues under study regarding decentralization in the natural
resource sector is the degree to which decentralization reforms actually enhance the
representation of local communities, and as a consequence, the extent to which policy
outcomes align with local needs (5). While decentralization should, in theory, empower
local governments who in turn serve their constituents, it seems clear that
decentralization reforms in the natural resource sector often fall short of this ideal (15,
16). Previous literature indicates that the accountability of local governments to their
constituents is an important condition for effective local governance under
decentralization (11, 17, 18). In other words, the possibility for decentralization to
produce improved governance outcomes seems to hinge on the degree to which it is
accompanied by increased downward accountability.
5
In assessing decentralized governance arrangements in developing nations, Crook
and Sverrisson (6) suggest that many local governments are quite unresponsive to the
needs of local people. They also suggest that the financial resources available to
governments account for some of the variation observed in responsiveness. Where the
financial resources allocated by central governments are adequate and secure, or where
subnational governments have the necessary infrastructure to raise and allocate funds,
local governments are often more likely to respond to the needs of the local community.
Crook and Sverrisson (6) show that while funding influences governance outcomes in
decentralized arrangements, the “adequacy”—or correct amount—of funds allocated to a
particular policy area is not enough to promote successful or equitable local policies.
Instead, they suggest that adequate financial resources are a necessary, albeit insufficient,
condition for effective governance.
It is reasonable to expect that inadequate funding can limit the activities of local
governments in the natural resource sectors. The powers transferred to local governments
under decentralization reforms matter little where governments are simply too cashstrapped to fulfill their mandates. Locally elected decision makers, facing demands from
the community to prioritize resource governance, must also contend with financial
constraints. Therefore, scholars might expect the responsiveness of local governments to
local needs to be explained in part by allocations of funding to local governments from
various sources, such as central governments, NGOs, and IGOs. While previous research
suggests that the allocation of funds may be one factor influencing the responsiveness of
local governments to community needs, the impact of funding from external nongovernmental sources has not been thoroughly examined. Previous research
6
acknowledges the importance of adequate funding in decentralized governance
arrangements, but focuses largely on the role of central governments in determining
financial resources (17). As we explain in the next section, existing evidence suggests
that NGO funding plays an important role in local natural resource governance. But
whether or not this funding improves the responsiveness of governance to local needs in
the natural resource sector, or possibly makes local leaders less accountable to resource
users and more accountable to these external interests is an unsettled question, and is the
question that we seek to address in this research. In other words, how does NGO funding
impact the responsiveness of local governments in the natural resource sectors?
NGOs and local interests International and domestic NGOs have proliferated in recent decades, and they
are an increasingly important source of funding for governance in developing nations.
Foreign aid spending is increasingly routed through these organizations, rather than
through local or national governments. NGOs are often regarded as an important
component of civil society in the developing world, and this view motivates international
donors to channel aid money through NGOs in order to promote civil society (19). These
organizations often play key roles in chains of aid delivery for sustainable development
and natural resource management in developing countries (20). Although NGOs offer
important material support for decentralized environmental governance in the developing
world, scholars have rarely studied the impacts of this support on local environmental
decision-making using quantitative methods (21, 22). Specifically, does the funding
offered by these organizations lead to local governance that is more or less responsive to
the needs of local communities? Case studies of local environmental governance in a
number of developing countries support divergent arguments as to the effect of NGO
7
funding on local interests. Some evidence suggests that through capacity building, NGOs
and other external organizations can facilitate governance and ultimately make it more
responsive to local needs (23, 24). At the same time, others point out that NGO assistance
can promote policies that are ill-suited to local needs, lead to financial dependence, and
undermine local authority (1, 2, 24).
The former hypothesis follows from the well-documented finding that local
governments in developing countries often lack the human and financial resources for
environmental governance (13, 25, 26). Without adequate resources, it is difficult for
local governments to exercise the powers that are transferred to them (23). At the same
time, NGOs are channels for international aid money, and are able to make considerable
contributions to local capacity by financing projects, paying the salaries of municipal
employees, and buying equipment, among other things. In this way, outside organizations
may be in a position to fill the “capacity gap” that prevents some local governments from
managing resources effectively.
While some case studies suggest that external funding might facilitate
environmental governance in a way that ultimately makes it more effective and
responsive to local needs, there is also evidence to suggest that NGO funding might
undermine local interests in natural resource governance. NGOs and other donor
organizations often provide funding to local governments on the condition that recipients
implement specific policies mandated by the donor, which may or may not be congruent
with local needs. Previous research suggests that development aid is often fraught with
informational asymmetries, one of which is a lack of understanding of local conditions by
donor agencies and contractors (20). Informational asymmetries and the conditional
8
nature of some external funding in the natural resource sector may explain in part why
some externally funded projects are poorly suited to local contexts.
Furthermore, the interests of NGOs and other external actors do not always align
perfectly with local interests regarding resource use. This is seen especially where NGOs
exhibit a rigid pro-conservation bias, and push for highly protective policies without
regard for local livelihoods (1, 24). NGOs may intentionally promote relationships of
perpetual dependence with certain communities, which may undermine local autonomy
(1). For example, Contreras (2) points to dependency relationships between NGOs and
communities in the Philippines, and likens NGO involvement in the forestry sector to
rent-seeking.
These points highlight an important aspect of the story regarding NGO funding
and local governance: NGOs and other external donors are not simply benign financiers,
providing the financial means for communities to pursue local policy goals. To assume
that external funding will necessarily lead to more responsive governance simply because
local governments are fiscally constrained is to ignore the fact that donor organizations
have their own policy preferences. In the case of environmental NGOs in developing
countries, this means that NGOs and donors may prioritize outcomes that can be
measured in terms of actual forest cover, possibly neglecting the less tangible (albeit
crucial) support for local self-governance institutions (22). Where NGOs and local
communities pursue divergent goals, or where external organizations lack a detailed
understanding of local policy preferences, it is reasonable to expect that the involvement
of NGOs in local policy processes will steer local governments away from governance
processes that are responsive to local needs.
9
The discussion above outlines ways in which NGO funding can impact the
responsiveness of local resource governance to local needs. Although the existing
evidence from local case studies yields important clues, it seems that the broad trends in
governance produced by NGO funding are not yet well understood. While it is easy to
find instances in which NGOs have promoted or stymied responsive governance, the
existing environmental governance literature lacks a systematic empirical investigation of
this relationship across a large number of localities. Furthermore, explanations of the
effects of NGO funding on local governance will be more robust if they consider the
local political context in which the support is offered, and particularly the political
motivations of local politicians to prioritize natural resources on the local political
agenda. We argue that the effect of NGO support depends critically on the nature of this
local political context. We seek to explain the effects of this funding source on local
government responsiveness by situating NGO funding within a broader theoretical
framework that takes these political motivations into account.
Our approach: taking political motivations into account Where meaningful powers in the natural resource sector are devolved to municipal
governments, local politicians hold broad authority in regards to natural resources.
Perhaps the most important choice facing politicians is whether or not to prioritize
resource governance. Previous literature points to two important findings regarding this
decision process. First, natural resource governance is often a low priority for local
politicians, and this indifference drives decisions regarding the financing and provision of
services in this sector (13, 27). Second, politicians who do prioritize resource governance
tend to do so in response to political incentives. The strongest motivation is the pressure
exerted by organized local groups in the natural resource sectors (27). Where groups
10
demand that local officials prioritize resource governance, politicians may see an
opportunity to gain or maintain political support. In these cases, politicians will take an
active role in natural resource policy. But where these groups are absent, or where they
are overpowered by other groups whose goals run counter to natural resource governance
(such as those representing agricultural interests, in the case of forestry), politicians will
have little to gain from prioritizing natural resources.
This has important implications for the arguments outlined above regarding the
impact of NGO funding on local government responsiveness. While some case studies
show that NGO involvement can overpower local interests and ultimately lead to less
responsive policy outcomes, this seems unlikely where politicians perceive the political
pressure exerted by organized local groups. Because these political incentives are their
primary motivation, it is unlikely that local officials will allow NGOs to steer the local
government towards policies that are incompatible with community preferences. After
all, the opportunity to appear responsive in the face of political demands from the
community is the primary motivator for politicians to take action.
Local officials would rarely act to negate the possible political advantages to be
gained from prioritizing resource governance. Where natural resource governance is an
important issue for local electorates, such as in municipalities where forest products are
important for local livelihoods, local officials are more likely to take an active role in this
sector. In these communities, local politicians will represent community interests in
response to the demands of the electorate, preventing a situation in which funds are spent
contrary to the policy preferences of the community. But where natural resource
governance is not a salient issue to organized local groups, local politicians will not face
11
political pressure to take such an active role in this sector. In these cases, politicians have
little to lose by accepting material support from NGOs, but the influence of these external
actors in local natural resource policy goes relatively unchecked. This means that NGO
funds may be spent in accordance with the policy goals of the NGO rather than those of
local resource users, potentially leading to governance that is less responsive to local
needs.
In our view, local political contexts are crucial for understanding the impact of NGO
funding on governance responsiveness. With this view as the basis, we formulate the
following hypothesis: the effect of NGO funding is dependent upon the level of
political pressure exerted by local groups in the forestry sector. In accordance with
the theories outlined above, we expect that NGO funds will be associated with less
responsive governance in municipalities where this pressure is low. This is because (1)
donor organizations earn influence over local policy processes, and (2) this influence can
overpower the influence of local resource users in natural resource governance and
planning. At higher levels of community pressure, NGO funding will be associated with
negligible or even positive effects on responsiveness.
III. RESULTS [Insert Table 1 about here]
Model 1: Explaining responsive governance The results of Model 1, as shown in Table 2, support our hypothesis that NGO
donations impede responsiveness where community pressure is low. At low levels of
community pressure, the marginal effect of NGO donations on responsiveness is
negative. As community pressure exceeds a value of about 3, which indicates that
community organizations expressed opinions to the mayor in the forestry sector “from
12
time to time,” the marginal effect is no longer statistically different from zero. The online
supplement presents substantive quantities of interest from this model as well as a
marginal effects plot of the interaction term.
Models 2‐3: Understanding NGO influence [Insert Figure 1 about here]
Model 2 and Model 3 provide evidence for the mechanism by which NGO
donations diminish responsiveness in some contexts. The results of Model 2, as shown in
Table 2, support the argument that NGOs earn influence over local policy processes by
donating material resources. The marginal effect of NGO donations on NGO influence is
statistically significant and positive for municipalities with low levels of local taxing
capacity. When the capacity variable exceeds a value of about 3, the effect of NGO
funding is no longer statistically different from zero at the 0.05 confidence level. A plot
of this interaction is included in the online supplement.
The results of Model 3 support the hypothesis that the positive marginal effect of
community involvement in forestry planning decreases as NGO influence in forestry
increases. Community involvement exerts a statistically significant and positive effect at
low levels of NGO influence. As NGO influence exceeds a value of about 3, which
indicates that NGOs have “some influence” in the forestry sector, the effect of
community involvement is no longer statistically significant at the 0.05 confidence level.
A plot of this interaction is shown in Figure 1.
IV. DISCUSSION Our results reveal a nuanced picture of the effects of NGO funding on
governance responsiveness. Model 1 suggests that where local officials lack political
pressure from organized local groups, NGO funding for forestry leads to less responsive
13
policy outcomes. We attribute this to the fact that NGOs that donate material resources
enjoy greater influence in local policy processes, and use it to pursue their own policy
goals in the natural resource sector that can differ from what local citizens want. The
results of Model 2 suggest that donors are most influential over local policy where
governments lack fiscal and institutional capacity. And our results from Model 3 suggest
a mechanism by which disproportionate NGO influence may hinder responsiveness to
local needs: by overpowering or “crowding out” local preferences in natural resource
planning and governance. The effects of NGO donations in Model 1 and Model 2 are
robust even when we control for the frequency with which NGOs expressed their
preferences in the forestry sector to municipal officials.
Higher levels of community pressure counteract the negative effect of NGO
funding in Model 1. Where officials are sufficiently motivated by pressure from below to
get involved in natural resource governance, they appear to provide a healthy
counterbalance to the influence of NGOs, ensuring that funds are not spent in ways that
damage responsiveness. Our results point to the importance of local political contexts for
understanding the effects of NGO interventions. Our analysis of the municipalities of
Bolivia and Guatemala suggests that the pressures exerted on local politicians by
organized community groups matter a great deal for responsive governance, especially
where external actors are involved.
It is worth noting that although higher levels of community pressure seem to
diminish the negative effect of NGO funding, our results did not show a positive effect of
NGO funding on responsiveness even at the highest levels of community pressure. In
other words, NGO funding seemed to harm responsiveness in the worst case scenario
14
(low community pressure) and had no effect in the best case scenario (high community
pressure). In our view, this study is an early step towards understanding the role of
external funds in responsive local governance.
Limitations It is important to note that NGOs are strategic about where they choose to work. In
order to secure and maintain funding from donors, these organizations often adjust their
activities strategically to pursue tangible, demonstrable results (20, 22, 28). Some NGOs
will even seek out communities in which natural resource governance may not be very
problematic and where the NGO might not make a big difference for the outcome, but
where measureable governance success is likely, and will tend to avoid localities in
which resource governance is politically challenging or even unfeasible. This means that
NGOs will often concentrate in those communities in which local groups are wellorganized and demanding action. In other words, NGO activity is not randomly assigned.
We think that it is unlikely that this selection issue is driving our results for two
reasons. First, we control for the level of local political organization around forestry as
well as the importance of agriculture in the municipalities in our sample, which are both
strong indicators of the political feasibility of forest governance. Second, if selection
alone is driving our results, NGO activity should be associated with positive outcomes,
rather than the negative outcomes that we find.
V. DATA AND METHODS Empirically, we add to the existing literature on NGOs and local governance in
two key ways. First, we explore the interaction between NGO interventions and local
political contexts. Second, we measure the responsiveness of municipal forest policy to
local needs, as rated by the local citizens themselves. Governance effectiveness and
15
responsiveness are conceptually and empirically different (6). While the former is often
measured in terms of policy outputs such as spending or numbers of projects, the latter is
best assessed by local citizens. Because the livelihoods, needs, and policy preferences of
local resource users may differ widely between communities, and because measures of
policy outputs alone do not necessarily tell us about how congruent these actions are with
local needs and preferences, researchers concerned with governance responsiveness must
measure the perceptions of responsiveness among local citizens.
We employ survey data from local governance actors in 200 municipalities in
Bolivia and Guatemala in 2001 and 2007. We augment this survey with municipal-level
biophysical and census data for these two countries. Drawing upon the theories outlined
in the previous section, we develop three models with which to test the relationship
between NGO funding, local political contexts, and responsive governance.
Model 1: Explaining responsive governance In order to capture the effect of NGO funding on local governance
responsiveness, local actors in each municipality were asked to rate the responsiveness of
the local government to rural needs in the forestry sector on a five-point scale. For the
Bolivian municipalities, these ratings come from local community representatives from
El Comité de Vigilancia (Municipal Oversight Committee), the grassroots organization
charged with monitoring the local government under the Popular Participation Law. For
the Guatemalan cases, representatives from the local development council and
representatives of the local water committee rated governance responsiveness. This
means that in both countries, a body that is independent of the municipal government
assessed the responsiveness of local policy. The averaged rating for each municipality is
the dependent variable for Model 1.
16
In order to model the effect of NGO donations on governance responsiveness, we
employ a dummy variable indicating whether or not external NGOs (organizations
originating outside the municipality) donated money or goods to the local government for
forestry projects, as reported by the mayor in each surveyed municipality. We model the
effect of NGO donations as moderated by political pressure from the local community in
the forestry sector. In order to measure community pressure, surveyed mayors were asked
to rate the frequency with which community organizations expressed their preferences in
the forestry sector to the municipal government, on an ordinal scale.
We also control for several political, economic, and biophysical factors. We
control for the level of communication between NGOs and the municipal government.
Mayors were asked to rate the frequency with which NGOs expressed their preferences in
the forestry sector to the municipal government, on an ordinal scale. Previous research
found a strong association between NGO communication and local forest governance
outcomes (29). Similar work also suggests that supervision by the central government
motivates local politicians to prioritize forest governance (27). Surveyed mayors and
local forestry officials reported the number of officials from the central government
monitoring forestry in the municipality. This continuous variable is log-transformed due
to outliers in the distribution.
Because agriculture is important to many local economies and is also the primary
driver of deforestation, it is necessary to control for the importance of agricultural
interests in the municipality. Local officials were asked to rate, on an ordinal scale, the
importance of agriculture in the municipality. Because many municipalities likely face
financial and technical constraints that limit their responsiveness in the forestry sector,
17
we control for local capacity. Mayors were asked to rate the importance of local taxes on
individuals as a source of municipal income. This measure is a proxy for local
institutional capacity, and is also meant to capture the degree to which local governments
have the financial resources to hire staff, purchase equipment, and implement forestry
programs (30). Because the extent of forest resources in a municipality could impact the
choices made by local officials in regards to forest governance, we control for the
proportion of forested land in the municipality using forest cover change maps (Hansen et
al., 2012).
We evaluate Model 1 using data from Bolivian lowland municipalities in 2001
and 2007, and from all other Bolivian and Guatemalan municipalities in 2007. Because
our measure of responsiveness only appears on the 2001 survey for municipalities in
lowland Bolivia, observations for other Bolivian and Guatemalan municipalities in 2001
are excluded from the model. We employ a random effects model with varying intercepts
by municipality. To account for heterogeneity between countries, we include a dummy
variable for Bolivian municipalities in all of the models presented in this paper.
Models 2‐3: Understanding NGO influence While Model 1 tests our general hypothesis that NGO donations will impede
responsiveness where community pressure is low, the next two models are meant to show
a more detailed picture of the causal mechanism. We argue that the key to understanding
this effect is to examine the influence of donor organizations on local policy processes.
Specifically, the literature reviewed in this paper suggests that donor organizations wield
considerable influence in local communities, that their policy goals often differ from
those of local resource users, and that highly influential outside organizations can
18
undermine local involvement in the policy process. We present two models with which to
explore these claims.
Model 2 tests the argument that by contributing material resources, NGOs earn
influence over local policy processes. Local governance actors in each surveyed
municipality in 2007 were asked to rate, on an ordinal scale, the influence of NGOs in the
forestry sector in the municipality. Our dependent variable is the averaged response on
this survey question for each municipality. Our key independent variable is a dummy
indicating whether or not NGOs donated money or goods to the municipality for forestry
projects, as reported by the mayor. Because we hypothesize that NGO donations will
lead to greater NGO influence in communities with lower financial capacity, we
employ an interaction term with our local taxing capacity measure explained in the
previous section. We control for NGO communication as well as the importance of
agriculture in the municipality, using the same measures included in Model 1.
Whereas Model 2 explains the determinants of NGO influence, Model 3 explores
its effects. Specifically, we attempt to show the mechanism by which NGO influence
impedes responsiveness. Our hypothesis is that while greater community involvement
in local forestry decision making will lead to outcomes that are more congruent with
the preferences of the community and thus more responsive, the positive effect of
community involvement will not be as great where NGOs wield disproportionate
influence. In other words, the influence of outside organizations can act to “crowd
out” local voices. In order to test this argument, we employ the same dependent variable
included in Model 1—local governance responsiveness. We model this outcome as
determined by the involvement of the local community organizations in planning with the
19
municipal forestry office. Local governance actors were asked to rate the frequency of
this collaboration on an ordinal scale. Because our hypothesis is that the level of NGO
influence in the municipality moderates the positive effect of community involvement on
responsiveness, we include an interaction term with the same measure of NGO influence
used as the dependent variable in Model 2. As outlined for Model 1, we control for
several political, economic, and biophysical factors that may influence responsiveness.
We evaluate Models 2 and 3 using OLS regression. Because our measure of NGO
influence, a key variable in Models 2 and 3, was not included in the 2001 survey, these
models are cross-sectional for 2007 only.
V. CONCLUSION In this study, we provide evidence for the argument that the effect of NGO funding
on governance outcomes is conditional on local politics. While previous research gave
important insights into the effects of external funding in local governance, we seek to
build upon this literature by connecting it to the incentives of local officials. Especially in
decentralized contexts, the ways in which local governance systems respond to external
involvement depend upon politics. Specifically, we find that the sector-specific political
pressure that organized local groups exert on officials is a crucial determinant of the
effects of external actors on the responsiveness of local policy. Where this political
pressure is low, our findings paint a pessimistic picture of the effects of donor funds. In
these local arrangements, it seems that external donors can harm the responsiveness of
municipal governments to local preferences.
This calls into question the ability of external donors to improve governance in areas
where local civil society groups do not pressure the municipal government to respond to
the preferences of the community. While more financial resources can certainly help
20
local governments to better address problems, this money on its own does not motivate
officials to prioritize the needs of the community in regards to natural resource
governance. Political pressure from below is what motivates local officials to take an
active role in ensuring that funds are spent in ways that are congruent with the
preferences of local people.
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Tables and Figures Table 1: Model results
Model 1
DV1: Governance
responsiveness
-0.945**
(0.420)
-0.105
(0.097)
-0.011
(0.053)
Independent Variables
NGO funding
Community pressure
Local capacity
Model 2
DV2: NGO
influence
0.865**
(0.354)
Model 3
DV3:Governance
responsiveness
0.035
(0.054)
NGO influence
0.147
(0.169)
0.338**
(0.141)
Community involvement in planning
NGO funding * community pressure
0.235*
(0.140)
NGO funding * local capacity
-0.185*
(0.110)
NGO influence * community
involvement
NGO communication
-0.057
(0.057)
Central government personnel monitoring
(log)
Importance of agriculture
Forest cover
Bolivia
Constant
N
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC
0.022
(0.067)
0.054
(0.081)
0.132**
(0.053)
0.005
(0.003)
-0.203
(0.190)
3.462***
(0.379)
173
0.301***
(0.060)
0.045
(0.051)
-0.269*
(0.161)
1.140***
(0.255)
137
0.326
0.295
0.832 (df = 130)
10.476***
(df = 6; 130)
0.142
(0.089)
0.078
(0.052)
-0.001
(0.004)
-0.122
(0.168)
2.505***
(0.404)
154
0.150
0.109
0.930 (df = 146)
3.682***
(df = 7; 146)
-250.958
525.916
563.755
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
25
Figure 1: Model 3 results – marginal effect of community involvement on governance
responsiveness, conditional on NGO influence. Community involvement in municipal forestry
planning has a positive effect on responsiveness, but the effect diminishes as NGO influence
increases.
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