Continuity and Change 21 (1), 2006, 9–35. f 2006 Cambridge University Press
doi:10.1017/S0268416006005777 Printed in the United Kingdom
Towards a better understanding of past
fertility regimes : the ideas and practice of
controlling family size in Chinese history
Z H O N G W E I Z H A O*
ABSTRACT.
Thanks to the progress that has been made in the study of population
history, it has been gradually accepted that fertility in historical China was only
moderate in comparison with the recorded high fertility. However, scholars still
disagree on whether the Chinese could have intentionally controlled their family size.
This article first summarizes recent findings about fertility patterns in historical
China. Then the author provides further evidence of people limiting their family size
in the past, before discussing the impact of traditional beliefs on people’s fertility
behaviour and summarizing the antinatalist ideas and suggestions put forwarded by
Chinese officials and intellectuals over China’s long history. This evidence is then
used to comment on a number of suggestions that have been made about China’s
traditional reproductive behaviour and culture. The article challenges the views that
people’s reproductive strategies aimed in the past to maximize the number of
surviving offspring and that the demand for children (or sons) was always high in
historical China.
Considerable progress has been made in the study of Chinese population
history during the last thirty years. Examinations of surviving family
genealogies and census-type materials have offered further insights into
past demographic regimes and shattered some long-established beliefs. As
a result, scholars have gradually accepted that fertility in historical China
was only moderate in comparison with the recorded high fertility.1 They
still disagree on whether the Chinese could intentionally control their
family size, however.2 In this article I begin by summarizing recent
findings about past fertility patterns. I then present new qualitative data,
* Demography and Sociology Program, Australian National University, and Pembroke
College, Cambridge.
9
ZHONGWEI ZHAO
including evidence of scholarly discussion showing that the Chinese
people deliberately regulated their family size. On the basis of this
evidence, I go on to reassess various suggestions that have made about
China’s traditional reproductive behaviour and culture. My article
challenges the widespread notions that people’s reproductive strategies
aimed in the past to maximize the number of surviving offspring and that
the demand for children (or sons) was always high in historical China.
RECENT FINDINGS ABOUT PAST FERTILITY PATTERNS
AND REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOUR
Very little was known about fertility regimes and reproductive behaviour
in historical China before the 1970s. For a long time, it was widely
believed that ‘the fecundity of the Chinese was without parallel ’ and their
‘birth rate was abnormally high ’.3 This view was held by both foreign
scholars and contemporary Chinese demographers, who regarded past
fertility levels as ‘surprisingly high ’.4 These notions were shaken by a
study conducted by Barclay and his colleagues in the mid-1970s which
showed that marital fertility rates were only moderate among the Chinese
peasant population surveyed around 1930.5 Recent analyses of historical
records and retrospective survey data support this conclusion. These
studies have shown that total marital fertility rates in most of the study
populations were between 5.5 and 7, a level notably lower than those
recorded in many pre-industrial European populations.6
Suggesting that China’s marital fertility rates were relatively low in
comparison with those in western countries is not the same as saying that
the Chinese had on average a smaller number of children than their
European counterparts. Marital fertility rates refer to fertility among
currently married women, and fertility among the entire population is
better indicated by the total fertility rate. For example, marital fertility
rates were high in some historical European populations, but their total
fertility rates were only moderate because the proportion never marrying
and the age at marriage were also high. In contrast, a very high proportion
of women married in most historical Chinese populations, and many of
them did so at young ages. The total fertility rate was between 5 and 6,
fairly close to that recorded in some European countries.7 This level,
nevertheless, is still noticeably lower than that in many high-fertility
populations.
In many historical European countries, women married late and the
mean age at first marriage was often above 25. Besides, a considerable
number of women did not marry at all. Fertility was high among
the married, the newly married in particular. The interval between first
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CONTROLLING FAMILY SIZE IN CHINA
marriage and first birth was only about 15 months in some of the populations.8 In contrast, the proportion of ever-married women was very high
in Chinese history and the age at first marriage was likely to have been
below 18 years. The interval between first marriage and first birth was
relatively long and fertility for the newly married was therefore relatively
low. As the 1982 One-per-Thousand-Population Fertility Survey shows,
the interval between first marriage and first birth was more than three
years for the rural women born between 1914 and 1930. Similar patterns
have been found in the Qing imperial lineage. In other historical Chinese
populations where the records were less complete, the interval was even
longer.9
The inter-birth interval was also relatively long in historical China.
Studies have revealed that the average inter-birth interval was around
three years in the Chinese populations so far investigated. The 1982
One-per-Thousand-Population Fertility Survey found that the interval
was as long as 39 months for rural women born in the early twentieth
century. This might be explained partly by the fact that these women went
through a period of rapid decline in infant and child mortality, when
improving infant survivorship tended to lengthen the time of breastfeeding, which in turn resulted in a longer birth interval. In her genealogical
study, Liu examined the birth intervals of recorded male children. Her
results show that the inter-birth interval (for children of both sexes)
was rather long in the studied lineage population at about three
years. Similar long inter-birth intervals have been observed in the population of Daoyi – an eighteenth- and nineteenth-century community in
northeast China.10 By contrast, some European historical populations
show that birth intervals between the first and the second birth, and
between the second and the third birth, were in the neighbourhood of two
years.11
Women in China also stopped having children at relatively young ages.
In the Qing imperial lineage population investigated by Wang and his
collaborators, women involved in both monogamous and polygynous
marriages completed their reproduction at about 34 years of age. In the 49
lineage populations examined by Liu, and in the Daoyi peasant population studied by Lee and Campbell, mean age at last birth was also rather
low, although this to some extent was affected by the under-registration of
those who died at very young ages. According to the 1982 One-perThousand Fertility Survey, the mean age at last birth was 38 for women
who were born in the early twentieth century and who remained married
after their fiftieth birthday. This, however, was still notably lower than the
mean age at last birth observed in some historical European populations,
which was above 40 years.12
11
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The following phenomena, also closely related to people’s reproductive
strategies and behaviour, are worth mentioning. One is adoption.
Although it varied from area to area and detailed quantitative studies are
still limited, available evidence indicates that adoption was common in
Chinese history. In the Qing imperial lineage population, for example, the
adoption rate (defined as the number of adopted sons per 100 sons who
survived to age 5) varied between 5.9 and 11.8 per hundred between the
early eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century. The rate was
relatively low among the Chinese peasant population surveyed by John
Lossing Buck and his team around 1930, varying between 0.8 and 2.7 per
hundred. In a Taiwanese population studied by Wolf and Huang,
the adoption rate varied from 3.1 to 7.2 per hundred during the early
twentieth century.13
The other phenomenon is infanticide, especially of female children. In
many historical Chinese populations, female infant and child mortality
was higher than that for males. Lee and his collaborators report that in
the Qing imperial lineage, infanticide ‘affected 20 per cent of all births of
females by 1780 ’.14 In another article, they report that female infanticide
was fairly common in Daoyi in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth
centuries. Under severe economic conditions, even boys became victims
of infanticide.15 While infanticide rates of this magnitude might have
not existed everywhere, infanticide, especially female infanticide, was
certainly widespread in the past.
The following observations can be drawn from the above discussion.
The relatively low marital fertility rates found in many historical Chinese
populations are obviously related to the low fertility rate of the newly
married, long inter-birth intervals, and early stopping of reproduction.
If China’s married women had adopted the fertility patterns of their
European counterparts (that is, having a quicker start to childbearing
after marriage, maintaining a shorter inter-birth interval and prolonging
their reproduction to later ages), their fertility levels would be noticeably
higher.
Most of the factors just listed tend to reduce rather than maximize the
potential size of the family. Their existence suggests that a considerable
number of people might not have wanted to have as many children as
possible, even if they were sons. This speculation is, to some extent,
supported by the practices of adoption and infanticide. For example,
although adoption reflected the fact that some families wanted more
children, it also indicates that people who gave away their children,
including sons, did not try to maximize their number. Furthermore,
if Chinese couples had not practised infanticide, the number of their
surviving children would have been larger.
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CONTROLLING FAMILY SIZE IN CHINA
EVIDENCE OF LIMITING FAMILY SIZE IN THE PAST
Since China’s relatively low marital fertility was first revealed in the
mid-1970s, researchers have made considerable efforts to uncover its
underlying causes. It has been suggested that the low fertility among the
newly married might be related to the practice of child marriage, which
tended to go against the natural inclination between spouses. When the
couple were brought up as siblings, childhood association could lead to
an aversion between them, and consequently cause a decrease in the incidence of marital sexual relations.16 The long inter-birth interval has been
related to intensive and prolonged breastfeeding, a factor that could
lengthen the period of postpartum amenorrhea and delay the next pregnancy.17 Another factor that could lead to a long birth interval is the
comparatively low coital frequency observed in some Chinese populations, which directly influences the chance of conception.18 In addition,
poor health, resulting from low living standards and certain kinds of
diseases, and periodic separation between spouses associated with
seasonal migration have also been regarded as factors contributing to
China’s moderate fertility.19
Scholars working in related research areas have largely agreed that all
these factors have played their parts in shaping the observed fertility
patterns, although the importance of each individual factor has varied
markedly both across regions and over time. Scholars have not agreed on
the question of whether there was deliberate control of family size or
fertility in the past, however.
Malthus asserted some two hundred years ago that, in contrast to
European countries, virtually no ‘preventive check ’ to population growth
existed in China.20 This view has led many contemporary scholars to
conclude that no voluntary control of family size or fertility existed in the
past. Although they acknowledge that marital fertility was relatively low
in historical China, they continue to insist that Chinese women did not
restrict their family size or their fertility. ‘Whatever the reason for moderate fertility in China, it was not deliberate fertility control.’21 Yet, these
notions have been challenged in recent years. Some researchers contend
that, while important to our understanding of past fertility patterns, the
reasons listed above are not sufficient to explain the complicated fertility
behaviour observed in Chinese history; intentional fertility control existed
in the past and contributed to the relatively low fertility.22 Debates on
these issues are still continuing.23
Those denying the existence of such control claim that there is no
evidence of people wanting to control their family size or fertility in the
past.24 This seems to be a mistake, however, since evidence of deliberate
13
ZHONGWEI ZHAO
control of family size or fertility is readily available both in ancient times
and in the recent past. One such example is the phenomenon of ‘ Sheng Zi
Bu Ju ’, which literally means having sons or children but not bringing
them up.25 Because many of these children were killed at birth or exposed
and left to die, ‘Sheng Zi Bu Ju ’ is generally regarded as infanticide. The
earliest record of ‘ Sheng Zi Bu Ju ’ was made more than two thousand
years ago, and it has been observed in almost all historical periods since.26
The following discussion will concentrate on ‘Sheng Zi Bu Ju ’ in the Song
Dynasty (960–1279 AD), when the practice was widespread and well
recorded.
The Song period is conventionally divided into the Northern Song
(960–1126 AD) when the capital was in Kaifeng in Henan province, and
the Southern Song (1127–1279 AD) when the capital was located in
Hangzhou in Zhejiang province. This transition took place because the
Northern Song was defeated by and lost a large amount of territory to the
Jin (1115–1234 AD), a state in the north. During this period China,
especially the south of China, witnessed rapid economic development. Its
population was likely to have reached more than 100 million. Migration
on a large scale from north to south was also recorded. It is during this
time that ‘Sheng Zi Bu Ju’ was observed in many areas and in many
official documents, personal writings, regional gazetteers and historical
records of other kinds.
A number of observations can be drawn from the available evidence.
‘Sheng Zi Bu Ju’ was practised widely, and is found in the regions of
Fujian Lu, Liangzhe Lu, Jinghu Nanbei Lu and Jiangnan Dongxi Lu,
which roughly cover the area of today’s Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu,
Hunan, Hubei, Anhui and Jiangxi provinces. They made up a very large
part of the region that was under the jurisdiction of the Song government,
and included both economically less developed and advanced areas. The
problem of ‘ Sheng Zi Bu Ju ’ was particularly severe in the prefectures of
Jianzhou, Chuzhou, Tingzhou, Nanjianzhou, Shaowujun, Jianningfu,
Quzhou, Yanzhou, Ezhou, Yuezhou, Xinzhou and Raozhou.27 Song Hui
Yao Ji Gao, a collection of Song laws, regulations and other historical
materials compiled by Xu Song in the nineteenth century also records that
this phenomenon existed in many areas, and that people ‘killed their
children if the number exceeded their expectation, regardless of their
sex ’.28
‘ Sheng Zi Bu Ju’ attracted wide attention and was noted and discussed
by many prominent politicians and scholars including Su Shi (1037–1101
AD), Yang Shi (1053–1135 AD), Zhu Song (1097–1143 AD), Fan
Chengda (1126–1193 AD), Lü Zuqian (1137–1181 AD) and Li
Gang (1083–1140 AD).29 The fact that it was mentioned by these
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CONTROLLING FAMILY SIZE IN CHINA
extremely well-known figures in Chinese history provides a clear indication that ‘Sheng Zi Bu Ju ’ must have been regarded as a rather serious
problem during their lifetimes. There is also evidence that action was
taken by Song governments and officials to eliminate the phenomenon of
‘Sheng Zi Bu Ju ’. Imperial laws and decrees prohibiting the practice were
promulgated, and financial support was provided to poor people who
could not raise their children. Even the emperor intervened directly
through an imperial edict. ‘Ju Zi Cang ’, literately meaning grain storehouses for bringing up children, were purposely built (often voluntarily)
by local gentry and officials to help poor families to feed their children.30
It is particularly notable that many scholars recorded the family size
that people wanted to keep. According to Su Shi, in parts of Hubei and
Hunan ‘peasants usually wanted to have two sons and one daughter. If
more were born, they would be killed. ’31 Yang Shi noted that in parts of
Fujian ‘people had children according to their economic ability. Even the
gentry behaved accordingly … Rich families had no more than two sons
and one daughter. Middle and lower families generally had only one
son. ’32 Also in Fujian, Li Gang observed that ‘people kept only one or
two children or sons, and the rest would be killed by drowning ’.33
A similar practice was found in Jiangxi, where according to Zhu Song,
‘people wanted to have only two sons, they drowned all the rest thereafter
regardless of their sex ’.34 All these records indicate a strong tendency
among people not to maximize their family size.
The wide practice of ‘Sheng Zi Bu Ju ’ was probably the result of several
factors. The ones most frequently noted in the records were heavy rates of
taxation and famine. Another was the impact of inheritance and marriage
customs. In some areas, Fujian for example, family property was often
divided while the parents were still alive. To avoid excessive division of
their property, parents sometimes killed their younger children at birth,
occasionally with the assistance of their older children.35 Large dowries
were essential for marriage in many areas and were regarded as an
important reason why female children were killed.36 The high cost of
marriage or bride price could lead to similar results. In addition to the
motives listed above, it is noteworthy that some rich families had only a
moderate number of children and that poor families had even fewer, because people wanted ‘Ji Chan Yu Zi ’ or ‘Ji Chan Shou Kou ’, literately
meaning ‘ having children according to their ability and wealth’.37 In other
words, their decisions to control family size or reproduction stemmed
directly from the consideration of their long-term economic interests.
Strictly speaking, the surviving Song records cannot be regarded as
evidence of intentional fertility control, because it is the number of
surviving children rather than the number of births that is being
15
ZHONGWEI ZHAO
controlled. Nor do I intend to suggest that infanticide is the same as the
control of fertility. It is undeniable, however, that as early as about a
thousand years ago a considerable number of people wanted to limit their
family size and that this was achieved largely by means of infanticide.
Recent investigation also shows that China’s low marital fertility was at
least partly affected by deliberate intervention. Wang and his collaborators suggested that in the Qing imperial lineage, low marital fertility
apparently resulted from a later start to childbearing, long birth intervals
and early cessation of reproduction. Lee and Campbell also discovered
that in Daoyi, the timing and frequency of having children varied
according to economic circumstances, such as fluctuations in the price of
grain and differences in family wealth, and social factors, such as household structure, family position and social status in the community. People
were able to adjust their reproductive behaviour in response to changes in
their socio-economic conditions.38
That people did consciously control their fertility in the past has also
been confirmed by my examination of fertility data on some 30,000 rural
women born between 1914 and 1930 that were collected by the 1982 Oneper-Thousand Fertility Survey. These women had little or no education
and rather high birth rates. Even so, evidence of deliberate fertility control
was found among them. The sex composition of the children that couples
already had exerted a noticeable impact on their fertility-regulating
behaviour. A larger proportion of women who had previously had only
daughters went on to have a further child ; their birth interval was shorter
and their mean age at last birth was higher. These points also applied to a
large extent to those who had had only sons in their first few births. In
contrast, a smaller proportion of those who already had both sons and
daughters – especially when sons outnumbered daughters – went on to
have a further child ; their birth interval was somewhat longer and their
mean age at last birth was lower. Behaviour of this kind was already
observable after women had had two or three children, though it became
more evident as their family size increased. The study also revealed
that women’s reproductive behaviour was affected by the survivorship
of their children, and that their age at last birth was related to the time
when they had their first surviving sons.39 Other things being equal,
women whose children survived and who had their first surviving son at
younger ages tended to stop their reproduction earlier than those whose
children died young and those who had their first surviving son at older
ages.40
Evidence of this kind is also revealed by other studies. For example, one
study involved interviews with 50 old women in Lianjiang county in
Fujian province in the mid-1990s. It found that the mean number of
16
CONTROLLING FAMILY SIZE IN CHINA
children was 5.9 among 42 women with completed fertility and that their
mean age at last birth (computed for 40 women) was 38.3. While these
women were not asked whether they had deliberately controlled their
fertility, the indirect evidence collected by Zheng and his colleagues
indicates that people had the intention to do so : ‘When women were
asked about their ideal number of children, the overwhelming majority
said that they did not want to have many children. ’41 A recent ethnographic investigation also suggests that people in Xiaoshan, Zhejiang
province, not only wanted to limit their fertility but some of them actually
did it through the use of traditional methods.42
A related question is about the extent to which contraception and
abortion were available or used in the past. Direct quantitative evidence is
difficult to obtain, especially among pre-twentieth-century populations.
Nonetheless, the available records show that China has a long history of
people using medical substances and other measures to induce abortion
and to prevent pregnancy. For example, it is recorded that two thousand
years ago potions were used to cause abortion. Xiao Pin Fang, a medical
book written in the mid-fifth century AD and regarded as essential reading for doctors during the Tang dynasty (618–907 AD), includes seven
prescriptions for abortion. Since then, a large number of medical books
have been written which include sections detailing medical substances
and prescriptions believed to prevent or terminate pregnancies or cause
sterility. Evidence of using acupuncture or other methods for inducing
abortions has also been found in historical records. According to some
studies, there has been a noticeable increase in prescriptions for contraception since the Ming dynasty (1368–1644 AD). Medical treatises such as
Ben Cao Gang Mu, Jing Yue Quan Shu and Fu Ke Yu Chi all collected such
prescriptions.43 It is possible that knowledge of these and other methods
of controlling births was fairly accessible to common people. Medical
substances believed to be useful for such purposes were also increasingly
available. Records suggest that abortive drugs were already sold in the
market in the Tang period (618–907 AD) and became more available
during the Song (960–1279 AD) and Yuan (1206–1368 AD) periods.
Studies show that abortive medicines were produced in large quantities
in certain areas during the reign of Kang Xi (1662–1722). Evidence of
people – from members of the imperial family to ordinary citizens – using
such drugs has been widely found.44 Bray has also shown that traditional
medicines were used for abortion in late imperial China and argued that
this could have had a flattening effect on past fertility patterns ; although
the efficacy of these methods is not as high as those we possess today,
laboratory analysis indicates that some are effective in dealing with
unwanted births.45
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ZHONGWEI ZHAO
T R A D I T I O N A L B E L I E F S, S O C I A L R E A L I T I E S A N D
FERTILITY BEHAVIOUR
The evidence presented in the previous section indicates that intentional
control of family size certainly existed in the past. Yet some scholars fail
to recognize this fact and evidence such as that provided above has often
been neglected. One explanation for this situation appears to be the strong
belief held by many that traditional China had a very pronatalist culture.
Some scholars remain convinced that through the ages the Chinese have
wanted ‘ as many children as possible, preferably sons ’.46 ‘The Chinese
not only liked to have children, they liked to have many. ’47 ‘Far from
limiting the number of sons reared, Chinese families made every effort to
maximize the number. ’48 These notions appear to be so deeply embedded
that some scholars simply cannot accept that Chinese people could
have deliberately controlled their family size in the past. Given the
evidence reported above, however, these stereotypical views need serious
re-examination.
China’s traditional culture and its impact on fertility behaviour should
not be oversimplified. While popular sayings encouraging high fertility
and large families were commonplace in the past, China’s reproductive
culture was far more complex than that portrayed by some scholars.
It included both pronatalist and antinatalist components.
Two popular sayings or beliefs are frequently cited in discussion of
traditional Chinese culture. The first is ‘Bu Xiao You San, Wu Hou Wei
Da ’, or ‘Out of three unfilial actions, being without an heir was the
worst. ’49 This was asserted by Mencius (c. 372–289 BC), one of the most
prominent Confucian scholars in Chinese history, and has been passed
down from generation to generation for more than two thousand years.
The second is ‘Duo Zi Duo Fu ’, literately meaning ‘More sons, more
blessing. ’ The earliest version of this saying can be found in ancient poems
and it has also had more than two thousand years of history.50 Although
the two beliefs are often quoted together as proof of China’s pronatalist
culture, their emphasis and impact on people’s reproductive behaviour are
very different.51
The focal point of the first saying is the continuation of the family line.
Under its influence, a strong preference for sons is likely to prevail. Sons
are essential to the parents because they, rather than daughters are
thought to bear the responsibility for carrying the family line to the future
generation. This belief, nevertheless, does not require parents to have as
many children or sons as possible. All that is required is to have enough
sons to feel reasonably secure that some of them will survive to adulthood
and take over the responsibility of continuing the family line. At this
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CONTROLLING FAMILY SIZE IN CHINA
point, the parents can stop having children and turn their attention to
other matters including, for example, preparing for their sons’ marriages
or helping to bring up grandchildren. If mortality is relatively low, parents
can reduce the number of births accordingly. Cultural influence of this
kind helps to explain, at least in part, why in some historical populations a
considerable number of women did not maximize the number of their
children but stopped childbearing at relatively young ages, and why the
age at which women had their last birth is related to their age at having
their first surviving son.
The second belief, by contrast, stresses the advantages of having many
children and especially sons. Under this influence, people would continue
having children until their ability was terminated by physiological factors.
If people strongly believed that ‘More sons ’ meant ‘more blessing ’ and
made every effort to achieve such a goal, then the survival of their existing
children and changing mortality levels would have no noticeable impact
on their fertility behaviour and fertility patterns.
The two beliefs are inter-related and their influences are difficult to
disentangle. Acknowledging their differences and their relative impact on
people’s reproductive behaviour is important for our understanding of
past fertility regimes, as the following examples show. The previous
section revealed that as early as a thousand years ago many families, rich
and poor alike, actively limited their number of children, though still
maintaining a preference for male children. This behaviour indicates that
people wanted to have sons to continue the family line, but does not
support the view that people wanted to have as many children or sons as
possible. Similarly, adoption was a way of ensuring the continuity of the
family line. A man who did not have sons was likely to adopt one or more
of his brothers’ sons. When the eldest brother had no sons, his younger
brothers often gave their own sons to him as heirs, even if the adoptee was
their first son or the only son they had. Occasionally, some men gave away
all their sons to their elder brothers, ending up with no heirs for themselves.52 This behaviour suggests that the continuation of the family line,
especially the direct line through the eldest son, was important to these
people. To those who gave away their sons, having many children was less
important than preventing the line of the larger family, or that of their
eldest brothers, from being broken.
That the second belief also had a marked impact on people’s reproductive behaviour is evident from numerous pronatalist sayings and the
high fertility observed in considerable parts of the population. However,
fertility behaviour is affected not only by popular beliefs or culturally
constructed expectations but also by the social reality that people must
face every day. Because of the association that existed between family size
19
ZHONGWEI ZHAO
and family wealth, many people might have had the goal of raising many
sons at the outset of their reproduction. However, because of the difficulty
and the high cost of bringing up children, some of them would soon
realize that having many children was a mixed blessing that could lead to
deterioration of their living conditions. They would change their attitudes
and behaviour accordingly. Besides, a considerable number of parents
might be fully aware of the disadvantages of having many children and
never hold the view ‘More sons, more blessing. ’ Reproductive behaviour
of the Song period sheds light on some of these issues.
The general position of the Song government was to encourage population growth because it helped to increase revenue and the power of the
state, which were needed to repel the threat from the north and to prevent
military failure. This partly explains why infanticide was regarded as
a major social issue causing the government deep concern. In spite of
military weakness, the Song witnessed rapid economic development,
especially in the south. It was ‘ahead of the rest of the world in technological invention, material production, political philosophy, government ’
and in many other areas.53 A macro-environment of this kind was perhaps
favourable to high fertility. However, it was under these conditions that
‘Sheng Zi Bu Ju ’ was widely observed.
From the records presented in the previous section and elsewhere, it is
clear that a considerable number of people limited their family size in
response to economic considerations such as preventing poverty, excessive
division of family property and the payment of costly dowries. The Song
scholars and officials noted that people were accustomed to ‘Ji Chan
Shou Kou ’ or ‘ Ji Chan Yu Zi ’ – deciding on the number of children they
intended to bring up according to their economic ability and wealth.54 In
these circumstances, the prevalence of ‘Sheng Zi Bu Ju’ or other similar
practices were by no means a simple outcome of son-preference, but were
a sad consequence of people’s prudent consideration of their long-term
interest. Similar evidence was revealed by Han’s recent ethnographic
study : while some women said they had hoped to have as many children
as possible, many stopped childbearing in their early thirties because of
the economic difficulty.55
In addition to economic constraints, other factors were also likely to
have been considered when people made their decisions about reproduction. As Zhu Song observed, ‘people of Fujian did not like to have
many children or sons ’.56 When the gentry and rich families chose to have
two sons and one daughter rather than to maximize the number of their
children, they apparently had something else in mind, which overrode the
desire of having a large family. Regardless of what were the underlying
reasons, the decision was probably a conscious one. In a society that was
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CONTROLLING FAMILY SIZE IN CHINA
dominated by a pronatalist culture, reaching such a decision might also be
difficult and painful, because it went against the established social norm.
A question that the sceptic may want to ask is why fertility in historic
China was not lower, if a considerable number of people did not intend to
have as many children as possible. For example, why was the observed
total fertility rate about 5 or 6 rather than 2 or 3? This may be related to
the following facts. First of all, as I said earlier, a considerable number of
people did want many children, or sons, and pursued such a goal when it
was feasible. Second, the overwhelming majority of the Chinese wanted
sons to continue the family line. When people said they wanted one or two
sons, what was implied was sons who would survive to adulthood. In
other words, they were not referring to the number of births but to ‘net
reproduction ’, which was entirely reasonable and legitimate given the
high rates of mortality. In a mortality regime similar to that observed in
the Chinese peasant population in the early 1930s, the pursuit of an average of 1.5 sons surviving to age 20 would require a total fertility rate of 5
or 6. Finally, many people lacked knowledge of reproduction and means
of contraception, even though some relevant beliefs and traditional
methods existed. This is also a major reason why many people used
infanticide to control the number of their children and why strictly defined
fertility-regulating behaviour was less observable.
THE INTELLECTUAL DISCUSSION ABOUT CONTROLLING
POPULATION GROWTH AND FAMILY SIZE
A further reason why some scholars argue that there was no deliberate
control of family size or fertility in the past is that they believe that
antinatalist ideas were rarely discussed among Chinese intellectuals and
that ‘when Chinese officials worried about the balance of population
and resources, they did not advocate birth control as the solution ’.57
Such arguments reflect a lack of understanding of Chinese culture and
the historical development of thought about population in China.
Population issues were discussed among scholars and politicians
more than two thousand years ago. Although Chinese traditional culture
had many pronatalist components, ‘antinatalist ’ views were also
promoted.
The disadvantages of having a large number of children have long been
recognized by the Chinese. Acceleration of population growth could upset
the balance between population and subsistence, and lead to falling living
standards, growing political instability and even social upheaval. Having
a large number of children also increased the burden on the parental
generation, at least when children were young. In addition, it might lead
21
ZHONGWEI ZHAO
to tensions between the family members and result in family disintegration, because China’s traditional inheritance system generally required
family property to be divided equally among sons.
The impact of rapid population growth on the society was discussed by
Han Fei Zi (c. 280–233 BC) more than two thousand years ago.
According to Han, people had lived peacefully in ancient time, because
the population was small in comparison with the resources. After noting
that having five children was not regarded as many in his times, Han
pointed out that ‘each child may in his or her turn beget five offspring, so
that before the death of the grandfather there may be twenty-five grandchildren. As a result, people have become numerous and supplies scanty ;
toil has become hard and provisions meager. Therefore people quarrel so
much that, though rewards are doubled and punishments repeated,
disorder is inevitable.’58 The negative impact on families of having many
children was addressed by Wang Fan Zhi (c. 590–c. 660 AD), a poet living
in the Sui (581–618 AD) and early Tang (618–907 AD) period. Many of
Wang’s poems describe the social life of his time and a few particularly
mentioned families and reproduction. In one of his poems, Wang
recorded that in some places the rich had a small number of children, but
the poor had large families.59 He apparently believed that these people
could not get rid of poverty because they had too many children. Wang
advocated that having one (a capable son) was enough and this would free
people from the vexations and tensions associated with family division.
He further suggested in another poem that even having no children should
not be regarded as a problem, as this could free parents from worrying
about the compulsory military service and other types of levy and corvée
that would be imposed on their children. These propositions were probably among the earliest calls for controlling family size that had both a
clear rationale and a well-defined target.60 It is very unlikely that these
views did not reflect any social reality and did not have any impact on
people’s reproductive behaviour.
According to the available records, scholarly discussion of population
issues has gradually increased since the Tang, and this is particularly the
case in the Ming–Qing period (1368–1911 AD) when population growth
became increasingly marked. In 1614 in a memorial to the throne Dong Qi
Chang (1555–1636 AD) estimated that since the founding of the Ming
dynasty, its population had increased about five times.61 A few decades
later, Xu Guang Qi (1562–1633 AD), a scholar, scientist and official,
suggested on the basis of his analysis of population growth in the Ming
imperial lineage that a population would double its size in about thirty
years if there were no destructive war. He called this ‘Sheng Ren Zhi Lü ’,
or the rate of population growth. Xu’s calculation is very close to that of
22
CONTROLLING FAMILY SIZE IN CHINA
Thomas Malthus who estimated (160 years later) that an unchecked
population would double its size every twenty-five years.62 Xu’s viewpoint
had a noticeable impact on demographic thinking in China in the next two
to three centuries.
Feng Meng Long (1574–1646 AD), a contemporary of Xu, also made
comments about population growth. He pointed out that if a couple had
only one son and one daughter, the size of the population would stabilize
forever. If a couple had two sons and two daughters, the population size
would double every generation. Its growth would never stop, and how
could this be supported ?63 Feng apparently believed that this could be
solved only through population control. Similar views were expressed by
others in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, which are not detailed here because of space constraints. However, the population theories
of the following two scholars are particularly worth noting.
Hong Liang Ji (1746–1809 AD), an official and scholar, believed that
the speed of population growth witnessed in the early Qing Dynasty had
overtaken the growth of means of subsistence. Such population pressure
would lead to deterioration in the standard of living and various kinds of
social problems as well as instability. As has been pointed out by
Silberman, Hong’s formulation of the principle of geometric population
growth outstripping the slow increase in food production, ‘his idea about
the survival of the fittest’ and ‘his reliance on natural check’ were all very
similar to those proposed by Malthus. Hong’s theory was developed
independently of Malthus and a few years earlier, and has earned him
the title of the ‘ Chinese Malthus ’.64 In spite of giving a fairly coherent
expression to his population theory, Hong did not make any detailed
recommendations to control family size or fertility.
Such recommendations were, however, proposed by Wang Shi Duo
(1814–1889 AD), although some of them were very cruel and discriminatory in nature. Wang lived in a period when the Qing empire was in
decline and when problems brought about by rapid population growth
had become more evident. Wang was a historical geographer. He also
served as a consultant for some high-ranking officials, but he never took
any such position himself. Wang held extreme views on population
growth and believed that all problems were caused by overpopulation.
According to Wang, rapid population growth had led to land being overcultivated and becoming no longer able to provide adequate subsistence
for the people. This had led to poverty and social upheaval. To solve these
problems, the population had to be reduced in size by 70 or 80 per cent.
On the basis of these judgements, Wang proposed some extreme measures
which are summarized below.65
23
ZHONGWEI ZHAO
Firstly, the population should be reduced through wide use of capital
punishment, including executing all peasant rebels and many other types
of criminals as defined by Wang. Secondly, late marriage should be
enforced. Men should marry at age 30 and women at 25 : men marrying
before 25 and women before 20 should be executed. Thirdly, celibacy
should be promoted. Houses of virgins (Tong Zhen Nü Yuan), temples
and nunneries should be encouraged. Poor people and those who could
not support themselves should be prohibited from marrying. Widows
and widowers who had children should not be allowed to remarry, and
those who did so should be executed. Fourthly, the number of children in
a family, especially daughters, should be limited. According to
Wang, poor families should not have daughters. If girls were born, they
should be killed. Infanticide (through drowning) should be rewarded.
Rich families should have one daughter only. For those having two
or more, taxes should be doubled. The same policy should apply to
those having more than two sons. Unattractive children should be
killed at birth. Fifthly, drugs and medical substances that prevented or
terminated pregnancy or caused sterility should be made widely available
and should be used by women after having a son to prevent further
pregnancies.66
Many of Wang’s suggestions are obviously very cruel, brutal, inhuman
and also naive, but they show that Chinese scholars worried about the
increasing population pressure, and understood that population increase
and fertility could be controlled through postponing marriage, lowering
the proportion marrying, preventing women from getting pregnant,
limiting the number of births and wide use of contraception and abortion.
They advocated these measures as solutions for China’s population
problems. To achieve the goal of limiting population growth, they wanted
to use not only laws and stringent government regulation but also economic means such as rewards and extra tax payments.
As indicated by its title, in this section I have summarized antinatalist
ideas and suggestions put forward by Chinese intellectuals and officials in
the last two thousand years. Pronatalist views and cultural tradition,
which often had a stronger influence, have not been discussed. Those who
want to gain a more complete picture of the history of China’s population
thought should consult some of the references listed in the endnotes and
other relevant materials. The evidence presented above has shown that
while the pronatalist ideology largely dominated official and scholarly
discourse of population issues in the past, antinatalist viewpoints were
also promoted from time to time. They were likely to be a reflection
of social reality and surely could have reached ordinary people and
reinforced antinatalist tendencies.
24
CONTROLLING FAMILY SIZE IN CHINA
THE USE OF HISTORICAL OR PUBLISHED DATA IN THE STUDY
OF POPULATION HISTORY
Investigation of Chinese population history has made considerable progress, but it is in the early stages of development. The number of experienced researchers who work in the field remains small. Some studies are
still exploratory in nature. Technical and methodological development is
rather limited. Many data problems have not yet been solved successfully.
For these reasons, careful use and interpretation of historical and
reported population data become more important for a better understanding of China’s past demographic regimes. It is because of these
considerations that the following questions are addressed briefly in this
section.
China’s historical population data are known for both their abundance
and their problems. Most individual-level data, for example family
or lineage genealogies and census-type materials, suffer from underregistration. At present, the best historical data known to researchers are
probably the Qing imperial genealogy, but even this data set underrecords a considerable number of people, females in particular, in the later
period. The quality of China’s aggregated population figures is also
questionable. In addition to other reasons, their quality depends on
governments strength, stability, influence and ability to collect the data.
Fluctuations in the recorded population size may therefore be a result of
actual demographic changes, or they could be an indication of government success or failure. Because of these problems, some of these data
cannot be used directly. Demographic rates computed from the data may
also be misleading unless they are carefully adjusted.
Besides problems of under-registration, some historical materials are
potentially biased data sources. For example, I have pointed out elsewhere that many available genealogies are records of surviving patrilineages. Other things being equal, these lineages, especially the first few
generations of the lineages, tended to have less severe mortality, a greater
proportion marrying, a larger mean number of children (especially of
sons), a higher sex ratio, and faster inter-generational population growth
rate that the general population. Accordingly, demographic indicators
computed from these records may not accurately represent the average
demographic rate of the entire population, even if they were not affected
by distortions of other types. Using these data for demographic research
requires taking special precautions.67
Most studies have attempted to adjust their data to overcome the
prevalence of under-recording. In doing so researchers use a variety
of assumptions and procedures, and this may prevent their studies from
25
ZHONGWEI ZHAO
being strictly comparable. For the same reason, researchers have often
modified standard demographic methods, which could differentiate their
results from those computed in conventional ways. Failure to treat
these differences carefully could result in misuse and misinterpretation of
published results.
For example, many Chinese genealogies did not record dates of
marriage. In some cases wives were excluded if they did not have sons. It is
therefore difficult to identify the men who were actually married but had
no sons. Some studies therefore have counted only the number of sons of
those who had sons, or whose sons were recorded in the genealogy, and
estimated their fertility rates accordingly. The authors usually explain
their procedures and acknowledge the difference between their figures and
the conventional fertility indicators.68 But such notes and the difference
between these results and those derived from all married couples including
those without sons have been ignored by some scholars.69 The difference
between the two is considerable, however. For example, Liu’s and
Telfords studies show that slightly more than one-fifth of married men
had no sons in the lineage populations studied by them.70 This is close
to the results reported by me. Under the conditions specified in my
simulation study, nearly 20 per cent of married males would have no sons.
The mean number of sons is 2.5 for all married men and 3.0 for those
having at least one son.71 If the latter figure is used as an indicator of the
fertility level for the entire married population, the fertility level would be
considerably overestimated.
The fact that studies conducted early in the development of a discipline
sometimes contain mistakes further underlines the need for caution when
citing reported results. For example, because Chinese genealogies rarely
provide detailed information on daughters, overall fertility levels are often
estimated from the number of male children, usually by employing a
sex-ratio multiplier. This method in itself is valid, though some scholars
have misused the sex-ratio multiplier and consequently overestimated
fertility rates in the population.72 These results have then been used
without question by other researchers in their discussion of past fertility
regimes. While issues of this kind are less important in comparison with
those addressed in other sections of this article, they can affect our
understanding of China’s past demographic regimes, and should be given
adequate attention.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Evidence reported in this article and elsewhere shows that marital fertility
in China in the past was moderate in comparison with that recorded in
26
CONTROLLING FAMILY SIZE IN CHINA
historical European populations, and that this was closely related to
relatively low fertility among the newly married, long inter-birth intervals
and early stopping of childbearing. Fertility patterns of this kind were
related to the practice of child marriage, intensive and prolonged breastfeeding, comparatively low coital frequency, poor health and periodic
separation. These factors are, however, unable to explain sufficiently well
the complex reproductive behaviour found in Chinese history. Recent
examination of historical population data has revealed that intentional
control of family size or fertility existed in the past.
In Chinese history, popular beliefs and traditional culture were dominated by pronatalist ideas. Antinatalist viewpoints also existed, however.
Traditional Chinese culture was not as simple as that suggested by
some scholars. Although popular sayings promoted large families,
notions discouraging high fertility were also expressed from time to time.
In contrast to the claim that they did not advocate population and fertility
control, Chinese scholars and government officials were concerned with
the danger of uncontrolled population growth and made comments and
suggestions about it. Intellectual concerns of this kind increased markedly
in the last four hundred years, just as in other parts of the world. This was
almost certainly not coincidental given the worldwide growth in population taking place at the time. The opinions expressed by scholars and
officials did not emerge from a vacuum, and they were most likely a
reflection of a common concern over rapid population growth and related
issues.
Although Chinese families wanted sons to continue their family line, a
considerable number of them had no desire to raise as many children or
sons as possible. Their reproductive strategies and behaviour appear
to have been guided by their conscious thinking rather than passively
following the predominant culture or belief. It is this observation that
makes the evidence presented in the second section of this article relevant
to the controversy about the intentional control of family size or fertility
in the past. As has been suggested, strictly speaking ‘Sheng Zi Bu Ju ’
should not be seen as fertility control, but the rationale and the underlying
causes that led to such behaviour are extremely important for our
understanding of past reproductive strategies and behaviour. The widespread infanticide observed during the Song period is an indication that
people consciously controlled their family size. More importantly, such
decisions were often reached on the basis of the family’s economic
resources and the number and sex composition of the children they
already had. This is consistent with the practice observed in recent history.
The evidence suggests that, as early as a thousand years ago, a large
number of Chinese already wished to regulate their family size, although
27
ZHONGWEI ZHAO
the means they used is now regarded as unacceptable. This was at least
partly due to the lack of effective contraceptive methods. Had they
been widely available, the incidence of infanticide might have been less
prevalent.
Examination of past fertility regimes and reproductive behaviour helps
to improve our understanding of recent population changes and demographic theories. The conventional wisdom about pre-transition fertility
regimes can be summarized as : fertility was high (at least within marriage)
because people did not know about family limitation or had no intention
of controlling their childbearing. This may be true for some historical
European populations where evidence of deliberate control of family size
remains scanty. But whether this is applicable to other countries needs
further investigation. In assessing the demographic transition in western
countries, Coale listed three preconditions for sustained fertility decline:
fertility must be within the calculus of conscious choice ; reduced fertility
must be perceived as advantageous; and effective techniques of fertility
reduction must be available.73 Evidence indicates that some of these
conditions were already met or partly met in the Song Dynasty. That
people had children according to their economic ability indicates that
such decisions were within the calculus of conscious choice. Those who
wanted to terminate their children’s lives apparently felt that such actions
had some advantages. Their desire to control their family size was so
strong that they turned to infanticide when the necessary knowledge of
reproduction and effective methods of contraception were not available.
These actions were not exactly the same as fertility control ; nonetheless
they show that people’s intentional control of family size existed in the
past.
In our contemporary demographic literature, mortality and fertility
changes are often measured independently. For example, in the discussion
of fertility decline and demographic transition, the total fertility rate or
the average number of births have been widely used. This may be regarded
as conventional by demographers. However, whether people in the past
generally thought about the issue in the same way is a different matter.
When people talked about the number of children they wanted, they
usually referred to the number of surviving children (or children surviving
to a certain age) rather than the number of births. This is entirely
reasonable, given high mortality, because many children died very young
and could neither continue the family line nor bring any benefit to the
existing family or their parents. Realizing this fact has important implications for our understanding of the pre-transitional fertility regime.
Total fertility rates in most historical Chinese populations studied were
between 5 and 6. Counting only the number of births leaves the
28
CONTROLLING FAMILY SIZE IN CHINA
impression of high or relatively high fertility, especially by the modern
standard. If the impact of mortality is taken into account, however, these
rates can only be regarded as moderate and sufficient to ensure that the
reproductive goals of most people would be achieved. Accordingly, the
question that we should ask is not why historical fertility was not lower,
but why did it not reach higher levels? Such a question would lead to a
different interpretation of the fertility or demographic transition. As has
been commented by Wilson and Airey, judging from the gross measure,
fertility was high in the pre-transitional society. The transition is largely a
process of fertility decline. Viewed in terms of net replacement, however,
the net reproduction rate was low prior to the transition. During the
process of transition, it first rose and then fell.74 The crucial question is not
whether these measures could be used in describing the fertility or demographic transition, but which of the measures might indicate more accurately the nature of this transition.
This also leads to the question of the cost of children in pre-transitional
society, which is an important concept in population studies and one used
widely in explaining fertility change, especially after Gary Becker formulated the demand theory.75 It has been generally accepted that because
the cost of children was relatively low in the past, people did not want to
control their fertility. This changed in the process of modernization. The
relative cost of children increased. People consequently started limiting
the number of their children and fertility declined. The theory has long
been a subject of debate. One of the controversial issues is the way in
which the cost of children is estimated. As indicated by this study, severe
infant and child mortality was an important fact that people had to confront in the past. While it directly influenced people’s fertility behaviour,
such impact seems not to have been dealt with adequately in measuring
the cost of children. The difference and the link between the cost of a
child (or a birth) and that of a surviving child (or a child surviving to
a certain age) have not been carefully addressed. This is partly affected
by our thinking in the contemporary world, where low mortality keeps
the cost of the two fairly close. In past high mortality regimes, however,
the difference between them was considerable. What was important
to the parents was not the cost of producing a child or a birth, but the
cost of a surviving child. In estimating the cost of a surviving child,
the cost of those who died at birth or in their childhood had to be taken
into account. From the parents’ point of view, this was a cost they had
to pay in the past, although it may not be regarded as a component of
the cost of children as defined by contemporary scholars. Without
taking these factors into account, the cost of surviving children can be
considerably underestimated.
29
ZHONGWEI ZHAO
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank Mac Boot, Zhang Haiyan, Adrian Hayes, Richard Smith,
Tony Wrigley and colleagues in the Demography and Sociology Program of the Australian
National University for their comments and help.
ENDNOTES
1 See G. W. Barclay et al., ‘A reassessment of the demography of traditional rural
China’, Population Index 42 (1976), 606–35 ; Ansley J. Coale, ‘Fertility in rural China: a
reconfirmation of the Barclay reassessment’, in Susan B. Hanley and Arthur P. Wolf
eds., Family and population in East Asian history (Stanford, 1985), 186–95 ; Stevan
Harrell, ‘ Introduction: microdemography and modelling of population process in late
imperial China’, in S. Harrell ed., Chinese historical microdemography (Berkeley, 1995),
1–20; Zhongwei Zhao, ‘Deliberate birth control under a high-fertility regime: reproductive behaviour in China before 1970, Population and Development Review 23 (1997),
729–67 ; and James Lee and Feng Wang, One quarter of humanity: Malthusian mythology and Chinese realities, 1700–2000 (Cambridge, 1999).
2 For the recent debate on the issue, see Arthur Wolf, ‘Is there evidence of birth control
in late imperial China?’, Population and Development Review 27 (2001), 133–54;
Cameron Campbell, Feng Wang and James Lee, ‘Pretransitional fertility in China’,
Population and Development Review 28 (2002), 735–50; Zhongwei Zhao, ‘Fertility
control in China’s past’, Population and Development Review 28 (2002), 751–7; Cao
Shuji and Chen Yixin, ‘Malthusian theory and Chinese population since the Qing
Dynasty: recent research in America’, Historical Research (2002), no. 1, 41–54; Feng
Wang and James Lee, ‘Zhadiao Renkou Jueding Lun de Guanghuan’ (‘ A critic of
population determinism ’), Historical Research (2002), no. 1, 55–61; and Chen Yixin
and Cao Shuji, ‘Zunzhong Zhongguo Renkoushi de Zhenshi: Dui Zhadiao Renkou
Jueding Lun De Guanghuan Yiwen Zhi Huiying’ (‘ Respecting the reality of China’s
population history’) (2003) at http://www./acriticism.com/article.asp?newsid=3926
&type=1002, accessed in April 2004.
3 Walter H. Mallory, China: land of famine (New York, 1926), 17 and 87.
4 Yang Deqing et al., On population (Shijiazhuang, 1979), 69.
5 Barclay et al., ‘A reassessment of the demography of traditional rural China’.
6 Among those based on an adequate population size, only Telford’s genealogical study
reports noticeably higher marital fertility rates. According to Telford, total marital
fertility rates in Tongcheng lineage populations were between 7.1 and 9.7. These figures
may represent a reality that fertility levels in these populations, who lived in a historically wealthy area where rapid population growth was recorded during the period of
observation, were indeed higher than those recorded in other Chinese populations. But
it is also arguable that his estimates may have been inflated by the assumptions used to
produce them. For example, Telford assumed that if people’s ages at death went
unrecorded, the date of their death would be approximated by the date when they had
their last recorded sons plus five years. If they had no sons according to the genealogies,
they would be assumed to have died at age 29. This could lead to an over-estimation of
the fertility rates if these people actually lived longer. In the absence of more detailed
information, further inquiries into these speculations cannot be carried out. Chiao and
his colleagues also reported that relatively high marital fertility rates were found in
Jiangyin in the early 1930s. But these rates, those observed among women who were
under age 20 or over age 35 in particular, are also noticeably lower than those recorded
30
CONTROLLING FAMILY SIZE IN CHINA
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
in some historical European populations. See Ted Telford, ‘Marital fertility in the
Ming–Qing transition: Tongcheng County, 1520–1661’, paper presented to the
Workshop on Qing Population History, California Institute of Technology, USA
(1985), and Chiao, C. M. et al., An experiment in the registration of vital statistics in
China (Oxford, 1938). See also Coale, ‘Fertility in rural China’; Zhao, ‘Deliberate birth
control under a high-fertility regime’; and Lee and Wang, One quarter of humanity.
For example, the total fertility rate was 5.5 in both the Haishan population studied by
Wolf and the Chinese peasant population examined by Barclay and his colleagues.
According to the 1982 One-per-Thousand-Population Fertility Survey data, the mean
number of children for the rural women who were born between 1914 and 1930 and
who were still alive in 1982 was 5.6; see Zhao, ‘Deliberate birth control under a highfertility regime’. These figures are only marginally lower than the level of 5.8 derived
from Wolf’s personal interviews of nearly 600 Mainland Chinese women. For details,
see Arthur P. Wolf, ‘Fertility in prerevolutionary rural China’, in Hanley and Wolf
eds., family and population in East Asian history, 154–85. Also see Coale, ‘Fertility in
rural China’, and Zhao, ‘Deliberate birth control under a high-fertility regime’.
M. W. Flinn, The European demographic system, 1500–1820 (Baltimore, 1981).
See Zhao, ‘Deliberate birth control under a high-fertility regime’, and Lee and Wang,
One quarter of humanity.
Zhao, ‘Deliberate birth control under a high-fertility regime’; Ts’ui-jung Liu, Lineage
population and social-economic changes in the Ming–Ch’ing periods (Taipei, 1992); and
James Lee and Cameron Campbell, Fate and fortune in rural China: social organization
and population behaviour in Liaoning 1774–1873 (Cambridge, 1997).
Flinn, The European demographic system.
Feng Wang, James Lee and Cameron Campbell, ‘Marital fertility control among the
Qing nobility: Implications for two types of preventive check’, Population Studies 49
(1995), 383–400; Liu, Lineage population and social-economic changes; Lee and
Campbell, Fate and fortune in rural China; and Zhao, ‘Deliberate birth control under a
high-fertility regime’.
Wolf and Huang, in Lee and Wang, One quarter of humanity, 108.
Lee, Wang and Campbell, ‘Infant and child mortality among the Qing nobility:
implications for two types of positive check’, Population Studies 48 (1994), 395–411,
here 403.
James Lee, Cameron Campbell and Guofu Tan, ‘Infanticide and family planning in late
imperial China: the price and population history of rural Liaoning, 1774–1873’, in T.
Rawski and L. M. Li eds., Chinese history in economic perspective (Berkeley, 1992),
145–76.
See Arthur P. Wolf and Chieh-shan Huang, Marriage and adoption in China, 1845–1945
(Stanford, 1980), and Arthur P. Wolf, ‘Fertility in prerevolutionary rural China’.
Liu, Lineage population and social-economic changes.
Barclay et al., ‘A reassessment of the demography of traditional rural China’; Wang,
Lee and Campbell, ‘Marital fertility control among the Qing nobility.
Coale, ‘Fertility in rural China’; Wolf, ‘Is there evidence of birth control in late
imperial China?’; Cao and Chen, ‘Malthusian theory and Chinese population since the
Qing dynasty’.
Thomas R. Malthus, An essay on the principle of population (London, 1826), Chapter 12.
Wolf, ‘Fertility in prerevolutionary rural China’, 177. See also Chen and Cao,
‘Zunzhong Zhongguo Renkoushi de Zhenshi’.
Zhao, ‘Deliberate birth control under a high-fertility regime’, and Lee and Wang, One
quarter of humanity.
31
ZHONGWEI ZHAO
23 See Wolf, ‘Is there evidence of birth control in late imperial China?’; Campbell, Wang
and Lee, ‘Pretransitional fertility in China’; Zhao, ‘Fertility control in China’s past’;
Cao and Chen, ‘Malthusian theory and Chinese population’; and Wang and Lee,
‘Zhadiao Renkou Jueding Lun de Guanghuan ’.
24 See Wolf, ‘Is there evidence of birth control in late imperial China?’.
25 When the Chinese use the word ‘Zi ’, it refers mainly to sons, but it sometimes also
refers to children.
26 Jen-der Lee, ‘Infanticide and child abandonment from Han to Sui’, Bulletin of the
Institute of History and Philology 66, 3 (1995), 747–810; Zang Jian, ‘The analysis of
Sheng Zi Bu Ju in the Southern Song countryside’, Zhongguoshi Yanjiu 4 (1995), 75–83.
27 See Zang, ‘The analysis of Sheng Zi Bu Ju in Southern Song countryside’.
28 Xu Song (compiled in the nineteenth century), Song Hui Yao Ji Gao, facsimile reproduction made by Bei Ping Tu Shu Guan in 1936, here 6520–4.
29 Su Shi (1037–1101 AD) was one of the best poets in Chinese history; Yang Shi
(1053–1135 AD) was an eminent Li Xue (a Confucian school of philosophy) scholar;
Zhu Song (1097–1143 AD) was the father of Zhu Xi (1130–1200 AD), a leading
Confucian scholar of the Song dynasty; Fan Chengda (1126–1193 AD) was another
famous Song poet; Lü Zuqian (1137–1181 AD) was a renowned Song scholar; and Li
Gang (1083–1140 AD) once served as the premier. Most of these scholars also served as
government officials, in some cases as high-ranking officials. Li Xue, or metaphysical
theory, examines ‘the workings of the cosmos in terms of li (principle, pattern) and qi
(vital energies, material force, psychophysical stuff)’. See Patricia Buckley Ebrey, The
Cambridge illustrated history of China (Cambridge, 1999), 152–3.
30 See Xu Song, Song Hui Yao Ji Gao, 6520–4 and 6569, and Zang, ‘The analysis of Sheng
Zi Bu Ju in Southern Song countryside’.
31 Su Shi (writing in the late eleventh century), ‘Yu Zhu E Zhou Shu’, in Taiwan Shangwu
Publishing House, Jing Yin Wen Yuan Ge Si Ku Quan Shu, vol. 1108, 202–3.
32 Yang Shi (writing in the eleventh or twelfth century), ‘Ji Yu Zhong Kuan Bie Zhi Qi
Yi’, in Taiwan Shangwu Publishing House, Jing Yin Wen Yuan Ge Si Ku Quan Shu, vol.
1125, 274. See also Wang, Lee and Campbell, ‘Marital fertility control among the Qing
nobility’, 383.
33 Li Gang (writing in the twelfth century), ‘Ou Yue Ming’, in Taiwan Shangwu
Publishing House, Jing Yin Wen Yuan Ge Si Ku Quan Shu, vol. 1126, 598–9.
34 Zhu Song (writing in the twelfth century), ‘Jie Sha Zi Wen’, in Wei Zha Ji, in Taiwan
Shangwu Publishing House, Jing Yin Wen Yuan Ge Si Ku Quan Shu, vol. 1133, 530–1.
35 See Xu Song, Song Hui Yao Ji Gao, 6520, and Zhu Song, ‘Jie Sha Zi Wen’, 531.
36 Xu Xiaowang, ‘Cong Niying Xisu Kan Fujian Lishi Shangde Renkou Ziran
Goucheng Wenti’ (2003), at http://jsw.baoji.gov.cn/llqy/2003-08-1801.htm, accessed in
May 2004.
37 Yang Shi, ‘Ji Yu Zhong Kuan Bie Zhi Qi Yi’, 274 ; Fan Zhiming (writing in the late
eleventh or early twelfth century), ‘Yue Yang Feng Tu Ji ’, in Taiwan Shangwu
Publishing House, Jing Yin Wen Yuan Ge Si Ku Quan Shu, vol. 589, 109–24, here 119.
38 See Wang, Lee and Campbell, ‘Marital fertility control among the Qing nobility’, and
Lee and Campbell, Fate and fortune in rural China.
39 The survey provided information on whether each child was alive at the time of the
survey, but did not give their age or date of death. Therefore, when children were said to
be still alive, it refers to the fact that they were alive when the survey was undertaken.
When they were said to have died, they had done so by the time of the survey, although
most of them would have actually died in the first few years of life.
40 Zhao, ‘Deliberate birth control under a high-fertility regime’.
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CONTROLLING FAMILY SIZE IN CHINA
41 Zheng Zhenman, ‘Fertility, marriage, and family on Fujian coast during the last century : a research report on Lianjiang county, Pukouzhen, Guanlingcun ’, in James Lee,
Guo Songyi and Ding Yizhuang eds., Marriage, family and demographic behaviour
(Beijing, 2000), 61–81, here 71–2.
42 See Hua Han, ‘Under the shadow of the collective good: an ethnographic analysis of
fertility control in Xiaoshan, Zhejiang province, P. R. China’, paper presented at the
Workshop on the Chinese Demographic Regime (Seattle, 2003). According to Han, the
methods used by women include taking herbal drinks ‘to induce the cessation of menses ’, eating water-chestnuts in bulk ‘to prevent pregnancy’; prolonging breastfeeding
‘to delay future pregnancy’; using abstinence ‘to cease reproduction ’; using ‘various
forceful physical activities such as jumping to induce miscarriages’; and using the loom
to harm the body in order to cause abortion.
43 Xiao Pin Fang was written by Chen Yan Zhi in the mid-fifth century; Ben Cao Gang
Mu was written by Li Shi Zhen in the late sixteenth century; Jing Yue Quan Shu was
written by Zhang Jie Bin in the early seventeenth century; and Fu Ke Yu Chi was
written by Shen Jin Ao in the late eighteenth century. They were all important medical
books.
44 Li Bozhong, ‘Abortion, contraception, and termination of pregnancy: fertility control
and its dissemination in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces during the Song, Yuan, Ming,
and Qing dynasties’, in Lee, Guo and Ding eds., Marriage, family and demographic
behaviour, 172–96.
45 F. Bray, Technology and gender: fabrics of power in late imperial China (Berkeley, 1997).
46 Sripati Chandrasekhar, ‘Communist China’s demographic dilemma’, in Sripati
Chandrasekhar ed., Asia’s population problems (London, 1967), 58–71, here 59.
47 Riaz Hassan, Ethnicity, culture and fertility: an exploratory study of fertility behaviour
and sexual beliefs (Singapore, 1980), 49.
48 Wolf, ‘Is there evidence of birth control in late imperial China?’, 134.
49 See Mencius, ‘Liloushang’, in Jiao Xun, The transcription of Mencius (Beijing, 1962),
313.
50 One poem was written as follows: ‘The wings of the locusts, they are multitudinous; it
is right that your sons and grandsons should be numerous. The wings of the locusts,
they are in great numbers ; it is right that your sons and grandsons should be in a
continuous line. The wings of the locusts, they are in crowds; it is right that your sons
and grandsons should be in great swarms.’ (Traditionally, Chinese people believed that
Zhongsi, a kind of locust, had high fertility. Therefore, it was frequently linked to
having a large number of children.) In another poem, having many sons and grandsons
was linked to great blessings and happiness. See Zhounan, ‘Zhongsi’ and Daya, Jiale’,
in Cheng Junying, The transcription of the Book of Odes (Shanghai, 1985), 10–11 and
538–40. For the English translation see Bernhard Karlgren, The Book of Odes
(Stockholm, 1950), 4 and 204–6.
51 In addition to these two sayings, another popular notion is producing sons to ensure
security in old age. This view, however, is a further extension of the second belief but
with a specific reference to the security in old age of the parents’ generation. It can be
seen as an important component of the second belief, and will therefore be included in
the following discussion.
52 Many cases of this kind have been found in my own study of Chinese genealogies.
Examples can also be found in Lai Huimin, ‘Male adoption strategies among the Qing
imperial lineage’, in James Lee and Songyi Guo eds., Demographic behaviour of the
Qing imperial lineage and its social environment (Beijing, 1994), 60–89.
53 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: a new history (London, 2001), 88.
33
ZHONGWEI ZHAO
54 Yang Shi, ‘Ji Yu Zhong Kuan Bie Zhi Qi Yi’, 274; Fan Zhiming, ‘Yue Yang Feng Tu
Ji’, 119.
55 Han, ‘Under the shadow of the collective good’.
56 Zhu Song, ‘Jie Sha Zi Wen’, 531.
57 Wolf, ‘Is there evidence of birth control in late imperial China?’, 151.
58 Chen Qiyou ed., Han Fei Zi Ji Shi (Beijing, 1958), 1040–1. For a translation see W. K.
Liao, The complete works of Han Fei Tzu, vol. 2 (London, 1959), 276–7. Because the
Chinese word Zi has both the meanings of ‘son’ and ‘child’, the term ‘Wu Zi’ has been
translated as five sons rather than five offspring by some scholars. See also Wu
Shenyuan, The history of China’s population thoughts (Chongqing, 1986), 51–4.
59 This differed from some of the Song records mentioned earlier, which suggested that
poor families wanted to have a smaller number of children. This could be a result of
regional variations or diversity in people’s reproductive behaviour.
60 Zhang Xihou ed., The transcription of Wang Fanzhi’s poems (Beijing, 1983), 167, 180
and 193. Wang’s poems reflected many aspects of the social life. For example, he
condemned those who did not respect or did not take care of their parents, and those
who verbally or physically abused their wives. See Wu, The history of China’s population
thought, 134–8.
61 See Ping-ti Ho, Studies on the population of China, 1368–1953 (Cambridge, 1959), 262.
Dong’s estimate, however, seems too high for that period.
62 Xu Guangqi (writing in the early seventeenth century), Nong Zheng Quan Shu (Beijing
reprint, 1956), 68; Wu, The history of China’s population thought, 203–8.
63 Feng Menglong (writing in the early seventeenth century), in Zhuang Wei and Guo
Qunyi eds., Tai Ping Guang Ji Chao (Henan, 1982), 201. See also Li Bozhong,
‘Preserving prosperity by controlling population growth – demographic behavior in
Kiangnan during the mid-Ch’ing’, New History 5, 3 (1994), 25–71, here 53–4.
64 For a discussion of Hong’s population theory see Leo Silberman, ‘Hung Liang-Chi: a
Chinese Malthus’, Population Studies 13 (1960), 257–65, here 260. Some Chinese
scholars have suggested, however, that the title of ‘Chinese Malthus’ should be given to
Wang Shi Duo. His ideas and recommendations on population issues will be discussed
below.
65 Wang’s view on population issues were largely expressed in his Wang Hui Weng Yi Bing
Ri Ji, written in 1855 and 1856 (reprinted Taibei, 1968). From the available evidence, it
is not clear whether these writings were published during his lifetime.
66 For the discussion of Wang’s view on population issues, see Zhang Minru, A brief
history of China’s population thoughts (Beijing, 1982), Zhang Guangzhao and Yang
Zhiheng, The history of China’s population and economic thought (Sichuan, 1988), and
Wu, The history of China’s population thought.
67 See Zhongwei Zhao, ‘Chinese genealogies as a source for demographic research: a
further assessment of their reliabilities and biases’, Population Studies 55 (2001),
181–93.
68 See for example Liu, Lineage population and social-economic changes; Ts’ui-jung Liu,
‘A comparison of lineage populations in South China, ca. 1300–1900’, in Harrell ed.,
Chinese historical microdemography, 94–120; Wang, Lee and Campbell, ‘Marital fertility control among the Qing nobility’; and Peng Xizhe and Hou Yangfanng,
‘Demographic and social change in Jiangsu and Zhejiang between 1370 and 1900: a
study of the genealogy of the Fan family’, Chinese Journal of Population Science 4
(1996), 361–72.
69 For example, Wolf used Ts’ui-jung Liu’s figures to support his claim that fertility in
historical China was higher than that suggested by other researchers. But he failed to
34
CONTROLLING FAMILY SIZE IN CHINA
70
71
72
73
74
75
acknowledge that Liu’s figure was computed only for those whose who had sons or
whose sons were recorded in the genealogies and that the figure would be noticeably
lower if those without sons but at risk of having them were included in the calculation.
See Wolf, ‘Is there evidence of birth control in late imperial China?’, 137. For further
detail, see Liu, ‘A comparison of lineage populations in South China’; Liu, Lineage
population and social-economic changes; and Zhao, ‘Fertility control in China’s past’.
Liu, Lineage population and social-economic changes, 132, and Ted Telford, ‘Fertility
and population growth in the lineages of Tongcheng county, 1520–1661’, in Harrell ed.,
Chinese historical microdemography, 48–93.
See Zhao, ‘Chinese genealogies as a source for demographic research’.
In estimating fertility levels in the lineage population she studied, Liu first computed
marital fertility for married males who had sons on the basis of the number of their
sons, which was 2.94 on average. Then she multiplied this number by 2.06 to produce
total marital fertility (for married males who had sons), which comes to 6.06. See Liu,
Lineage population and social-economic changes, 100. In her 1995 paper, she used a
multiplier of 2.05; see Liu, ‘A comparison of lineage populations in South China’, 99.
This is incorrect. Because the fertility rate that she computed from the genealogy is
derived from male children, the multiplier used here should be 1.95 if it is assumed that
sex ratio at birth is 105. The resulting marital fertility should be about 5.7.
Ansley J. Coale, ‘The demographic transition’, International Population Conference,
Liege IUSSP, vol. 1 (1973), 53–71, here 65.
For a detailed discussion of the issue and the net replacement, see Christopher Wilson
and Pauline Airey, ‘How can a homeostatic perspective enhance demographic
transition theory?’, Population Studies 53 (1999), 117–28.
G. S. Becker, A treatise on the family (Cambridge, 1981).
35