SOCIOECONOMIC SEGREGATION WITH (WITHOUT)
COMPETITIVE EDUCATION POLICIES. A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF ARGENTINA AND CHILE
Mariano Narodowski* & Milagros Nores**
Documento 53
*
Agosto de 2001
Centro de Políticas Educativas - Fundación Gobierno y Sociedad & Universidad de Quilmes.
Centro de Políticas Educativas - Fundación Gobierno y Sociedad.
**
Socioeconomic segregation with (without) competitive education
policies. A comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile.
The last decades can be largely characterized by the amount and content of the education
policies developed world-wide. Originated in the north –North America and Europe- a
tidal wave of thinking about the downfall of the Welfare State swept over Latin America in
the 1980s, and consequently, some education policies were “dramatically altered to reflect
changed economic policies” (Arnove, 1997) . In an intent of improving administrative
efficiency, school quality, and school equity in education the current trend has meant an
important transformation of the national state’s role in education in favor of an increased
role of lower government levels. This has not necessarily meant increased at the microlevels, that is, at the schools.
However, while as an international trend, education decentralization has been widely
recognized, its uncritical acceptance as a concept in itself can fail to appreciate its variety
within the different educational systems (Bullock & Thomas, 1997). As Whitty, Power &
Halpin (1998: 23) describe in their study of redistribution of powers in England and Wales,
Sweden, New Zealand, Australia and the USA, the complexity of the reforms in these
countries derives from the many meanings behind the concepts of devolution and choice.
In their belief, this is related to Lauglo’s description of the diverse implications brought
about by different forms of decentralization (1996, as cited in Whitty et al.).
More specifically, Welsh & McGinn (1998) define decentralization as being “about shifts
in the location of those who govern, about transfers of authority from those in one location
or level vis-a-vis educational organizations, to those in another level.” Additionally, they
recognize three major positions in the conflict about who should govern education:
political legitimacy, professional expertise and market efficiency. The authors state that the
fundamental difference between these three is in terms of the justification for holding
authority. Political legitimacy is about governance of education being legitimated by
individuals who have been selected through a political process; professional expertise in
governance refers to authority being assigned primarily to those with technical expertise in
the matter; and finally, the market efficiency position brings into play a differentiation
2
between governance of production and governance of consumption of education. Welsh
and McGinn do not view these three as mutually exclusive.
Chile has been in Latin America a regional reference in terms of educational
decentralization reforms (although it has been so not only in education). As such it has
been widely studied (Aedo & Larrañaga, 1994; Bullock & Thomas, 1997; Carnoy, 1997 &
1998; Carnoy & McEwan, 1998 & 2000; Gauri, 1999; McEwan, 2000a & 2000b; Belfield,
2001; Bravo, Contreras & Sanhueza, 1999; Contreras, 2001; Mizala and Romaguera, 1998
& 2000; Parry, 1997a & 1997b; Patrinos & Ariasingman, 1998; Rodriguez, 1988; Viola
Espinola, 1992 & Undated; Welsh & McGinn, 1998; West, 1996; within others) because of
the decentralization and market reforms introduced during the 1980s. Presently, the model
of education provision and administration in place in Chile is one of a quasi-market, being
the general characteristics of such market a public finance of education with supply
competition in the production of it, and involving public and private suppliers1.
On the other hand, Argentina represents a model of public provision of schooling inherited
from a strong welfare state that faced a series of national state reduction reforms during the
1990s over the basis of issues of efficiency and federal legitimacy. This system, which we
categorize as a quasi-monopoly one, has an exit2 option to a portion of its school
population to the private sector, and it even promotes such exit through a state
subsidization of private schools. By Quasi-Monopoly we draw upon the work of
Narodowski & Nores (2001) who develop a taxonomy of models of education provision
and differentiate pure monopolies from quasi-monopolies, that is, models of state provision
that have imbedded exit options but that do not contemplate supply competition, in contrast
to quasi-markets, which do so.
Therefore, a comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile implies a comparison of two
countries that although from a national perspective have faced very different
decentralization reforms that have meant a shift in the locus of governance, and that has
taken place over within two very different sets of regulatory frameworks, have presently
1
For further definition of quasi-markets refer to Cullis & Jones (1998). They differentiate such markets in
their recognition that they are the result of a world trend for lower levels of public provision and higher
market levels.
2
We make reference to the concept of ‘Exit’ as developed by A. Hirschman (1969).
3
arrived to similar states of their education system in terms of their enrollments’
socioeconomic segregation. That is, different models of schooling provision, different
types of education markets and regulations, however, apparently similar results.
In both cases, in the strategy adopted towards private education, an imperative need for
solving supply problems at the middle level has predominated, as well as financial
restraints to the system as a whole. Consequently, the decentralization reform to the
municipal level in Chile, as well as the decentralization reform to the provincial levels in
Argentina, have answered to the corresponding national governments’ efficiency needs for
the provision of education.
Within the differentiated forms of education provision, this paper intends to inquire into
the causality governing the relation between the use of vouchers in education and an
increased enrollment segmentation or student sorting. The interest in this matter is born
from an in depth knowledge of the Argentine education system, where we have observed
that not withstanding the non-existence of vouchers, or any similar form of competitive
model of education provision, some of the most important objections to such policies are,
however, especially valid.
Theoretical approach
It is a fairly predominant statement in the literature against competition, voucher and
charter school initiatives, that such reforms increase student sorting across individual
characteristics such as race, class, etc. Several authors have argued that because school
choice policies induce families to exit public schools, they heavily promote enrollment
segmentation (McEwan, 2000b; Doerr, Menendez & Swomley, 1996; Smith & Meier,
1995; Graubard & Rothstein, 1998; Carnoy, 1997; Cobb & Glass, 1999; Hassel, 1997;
within others). Mostly, such approaches to the problem of socioeconomic segregation have
to do with thinking the relationship between vouchers and this kind of segmentations as a
positive causality were the implementation of vouchers in and education system produces
increased segmentation (see I). However, such same results can be found in centralized
education systems that have explicitly avoided the introduction of vouchers (see II).
Therefore, this work intends to brake the assumption that vouchers are a necessary
condition for socioeconomic segmentation and even question it as a sufficient condition.
4
I - Chile:
[
II - Argentina
[
Competitive Educ.
⇒
Policies (vouchers)
No Competitive
Educ. Policies
*
∆ Privatization
]
⇒
∆ SES
segmentation
∆ Privatization
]
⇒
∆ SES
segmentation
While opponents of school choice policies usually argument that vouchers induce
enrollment privatization and hence, enrollment segmentation, the evidence form Chile and
Argentina shows that enrollment segmentation is not necessarily a consequence of the
introduction of vouchers. While for Chile that argument might be valid, it is not so for
Argentina. Therefore, vouchers are an intervening variable in the determinants of a
country’s socioeconomic segmentation, but definitely not an independent variable. The
school choice decisions brought about by the introduction of vouchers are endogenous to a
series of factors that determine such choice, which also play an important role in the
determination of socioeconomic enrollment segmentations in non voucher systems.
Consequently, this papers questions the validity of empirical analyses which have consider
student socioeconomic characteristics and school choice decisions as independent
determinant variables of student results, which predominates in the analysis of competition
policies.
Chile: twenty years of a quasi-market system of education.
Historical Perspective
Before the 1980s and since at least the second half of the nineteenth century, the
predominant state model in Latin America was that of a liberal state that tightly controlled
the of public education system. Such control meant a thorough regulation of the inputs of
the schooling process by the national states in their intent of establishing the foundations of
the nation and the citizenship (Weinberg, 1984; Torres and Puiggrós, 1997). As Torres and
Puiggrós state, the implementation of a welfare-oriented public policy has been a central
element of the Latin American state, that is, a Welfare State with an intense interventionist
role that included the protection of minimum standards on income, nutrition, health,
housing and education. Such state was preceded by state authoritarianism (eighties) and an
aftermath return to liberal-democratic governments. Within this framework the history of
education in Argentina and Chile did not differ significantly until the 1980s, when Chile
made a significant shift that sent its education system through a completely different path.
5
Basically, in Chile, during the first half of the 20th century the system’s trend was towards
increased centralization and an accelerated involvement of the state which resulted in the
concept of the ‘Teaching State’ (Matte & Sancho, 1991).Therefore, up until the eighties,
the education system provided schooling through its simultaneous provision and finance on
one hand, and by additionally subsidizing private schools. The traditional private
subsidized supply consisted mainly of urban primary schools serving middle and lowincome families, half of which were catholic and with an average subsidy of around 60 to
65% of school expenses (Viola Espinola, 1992), which in reality –taking into account the
forms and amounts of payments- meant a funding of 25% of the per student cost at official
schools (Panadeiros, Susmel & Nores, 1998).
Almost all responsibilities for primary and secondary education laid at the center, which
administrated the system through a strong regulatory framework, that included a sharp
control over private schools. Even the administration of human resources was centralized,
with a national salary scale and centralized decision-making on school appointments. In
terms of funding, this centralized system meant that resources were assigned to schools on
the basis of historical budgets (Panadeiros, et. al, 1998).
With the education system’s reform implemented during the 1980s, the predominating
concept was of public funding of education, clearly defined as a separate action from the
production of education in itself. The scheme put into place implied an equal per student
funding of all children attending both public schools –with now its administration being
decentralized to the municipal level- and private schools incorporated to the subsidy
regime. This centralized financial scheme within a decentralized administrative system was
extended for pre-school, primary and secondary education (although the Constitution of
1980 only guarantees free primary education), with the level of per student funding varying
correspondingly (Matte & Sancho, 1991).
The underlying principles embodied in the model of education that was developed during
these years answered to a clear recognition of the need to provide basic education for all
(based on the existence of externalities of it), and an intention to promote equality of
opportunities, as reflected by the capitation funding mechanism (Panadeiros, et. al, 1998).
6
Such principles were to be fulfilled at the lowest efficiency costs, that is, through the
participation of the private sector. Additionally, this strategy also answered to an demand
excess that had to be satisfied.
Specifically, Panadeiros, et. al (1998) describe three main components of the reform: (a) a
transference of public education establishments from the central government to the
municipal level; (b) a transference of middle technical-professional schools to non-profit
business organizations; and (c) the replacement of the existing supply-based funding
mechanism to a demand-side funding scheme to which private non-profit schools could
apply for. The transference in itself was not complete until 1986, partly as a consequence
of the economic crisis the country went through in the early eighties as well as because of
the introduction of a series of market distortions during those years3.
In the 1990s, the Chilean transition-to-democracy government puts into the educational
policy agenda the issues of education quality and equity intertwined. Therefore, pro-active
policies and initiatives of positive discrimination, as well as initiatives intended to
strengthen the educational system’s institutional capacities were dominant from the central
government’s perspective. All these were developed within the existing decentralized and
pro-competitive education system.
Consequently, the per student finance system for public and private subsidized schools was
preserved, with an increase in education spending so as to revert the tendency of the
eighties of decreasing resources in the sector (only in 1994 is the per student spending of
1982 surpassed). Additionally, within a tax reform of 1993, private subsidized primary and
secondary schools and municipal secondary schools were allowed to opt for a mix funding
scheme4. By 1997, 25% of the enrollment was subscribed to it (Cox, 1997). Such a reform
clearly promotes a greater enrollment segmentation by income levels, as those who can not
3
The transference to the municipal level was temporarily suspended during 1983. In addition to this, the
economic crisis changed the rules of the game during these years since per student funding was initially
indexed and this was modified, which brought municipal schools into a deficit that brought about the Central
Government’s intervention to cover these. Furthermore, so as not to reduce demand for municipal schooling
a modification was introduced which limited private-subsidized school entry to the market. These market
distortions basically disappeared in 1986 (Panadeiros, et al., 1998).
4
The discount on resources to the schools is proportional to tuition increases. For a tuition charged to parents
of half the per student subsidy, their is no discount on government funding; for tuition levels between ½ and
7
pay the tuition imposed face limited school choices. Additionally, compensatory policies
have apparently been insufficient to compensate for the costs imposed by this initiative on
the lowest incomes groups (Viola Espínola, undated).
Furthermore, during the initial democratic years a teacher statute was enacted (and four
years later reformed)5. This norm was highly regulatory, and even considered a step back
on the existing decentralized system. The rigidity it brought to schools in terms of teachers
mobility meant a limitation on the schools’ administrative capacities, but apparently was of
utmost importance in increasing feasibility for subsequent education programs (Cox,
1997). However, such rigidity was significantly reduced by the 1995 Law of Teacher
Statute Reform. Two programs were the consequence of this reform, PADEM (a
development program for municipal education) and SNED (a system intended to asses the
performance of the schools’ teacher teams). As a consequence of the reforms and increased
funding, teacher salaries increased 80% between 1990 and 1997 (Cox, 1997).
Finally, the 1990s in Chile are marked by a the introduction of compensatory policies.
Such policies are the reflection of the prevalent concept of positive discrimination that is,
as Reimers (2000: 94) states, relatively recent in education policy discourse in Latin
America. Such policies in Chile took the form of interventions at different need levels6.
During the early 1990s a program known as P900 was set in place, which targeted the
lowest 10% basic education schools (lowest en terms of education results) with direct and
technical aids such as infrastructure, textbooks, didactic teaching material, class libraries,
and innovation with monitors for children’s schooling reinforcement (Cox, 1997).
Additionally, the MECE-Básica program is a systemic intervention on basic education that
included material, technical and pedagogical components; and, the MECE-Media (1995)
was developed for middle education with innovation and investment components7. In
addition to these three, some other policies were developed as are: the extension of the
school day, the networking of outstanding schools and the strengthening of teacher training
programs.
a complete subsidy their is a 10% discount; for tuition levels between one and two per student subsidies their
is a 20% discount, and so on (Cox, 1997).
5
Law 19.070 and Law 19.410.
6
For further characterization of the reforms introduced in Chile during the 1990s refer to Cox (1997).
7
World Bank financed (Latorre, 1997).
8
The model
The present education trend promoting the introduction of competitive markets can be
grouped into two lines of thought. That is, competitive forces in education can be
introduced for two alternative reasons: as instruments for systemic change or as
mechanisms for integral change. Lane (1999) introduces the concepts of “integral reform”
vs. “systemic reform”. Under the argument for an integral reform of the education system
Lane considers charter schools as an additional component of national and state efforts to
modify and change traditional public schools, in opposition to being an instrument for
systemic reform intending to completely restructure the system. In short, as an alternative
within, and not to, public education. Lane’s categorization into these two theoretical
perspectives of what charter schools can generate in the existing educational systems can
be generalized for school choice policies in general.
Chile’s reform has been described as a voucher model by an important number of authors
analyzing it (Parry, 1997a and 1997b; Carnoy and McEwan, 1998 and 2000; Bullock &
Thomas, 1997; West, 1996; Carnoy, 1997; within others). On the other hand, Welsh &
McGinn (1998) have described it as a charter school model of education provision.
Actually, the main difference between vouchers and charter schools (these being both
alternatives of school choice models) lays in how the subsidy reaches the school, being the
voucher much more liquid for parents and students than the transfer of funds to the schools
on the basis of their student enrollment. Notwithstanding this difference, in its form, the
Chilean education reform falls into what Lane (1999) denominated as charter being
instruments for systemic reform. The model integrated into a single market traditional
public schools together with private subsidized schools with an explicit intention of
making all public schooling subject to market rules.
Chile’s school choice reform answered mostly to immediate needs as were greater
efficiency, higher educational quality, higher equity, and the need to solve the existing
access problems of the secondary education level. It can be categorized as a quasi-market
model of educational provision, since it complies with the general characteristics of such a
market, that is, public funding of the service with its provision being in a competitive
market where public and/or private organizations take part. In education, Levacic (1995) as
cited in Gordon & Whitty (1997) describes the salient characteristic of this market as being
9
the separation between the provider and the producer of schooling, with the simultaneous
introduction of consumer choice elements into the relation between supply and demand. As
Vandenberghe (1999: 273) states, quasi-markets form a subtle combination of the principle
of public funding with the corresponding bureaucratic controls, and the “market-oriented,
competition-driven approach of education”.
Basically, school choice proposals are based on a series of perceptions about the structure,
the behavior, and the output of the dynamics of competitive markets. In the market logic,
consumers play a central role because they reveal information about their preferences
through their interaction with the supply side. On the basis of these sets of preferences, the
supply adjusts its decisions about what, how much and at what price to offer. This supply
and demand interaction brings the production of the good/service closer to the consumers
interests; that is, consumer sovereignty guides the market to its best outcome (Aoki &
Feiner, 1996). In education, this process implies that education supply is brought about to
behave similar to the private sector, with a multiplicity of suppliers (public and private)
competing for students.
The real effect, size, and implications of a school market when introduced, depends on its
particularities. As Levin (1992) states, different specifics can eventually lead to extremely
different results in practice, being the models financial, regulation, and information
provision components of particular importance. It is evident that differences in the
particularities of the model implemented answer to very different ideals and goals in terms
of education equity and quality. Similarly, Arons (1971) defines the voucher scheme as
malleable in its basic design, and such design as being deterministic of its results. With this
in mind, the school choice model in Chile can be described on the basis of the mentioned
three components, which determine the form the model will take in practice (which applies
only for included schools). That is, it defines the rules of the game under which schools
compete for students.
10
Table I. The Chilean Model of School Choice.
Specified
Component
Participation
✔
✔
Municipal schools
Private schools
Regulation
✔
✘
✘*
✔
✘
✘
✘
Curriculum specification
Teacher certification
Teacher salaries
Minimum infrastructure
Student admission standards
Marketing
Textbooks
Finance
✔**
✘
✘
✘
Parental additional funding
Compensatory funding
Transportation provision
Textbook provision
Information
Assessment
Public provision of information
✔
✘
* The teacher statute of 1990 had several implication on teachers’ minimum working
conditions.
** The funding mechanism was modified by law on 1993 to allow for mixed funding
between state and parents through tuition fees.
Source: elaborated on the basis of Levin (1992).
As can be seen in Table 1, the Chilean model allows for access to public resources to both,
public and private schools. Additionally, it includes the regulatory components of
curriculum specification and minimum infrastructure requirements, a finance component
allowing for additional parental funding over public resources, and an information
component that includes assessment of student’s results. Apparently, the model puts
emphasis on controlling output and content of schooling, but eliminates regulation over
inputs, except for requiring compliance with minimum requirements on infrastructure and
teacher salaries (the teacher statute establishes minimum working conditions).
Additionally, the 1993 amendment that allows for schools to opt for mixed funding (only
private-subsidized schools at the basic level, and all schools at the middle level) has
important equity implications8, as so does the fact that student admission mechanisms are
not regulated and although municipal schools have to admit every student at their door, this
is not true for private subsidized schools.
8
Law N° 19.247 of 1993 established two alternatives to facilitate private resources in public education.
These are: private donations (with tax benefits) and mixed funding. Municipal schools who opted for mixed
funding should still receive students that are not able to pay (Latorre, 1997).
11
Enrollment Privatization and its socioeconomic segmentation
After the implementation of the per student subsidy for public and subscribed private
schools, private subsidized enrollment grew enormously in Chile (Figure 1). Between 1981
and 1991, private subsidized enrollment increase 57%, that is, it went from approximately
430 thousand children to 950 thousand (which implies an average annual growth rate of
12%). And in the last decade it did so even more, having increased up to 1.2 million by
1999. In short, it experienced an 180% variation in two decades. The growth in private
non-subsidized enrollment was much smaller, with an increase of 20% in the first decade
(2% on average, per year), and adding up to a variation of 57% by 1999. Quite contrary,
public school enrollments decreased 21% between 1981 and 1991, and from there on it
grew steadily. However, in 1999, enrollments in the public sector where still below what
they used to be in 1981. Such an enrollment privatization has been mostly a consequence
of the incentive for privately administered schools to enter the market, established by the
per student subsidy allocated (which in fact was initially higher than the preexisting mean
per student expenditure).
Figure 1. Evolution of School Enrollments in Chile, 1981-1999 (thousands).
2500
Public
2000
thousands
1500
Private subsidized
1000
500
Private non-subsidized
0
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Source: Ministry of Public Education of Chile.
12
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
The main criticisms to the model have concentrated on two issues. On one hand, on the
socioeconomic segmentation it has produced on its student population as evidenced by the
socioeconomic characteristics of each child, and on the other, on a lack of clear evidence
of private school effectiveness under such a school choice scheme.
A descriptive-statistics approach of analysis of the effects of the reform done by Viola
Espínola (1992) describes the mentioned enrollment segmentation. Summarizing, while the
higher income groups –urban and rural- have chosen the private system, the lower income
households have stayed in the municipal system. However, the author found that although
the gap between higher and lower income groups tended to be stable on private subsidized
schools, it widened under the municipal schooling system, apparently evidencing a higher
compensatory ability of the first. A series of studies done by the Chilean Ministry of
Planning and Cooperation (1999a, 1999b, and 1999c) also evidence the segmentation of
the different income levels by school dependency.
The 1998 distribution of school enrollment by income level for each type of education is
described in Table II. Evidently, what Viola Espínola described for 1990 is still evident on
the 1998 data. The highest quintile mostly attends private non-subsidized schools, the
fourth and third quintile attends municipal and private subsidized schools in similar
proportions, and the lower quintiles are highly concentrated in municipal schools. Such
segmentation is observed for basic as well as middle education levels. While a 75% of the
lowest quintile attend municipal basic education, only a 19% of the fifth quintile does so.
At this same education level, although private subsidized school do not serve
predominantly the highest quintile, it is still biased towards serving the fourth quintile
(48%) more than the municipal sector does (40%).
13
Table II. Population aged 0-24 enrolled by Income Level, Type of education and Dependency, 1998.
Education type
Dependency
National Quintile
Total
I
II
III
IV
V
Basic
Municipal
75.3
63.7
54.5
40.4
18.9
57.5
Private Subsidized
24.2
35.1
42.3
48.3
28.0
33.8
Private Non-Subsidized
0.5
1.1
3.1
11.3
53.2
8.4
Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
Middle Science and Municipal
78.6
66.8
59.0
45.0
22.3
53.8
Humanities
Private Subsidized
18.3
28.4
33.8
38.9
25.8
29.2
Private Non-Subsidized
2.6
3.9
6.9
15.2
51.7
16.5
Corporation
0.4
0.9
0.2
1.0
0.2
0.5
Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
Middle Technical and Municipal
50.6
47.1
47.1
42.3
25
46.4
Professional
Private Subsidized
36.3
37.8
39.5
43.9
51.1
39.3
Private Non-Subsidized
1.3
Corporation
12.4
14.0
13.1
12.5
13.8
13.1
Total
99.3
98.9
99.7
98.7
89.9
100.1
Source: Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (1999b).
A large set of studies about the Chilean education system have used an econometric
approach to analyze private and municipal school effectiveness (and efficiency). Most of
these are summarized in Table III. Basically, all these studies agree on the fact that the
rough gap in student achievement test scores –the predominant measure of school quality
these studies use - between public and private subsidized schools is highly determined by
differences in students’ socioeconomic background. Parry (1997) reached the conclusion
that each type of school specializes: public schools targeting socioeconomically
disadvantaged students and private schools producing higher scores with ‘high quality’
students. Similarly, Mizala & Romaguera (1998 & 2000) recognize the existence of
significant differences on the supply’s geographical distribution for each type of schools,
and of the income levels of the children attending these, which in turn has a strong
correlation with the type of school. And, Bravo et al. (1999) trace a greater concentration
of lower quintile students in public schools and a similar concentration of higher quintile
students on private schools (whether subsidized or not).
Mostly, these studies try to identify private vs. public schools differences searching to
understand the implications of nation-wide school choice experiences. All studies having
used data for years previous to 1990 (included) found a higher test score achievement of
private subsidized schools after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics (measured by
family income and/or parental education) and other geographic and school-quality related
14
variables (i.e. class size, teacher experience, non-teaching assistants, and failure rates,
within others).
Furthermore, the study by Bravo et al., which covers all assessed years (by the national
assessment systems9) between 1982 and 1997, found that public and private subsidized
schools have equally distributed educational results (and this has remained stable) and that
private subsidized superiority over municipal schools, having controlled for school
socioeconomic variables, has decreased during the nineties. This result is similar to the
what the authors analyzing post 1990 data sets, that is as Carnoy & McEwan (1998 and
2000), McEwan (2000), Mizala and Romaguera (1998) have arrived to. However,
altogether, studies on the effectiveness of private schools in the Chilean educational system
have found a set of mixed results for post 1990 data sets. If a private subsidized superiority
has been found, such superiority in terms of test scores is small, having controlled for
available data on socioeconomic characteristics.
9
The establishment of an assessment system was a fundamental component of the reform. An assessment
system worked between 1982 and 1984 denominated PER (Prueba de Evaluación del Rendimiento Escolar)
which was suspended on that last year. However, in 1988 the assessment reform component is retaken and
the SIMCE (Sistema de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación) was put into place, and has been operating
since.
15
Table III. Econometric Studies on the Chilean Model of School Choice.
Study
Data
Content
School type
differentiation
Method
Results
The performance gap favorable to private schools in comparison
to public ones decreases when controlling by socioeconomic,
geographic and school quality-related factors; and only in the
nineties is this gap non-significant, even turning negative the last
years.
Bravo, D., Contreras, D., & Sanhueza, C. (1999) PER: 1982-1984,
Educational Achievement, Inequalities and SIMCE: 1988Private/Public
Gap:
Chile
1982-1997. 1997
Universidad de Chile.
School level data for Public; Private; and
Spanish and Math, Private Subsidized
and 4th and 8th
grade.
Cross-Section
estimations;
Parry, T. (1997). Theory meets reality in the SIMCE: 1988education voucher debate: some evidence from 1990.
Chile. Education Economics, (5)3.
School level data for Public; and Private
Spanish and Math, Subsidized
4th grade.
OLS
Public schools produce higher achievement than private
subsidized schools, after controlling for other factors (such as
SES), but private-subsidized schools appear to make better use
of student and school inputs. Findings also implicate school
specialization: municipal schools achieve higher performance
with disadvantaged children and private-subsidized schools
produce higher scores enrolling ‘high-quality’ students.
Competition between schools does raise achievement, but the
impact is small.
SIMCE: 1991; and School level data for Public; and Private
data from a
Spanish and Math, Subsidized
random sample of 8th grade.
50 schools in the
santiago area
OLS
Achievement test results do not differ significantly between
public and private subsidized schools. Public schools principals
surpass their private counterparts in terms of leadership ability.
Public schools are also more likely to provide innovative
courses. The evidence suggest that the long-run equilibrium is
never reached-there will always be some poor quality schools
because of information asymmetry.
OLS and TSLS
Attending a private subsidized school does increase standardized
test scores, but the impact is relatively small. However, when
TSLS models are estimated to control for school choice, the
impact of private subsidized school increases significantly.
Parental characteristics operate on the selection of school, and
such impact is overestimated by the OLS model. The Chilean
voucher system succeeds as an instrument of social mobility.
OLS
The educational gap between school dependencies is statistically
significant at approximately 7 to 8 points in favor of private
schools, after controlling for average parental education at the
school level, teacher experience, female teacher percentage, and
number of non-teaching assistants.
OLS
Private subsidized schools obtain higher test scores than public
schools after controlling after for class size, teacher/student ratio,
mother' s average years of education, family income and failure
rates.
Parry, T. (1997). How will schools respond to
incentives of privatisation? Evidence from Chile
and Implications for the United States. American
Review of Public Administration, (27)3.
Contreras, D. (2001) Evaluating a Voucher PAA: Academic
system in Chile. Individual, Family and School Aptitude Test,
Characteristics. Working Paper N° 175, 1998.
Economics Department, Universidad de Chile.
Individual level
data; 142,382
observations.
Rodriguez, J. (1988) School Achievement and PER: 1988
Decentralization Policy: the Chilean Case. Draft.
ILADES.
Sample of 281
schools in Santiago,
4th grade.
Aedo, C. and Larrañaga, O. (1994) Sistemas de
Entrega de los Servicios Sociales: La
Experiencia Chilena. En Aedo, C. and
Larrañaga, O. Sistemas de Entrega de los
Servicios Sociales: Una Agenda para la
Reforma. Washington, D.C.: Interamerican
Development Bank.
SIMCE: 1990 and 500 schools
1991; and
CASEN: 1990 for
socioeconomic
information.
Public; Private; and
Private Subsidized
-
16
OLS
Carnoy, M. and McEwan, P. (1998) Is SIMCE: 1998Privatization More Effective and Cost-Effective 1996, bi-anual.
the Public? The Case of Chile. Draft. Stanford
University.
-
OLS
After controlling for different variables and using a fixed effect
approach they conclude that competition reduced school
performance.
Carnoy, M. and McEwan, P. (2000) The
Effectivenes and Efficiency of Private Schools
in Chile's Voucher System. Educational
Evaluation and Policy Analysis, (22)3.
School level data for Public corporation,
Spanish and Math, Catholic voucher,
4th grade.
Protestant voucher, nonreligious voucher, and
non-voucher private
schools relative to
Municipal schools.
OLS
On average, non-religious and profit maximizing voucher
schools are marginally less effective than public schools in
producing Spanish and Math achievements (or at best, similarly
effective). However, they cost about 13%-17% less than public
schools after controlling for achievement and student
background. In contrast, Catholic schools are more effective than
public schools at producing achievement for similar students.
The results therefore, deliver a mixed message.
McEwan, P. (2000) Private and Public SIMCE:1997
schooling in the Southern Cone: A comparative
analysis of Argentina and Chile. Occasional
Paper No. 11, NCSPE, Teachers College,
Columbia University.
School level data for
Spanish and Math,
8th grade
(n=160,283)
OLS
The results are decidedly mixed. Catholic schools are somewhat
more effective than public schools un producing student
outcomes. There are few differences in outcomes between public
and non-religious subsidized schools. In short, private schools
vary widely in the outcomes they produce.
Mizala, A. and Romaguera, P. (1998) SIMCE:1996; and
Desempeño escolar y eleccion de colegios: la JUNAEB for
experiencia chilena. Center of applied children's health
Economics, Universidad de Chile.
status.
Over 5,000 schools; Municipal; and Private
average score
non-subsidized and
between the math
private subsidized
and spanish tests for
4th grade.
OLS
The authors control for socioeconomic level, a vulnerability
index of the school, and a series of institutional characteristics of
the school (a geographical index, teacher experience, number of
teachers -size-, and preschool education). The initial difference
on average scores between dependencies -favoring private
subsidized schools over municipal ones- disappears after
introducing controls to the model, and the sign is even reverted.
Additionally, it's significance is reduced.
Mizala, A. and Romaguera, P. (2000)
Determinación de factores explicativos de los
resultados escolares en educación media en
Chile. Center of applied Economics, Universidad
de Chile.
Individual and
Municipal; Nonschool level data for subsidized Private and
Spanish and Math, private subsidized
8th grade
OLS
At the school level data there is a significant correlation between
school dependency and its students socioeconomic level. On
average, municipal schools have lower that the expected results
in comparison to the other two types of schools. At the student
level, school dependency is a significant variable. Students at
municipal schools have lower SIMCE results than students at
private subsidized schools, which in turn has lower results than
private non-subsidized.
SIMCE: 1990,
1992, 1994 and
1996; and
JUNAEB for
background
information on
children.
SIMCE: 1998;
JUNAEB data for
vulnerability and
MINEDUC data.
Public; and Private
Subsidized
Catholic subsidized, nonreligious subsidized, and
non-subsidized private
schools, relative to
public schools.
17
It is worth noting that the study done by Contreras (2001) is the only one of the hereby
included studies which uses a different data source, that is, individual student data. With
two-stage least squares estimations to control for school choice, the author shows that the
impact of private subsidized schools is larger than what the estimation by ordinary least
squares results in, and therefore concludes that the Chilean model actually succeeds as an
instrument of social mobility.
These results have to be put into context with what has happened in the legislative and
political arena during this decade. As a matter of fact, although the value of the per student
subsidy initially decreased because of an economic crisis that affected all public funding,
and with the exception of the interruption of the assessment system, there were no
important changes in the direction of the policy in place or in the commitment with the
reform through the 1980s.
On the other hand, the 1990s have been characterized by an important set of changes in the
policy rules that determined the institutional characteristics of the market game. On the one
hand, as occurred in most Latin American countries, an important set of compensatory
policies were put into place, some of which directly affected the budget of public schools.
Additionally, as has been already mentioned, the funding scheme of the previous decade
was changed to allow for the existence of complementary sources of school funding by the
private sector, either from parents themselves, or through tax-deductible donations.
Drawing from these studies’ results, it is plausible to hypothesis that the
decrease/disappearance of the difference in subsidized private school effectiveness as
measured –versus municipal schools-, as Bravo et al. (1999) observe, may be interpreted
either as a problem of private subsidized schools, or, more interestingly, as a model
success. That is, that the competitive pressures introduced by it have brought about a
municipal school quality increase. Even Carnoy & McEwan (2000: 228) recognize such
plausibility.
18
Theoretically, competitive forces bring a market to equilibrium. In the present model, such
competitive pressures means a competition on the sphere of quality, since subsidized
schools can not compete on prices –their price is fixed at the per student subsidy-, they do
so on the quality sphere (cost of zero does not imply equal access for all students; this is
determined by the location of the school, and admission policies). In Chile, it is plausible
to hypothesize that once the subsidy was established and the market opened, schools
entered the market taking advantage of the public funding of education. However, as the
threat this meant to municipal schools became visible, this worked as an incentive for such
schools to improve, in order to retain there already weakened demand capture. This meant
quality improvements that narrowed down the difference between the private subsidized
sector and municipal schools in terms of results (once having corrected for the population
they served), although both sectors where improving in terms of achievement results.
Argentina: over fifty years of a quasi-monopoly in education.
Historical perspective
As was mentioned before, up until the 1980s, the Argentine education system’s progress
does not differ much from what took place in its neighbor country. While Chile broke up
with the liberal state’s strong regulation of education, Argentina has not done so in such a
stark way, and to the same degree. Quite contrary, Argentina’s education reforms are
concentrated on the early 1990s –together with the introduction of compensatory policiesand still on going, and although these have brought about an important amount of changes
in the system, they have not implied a strong deviation from previous policy.
Argentina’s present education system is mainly based on the organization and discipline of
all preexistent schooling experiences, which were diverse and mainly of denominational
origin. By the end of the 19th century, the Schools Directorate10 of each province, together
with the National Education Council11 founded the institutional basis over which rules on
school finance, administration and organization were established, and all schools started to
depend upon one of these. As stated on a previous work (Narodowski, 2000), in Argentina
the governments managed a ‘statalization’ of schools which is reflected on the
monopolistic provision of education which was agreed on and that has subsisted to the
10
11
Dirección de Escuelas.
Consejo Nacional de Educación.
19
present based on an underlying ‘consensus’ on education. A reflection of this underlying
‘consensus’ is the fact that Argentina lacked a organic education law up to the enactment
of the Federal Education Law of 1993 (Ley Federal de Educación). The work emphasizes
that the State’s education policies, their firmness and their effectiveness, all through the
twentieth century were founded on very few parliamentary regulations.
After the twentieth century’s 1950s, the educational system faced a strong legitimacy loss
related to the fact that the system was not able to fulfill its promise of social mobility.
Additionally, the legal equalization that the State gave to private education institutions such as the elimination of private school students to take equivalency examinations at
public schools so as to receive their certification- (Narodowski y Andrada, 2002). Also,
private-school subsidies were regularized by the end of the 1940s12, but the governmentchurch conflict of the 1950s13 left subsidies during that decade to be mainly defined with a
high degree of institutional discretional power (Morduchowicz, et al., 1999). However,
only in 1964 were ‘objective’ parameters and criteria established for private subsidy
allocation14, however still today, the amounts allocated per school lack any clear
consistency (Morduchowicz, et al., 1999) and frequently answer to client-oriented and
prebendary criteria (Narodowski, 2000).
From these years on, the Argentine educational system has preserved its main
characteristics, and built on them. That is, although the main principles have not changed
much, and at the Macro level the system remained mainly the same, at the micro level it
has constantly grown –in normative terms-, which has led to a hyper-regulation of public
schools (Narodowski, 1999). In contrast, in the private sector this has not happened, and
therefore there has been a relative de-regulation of this sector. Most substantial reforms
during the 1970s took place in the teacher-training field (Narodowski, 2000), when the
military regime eliminated the traditional Normal Schools and teacher training starts to be
provided by tertiary non-university institutions.
12
Law 13.047 of September 22, 1947, known as Teacher Statute for Private Schooling Institutions (Estatuto
para el personal docente de los establecimientos de enseñanza privada).
13
Between 1953 and 1958 the conflict between the Catholic Church and the government of Perón reflected
itself in the education sector through a series of norms that took power away from the Church, the main
private sector schooling provider (Morduchowicz et al., 1999).
14
Decree 15/1964.
20
Furthermore, the decentralization reforms of 1978 (transference of primary national
schools to the provincial governments) and 1992 (transference of middle schools to the
provincial level) dismantled the Federal government’s structure of schooling provision on
the basis of financial and economic needs. However, such decentralization initiatives has
meant a lost Federal government control in favor of the provincial levels, but has not mean
increased school autonomy. Finally, the 1993 Federal Education Law15 brought about a
formal and long needed organization of the education system, extending compulsory
education and restructuring its levels. As ascertained on a former study (Narodowski,
2000), no mayor novelties surfaced in terms of strategic State prevalence and control in
education policy, except for its curricular component. These last reforms had little
implications for school autonomy and everyday schooling activities. Although the last
series of reforms implied a discourse shift from input-based control of education to outputbased provision of education, in reality they only implied an additional normative layer.
The last 30 years in education policy have generated a hyper-regulated impoverished state
system coexistent with a highly autonomous and expanded private sector.
The model
Argentina’s model of public provision of education has the particularity of mixing a strong
welfare state inherited from the post World War II era with a series of reforms over the
basis of issues of efficiency and federal legitimacy that have construed over, instead of
replacing, the former. Such a model of education provision can be categorized as a quasimonopoly one.
The quasi-Monopoly definition hereby considered is based on the work done by
Narodowski & Nores (2001). As mentioned before, they elaborate a taxonomy of
education provision models. Their main contribution is the differentiation of pure
monopolies from quasi-monopolies, that is, models of state provision that have imbedded
“exit” options but that do not contemplate the promotion of supply competition or marketoriented provision as quasi-markets do. Explicitly, if a monopoly and a market model
could be thought as linear opposites and the distance between these two a continuum, a
quasi-monopoly of education provision would be somewhere between a pure monopoly
and a quasi-market.
15
Law N° 24.195 of 1993: Ley Federal de Educación.
21
Argentina fits into this category, predominantly because it evolved into a system where the
main form of education provision is that of public education, supplied by a centralized
State (presently provincial states), with an effective and state promoted exit option. This
exit alternative is the private sector, which the state furthers through an institutionalized
subsidy assistance. Therefore, although the decentralized system does no establish a
competitive setting for all schools, it does finance a segment of the supply that draws
students from the total enrollment pool, and allows such segment to be part of a
competitive market (together with non subsidized private schools) while not introducing
any competitive incentives, and/or deregulating the traditional public school system that
has increasingly lost legitimacy.
The decentralization in Argentina did not change the system’s form of governance as it did
its locus. Although the provincial levels are responsible for the educational service
provided under their jurisdiction, it is not true that from the schools’ perspective this has
translated itself into greater school autonomy. Such school autonomy however, has always
been present in the private subsidized sector, and this has not changed with the
decentralization reform.
Enrollment privatization and Socioeconomic segmentation
Since the legal equalization of the private sector’s school supply in the sixties, the ‘exit’
option has been increasingly exercised in Argentina, mainly by those who had the means to
escape to the private education sector, in the search for higher quality. As can be observed
in Figure 2, although total enrollments (primary and secondary) increased between 1950
and 1980 for both, the private and the public sector (121%), private sector’s participation
did so in 11 percentage points (from 9.6% to 20.6%). Enrollments in these schools more
than tripled during this period. Additionally, between the years 1980 and 1998, (years for
which the Chilean case has been described) such participation grew an additional 1.7
(increasing from a 20.6 % of total enrollments to a 22.3%). Furthermore, while private
school supply increased almost 60%, public school supply fell a 5.2%.
22
Figure 2. Evolution of School Enrollments in Argentina, 1980-1998 (thousands).
7000
6000
5000
Thousands
4000
Public Sector
3000
2000
Private Sector
1000
0
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1994
1997
Source: Morduchowicz et al. (2000).
However, looking at enrollments from a different perspective, a similar segmentation to
that of Chile can be observed. Table IV presents enrollment by income level, type of
education and dependency for the coexisting reformed and non-reformed systems16.
Although private subsidized schools could not be traced trough the existing data for
Argentina, religious private school are differentiated17. Over two thirds of the private
schools fall into this category. Similarly, 75% of private schools received some percentage
of subsidies in 1998 (Morduchowicz, et al., 1999). Therefore, it is not strongly mistaken to
assume that a large share of the existing subsidies are assigned to religious private schools.
As evidenced, the lowest quintiles have higher public education participation rates, than
the fourth and fifth quintile. Although the levels of education are mixed combining reform
and non-reformed schools, it is evident that this occurs at all levels of education, but much
less markedly at the secondary and polimodal level. While 86% of the lowest quintile
enrolled in basic general education attends public schools, only a 27% of the highest
quintile does so. That is, the probability of attending a public school for a child of the
highest quintile is about one third of such probability for a child of the first quintile.
16
The 1993 Federal Education Law changed the structure of the education levels from seven years of primary
education (presently the non-reformed primary schools) to nine years of basic general education (reformed
primary schools and the first two years of what used to constitute the secondary level), and the five years of
secondary education (presently the non-reformed secondary schools) into 3 years of polimodal education.
17
The information is based on the Encuesta de Desarrollo Social, a urban household survey administered on
1997 by SIEMPRO (Sistema de Información, Monitoreo y Evaluación de Programas Sociales), of the
Ministry of Social Development and Environment.
23
Table IV. Population aged 0-24 enrolled by Income Level, Type of education and Dependency, 1997.
Education level
Dependency
Income Quintile
Total
I
II
III
IV
V
Basic General
Public
86.1
76.8
59.8
50.9
27.1
70.9
Education
Religious Private
8.0
14.4
28.6
31.2
44.6
18.5
Non religious Private
5.9
8.8
11.6
17.9
28.3
10.6
Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
Primary
Public
95.3
85.8
76.4
67.9
51.4
85.4
(non reformed)
Religious Private
3.8
10.4
16.1
24.8
32.2
10.6
Non religious Private
0.9
3.8
7.5
7.3
16.5
4.0
Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
Polimodal
Public
80.4
74.9
76.9
49.7
52.7
70.7
Religious Private
16.3
11.3
9.5
44.2
13.2
17.8
Non religious Private
3.3
13.9
13.6
6.1
34.0
11.5
Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
Secondary
Public
87.5
83.7
72.8
63.8
43.4
74.3
(non reformed)
Religious Private
6.8
10.5
20.4
20.6
34.7
16.1
Non religious Private
5.7
5.8
6.8
15.7
21.9
9.5
Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
Source: Elaboration on the basis of the Encuesta de Desarrollo Social, SIEMPRO, 1997.
In terms of private schooling, the higher the quintile group, the higher the percentage of
children attending these types of schools. Moreover, this is much stronger for religious
private enrollment. While about 6% of the lowest income children in basic general
education attends a non-religious private school, and 8% a religious one, 45% of the
children in the highest quintile attend the former and 28% the latter. Such pattern is the
same for non reformed primary and secondary education, and not so clear for polimodal
education (by 1997 this education structure had been implemented in less than half of the
provinces with a lot of irregularities, and such stark difference in comparison to what
happens in the rest of the levels may be consequence of this). Anyhow, the enrollment
segmentation by school dependency for the different income quintiles follows a similar
pattern to that of Chile that was mentioned before.
There are not many studies with a similar focus of those mentioned for Chile that approach
the Argentine case through an econometric methodology. The traced ones have
predominantly tried to identify public versus private sector differentials in education. The
results obtained through regular OLS analysis (Table V) are definitely mixed –controlling
for socio-economic characteristics of the children-, with somewhat better results for private
schooling at least at the primary level (Llach et al., 1999), or for catholic private schools
(McEwan, 2000), or through a greater school autonomy in the private sector (Eskeland &
Filmer, 2000). Additionally, Llach et al. find that the higher the socioeconomic
background, the higher the probability of choosing a private school, which further
evidences the enrollment segmentation mentioned before.
24
Table V. Econometric Studies on the Argentine Model of Education Provision.
Study
Data
Content
School type
Method
differentiation
Results
McEwan, P. (2000) Private and Public SINEC: 1997
schooling in the Southern Cone: A
comparative analysis of Argentina and
Chile. Occasional Paper No. 11, NCSPE,
Teachers College, Columbia University.
Individual level
data for Spanish
and Math.
National sample
of 7th grade.
(n=28,860)
Catholic subsidized, nonreligious subsidized, and
non-subsidized private
schools, relative to public
schools.
OLS
The results are decidedly mixed. Catholic schools are
somewhat more effective than public schools in producing
student outcomes. More differences in outcomes between
public and non-religious subsidized schools than Chile. In
short, private schools vary widely in the outcomes they
produce.
Eskeland, G.S & D. Filmer. (2000) Does SINEC: 1994
decentralization
improve
learning?
Autonomy and parental participation in
argentine schools. Preliminary draft.
Individual level
data for Spanish
and Math.
National sample
of 6th & 7th
grade. Urban
schools only.
None
OLS
Autonomy and participation matters.
Llach, J.J., Montoya, S. & F. Roldán. SINEC: 1993
(1999). Educación para todos. (Buenos and 1997 (not
Aires, Ieral).
comparable).
Individual level
Private schools and Public
data for Spanish schools.
and Math.
National sample
for the 7th grade,
and the 12th
grade.
OLS, and
HLM
25
For primary education -and always after controlling for
socioeconomic status-, attendance to a private school is
positively associated with scores most times and only 7%
of the variance on test scores is explained by the school
type. At the middle level, there is no significant positive
association between attendance to a private school and test
scores. Private school attendance is positively associated
with less drop-out and repeater rates, and with promotion
on time. Additionally, the HLM study showed a positive
effect of private schools larger than the effect of public
schools for all provinces except Buenos Aires when
controlling for socioeconomic status. Lastly, selection bias
is clearly important since higher SES increase the
probability of choosing private schooling.
Differing governance models
Consequence of the differing models of education provision of Argentina and Chile and
the differing decentralization reforms that have taken place in these countries are two very
different sets of regulatory frameworks and education finance and administration systems,
that is, dissimilar forms of governance.
We developed a series of decision-making aspects in the areas of: policy planning, school
supply, school organization, financing, personnel, curriculum and instruction, monitoring
and evaluation, and student choice regulation –a total of 25 decision-making categories-.
From this categorization (see appendix) the decision-making level for public and private
subsidized schools was traced.
As observed in Figure 3, while in Argentina 88% of these decisions for public schools
either are taken or have to have the input of provincial education authorities, in Chile,
municipal governments are responsible for a larger amount of such decision (46%), but
with an important supervision and control responsibility remaining at the central level
(59%). Furthermore, for the private subsidized schools, the locus of governance changes in
both cases towards greater school level decision-making, but this occurs much more
markedly in Chile. In Argentina, provincial authorities intervene in 42% of such decisionmaking categories for private-subsidized schools, and 58% of these have the School’s
input. On the other hand in Chile, municipal governments intervene in only 4% and the
School does so in 63%.
26
Figure 3. Governance of Public and Private-Subsidized schools, in Argentina and Chile.
PS _A R G
PUB _A R G
P&S
S
8%
8%
P
17 %
C
P&S
4%
4%
C &P
17 %
C &P
C
29 %
8%
P
C ,P&S
51 %
S
4%
50 %
PS _C H
PUB_C H
M &S
M
25 %
8%
P
4%
S
8%
C &S
13 %
S
50 %
C &M
4%
C &S
8%
C
C &M
38 %
C
13 %
29 %
Note: C = Central level; P = Provincial level; M = Municipal level; and S = School level.
Source: Own elaboration.
Conclusions
The worldwide intent of improving administrative efficiency, school quality, and school
equity in education has meant an important transformation of the national state’s role in
education in favor of an increased role of lower government levels. Within the different
directions that such policies have taken in the country-specific settings, some countries
have introduced reforms with specific competition and efficiency components, as did
Chile, while others have stayed in the decentralization discourse with limited real changes
having been done in this direction, as did Argentina.
Therefore, a transfer of authority from those in one location or level vis-a-vis educational
organizations, to those in another level, has not necessarily changed the rules of the game
for schools. On one hand, Chile introduced strong decentralization and market reforms
during the 1980s. Therefore, it evolved into a quasi-market model of education provision,
where education is provided in a market system but where some aspects have been kept at
the centralized decision-making level. On the other hand, Argentina can be defined as a
quasi-monopoly system of education provision, since it’s education system is highly
27
centralized at the provincial level (being a federal country) but has an explicit and statesubsidized exit option. Hence, these two countries have faced very different
decentralization reforms, and which have taken place over within two very different sets of
regulatory frameworks. Notwithstanding, presently they have arrived to similar states in
terms of the education system’s enrollments’ socioeconomic segmentation. In short, they
represent two different models of schooling provision and regulations that have arrived in
the socioeconomic aspects to similar results.
The paper questions the causality governing the relation between the use of competitive
policies (vouchers) in education and an increased enrollment segmentation or student
sorting. That is, it questions a predominant statement in the literature opposing competition
initiatives in education, that states that such initiatives promote enrollment segmentation.
About all of these approaches to the problem of socioeconomic segregation have to do with
thinking the relationship between vouchers and this kind of segmentations as a positive
causality were the implementation of vouchers in education results into increased
segmentation. However, such same results can also be found in systems such as the
Argentine education system, that which are highly centralized and have not introduced
competitive reforms. Therefore, the evidence form Chile and Argentina shows that
enrollment segmentation is not a consequence of the introduction of vouchers, and the
causal relationship between this two variables is broken. Even more, the equilibrium
apparent in the Chilean experience would indicate the model’s success (Bravo et al., 1999)
on the basis of competitive policies in education.
In conclusion, vouchers are not an independent variable but an intervening one within the
determinants of socioeconomic segmentation. The family school choice decisions brought
about by the introduction of systems such as vouchers are definitely endogenous to a series
of factors that determine such choice, factors that that are evidently important in the
determination of socioeconomic enrollment segmentations in non voucher systems.
Apparently, this questions the validity of empirical analyses which take student
socioeconomic characteristics and school choice decisions as independent determinant
variables of student results, highly predominant in the empirical studies of competition
policies.
28
Appendix i. Educational System's Governance of Public and Subsidize-Private Schools, by
administration level.
Decision-making by
Argentina
Chile
Central Provincial Municipal
School
Central Provincial Municipal
category
Governance
Policy planning
X
X
X
Implementation
X
X
X
X
School supply
Official authorization
X
Xa
School opening and closure
P
S
P
School organization
Structure
P
S
P
Min. Requirements
X
X
Financing
Recurrent funding
Xb
X
Capital funding
P
S
P
Compensatory funding
X
X
X
School budget administration
X
S
P
Private funding
Sc
Personnel
Hiring and Firing
P
Se
P
In-service training
X
P
S
X
P
Salary determination
P
Sf
Pg
Qualification standards
Xh
X
Curriculum & instruction
Curriculum content
X
X
S
X
Textbooks decision-making
P
S
P
Textbook provision
X
P
P
Didactic methods
P
X
P
Student evaluation
P
X
P
Monitoring & evaluation
Monitoring/supervision
Accreditation
X
X
Promotions
X
Discipline
X
Student/Schools Assessment
X
X
X
Students
Admissions
P
S
Pj
X = Public and Subsidized-Private schools; P = Public Schools, S = Subsidized-Private Schools.
School
S
S
X
S
S
Sd
S
S
Sg
Xi
S
S
X
X
X
X
Sj
Categories developed by the author and based on Rideout & Ural. (1993).
a) Authorization is given by the National Ministry of Education with compliance to a set of requirements.
b) Subsidies to private schools are only given to cover teacher salaries.
c) Schools that are granted subsidy are done so at different percentages on the basis of their organic personnel plant.
d) Subsidized schools can receive donations since 1993, as well as opt for mixed funding.
e) The province of Jujuy however, establishes that private schools have the possibility of receiving financial support under the condition that they comply with the
provincial teacher statute in terms of job stability and labor conditions.
f) As stated in the FLE, teachers in private institutions have the right to earn a minimum wage of at least as much as teachers in the public sector.
g) Limits imposed by the teacher statute.
h) The requirement of the Federal Law of Education on teacher certification is that it complies with each jurisdiction's requirements.
i) Schools have to comply with study plans and programs either being these the general ones dictated by the central government, or their own after the National
Ministry's approval.
j) Municipal schools are not allowed to select students, while subsidized schools do not have such a restriction.
29
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