Original Article
Going through the democratic motions
in Southeast Asia
Munir Majid
IDEAS, LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2 2AE, UK.
E-mail: [email protected]
Abstract In Southeast Asia there is rising expression of the right to be heard to
address grievance or to change policy of government in a desired direction.
Although this might have been ignored in the past, by repressive means if deemed
necessary, it has become increasingly difficult to push back or aside the wave of
such views that today find convergence in a marketplace that engages a global
constituency of shared ideas facilitated by civil society organizations and, most
importantly, by information and communication technology (ICT). There is a
distinction that needs to be made between fulfilment of the principles and practices
of liberal democracy on the one hand, and activism in the ‘democratic process’ on
the other, the latter comprising at the one end participation in a large marketplace
of expression of views and at the other an experience of concentrated new forms of
securing support in electoral contest. It must be borne in mind the principles and
institutions of liberal democracy could be absent or limited in the political system,
and yet there may be animated activity in the digital sphere of a truncated
democracy. Such intense activity in the new media could still come to be dominated
by the ruling rich and powerful who already control the conventional media.
International Politics (2010) 47, 725–738. doi:10.1057/ip.2010.27
Keywords: Southeast Asia; ICT; civil society; liberal democracy
Introduction
Since the countries in the region gained independence from the end of the
Pacific War, the varied experiences of democracy in Southeast Asia have for
the most part been the reflection of will of political personality. Whatever the
popular wish and existent institutional support, those experiences have been
largely determined by a political order usually under the direction of a
dominant individual leader. This has been the common, even remorseless,
experience.
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics
www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738
Majid
However in Southeast Asia today, indeed in many parts of the world, there is
rising expression of the right to be heard to address grievance or to change
policy of government in a desired direction. Although this might have been
ignored in the past, by repressive means if deemed necessary, it has become
increasingly difficult to push back or aside the wave of such views that today
find convergence in a marketplace that engages a global constituency of shared
ideas facilitated by civil society organizations and, most importantly, by
information and communication technology (ICT).
The lone citizen is no longer isolated. He can get support and access to share
his concerns and experience, and the political market forces have caused such
democratic governments as there are in Southeast Asia – and even
undemocratic ones – to rethink their whole strategy and means of addressing
citizens’ concerns and gaining their support. Of course this communications
reach also implies that established institutions in the system, such as political
parties or well-organized groups, are better able to galvanize support for
themselves – even if they also are more exposed to criticism of their
shortcomings – in the democratic process.
There is, however, a distinction that needs to be made between fulfilment of
the principles and practices of liberal democracy on the one hand, and activism
in the ‘democratic process’ on the other, the latter comprising at the one end
participation in a large marketplace of expression of views and at the other an
experience of concentrated new forms of securing support in electoral contest.1
It must be borne in mind the principles and institutions of liberal democracy
could be absent or limited in the political system, and yet there may be
animated activity in the digital sphere of a truncated democracy. Such intense
activity in the new media, in turn, could still come to be dominated by
the ruling rich and powerful who now already control the conventional
media.
Thus, whether or not the technologically driven participatory expansion
will truly vitalize the erratic democracy of Southeast Asia remains to be seen.
We are only at the early stages of such democratic assertion and representation. Looking back, the history of democracy in the region is filled with sharp
twists and turns, and the path of democracy seldom runs smooth. Countries in
the region with no pretence at democracy, such as Vietnam, know how to
control, contain and deter the combined force of social activism and
communication technology – and they have the example to follow of other
similar countries in the near region, for example China. On the other hand, in
countries whose democracy has at best been termed as ‘hybrid’, with
authoritarianism and democratic elements, such as Singapore, a greater
openness to the world – and to the flow of information and communication –
leaves the society more exposed to outside influences and tending to be more
expressive.2
726
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
International Politics
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738
Going through the democratic motions in Southeast Asia
Erratic Democracy
A leading writer of the time wrote over 40 years ago:
The tradition of obedience and hereditary memories of despotic rule
have ensured that democracy, where it has been attempted, has proved
a frail plant. It has withered and died in Burma and Indonesia since
independence and has little meaning in Cambodia, Laos and South
Vietnam y Democracy has never really been tried in Siam. Only in
Malaysia y and the Philippines y does democracy look like having any
future. Crozier (1968)
This somber prediction, although not exactly accurate, is not too wide of the
mark. In the history of Southeast Asia’s erratic democracy, there are many
examples of its expression being controlled or contained, and even deterred.
Indonesia, which at this time is being lauded as a leading light of democracy in
Southeast Asia and the Muslim world, experienced a sharp turn from
representative to ‘guided’ democracy with the stroke of a pen, Sukarno’s
Presidential decree of 5 July 1959 (whose legal validity has, until today, not
been established), after the republic’s first President tired of what he considered
the unsatisfactory experiment with parliamentary democracy. The reality is the
sharp change took place because of his own predisposition.3 It is a long story
but guided democracy, with the people’s whipped up enthusiastic support, led
to disastrous consequences for Indonesia, culminating in the 1965 military
coup and Sukarno’s replacement in 1966 with President Suharto. The new
President, in turn, over more than 30 years, in what was called ‘Suharto’s
New Order’, presided in a benign dictatorship, supported by capitalist cronies
in an era of corruption and unequally distributed economic growth.4 When
he was replaced following the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, a succession
of three Presidents took office before Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who, in
2009, became the first Indonesian President ever to be re-elected, leading
to current celebration of the vast republic’s democratic credentials. It would
however be too sanguine to conclude that democracy has been implanted in
this huge archipelago, which has experienced some traumatic events in the past.
Malaysia makes another interesting study of the twists and turns of the
democratic path and process. Tunku Abdul Rahman, its first Prime Minister
on independence in 1957, was no doubt a truly inclined democrat, whatever
difficulty he faced in establishing a young nation founded on competing racial
representation and interests. However, subsequent events were to have an
impact on democratic practices in the country.
When Malaysia came close to falling apart following racial riots in 1969 and
democracy in the country was ‘suspended’, aside from economic inequalities, it
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
International Politics
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738
727
Majid
was the official view that unbridled freedom of expression led to racial
animosity. This freedom was then limited by law. In the years that followed the
reintroduction of democracy in 1971 in a more limited form, the issues that
divided the races, such as contested political rights, religious differences and
racially driven socio-economic policies, remained beneath the surface as they
were denied public expression. There have been occasions when these issues
have flared up, as in the controversy since the end of last year over a court
judgement allowing the use of the term ‘Allah’ for God in the Malay language
by Christians, which Malay-Muslims generally do not accept.5 By and large,
however, the peace has been kept by tough national security laws and a shared
interest in economic prosperity.
Such economic prosperity was at its most evident during Prime Minister
Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s 22 years in power (1981–2003), a period that saw a
diminution of the political and civil rights in a democracy. Mahathir was not
tolerant of dissent and took the view that the elected Prime Minister had a right
greater than what might be enjoyed by the unelected institutions in a liberal
democracy, such as the judiciary or the press. The concept of separation of
powers, checks and balances was alien to him. Even among the elected,
Mahathir took the view that his position was unassailable except once at the
polls, whether for state or party office. When challenged he was not hesitant
to use existing security and other laws to maintain his primacy. Perhaps the
darkest time for democracy was when he emasculated the hitherto independent
judiciary to ensure he remained leader of the ruling party and Prime Minister
of Malaysia in 1988.6 In 1998 Mahathir once again used without hesitation the
power of office to break the political back of his deputy Anwar Ibrahim in their
struggle for power, often not really accurately caricatured as one between the
forces of authoritarianism (Mahathir) and democracy (Anwar).
There were other instances in which it might have appeared Mahathir was
acting in the democratic interest, such as when he moved to curtail the powers
of Malaysian royalty. But the constitutional changes he effected in 1983, 1993
and 1994, on the period after which bills from the legislature would become
law with or without the royal assent and on abolishing sovereign immunity
for acts by royalty in their personal capacity, were the result first and foremost
of perceived challenge to his own exercise of power, not of any principled
construct on the role of constitutional monarchy in a democracy. When
Mahathir took the rulers on, he disregarded Article 38(4) of the Federal
Constitution that ‘no law directly affecting the privileges, position, honours
or dignities of the rulers shall be passed without the consent of the Conference
of Rulers’.
In the exercise of raw political power, no Malaysian Prime Minister before
or since has come anywhere close to Mahathir’s ruthlessness and genius.
He saw off the judiciary, royalty and political opponents without let or
728
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
International Politics
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738
Going through the democratic motions in Southeast Asia
hindrance of democratic nicety and reservation. This predisposition remained
even after he left office, as was demonstrated by his bitter attack on his chosen
successor for daring to change some of his major policies and for alluding
just to certain excesses in his time.7 Indeed, out of power, he called on the very
democratic rights he denied others when in power, and turned upside down
many of the things he did as leader as consequences and situations that
were not acceptable, as if they were not the result of decisions he had forced
through in the first place.
Yet, Mahathir remains almost as popular as he was when Prime Minister
whose contribution to national development is lauded, his transgressions
against democratic practice widely forgotten or forgiven, or considered
inconsequential. He was Malaysia’s most political Prime Minister ever, using
the power of office largely to achieve developmental ends, never mind the
means. He made Malaysians proud in international assertion and in domestic
achievement. If democracy is what the majority of the people want, here we
have it!
In Thailand today, nobody has been able quite to take a grip on power as
Mahathir did in Malaysia. This should not be taken to imply that Thailand
is necessarily ‘more democratic’ than Malaysia, as the current political conflict
in the country is widely described as one between the revisionist forces of
democracy and the status quo of undemocratic privilege. Yet it cannot be
denied that in terms of freedom of speech and assembly, Thailand is way ahead
of Malaysia, even if Malaysians might say there is a price to pay for those
freedoms.
This time around Thailand has been in crisis since the coup in September
2006 that ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. This has been par for the
course in the country, where the military steps in from time to time, ostensibly
to suppress corruption and restore order, but actually retarding democratic
rule in the process. It has been estimated the military has intervened ‘once every
four years on average since 1932’.8
The pro-Thaksin ‘Red Shirts’ (National United Front of Democracy against
Dictatorship – UDD) are pitted against the ‘Yellow Shirts’ (People’s Alliance
for Democracy – PAD) who are in favour of the status quo, including Prime
Minister Abhisit, thrust to power on 15 December 2008 with the support of the
military and the palace. It is often described as a struggle between rural
Thailand, represented by the former, and Bangkok by the latter. However,
fundamentally, it is a conflict whose outcome will determine the future of
democracy in the country. Many of the country’s intellectuals and academics
are hopeful about the ‘emerging (democratic) soul’ of Thailand, but that still
remains to be seen.
Meanwhile, the situation has inflicted tremendous damage on the country
and its reputation. There have been many violent protests. One, in November
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
International Politics
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738
729
Majid
2008, resulted in the closure of Suvarnabhumi international airport, as well as
other airports in the country. Another, in April 2009, most embarrassingly,
caused the cancellation of the East Asia and Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) summit in Pattaya, in the year Thailand had hoped to
celebrate as the chair of the regional grouping. The ‘war of attrition’ and
challenge of wills continue with, for example, prolonged street demonstrations
and occupation of public buildings in Bangkok earlier this year.
In the stand-off between the two sides of the conflict, there is actually no
monopoly of right and rectitude. The populism that drives the Thaksin camp
ignores the many instances of corruption and conflicts of interest under his
regime because of the development he brought to the country and the hope
he gave to people at the bottom of the social heap in Thailand; but, while it
uses the language of democracy, it is overwhelmingly personality-based, and
Thaksin’s orchestration of that populist support is self-centred. On the other
hand, the elitist and exclusive status quo forces of military, palace and
bureaucracy do not have democratic right to intervene in political process to
promote outcomes palatable to them, even if they can make out the case
against the corruption and abuse of the Thaksin regime, or for the need to
restore order, which is wearing thin as order has not fully been restored.
This is a dangerous situation because at some point order may be bloodily
asserted. That point could come at the end of 81-year-old King Bhumibol’s
63-year reign, which may encourage the revisionist political forces to push their
case more violently and, on the other hand, the forces of the status quo may
become more inclined to use force more aggressively after having shown
restraint over an extended period. Different interpretations of the meaning of
the end of King Bhumibol’s reign could result in that bloody outcome. The
situation in Thailand needs political leadership of the highest order to restore
peace and stability. Democracy perhaps can only come afterwards.
The corruption and conflicts of interest that bedeviled Thaksin and blighted
the democratic hope he promised were to be found in another part of the
region, the Philippines. The last President of the Philippines, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, was sworn in on 20 January 2001, as street demonstrations
against the widely perceived corrupt Joseph Estrada drove him out of power.
She was elected in her own right for a full 6-year term in the controversial May
2004 elections. In the May elections this year Noynoy Aquino, son of parents
with acknowledged democratic credentials, was elected President, but with
corruption and politically related violence endemic in the Philippines,
particularly in the troubled south, the democratic process cannot be viewed
with any equanimity.9
The Philippines, with its length of experience, is perhaps the best illustration
in all of Southeast Asia of the path of democracy never running smooth. Great
promise often gets mired in corruption and violence. President Ferdinand
730
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
International Politics
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738
Going through the democratic motions in Southeast Asia
Marcos is the outstanding example of this. The longest serving leader of the
Philippines (1965–1986), Marcos started out full of promise, being compared
with the late US President John Kennedy and his Camelot. But he showed
power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. When it suited him,
the legally trained Marcos did not baulk at ruling by decree, as he did from
September 1972, with the declaration of martial law that was not lifted until
January 1981 after a new constitution introduced in early 1973 had allowed
him to stay in power as Prime Minister. Soon after martial law was lifted,
the first presidential election in 12 years was held, which was boycotted by the
opposition. It was a massive orchestrated victory for Marcos that saw the
‘birth of a new republic’. This lasted 5 years before political and economic
crises led to its demise.
In 1983, the Philippines government had been implicated in the assassination
of Marcos’ primary political opponent Benigno Aquino Jr. In the snap election
of 1986 against Aquino’s widow Corazon, Marcos indulged in massive
electoral fraud again, resulting in his being overthrown in February in the
People’s Power Revolution. Transparency International characterized Marcos
as the second most corrupt leader ever in Southeast Asia, after Suharto, the
epitaph that will stick to the man who died in exile in 1989 after starting out so
full of promise.
Whatever can be said about Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew it cannot be that he
or any administration in the island-republic is corrupt. In fact, Singapore is one
of the least corrupt countries in the world where you can do business without
any hidden costs and delays. Singapore’s economic development is the greatest
success story of this clean, intelligent and efficient government. It is often said
that it is easy for the small island-republic to attain those heights, but one only
has to look at the mess of Metro-Manila or Jakarta to see it is not just a matter
of size. Singapore set out, under Lee Kuan Yew’s leadership, to become a
pristine economic dynamo, directly linked to a competitive global market,
which requires nothing less than first world delivery and performance. That
sets Singapore apart from its neighbours in Southeast Asia.
In the second volume of his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew observed: ‘My
experience of developments in Asia has led me to conclude that we need good
men to have good government. However good the system of government, bad
leaders will bring harm to their people’ Lee (2000). The Singapore leader, along
with Mahathir (although the two leaders did not see eye to eye on more things
than they did), also stressed Asian values, especially from the early 1990s,
which emphasized community as opposed to individual interest, and economic
and social, rather than civil and political rights.
This is where criticism is often made of Singapore’s political system.
Freedom House does not consider Singapore an ‘electoral democracy’ and
ranks the country as ‘partly free’. Reporters Without Borders, in one of its
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
International Politics
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738
731
Majid
surveys, ranked Singapore 140th out of 167 countries in its Worldwide Press
Freedom index. There are two main opposition parties, the Workers’ Party of
Singapore and the Singapore Democratic Party, but the country is a de facto
one-party state, the ruling People’s Action Party having ruled it throughout
since 1959. Elections are not considered free and fair because of preponderant
forces arraigned against the opposition, in terms of media control and
coverage, and use of the law courts to browbeat them.
Singapore however does not appear to be particularly concerned about such
criticism of its democracy, preferring to advertise its incorruptibility, efficiency
and economic success instead. Lee Kuan Yew had further noted in his
memoirs: ‘y . I have also seen so many of the over 80 constitutions drafted by
Britain and France for their former colonies come to grief, and not because of
flaws in the constitutions. It was simply that the preconditions for a democratic
system of government did not exist’ Lee (2000). However, increasingly,
Singaporeans today ask what are those preconditions and how and when they
can be considered to exist in their country. As we have noted, they are now
more expressive and opinionated. How much longer will they accept being
mollycoddled and spoken down to? Singapore, despite its real, financial and
economic successes, cannot avoid the soft development that has to follow.
Indeed, across Southeast Asia in general, there are clear rumblings of a
desire for greater democracy or, at least, better recognition of political and civil
rights. All 10 ASEAN member states, including the four (Myanmar, Laos,
Vietnam and Brunei) that cannot in any way be considered democratic, do not
escape such pressure. In however incomplete and unsatisfactory a form, they
have formally recognized the peoples’ rights in the ASEAN Charter that was
adopted in November 2007 followed by the setting up of the ASEAN InterGovernmental Commission on Human Rights in October 2009. The
imperfections are all too evident in the terms of reference of the commission,
which give due deference to sovereign rights and consultation, but it is a fact
that it has been established. Civil society and non-governmental organizations
remain dissatisfied of course. Nonetheless they have something to work on to
ensure the commission progresses from ‘promotion’ to ‘protection’ of rights,
from considering thematic issues to hearing individual complaints. And the
means of airing their views, getting together and mobilizing support are now
better than ever before, although it is understandable that they are impatient
given continued unconscionable violations in some parts of Southeast Asia,
such as in Myanmar.
Malaysia’s Experiment with ‘Functional Democracy’
After Mahathir stepped down as Prime Minister in October 2003, the iron grip
on power was loosened by his successor Abdullah Badawi. Abdullah pointed in
732
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
International Politics
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738
Going through the democratic motions in Southeast Asia
the direction of greater liberalism, but did not adequately think through or
map out the process of political change. He raised high expectations, but could
not fulfil them. At the start of his relatively brief period as Prime Minister he
led the ruling Barisan Nasional, in March 2004, to its greatest parliamentary
triumph ever, winning 199 out of 219 seats. He regained control of Terengganu
state that Mahathir had lost in 1999 and obtained 64 per cent of the popular
vote, just 1 per cent less than the party’s best achievement in 1995. Abdullah
was at a political peak. Yet he did not, and could not, exercise power to shape
the Malaysian political system in the image he promised.
He did not use his electoral triumph to change the composition of his
Cabinet, to signal to supporters he meant business about bringing change, and
to warn off his opponents, particularly in his own party in the Barisan Nasional
coalition, the pivotal United Malay National Organization (Umno). Mahathir
had shown in the years he was leader of the party how the membership, and its
warlords, respected power and would congregate around the man wielding it.
The amiable Abdullah, unfortunately, did not know how to use it. Indeed, one
and a half years after his famous election victory, the Umno election turned in a
mixed bag of high-level representatives many of whom were not on the same
wave length as him on the need for reform and change. The Supreme Council,
Umno’s powerful policy-making body, was not fully with him, whereas control
of his party was a sine qua non for change. He failed to exert or achieve it. His
agenda for change – such as strengthening the fight against corruption, reviving
the judiciary and reforming the police – was in trouble.
Change also meant an ability to control the vested interests and institutions
to implement it, such as the civil service and, indeed, the police. In fact, the
police were very clear and openly informed the Prime Minister they were
opposed to some proposed measures of reform of the force that, therefore,
were not implemented. As always in such situations, demonstration of
powerlessness encouraged other vested interests. In desperation, Abdullah
tightened his grip on the press to give the appearance of being in control, which
undermined his liberal credentials and drove many more Malaysians to the
alternative media on the web. He also came to rely more and more on a small
group of young advisers, including his son and son-in-law, which exposed him
to charges of supplanting the Umno decision-making structure and of
nepotism – led by none other than his predecessor Mahathir who, as we have
seen, had been virulent in his attack on his successor’s governance and policies.
Fast forward, with the disastrous election results of March 2008 where the
ruling coalition lost its two-thirds majority in Parliament and control of five
states, both for the first time in Malaysian political history, the chorus for
Abdullah to step down grew louder and louder until 1 year later he finally did.
There has been no steeper descent from power by a Malaysian Prime Minister
than by Abdullah Badawi.
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
International Politics
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738
733
Majid
Many intriguing questions remain about Abdullah’s period as the country’s
leader. The most significant is whether the country could have continued with
a Mahathir-type leadership style with its concomitant attitude on the limits
of liberal democratic practice, and for how long, or was it ripe for change.
In any case, Abdullah’s leadership would not have fitted either situation.
The succession, evidently, was flawed – something Mahathir was not shy to
point out, although he does not blame himself for having failed to plan it
successfully.
Many changes have been taking place in the country in which Mahathir’s
long stay in power obscured. His stature and reputation stilled them, but
Malaysians were nonetheless hungry for revision of policies and for freer
expression of views. When he was gone, they celebrated the prospect of change
(Abdullah’s first general election). When change did not come they indicated
their displeasure (Abdullah’s second, and his fall from grace). There is now a
more animated level of expression of views in which Mahathir himself also
participates. Ever adaptable and willing nonchalantly to take positions once
anathema to him when in power, he now uses the internet to put across his
views, arguing with not a hint of irony that the conventional media was
controlled and that people were afraid to criticize the ruling regime. The
country’s fourth Prime Minister also now happily uses the democratic idiom in
expressing his views, such as how nomination and election to posts in his
political party should be open and free – something he had controlled by
amending the Umno constitution after he came close to losing the party’s
presidency in 1987. Mahathir, this most political man, has changed, which is a
sure indication the country has too. The people expect greater appurtenances
of democracy in the Malaysian political system. This is what the current Prime
Minister Najib Razak has to deal with.
Having watched the political drama that brought him to power in April
2009, the new leader is not one to rush in where angels fear to tread. A highly
intelligent and deliberate person, he would have observed the folly of making
big political reform pledges, as he might not be able to keep them. Not yet 60,
but already a political veteran of 34 years, he also appreciates the need to keep
his party with him and not to be on the wrong side of the indefatigable
Mahathir, who continues to be more than just of nuisance value.
But he is savvy enough to recognize the need for change, both in the ruling
party and, more broadly, in the way the country is governed. His approach is
not to go for the ‘big bang’ – the major political issues that divide – which
could lead him to a quagmire, but to concentrate on the ‘bread and butter’
issues that have a major impact on people’s lives, which he hopes will not
unduly antagonize anyone.
In the process of reaching out to the people, he has also concentrated on
gestures and symbols, means and methodologies that have reach, and invited
734
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
International Politics
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738
Going through the democratic motions in Southeast Asia
involvement and participation in the process of change and improvement. His
first visits as Prime Minister were to multi-racial and multi-religious areas and
events, while also not neglecting his Malay base. His 1Malaysia campaign, with
the watchwords ‘People First’, ‘Performance Now’, is catchy and sits well with
the Malaysian, particularly Malay, penchant for campaigns and slogans. While
it has a contemporary reality, at the same time, it expresses a return to the
founding basis of Malaysian nationhood without trumpeting it. He engages
with the people on Facebook, has his own blog and is chatty and accessible
with this largely young constituency.
He has identified six key result areas that his government will address with a
plan of action in consultation with the people. These are matters that deeply
concern the people, such as education, public transportation, corruption, rural
infrastructure, crime and raising the living standard of the poor. The
programmes are detailed, have timelines and are more in keeping with good
corporate management than with the cut and thrust of politics. Ministers and
ministries will be evaluated against these programmes and their other
responsibilities through key performance indicators, and the whole of the
Government Transformation Plan will be reviewed in an annual report, the
first of which will come out in the first quarter of 2011. Najib believes this is
what the people want: real performance with transparency and accountability.
It is indeed a bold experiment, unique in government anywhere.
There are two main problems with this functional approach. First, the habit
of cooperation that it will engender takes time to develop as will the results.
Second, any number of issues can arise in the meanwhile, which could cause big
and destructive political problems. Of course existing laws could be enforced,
but their application could, in turn, make the issues bigger. Malaysia’s political
development has not all been positive and there is a heavy drag on the
movement forward that Najib envisages. You change approaches and policies
by doing and not by talking and announcing, but the change cannot easily
escape being categorized as fundamental and not merely functional. There
will be Malaysians who will be suspicious and wish to hang on to the past, and
there will be those who will be expectant and want to reach out to the future.
The tension in Malaysian society, based on its political order and socioeconomic policies, cannot be avoided and has to be resolved.10
Such a direct approach, however, could break the country. After 53 years of
political domination, the Malays are not going to easily accept a new order,
just as they will be reluctant to see their preferential socio-economic benefits
availed in the last 40 years come to an end. The benefits of the new
arrangements will need to be quickly evident if the forces pushing ahead are to
prevail over those pulling back. The Malaysian government has committed
itself to a New Economic Model (NEM), the outlines of which were released at
the end of March,11 based on a high-income economy that is to propel the
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
International Politics
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738
735
Majid
country forward. This NEM emphasizes human capital, innovation, merit and
efficiency and eschews the costs of rent-seeking that characterize present
affirmative policies under the New Economic Policy (NEP) in existence for the
last four decades. Not surprisingly, Malay vested interests are fearful of this
proposed change, and have been actively lobbying against it by claiming that
Malay special privileges are guaranteed in the constitution. In the Tenth
Malaysia Plan announced in June the policy substance to the NEM was
announced, but without pushing hard against the NEP. Clearly, both process
and content will ultimately have to take cognizance of the political undertones
– demonstrating the difficulty of forging ahead with the functional approach
without addressing deep political concerns. There is no gainsaying the NEM is
an essential reality check on the negative economic consequences of the NEP,
but the political buy-in is just as critical.
Conclusion
Although there may be new forms and methods of reaching out to the people
and of putting views across, this phenomenon of the digital age cannot yet be
said to enhance the experience of liberal democracy in Southeast Asia
comparable with its practice in the older democracies of Europe and America.
The experience of democracy in the region, furthermore, is exposed to the
caprice of leaders who are not subjected to effective checks and balances
between elections that, if held at all, are weighted in favour of the ruling
parties. In addition, corruption and violence continue to plague democratic
life, such as it may exist, in at least a couple of countries.
In the country with the highest achievement of economic success, the record
of liberal democracy is in inverse proportion that underlines the priority to
serve other needs first before development of democracy. But where those
needs can be said to have been fulfilled, in Singapore, the country’s political
managers are not as inclined or adept in managing the kind of change towards
achieving liberal democracy as they were economic transformation.
The proposition of ‘functional democracy’, as is being experimented in
Malaysia, may be a greater force in the development of democracy than that
through real recognition of political and civil rights. However, in the
Malaysian case, there is the threat of underlying conflicts in a multi-racial
nation uprooting such progress if those conflicts are not concurrently
addressed or sufficiently rapid progress is not achieved through the functional
route.
From the record of its history in Southeast Asia thus far, the practice of
democracy in the region is not likely to follow the same path as in Europe and
America. However, this does not imply Southeast Asia is only going through
736
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
International Politics
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738
Going through the democratic motions in Southeast Asia
the democratic motions. It has its own trajectory based on differently identified
priorities for progress of the process. There is also a dynamism in its movement
that ICT has had a positive impact on, most notably in activity in the electoral
process. The dynamism makes the process of democratization in Southeast
Asia an interesting work-in-progress with likely positive outcomes across
many, if not all, parts of the region.
About the Author
Munir Majid is Visiting Senior Fellow in IDEAS at the LSE where he is Head
of the Southeast Asia International Affairs Programme. Dr Majid received his
PhD in International Relations from LSE and has worked as a journalist and
as a banker. He served as the founding Executive Chairman of the Malaysian
Securities Commission during the 1990s and became Chairman of Malaysian
Airlines in 2004.
Notes
1 A ground-breaking workshop on democratization was organized in London on 12 February
2010 by LSE IDEAS Southeast Asia International Affairs Programme at which academic and
non-academic experts from Europe and Southeast Asia put forward the new methods employed
to secure support in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. The workshop
discussion is published as an LSE IDEAS Special Report, ‘Democratisation and new voter
mobilization in Southeast Asia’, May 2010.
2 Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew would never have dreamed, when he was Prime Minister or
even Senior Minister, that remarks made by him about Singaporeans becoming less ‘harddriving’ would have drawn such vitriolic comments expressed in The Temasek Review, Monday,
8 February 2010, www.temasekreview.com/2009/12/24/mm-lee-good-thing-to-welcome-somany-chinese-immigrants-as-singaporeans-have-become-less-hard-driving/.
3 For a useful narrative covering events during this period see Legge (1972).
4 A readable book on Suharto’s New Order is by Vatikiotis (1993).
5 See Majid (2010a) for a flavour of the issues and emotions involved.
6 For the most recent rendition of that dark episode see Wain (2009).
7 Mahathir expressed privately to the writer his anger and frustration with Abdullah during a
meeting on an unrelated matter on 8 August 2005 at his Perdana Leadership Foundation office
in Kuala Lumpur.
8 Thitinan Pongsudhirak in The Guardian, 8 November 2009, where he also referred to ‘the soul
of an emerging Thailand’.
9 See, for instance, Eva-Lotta Hedman on a gruesome massacre on 23 November 2009: The
Maguindanao Massacre, Critical Elections and Armed Conflict in the Philippines, LSE IDEAS
Situation Analysis.
10 See, for instance, Kessler (2010).
11 National Economic Advisory Council: New Economic Model for Malaysia Part 1, Percetakan
Nasional Malaysia Berhad, Kuala Lumpur, March 2010. For a review of the report see Majid
(2010b).
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
International Politics
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738
737
Majid
References
Crozier, B. (1968) Southeast Asia in Turmoil. Middlesex: Pelican, p. 22.
Kessler, C. (2010) Can BN win again? Malaysia’s next national elections: A ‘last hurrah’? Off the
Edge, February, pp. 50–57.
Lee, L.K. (2000) From Third World to First. Singapore: Times Media, p. 735.
Legge, J.D. (1972) Sukarno, A Political Biography. New York: Pelican, pp. 279–310.
Majid, M. (2010a) The world is what I say it is? The Edge 25 January.
Majid, M. (2010b) NEM: Malaysia must not lose its way. The Edge 12 April.
Vatikiotis, M. (1993) Indonesian Politics Under Suharto. London: Routledge.
Wain, B. (2009) Malaysian Maverick – Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 69–77.
738
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
International Politics
Vol. 47, 6, 725–738