How Schools Change Reforms:
Redefining Reform Success and Failure
LARR Y CUBAN
Stanford University
Because schools change reforms as much as reforms change schools, judging an
innovation’s success or failure has been, and is, no easy task. I identify three com mon criteria used by policymaking elites (effectiveness, popularity, and fidelity) and
two less common ones used by practitioners (adaptability and longevity) and apply
them to the two-decade-old Effective Schools school reform. What emerged as crucial
in evaluating school reforms is what criteria are being used to make judgments,
whose criteria they are, and how schools change reforms as they are implemented.
The example of Effective Schools challenges policymakers and researchers to become
more explicit about which criteria they employ to judge success and to understand
how the journey of school reform is a story of constant adaptation that ultimately
undermines the common criteria generally used to judge success and failure.
In 1906 in a town built by U.S. Steel on the shores of Lake Michigan, a new
superintendent introduced an educational innovation that hundreds of
school districts adopted in the next decade. Visitors traveled thousands of
miles to talk to Superintendent William Wirt, sit in classrooms of the
cheerfully decorated Froebel and Pestalozzi Schools, and marvel at how
children of immigrants learned during the day while their non-English
speaking parents attended classes at night. Even though U.S. Steel owned
the property and employees largely ran the town, the educational experiment converged with company interests in providing what observers called
a productive education for both white-collar and blue-collar employees.
Progressives of the day, imbued with the pedagogically revolutionary ideas
of John Dewey and Frederick Taylor’s scientific management, wrote articles and books praising the combination of work and play, of school and
community, of efficiency and civic-mindedness, that put the name of Gary,
Indiana, on the early twentieth century map of school reform (Cohen,
1990; Cremin, 1961).
The Platoon School (or Gary Plan), as the innovation was labeled, was
introduced in a remodeled elementary school holding children from
kindergarten through the twelfth grade. Administrators divided the student body into two groups or “platoons.” One platoon would be in the
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classrooms or auditorium while the other would be in the basement where
there were woodworking, printing, and other shops; upstairs in music, art,
and play rooms; or outside on the playground. During the day, each platoon would change places, Giving each child academic, practical, recreational, and aesthetic experiences while thoroughly using the entire facility
(Cohen & Mohl, 1979; Cremin, 1961).
While most elementary school children in cities at the turn of the century stayed the entire school day of five or six hours in a self-contained
classroom with one teacher, Gary pupils worked with many teachers during
an eight-hour day, even receiving released time for religious instruction.
Moreover, because Superintendent William Wirt believed in tying the
larger community of Gary to the school, adults (many of whom were recent
immigrants working in the steel mills) would attend evening and weekend
classes to learn to read and write English, hear lectures, and use various
shops to learn industrial skills. Such a work-study-play-community school
arrangement—a revolutionary shift in school organization and curriculum—made it possible to have many more students attend school since the
schedule permitted all available space to be used by students during the
day and adults at night. The Gary innovation spread swiftly across the
nation. Educational pundits of the day applauded its success (Dewey &
Dewey, 1915).
In 1918, however, two educational experts completed a foundationfunded study of the Gary schools. It praised some aspects of the platoon
plan but raised serious questions about the quality of academic work and
weak student performance on achievement tests. As a consequence,
national interest in the Gary Plan ebbed considerably in subsequent years.
By the mid-1920s, the innovation had receded and virtually disappeared
from the national scene. In Gary, it lasted in some form or another into
the 1940s (Cohen, 1990; Cremin, 1961).
Today Platoon Schools are largely forgotten. Yet the core notions of
using buildings fully; offering a diversified curriculum combining academic subjects, practical tasks, and play in which students move to various
parts of the school building; and having the school as an educational,
social, and recreational center for adults have become mainstream features
of elementary schooling. The Platoon School foreshadowed the modern
elementary school (Cohen & Mohl, 1979).
Was the Platoon School a success, then, because it contained the embryo
of the modern elementary school? Or was it a success because it became
popular in the media and spread swiftly to hundreds of school districts? Or
was it successful because it lasted for over four decades in Gary? Or was the
reform a failure? After all, the Gary Plan soared in popularity, matured,
and then vanished from the national scene—even after decades in the city
How Schools Change Reforms
of its birth; few present-day school reformers would recognize the name or
remember the program. The historical example suggests the puzzling ambiguity of, if not confusion in, evaluating the “success” of school reforms.
In this article, I will argue that most highly touted school reforms today
are like the Platoon School. They are adopted and, as they are implemented, undergo changes that transform them in ways that few of the
designers of the original reform could predict, or even claim ownership.
Because schools change reforms as much as reforms change schools, judging an innovation’s success or failure is no easy task. Such doubts, however,
have hardly prevented policy elites (then and now) from rushing to judgment by employing preferred standards to judge success. Allies in the
media amplify elite opinions, often framing the making and unmaking of
reforms as a political contest—who won and who lost (Broder, 1987; Fallows, 1996). Few media judgments of success are made about either the
substance of the reform or its gradual metamorphosis. As a result, some
promising reforms that evolve too slowly for impatient policymakers and
media pundits are aborted while others that are earmarked as winners by
opinion-setters in the horserace for public attention often fade and disappear. I argue that what becomes crucial in evaluating reforms within
schools is identifying what criteria are used to make judgments, whose criteria they are, and how schools change reforms as they are implemented.1
This article, then, is written primarily for an audience of policymakers,
administrators, and researchers who seek school reforms and are in a position to pass judgment on their worth. Increased awareness of the dominant
(and historically defined) framework of thinking about school reform as a
Super Bowl where winners get glory and losers anonymity can reveal which
criteria are prized over others and how such choices serve particular interests in judging winners and losers in the contest of school reform.
Why this audience? I am a rationalist at heart. I believe that lay and professional elites who shape educational policy in this country act as closet
historians; they have a picture in their heads of the past, an interpretation
that forms the basis for creating a better present. They use history whether
they know it or not. If they can come to know the inexorable and enduring process of how schools change reforms historically and, further, come
to understand clearly the factors that shape how judgments of success and
failure have been (and are) made in America, they may be politically
smarter in designing, implementing, and evaluating programs that will
result in sustained improvements for children.
Suppose, for example, that, as time passed, an innovation that was once
labeled a failure overcame early obstacles in its implementation and
desired results came later than expected. Or suppose that the designers of
a school reform judged the results to be unsuccessful because teachers
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failed to adhere to the plan. Yet these very same teachers took the design,
adapted portions of it to their classrooms, secured favorable results from
their students, and privately called the reform a winner. How can a school
reform be judged successful by one group and tossed out as a miserable
defeat by another?
To advance my rationalist credo and to begin answering these questions,
I examine first the implicit but dominant standards that policymakers and
others have used to determine “success” and “failure.”2 Next, I inquire into
two other standards that have been frequently neglected by policy elites
and media, and then apply all of them to a two-decade old reform initially
aimed at big-city elementary schools that eventually was transformed into a
national crusade called Effective Schools. For a country that has been
undergoing unrelenting school reform for the last two decades and has
embarked on a novel experiment involving the establishment of national
goals, curricular standards, and tests, such contemporary and historical
inquiries into the anatomy of judging success and failure may counter the
persistent forgetfulness that so commonly afflicts American reformers
(Knapp, 1997; Tyack & Cuban, 1995).
I M P LI C I T S TA ND AR D S I N D EF I NI N G S U CCE S S
A N D F A I L U R E I N S C HO OL R E F OR M
The primary standard used by most policymakers, media editors, administrators, and researchers is to ask whether a program’s intended goals were
achieved. Have you done what you said you were going to do and can you
prove it? In a society where “bottom lines,” Dow Jones averages, sports statistics, and vote-counts matter, quantifiable results often determine success.
This is the effectiveness standard. For the last quarter-century the effectiveness standard, an outgrowth of a strong belief in professional expertise and
technical rationality applied to organizations, has been used for schools to
examine what students have learned in school and do after graduation by
using proxy measures for both such as student test scores, rates of college
attendance, and other numerical indicators (Majone, 1989; Schön, 1983).3
T HO S E I N A U TH ORI T Y S UB J EC T I V EL Y S ET T HE D ES I RE D
GO ALS F O R R E F OR M A N D TH E M E A S U R E S TH A T W I LL BE
U S E D TO D E TE R M I N E S U C C ES S . F O R E XA M P LE ,
NA TI O N AL A N D S TA T E P O L I C Y M A KER S C ONC L U D E D BY
TH E L A T E 1 9 7 0 S T H AT AM ER I C A N P U BLI C S CH O OL S H A D
D EC LI N ED B EC AU S E S C HO LAS TI C A P TI TU D E S TE S T
S C O R ES HA D P LU NG E D D O W NW A RD . T H I S W I DE L Y
R E PO R T ED V I EW T H AT S A T S C O RE S WE RE R EL I AB L E
M EA S U RE S O F S C HO OL P ER F OR M AN C E — EVE N T H OU GH
How Schools Change Reforms
T ES T - M A KE R S R E PE A T EDL Y S TA TE D TH A T S U C H C LAI M S
W E R E F A LS E— B E C AM E T H E PO PUL A R W I S D OM O F T H E
M OM E N T , HE LP I NG T O F U EL PU B LI C S UPP O R T F O R
S T A TE S ’ R AI S I N G AC A DE M I C R EQ U I R E M EN TS I N TH E
1 9 8 0 S . I T DI D N OT M AT T ER T HAT TH E T ES T - M A KE RS
C A L LE D S UC H U S E OF S C OR ES EX CE S S I VE ; WH AT M A TT E RE D M OR E TO P U BL I C O F F I C I AL S S E E KI N G PO LI T I CA L
S UPP O R T A ND T HE M EDI A S E E KI NG A U DI E N C ES WE RE
Q UA N TI TA T I V E M EA S U R E S TH A T C OU L D B E US E D TO
E S T AB LI S H R A NK I N G S O F S C HO O LS , TH E RE B Y C RE A T I N G
E AS I L Y I D EN TI F I A BL E W I NN E R S A N D LO S E RS ( N A TI O N AL
C OM M I S S I O N ON E XC E LL ENC E I N ED U CA TI ON , 1 9 8 3 ; U . S .
C O N GR E S S , 1 9 9 2 ) .
Yet even here, test results proved ambiguous measures of a reform’s success. Just as the 1918 evaluation of the Platoon School slowed down considerably the spread of the Gary Plan, early evaluations of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in the mid-1960s revealed
so little improvement in poor children’s academic performance as to jeopardize congressional renewal of the program. Such evidence gave media
critics and national policymakers hostile to federal intervention a reason to
brand the War on Poverty programs as failures. Yet unpromising test scores
were insufficient to overcome the program’s political attractiveness with
constituents and legislators. Each successive president and Congress used
that popularity as a basis for allocating eagerly sought funds to needy students in schools across the nation (Hoff, 1997; Kennedy, Jung, & Orland,
1986; McLaughlin, 1975).
Popularity, then, is a second standard that public officials use in evaluating success. The spread of an innovation, and its hold on the imagination
of voters and professional educators, becomes an important criterion since
fashionableness, as documented by opinion polls and media reports, easily
translates into political support for top policymakers endorsing the reform.
The rapid diffusion of special education, bilingual education, whole language, new math, and desktop computers in schools since the 1970s offers
an obvious example of innovations that swept across the nation capturing
both district and state school boards and practitioners’ attention. Few educators or public officials initially questioned the accelerating outlays of
public funds for new programs because they were viewed as ways of coping
with important unmet educational needs of children. The popularity of
these reforms became evidence to support media editors’ and policymakers’ judgments that they were, at least at first, resounding successes (Educa tion Week, 1993).
A third common standard policymakers and administrators use to judge
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success is assessing how well the innovations mirrored what reformers
intended. This fidelity standard aims at assessing the fit between the initial
design, the formal policy, the subsequent program it spawns, and its implementation. How, they ask, can an effectiveness standard ultimately be
applied if the reform departs from the blueprint? If the federal government, for example, funds a bilingual program that it wants to be implemented because it has proved to be effective elsewhere, state and local
implementers must follow the original design of the program as they put it
into practice or else the desired outcomes will not be achieved.
The fidelity standard places great importance on implementers, who
invariably are teachers and principals, following the designer’s blueprint.
When practitioners add, adapt, or even omit features of the original
design, then policymakers, heeding this standard, say that the policy and
program cannot be determined effective because of these changes
(Emrick, Peterson, & Agarwala-Rogers, 1977; Emshoff et al., 1987; Snyder,
Bolin, & Zumwalt, 1990).
From where do these interrelated and dominant criteria of effectiveness,
popularity, and fidelity arise? Policymakers derive the criteria of effectiveness
and fidelity from a view of organizations as instruments for solving problems through top-down authority, formal structures, clearly specified
roles, and technical expertise to fulfill one primary task: achieve desired
goals set by organizational decision makers. Within organizations where
rational decision making and control are prized, two linked questions are
asked: Have the prescribed procedures in performing the task been followed (fidelity) and have the goals been achieved (effectiveness)? Hence,
in judging reforms, those who carry out the changes must be faithful to the
design before the cardinal standard of effectiveness in achieving goals is
invoked (Scott, 1987, pp. 57-78).
But how have these beliefs about rational organizations become embedded in these standards? The growth of professional expertise, or what Donald Schön calls “technical rationality” and Giondomenico Majone names
“decisionism,” have come to be anchored in university-credentialed knowledge in the twentieth century, especially since World War II. This expertise, often grounded in the natural, physical, and social sciences, is located
in professional training programs at universities. Rather than favoring
practitioner expertise anchored in schools and classrooms, public officials,
administrators, and researchers use this scientifically grounded knowledge
to evaluate whether reforms have succeeded (Majone, 1989, pp. 12-20;
Scheffler, 1984; Schön, 1983, pp. 21-36).
Popularity as a measure of success, contrary to the effectiveness and
fidelity standards, derives from the political nature of public institutions
and the astute use of symbols to convey values. Schools, for example, are
totally dependent on the financial and political support of local communi-
How Schools Change Reforms
ties and the state. Taxpayer support or opposition for bond referenda or
program initiatives taken by school boards is often converted into political
capital or deficits at election time. The media play an important role in
defining a school reform as news, especially in the slant editors take in portraying the innovation. Potent symbols (e.g., school prayer, the computer)
become shorthand terms for highly prized values to mobilize supporters.
Whether an innovation spreads and captures public and practitioner attention becomes a strong basis for evaluating its success (Kliebard, 1990; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Wirt & Kirst, 1989).
Although political and rational considerations dominate policy talk on
school reform, they, or the primary symbols, are seldom made explicit.
Hence, these mainstream standards are infrequently debated publicly, much
less questioned. Unexamined acceptance of effectiveness, fidelity, and popularity thus avoids inquiring into the slippery issue of whose standards are
being used to judge success. In asking the question of whose standards will
be used, neglected alternatives for judging success and failure emerge.
W HO S E S TA ND AR DS A RE U S E D ?
When federal, state, and local policymakers (and media reporters following their lead) talk about reforms and use these criteria to determine success, their judgments carry much weight because elected state and district
policymakers are authorized to act in behalf of the community. This political legitimacy influences voters.4
But what about practitioners who are the foot-soldiers of every reform
aimed at improving student outcomes? Their criteria diverge considerably
from what policymakers, administrators, and researchers would prize. Practitioners bring moral and service values inherent to teaching that differ
from the technical and scientific values that policy elites possess. Practitioners accumulate expert knowledge about students and how to teach
skills and subject matter that few researchers or policymakers plumb. From
these values and expertise emerge standards for judging success and failure that diverge from those of policymakers and researchers. Of course
teachers seek improvement in students’ performance and attitudes but
what teachers count as significant results are seldom test scores but attitudes, values, and actual behavior on academic and nonacademic tasks in
and out of the classroom. What becomes especially important to teachers is
how they can put their personal signature on the mandated reform and
make it work for their students and themselves (Berman & McLaughlin,
1978; Cohen & Spillane, 1992; Cuban, 1993; Elmore & McLaughlin, 1988;
McLaughlin, 1978; Wolcott, 1977; Welker, 1992).5
To reformers, however, alterations in their design and variations in prac-
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tice become evidence of decay and failure; to teachers, the very same modifications are viewed as healthy signs of inventiveness, active problem solving,
and a precondition for determining effectiveness—as they would define it.
To one, the end-product is everything; to the other, getting to the end-product is as important as the outcome. This practitioner-derived standard of
adaptiveness (the flip side of the fidelity standard) becomes an essential prior
condition for other criteria to be applied.
Another standard occasionally used by practitioners and social scientists
to judge success or failure is to ask whether the reforms have endured
(Kirst & Meister, 1985). This longevity criterion is a plausible standard. After
all, in public schools, where so many innovations last no longer than warm
breath on a cool window, a program that survives is a signal achievement to
which officials can point with pride. The comprehensive high school, vocational education, junior high schools, kindergartens, and (a more prosaic
example) overhead projectors were once reforms and are now pervasive
after almost a century. They were not written in snow. Durability, then, is
another standard by which success or failure can be determined.
As alternative criteria, adaptability and longevity derive from a set of
assumptions about organizations different from the ones dominating
mainstream policy thinking. These assumptions find organizations less
rational, less tightly coupled, and shaped more by external political, social,
and demographic factors as well as behaviors of the people within them.
Unpredictable external factors and a web of larger social beliefs intersect
with an informal side of the organization—who talks to whom, the stories
that people tell—to fashion workplace behavior often producing unintended consequences for rationally inspired policies. While formal goals
are important, they are easily displaced by an abiding concern for accommodating to societal beliefs and organizational survival. Adaptations in
roles and structures occur naturally and often as people within an organization cope with the inexorable range of external and internal problems
that ebb and flow. Organizations, then, evolve in order to survive (Meyer,
1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Scott, 1987, pp. 79-101).
But why are these standards of adaptiveness and survival, ones that practitioners would prize in a school reform, seldom invoked by policy entrepreneurs? The question boils down to one of power and status: Whose
standards count? When national, state, and district policymakers, holding
implicit views of how organizations work, using research findings to bolster
their decisions, and having access to media, place their weight behind
reforms, legitimacy in making changes rests with those at the top of the
organization, not those at the bottom whose organizational views, expertise, and values might differ. Without the cachet of scientific expertise,
access to top officials, or easy entree to reporters, individual teachers are
How Schools Change Reforms
stuck . Collectively, teachers have organized into unions and, more
recently, asserted their political clout through taking explicit positions on
school reform. Yet in making policy and judging success, unions play a limited role. Thus, when individual teachers do choose to make adaptations,
they do so unobtrusively or, in some cases, engage in guerrilla warfare with
administrators. Organizational legitimacy, use of scientifically derived data,
and power often determine whose criteria are used to judge success and
failure. Finding out whose standards are being used becomes an important
initial step in making judgments about reforms.6
Thus far, I have argued that assessing school reforms goes beyond the
policy elites’ using unarticulated standards of effectiveness, popularity, and
fidelity. I have identified alternative standards of adaptiveness and
longevity. Applying all of these standards to a reform that began in the late
1970s offers a chance to examine how reforms are transformed as they are
implemented in schools and whose standards of judging success and failure come into play. I first describe the Effective Schools movement itself,
the shifting environment that gave shape to the movement, and the degree
to which its ideology and programs were put into practice.
EF F EC T I V E S CH OO LS R ES EA R CH A ND R EF ORM
In the mid-1970s, a small number of researchers began working to disprove
the then mainstream wisdom that what largely determines students’ academic performance—as measured by standardized achievement tests—is family background. Research studies on the inability of public schools to
overcome the effects of poverty and race had led national policymakers to
call for reduced federal funding of programs (Coleman et al., 1966; Jencks
et al., 1972; Ravitch, 1983).
Within this social milieu of pessimism about the inadequacy of public
schools to make a difference in the lives of poor minority children, the
Effective Schools movement was born. Believing deeply in the value of
equity and expecting that urban schoolchildren would be especially
harmed were such a prevailing consensus of opinion among policymakers
to persist, this small band of activist researchers led by Ron Edmonds identified a handful of big-city schools enrolling large numbers of low-income
minority children who scored higher on standardized achievement tests
than would have been predicted by the socioeconomic status (Brookover &
Lezotte, 1979; Edmonds, 1979; Firestone, 1991; Weber, 1971).
These researchers-cum-reformers extracted from these schools certain
factors (e.g., clearly stated academic goals, principal’s instructional leadership, concentration on basic academic skills, strong emphasis on maintaining order in school, frequent monitoring of academic achievement, con-
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necting what is taught to what is tested, etc.) that they linked to the students’ higher-than-expected academic performance on standardized tests.
By the early 1980s, lists of essential factors had been consolidated into various Effective School models that swiftly spread to many big cities across
the country. In creating the Effective Schools’ ideology and model programs, Ron Edmonds and others prized four values: All children, regardless of background, can learn and achieve results that mirror ability, not
socioeconomic status; top-down decisions wedded to scientifically derived
expertise can improve individual schools; measurable results count; and
the school is the basic unit of reform (Cohen, 1982; Edmonds, 1979; Firestone, 1991; Levine & Lezotte, 1990; Purkey & Smith, 1983; Ralph &
Fennessy, 1983; Stedman, 1987).
At about the same time, another national impulse for school reform had
emerged with a barrage of reports about failing American schools. U.S.
presidents, corporate leaders, and critics blasted public schools for contributing to a globally less competitive economy, sinking productivity, and
jobs lost to other nations. The United States, as A Nation at Risk put it, had
educationally disarmed itself in a hostile economic war. “If only to keep
and improve on the slim competitive edge we still retain in world markets,”
the report said, “we must dedicate ourselves to the reform of our educational system.” States raised graduation standards, created curriculum
frameworks, initiated accountability plans, and focused on teacher performance. Excellence, not equity, became the slogan of the day (National
Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983, p. 7).
In the wake of this charge of mediocrity and the resurgent belief, propagated by policy elites, that public schooling did indeed make a difference
to the nation’s economic health, Effective Schools models focusing on academic achievement and accountability in minority-populated schools
became popular. Suburban districts and entire states hastily installed programs that identified five, seven, or fourteen factors of effectiveness and
laid out careful designs for schools to follow in implementing different
models in such diverse places as Georgia, Minnesota, and California.
Amendments to the Elementary and Secondary School Act in 1988
included specific reference to Effective Schools research. Federal officials
directed Title 1 schools to consider that research when designing their
programs and told state agencies receiving federal funds that they had to
set aside monies to help schools establish programs based on the factors
that Ron Edmonds and his colleagues had identified (Bullard & Taylor,
1993; Firestone, 1991; Murphy, Hallinger, & Mesa, 1985; Silver, 1994).
Even with this energetic state and federal activity in bending the Effective
Schools movement to the newly hatched economic imperative, by the end of
the 1980s, policymakers spoke publicly less and less of “effective schools” and
How Schools Change Reforms
far more about “restructuring,” “site-based management,” “professional
development of teachers,” and “systemic reform.” Other beliefs about how
school reform should be implemented were emerging among federal and
state policymakers, who viewed the reform of schooling as a far larger
project involving national goals, curriculum, and testing rather than a local
school-by-school venture (Cohen & Spillane, 1992; Murphy, 1992; National
Governors’ Association, 1991; Ogawa, 1994; Smith & O’Day, 1990).
Many local and national reformers—believing deeply in the value of
equity—still pursued the same goal of improving the academic fortunes of
low-income minorities but used different approaches consistent with the
new reform surge. For example, university professors such as James
Comer, Robert Slavin, and Henry Levin launched national programs of
school-by-school reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s that had targets
similar to those of the Effective Schools movement and even a similar
focus—using the school site—but with different strategies for improvement
(Chenoweth, 1992; Comer, 1988; Levin, 1989; Slavin, Madden, Karweit,
Levermore, & Dolan, 1990). In doing so, they borrowed heavily from an
earlier and heretofore neglected tradition of school improvement through
planned change that was heavily dependent on faculties, principals, and
parents’ making managerial and curricular decisions at each school site.
Also, state and district efforts to use vouchers for private schools and
parental involvement in directing schools leaned on Effective Schools
research to improve big city schools (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Firestone, 1991;
Fullan 1991; General Accounting Office [GAO], 1989).7
If Edmonds’s work in the late 1970s spawned a cottage industry of Effective Schools aimed at ensuring equity for low-income minority students,
the linkage of public schools to the economy in the early 1980s, in effect,
nationalized the Effective Schools movement while dropping the brand
name. Federal and state policymakers, believing in education as the engine
for the economy and using the same Effective Schools research, sought a
broader and speedier impact on the nation’s schools than the slower schoolby-school approach. They called for national goals, curriculum, and tests.
Throughout the 1980s, U.S. Secretaries of Education William Lamar
Alexander and William Bennett talked about “good schools” and “effective
schools” in the same breath. Assistant Secretary of Education Chester Finn
spearheaded the production of a popular pamphlet called What Works
that drew directly from the effective schools research. President Bush and
his policy advisers organized the nation’s governors to endorse six national
goals in 1989. A movement toward national goals, curriculum, and tests
received the stamp of approval from a Republican president who styled
himself the “Education President” (U.S. Department of Education, 1987;
Wirt & Kirst, 1989).
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When administrations changed, top policy advisers to Democrats also
drew from the same well of Effective Schools ideology and research. Within
an article that became a script for national and state policy elites, for example, Marshall Smith and Jennifer O’Day (1990) made clear that the ancestry of “systemic reform” was in the Effective Schools movement. “The most
effective schools,” they said, “maintain a schoolwide vision or mission, and
common instructional goals which tie the content, structure, and resources
of the school together into an effective unified whole.” Moreover,
the school mission provides the criteria and rationale for the selection
of curriculum materials; the purposes and the nature of school-based
professional development, and the interpretation and use of student
assessment. (p. 235)
Smith’s passion for both equity and excellence in schooling, his earlier
work that synthesized Effective Schools research, and his experience in
Washington policy circles made him an ideal candidate to serve the new
U.S. Secretary of Education, Richard Riley, in 1992. As Undersecretary of
Education and later Deputy Secretary, Smith drafted many of the Clinton
administration’s bills on national goals and testing and accelerated the
shift toward nationalization of the Effective Schools movement without
once using the phrase effective schools. The bipartisan reliance of policy
elites on Effective Schools research renewed attention to the earlier point I
raised of whose standards for evaluating success are invoked.8
Whose standards for success are being used? Although three different groups
have vied for attention in judging the success and failure of effective
schools, one group’s standards easily dominated the others. Federal, state,
and district policymakers (including their accompanying foundation- and
corporate-supported analysts and evaluators), amplified by the media, are
the opinion setters. These policy entrepreneurs see school organizations
as goal-driven political entities with formal structures and leaders exerting
top-down authority. These entrepreneurs juggle highly prized values of
equity, efficiency, excellence, and getting reelected. They are also especially sensitive to strong public expectations for school accountability and
test scores. Hence, this policy elite favors the standards of effectiveness,
fidelity, and popularity—even when they conflict with one anot her.
Because the world they inhabit is one of running organizations or advising
those who do, their authority and access to the media give them the leverage to spread their views about how to judge success (Darling-Hammond,
1993; Kahne, 1996; Ogawa, 1994; Rotberg & Harvey, 1993).
Although effectiveness, fidelity, and popularity criteria govern mainstream policy formation, analysis, and evaluation, as applied to public
schooling these standards are seldom applied to other social and political
How Schools Change Reforms
goals that schools are expected to achieve. Since the early 1980s, the dominant view among national policy elites that education is the engine driving
the economy has overshadowed other common purposes of public schools
in a democracy such as building citizens, seeking social justice, and providing a psychologically and emotionally healthy experience for children.
Instead, “effectiveness” and “popularity” of a school reform in public
schools have often been shrunk to quantifiable student outcomes and even
those student outcomes have been further miniaturized to mean higher
scores on standardized achievement tests (Kahne, 1996).9
Since the initial Effective Schools research in the early 1970s relied on
standardized achievement test scores to identify low-socioeconomic-status
schools that exceeded academic expectations, using test results seemed
appropriate. Moreover, for the loose alliance of federal, state, and local
policymakers and administrators, these numbers were useful tools to display to an increasingly skeptical public that schools can succeed and be
held accountable for their performance. With newspapers publishing
school-by-school standardized test scores since the late 1960s, the popular
notion that schools were engaged in a contest with clear winners—those at
the top of the list—and losers—those at the bottom—became an easy
segue for a public that eagerly followed the World Series and national
rankings of football teams.
Yet the widespread notion of improved test scores as a valid measure of
school improvement remained slippery. Researchers and psychometricians
have often explained to policymakers and administrators the technical difficulties of using standardized achievement test scores to judge a school’s
performance. They have pointed out how even the lowest-performing
schools can show improvement simply by shifting the metric used, changing the definition of what constitutes improvement, and preparing children for tests. They have pointed out how reliance on test scores can steer
a district’s programs in undesired directions (Brophy & Good, 1986;
Cuban, 1984; Purkey & Smith, 1983; Ralph & Fennessy, 1983; Rowan,
Bossert, & Dwyer, 1983).
The world that policy elites inhabit, however, is one driven by values and
incentives that differ from the worlds that administrators and practitioners
inhabit. Policymakers respond to signals and events that anticipate reelection or reappointment and media coverage. They consider the standards
of effectiveness, fidelity, and popularity rock-hard fixtures of their policy
world (Elmore & McLaughlin, 1988; Kahne, 1996).
Do practitioners share the same standards? Some urban educators who
remain committed to the dreams of the founders of Effective Schools and
the importance of equity for low-income minority children still adhere to
the design where five or more factors are considered to be correlates of
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Effective Schools. For these true believers, the fidelity standard is the first
step toward the effectiveness standard of higher test scores (Bullard & Taylor, 1993; Levine & Lezotte, 1990).
Although most big-city teachers and principals have expressed initial support for Effective School models because of the attention and occasional
extra resources they received after years of neglect, many teachers and principals have also expressed strong skepticism about the validity of test scores
as a measure of either their effects on children or the importance of their
work (Herndon, 1968; Kohl, 1968; Wise & Darling-Hammond, 1985)
Such practitioners use different criteria to determine their success.
They are just as interested in student outcomes as are policymakers, but
the outcomes differ. What skills, content, and attitudes have my students
learned beyond what is tested? Are our students decent people? Are the
parents working with us rather than against us? To what extent is the life
lived in our classrooms and schools healthy, democratic, and caring?
Furthermore, they ask: Can these innovations be bent to our purposes?
They judge their success by figuring out how to adapt mandated materials
they are given for their classrooms to their daily routines with students.
Incentives that drive practitioners are located in the satisfactions they gain
from working with students and one another. These often-ignored questions are seldom heard (Holt, 1964; Kahne, 1996; Sizer, 1984, 1993;
Wigginton, 1985).
A third set of standards comes from researchers. Researchers judge success by the quality of the theory, research design, methodologies, and usefulness of their findings. In most cases, by the mid-1980s, researchers had
pronounced the Effective Schools research seriously flawed in theory,
design, and methodology, although a few did point out redeeming qualities in that body of literature. These researchers’ standards have been
selectively used by both policy elites and practitioners in making judgments about establishing Effective Schools programs or any of the subsequent incarnations in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Brophy & Good,
1986; Levine & Lezotte, 1990; Purkey & Smith, 1983; Rowan, Bossert, &
Dwyer, 1983; Stedman, 1987; Teddlie & Stringfield, 1993).
So at least three sets of standards for judging success are available. Practitioner- and researcher- derived standards have occasionally surfaced and
received erratic attention from policy elites. But it is this strong alliance of
state and federal policymakers and associates in the corporate, foundation,
and media worlds with their implicit standards of effectiveness, fidelity,
and popularity that continues to dominate both public debate and school
reform agendas.
Before we apply the dominant but unarticulated standards of effectiveness, fidelity, and popularity and the alternative ones of adaptability and
How Schools Change Reforms
longevity to Effective Schools programs, an essential question must be
asked: Were the Effective Schools ideology and program actually implemented? A Government Accounting Office report found in 1988 that two
out of every five districts in the nation had installed some version of an
Effective Schools program and among the fifty largest city and county systems, thirty-nine had done so (GAO, 1989). “Some version” means that
local administrators and teachers adapted these programs to local circumstances and that the Effective Schools concepts themselves underwent
changes as they became institutionalized. Reforms may change schools but
schools also change reforms. So within a decade, some form of Effective
Schools ideology and program had spread beyond big cities to suburbs and
rural districts, mostly, however, in elementary rather than secondary schools.
The very nature of secondary schools made the grafting of Effective
Schools research findings—largely anchored in studies of elementary
schools—cumbersome. Secondary schools’ size, multiple goals, differentiated curriculum, and faculty’s subject-matter training made the five (or six
or ten) factors of school effectiveness an awkward fit (Firestone & Herriott,
1982). For urban and suburban junior high schools, the reemerging middle-schools movement in the early 1980s (after its initial appearance in the
mid-1960s) has competed with Effective Schools ideology for a version of
what constitutes a “good” school. Middle-school beliefs in team teaching of
core subjects, teachers acting as advisers, a pedagogy grounded in active
learning and small-group instruction, and large time blocks set aside for
classes are anchored in a neoprogressive philosophy that was, at best, skeptical and, at worst, hostile to some of the Effective Schools factors and standardized achievement testing. Thus, middle schools imbued with this neoprogressive ideology, especially those in affluent suburban districts, made
a dry, inhospitable seed-bed for Effective Schools (Carnegie Council on
Adolescent Development, 1989; Lewis, 1990).
Although determined efforts were made to graft lists of Effective Schools
factors onto high schools in the mid-1980s, the graft seldom took because
of competing ideologies among reformers about the social and political
purposes of public schools. No consensus among policy elites, high school
practitioners, and researchers yet exists about what constitutes a “good” or
“effective” high school (Boyer, 1984; Coleman, Kilgore, & Hoffer, 1982;
Corcoran & Wilson, 1985; Lightfoot, 1983; Muncey & McQuillan, 1996;
Sizer, 1984, 1992).10
Few of that hardy band of Effective Schools reformers in the early 1970s
could have foreseen that the basic values they professed about all children
learning, the importance of academic achievement, and accountability
would be seized a decade later by corporate leaders, foundation officials,
governors, and presidents. Effective Schools reformers had fought the then
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“wisdom” of policy elites that schools made little difference in the lives of
big-city children. Now in the late 1990s, national goals, curricular standards, and tests dominate talk of school reform. Test scores remain the
coin of the national realm. Coordinating district, state, and national goals
and curriculum, texts, and tests has become the challenge of the decade.
These reformers two decades ago could not have foreseen how fears of
decline in economic competitiveness would have driven policy elites to link
improved schools to an improved economy and thus have nationalized the
ideology of Effective Schools.
After almost two decades of Effective Schools research and implementation, the legacies are plain to see in the policy announcements and dominant beliefs embedded in state and national agendas for improving
schools: Regardless of background, all children can learn; the school site,
rather than the classroom, is the unit of reform; administrative leadership
is essential for improvement; clear and measurable goals are critical; topdown decisions and expertise make a difference in school improvement;
academic improvement in schools requires linking basic skills instruction
to the school’s goals, curriculum, daily lessons, and tests; and finally, what
counts as success is students’ scores on standardized achievement tests
(Murphy, 1992; Ogawa, 1994; Shipps, 1987).
A PPL Y I N G T HE S T AN DA RD S
In applying the standards most commonly used by federal, state, and local
policymakers (effectiveness, fidelity, and popularity) to Effective Schools
reforms, the judgments are mixed. There are individual urban and rural elementary schools that have clearly met the effectiveness criterion for years
(Levine & Ornstein, 1993; Teddlie & Stringfield, 1993). Depending on the
evidence used, Effective Schools reforms may have also played a role in the
steady increases in basic skills as measured by the National Assessment of
Educational Progress over the last twenty years, although the gap in scores
between minority youth and whites on these tests remains as wide as it was
two decades ago (Hoff, 1997). The persistent presence of urban schools
scoring in low ranges on these tests, the instability of test scores over time in
schools, and the growing appeal of vouchers in Milwaukee and Cleveland
and of private firms running public schools suggest that any judgment of
success by the effectiveness standard depends heavily on the setting and is,
therefore, spotty (Bullard & Taylor, 1993; Levine & Lezotte, 1990).
Fidelity as a standard of judging success disappeared early in the movement for Effective Schools as districts and staffs swiftly tailored the different factors of effectiveness to their setting. Moreover, other reforms
blended nicely with Effective Schools. Rodney Ogawa (1994) documented
How Schools Change Reforms
how key players who promoted school-based management saw it easily
meshing with parts of school effectiveness initiatives. Similarly, the federal
government’s enthusiasm for selected pieces of Effective Schools research
and practice (e.g., Title 1 amendments; the notion of national goals tied to
national assessments) further suggests how little quality control the designers exerted over the reform. Were fidelity-to-design the standard for judging success, mark it a failure.
On the measure of popularity, score Effective Schools a success. Once
researchers and reformers identified essential factors correlated with
increased academic achievement, the innovation spread swiftly in urban
districts. Since the early 1980s, when national reports, presidents and governors, and top educational policymakers adopted the idea that schools’
productivity as measured by test scores was instrumental to a competitive
global economy, Effective Schools ideology and essential features were
drafted into a national crusade for excellence.
Similarly, were adaptiveness to be used as a criterion, then one could
easily argue that the Effective Schools program has been strikingly successful. The ideology of the movement—its central commitment to all children
learning, its focus on clear goals and the school as the natural site for
improvement, and its embrace of standardized test scores as a proper measure of academic performance—has become mainstream thinking among
policymakers and popular rhetoric among administrators and practitioners. That small-town, suburban, and state administrators (e.g., Beaverton,
Oregon; Frederick, Maryland; Casper, Wyoming; Minnesota Effective
Schools Program) embraced the school reform also suggests its plasticity
with pupil enrollments very different from the ones in which the movement
began (Bullard & Taylor, 1993). Adaptiveness also means that school districts and individual schools alter the reform as it is implemented. Applying
the standard of adaptability, mark Effective Schools a resounding success.
What about longevity? Is almost twenty years sufficient time to say that
Effective Schools reform has lasted? Certainly, it has outlasted such oncepopular innovations as science and math curriculum reforms and instructional television (ITV) in the 1960s and language laboratories of the early
1970s. What has given Effective Schools longer staying power, ironically, is
its loss of name and focus on low-income minorities. Just as the Platoon
School lost its name and attachment to the Gary Plan yet survived for
decades in varied districts, the central beliefs and selected features of
Effective Schools programs, shorn of identifying attachments to big-city
schools in the late 1970s, have continued to permeate reforms in the midto-late 1990s.
Applying, then, the standard of effectiveness, there is some evidence of
partial success (e.g., individual schools that have performed consistently
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How Schools Change Reforms
above expectations; test-score evidence of gains in basic skills for urban
children) but no clear long-term trend of student improvement in academic performance. For popularity and adaptiveness, there is no question
that both have been in full display. Effective Schools programs have been
tailored to meet school settings different from those for which they were
originally conceived. If some Effective Schools reformers disliked the constant modifications and dilution of their correlates of effectiveness, other
administrators and practitioners enjoyed the reform’s flexibility. Its
resiliency and popularity have given the ideology and program a remarkable reach. However, such plasticity and popularity—a reform for all seasons—mean that whatever ideological and programmatic bite it contained
softened considerably as it spread to small towns, suburbs, states, and the
embrace of the federal government.
Hence, as Effective Schools became a generic program of improvement,
even losing its brand name, its potential to meet the standard of effectiveness lessened considerably. Schools modified the innovation. It is, of
course, precisely that capacity for adaptiveness and enduring popularity
that has permitted Effective Schools to survive for over twenty years. The
striking success of Effective Schools on both criteria may suggest to reformers that change within established institutions such as schools occurs far
more than informed opinion suggests.
So a mix of partial successes and failures for the Effective Schools reform
emerges from this analysis—depending on what vantage point reformers
take. For those Effective Schools promoters who prize fidelity, departures
from the original design are marks of failure. For pragmatists among such
committed reformers, however, the partial success in meeting the standard
of effectiveness and total success in being adaptive, popular, and surviving
might leave them feeling proud of what has occurred since the late 1970s
and optimistic for the future since such changes must to be counted in
decades, not years.
S O WH A T?
Now what is gained by exploring the standards by which judgments about
success and failure are determined and applying them to the Effective
Schools movement? In other words, so what? I have argued that it is crucial to evaluate school reforms by identifying the criteria used to make
judgments, whose criteria they are, and how schools change reforms as
they are implemented. What determined which standards came into play
and whose standards were applied in evaluating success and failure were
noted in the example of the Effective Schools movement. I have asserted
that the choice of standards depended on informal networks of policy
entrepreneurs, using symbols and scientific expertise, and having access to
media. These policy elites, then and now, ultimately judge the success of
school reforms. I argued that the standards they use were too often unarticulated and should be made explicit for public debate.
Why? Because the lay and professional elites, with their political savvy,
use particular criteria for evaluating success and failure to frame the
agenda of public problems. In doing so, they dominate which directions
educational policy and funds take, yet they are largely uninformed about
past reforms. For policy elites to know that the journey of previous school
reforms is a story of constant adaptation and the power of established institutions to bend innovations to fit their contours could lead amply funded
policymakers to anticipate and encourage adaptations of their plans. They
can design hybrids that meld the new and old in ways that leave room for
modifications (Tyack & Cuban, 1995).
If hybrid reforms encourage adaptations, then policy elites, especially
the experts they hire to evaluate reforms, can move away from the usual
thumbs-up or thumbs-down verdict on a reform, and point to improvements in practice. Policy entrepreneurs must come to understand the
inevitable variations in school-by-school change. If reforms change
schools—as some have—so do schools clearly change innovations. As long
as that fact remains either a mystery or a design failure to policy entrepreneurs it remains a serious problem that their cadres of analysts and
advisers must face.
The political stakes for students, parents, and practitioners are high
when presidents of the United States, U.S. secretaries of education, governors, legislators, academics, and foundation and media officials seek to
reform the nation’s schools. If elite reformers can come to know how
schools have inexorably changed reforms in the past and, further, come to
understand clearly the factors that shape how judgments of success and
failure have been (and are) made in America, they may not only get
smarter in designing, implementing, and evaluating programs but become
more accountable for what happens in schools.
Notes
1 By “policy elite” I mean loose but intersecting networks of public officials, corporate
executives, foundation officers, and academic experts who use both public and private
funds to run projects and write papers consistent with their versions of reforms. As policy
entrepreneurs, they have ready access to media and the capacity to frame problems and set
a public agenda for their discussion (Kingdon, 1984). As advisers to top public officials,
corporate leaders, and foundation executives, they are analysts whose values reflect their
patrons. Political party labels do not define these elites, although there are clearly Republican and Democratic members who carry their affiliation on their sleeve and, when administrations change, move in and out of office. I do not use the word as a populist jab at
appointed officials. Nor do I suggest conspiratorial groups secretly meeting and designing
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scripts for action (Safire, 1997). I suggest only that these overlapping networks of likeminded and decent individuals share many of the same values and tastes and seek school
improvements aligned to those values. They convene frequently in different forums, speak
the same policy talk, and are connected closely to sources of public and private influence in
governments, media, businesses, academia, and foundations. They help create a climate of
opinion that hovers over no more than a few hundred influentials in policymaking. Familiar
with the ways of the media, these policy elites extend and shape that climate of opinion by
closely working with journalists who report what they say, write, think, and do (Fallows, 1996;
Reich, 1992). Few members of these loosely connected policy elites, however, have had direct
or sustained experience with either principals or teachers, much less the act of teaching. Yet
their recommended mandates touch the daily lives of both educators and children.
Earlier elites in education have been examined to determine their influence on policy
formation. For a polemical discussion that contains inferences more than direct evidence of
educational elites that dominated schools before and after World War II (see Bestor, 1953).
For a balanced and well-documented examination of the “interlocking directorates” among
educational progressives in the early decades of this century and their influence on both policy and practice, see Tyack and Hansot, 1982.
Thus far, with one exception, the interlaced networks of academics, foundation executives, corporate leaders, and national and state educational policymakers in the 1980s and
1990s await their chroniclers and analysts. The one exception is Rodney Ogawa’s (1994)
map of how the reform of school-based management was initiated, spread, and became
adopted by networks of policymakers, teacher union officials, and academics beginning in
the mid-1980s. He does not use the word elite in his analysis but his careful and systematic
examination of the documents, actors, and linkages powerfully illustrates how a small group
of policy entrepreneurs promoted a school reform officially and unofficially and saw its institutionalization in the nation’s political agenda for school improvement.
2 The quotation marks around these words are to underscore their shifting, ambiguous, and historically based character.
3 Using numerical measures to determine organizational effectiveness has a long history, of course. I offered one early and unusual example in the report on the Gary, Indiana,
schools in 1918. The accelerated incidence of “indicators” for school effectiveness since the
1960s is nicely picked up in Murnane (1987, pp. 102-103). Having some set of quantitative
measures to assess the degree to which the goals of a school, district, state, and nation have
been achieved has become pervasive in American education in the last quarter century. In
California, for example, every school reports to parents the test scores, rates of attendance,
suspensions, and other data on an annual basis. The State Department of Education has an
annual report card issued to the public recording different measures of effectiveness.
Schools are not alone in this use of numbers by social scientists to measure organizational
effectiveness. Announcements of leading economic indicators often lead the nightly
television news programs. For hospitals the efficiency of nonprofit and for-profit institutions
has been measured by numbers of employees, empty beds, and other indicators. One popular
measure of hospital effectiveness (rather than efficiency) has been mortality rates (see Lewin,
1987, p. 29; Tolchin, 1990, p. A11). In the airline industry, on-time arrivals has become a
measure of an airline’s effectiveness. Other indicators have been used and combined into an
index that rates each company’s performance (see Goodman, 1992, p. A5). And, of course, in
the auto industry, miles-per-gallon has been a standard measure of efficiency that still gets
full-page displays in most of the nation’s newspapers when annual figures for each car manufacturer are released (see, for example, San Jose Mercury, 1986, p. 8A).
I offer these examples across U.S. institutions to suggest the pervasiveness of metrics in
the service of determining organizational effectiveness. Schools, then, are just another social
institution where social scientists have applied a dominant standard of quantitative measures
to assess whether the organization is reaching its goals.
How Schools Change Reforms
4 The ambiguous but nonetheless crucial role of the media in publicizing official definitions of success underscores the question of whose standards will dominate what is
labeled a success. One clear example of this arose during the Gulf War in 1991. Howard
Kurtz (1993) describes how Pentagon officials dealt with the press on the success of bombing raid: “Reporters were upset about the military’s initial claim that 80 percent of its
bombing raids had been successful. Officials later admitted that the number of ‘sorties’ had
included reconnaissance, refueling and other support missions, and that ‘success’ had been
defined as the pilot releasing his payload and returning to base, regardless of whether the
target was destroyed.” Kurtz comments: “We had been snookered again” (p. 227).
5 For a clear instance of the constant struggles of teachers to modify district and state
reforms intended to alter classroom instruction, see Cohen and Ball, 1990, pp. 249-256.
The entire issue of this journal deals with the studies of a group of Michigan State University researchers who examined what a group of elementary school teachers who taught
math had done with the new California math curricular framework.
6 Note that in the instance of the Platoon School, the foundation-funded evaluation
of the Gary Plan used experts to collect data on all aspects of the innovation but it was the
test data that garnered media attention in 1918 and ultimately diminished its popularity.
See Wolcott (1977), for the overt and covert ways that teachers acted in trying to reshape
an administrative design to plan all curriculum, instruction, and budgeting for a district.
The instance cited above of falling SAT scores being used by federal and state officials as
evidence of U.S. schools’ decline revealed how scientific evidence is used by policymakers
to seek ends that test experts found distasteful. Such expert opinion was dismissed as U.S.
secretary after secretary of education in the 1980s used SAT scores on their “wall charts”
that were reproduced in newspapers and magazines as evidence of American success or failure as scores rose and fell.
7 What makes this puzzling initially is that academic researchers have continually
pointed out the methodological and design problems in the Effective Schools research and
argued consistently that there is little scientific basis for constructing such programs.
Although occasional scholarly studies are exempt from these criticisms (see the decadelong study on school effects in Louisiana completed by Teddlie & Stringfield, 1993),
nonetheless, few of the practitioner-based reformers have listened to the academics
because they have largely endorsed the central tenets of the reforms regardless of design
and methodological flaws. In this case, practitioner endorsement gave the movement a
legitimacy that academic research could not. I explain this as a rare alliance (albeit a silent
one) between practitioners and policymakers and another exercise in policymakers’ influence in having their standards of judging success adopted.
8 Another connection between a top policy adviser in the Clinton administration and
the Effective Schools movement is Michael Cohen, who served Secretary Riley before moving to the White House. In the late 1970s, Cohen worked in the National Institute of Education monitoring federal research grants to Ron Edmonds. In the early 1980s, he wrote
articles based on findings from the research on effective schools. As a policy analyst working in the Department of Education in the 1980s and early 1990s, Cohen worked closely
with Marshall Smith, who had left the government to be a professor at the University of
Wisconsin and, later, Stanford before returning to Washington in 1993.
9 For an example of deep concern over using test scores to judge the success of Title I
programs (see Rotberg and Harvey, 1993). They point out all of the shortcomings to using
test scores, as reported by teachers, principals, researchers, and policymakers, and go on to
propose alternative measures that broaden the indicators used to determine whether the
program is successful. These measures remain within the effectiveness standard for obvious
reasons since the original legislation required evaluations that relied on measuring student
academic performance.
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10 By the early 1990s, the Coalition of Essential Schools (CES) had produced an alternative definition of a “good” high school. With its nine “essential principles,” ones that are
largely antagonistic to implementing a five-factor formula dependent on scores on standardized achievement tests, there is focus on developing the student’s mind, teaching as
coaching—no teacher should have more than eighty students—and democratic decision
making. Graduation depends on how well each student displays mastery of certain skills
and knowledge. Hence, there is no need for age-grading of students or awarding units for
completion of courses since what the student performs in actual work is important.
Although CES members and networking schools have swiftly spread in the last five years,
less than 1 percent of U.S. high schools belong to CES (Sizer, 1992).
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