1
Table of Contents
Letter from the Secretary-General .......................................................................................................... 4
Letter from the Under-Secretary General ............................................................................................... 6
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 8
The History of the Foreign Affairs Council: ......................................................................................... 8
Membership and Working Structure: ............................................................................................. 8
AGENDA ITEM I: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EU ARMED FORCES ..................................................... 10
The History of European Defence Integration .................................................................................. 12
Europe after WWII......................................................................................................................... 12
The Idea of the European Defence Community (EDC) .................................................................. 15
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (First Pillar) ........................................................ 16
The Western European Union (WEU) (Second Pillar) ................................................................... 21
European Security in Transition: The Post-Cold War Era .................................................................. 26
Redefining the Role of NATO......................................................................................................... 27
The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO ................................................ 28
WEU as the Defence Arm of the European Union (EU)................................................................. 30
The Petersberg Declaration ........................................................................................................... 30
The Treaty of Amsterdam.............................................................................................................. 33
The St Malo Process and the Cologne European Council .............................................................. 34
Renewal of the ESDI: The Berlin Plus Agreement ......................................................................... 36
The Lisbon Treaty .......................................................................................................................... 38
Re-emergence of the Russian Expansionism in the Eastern Flank of the EU .................................... 39
The Ukraine Crisis and the Annexation of Crimea......................................................................... 39
Towards a European Defence Union in the 21st Century ................................................................. 41
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 41
POINTS TO BE ADDRESSED IN A RESOLUTION .................................................................................. 43
Bibliography........................................................................................................................................... 45
AGENDA ITEM II: COMBATING MARITIME PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA ....................................... 51
International Maritime Piracy ........................................................................................................... 51
Piracy and Armed Robbery under International Law .................................................................... 52
Statistics of Piracy in Different Regions......................................................................................... 54
International Cooperation and Response ..................................................................................... 57
The EU NAVFOR Somalia: Operation ATALANTA .......................................................................... 58
2
Economic Costs and Trade-related Implications of International Maritime Piracy ...................... 59
Global and Regional Trade ............................................................................................................ 61
Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea ............................................................................................... 64
Why is the Gulf of Guinea important? .......................................................................................... 67
CAUSES OF PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA .................................................................................... 68
Economic Poverty and Politics of Exclusion .................................................................................. 68
Poor Governance and Corruption ................................................................................................. 69
High Profitability of Piracy ............................................................................................................. 70
The Weakness of the Legal Definition of Piracy under International Law .................................... 71
Conflict and Disorder ..................................................................................................................... 71
Subregional and Continental Response ............................................................................................ 72
International Community’s Response ............................................................................................... 76
EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea ................................................................................................ 77
The Way Forward .............................................................................................................................. 80
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 80
POINTS TO BE ADDRESSED IN A RESOLUTION .................................................................................. 81
Bibliography........................................................................................................................................... 82
3
Letter from the Secretary-General
Honourable Participants,
It is my utmost pleasure to welcome you all to the 12th session of our conference. I am
Deniz Ayyıldız, a senior student at Middle East Technical University in International
Relations department. As the member of METU Foreign Policy and International Relations
Club with a MUN career since my freshman year and the former Under Secretary General of
this very conference, it is my honour to serve you as the Secretary General of EUROsimA
2016.
Since 2005, EUROsimA has been a prestigious conference aiming to strengthen the
participants’ knowledge of the institutions of European Union and European politics. In
addition to traditional EU committees, the Conference aimed to broaden the perspective with
international associations and organizations that have significant importance in world politics.
This year, as the Academic Team, we prepared the content of our committees under the theme
of Development within Harmony.
Being the core elements of our conference, institutions of European Union are
substantially fundamental in order to improve the participants’ academic experience. As the
traditionally simulated committee of EUROsimA, Council of Europe is the ministerial level
institution in which government ministers from each EU country meets to discuss, amends
and adopt laws, and coordinate policies. While many different configurations of the
Consilium have previously been simulated at EUROsimA in the past years, Foreign Affairs
Council is once more to be simulated.
4
The participants of Foreign Affairs Council are asked to discuss two topics which are
greatly important for the external policies of EU related to foreign policy, trade, security,
defence, and development matters. After gaining popularity with St. Malo Declaration in
1998, the establishment of the EU armed forces is still one of the foremost security issues
under the context of European security. Ministers of Foreign Affairs Council will have to
respond global crisis and find effective security strategies regarding the issue. Furthermore,
taking into consideration its important place on external trade of EU, Gulf of Guinea is under
the threat of piracy, thus Foreign Affairs Council is asked to produce better social and
economic action plans for the region.
Before concluding my words, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to our
Academic Advisor Mustafa Emre Selek who always supported me and without whom this
conference would not be possible, and to Ken Berk Kayacan, the Under Secretary General
responsible from Foreign Affairs Council, whose great and invaluable efforts created this
document.
Kind Regards,
Deniz Ayyıldız
Secretary General of EUROsimA 2016
[email protected]
5
Letter from the Under-Secretary General
Dear Participants,
It’s my sincerest honour to welcome you to EUROsimA 2016.
My name is Ken Berk Kayacan, a 4th year International Relations student at the
Middle East Technical University. As a member of METU Foreign Policy and International
Relations Club, I have had the chance to participate in several MUN conferences as a delegate
both in Turkey and overseas. This year, it is my utmost pleasure to serve EUROsimA 2016 as
the Under-Secretary General responsible from the Foreign Affairs Council committee.
EUROsimA 2016, hopefully, will be a totally unique experience for its participants
who are waiting zealously to discuss the problematic issues on the European Union’s agenda
and take the matter into their hands in order to find sound solutions. As the academic team of
EUROsimA 2016, we have meticulously chosen the topics and put real effort into the process
of preparation of the study guides so that you can enjoy this very conference thoroughly. By
this spectacular event, I believe that the participants, who are to become acquainted with the
institutions of the EU and also those who will be simulating for the very first time, will have a
chance to broaden their knowledge on the designated topics, and to improve their public
speaking skills.
The first agenda item of Foreign Affairs Council, the Establishment of the EU Armed
Forces, is designated in order to provide the participants the flexibility to decide upon the
future of the EU’s yet-to-be-seen integration in the fields of defence and security. During the
sessions, the delegates should be posed to cope with both internal and external challenges
6
from within and outside of the EU and crisis situations in cooperation with the United States
and Russia.
The second agenda item, Combating Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, is
prepared to discuss the importance of the Gulf of Guinea region, in which the rate of piracy
incidents has surpassed recently the maritime piracy in Somalia, for the European Union’s
future, and the delegates will brainstorm in order to come up with new action plans and
strategies on the way towards combating maritime piracy, improving further the current EU
Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea.
Finally, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to our Secretary-General Deniz
Ayyıldız, and our Advisor Mustafa Emre Selek without whom this conference would be
impossible. Also, I congratulate our organizing team for its hard work to realize this very
conference. Last but not least, for her invaluable efforts in the preparation of this guide, I
would like to thank our Assistant Secretary General Ceren Çevik. I hope you will all enjoy the
conference till its last moment and have a great time at the Middle East Technical University.
If you have any questions concerning the guide, do not hesitate to ask. I am looking forward
to meet you all before and during the conference.
Sincerely,
Ken Berk KAYACAN
Under-Secretary General
[email protected]
7
INTRODUCTION
The History of the Foreign Affairs Council:
The Foreign Affairs Council was established by the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 as one of
the configurations of the Council of the European Union. Before the Lisbon process, the
external actions of the EU were conducted under the umbrella of “General Affairs and
External Relations Council”. 1
Membership and Working Structure:
The Council is responsible for defining and implementing the Union’s trade,
development cooperation, and security policies (Common Security and Defence Policy, and
Common Foreign and Security Policy) concerning external relations, and aims at ensuring
unity, consistency, and effectiveness of EU’s external action.
2
The council meetings are
attended by the representatives of the all EU member states at a ministerial level, and bring
together mainly the foreign ministers, but also the defence, trade, and development ministers,
depending upon the agenda item. The meetings are held once a month and chaired by the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The only exception
to this is that when common commercial policy issues are discussed, FAC is presided by a
representative of the EU member state on a rotating basis for a six-month term.3 The High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is tasked with expressing
Kaczyński, Piotr Maciej, and Andrew Byrne. "The Key to Political Influence of Rotating Presidencies." CEPS
Policy Brief, no. 246 (July 2011).
2
Foreign Affairs Council configuration (FAC), Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/councileu/configurations/fac/
3
Ibid.
1
8
the EU’s stance in international organizations and carrying out political dialogues with the
third countries. 4
As mentioned before, FAC defines and implements the EU’s security and foreign
policy with the assistance of the European Commission and HR under the framework
provided by the European Council. To this aim, it has the competence to adopt crisis
management actions (civil and military), and to take security measures whenever deemed
necessary, including possible sanctions. Other than security issues, FAC adopts measures so
that the EU’s common commercial policy can be implemented in a co-decision with the
European Parliament, covering trade and investment relations, intellectual property rights and
foreign direct investment. Concerning trade policy, the Council is authorized to mandate the
European Commission with opening negotiations for the possible trade agreements, including
tariff amendments, customs and trade provisions and protective measures.5
4
"Foreign Affairs Council." June 22, 2015. http://www.eu2015lu.eu/en/la-presidence/formationsconseil/affaires-etrangeres/index.html.
5
Foreign Affairs Council configuration (FAC), Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/councileu/configurations/fac/
9
AGENDA ITEM I: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EU ARMED FORCES
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union remarked a drastic
change in world politics and led to the creation of a multipolar international system. From
now on, the European Economic Community was no more under a direct military threat by
Russia as it was crumbling due to the fact that the Russian economy was in a process of
integration into the international capitalist economic structure, leaving many people
unemployed, and consequently, Russia had reduced in time its military capabilities
significantly. In terms of the European security, the United States of America was in the
position of the main security provider of Europe through NATO military assets against the
Eastern bloc from the beginning of the Cold War till the dissolution of the USSR. As a result
of this, the EEC was able to strengthen its economy as a monolithic entity, becoming a huge
market and a regional power in the international arena. With that economic strength, the EEC,
transforming itself into the European Union with the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 6 which
accelerated the integration process, began to incorporate also the Eastern European and
Balkan countries in order to prevent a future Russian expansionism into the Eastern Europe
once again. On the other hand, taking into consideration the lowered possibility of a direct
aggression against the territories of the Alliance, NATO concluded a reduction of its overall
military size situated in Europe reiterating its primary objectives unchanged in its Strategic
Concept of 1991.
7
Yet, this also signalled that as the European identity began to emerge,
Europe had to share a greater burden for its own defence.
8
As a result of this, the European
Union member states became more and more concerned with security& defence of Europe,
6
For further information http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:xy0026
See also at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm
8
Ibid.
7
10
and raised the question of the degree of vulnerability of the European defence and the
necessity of establishing a common EU army.
In March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea upon the political instability in Ukraine, asserting
that the deteriorating situation in Ukraine threatened the lives of the ethnic Russian citizens
living in Crimea. This strategic move by Russia is currently posing a threat in the Eastern
flank of the EU which alerted the member states over the European defence capabilities. In
order to deal with the Russian aggression, the current president of the European Commission,
Jean-Claude Juncker suggested in an interview that a common EU army could be useful for
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) and defend the European values against the
Russian aggression. 9
Even though this suggestion has been supported by some of the EU member states, there
is no unanimity over that. Especially, the United States and also the Atlanticist group within
the Union underline the importance of NATO pertaining to the defence of Europe. On the
other hand, Russia will certainly feel threatened by such action. Therefore, while the Foreign
Affairs Council is making decisions upon this topic, it should bear in mind all these facts
mentioned above and take into account the Union’s relations with external powers, such as the
US and Russia. What will be the implications of establishing a common EU army and the
challenges for the Union, concerning budgeting and maintenance issues?
9
See also at http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/juncker-nato-not-enough-eu-needs-army-312724
11
The History of European Defence Integration
Europe after WWII
In order to comprehend and clarify the current European approach to security and
defence concerns, one should have knowledge of the historical flow that affected and shaped
the above-mentioned concepts particularly after the Second World War.
After the end of WWII, the United States was devising that the newly-established United
Nations would prevent the future military conflicts through negotiation and diplomacy, thanks
to the five permanent member states of the Security Council: France, Republic of China,
Britain, the US, and the Soviet
Union.
Unfortunately,
breakthrough
idea
of
this
world’s
policemen was interrupted by the
clashing ideologies of communism
and
capitalism,
which
were
represented by the USSR and the
US
respectively.
This
conflict
rendered itself inevitable as the
maintenance
and
expansion
of
capitalist international economy depended upon the containment of communism. The free
world - as the term coined by the American president Harry S. Truman- had to be protected
against a Soviet expansion which was going to be called later the Truman Doctrine. 10 What
Truman meant exactly by the free world was Western European states. The US policy of
10
Hüseyin Bağcı. Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar. Ankara: METU Press, 2001.
12
containment was the first clash between the two powers in 1947 paving the way for rigid
alliance systems in the forms of Eastern bloc and Western bloc. 11
Bearing in mind that the Europe’s devastated economy by WWII had to be restructured in
order to contain communism, the US was to
give economic assistance to Western Europe
under the name of Marshall Plan. Yet,
Europeans had to share the burden of this
recovery programme through providing
security
for
the
American
business
investments so that the recovery could be
achieved without a Soviet interruption. 12
In order to realize that, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, and
Luxembourg came together and signed the Treaty of Brussels (1948)
13
which provided
collective self-defence against communism and also the rearmament of Germany.
Particularly, France was refraining from the return of German militarism. Meanwhile,
Germany was partitioned into four occupation zones at the end of the WWII. It was agreed by
the allies who were consisting of the UK, France, the US, and the Soviets that Germany
would be demilitarised under the administration of the occupying forces, and whenever it’s
possible, the German territories would be returned to the German authorities.14 However, this
did not take place as a consequence of the increasing enmity between the Soviets under the
rule of Joseph Stalin, and the United States. A month later the Treaty of Brussels was signed
Shen Zhihua. "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin’s Strategic Goals in the Far
East." Journal of Cold War Studies 2.2 (2000): 46. Web.
12
Türker Ari. "The European Defence Community in the U.S. Foreign Policy Context." Page 85.
13
See also at http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_brussels_treaty_17_march_1948-en-3467de5e-9802-4b65-8076778bc7d164d3.html
14
CVCE. "Reunification of a Divided Germany." CVCE: Innovating European Studies. September 28, 2012.
http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/reunification_of_a_divided_germany-en-f1e1a976-11e9-46d5-aadf134e48cd8d43.html.
11
13
by the Western European states, the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin in April 1948, and
occupied the eastern part of Germany. This was to be the first overt military confrontation of
the Cold War. 15
As a consequence, Germany was divided into two separate states: the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) in the West and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the
East. The thing is that it was feared by the Western bloc that Stalin wanted to unify Germany
through its socialist system which would be directly resisted by the United States and the
Western Europe. At this point,
Europe’s security was at stake
against
the
Soviet
concerning
Union
Germany’s
unification, and the US was
aware of the fact that a larger
military assistance by her had
to
come
to
the
fore.16
Therefore, in 1949, the North
Atlantic Treaty17, which established the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and
obliged the US to the defend Western Europe whenever it’s necessary, was signed by the
United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. According to the Article V, “parties
to the Treaty accept that an armed attack against one shall be considered an armed attack
Shen Zhihua. "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin’s Strategic Goals in the Far
East." Journal of Cold War Studies 2.2 (2000): 47. Web.
16
"North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949 - 1945–1952 - Milestones - Office of the Historian."
Office of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato.
17
NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 1949.
15
14
against all”.18 From now on, the United States has become the main security provider in
Europe.
The Idea of the European Defence Community (EDC)
In the year of 1950, when
Stalin decided to involve in the
Korean Civil War through assisting
militarily the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea against the USbacked Republic of Korea, the
communist threat turned into a
reality for Europe, too. Another
division of a country had already
existed at the heart of Europe:
1 - EDC Countries are demonstrated in pink.
Germany. As a result of this, Jean
Monnet, General Commissioner of the French National Planning Board, contemplated a
common EU army which would be consisting of 100,000 troops from the state parties to the
Treaty of Brussels.19 The common army would be run by a European Ministry of Defence,
placed under the supreme command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).20 At
the same time, the US feared that a Soviet-led assault on West Germany; thus, the United
States insisted upon the inclusion of West Germany into this idea and West Germany’s
rearmament, deeming it as a safety valve. This was agreed by Monnet on conditional terms.
Monnet proposed this draft to the French Prime Minister at the time, René Pleven. When the
18
NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 1949.
Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE). "The Plan for an EDC." Cvce.eu. May 14, 2013.
http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/the_plan_for_an_edc-en-4996601d-bd87-49e8-a5ff-f69cb86a7309.html.
20
Ibid.
19
15
draft was also passed in the French National Assembly, it took the name of the Pleven Plan.
The French Minister began to negotiate the European Defence Community with the members
of the newly-established European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. Next year, the
Treaty of European Defence Community
21
was signed in Paris in 1952 with the American
support. According to the final version of the Treaty, half of the troops would be provided by
France, and the West German troops would be under the command of the French Generals,
which was actually a discrimination directed against the German since France was still in fear
of a militarily superior Germany.22 Moreover, the prospective EU army would be under the
authority of a projected post of a European Minister for Defence of ECSC (assuming that the
ECSC would complete the political integration and lead to supranational command and
management of the EU army) placed under the supreme command of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO).23 In spite of the fact that the treaty was proposed by the French
PM, René Pleven, and signed by the ECSC member states, the French National Assembly did
not ratify the Treaty in 1954 with the Gaullist concerns of rearmament of Germany, and
protection of French national sovereignty. Yet, the Treaty of European Defence Community
never went into effect.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (First Pillar)
Although the five Western European states showed their determination by signing the
Treaty of Brussels in 1948 in order to deter the Soviet threat, the fact was evident that the US
military capabilities, especially nuclear weapons, were needed since the Soviet military might
was far ahead of the combined power of the signatories of the Brussels Treaty. As a result of
this conclusion, the Brussels Treaty powers negotiated with the US and Canada the creation of
21
See also at http://aei.pitt.edu/5201/1/5201.pdf
Türker Ari. "The European Defence Community in the U.S. Foreign Policy Context." Page 89.
23
"The Plan for an EDC.” The Plan for an EDC - The Organisation of Post-war Defence in Europe (1948–1954)
- CVCE Website. http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/803b2430-7d1c-4e7b-910147415702fc8e/29a4e81c-c7b6-4622-915e-3b09649747b8.
22
16
a single North Atlantic Alliance based on security guarantees and mutual commitments
between Europe and America. Portugal, Norway, Italy, Iceland, and Denmark were also
invited to join this process. In the end, the North Atlantic Treaty, establishing the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was signed on 4 April, 1949. Currently, NATO has 28
member states, consisting of Greece (1952), Turkey (1952), Germany (1955), Spain (1982),
Czech Republic (1999), Hungary (1999), Poland (1999), Bulgaria (2004), Estonia (2004),
Latvia (2004), Lithuania (2004), Romania (2004), Slovakia (2004), Slovenia (2004), Albania
(2009), and Croatia (2009) in addition to the founder states.
NATO is a military alliance based upon the principle of collective defence and was
established on the basis of the Article 51 of the UN Charter, deeming the individual or
collective use of force permissible in the case of self-defence.24 According to the Treaty’s
Article IV, the parties have the right to consult each other whenever the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of any of the parties is under threat.
25
Article V states that
an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against all, and the Alliance shall
assist the party or the parties under attack by military means. 26 Hence, Article V can be seen
as the pillar of NATO, and eventually, of the European security even today.
24
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, Article 51, available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html
25
NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 1949.
26
Ibid.
17
During the Cold War period, NATO’s strategy had evolved in time, not in favour of
dialogue, but confrontation due to the bipolar international structure till the 1970s when
SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitations) agreement took place between the US and the Soviets
which proceeded later with START (Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks). The initial formulation of
NATO strategy was titled as “The Strategic
Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic
Area in 1952.27 This very first strategic concept
acknowledged numerical inferiority of the alliance
vis-à-vis
the
Soviets
and
underlined
the
importance of reliance on US nuclear capabilities
and “ensuring the ability to carry out strategic
bombing promptly by all means possible with ‘all
types of weapons’, without exception”.28 In the mid-1950s, the estimated number of the
Soviet armed forces was approximately 5.5 million men under arms.29 When the communist
states of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, German Democratic Republic (GDR),
Bulgaria, Albania and the Soviet Union established the Warsaw Pact (the Treaty of
Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance) in 1955, which was a military assistance
treaty akin to NATO, the imbalance of conventional military power, consisting of ground,
navy, and air forces, increased drastically in favour of the East. According to Richard
Bitzinger, it was estimated at that time the combined conventional military forces of the Pact
had a 10:1 superiority in standing divisions over NATO.30 In comparison with 150 readily
available divisions of the Warsaw Pact, there were only 25 active divisions of NATO in
27
NATO Handbook, 2001, NATO Office of Information and Press, page 43
"Strategic Concepts." NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm#
29
Richard A. Bitzinger. "Assessing the Conventional Balance in Europe, 1945-1975." May 1989. Page 4.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2007/N2859.pdf.
30
Ibid, p. 7.
28
18
Europe.31 This fact caused the NATO leaders to alter their deterrence strategy and to
introduce the concept of ‘massive retaliation’ in 1957 just only a year after the crushing of the
Hungarian uprising of the Soviets. Massive retaliation highlighted explicitly the use of nuclear
weapons as a way of deterrence in addition to the conventional weapons. 32 This change in the
deterrence strategy would also reduce the defence expenditures of NATO since less
conventional forces were needed now.
When a series of international developments took place, massive retaliation turned out
to be less effective. Firstly, the Soviet Union accomplished developing intercontinental
ballistic missile capabilities and its nuclear capability. This meant that NATO was about to
lose its competitiveness in nuclear deterrence. Secondly, another Berlin crisis occurred from
1958 to 1962, which culminated in the construction of the Berlin Wall by the USSR. In
addition to these, upon the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the US changed its position to favour
a non-nuclear stance in order to ease tensions with the Soviets.33 The renewed strategy of the
Alliance was embedded into the fourth strategic concept: the doctrine of ‘flexible response’.
According to this strategy, the main idea was to provide a degree of flexibility so that the
aggressor would not be able to calculate the magnitude of NATO’s response in the event of
aggression, and this would increase deterrence.34 Three types of military responses were
identified: “1) direct defence: the aim was to defeat the aggression on the level at which the
enemy chose to fight; 2) deliberate escalation: this added a series of possible steps to defeat
aggression by progressively raising the threat of using nuclear power as the crisis escalated; 3)
general nuclear response, seen as the ultimate deterrent.”35
31
Ibid.
"Strategic Concepts." NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm#
33
Ibid.
34
NATO Handbook, 2001, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001. page 43.
35
"Strategic Concepts." NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm#
32
19
In the mid-1960s, NATO revised once again its strategic thinking bearing in mind the
fact that the security environment had also changed since 1949. As a response to this, Belgian
Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel introduced the “Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of
the Alliance”, which proposed adopting a dual-track policy for NATO: deterrence and
dialogue at the same time during a relative détente between the US and the Soviets.36
Incorporating a political aspect to the Alliance’s approach towards security, the Harmel
Report
37
provided a room for relaxation of tensions with the USSR while deterrence was
maintained. This novelty also coincided with SALT I process between the US and the Soviets
which resulted in the reduction of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) to 100 missiles of both sides
by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972.
Moreover, the report set the basis of the
introduction of Federal Republic of Germany’s Ostpolitik – a policy aiming at bringing a
more positive relationship with primarily East Germany and the other communist states- in
196938, and also the convening of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe(CSCE)39 in 1973, which culminated in signing of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975
between the two blocs, concerned with respect the fundamental freedom of their citizens,
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.40
In 1979, the environment of détente was disturbed by the fact that the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan in order to expand its sphere of influence towards the Middle East.
Furthermore, it deployed SS-20 Saber ballistic missiles (intermediate-range ballistic missile
with a nuclear warhead) in Warsaw Pact countries.41 Upon these developments, NATO
responded with its dual-track strategy as it was framed in the Harmel Report. The Alliance
36
"The Harmel Report." NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_67927.htm.
See also at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26700.htm
38
NATO Handbook, 2001, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001. page 35.
39
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was renamed the Organisation on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in January 1995.
40
"History." NATO. http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html.
41
NATO. Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers
(The "Double-Track. Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces). Brussels, 12 December 1979.
37
20
negotiated first with the Warsaw Pact a mutual limitation of medium and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles. Since no agreement was reached, NATO started deploying its own Pershing
cruise missiles as a countermeasure.42
Throughout the 1980s, the relations between the East and the West did not strain as
much as they did in the past, due to the fact that command economies in the Warsaw Pact
were in poor conditions and in the phase of disintegration. Even the Soviet Union was unable
to halt the fragmentations within the system, such as the break-up of East Germany in 1989.43
Here, we briefly tried to depict the role of NATO in terms of the European security,
how the Alliance defined the concept of security, and tackled political and military problems
encountered during the Cold War years. NATO’s changing role in the post-Cold war era and
repercussions of this change concerning Europe will be discussed in detail later on.
The Western European Union (WEU) (Second Pillar)
The Western European Union (WEU) could have been regarded as the second
pillar of the European security until 2011 when it was replaced by the European Union. As
previously mentioned, the French initiative to
establish European Defence Community (EDC)
was concluded with a failure in 1954 as the French
Parliament did not accept the premises of the EDC
Treaty concerning the German rearmament issue,
and did not ratify it. An alternative plan had to be
42
43
"Strategic Concepts." NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm#
"History." NATO. http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html.
21
devised immediately so that West Germany could be integrated into the European defence
complex under the Atlantic framework, which was already-established NATO.44 To that end,
Brussels Treaty powers, the US, and Canada came together at a conference held in London
from 28 September to 3 October 1954, and invited Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) to the conference to join the Brussels Treaty. Several decisions were agreed upon,
including ending the occupation regime in the FRG and restoring the country’s sovereignty,
monitoring German rearmament by amending the 1948 Brussels Treaty, accession of the FRG
and Italy to the modified Brussels Treaty and accession of the FRG to NATO. 45 Moreover,
France’s reservations on the question of German rearmament was compensated by the United
Kingdom’s existing troops on the mainland Europe, and preventing the withdrawal of the US
forces from the FRG.46
The conclusions of the conference were formalised by the Paris Accords, when the
Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty 47was signed by FRG, Italy, and the
original signatories of the Brussels Treaty in 1954, establishing Western European Union
(WEU) -an international organisation and military alliance based on collective defence. A
year later, the FRG successfully joined NATO’s military structure in 1955.48
Beside the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Modified Brussels Treaty
(MBT) established WEU parliamentary Assembly, an Agency for the Control of Armaments
44
Alyson JK Bailes, and Graham Messervy-Whiting. "Death of an Institution: The End for Western European
Union, a Future for European Defence?." - Archive of European Integration. Egmont Paper No. 46, May 2011:
11. http://aei.pitt.edu/32322/.
45
"The Establishment of Western European Union (WEU) - The Organisation of Post-war Defence in Europe
(1948–1954) - CVCE Website." The Establishment of Western European Union (WEU) - The Organisation of
Post-war Defence in Europe (1948–1954) - CVCE Website. May 14, 2013.
http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/803b2430-7d1c-4e7b-9101-47415702fc8e/6d9db05c-1e8c487a-a6bc-ff25cf1681e0.
46
Ibid.
47
See also at http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/11/26/7d182408-0ff6-432e-b7930d1065ebe695/publishable_en.pdf
48
Alyson JK Bailes, and Graham Messervy-Whiting. "Death of an Institution: The End for Western European
Union, a Future for European Defence?." - Archive of European Integration. Egmont Paper No. 46, May 2011:
11. http://aei.pitt.edu/32322/.
22
and a Standing Armaments Committee.49 Similar to NATO’s Article V pertaining to
collective defence; WEU member states were obliged by the MBT’s Article V, which states
that “if any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe,
the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and
assistance in their power”.50 Yet, WEU maintained Brussels Treaty powers’ decision of 1950
of not establishing a military structure, and relying on NATO’s information and advice on
military matters in close cooperation, according to the MBT’s Article IV. 51 As this fact and
the EDC’s failure reveal together, Western Europe was both reluctant and not able to develop
a defence system without the US’ support under the NATO’s umbrella.
Since the founding member states were determined not to establish a military structure
within the institution, WEU remained passive as a forum for consultation and discussion, and
had passed through a dormant period from the 1950s to the mid-1980s. In this successive
three decades, WEU did not have an obvious task to perform- NATO was purely responsible
from the defence of Europe, and on the other hand, the European Community (EC) was
concerned only with civilian ambitions.52 Thus, WEU stacked to solving post-war matters that
could undermine the cohesion among its member states if prolonged. These post-war matters
were: 1) the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Atlantic Alliance; 2) the
restoration of confidence among Western European countries by assuming responsibilities for
arms control; 3) settlement of the Saarland problem (the German province was only to be
49
"The Establishment of Western European Union (WEU) - The Organisation of Post-war Defence in Europe
(1948–1954) - CVCE Website." The Establishment of Western European Union (WEU) - The Organisation of
Post-war Defence in Europe (1948–1954) - CVCE Website. May 14, 2013.
http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/803b2430-7d1c-4e7b-9101-47415702fc8e/6d9db05c-1e8c487a-a6bc-ff25cf1681e0.
50
Text of Modified Brussels Treaty (Paris, 23 October 1954). [ON-LINE]. [Brussels]: Western European Union,
[06.10.2000]. Available on http://www.weu.int/index.html.
51
Alyson JK Bailes, and Graham Messervy-Whiting. "Death of an Institution: The End for Western European
Union, a Future for European Defence?." - Archive of European Integration. Egmont Paper No. 46, May 2011:
12. http://aei.pitt.edu/32322/.
52
Ibid, p. 14.
23
returned in 1956 to the FRG); 4) consultation between the European Community founding
Member States and the United Kingdom.53 Although the Modified Brussels Treaty envisaged
also a non-military cooperation for the WEU- as the full title of the MBT ‘Economic, Social
and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence’ suggests- the non-military tasks were
appropriated by either the Council of Europe or the EC with the development of European
Political Co-operation.54 As a result of this, WEU was about to lose its effectiveness as a
defence and consultation mechanism.
The turning point of the reactivation of WEU came in the mid-1980s when Europe
witnessed the revival of the European security debate. The idea was to build an integrated
Europe not only in terms of economic or social policies, but also security and defence aspects
which would strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. However, this abrupt
change in the European mind-set arrived at a time when the United States had to deal with the
threat of terrorist attacks in non-European regions which were supported by ‘rogue states’.
This culminated in a political pressure from both Washington D.C. and the American
Congress in the direction that Europe had to engage in better burden-sharing within the
Alliance when it comes to defence of the European continent.55 Hence, this was not a pure
coincidence, but a political concern. In 1984, on the initiative of the French and Belgian
Governments, a joint meeting of WEU Foreign and Defence ministers took place in Rome
where the WEU’s reactivation was agreed by a founding text: the Rome Declaration. 56 This
event was unprecedented in the sense that for the first time, the European security identity
Western European Union - Union De L'Europe Occidentale. “WEU from 1955 to 1984.". http://www.weu.int/.
Alyson JK Bailes, and Graham Messervy-Whiting. "Death of an Institution: The End for Western European
Union, a Future for European Defence?." - Archive of European Integration. Egmont Paper No. 46, May 2011:
12. http://aei.pitt.edu/32322/.
55
Alyson JK Bailes, and Graham Messervy-Whiting. "Death of an Institution: The End for Western European
Union, a Future for European Defence?." - Archive of European Integration. Egmont Paper No. 46, May 2011:
15. http://aei.pitt.edu/32322/.
56
See also at http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/7/11/c44c134c-aca3-45d1-9e0b04d4d9974ddf/publishable_en.pdf
53
54
24
was defined by the adoption of the declaration.57 With the declaration, “continuing necessity
to strengthen western security, and that better utilization of WEU would not only contribute to
the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the
countries of the Atlantic Alliance"58 was recognized.
On the basis of the Rome Declaration, in 1987, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of
WEU adopted “Platform on European Security Interests” in The Hague in which they
reaffirmed their determination to strengthen the European pillar within NATO, and introduce
security and defence dimensions into integration plan of Europe.59 In the same meeting, it was
decided to open negotiations with Portugal and Spain concerning their accessions to WEU
which indicated the WEU’s
willingness
to
enlarge
the
institution.
Furthermore,
in
November
1989,
the
Ministerial Council decided to
establish
an
Institute
for
Security Studies in order to
develop a European security identity and to implement the Hague Platform.
The change in the European mind-set towards the sense of ‘Europeanness’ in security
matters and reactivation of WEU immediately paved the way for the joint WEU military
operations in and out of Europe. In the years of 1987 and 1988, the Iran-Iraq War hindered the
freedom of navigation and international trade in the Persian Gulf due to the mines laid around
the Strait of Hormuz. In compliance with the Article VIII (3) of the MBT, the joint forces of
57
Apostolos Tsohatzopoulos. "WEU's Challenge." NATO Review No. 2, Summer 1998, Pp. 4-6.
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9802-02.htm.
58
Western European Union - Union De L'Europe Occidentale. “Reactivation of WEU." http://www.weu.int/.
59
NATO Handbook, 2001, NATO Office of Information and Press, page 360.
25
WEU responded with ‘Operation Cleansweep’ in which minesweepers were dispatched in
order to complete the clearance of a 300-mile sea lane from the Strait of Hormuz. This is the
first time that WEU countries conducted a joint operation.60
During the Gulf War in
1990/1991, in order to implement and enforce the United Nations Security Council Resolution
661, WEU member states supported the US-led Operation Desert Storm with their mineclearance mandate in the Gulf waters. Moreover, WEU contributed in the humanitarian
actions for Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq.61
European Security in Transition: The Post-Cold War Era
Since 1989, the international
security environment had been in a
drastic change stemming from the fact
that the satellites of the Soviet Union
were in the process of secession and
recovering their sovereignty as a result
of the perestroika and glasnost policies introduced in the Soviet Union- which allowed the
satellite states to act more independently in politics and to adopt market economy- and of the
ongoing civil and political public unrest in the communist states. Subsequently, the three
Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia regained their independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991. Furthermore, between the years of 1989 and 1991, the communist
governments in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Romania
were forced to resign by popular uprisings. As a consequence, the Warsaw Pact, which had
Western European Union - Union De L'Europe Occidentale. “Operational Role." http://www.weu.int/.
Alyson JK Bailes, and Graham Messervy-Whiting. "Death of an Institution: The End for Western European
Union, a Future for European Defence?." - Archive of European Integration. Egmont Paper No. 46, May 2011:
17. http://aei.pitt.edu/32322/.
60
61
26
been seen as the main security threat to Europe since 1955, was abolished in February 1991 in
a Pact meeting in Hungary. Only ten months later, a new chapter in international politics was
about to begin: the Cold War came to an abrupt end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
In the West, in contrast, the European Community (EC) was achieving a political and
economic unity, including the cooperation in security matters through increased role of WEU
and the development of a European security identity.
Redefining the Role of NATO
Bearing in mind the changing nature of the security threats against Western Europe,
NATO tried to adjust the reason for its very existence by redefining the emerging security
challenges. In the post-Cold War era, the United States, as the main financial and military
contributor in the Alliance, was aware of the fact that in the new world order and security
environment, it was the time for the European members to shoulder a greater share of the
collective defence burden compared to the past.62 Large contingent of troops and substantial
nuclear assets of the US were no more deemed as a priority on the European soil. In the
direction of this strategic thinking, NATO published its new Strategic Concept in 1991.
In the Strategic Concept of 1991, first of all, NATO reiterated that its main purpose
was “to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means
in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”.63 Still, the Article V of the
Washington Treaty could be invoked in the cases of armed attack against its member states.
Thus, the essence of NATO remained the same. Secondly, Clause 35 of the document
62
Bekkevold, Jo Inge, Ian Bowers, and Michael Raska. Security, Strategy and Military Change in the 21st
Century: Cross-regional Perspectives. Routledge, 2015.
63
"The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (1991)." NATO.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm.
27
revealed that the USSR64 was no more seen as an adversary, or a direct threat to the Alliance.
Hence, NATO decided to reduce the overall size of the Allies’ forces and their readiness.
Also, the maintenance of a defensive posture in the central Europe was no more required.65
Thirdly and most importantly, Clause 21 of the Strategic Concept emphasized the creation of
the European identity in security and defence, and the responsibility of the EC, WEU, and
CSCE 66 in greater burden-sharing concerning the European security.67
The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO
It is crystal clear that NATO was now more supportive of the development of a
European security and defence identity; yet, the Bush Sr. Administration in the US was
deeply concerned with the fact that the process of Europeanization had to take place within
the NATO military structures by using the NATO assets, or explicitly, the US assets.
Otherwise, a completely autonomous European military structure would undermine NATO’s
primacy and pre-empt its function as a forum for consultation and decision-making
concerning security and defence matters.68 The US had a point in being concerned with this
issue since there were intense Franco-German initiatives for a European political union in
1991(or the European Union69) that would eventually bring more autonomy over military
operations to WEU. After the establishment of the European Union (EU) in 1992, the Britishled Atlanticists were standing together with the United States so to block any efforts to
64
The NATO Strategic Concept was written just before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
"The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (1991)" NATO. Clause 45.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm.
66
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was renamed the Organisation on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in January 1995.
67
NATO. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept. 1991.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm.
68
Jolyon Howorth, and John T. S. Keeler. Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European
Autonomy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 25.
69
The European Union was established by the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 in which the EU also introduced its
Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP).
65
28
integrate the EU’s emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)70 to WEU.71 For
the French-led Europeanists, it was vital to lessen the role of the US while strengthening the
autonomy of WEU. Subsequently, in this contentious political environment linking North
America to Europe, it was decided at the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting to develop the
European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 72within NATO.
The expectation was to meet the European Union’s wish to establish a Common
Foreign and Security Policy, and to respond to the need for a more balanced relationship
between North American and European members of the Alliance.73 ESDI was devised to
allow WEU to use NATO assets and capabilities and to elaborate appropriate multinational
European command within NATO in order to prepare, command and conduct WEU-led crisis
management and peace-keeping operations in pursuit of developing the EU’s Common
Foreign and Security Policy.74 The motto of ESDI was designated as: separable but not
separate.
70
See also at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/foreign_security_policy.html.
James Sperling. Two Tiers or Two Speeds?: The European Security Order and the Enlargement of the
European Union and Nato. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, 47.
71
72
See also at http://www.nato.int/DOCU/comm/1999/9904-wsh/pres-eng/05esdi.pdf
NATO Handbook, 2001, NATO Office of Information and Press, page 99
74
EUROPA. EUR-Lex Access to European Union Law. Glossary of Summaries. http://eurlex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/european_security_defence_identity.html.
73
29
WEU as the Defence Arm of the European Union (EU)
The European Union’s establishment through the Maastricht Treaty of 199175,
which actually entered into force in 1993, did not end the role of WEU in terms of building a
common European policy on security and defence, but on the contrary, WEU found a room to
become the defence component of the EU while at the same time establishing closer ties with
NATO through ESDI.76 Although France and Germany much discussed the issue whether
WEU should be integrated into the EU to render the CSDP more effective, the main obstacle
was the fact that Britain was strongly against the integration plan, and that not all of the EU
member states were members of NATO, and willing to accept the MBT’s Article V
imperatives, necessitating involvement in collective defence efforts through NATO military
structures when deemed necessary.
Especially, to bypass the MBT defence imperatives, Denmark, Ireland, Austria,
Finland, and Sweden joined the WEU as Observers, but not as full members.77 Consequently,
WEU kept its position as the ‘Defence Arm’ of the Union until the Treaty of Amsterdam78 of
1997.
The Petersberg Declaration
In 1992, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU member states gathered near
Bonn, Germany in order to strengthen the operational role of WEU. Furthermore, on the basis
75
See also at http://europa.eu/eu-law/decisionmaking/treaties/pdf/treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf
76
James Sperling. Two Tiers or Two Speeds?: The European Security Order and the Enlargement of the
European Union and Nato. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, 48.
77
Alyson JK Bailes, and Graham Messervy-Whiting. "Death of an Institution: The End for Western European
Union, a Future for European Defence?." Archive of European Integration. Egmont Paper No. 46, May 2011,
21. http://aei.pitt.edu/32322/.
78
With the Treaty of Amsterdam, operational role of WEU was transferred to the EU.
30
of the Maastricht Treaty guidelines settled down in 1991 for WEU’s future development, the
member states issued the Petersberg Declaration79, concerning their preparedness to make
available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for
military tasks under the authority of WEU.80 By this Declaration, WEU members pledged
their support for conflict prevention and peace-keeping efforts in cooperation with the CSCE
and with the United Nations Security Council.
Article II (4) of the Declaration designated the following three purposes for
which military units could be deployed: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks;
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.81 The term ‘peacemaking’
was
synonym
adopted
for
as
a
‘peace-
enforcement’. Not to cause an
unnecessary
duplication,
the
Petersberg Tasks did not include
territorial defence which is in the
domain of NATO.
Following the decisions taken at Maastricht and Petersberg, WEU began to
develop the WEU’s operational role in order to provide the organization with the necessary
tools to carry out the Petersberg tasks mentioned above. To this end, a WEU Planning Cell
was established, under the authority of the WEU Council, to implement planning for possible
WEU operations and to establish and to keep up-to-date the list of Forces Answerable to
WEU (FAWEU). However, as a product of the MBT, WEU refrained from establishing
79
Further information at http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf
NATO Handbook, 2001, NATO Office of Information and Press, page 361.
81
European Union. "European External Action Service." European Union External Service.
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/petersberg/index_en.htm.
80
31
standing forces or command structures of its own.82 The military unit and command structures
designated by WEU members and associate members can be made ready in time of crisis to
WEU for its various possible tasks. They include both national units and several multinational
formations, such as the Eurocorps consisting of Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and
Spain; the Multinational Division Central- it also forms part of the Reaction Forces available
to SACEUR83 within NATO’s military structure; the UK/NL Amphibious Force; Eurofor
(rapid deployment force) and Euromarfor (maritime force) including forces from France,
Italy, Portugal and Spain; the Headquarters of the First German-Netherlands Corps; and the
Spanish- Italian Amphibious Force.84
Having relied upon the above-mentioned combined military unit and command
structures, WEU involved in peace-keeping operations to support the efforts of UN, NATO,
and the CSCE. In July 1992, WEU deployed naval forces to Adriatic in order to monitor the
compliance with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
On 5 April 1993, the WEU Council of Ministers decided to provide assistance to
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania to enforce the UN embargo on the Danube.85 This assistance
was a police and customs operation with the CSCE. When the UN sanctions were terminated
in 1996, both the Adriatic and Danube operations were halted.
In early July 1994, the EU Administration being established in Mostar, BosniaHerzegovina requested a provision of support by WEU to dispatch a police contingent in to
82
NATO Handbook, 2001, NATO Office of Information and Press, page 364.
SACEUR stands for Supreme Allied Commander Europe. He is responsible to NATO’s highest military
authority, the Military Committee, for the conduct of all NATO military operations.
84
NATO Handbook, 2001, NATO Office of Information and Press, page 365.
85
European Union. " About CSDP - The Western European Union." European Union External Service.
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/petersberg/index_en.htm.
83
32
order to assist the Bosnian and Croat parties in Mostar to set up a unified police force for
Mostar. The WEU police contingent continued to provide assistance until 1996.86
In the context of Albanian crisis, in 1997, the WEU Council decided to deploy a
Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) to complement the action of the
Multinational Protection Force deployed by several European countries under the authority of
the UNSC Resolution 1101. The first WEU operation to be directed by the WEU Council on
the role of the MAPE was to give the Albanian police authorities information and advice on
appropriate aspects of policing and restoring order, as well as on their responsibilities in the
electoral process.87
In May 1999, at the request of the EU, WEU initiated a Demining Assistance Mission
to the Republic of Croatia (WEUDAM) WEU provided advice, technical expertise and
training support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) in the areas of programme
management, planning and project development, geographic information systems.88
The Treaty of Amsterdam
As a part of the Maastricht Treaty’s vision to develop a Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) “including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which
might in time lead to a common defence”, the EU members were seeking to transform the
Union into a security and defence political actor. For this reason, the incorporation of WEU
into the EU was crucial and inevitable. Eventually, in 1997, the EU member states adopted
the Treaty of Amsterdam which achieved to codify new structures and tasks for the CFSP,
indicated the possibility of developing a future common defence policy for the EU, and
86
NATO Handbook, 2001, NATO Office of Information and Press, page 368.
Western European Union - Union De L'Europe Occidentale. "Crisis Management Operations (1997-2001)."
http://www.weu.int/.
88
NATO Handbook, 2001, NATO Office of Information and Press, page 368.
87
33
defined the range of military tasks which the EU could undertake (incorporated WEU’s
Petersberg Tasks into the EU).89 In this way, the EU was provided with an access to
operational capability, rendering WEU an integral part of the Union. In order to harmonise
WEU and the Union, EU ministers endorsed a decision enhancing the operational role of
WEU Observer countries, like Denmark and Sweden, in line with the Article 17 (3) of the
Amsterdam Treaty. It can be concluded that WEU was no more the defence component of the
EU.
The St Malo Process and the Cologne European Council
Although the Treaty of Amsterdam became a milestone in terms of the EU’s
transformation
into
a
security
and
defence actor, the real breakthrough came
in 1998, when France and Britain met in
the halfway to end their disagreement
over an autonomous Union from NATO
in terms of military capabilities, and
signed the Declaration on European
Security at St Malo90. The Declaration stated that ‘the Union must have the capacity for
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them
and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’.91 Britain compromised in
the sense that it left the opposition to a direct military role for the EU, and in return, France
89
European Union. "About CSDP - The Treaty of Amsterdam." European Union External Action.
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/amsterdam/index_en.htm.
90
See also at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/FrenchBritish%20Summit%20Declaration,%20SaintMalo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf
91
Alyson JK Bailes, and Graham Messervy-Whiting. "Death of an Institution: The End for Western European
Union, a Future for European Defence?." - Archive of European Integration. Egmont Paper No. 46, May 2011,
39. http://aei.pitt.edu/32322/.
34
agreed that this renewed role for the EU would take place in conformity with the respective
obligations to NATO.92 The United States’ stance on this issue was reserved since such a
change in the nature of the European Union could harm the primacy of NATO and the ESDI
which was established by NATO’s Berlin Communique, allowing WEU to use NATO assets.
US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, put forward three conditions to accept the St Malo
Agreement: no decoupling (NATO retaining the role as the US-Europe strategic link for ‘real’
defence), no duplication of defence efforts, and no discrimination against non-EU NATO
allies.93
The Saint-Malo Agreement, which paved the way for a defence component of the
EU for the first time, constituted the basis of the European Council meeting in 1999. In
Cologne, EU heads of state and government agreed that the Union should have its own
military structures to respond to international crisis autonomously. Furthermore, it is agreed
that the evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was imperative to be
able to play a full role in the international stage. In order to conduct, plan, and analyse
military operations, EU member states also agreed upon establishing necessary institutions
that required: “regular meetings of the General Affairs Council (GAC), including, when
appropriate, national defence ministers; a permanent body in Brussels, the Political and
Security Committee (PSC), consisting of representatives at ambassador level with
political/military (pol/mil) expertise; an EU Military Committee consisting of military
representatives that make recommendations to the PSC; an EU Military Staff including a
Situation Centre; other resources such as a Satellite Centre and an Institute for Security
Studies”.94
92
Ibid.
Bekkevold, Jo Inge, Ian Bowers, and Michael Raska. Security, Strategy and Military Change in the 21st
Century: Cross-regional Perspectives. Routledge, 2015.
94
European Union. "The Cologne European Council." European Union External Service.
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/petersberg/index_en.htm.
93
35
Moreover, European heads of state and government agreed on the need to develop
military forces and headquarters for crisis management operations, and envisaged that the
deployable forces would be drawn from either from NATO assets, bypassing here the
operational role of WEU, or from national and multinational contributions by EU member
states.95 Drawing a conclusion from this framework, it is observed that the EU began to
replace WEU and to render it defunct as the second pillar of the European security- WEU was
closed down in 2011 by the EU.
Renewal of the ESDI: The Berlin Plus Agreement
The
developments
above-mentioned
necessitated
an
establishment of a formal agreement
between NATO and the EU, the
emerging security and defence actor
which was going to replace WEU.
This agreement had the purpose of
building on the NATO’s Berlin Communique of 1996 that developed the ESDI, regulating the
relations between WEU and NATO and permitting the use of NATO assets in the WEU-led
operations. After the NATO’s Washington Summit in 1999, the Berlin Plus Agreement 96was
signed in 2003 in a joint declaration of NATO and the EU which covered: “a NATO-EU
Security Agreement that covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal
security protection rules; assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led
operations; availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led civil-military operations;
95
Ibid.
The European Council. EU-NATO: The Framework For Permanent Relations And Berlin Plus. The European
Council.
96
36
procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities; terms
of reference for using NATO’s DSACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) for
commanding EU-led operations; EU-NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an
EU-led operations making use of NATO assets and capabilities; arrangements for coherent
and mutually reinforcing capability requirements, in particular the incorporation within
NATO's defence planning of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EUled military operations”. 97
As an outcome of the Agreement, it was also decided to create European rapid
reaction corps (EUFOR) of 50,000-60,000 troops that could be deployable within 60 days.
98
In December 2003, EUFOR replaced the NATO mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia with 350 troops to conduct ‘Operation Concordia’ in which the EU used NATO
assets and capabilities and where the EU Operation Commander was Deputy Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (DSACEUR).99 The second EU-led operation took place under the name
of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004. EUFOR Althea was consisting of
7,000 troops deployed in order to enforce the Dayton Peace Agreement under the
authorization by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
100
Moreover, EUFOR was
deployed in DR Congo to support the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (MONUC) in 2006101, and in Chad and Central African Republic for the ongoing
peacekeeping missions.
97
See also at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm
"ESDI: "Separable but Not Separate"?" NATO Review. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2000/More-capablebalanced-alliance/ESDI-Separable-but-not-separate/EN/index.htm.
99
Julie Kim. Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping. Report no.
RS21774. CRS Report For Congress, 2006, 3.
100
Ibid, 4.
101
European Union. "EUFOR RD Congo." European Union External Action.
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-rd-congo/index_en.htm.
98
37
The Lisbon Treaty
From the signing of the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union, the
Union had struggled to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through
Petersberg Tasks. After the 1999 Cologne European Council meeting, the European defence
integration plans gained momentum with the establishment of the EU rapid reaction forces.
However, in 2007, the EU was about to sign an unprecedented treaty for its contributions to
the common defence of the EU.
Signed in 2007, and adopted in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty was unique in the
sense that it contained a number of new provisions pertaining to the CSDP. Under the clause
of 27 (7), the Treaty states that “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its
territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by
all means in their power.”102 This was a mutual clause that was inspired by the MBT’s Article
V pertaining to collective defence. In addition, a solidarity clause was included, stating that
“the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if an EU Member
State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster”.103 The
Lisbon Treaty also expanded the range of Petersberg Tasks to include: humanitarian and
rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis
management, including peace-making; joint disarmament operations; military advice and
assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilisation tasks.
Up to now, it should be discernible that in the Post-Cold War era, the European
Union has been in search of full integration resulting in a common defence policy that can
102
European Union. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community. Article 27(7), December 13, 2007.
103
European Union. " The Treaty of Lisbon." European Union External Action. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/aboutcsdp/lisbon/index_en.htm
38
establish more than European peace-keeping forces, an EU Army. The Lisbon Treaty
explicitly demonstrates the utmost desire of the Union to establish its own collective defence
mechanism through CSDP. However, due to the EU’s intertwined structure with NATO and
the disagreements within the Union between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists, the Lisbon
Treaty’s mutual defence clause acknowledges that mutual defence commitments must be in
consistence with the NATO obligations.104 Hence, the European Union still lacks the unity it
desired to attain to the goal of establishing an EU Army. Yet, the unexpected Russian
expansionism during the Ukraine crisis that culminated in Crimea’s annexation by Russia in
2014 may lead to establishment of a consensus among the EU member states over fostering
the efforts towards creating an EU Army.
Re-emergence of the Russian Expansionism in the Eastern Flank of the EU
The Ukraine Crisis and the Annexation of Crimea
In 2014, Ukraine’s pro-Moscow president Viktor Yanukovych made a deal worth 15
billion dollars with Russia to join the ‘Euroasian Union’ consisting of Belarus, Kazakhstan,
and Russia. However, this led to widespread protests of the Ukrainian people who gathered in
the Independence Square- known as the Maidan.105 Yanukovych tried to suppress the
protesters by using the police force, but in response, the protests turned into the symbol of
condemnation of the corrupted Yanukovych government.
106
In the protests, more than 100
civilian people died, culminating in the increase in number of protestors and the pressure on
the government. Eventually, Yanukovych had to flee to Russia, and an interim government
104
Ibid.
Alan Yuhas. "Ukraine Crisis: An Essential Guide to Everything That's Happened so Far." The Guardian.
April 13, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/11/ukraine-russia-crimea-sanctions-us-eu-guideexplainer.
106
Catherine E. Shoichet. "Ukraine Crisis: What's Happening? Depends on Whom You Ask - CNN.com." CNN.
March 4, 2014. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/03/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-fight-over-facts/.
105
39
consisting of the opposition was established. The elections were going to be held in 25 May
2014. During the final days of protests, the Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered surprise
military drills on the border of Ukraine, and sent the Black Sea Navy to the Crimean coasts.107
Afterwards, it was reported that in Crimea, which was a semi-autonomous region of Ukraine
and mostly populated by the Russians, the troops alleged to be Russian contingents showed
up and seized the Supreme Council of Crimea and the airports. In this chaotic situation, the
Crimean Parliament held a referendum concerning Crimea’s accession to Russia. It was
alleged that 97 percent of the people voted in favour of the referendum.108 Subsequently, the
Treaty on Accession of the
Republic of Crimea to Russia was
signed between representatives of
the Republic of Crimea and the
Russian Federation on 18 March
2014 to lay out terms for the
immediate
admission
Republic
of
of
Crimea
the
and
Sevastopol as federal subjects of Russia and part of the Russian Federation. The European
Union and the United States declared that the referendum in Crimea is a violation of the
international law. Furthermore, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a non-binding
resolution, which declared the Crimean referendum and subsequent status change invalid, by
a vote of 100 in favour to 11 against, with 58 abstentions and 24 absent on 27 March 2014.109
At an emergency meeting of the Council of the European Union condemned the clear
107
Alan Yuhas. "Ukraine Crisis: An Essential Guide to Everything That's Happened so Far." The Guardian.
April 13, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/11/ukraine-russia-crimea-sanctions-us-eu-guideexplainer.
108
Alia E. Dastagir. "Ukraine, Russia, Crimea: How the Story Evolved." USA Today. April 24, 2014.
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/20/ukraine-crisis-explainer/6610749/.
109
"Backing Ukraine's Territorial Integrity, UN Assembly Declares Crimea Referendum Invalid." UN News
Center. March 27, 2014. Accessed 2016. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47443.
40
violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by acts of aggression by the
Russian armed forces as well as the authorization given by the Federation Council of Russia
on 1 March for the use of the armed forces on the territory of Ukraine.
As mentioned above, Russia’s military intervention into the Ukrainian
territories and her illegal annexation of Crimea based on irredentism110 raised the concerns
over how limited the European military capabilities are. After the annexation of Crimea,
Russia also augmented the number of her troops deployed on the Russia’s Western border
with Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania, and in Kaliningrad, which is a special Russian
territory bordering Poland and Lithuania. According to Independent, Russian Defence
Minister, Sergei Shoigu announced that Russia will create three new military divisions on its
Western border in 2016 and bring five new strategic nuclear missile regiments into service.111
Towards a European Defence Union in the 21st Century
Conclusion
The unexpected Russian aggression in the EU’s Eastern flank has definitely
stimulated the desire of the European countries to establish a common EU Army, but on the
other hand, flared up the ages-old debate between the Atlanticist countries, which are in
favour of keeping NATO’s primacy over European defence matters, and the Europeanists,
which directly supports establishing an independent EU Army. The German Minister of
Defence, Ursula von der Leyen reiterated the remarks of the President of the European
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, “our future as Europeans will at some point is with a
110
It is a political manoeuvre aiming to reclaim adjacent territories on the grounds of historical or ethnic
association.
111
John Hall. "Russia Announces Plans to Deploy Military Divisions on Western Border and Form New Nuclear
Regiments." The Independent. January 12, 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russiaannounces-plans-to-deploy-military-divisions-on-western-border-and-form-new-nuclear-regimentsa6807906.html.
41
European army."112 On the other hand, the United Kingdom disputes that security should be a
national issue, not a supranational one. The UK firmly sticks to the idea that the EU must
avoid duplicating the role of NATO when the issue comes to the European defence. Being
concerned with their physical proximity to the Russian border, the EU member countries,
such as Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have reservations on establishing a common
EU Army. They have called for “a significant strengthening of the NATO’s military presence
to the region to deter possible Russian aggression”.113 Concerning the United States, she
welcomes the idea of more European engagement in the defence matters. Yet, the US fears an
unnecessary duplication and retains its position for a more NATO-centric solution so that
NATO can ensure its primacy and the right of first refusal114. Also, the US calculates that the
increased defence investment by the EU partners of NATO will undermine NATO’s military
capabilities since the non-NATO members of the EU are likely to veto the use of any EU
asset for NATO’s use. Hence, the transatlantic relationship is in tatters in terms of
establishing a common EU Army. Upon the establishment, the US may reduce the number of
its troops and nuclear arsenals committed to the European defence. On the other hand, Russia
will see such a development a direct threat for herself, and call the creation of such a force
"provocative".
Another point that must be brought to the table during the sessions is budgeting
and financial maintenance of a common EU Army, along with the individual troop
contributions of the states. The desire of the European Union for a common defence
mechanism stands in stark contrast to the individual defence policies pursued by the EU
112
Steven Tomaszewski. "The European Union Wants an Army of Its Own | VICE News." VICE News RSS.
March 13, 2015. Accessed February 06, 2016. https://news.vice.com/article/the-european-union-wants-an-armyof-its-own.
113
Roland Oliphant. "Nato Considers Sending 4,000 Troops to Russian Borders." The Telegraph. Accessed
February 06, 2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11961836/Nato-considers-sending4000-troops-to-Russian-borders.html.
114
Berlin Plus Agreement restricted the use of NATO’s assets by the EU to the times only when NATO declines
to intervene in a crisis.
42
member states. Defence spending of the EU countries in NATO fell from an average of 2
percent of their GDP in 1995-1999 to 1.5 percent in 2014.115 In 1990, the then 14 European
members of NATO spent around $314 billion collectively, and this figure dropped only to
$227 billion spent by 26 NATO-EU member states in 2015.116 German armed forces have
shrunk from 333,000 in 1998 to 205,000 in 2011. France has reduced its armed forces from
449,000 in 1998 to 227,000 in 2011. Furthermore, Italy’s armed forces reduced from 402,000
in 1998 to 192,000 in 2011.117
POINTS TO BE ADDRESSED IN A RESOLUTION
In the possible resolution, the following should be addressed:
 How will be the possible EU Army financed?
 What will be the threshold for the troop contributions of individual EU member
states?
 Where should be the possible EU military headquarters (HQ) and military
bases located?
 What will be clear-cut definitions of the main decision-making body, and the
subsidiary bodies at the EU HQ?
 What kind of military tasks could the possible EU Army engage in?
 In geographical terms, where will be the possible EU Army fully operational?
 Should the institutions related to intelligence-gathering, and defence industries
be centralized?
115
Jan Techau. "The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe." Carnegie Europe.
September 2, 2015. http://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/08/31/politics-of-2-percent-nato-and-security-vacuum-ineurope/ifig.
116
Ibid.
117
International Institute for Strategic Studies. "Military Balance 2012 Press Statement." News release, March 7,
2012. IIS. http://www.iiss.org/en/about us/press room/press releases/press releases/archive/2012-ebe1/march1290/military-balance-2012-press-statement-b956.
Institute for Strategic Studies
43
 Should there be an inter-operability of the possible EU Army with NATO, or
should it be thoroughly autonomous from the Atlantic Alliance?
44
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50
AGENDA ITEM II: COMBATING MARITIME PIRACY IN THE GULF OF
GUINEA
International Maritime Piracy
In the contemporary world,
globalization
process
has
also
accelerated deepening of the global
economic integration between the
states located more than 3,000
kilometres apart118, and this global
merchandise trade is most of the time dominated by the sea trade operating through the
international routes and trade lanes. Consequently, there is a linear linkage between the
importance of high seas for trade-led economic prosperity and the growth in the world
economy- maritime transport activity. Yet, increased volume of international trade on the seas
has culminated in the rise of the vulnerability of international shipping in the forms of piracy
and armed robbery. According to ICC International Maritime Bureau, between the years of
2006 and 2010, piracy incidents drastically increased by 86.2 per cent worldwide while the
number of both attempted and actual attacks escalated from 239 in 2006 to 445 in 2010.
119
This rapid increase in the piracy activities especially in East Africa (off the coasts of Somalia,
Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean) has turned into an appalling issue since 2006. While the
counter-piracy efforts of the international community reduced the number of incidents which
take place in East Africa, the Gulf of Guinea is emerging as another hotspot for piracy
activities in consistency with the growing number of incidents located off the coast of Nigeria
118
Jean-Paul Rodrigue (2013). The Geography of Transport Systems. Department of Global Studies and
Geography. Hofstra University. New York. http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch5en/conc5en/ch5c2en.html.
119
ICC International Maritime Bureau (2013). Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report. 1
January-31 December 2012. January.
51
and other neighbouring countries, including Gabon, Togo, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, and
Benin.120
Maritime piracy is a maritime transport issue affecting terminals, ships, ports,
seafarers and cargo, and it can be attributed to substantial human costs since seafarers are the
ones to be affected by such piracy attacks. Most of the time, they are held hostage and subject
to torture; still, in some cases, they are killed by hostage-takers. From 2005 to 2012, 5,420
seafarers were held hostage, and 61 seafarers were killed due to piracy worldwide.
Concerning the Gulf of Guinea region, victims are subject to greater violence. 121
As a multifaceted transnational security challenge, along with the human costs, piracy
has broader repercussions on the global economy disrupting transportation, energy
production- oil and LNG-, and fisheries. Particularly, developing countries’ economies in the
affected regions immediately come under pressure by such disruptions. Furthermore, it poses
a threat to safety of navigation and delivery of humanitarian aid.
Up to this point, we introduced briefly the current situation pertaining to international
maritime piracy, but before moving to a deeper level of analysis of piracy focusing on the
Gulf of Guinea and providing further statistics, it is essential to clarify how international law
tackles with and defines ‘piracy and armed robbery’.
Piracy and Armed Robbery under International Law
As a growing concern, piracy was defined by the international community during the
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) between the years of 1973
120
ICC International Maritime Bureau, IMB Piracy Report highlights violence in West Africa, 15 July 2013,
https://icc-ccs.org/news/865-imb-piracy-report-highlights-violence-in-west-africa.
121
One Earth Future Foundation (OEF). (2013). The Human Cost of Maritime Piracy 2012. Working Paper.
Ocean Beyond Piracy Project.
52
to 1982. The concluding agreement, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)122 aims at defining the rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties to the
UNCLOS concerning the use of the world’s oceans and the establishment of guidelines for
businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources. The
Convention defines piracy under its Article 101 which states the following:
''Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property
in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a)
or (b).'' 123
Article 100 of UNCLOS requires all States to cooperate ‘to the fullest possible extent in
the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
State’.
124
In Article 105 of the Convention, it is stated that all contracting parties have
universal jurisdiction on the high seas to seize pirate ships and aircraft, and arrest the persons
and seize the property on board. 125
122
See also at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
United Nations. "Legal Framework for the Repression of Piracy Under UNCLOS." UN News Center.
September 09, 2009. http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_legal_framework.htm.
124
United Nations. “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” Article 100.
125
Ibid, article 105.
123
53
It should be also noted that the act of piracy is distinct from armed robbery against
ships, which may take place within the internal waters
126
and territorial sea
127
of a coastal
State. Armed robbery against ships is defined by the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), which is a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for setting the global
standards for the safety, security and environmental performance of international shipping.
Armed robbery against ships is defined in the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships as the following:
"Armed robbery against ships" means any of the following acts:
(a)
any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat
thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or
against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic
waters and territorial sea;
(b) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above."128
Statistics of Piracy in Different Regions
In compliance with the above-mentioned definitions of piracy and armed robbery,
between the years of 2003 and 2012, more than 3,000 acts of piracy had been reported
126
A nation's internal waters include waters on the landward side of the baseline of a nation's territorial waters,
except in archipelagic states.
127
Territorial waters or a territorial sea as defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
is a belt of coastal waters extending at most 12 nautical miles (22.2 km; 13.8 mi) from the baseline (usually the
mean low-water mark) of a coastal state. The territorial sea is regarded as the sovereign territory of the state,
although foreign ships (both military and civilian) are allowed innocent passage through it; this sovereignty also
extends to the airspace over and seabed below.
128
"Default Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships //." Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. Accessed
March 22, 2016. http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Default.aspx
54
worldwide.129 The number of actual attacks rose from 49 in 2008, and reached a peak at 249
in 2010, decreasing to 202 in 2012.130 The number of successful hijackings totalled 49 in 2008
before peaking at 53 in 2010, being lowered to 28 in 2012.
131
Furthermore, the number of
both actual and attempted attacks decreased from 445 in 2010 to 297 in 2012, indicating a
reduction in piracy levels in East African waters. Yet, the incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and
Asian waters soared drastically since 2010. When there were only 26 piracy attacks in East
Africa, 55 incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and 130 attacks in Asia were reported.132 In 2013,
43 incidents were reported in the Gulf of Guinea with seven hijackings and 123 crew
members being taken hostage. 133
In East African waters, piracy is concentrated off the coast of Somalia/ the Cape of
Good Hope lane/ the Mozambique Channel/ the Gulf of Aden in general. Yet, unlike the
incidents in other regions, pirates off the coast of Somalia apply a different strategy of moving
farther away from the coast and territorial waters into the Mozambique Channel, Maldives,
the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and the Indian territorial waters. As a result
of this, maritime piracy has expanded geographically, including the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Kenya, Madagascar, India, Mozambique, Dijibouti, Qatar, Oman, Seychelles, the United
Republic of Tanzania, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 134
"An Overvıew Of The Internatıonal Legal Framework And Of Multılateral Cooperatıon To Combat Pıracy."
3. Proceedings of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York and Geneva.
130
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report. Various
Issues.
131
Ibid.
132
ICC International Maritime Bureau (2013). Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. Annual Report. 1
January- 31 December 2012. January.
133
ICC International Maritime Bureau (2013). Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. Annual Report. 1
January- 30 September 2013.
134
"An Overview Of The International Legal Framework And Of Multilateral Cooperation To Combat Piracy."
8. Proceedings of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York and Geneva.
129
55
Recently, the Gulf of Guinea has emerged as another hotspot in terms of escalation of
piracy attacks with increased range of targeted ships and level of violence. In 2011, the
reported number of incidents was 44, and this number rose to 55 in seven countries in the
Gulf of Guinea region in 2012.
135
The annual statistics of the Gulf of Guinea demonstrates
that maritime piracy in the region is a growing trend as a way to generate income. The share
of the Gulf of Guinea in total number of incidents reported from Africa was 17.3 per cent in
2008.
In
percentage
2010,
was
this
about
13.5 per cent. Startlingly,
the rate of piracy attacks
turned out to be 37 per
cent in 2012 and 66.7 per
cent between January and
September
2013.136
Within this period, the
severity of incidents had transformed from low level armed robberies to hijackings,
kidnappings and cargo thefts.137 As a result of this, the Gulf of Guinea region is currently
designated as a war risk zone for shipping by the Lloyd’s Market Association (LMA) - the
London-based group insurers.138 As Angola, Ghana, Cameroon, Guinea and Nigeria are the
substantial oil exporters to the United States and the European Union member states, piracy in
135
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. Various Issues.
Ibid.
137
ICC International Maritime Bureau, IMB Piracy Report highlights violence in West Africa, 15 July 2013,
http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/865-imb-piracy-report-highlights-violence-in-west-africa.
138
One Earth Future Foundation (OEF) (2012) The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy 2011. Working Paper.
Ocean Beyond Piracy Project.
136
56
the region leads to the concerns related to trade-led development and regional security, along
with global energy trade and supply. 139
International Cooperation and Response
The United Nations Security Council has adopted several resolutions related to
counter-piracy action in East African waters since 2008.140 In addition, the regional security
organizations, such as the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the League of Arab
States, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are actively engaged in fight against
piracy off the coast of Somalia.141 More than 40 countries are currently involved in counterpiracy operations in East Africa through using their own national capacities or joint forces
(the Standing Naval Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization- NATO Operation
Shield; Combined Task Force 151; and the European Union Naval Force Somalia- Operation
Atalanta).142 As a result of this collective effort, the share of piracy incidents of East Africa in
the total number of international piracy activities has decreased from nearly 50 per cent in
2008 to about one third in 201 and 17.3 per cent in 2012. Nevertheless, maritime piracy in
East African waters remains as a grave concern since the fear is that pirates off the coast of
Somalia might not have totally given up on piracy, but may be changing their strategy
towards ships at anchorage.
139
Stephanie Hanson (2011). As piracy in West Africa increases, risks on land grow. The National. 17
November. http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/as-piracy-in-west-africa-increases-riskson-land-grow.
140
See also at http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_documents.htm
141
World Bank (2013). The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation. http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/11/02/090224b08318971a/2_0/Rendere
d/PDF/The0pirates0of00rebuilding0a0nation.pdf
142
One Earth Future Foundation (OEF) (2012). The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy 2011. Working Paper.
Ocean beyond Piracy Project.
57
The EU NAVFOR Somalia: Operation ATALANTA
As a response to intensive Somalibased piracy activities and armed robbery at
sea located in the Horn of Africa and in the
Western Indian Ocean, the European Union
embarked upon a counter-piracy mission with
the EU naval force for the first time in its
history in
December
framework
of
the
2008
European
within
the
Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and in
compliance with the UNCLOS and the UN Security Council Resolutions143 pertaining to
piracy off the coast of Somalia. Under the guidance of EU Council Joint Action 851,
Operation ATALANTA has been launched in order to realize the following mandates:
“Protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP), African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other vulnerable shipping; deterrence and
disruption of piracy and armed robbery at sea; monitoring fishing activities off
the coast of Somalia; supporting other EU missions and international
organisations working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the
region.”144
According to the European Union External Action Service (EEAS), at the height of
Somali piracy in January 2011, 32 ships and 736 hostages were being held by pirates, and this
number had decreased to 30 hostages and no ships being held by December 2014.145 Up to
143
See the related UNSC Resolutions at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/piracy/piracy_documents.htm.
European Union External Action. "Missions | Eunavfor." Eunavfor Missions. http://eunavfor.eu/mission/.
145
Ibid.
144
58
now, 149 suspected pirates have been arrested, and in 2013, 4 pirate groups were prevented
from taking potential pirate action on merchant shipping and vulnerable vessels in the area. 146
Moreover, EEAS states that since the launch of the Operation ATALANTA in 2008, EU
NAVFOR has succeeded 100 per cent in providing protection to WFP vessels delivering food
/aid to the Somali people and the AMISOM shipments, deterring and preventing acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, transfer of suspected pirates to competent
authorities with a view to their prosecution and conviction due to its close co-operation with
regional governments, such as the Republic of the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Kenya.147
Since the Council of the EU extended the Operation ATALANTA on 21 November
2014 until December 2016, EU NAVFOR still operates in the areas, including the Southern
Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean, covering the Seychelles, Mauritius, and
Comoros.148
Economic Costs and Trade-related Implications of International Maritime Piracy
Although there are assessments prepared by different institutions on the global cost of
piracy, the estimations and conclusions vary from institution to institution since most of the
studies focus on the cost of ransoms, security deterrence equipment and naval forces
deployment. However, the effects on foreign investment in the affected regions, or the effects
on commodity prices also must be taken into account.
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and RAND Corporation (Research and
Development) estimate piracy costs to range between US$1 and US$16 billion annually.149 In
146
European Union External Action. "European External Action Service." European Union.
http://eeas.europa.eu/piracy/containing_piracy_en.htm.
147
European Union External Action. "Missions | Eunavfor." Eunavfor Missions. http://eunavfor.eu/mission/.
148
Ibid.
149
Chalk, Peter (2008). The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy and Challenges
for the United States. The RAND Institute. See also The Maritime Security Market 2010-2020: Piracy, Shipping
and Seaports. April 2010.
59
addition, the One Earth Future (OEF) Foundation conducted three assessment reports, which
were published in 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively.150 According to the OEF, the total cost
of piracy off the coast of Somalia was US$7- US$12 billion in 2010; US$6.6- US$6.9 billion
in 2011and US$5.7- US$6.1 billion in 2012. Over 80 per cent of these costs were estimated to
be endured by the shipping industry, and 20 per cent were estimated to be borne by
governments.151 The cost per piracy attack was valued at US$82.7 million in 2012- a total of
189 per cent augmentation over the US$28.6 million estimated for 2011.152 This demonstrates
that despite the fact that the incidence of piracy dropped by 70 per cent between 2011 and
2012, there was a much smaller reduction in the cost (8.2 per cent) of combating piracy
during the same period.
In 2013, the World Bank calculated that the global economic cost of piracy off the
coast of Somalia at US$18 billion, with a margin of error of US$6 billion.153 Yet, these
figures do not take into account for losses to fisheries and tourism. The report acknowledges
that concerning the order of magnitude, the calculation is in line with other assessments; yet,
those assessments adopt a different methodology, such as the 2012 OEF assessment.
According to a preliminary assessment by the OEF (published in 2013), the cost of piracy in
the Gulf of Guinea region is estimated to range between US$740 million and US$950 million
in 2012. 154
150
One Earth Future Foundation (OEF) (2011). The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy 2010. Working Paper.
Ocean Beyond Piracy Project; One Earth Future Foundation (OEF) (2012). The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy
2011. Working Paper. Ocean Beyond Piracy Project; One Earth Future Foundation (OEF) (2013). The Economic
Cost of Somali Piracy 2012. Working Paper. Ocean Beyond Piracy Project.
151
Ibid.
152
Ibid.
153
The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/pirates-of-somalia-main-report-web.pdf.
154
One Earth Future Foundation (OEF) (2013). The Human Cost of Maritime Piracy 2012. Working Paper.
Ocean Beyond Piracy Project. The relevant cost headings include insurance (49 per cent), private armed guards
(19 per cent), military expenditure (15 per cent), labour (8 per cent), stolen property ( 8 per cent) and capacitybuilding (less than 1 per cent).
60
Global and Regional Trade
Maritime transport has a strategic economic importance and is vital for global trade,
along with being a mere revenue-generator. Ports can be considered as gateways for providing
access to international markets for the exports of all countries. Yet, maritime piracy obstructs
maritime transport operations and the movement of international freight. In this century on
which interdependency process has accelerated among states through economic relations,
disruption of maritime piracy is directly putting burden on the shoulders of developing
countries in Africa.
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden, especially, hinders the international trade flow in the AsiaEurope trade corridor and the Suez Canal, which is one of the main international maritime
passages under the sovereignty of Egypt. In 2012, over 40 per cent of world’s containerized
trade was being carried out through the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal which can be
61
regarded as the first choice for traders engaged in the East-West trade.155 Approximately, 7
per cent of maritime transport passes through the Suez Canal, witnessing the passage of 1,700
to 2,000 ships every month or some 60 ships per day.156 In 2012, 17,225 ships passed through
the Suez Canal in both directions, with container ships being the largest user.
157
In 2005, 36
per cent of ships transited through the Canal were containerships, 20.5 per cent were bulkers
and 19.6 per cent were tankers.158 In 2012, these shares turned out to be 36.8 per cent, 17 per
cent and 25 per cent. 159
The cost of trade is directly affected by piracy attacks as cargo ships are intercepted
and prevented from delivering the goods to the planned destinations. Moreover, shipping
companies are forced to alter trading routes when ships pass through volatile regions. As a
result of this, applied insurance premiums increase and clients are lost to ports.
As mentioned earlier, the World Bank estimated that piracy incidents off the coast of
Somalia culminated in the 1 per cent rise in trade costs, which can be considered as a hidden
tax on world trade;160 the total cost of piracy to global trade is evaluated at about US$18
billion in which US$1 trillion of international trade passing through.161 Solely, trade costs in
Somalia are estimated at US$6 million per year.
162
Some estimates demonstrate that piracy
incidents in East African waters may cause a welfare loss of between US$0.9 and US$3.6
155
See UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2013, Geneva.
Aly Elmaghawry. “Overview of Somali piracy impacts on maritime industry and international response.
Maritime Safety programs”. AASTMT, Alexandria. October 2009.
157
The Suez Canal authority. “Traffic Statistics. Yearly Number and Net Ton by Ship Type, Direction and Ship
Status”. 2012. http://www. suezcanal.gov.eg.
158
Ibid.
159
Ibid.
160
World Bank. “The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation”. 2013.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/pirates-of-somalia-main-report-web.pdf.
161
The relevant assessment combines comprehensive data on worldwide trade flows for 2000-2010 with a novel
dataset of shipping distances between pairs of countries to examine econometrically the impact of Somali piracy
on trade flows.
162
Ibid.
156
62
billion.163 This means that the estimated amount of welfare loss leads to the fact that labour
and resources are moved away from productive tasks towards security and protection tasks
(expenditure on security measures).164 In addition, the value of the loss is transferred from
exporters and importers to pirates.
Other assessments indicate that along with the direct costs for industry and
government of piracy off the coast of Somalia, there is a revenue loss pertaining to lower
traffic volume passing through the Suez Canal and a negative effect on tourism, which were
estimated to at 1.25 billion in 2010.165 In the case of the Suez Canal, some vessels decide to
bypass it and reroute around the
Cape of Good Hope, and as a
result of this, less revenue is
collected by Egypt at the end of
the day. The revenue from the
Suez Canal accounted for 3.2 per
cent of Egypt’s GDP in 2008country’s third largest source of
foreign currency.166 Rerouting from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope would
culminate in around US$30 billion welfare loss to the international economy. 167
To illustrate the economic effects of piracy on regional trade, according to the Kenyan
Shippers Council, it is estimated that piracy attacks lead to increases in the monthly cost of
Timothy Besley. “Thiemo Fetzern and Hannes Mueller. The Welfare Cost of Lawlessness: Evidence from
Somali Piracy”. 27 July 2012.
164
Ibid.
165
One Earth Future Foundation (OEF) (2011). The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy 2010. Working Paper.
Ocean Beyond Piracy Project.
166
One Earth Future Foundation (OEF). The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy 2010. Working Paper. Ocean
Beyond Piracy Project, 2011.
167
Fu, Xiaowen, Adolf Ng and Yui-Yip Lau. “The impact of maritime piracy on global economic development:
the case of Somalia”. Maritime Policy and Management. 2010. Vol. 37 No. 7, pp. 1-21.
163
63
exports and imports by US$9.8 million and US$23.8 million respectively.168 In 2010, the
trade cost on Kenya was calculated at US$414 million, and the cost on Yemen’s trade was
estimated at US$150 million. In another study, it was revealed that Nigeria had lost its export
earnings (about US$600 million) due to piracy threats to the fisheries in 2008.169
As the geographical scope of piracy incidents began to expand into the Indian Ocean,
some Indian industries are currently under the direct threat of piracy. Every year, India trades
US$110 billion worth of goods through the Gulf of Aden, and it imports 75 per cent of its oil
supply from the Middle East.170 Both exports and imports of India bring additional costs
stemming from the increased war risk insurance and longer transit times.171
Until now, as a synopsis, it is depicted how international maritime piracy affects the
international economy by disrupting the international trade through the incidents on main
trade routes, and how international community reacts and aims at lowering the number of
piracy attacks worldwide with a special emphasis on the European Union’s military effort in
Somalia. From now onward, the focus will be on ‘implications of the maritime piracy in the
Gulf of Guinea’ and the efforts put by the regional organizations and the European Union so
far.
Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
The Gulf of Guinea is host to numerous natural harbours with its 5,000 nautical mile
(nmi) coastline, and also rich in fish, hydrocarbons, and other resources. These features pave
the way for shipping, resource extraction, maritime commerce, and development. On these
fertile grounds, shipping traffic in West African ports has increased by 14 per cent annually
168
One Earth Future (OEF) (2012). The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy. Working Paper 2011. Ocean
Beyond Piracy Project.
169
Ibid.
170
One Earth Future (OEF). The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy. Working Paper 2011. Ocean Beyond Piracy
Project, 2011.
171
Ibid.
64
since 1995, the fastest of any region in Sub-Saharan Africa.172 Stretching from Angola to
Cape Verde, the Gulf of Guinea is the main transit hub, which heavily contributes in the
region’s rapid economic growth, averaging 7 per cent since 2012. Moreover, the region has
become a hub for energy supplies- mainly petroleum which is consumed in North America,
Europe, and Asia and transits
this trade route.173 The Gulf
of Guinea is currently the
source of 5.4 million barrels
of oil per day (bbl/d), which
equates to more than over
half of US crude oil imports
in 2008 (9.8 mbbl/d) and the
total amount imported by the 27 member states of the European Union in 2008 (4.9
mbbl/d).174 In 2011, the total oil supply of the region was equal to 40 per cent of all 27
member states of the EU and 29 per cent of total US petroleum consumption. Angola and
Nigeria are the two countries of the region that possess most of the oil supplies of the Gulf of
Guinea together- 34 per cent and 47 per cent respectively.175 With new discoveries of
minerals in the countries, such as Togo, Ghana, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire, the Congo, Cameroon,
and Benin, the geostrategic importance of the region has increased as well as the investments
made by oil companies.
“Beyond the Bottlenecks: Ports in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Ocean Shipping Consultants, Ltd. for the Africa
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic project , June 2008, 1.
173
Adjoa Anyimadu. Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons Learned from the Indian Ocean. Africa
2013/02 London: Chatham House, July 2013
174
Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, 1. Report. London: Chatham House, 2012.
175
Ibid, page 1.
172
65
In Nigeria, oil production is estimated to have decreased by 20 per cent, costing the
Nigerian economy US$202 million between the years of 2006 and 2008. 176 According to the
same research, illegal trading of oil cargo led to revenue losses. It is estimated that 10 per cent
of Nigeria’s daily oil output which is worth US$1.5 million has been stolen.177 The total value
of stolen or wasted oil in Nigeria has been between US$300 and US$400 billion in the last 50
years. 178 Incurred revenue losses mean that fewer resources can be made readily available for
social and economic development programs which are crucial for the local population, in
which people live below the poverty line.179
Piracy rate in the Gulf of Guinea accounted for 30 per cent of incidents that had taken
place in African waters between 2003 and 2011180, and this rate surpassed the Gulf of Aden as
the region with the highest number of piracy attacks in the world.181 On the one hand, this is
partly stemming from the fact that the counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia were
fruitful (EU NAVFOR Atalanta) which have reduced the number of piracy incidents east of
Suez. On the other hand, instances of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are on the rise: in 2011, 53
cases were recorded, which is higher when it is compared to 39 attacks in 2010.182
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea differs from piracy incidents in East African waters in the
sense that attacks in the Gulf of Guinea are generally linked to oil production and usually take
place in territorial waters, while ships are anchored or berthed. Apparently, the purpose of the
attacks is not to hijack ships and hold hostages, but to capture oil tankers and resell the cargo.
176
One Earth Future (OEF) (2011). The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2010. Working Paper. Ocean Beyond
Piracy Project. See also Nincic, Donna (2009). Maritime piracy in Africa: The humanitarian dimension. African
Security Review 18.3.
177
Ibid.
178
Ibid.
179
Stephanie Hanson. As piracy in West Africa increases, risks on land grow. 17 November 2011.
180
Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea. 1. Report. London: Chatham House, 2012.
181
Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo. “Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.” Africa Security Brief. No. 30.
February 2015.
182
Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea. 1. Report. London: Chatham House, 2012.
66
Why is the Gulf of Guinea important?
(a) Investment: Oil companies both from the West and the East have made huge
investments for both onshore and offshore drilling, and since the region has the fastest
rate of new oil reserves in the world, it also attracts new investments for further
exploration.183
(b) Rich fishing and other marine resources: Fishing is a vital resource for many countries
affected by piracy. Africa’s fishing industry generates around US$10 billion every
year through international trade, global exports and fishing licenses issued to foreign
183
Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea. 8. Report. London: Chatham House, 2012.
67
operators.184 In the West Africa, according to the Gulf of Guinea Regional Fishing
Commission, there is an annual potential for fishing up to 1 million tons of sea fish
and 800,000 tons of inland fisheries.185 Yet, in the Gulf of Guinea, many of fishing
trawlers are fishing illegally due to inadequate security checks.
(c) A major source of hydrocarbon resources: The Gulf of Guinea produces about 5.4
million barrels of crude oil per day. The United States meets 15 per cent of its oil
supplies from this region. In addition, Japan, China, and the European states, such as
France, are dependent on the oil and gas supplies of the Gulf of Guinea.186
(d) Geographical location: The region is ostensibly a vital maritime route for commercial
shipping from America and Europe to Africa. The region’s physical proximity to both
Europe and North America renders the Gulf of Guinea indispensable for the global
supply of energy.
CAUSES OF PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
Economic Poverty and Politics of Exclusion
In the Gulf of Guinea region, people live under a chronic insecurity. Underdeveloped
economies of the West African states have led to the fact that communities relied totally on
subsistence agriculture, aiming at survival rather than growth. Regretfully, the countries, such
as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Niger, have some of the lowest access to electricity rates in the
world.187 The states are unable to provide the basic needs, which are designated by the United
Nations as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and services, like sanitation and
184
One Earth Future (OEF) (2011). The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy 2010. Working Paper. Ocean
Beyond Piracy Project.
185
Ibid.
186
Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea. 8. Report. London: Chatham House, 2012.
187
Onyej Bazilian et al., “Oil, Energy Poverty and Resource Dependence in West Africa,” Journal of Energy and
Natural Resources Law 31, No. 1 (2013): 33–53,
available at http://erg.berkeley.edu/publications/Recent_Publications/Faculty/Dan_Kammen/journalofenergy.pdf
68
healthcare, and public services are not universal yet. Lack of education culminated in
prevalent illiteracy, unskilled labour force, and lack of employment opportunities. As a
consequence, the youth populations are left unemployed, providing a fertile ground for
insurgent groups and criminal networks. This is one of the contributing factors for the
increasing piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea region. Also, the economic inequality is
exacerbated by the divisions between the ethnicities and local tribes, excluding groups and
women from decision-making and employment opportunities.
Poor Governance and Corruption
As mentioned previously, social services are not provided for people in a proper way
which is stemming from the fact that there is poor governance and highly centralized national
administrations which are not held accountable to their own citizens.188 As a result of this,
populations resort to violence to change things. As corrupted governments are inadequate in
enforcing law and allocate few resources to combat piracy, crime rates increase around the
areas with insufficient security and abundant targets, threatening the stability of the
neighbouring countries.189 In Nigeria, corruption exists from top to bottom, and at the highest
levels of government, it is impelled by the fact that the revenue gained from oil consists of
approximately 80 per cent of Nigeria’s state revenue.190 Billions of dollars generated by oil
supplies vanish from the Niger Delta states governors’ offices. Since there is no money
provided for development, the local people of the Delta turn to piracy in order to earn a
living.191
188
Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea: Assessing the Threats, Preparing the Response. 3. Meeting Report. January
2014. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_gulf_of_guinea.pdf.
189
Riggs. “Piracy in the Horn of Africa”. 10-11.
190
Tepp, Eero. "The Gulf of Guinea: Military and Non-Military Ways of Combatting Piracy." Baltic Security
and Defence 14, no. 1 (2012): 181-204.
191
Ibid.
69
Should we make a transition to lower levels, port officials, local politicians, members
of the military, and police officers are liable for piracy incidents. Military members and
security guards, who are in charge of protecting vessels and oil terminals, disappear just
before a pirate attack, and police officers are bribed so that they do not enforce the laws.
Moreover, port officials accept the stolen goods as part of their profits to close an eye to
criminal networks.192
High Profitability of Piracy
In economically depressed regions, such as the Niger Delta, piracy turns into a
lucrative business.193 When there is a high level of unemployment, piracy is perceived as a
career option, especially in communities in which pirates are seen as the sole source of wealth
and role models to youngsters194 who prefer earning money easily and becoming rich without
hard work and patience.195
In the case of hijacked vessels, anything that is found valuable is plundered and carried
off easily. Well-organized pirates may steal the whole cargo and sell it in the international
markets. Furthermore, some ships vanish altogether, like in 2004 on which two oil tankers
carrying 30,000 barrels of oil disappeared although they were under the liability of the
Nigerian Navy.
196
One ship was detected near Port Harcourt and assumed that it was used to
smuggle oil from pipelines- a method called ‘oil bunkering’.197
192
Ibid.
Dunn. “Oil Pirates of the Niger Delta.” 39.
194
Ibid.
195
Ibid, 32.
196
Tepp, Eero. "The Gulf of Guinea: Military and Non-Military Ways of Combatting Piracy." Baltic Security
and Defence 14, no. 1 (2012): 181-204.
197
Dunn. “Oil Pirates of the Niger Delta.” 39.
193
70
The Weakness of the Legal Definition of Piracy under International Law
As mentioned before, Article 101 of the 1982 UNCLOS is the international definition
of piracy accepted by the international community under the umbrella of the United Nations.
Yet, the definition has a jurisdictional loophole in which the act of piracy is restricted to than
an act that can solely take place upon the high seas. With this restriction, pirates are only
bound by international law upon the high seas, and when they act within the territorial waters
of the coastal states, international law cannot be enforced by international authorities, and
they are left to apprehension by local law enforcement. Under the corrupted regimes and poor
governance, most of the time, pirates find a chance to flee from security guards.
There is another convention that can be applied to piracy, which is called the UN 1992
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.
The Convention states that ‘the ratified states either prosecute or extradite suspects’.198
Nonetheless, the drawback is that the Convention can only be invoked when violence is
sufficient to disrupt maritime safety, which is left to national authorities’ apprehension once
again. The Convention is not enforced consistently.
Conflict and Disorder
Piracy usually surfaces when there is conflict and disorder stemming from the fact that
the region has either a weak or non-existent governing authority. As a result, anarchy prevails
and provides a fertile ground for criminal activities and piracy. For instance, Somalia’s central
government collapsed as a result of the civil war of the 1990s, and coastal areas of Somalia
left without rule and law. This all of a sudden paved the way for the rise of piracy in the Gulf
198
See the 1992 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
also at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/conventions/Conv8.pdf.
71
of Aden. In a similar way, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is the outcome of the ongoing
insurgency in the Niger Delta.199 In 1966, the ethnic Ijaws involved in an armed revolt,
declaring independence in the resource-rich Niger Delta region, Biafra. The revolt was
suppressed at that time, but the clashes between the Nigerian government and the militants did
not end since then. 200
MEND is currently the largest and most powerful militant faction, and it is alleged that
it has been fighting against state neglect, oil profiteering, and also economic degradation. The
militant group has been carrying out a campaign against the Nigerian government. All
facilities of the government, including the personnel, aircraft, vessels, and infrastructure are
subject to the attack of MEND, which works in favour of the pirates using insurgency by
MEND as a cover to their piracy attacks.201
Subregional and Continental Response
At the initiative of President of Benin, Thomas Yayi Boni, and international partners
including the United States, France, and the United Nations Security Council, beginning from
2012, Benin engaged in a regional strategy that would culminate in the March 2013
ministerial conference on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The conference was held in
Cotonou and organized in partnership with the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of
West African States in order to respond to Security Council Resolution 2039 202, which was
Nwanna. “Piracy and Maritime Security in West Africa.”
Stephanie Hanson, “MEND: The Niger Delta’s Umbrella Militant Group Backgrounder”. 2007.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12920/.
201
Ibid.
202
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2039 (2012) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off
the coast of the States of the Gulf of Guinea], 24 May 2012, S/RES/2039(2012), available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4fbe210f2.html [accessed 18 March 2016]
199
200
72
adopted in February 2012.203 As the next step of building a collective response, 25 countries
from the Gulf of Guinea region came together in Yaoundé, Cameroon in June 2013 in order to
formalize the adoption of an integrated response to a comprehensive security challenge in the
region.204
At the meeting, the heads of government from ECCAS and ECOWAS reached an
agreement upon establishing a Maritime Inter-Regional Coordination Centre (MICC).
Moreover, the non-binding Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed
Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa was adopted
in order to promote collective efforts information sharing, interdiction, prosecution, and
support to victims.205
The Yaoundé Declaration urges its signatories to work for the
promotion of peace, security, and stability in the West and Central African maritime are
through the mobilization of adequate operational resources. It also calls for GGC, ECCAS,
and ECOWAS to promote activities with the purpose of cooperating and coordinating, and
203
United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa
(UNOCA), “UN Supports the Development of a
Regional Strategy Against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Cotonou,” March 19, 2013, available at
http://unowa.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JtbNwziEUQM%3D&tabid=765&mid=1796 .
204
Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea: Assessing the Threats, Preparing the Response. 5. Meeting Report. January
2014. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_gulf_of_guinea.pdf.
205
Ibid, 4.
73
interoperability of resources among the members. The participant states of the Yaoundé
meeting signed also Memorandum of Understanding among ECCAS, ECOWAS, and the GGC
on Maritime Safety and Security in Central and West Africa. This memorandum aimed at
facilitating “the coordination and implementation of joint activities; sharing of experiences
and the exchange of information on suspicious movements and activities at sea; the
establishment of an inter-regional coordination centre for the implementation of the regional
strategy for maritime safety; the harmonization of control procedures to reinforce the fight
against crimes at sea; and the harmonization of laws on piracy and other illegal activities.”206
At the subregional level, ECCAS countries adopted a maritime safety and security
strategy in 2008, aiming at ensuring security by protecting fisheries, offshore oil resources,
and sea routes.207 Central African states of the Gulf of Guinea are organized into zones in
order to bolster cooperation, and launched joint patrols. ECOWAS and ECCAS have adopted
policies and launched specific actions, including for ECOWAS a comprehensive Conflict
Prevention Framework in 2008 in order to address inter alia cross border and maritime
security issues, a Counter Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan, and a landmark Praia
Plan to address the drugs problem.208 ECOWAS developed an ECOWAS Integrated Maritime
Strategy (EIMS). “The objectives of a fully developed EIMS were to:
1) Raise awareness and knowledge of the threats to the maritime domain;
2) Provide a common regional framework for regulating maritime activities in West
Africa;
3) Devise strategies for preventing and combating threats to the domain;
206
Ibid, 7.
Commander Michael L. Baker, “Toward an African Maritime Economy: Empowering the African Union to
Revolutionize the African Maritime Sector,” Naval
War College Review 64, No. 2 (Spring 2011): 39–62, available at
www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/b49b0b07-c0a4-41e1-964d-dc37cf03e0b0/Toward-an-African-MaritimeEconomy--Empowering-the .
208
Council Of The European Union. Foreign Affairs Council Meeting. "EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea."
Press release, Brussels, 2014.
207
74
4) Mobilise resources for the prevention and combating of maritime challenges;
5) Coordinate and strengthen practical cooperation on maritime issues at a national,
bilateral and multilateral levels;
6) Enhance the capacity of ECOWAS Member States to effectively deal with the threat
of piracy and other violent acts; and
7) Identify and establish institutional mechanisms for the monitoring and enforcement of
common standards for the use of the maritime domain and for preventing and
combating threats.” 209
There are eight member states of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) which
belong to both ECOWAS and ECCAS, and the GGC contains the entire region with a
membership open to all the relevant countries.210 GGC members has also been developing
a region-wide strategy that will fortify cooperation between ECOWAS and ECCAS with
the establishment of an Interregional Centre for the Coordination of Maritime Security in
the Gulf of Guinea, focusing on the hot spots, such as Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and
Cameroon.
At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has developed the 2050
Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIM Strategy), building on prior national and international
frameworks regulating maritime initiatives in Africa. “The AIM Strategy aims to:
1) Foster increased wealth creation from Africa’s inland waters, seas, and oceans by
developing a sustainable economy;
209
Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Institute for Security Studies (ISS).
“ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) Activity”. 2014.
210
The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) was founded in 1999, and it comprises Angola, Cameroon, DRC,
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and Sào Tomé and Principe.
75
2) Ensure maritime safety and security and the protection of the marine
environment.” 211
This strategy was adopted at the Second Conference of African Ministers Responsible
for Maritime-related Affairs, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in December 2012.212
International Community’s Response
The United Nations has been actively a part of combating against piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea. Upon the President Yayi Boni’s call to halt the piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea,
the Security Council adopted Resolution No. 2018 in October 2011, condemning all acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea committed off the coast of Gulf of Guinea states, and calling
on regional organizations and
the countries concerned to work
toward
a
comprehensive
strategy
to
facilitate
prosecution
of
the
alleged
perpetrators of piracy acts.213 In
order
to
complement
the
Security Council’s initiative,
the UN Secretary-General sent a multidisciplinary mission to the Gulf of Guinea in November
2011, with the objectives “to assess the scope of the piracy threat in the Gulf of Guinea and to
make recommendations on possible measures the United Nations and the international
community as a whole could implement to respond in an effective manner to the dangers
African Union, “2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy,” available at
http://pages.au.int/sites/default/files/2050%20AIM%20Strategy%20(Eng)_0.pdf .
212
Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea: Assessing the Threats, Preparing the Response. 6. Meeting Report. January
2014. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_gulf_of_guinea.pdf.
213
United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2018 (October 31, 2011), UN Doc. S/RES/2018, available at
www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2018(2011) .
211
76
posed by that threat.”214 The report of this multidisciplinary mission was presented to the
Security Council, and in compliance with the report, Resolution No. 2039, urging Gulf of
Guinea states, with the support of the international community, to develop and implement
national maritime security strategies with a particular focus on the prevention and repression
of piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as the prosecution and punishment of those
convicted of such crimes.215 Furthermore, the United Nations supported the Yaoundé summit
of June 2013. The United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and the United Nations
Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) assisted in developing a common agenda for the
summit.216
EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea
The European Union and the countries of the Gulf of Guinea region have major
developmental, economic, commercial and security interests in common. The Gulf of Guinea
is rich in resource both for consumption and local employment, and for trade with Europe.
Maritime trade to and from the Gulf of Guinea is to a great extent realized by the EU. There is
an average of 30 EU flagged vessels at any one time in the Gulf of Guinea.217 As mentioned
before, the sustainability of all maritime resources, including fisheries, is a key concern for
the local population as well as European customers.
Another concern for the European Union is the energy security of the European
continent which is dependent on Africa to some extent. As a consequence, the EU is
United Nations Security Council, “Letter Dated January 18, 2012 from the Secretary-General Addressed to
the President of the Security Council, Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea (7 to 24 November 2011)” (January 19, 2012), UN Doc. S/2012/45, available at
www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/AUUN%20S%202012%2045.pdf
215
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2039 (February 29, 2012), UN Doc. S/RES/2039, available at
www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2039(2012) .
216
Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea: Assessing the Threats, Preparing the Response. 6. Meeting Report. January
2014. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_gulf_of_guinea.pdf.
217
Council Of The European Union. Foreign Affairs Council Meeting. "EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea."
Press release, Brussels, 2014.
214
77
committed to supporting the sustainable exploitation of natural resources in the Gulf of
Guinea, including hydrocarbons. Concerning oil and LNG, Europe meets half of its energy
needs, of which nearly 10 per cent of its oil and 4 per cent of its natural gas from the Gulf of
Guinea.218 Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Nigeria, and Gabon are substantial crude oil suppliers,
and Nigeria of LNG-natural gas. On the other hand, the physical proximity of the Gulf of
Guinea to Europe gives an advantage over the Middle East for the oil needs, and Europe
maintains its place as the primary export market for other regional products, including
forestry, agricultural and mineral resources.219 All these reasons pave the way for growing
mutual interest in a partnership between the Gulf of Guinea countries and the European Union
in order to promote growth and jobs by ensuring security and stability. Hence, the EU is
willing to build on the regional momentum that was created at the Yaoundé Summit of June
2013 and to support the regional organisations (ECCAS, ECOWAS, and GGC) and individual
states to help them tackle the challenges and implement them in a coordinated manner, in
compliance with the Code of Conduct. With this goal in mind, the European Union has
undertaken the following commitments:
1) The European Union is addressing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing through
the implementation of the IUU Regulation and through EU Fishery Partnership
Agreements with many of the coastal countries of West and Central Africa. These help
to regulate fishing, including by EU vessels, and support development and improved
governance in the fishing sector;
2) The EU continues to support the socio-economic development of the Gulf of Guinea
countries, through their bilateral and regional cooperation. The support provided is
consistent with the national development policies of the beneficiary countries and
218
Ibid.
Examples include iron ore (Nigeria, Gabon and Cameroon), diamonds (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone),
manganese (Gabon), bauxite (Guinea), cobalt and timber (Cameroon) and cocoa (Ghana, Ivory Coast).
219
78
integrates the regional dimension. The support includes at the same time state building
and reinforcement, economic growth and poverty reduction in all its aspects;
3) The EU ‘Critical Maritime Routes’ programme (CRIMGO) was launched in 2013,
and has a four-year duration with a budget of €4.5 million and is now further
expanded to complement and reinforce regional and international initiatives in
support of the wider Yaoundé process and the Intra-Regional Coordination Centre.
The project aims to counter piracy and supports a number of countries: Benin,
Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, Sao Tomé and Principe, Togo. Its
main components are: “(a) setting-up a regional maritime security and safety
training function, (b) starting a regional maritime information-sharing function, (c)
improving coast guard work (maritime law enforcement), and (d) developing a
joint operational coordination capacity through common exercises or pilot
operations.”220
Bearing in mind the above-mentioned concerns and efforts made by the EU, Foreign
Affairs Council adopted a ‘EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea’221 at its meeting on 17 March
2014 with four objectives: (a) building a common understanding of the scale of the threat in
the Gulf of Guinea and the need to address it among the countries in the region and the
international community; (b) helping regional governments put in place the institutions and
capabilities to ensure security and the rule of law; (c) supporting the development of
prosperous economies in the coastal countries, enabling them to provide basic services,
employment opportunities and poverty reduction for their citizens; (d) strengthening
cooperation structures between the countries of the region to ensure effective action across
borders at sea and on land. Finally, in order to realize the four objectives of the above-
220
Council Of The European Union. Foreign Affairs Council Meeting. "EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea."
Press release, Brussels, 2014.
221
See also at http://eeas.europa.eu/gulf_guinea/docs/strategy_en.pdf.
79
mentioned EU Strategy, the Council of the European Union adopted ‘the Gulf of Guinea
Action Plan 2015-2020’222 as annexation to the EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea. The
Action Plan lies out explicitly the types of actions that will be carried out between the years of
2015 and 2020.
The Way Forward
Conclusion
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has a different nature when it is compared with piracy in
Somalia as the root causes of piracy in West Africa reflect the complexity of the matter. In the
Gulf of Guinea, the causes are intertwined and necessitate a cross-sectoral approach. The
Yaoundé Summit of 2013 is unprecedented in the sense that for the first time, at the regional
level, individual states and regional organisations agreed to cooperate, share information, and
develop regional maritime security in its widest sense. In combating piracy, the European
Union should seek closer partnership with the countries of the region and coordination with
both regional and international organisations which are: UN Offices for Central and for West
Africa and on Drugs and Crime (UNOCA, UNOWA, and UNODC), the African Union (AU),
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), INTERPOL, ECCAS, ECOWAS, GGC, and
Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa (MOWCA). Since there are several causes
that are linked one another, such as widespread corruption in governmental posts, economic
poverty, conflict and disorder, the European Union has a great responsibility in undertaking
an integrated approach concerning different fields: promotion of justice and human rights, the
rule of law, fighting corruption, providing legal and security frameworks, and so on.
Concerning the legal weakness of the definition of piracy, the EU should refer the situation to
222
See also at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/16-council-conclusions-gulfguinea-action-plan-2015-2020/.
80
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in order to eliminate the legal drawback.
Furthermore, economic governance is another concern that can reduce the piracy incidents.
The EU should support the states in the region to foster societal participation in the
exploitation of natural resources, including oil and fisheries.
POINTS TO BE ADDRESSED IN A RESOLUTION
In the possible resolution, the following should be addressed:
 Would naval force operations in the Gulf of Guinea be sufficient to eradicate piracy
incidents as in the case of Somali piracy (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA)?
 Although the European Union decided to carry out a multi-dimensional approach
towards combating piracy in compliance with the Gulf of Guinea Action Plan 20152020 in order to provide operability to EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, the Action
Plan is still focused more on hard security concerns through joint naval operations,
and train and equip programs. Should the EU enhance the effectiveness of the Plan
through a comprehensive economic development framework for the region?
 Should the EU get involved in the Gulf of Guinea region by a boots-on-the-ground
policy in the case that the EU Strategy fails?
 The Gulf of Guinea region is currently funded by the EU under the 11th European
Development Fund (EDF) to provide humanitarian aid, to promote human rights and
democratic political environment. Should the programme also cover the areas of
maritime security capacity, human trafficking, and money laundering?
 Should the EU invest in the Gulf of Guinea through build-operate-transfer model in
order to create job opportunities along with giving loans and financial aid?
81
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