Gideon v. Wainwright | The Oyez Project at IIT

GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT
Term: 1960­1969 1962
Location: Bay County Circuit Court
Facts of the Case Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with a felony: having broken
into and entered a poolroom with the intent to commit a misdemeanor offense. When
he appeared in court without a lawyer, Gideon requested that the court appoint one
for him. According to Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed
to an indigent defendant in capital cases, so the trial court did not appoint one.
Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years
in prison. Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court and
argued that the trial court’s decision violated his constitutional right to be represented
by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief.
Question Does the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in criminal cases extend to felony
defendants in state courts?
Conclusion Decision: 9 votes for Gideon, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel
Yes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 9­0 majority. The Supreme
Court held that the framers of the Constitution placed a high value on the right of the
accused to have the means to put up a proper defense, and the state as well as
federal courts must respect that right. The Court held that it was consistent with the
Constitution to require state courts to appoint attorneys for defendants who could not
afford to retain counsel on their own.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not apply a watered­down version of the Bill of Rights
to the states. Since constitutional questions are always open for consideration by the
Supreme Court, there is no need to assert a rule about the relationship between the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. In his separate opinion concurring in
judgment, Justice Tom C. Clark wrote that the Constitution guarantees the right to
counsel as a protection of due process, and there is no reason to apply that
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Case Basics
Docket No. 155
Petitioner Clarence Earl Gideon
Respondent Louie L. Wainwright, Director,
Division of Corrections
Decided By Warren Court (1962­1965)
Opinion 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
Argued Tuesday, January 15, 1963
Decided Monday, March 18, 1963
Advocates
Abe Fortas
(Appointed by the Court, argued the
cause for the petitioner)
Bruce R. Jacob
(Argued the cause for the respondent)
J. Lee Rankin
(By special leave of the Court, argued
the cause for the American Civil
Liberties Union as amici curiae, urging
reversal)
George D. Mentz
(Argued the cause for the State of
Alabama, as amicus curiae, urging
affirmance)
protection in certain cases but not others. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a separate
concurring opinion in which he argued that the majority’s decision represented an
extension of earlier precedent that established the existence of a serious criminal
charge to be a “special circumstance” that requires the appointment of counsel. He
also argued that the majority’s opinion recognized a right to be valid in state courts as
well as federal ones; it did not apply a vast body of federal law to the states.
Warren
Black
Douglas
Clark
Harlan
Brennan
Stewart
White
GIDEON v. WAINWRIGHT. The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago­Kent College of Law. 24 November 2014.
© 2005­2011 Oyez, Inc.
Criminal
Procedure Right
to Counsel
Goldberg
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