Journal of Media & Mass Communication Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2015
Language Shapes Thought: Rethinking on
Linguistic Relativity
Lin Zhu
International College of Chinese Studies, Shanghai Normal University, Shanghai, China
Email: [email protected]
categories naming reflects both universal tendencies and
some degree of linguistic convention.
A number of findings show that there exists
“categorical perception” (CP) for color, and the
differences of color categories in languages may predict
where CP will occur [2], [3]. For example, there are
different color terms to distinguish light blue (goluboy)
and dark blue (siniy) in Russian, but not in English. And
this difference results in the different discriminations in
this color category [3]. Examples of CP have been
reported for many different stimuli, and some studies
reported CP effects in the reaction times. Participants
were faster at discriminating target from distractors if the
colors of target and distractors fall into different linguistic
color categories than into the same category [3]-[7]. In
addition, color CP would disappear with a concurrent
verbal interference task, and this finding implied that
color CP is language based [6]. Previous studies also
examined CP effects by testing color discrimination
under conditions in which response time and memory
requirements are reduced [8], [9]. However, it is not easy
to explain the results of these studies, because the
interaction between language and color could arise at
many different levels and could depend on the task to a
large extent. Furthermore, many studies measured the
speed of the response or the ability of memory. This
raised the possibility that language only affects the ability
to store or react to it.
Furthermore, language affects perception primarily in
the right visual field (RVF), because the left brain
hemisphere is dominant for language. Given the
hemispheric specialization, our perception might be
influenced by our native language in the right visual field
than the left visual field [2], [10]. This effect means
language might shape color processing and could support
Whorf hypothesis in color domain. Gilbert, Regier, Kay
& Ivry (2006) tested this hypothesis using a lateralized
visual search task [6]. They found that cross category
targets were identified faster than same category targets
in RVF and when RVF color CP is found, it has a verbal
basis. Roberson, Pak & Hanley (2008) also reported color
CP in the RVF in Korean, reinforcing that cross category
targets were identified faster than same category targets
in RVF [7]. Given this aspect of hemispheric
specialization and the universal Whorf effect in language,
the asymmetric effect might reflect a general influence of
language on perception, this effect would not limited
Abstract—We reviewed the researches on linguistic
relativity in color, space and time domains, and rethink the
relationship between language and perception to support
the idea that language interact with other cognitive
processes and shape the perception and thought of human.
Language, perception and action are not separated systems,
but are closely interconnected and highly interacted to some
extent. And language plays a constructive role in object
affordances, which do not only require low-level processes
of action and motor control, but depend on the language
knowledge as well.
Index Terms—color, space, time, linguistic relativity,
OBJECT affordances
I.
INTRODUCTION
The existence of Whorf effect, which supports that
one’s native language shape one’s ways of cognition and
perception, has been debated for many years. The
relationship between language and perception is also the
classic debate in linguistics. The side of linguistic
relativity holds that our perception is shaped by the
semantic categories in our language. The questions
underpinning the linguistic relativity debate are questions
such as: does language shape thought? And does
language modulate perception? In this review, we will
investigate the recent researches on linguistic relativity in
color and spatiotemporal domains, and rethink the
relationship between language, thought and cognition.
II.
COLOR DOMAIN
The hotly debated question in color domain is if the
color categories defined by languages may affect the
process and perception of color categories. Regier & Kay
(2009) suggested the debate may conflate two distinct
questions: Do color terms affect color perception? Are
color categories determined by largely arbitrary linguistic
convention [1]?
The responds of linguistic relativists would be
affirmative to both questions, and along with the arisen of
new studies and evidences, linguistic relativity was
proved to be partly right. With regard to the first question,
color terms affect color perception primarily in the right
visual field. With regard to the second question, color
Manuscript received December 24, 2014; revised July 2, 2015.
©2015 Journal of Media & Mass Communication
doi: 10.12720/jmmc.1.1.6-11
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Journal of Media & Mass Communication Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2015
III.
within color domain. So, Gilbert et al. (2008) employed
visual search task, but replaced the colors with pictures of
cats or dogs. The results of their experiments supported
previous findings of a lateralized Whorf effect to noncolor stimuli. So this effect might have a general
influence on perception and reflect the interaction
between language and perception.
However, the findings of pre-linguistic CP in infants
and that color terms do not affect color CP in toddlers call
the hypothesis of language-driven CP in the RVF in
question. This also raised the question about the relation
between pre-linguistic CP and the language-driven RVFlateralized color CP in adults. Franklin et al. (2006)
compared infants and adults performance on a visual
search task and found that pre-linguistic infants showed
no CP in the RVF, and clear CP in the LVF [6]. This
study suggested that the acquisition of color terms cause
the shift of color CP from RH to LH. But what is the
nature of this shift? Where did the CP effects come from?
These are still open questions.
Besides the evidence from behavior studies, some ERP
and fMRI studies have raised a number of related
evidences. For example, Siok et al. (2009) found that
discriminating colors of different lexical categories
elicited faster and stronger response in the left
hemisphere language regions and suggested that the
language areas might act as a top-down control source on
the visual areas in color perception [11]. Holmes et al.
(2009) founded that shorter latencies for early
components to cross-category differences than for withincategory differences providing evidence for an early role
for categorical differences in color perception and
suggesting influence of color categories on postperceptual processing [12]. Liu et al. (2010) employed a
“same-different” judgment task and their results
suggested that the categorical perception of color stimuli
presented in the RVF might result from an effect of
language-related processes suppressing the capacity to
discriminate two shades of color within the same color
category [13]. Although many recent electrophysiological
and imaging studies support that linguistic category affect
color discrimination via involvement of left hemisphere
language regions, there are still uncertain and opened
questions, such as the influence of color categories is
post-perceptual or pre-perceptual processing, the nature
of hemispheric specialization and CP effect. Lu, Hodeges,
Zhang & Wang (2012) tried to answer these questions by
employing color naming task. Their result showed that
linguistic effects on color discrimination cannot be
restricted to the left hemisphere, and linguistic effects on
color cognition are more robust and distributed than
previously acknowledged [14].
To summarize, it appears uncontroversial that once
language is learned, its lexical categories shape
perceptual discrimination primarily in the left hemisphere
and right visual field. The Whorf hypothesis would be
partly right which implies the relation between language
and perception in color domain might be deliberated
more broadly.
©2015 Journal of Media & Mass Communication
SPACE AND T IME DOMAIN
There are many different ways to describe spatial
relation in different languages and there has been a great
deal of thoughts about spatial frames of reference. Most
of literature privileges.
Egocentric coordinates, two other distinct types based
on object-centered coordinates, and absolute coordinates,
which may be called the Relative (egocentric), the
Intrinsic (object-centered) and the Absolute (like north,
south) system [15].
Languages have specialized expressions for one, two
or all the three spatial frames of reference, and the
application of these spatial frames of reference differ
across languages. The computations required in different
spatial frames of reference are different, such as absolute
spatial frames of reference in all situations are of a quite
different from the other two frames. There are two
viewpoints about if the different spatial frames of
reference need different deeper cognitive consequences.
According to one view, spatial cognition is inherently
‘dynamic, egocentric and primitive’ [16]. The other
viewpoint is that spatial cognition requires multiple
spatial frames of reference, and that languages recruit
from these systems [17]. A lot of experiments have
shown that people do use different non-linguistic spatial
frames of reference to do the same tasks, and that these
non-linguistic spatial frames of reference align with the
preferred spatial frame of reference of their language [18],
[19]. And Dehaene et al. (2006) reported the data from
Munduruku tribe [20]. They evaluated spatial thinking
among Munduruku children and adults, and tested
American children and adults as a comparison group for
their Amazonian sample. They found that American
adults did better than Munduruku of any age, and better
than American children. Their results supported that there
are universal tendencies in space cognition and language
affect space cognition as well. Thereby, culture and
language are crucial for full development of geometric
and spatial potential.
In general, time representation relies on space
representation in most diverse languages. But the
representation way differs across languages and cultures,
depending on the spatial representations, spatio-temporal
metaphors, culture, age and experience [21]-[23].
English speakers use the horizontal spatial metaphors
primarily to express time, whereas Chinese speakers also
use the vertical metaphors. Both English and Mandarin
use horizontal spatial terms to talk about time, but in
Mandarin, spatial metaphors for time are also common.
Unlike English speakers, Mandarin speakers also use
vertical metaphors frequently [24], [25]. Will the use of
different spatial metaphors affect the way of
conceptualize time? In consideration of this linguistic
difference, some argued that Mandarin speakers think
about time vertically more than English speakers do.
Many studies have demonstrated that English speakers
construct representations of time that are horizontal and
people spatialize time naturally and automatically [21],
[23], [26], [27]. While a number of similar studies found
that vertical representations of time in English speakers
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Journal of Media & Mass Communication Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2015
possibilities that objects offer for bodily interaction.
Objects
typically
elicit
multiple
affordance
representations, and a number of behavioral studies have
shown that different affordances can be activated
depending on linguistic context [34], [35]. These studies
proposed that object affordance strongly depends on
context and intention. This view predicts that there is no
context-neutral description of object features and object is
defined by the set of possible actions that can be
performed on it.
Object affordances do not only require low-level
processes of action and perception control, but depend on
the specific language knowledge as well. The evidences
in color and spatiotemporal domain support that language
play a key role in the perception, cognition and then in
thought and communication of human. Moreover, there is
a growing body of evidence that speakers of different
languages, whose terminology or grammatical structure
differ, influence the processing of conceptualization,
object affordances i.e., in different ways. Besides
semantic knowledge reviewed about color, space and
time terms, Boroditsky, Schmidt, & Philips (2003) have
suggested that the interaction grammatical patterns in
words do affect our representation of the outside world
[36]. Studies investigating the influence of grammatical
categories on perception, have essentially focused on
potential links between grammatical gender and object
categorization. Cubelli et al. (2011) employed non verbal
semantic task on pictures and offered strong evidence to
support that grammatical gender can affect
conceptualization [37]. Boutonnet, Anthanasopoulos &
Thierry (2012) tested Spanish-English bilinguals and
control native speakers of English in a semantic
categorization task on triplets of pictures in an all-inEnglish context while measuring event-related brain
potentials (ERPs) [38]. Pulvermüller, Cook & Hauk
(2012) examined the effects on event-related brain
responses of action-related semantics, lexical category,
and words inflection and their results demonstrated that
intrinsic properties of semantic and grammatical,
including morphophonological, analysis of action-related
language are manifest in motor systems activation [39].
These experimental results demonstrated that this kind of
unconscious effect play a part in representation and
conceptualization. Their results provided evidence for
spontaneous and unconscious access to grammatical
knowledge, thereby provided support for linguistic
relativity effects in the grammatical domain.
Consequently, language knowledge including semantic
and grammatical information might intact with cognition
substantially, and modulate perception and action
spontaneously. Many studies argued, perception, action
and language have common representational resources
and cognitive processes including perception and
language are closely intertwined and consist of a set of
processes that determine possible actions. That is, we
tend to say what we do and tend to do what we say to
some extent [40], [41]. In this sense, language is highly
interconnected with other cognitive processes such as
were non-existent or very rare. [23], [28], [29]. And
studies comparing English and Mandarin speakers found
that Mandarin speakers do construct vertical
representations for time, and do so more often than
English speakers [23], [27].
One experimental paradigm used to test English and
Mandarin speakers’ representations of time produced
mixed results and evoked many disputes [25], [26], [30],
[31]. At first, Boroditsky (2001) used this paradigm and
argued for the point that the use of spatial metaphors
could change the way speakers think about time. But the
later studies used this paradigm produced inconsistent
results, such as January & Kako (2007) and Chen (2007)
could not replicate her experimental findings. So they
argued that Chinese speakers do not conceptualize time
differently than English speakers. Replying to their
disputes, Boroditsky, Fuhrman & McCormick (2011)
suggested this type of design can only be used to test for
interactions between groups but not relied exclusively or
almost exclusively on data from only one language group,
such as 73 Mandarin speakers but only 14 English
speakers [32]. Furthermore, she stated that they used
different stimuli and experimental procedures from her
original study. Because the original paradigm tested only
for effects of axis, Boroditsky, Fuhrman & McCormick
(2011) presented a new paradigm to extend the early
studies. The task separated the directions within the axes,
the task was non-linguistic, the task relied on reactiontime, and the task tested temporal reasoning across a wide
range of temporal progressions and durations. And the
results of this study extended and supported her previous
work.
In summary, this study together with previous other
studies might prove that Mandarin speakers use vertical
terms to talk about time more than English speakers do
and Mandarin speakers think about time vertically more
than English speakers do as well. Speaker across different
languages might activate different space representation
with cultural specialties and their different time
representation might produce diverse emotional and
behavioral consequences [22], [33].
IV.
DISSCUSION
From the review above about linguistic relativity in
color and spatiotemporal domains, it appears that
language do indeed play an important role in the
perception, cognition and then in thought and
communication of human. This discussion briefly
addresses the relation between language, perception and
cognition.
The dynamic, distributed characters of language and
perception point to the possibility that both are far more
diverse and complicated than linguistic relativity theorists
and universalists have assumed. It appears that the more
we learn about languages and perception, the more
complex they become. We now move to the object
affordances: because, overall, more and more evidence
suggests that people perceive object affordances rather
than a set of separate dimensions, such as color, time and
space. Object affordances can be defined as the specific
©2015 Journal of Media & Mass Communication
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Journal of Media & Mass Communication Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2015
through evolution. The main reason of focusing on the
relation between language and objects affordances of
action in our discussion is that the basic function of
cognition is the control of action. Based on evolution,
multi-cellular creatures need nervous system to express
active movement, and systems evolution demands action
and the knowledge of objects affordances which serve
linguistic relativity and shape human thought at last.
Nevertheless, just as effective action requires
coordination with other systems in the brain, besides
action and perception systems, language needs
coordination with other systems such as emotional
systems throughout the brain.
action and perception to support object affordances,
thereby influences other functional networks.
To date, more and more new aroused evidences
support the linguistic relativity hypothesis, by showing
that both action-perception features and semantic or
grammatical features of objects are spontaneously
retrieved which likely contribute to objects affordances
and mental representations of these objects. That is, both
action-perception systems and language systems serve
thinking and communication of human. As thus,
perceptual systems and natural language statistic systems
might be interconnected together, just as Boroditsky &
Prinz (2008) have supposed [42]. Only perception or
language is not enough for human cognition. On the one
hand, perception and action systems may store and utilize
representation off line and reactivate the similar pattern
when applying to thinking. But this type of representation
has some limits such as integration problems and nonefficiency. On the other hand, structured language inputs
include a lot of special statistical rules only existing in
language such as phonetic, lexical and syntactic patterns.
A number of studies have shown, human may make use
of the special co-occurrence information of new words in
context and judge the meaning by statistic information
[43], [44]. Connecting with natural language systems
might resolve the above problems by integrating human
experience through language knowledge along with
action-perception information.
The mechanism of object affordances in this discussion
shares the insight that the brain is organized along two
major neural pathways, one encoding affordances and
actions and the other one, involving a number of
mechanisms that allow the selection of affordances and
actions on the basis of high-level goals [45], [46].
Therefore, we prescribe possible actions, rather than
describing states of the world. Knowing what an object is
does not mean to possess descriptions of this object, but
to master sets of sensomotor skills and possible actions to
utilize the object in concrete context [47]. A number of
studies showed, that the processing of objects affordances
for action is to a strong extent determined by top-down
influences related to one’s action intention and the
context [48], [49]. That is, object affordances are not
automatically activated every time but depend on the
context. And when the processing of objects affordances
is determined by top-down influences, there displayed
universal aspects of event perception and cognition but
not linguistic effects, especially in action and event
perception [50]. Nonetheless, the hierarchical, goaldirected mechanisms of object affordances and action
control might be exploited for language [51], and to serve
the function of varied linguistic relativity.
From the viewpoint of contemporary cognitive
neuroscience, meaning is the result of our interactions
with the outside world. Language connects all the
possible actions in a network thereby expanding
individual action experiences. Language’s nature is in
this view not only epistemic, but also action-based
primarily, and the solution of contextually appropriate
action might extend to contextually-appropriate language
©2015 Journal of Media & Mass Communication
V.
CONCLUSION
From the review above about researches on linguistic
relativity in color, space and time domains, we might
move to rethink and discuss the relationship between
language and perception to support the idea that language
interact with other cognitive processes and shape the
perception and thought of human.
To be concluded, language do plays a constructive role
in object affordances, perception and representation.
Language, perception and action are not separated
systems, but are closely interconnected and highly
interacted to some extent. Language plays a constructive
role in object affordances, which do not only require lowlevel processes of action and motor control, but depend
on the specific language knowledge as well. Thereby the
hierarchical, goal-directed mechanisms of object
affordances and action control might serve the function of
varied linguistic relativity.
And accepted the suggestion of Jeannerod [40, 41]
about arguing for a representational approach to action
and the idea that the organization of action derives from
the organization of its representational underpinnings, we
might propose that action language may affect overt
execution and motor expertise may affect action language
processing, thus, action control and execution need
language semantic and action procedural knowledge at
the same time and might draw on a common
representational resource. The same coding and
representational resource of language, perception and
action might put the resource of joint attention which
distinguished human from other animals and opened the
door of social cognition.
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Cambridge from Mar.2013 to Mar. 2014. She is a Lecturer of
International College of Chinese Studies in Shanghai Normal University,
Shanghai China. The main published books and published articles are
Syntactic Reconstruction of Chinese Case System and Chinese Origin,
Shanghai, China: Xuelin Press, 2013. Typological, Historical and
Cognitive Research on Chinese Causativity, Shanghai, China: Xuelin
Press, 2011. Her current research interests are cognitive linguistics and
neurolinguistics.
Lin Zhu is born in Jiangsu Province, China,
20/05/1976. She got Ph.D. degree in linguistics
of Division of Humanities, HongKong
University of Science and Technology,
HongKong, China, in 2007.
She was a Teaching Assistant of Division of
Humanities in HongKong University of Science
and Technology from Sep.2003 to May. 2007.
She was an Academic Visitor in University of
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