Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the editors of The Journal of Interdisciplinary
History
Counting the Votes: South Carolina's Stolen Election of 1876
Author(s): Ronald F. King
Source: The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 169191
Published by: The MIT Press
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Journal of Interdisciplinary History, xxxii:2 (Autumn, 2001), I69--I9I.
Ronald F. King
Counting the Votes: South Carolina's Stolen
Election of 1876 Electoral democracy is not always a
smoothly functioning system for the aggregation of citizen preferences. American democracy, moreover, has not always been remarkable for fair procedures and the objective administration of
franchise rules.
The presidential election of 2000 has revived interest in the
controversies of South Carolina's gubernatorial election of 1876.
In both elections, the winner of the popular vote lost the electoral
college vote; the electoral college vote depended upon contested
returns in a southern state; charges of ballot mismanagement and
possible fraud were rampant; the decision ultimately depended
upon the discretionary powers of the officials responsible for
counting the votes allegedly cast; and those officials were often
criticized for acting with partisan bias.
The goal of this article is to use modern social science methods to examine the election in South Carolina, and, ultimately, to
decide which individual legitimately should have been declared
the winner-Wade Hampton (Democrat) or Daniel Chamberlain
(Republican)-and which party should have been allowed to or-
ganize the state government. On one side is the claim that the Republican party sought to maintain control by means of a blatant
manipulation of the election count. On the other side is the claim
that the Democratic party sought to impose control by means of
extraordinary fraud and intimidation of voters on election day.
The final result of the election, in Hampton's favor, shifted power
to the white Redeemers and led in the direction toward segregation.
Ronald F. King is Professor of Political Science, Tulane University. He is the author of Budgeting Entitlements (Washington, D.C., 2000); Money, Time, and Politics (New Haven, 1993).
The author would like to thank Dale Baum, Susan Ellis, Donald Greco, J. Morgan
Kousser, Peyton McCrary, James Morone, Lawrence Powell, Douglas Rose, Paul Sum,
Eric Uslaner, and Richard Valelly for their advice and encouragement. The American
Philosophical Society and the Murphy Institute of Political Economy provided generous
support.
S2001oo by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the editors of The Journal of
Interdisciplinary History.
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170 RONALI) F. KING
The debate over Reconstruction remains salient, more than a
century later, because, at its core, it concerns the inequalities per-
vasive to race relations in America and the apparently limited
achievement of public policy to rectify them. It affixes blame for
failures at that critical juncture when slavery ended, and it offers
the possibility of alternative paths not taken. The long-prevalent
view, generally favorable to white southerners, remains surprisingly popular, despite recognition of the ideological agenda of its
initial proponents. Revisionist accounts increasingly have emphasized the role of militant white intransigence and a weakness of
will from Washington. Nevertheless, there has been little systematic testing of the key hypotheses.
By 1876, politics in South Carolina had become polarized by
race and by partisanship. The revitalized Democratic party, reject-
ing fusion with moderate Reconstructionists, united behind
Hampton and launched a crusade to return the state to its "natural
ruling element." The dominant Republican party, in response,
put aside internal divisions concerning reform to endorse the reelection of Chamberlain, the incumbent governor. The campaign
of 1876 was vehement, vicious, and often violent. The Democrats,
needing to overcome a considerable black voting majority in the
state, organized with military-style efficiency in order to produce
partisan solidarity among whites and defections among blacks.
Rifle clubs, for example, with members identified by their red
shirts, escorted Hampton throughout his speaking tour and disrupted Republican political rallies. The Republicans, desperate to
maintain supremacy, called upon federal troops for protection and
distributed guns to the loyal militia. Political tensions and racial
animosities sometimes exploded in riots and massacres, despite repeated calls for peace; the pro-Democratic forces earned a disproportionate share of the responsibility.'
The outcome of the gubernatorial contest was close, and each
side immediately accused the other of fraud. The state Board of
Canvassers, comprised of five Republican officials, tabulated the
result and found that Hampton received 92,261 votes compared to
91,127 for Chamberlain. Yet the Board, acting on questionable
authority, also declared that the elections in Edgefield and Laurens
I Francis Butler Simkins and Robert Hilliard Woody, South Carolina During Reconstruction
(Chapel Hill, 1932); Joel Williamson, After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina During Reconstruction, 1861-1877 (Chapel Hill, 1965); Richard Zuczek, State of Rebellion: Reconstruction in
South Carolina (Columbia, 1996).
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COUNTING THE VOTES 171
counties were invalid and excluded their returns, thereby transforming a I,134-vote Republican defeat into a 3,145-vote victory.
The Democratic party challenged this action in the state Supreme
Court, which decided that the state legislature alone had the
power to certify the winner.
This decision engendered further complications; the legisla-
ture was in dispute about which party held the majority. Admitting only those legislators with certificates from the Board of
Canvassers and physically excluding all others (in particular, those
from Edgefield and Laurens), the state House of Representatives
constituted itself with a potential membership of I 16, and thus a
Republican majority. Democrats withdrew from the body and established an alternative state House, with a potential membership
of I24 and a Democratic majority that included legislators from
Edgefield and Laurens. The two separate bodies each claimed legitimacy, and each proceeded to certify and inaugurate its own
governor. In fact, neither had full legitimacy. The Republican
House could declare the presence of a quorum only by ignoring
the vacant seats from Edgefield and Laurens, whereas the Democratic House could not elect a governor without the cooperation
of the state Senate, which remained Republican. The Democratic
legislature gradually gained in authority, judging by attendance
and revenue-raising capacity. Yet the matter was not finally settled
until April 1877, when President Hayes withdrew federal troops
from South Carolina, and Chamberlain reluctantly abandoned the
state executive offices to Hampton.
The analysis in this article is performed as if commissioned by
the Supreme Court in the state to help determine the victor. The
proposed methodology is in three parts: to estimate the partisan
division of the vote by race, using ecological inference; to identify
implausible county results based on the analysis of outliers; and to
simulate a counterfactual vote outcome to substitute for the pub-
lished result in those counties identified as extreme outliers. This
methodology differs from that the one actually utilized in South
Carolina, since it implies a statistical re-estimation of the vote in
suspect counties rather than an outright rejection of ballots cast.
This is, however, a far more defensible means of adjustment, generating simulated outcomes that are plausible and precise.2
2 Regarding the application of ecological inference to Reconstruction elections, see
J. Morgan Kousser, "Ecological Regression and the Analysis of Past Politics," Journal of Inter-
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172 RONALD F. KING
In 1876, the state Supreme Court did not solicit professional
advice regarding the gubernatorial outcome. Nor did the academic expertise capable of offering such advice exist at the time.
Modern commentators continue to express doubt whether the
matter can be resolved. Although most generally recognize, as partisan Democrats insisted, that Hampton received a majority of the
votes cast and counted, many also suspect, as partisan Republicans
insisted, "that if the canvass in the State had been free from vio-
lence and fraud the republican majority would have been
sufficiently large to elect all the candidates for state offices and to
have largely increased the majority for Hayes and Wheeler electors. "3
This study sustains the Republican position. The Board of
Canvassers in South Carolina might have been biased in its decision making and arbitrary in the votes that it chose to reject, but it
was correct in declaring Chamberlain the winner. This finding
gives detail to the historiography of the 1876 election and adds
needed methodological rigor to the revisionist interpretation of
Reconstruction. It should prove disappointing to those still
tempted to believe that, at the end of the era, southern states were
returned to their rightful (white) rulers, who deserved power now
that loyalty to the Union had been reaffirmed. Chamberlain was
essentially correct when he complained to his aides that "the Government of the United States abandons you, deliberately withdraws from you its support, with full knowledge that the lawful
Government of the State will be speedily overthrown."4
THE RACIAL PATTERN TO THE VOTE-ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE This
analysis relies on votes aggregated by county (South Carolina had
thirty-two counties in 1876). It is the only form in which complete electoral and demographic data exist for this period. Moreover, the state Board of Canvassers based its actions on county
aggregations, excluding the entire return from Edgefield and
disciplinary History, IV (1973), 237-262. Regarding the use of outliers to indicate potential
fraud or intimidation in Reconstruction elections, see Lawrence N. Powell, "Correcting for
Fraud: A Quantitative Reassessment of the Mississippi Ratification Election of 1868," Journal
of Southern History, LV (1989), 633-658.
3 House of Representatives, Recent Election in South Carolina, 44th Congress, 2d sess., 1877,
H. Rept. 175, II, 186.
4 Zuczek, State of Rebellion, 201.
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COUNTING THE VOTES 173
Laurens counties. The justification behind the Board's decision is
not entirely clear. Two recent scholarly accounts assert that it re-
sulted from the fact that both counties showed more Democratic
votes cast than total registered voters, but this explanation is certainly mistaken; there was no official registration list of eligible
voters for the 1876 election. In fact, the absence of voter registration was one of the main complaints made by Democratic advocates before the U.S. Electoral Commission when challenging the
South Carolina presidential vote. The Republican defense was
that voters could legally vote at any polling place in their county
of residence. Blacks often had to "mass their vote," traveling together to a particular locality for purposes of "mutual protection and safety."5
Data are available, however, for the number of males aged
twenty-one and older in South Carolina from the 1875 state census, as well as for the number of individuals who signed in to vote
on election day in 1876, both sets categorized by race and by
county. These records can be compared to the 1876 gubernatorial
vote. As seen in Table i, blacks comprised 6o percent of South
Carolina's male population, twenty-one and older, in 1875. They
constituted 54 percent of 1876 voter sign-ins, excepting Charleston, which failed to record sign-ins by race. Yet, Chamberlain, the
Republican candidate, only received 49.7 percent of the total
vote.6
On the surface, this result is not inherently implausible. Despite their considerable allegiance to the Republican cause, blacks
had become increasingly frustrated with Reconstruction rule. The
Democratic campaign of solicitations and intimidations had also
taken its toll. Curiously, the total sign-ins for 1876, adding at least
23,841 for Charleston (the number of gubernatorial votes cast),
was equal to 99 percent of the state's eligible voting population, as
recorded in 1875. White sign-ins were equal to 98 percent of re-
corded white eligible voters, even before any adjustment for
Charleston. A possible explanation could be the weakness of the
data. For example, the 1875 state census most likely underestimates the number of South Carolina eligible voters in 1876 simply
5 Ibid., 191; Walter Edgar, South Carolina: A History (Columbia, 1998), 404; Congressional
Record, "Electoral Commission," 1877, V, 189, 299; H. Rept. 175, I, 6-7.
6 H. Rept. 175, II, 62; Senate, South Carolina in 1876, 44th Congress, 2d sess., 1877, Senate
Miscellaneous Document 48, 84.
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Table 1 South Carolina Official Statistics
1875 CENSUS, MALE 21+ 1876 VOTER SIGN-IN I187
COUNTY WHITE BLACK TOTAL WHITE BLACK TOTAL HAMPTO
Abbeville 2,928 4,951 7,879 3,075 4,473 7,548
Aiken 2,494 3,473 5,967 2,961 2,795 5,756
Anderson 3,329 2,215 5,544 3,445 1,858 5,30
Barnwell 2,583 4,734 7,317 2,999 3,763 6,762
Beaufort 1,76o 8,241 Io,oo001 1,867 8,o096 9,96
Charleston 7,398 17,687 25,085 - 8,80
Chester 1,604 3,290 4,894 1,6o8 2,813 4,421
Chesterfield I,543 1,199 2,742 1,547 1,o81 2,6
Clarendon 1,171 2,202 3,373 I,283 2,046 3,329
Colleton 2,478 4,217 6,695 2,440 4,728 7,I68
Darlington 2,362 3,747 6,Io9 2,544 3,716 6,260
Edgefield 2,722 4,400 7,I122 4,974 3,107 8,o8
Fairfield 1,451 3,370 4,821 I,66o 3,366 5,026
Georgetown 643 3,I19 3,762 729 3,I18 3,847
Greenville 4,165 2,146 6,311 3,964 2,085 6,049
Horry 1,696 712 2,408 1,846 693 2,539
Kershaw 1,285 2,421 3,706 1,509 2,320 3,829
Lancaster 1,330 1,364 2,694 1,438 1,344 2,782
Laurens 2,259 2,844 5,1o3 2,916 1,804 4,720
Lexington 2,o31 1,378 3,409 2,o098 1,313 3,41
Marion 3,o81 2,883 5,964 3,o047 2,619 5,666
Marlborough 1,583 1,925 3,508 1,696 1,864 3,56
Newberry 1,725 3,254 4,979 1,832 3,139 4,971
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Table 1 Continued
1875 CENSUS, MALE 21+ I876 VOTER SIGN-INA I87
COUNTY WHITE BLACK TOTAL WHITE BLACK TOTAL HAMPTO
Oconee 2,046 703 2,749 2,oi018 631 2,649
Orangeburgh 2,181 4,384 6,565 2,552 4,8oi 7,35
Pickens 1,815 545 2,360 1,926 512 2,438
Richland 2,I162 5,036 7,198 2,107 4,212 6,319
Spartanburgh 4,367 2,o015 6,382 4,436 1,798 6,23
Sumter 1,827 4,362 6,I89 1,965 4,295 6,260
Union 1,979 2,356 4,335 2,122 2,I68 4,290
Williamsburgh 1,412 2,576 3,988 1,529 2,506 4,03
York 2,789 2,995 5,784 2,815 2,901 5,716 3
Total 74,199 110,744 184,943 72,948 85,965 158,913
aWithout Charleston, which has no sign-in records by race.
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176 RONALD F. KING
because of population growth. The 1870 U.S. census shows fewer
males twenty-one and older; the 188o U.S. census shows more. In
addition, the 1875 state census probably overestimates the percentage of blacks. Although the 1870 and 188o U.S. censuses do
not subdivide the category of males twenty-one and older by race,
the share of blacks in the total state population is about 2 percent
higher in the 1875 state census than in either of the two surround-
ing U.S. censuses.7
Nevertheless, anomalies within the data make this simple explanation less than satisfying. In 1876, twenty-six of the thirty-one
counties with available data had more white sign-ins than white
males twenty-one and older, according to the 1875 census. Yet,
the overage was 2,252 (82 percent) in Edgefield and 678 (29 percent) in Laurens, by far the largest amounts. By contrast, twentynine of the thirty-one counties had fewer black sign-ins in 1876
than black males twenty-one and older, according to the 1875
census. The deficit was 1,293 (29 percent) in Edgefield and I,o4o
in Laurens (37 percent), again the largest amounts.
Republican proponents at the time had difficulty when arguing that such anomalies translated directly into illegitimate vote
outcomes. For example, they showed that the gubernatorial vote
in Edgefield and Laurens was different in 1876 than in I874. But
the party configuration in South Carolina was also different in
1874, when the Republican margin of victory was nearly 12,000
votes. Edgefield and Laurens were not unique in shifting from a
substantial Republican win to a substantial Republican loss; the
change in vote direction from these two counties constituted only
a small share of the net change across the two elections.
Similarly, Republican proponents, in their formal justification for the Board of Canvassers' action, made much of the fact
that the 1875 census numbers did not show enough voters to constitute Hampton's figure. Specifically, they argued that Hampton's
total in 1876 was greater than the number of eligible whites from
the 1875 census, plus the remaining number of eligible blacks,
once Chamberlain's vote was subtracted-H76 > W75 + (B75-
C76). The problem is that this finding is not automatically an indicator of illegality. The population of eligible voters, both black
7 U.S. Department of the Interior, Census Office, Statistics of Population, Ninth Census of the
United States (Washington D.C., 1872); idem, Statistics of the Population of the United States at the
Tenth Census (Washington D.C., 1883).
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COUNTING THE VOTES 177
and white, might well have increased between the 1875 census
and the 1876 election. A greater number of black voters with a
lower loyalty rate to the Republican party, plus some increment
in the number of white voters, could have been sufficient to constitute observed Hampton and Chamberlain vote totals. Not sur-
prisingly, the apparent Hampton surplus relative to the 1875
census data was also true for a number of South Carolina counties
where the votes were not negated. Equally important, there was
no apparent Hampton surplus for Laurens County, the other
county with negated votes. There, Republicans chose to cite not
allegedly phantom white voters but actual black non-voters. The
conclusion is that Republican proponents were technically unconvincing in their own defense.8
To understand the 1876 outcome in South Carolina, more
reliable numbers are needed regarding the share of eligible whites
who voted for Hampton, the share of eligible blacks who voted
for Chamberlain, and the share of eligible voters of both races who
did not vote. Ideally, survey or exit-poll data for an appropriate
sample of separate individuals would be available to estimate the
relationship between each demographic category and type of vote
activity. Unfortunately, no such data exist for nineteenth-century
elections. Instead, this analysis estimates voter behavior from the
county-level aggregates by means of ecological inference. The
percentage of eligible voters engaged in a given activity (vote for
the Democrat, vote for the Republican, not voting in 1876) is regressed by the percentage of black eligible voters, weighted by the
total of eligible voters. As a substitute for survey data, weighted re-
gression interprets the operationalized variables not as a summation across separate individuals but rather as a summation within
each individual. That is, instead of considering some specific percentage of voters in a given county as black (and the remainder
as white), each voter in that county is considered hypothetically
as some specific percentage of black. The net county result is exactly the same; each individual is still counted only once. Ecologi-
cal inference is thus based on a computational shortcut that
produces a complete and exclusive account of all eligible voters
in 1876, achieved by a means that minimizes undue biasing of the
estimate.
8 H. Rept. 175, II, 63-64, 92-94.
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178 RONALD F. KING
Logically, Chamberlain's total vote is some given percentage
(q) of eligible blacks (N) who voted Republican in the gubernatorial election, plus some percentage (pc) of eligible whites (I-N)
who voted similarly. Hence, Chamberlain's vote equals pc + (qe pe)N. This is the format of a linear regression equation, a + bX,
which can be estimated for the main coefficients. The constant, pC,
indicates the share of eligible whites who voted for Chamberlain.
The sum of the slope and constant coefficients, (qc - pc) + pc, indicates the share of eligible blacks who voted for Chamberlain. The
procedure is repeated to estimate the share of eligible whites and
blacks who voted for Hampton (q. and Ph) and who did not vote
in the gubernatorial contest (qnv and pnv). The sum of all the con-
stant coefficients, p, will be equal to I.o, since the behavior of
whites is captured completely by the three possible options
(Chamberlain, Hampton, and not-voting); the sum of the constant plus slope coefficients, q, will also equal 1.o, since the behavior of blacks is similarly captured by the three available options.
The result of ecological inference is a comprehensive accounting
of vote shares by candidate within each social grouping.'
Given the absence of 1876 registration data, this analysis begins with the number of voter sign-ins on election day, which
were categorized by race in the official poll results for thirty-one
of the thirty-two counties in South Carolina. Local officials had
the best opportunity to engage in electoral abuse; they could stuff
ballot boxes, coerce potential opponents to alter their choices, or
merely alter the final figures of their precincts. All of these actions
would appear visible relative to the estimated vote totals based on
the number and racial composition of sign-ins. Suspicion would
be warranted if the sum of votes cast in the gubernatorial race in a
given county varied substantially from the number of sign-ins on
election day, or if a vote outcome for Hampton and/or Chamberlain differed considerably from the statistical prediction based on
the number of signed-in white and black voters.
The examination of votes cast relative to sign-ins is not exhaustive regarding possible indications of electoral irregularity.
Sign-in totals might have been subject to positive bias by fraud.
Certain individuals could have voted more than once using differ9 Leo A. Goodman, "Ecological Regressions and Behavior of Individuals," American Sociological Review, XVIII (1953), 663-664; idem, "Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlation,"
American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (1959), 61o--625.
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COUNTING THE VOTES 179
ent names, and others could have voted even if technically ineligible because of age or residence. There were reports that precinct
managers sometimes allowed males younger than twenty-one and
residents of neighboring states to vote, either out of complicity or
fear. Conversely, sign-in totals might have been biased negatively
by intimidation. Potential voters could have abstained because of
the threat of violence or economic sanctions. Nevertheless, the
sign-in list is the first data source that a court interested in plausible
estimates would consult.
A significant difference between this analysis and the one performed by the state Board of Canvassers is that it is not restricted
to Edgefield and Laurens. There were other South Carolina coun-
ties with documented incidents of attempted anti-Republican
electoral abuses that might appear anomalous upon a comprehensive examination of the statewide vote. Moreover, this analysis
also permits investigation of possible pro-Republican abuses, as
were alleged in the cases of Beaufort and Charleston. The goal is
to present assessments of probable fraud and intimidation that are
inclusive, objective, and plausible.
The weighted ecological estimates for the entire set of counties in South Carolina (neglecting Charleston because it did not
collect sign-in data by race) contain systematic findings for the
main quantities of interest (See Table 2, Section A). As would
be expected, virtually all of the voters who signed in on election
day cast ballots in the gubernatorial race. Also not surprisingly,
approximately all of the whites voted for Hampton, and more
than 90 percent of the blacks voted for Chamberlain. "What is
surprising," as Zuczek comments, "given the brutal choices facing
Republicans-especially black Republicans-was the small num-
ber of voters who did change sides.""'
Two slightly illogical components to the findings, permitted
because the estimating technique utilized intentionally does not
constrain the coefficients within a strict zero-to-one interval, are
that fewer than no white sign-ins voted for Chamberlain (-3.3
percent) and that fewer than no white sign-ins neglected to vote
in the gubernatorial contest (-2.4 percent). Hence, whites seem to
have voted more than 100 percent for Hampton (105-7 percent).
The illogical numbers can be excused to some extent as the effect
io Zuczek, State of Rebellion, 169.
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I80 RONALD F. KING
of tiny and insignificant coefficients, which vary plus or minus a
small amount around zero. Yet, they also provide grounds for attention. The main assumption of this ecological inference is that
the pattern of partisan loyalty and defection by race is relatively in-
variant across the counties of South Carolina (that is, the regression coefficients a and b are independent of any features of X). The
illogical numbers indicate the possibility that the coefficients for
central voter tendencies, based on the full set of South Carolina
counties, might not be fully reliable. In fact, there is good reason
to believe that not all of the state's counties would have had a sim-
ilar pattern of partisan loyalty by race-due to the biasing effect in
certain areas of extraordinary electoral intimidation and fraud. It is
necessary, therefore, to look more closely at the data, searching especially for those counties where the vote patterns seem incongruous with the number and social characteristics of their sign-ins."1
PROBABLE FRAUD AND INTIMIDATION-THE IDENTIFICATION OF
OUTLIERS Outlier analysis is based on the comparison between
the actual value for each observation and the predicted value calculated from the estimated regression coefficients. No predicted
value is ever perfect; residual variation not captured by the calculated influence of the independent variable(s) on the dependent
variable is inevitable. It is important to examine the residuals
for unusual patterns and to identify those observations with ex-
ceptionally deviant, "outlier" coefficients. Figure I shows the
Hampton and Chamberlain residuals for the weighted ecological
regressions (actual minus predicted value), plotted against the actual vote share for each candidate.
There is no accepted convention for the identification of outliers. For this analysis, an extraordinary outlier is defined as a
county in which a candidate receives a share of the vote that varies
from the expected value by 1.5 standard deviations or more.
(Other reasonable definitions give virtually the same result.) By
this standard, Hampton in 1876 did remarkably better than predicted in three counties (Anderson, Barnwell, and Edgefield) and
remarkably worse than predicted in one (Laurens). Chamberlain
in 1876 also did remarkably better than predicted in three counties
iI Regarding illogical inferences in ecological estimation, see Christopher H. Achen and
W. Phillips Shively, Cross-Level Inference (Chicago, 1995); Gary King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem (Princeton, 1997).
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Fig. 1 Regression Residuals vs. Actual Vote
A. Hampton (Democrat)
Edgefiel
Barnwell
Anderson
Abbeville
0
Fairfield
Union
Chester
Georgetown
SColleton
York
Newberry Marlborough
Sumter Kershaw
Williams
SRichland
Rich
Claredon Aiken Spartanburgh
Darlington
Chesterfield
Oconee
Beaufort OrangeburghDargton
Lancaster Chesterfield
Greenville H ne Pickens
Marion
Lexington
Laurens
Hampton Vote Percentages, by County
B. Chamberlain (Republican)
Edgefield
Laurens
5
)
Williams
Lexington Marion
Darlington
OrangeburghBeaufort
Chesterfield Lancaster Clrendo
SClarendon
H
Richland
Oconee HorryAiken
Pickens
Sumter
Spartanburgh
Kershaw
Greenville
Marlborough NewberryColleton Georgetown
Marlborough
NewberrYolton
York
Chester
Union
Fairfield
Abbeville
Barnwell
Anderson
Chamberlain Vote Percentages, by County
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182 | RONALD F. KING
(Edgefield, Laurens, and Williamsburgh), and remarkably worse
than predicted in two (Anderson and Barnwell). The net finding is
that five counties deserve a closer look.
First come the two counties in which Hampton received far
more votes and Chamberlain received far less than the social char-
acteristics of the sign-ins and the estimated division of their preferences would appear to justify. Ironically, these two counties with a
consistent pro-Democratic bias are Anderson and Barnwell-
which were not selected for vote rejection by the state Board of
Canvassers. Barnwell, however, was mentioned often in Republican complaints regarding acts of intimidation. Both of these counties, like Edgefield, sit on the Georgia border, where the most
trouble seems to have occurred.
Second comes the county that showed more votes than expected for both the Republican and the Democratic candidatesEdgefield. The explanation is simple. As Table I reveals, Edgefield
in 1876 had nearly 1,300 more votes cast for the gubernatorial candidates than voters who signed-in that day to vote. Assuming that
the black defection rate was 7.4 percent-in accordance with the
data from Table 2, Section A-not enough voters signed in to
constitute Hampton's total of 6,267. Likewise, assuming that no
whites voted Republican and that black gubernatorial non-voting
among sign-ins was 1.3 percent, not enough voters signed in to
constitute Chamberlain's total of 3,107. The state Board of Can-
vassers was certainly correct in declaring the returns from
Edgefield County suspect.
The next county, Williamsburgh, saw Chamberlain do better
than predicted, but Hampton stay within the normal range. Again,
the explanation is found in voter sign-ins. Votes exceeded voters
by 165. There is some indication that two of the eleven precincts
in Williamsburgh had failed to record the number of sign-ins by
race. If the sign-in count from those two precincts simply had
been neglected when the county data were compiled, it would account for the disparity. Nevertheless, the vote in Williamsburgh
estimated from sign-ins officially reported deviates significantly
from that actually cast.'2
Finally, the one suspicious county in which Chamberlain did
better than predicted and Hampton did worse (a pattern of consis12 H. Rept. 175, II, 63.
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COUNTING THE VOTES 183
tent pro-Republican advantage) was, ironically, Laurens, which
the partisan Board of Canvassers excluded from the election. Yet,
the irony disappears when actual votes are compared to sign-ins.
As Table I reveals, the quantities are exactly the same. That
Hampton's vote would exactly equal the number of white signins, that Chamberlain's vote would exactly equal the number of
black sign-ins, and, thus, that the total gubernatorial vote would
equal the total number of sign-ins is completely implausible. The
most likely explanation is that election officials in Laurens neglected to report sign-ins by race. Instead, they simply assumed
that all of Hampton's votes came from whites and all of Chamber-
lain's came from blacks. Given a certain amount of black defec-
tion, however, the actual Democratic vote appears too small and
the Republican vote too large. The existing literature, including
the Congressional reports of the era, is silent regarding this odd
correspondence between sign-ins and votes. Nonetheless, it is
sufficient, by itself, to make the 1876 election return from Laurens
questionable.
The counties in which suspect returns occurred, relative to
sign-ins, are distinguished statistically from those for which no sus-
picions exist. The estimated racial pattern in partisan preference
differs systematically across the two subsets, legitimating a formal
division of the sample. As seen in Table 2, Section B, the outlier
subset (five counties) generates more illogical results relative to
the estimates for the entire sample, Section A. As seen in Table 2,
Section C, such illogical results virtually disappear for the nonoutlier subset (twenty-six counties), and a greater number of the
coefficients become statistically significant. Whites in the counties
that are not suspect on the basis of sign-ins voted almost unanimously for Hampton. Blacks in those counties voted nearly 9 percent for Hampton and more than 91 percent for Chamberlain.
The conclusion from the outlier analysis is that the gubernatorial vote in those five counties does not seem to be entirely
trustworthy, based on election-day sign-ins. Individually, they are
identifiable by anomalous vote tallies. Collectively, they produce
an electoral pattern systematically different from the other counties. Outlier status, however, does not automatically indicate the
existence of intentional fraud or intimidation. Errors in the math-
ematical computation of sign-ins could conceivably have created
the appearance of county anomaly, or special circumstances might
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184 I RONALD F. KING
Table 2 1876 South Carolina Gubernatorial Election, Estimates Based on 1876
Sign-Ins
PARAMETER ESTIMATES VOTER ALLOCATION
CONSTANT BLACK SIGN-INS WHITES BLACKS
A. ALL SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTIES EXCEPT CHARLESTON (N=31)
Hampton 1.0571070* -.9833770* 105.7% 7.4%
Chamberlain -.0330201 .9462261* -3-3 91 3
Non-Voters -.0240865 .0371507 -2.4 1.3
B. SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTIES WITH SUSPECT OUTLIER RESULTS (N=5)
Hampton 1.137231* -I.05968I* I13.7% 7.8%
Chamberlain -.001457 .866552 -0.I 86.5
Non-Voters -.135774 .193129 -13.6 5-7
C. SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTIES WITH NO SUSPECT OUTLIER RESULTS (N=26)
Hampton I.o06980* -.929950* Io101.7% 8.7%
Chamberlain -.033882 .949498* -3-4 91.6
Non-Voters .o169o02 -.019546* 1.7 -0.3
*p < .05
have led to an unusual pattern of voting, such as local blacks or
whites in a particular county expressing preferences markedly different from those across the state as a whole.
Reciprocally, this search for intentional fraud or intimidation
via outlier status is not comprehensive. Illegal campaign activities
could have affected only voter turnout in a county; the relationship between sign-ins and vote preferences could have remained
unexceptional. Nevertheless, a hypothetical court investigating
the legitimacy of any election would look first at the number of
votes cast, the number of individuals who signed in to vote on
election day, and the association between them. Under the circumstances of this election, it would be hard-pressed to accept
suspect county returns in which votes and voters do not correspond. The next stage in the analysis, beyond the identification of
implausible electoral results, is to adjust for them.
A MORE PLAUSIBLE RESULT-COUNTERFACTUAL VOTE SIMULATION
The object is to construct a reasonable counterfactual outcome,
suggesting what would have occurred in the outlier counties had
extraordinary fraud and intimidation not occurred and more normal electoral circumstances had prevailed instead. Using ecologi-
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COUNTING THE VOTES 185
cal regression, behavioral estimates for black and white voters are
computed for the subset of South Carolina counties not under suspicion. These coefficients are then extracted and applied to the
subset of counties identified previously as outliers. The recalculated election returns are a simulation, under "partial equilibrium"
conditions, of the probable result had the electoral pattern by race
in the outlier counties been similar to that in the non-outlier
counties. Assuming that no other variable systematically differentiates the two sides of the divided sample, this procedure permits an
informed conjecture, allowing for the usual statistical hesitance,
about which candidate should have been declared the winner in
1876.
This procedure for counterfactual analysis should not rely
on the data set based on sign-ins by race for four reasons: First,
the data regarding sign-ins is probably inaccurate in certain counties-for example, Williamsburgh and Laurens. Second, Charleston, which contained more than 23,000 voters (13 percent of the
total), has no sign-in data. Third, fraud or intimidation could have
affected the share of sign-ins relative to potential voters. Fourth, it
is empirically circular to calculate the "normal" votes in certain
counties from the same data that was used to identify them as abnormal; the re-estimation results will vary from the original as a
matter of course. Therefore, this counterfactual analysis employs
the other available data set-the 1875 state census count of males,
twenty-one years of age or older, categorized by county and by
race. Even though the 1875 census count most likely
underestimates the eligible voters in 1876, especially white voters
(as discussed earlier), ecological analysis can accommodate such
underestimation by again removing any constraints that limit
the outcome to the range zero-to-one. Previously, illogical results-such as whites voting greater than 100 percent for the
Democratic candidate-were permitted because they served as
prima facie evidence of electoral corruption; now they will be admitted because of the problems inherent in using 1875 data for a
1876 election, only on the condition that the empirical results
conform to plausible expectations.
Table 3 demonstrates the findings from the ecological regressions using the census data from 1875. The independent variable is
the black percentage of males twenty-one and older. The dependent variable is the percentage of males twenty-one and older who
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I86 RONALD F. KING
cast ballots for Hampton, for Chamberlain, or did not vote.
Summed across all thirty-two counties, blacks voted approximately 12 percent Democratic and 88 percent Republican. Whites
voted considerably more then 100 percent Democratic, reflecting
the probable undercount of white eligible voters in the 1875 Census.
As before, the statistical improbability that the outlier subset
could be derived from the main set, differentiated only by random
chance variation, justifies a division of the sample. The outlier
subset of five counties, by itself, has results that are unstable and il-
logical. When removed, leaving the nonsuspect subset of twentyseven counties, whites in the 1875 census voted approximately 1o3
percent for Hampton and blacks approximately Io percent.
The counterfactual is constructed by applying the estimated
central tendency from the nonsuspect subset to the demographic
distribution in the suspect counties. The findings are reported in
Table 4. According to the official tally, Chamberlain won in the
nonsuspect counties by 6,661 votes, and he lost in the suspect
counties by 7,795 votes, resulting ostensibly in a I,134-vote
Hampton victory. The simulated vote for the two candidates in
the suspect counties, however, is almost equal, giving Chamberlain the state by 6,485 votes. The official count awarded Cham-
berlain 47.7 percent of the vote. The Board of Canvassers,
excluding returns from Edgefield and Laurens, gave Chamberlain
50.9 percent. In this simulation, which identifies a greater number
of counties as suspect and, unlike the state Board, corrects for
probable fraud and intimidation by re-estimation rather than vote
rejection, Chamberlain does even better, receiving 51.8 percent of
the vote. The controversial State Board of Canvassers was correct
in reversing the direction of the probable gubernatorial result. It
also seems to have been somewhat too cautious in the extent of its
corrections.
Some remarkable changes in vote outcome become visible
when the simulation is disaggregated by county. Edgefield, which
by the official tally showed 2,252 more gubernatorial votes than
individuals eligible according to the 1875 census, has its total vote
decline by 25 percent under stimulation. Barnwell and Edgefield
counties, both with strong black majorities, show surprising
Hampton wins turning into sizable losses. Anderson, despite a
large white majority, sees the Hampton margin decline from 79
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COUNTING THE VOTES 187
Table 3 1876 South Carolina Gubernatorial Election, Estimates Based on 1875
Census, Males Twenty-One and Older
PARAMETER ESTIMATES VOTER ALLOCATION
CONSTANT BLACK SIGN-INS WHITES BLACKS
A. ALL SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTIES EXCEPT CHARLESTON (N=32)
Hampton 1.o5463 I0* -.9281380* Io5.5% 12.6%
Chamberlain -.o866495 .9675668* -8.7 88.I
Non-Voters .0320 I 81 - .0394289 3.2 -0.7
B. SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTIES WITH SUSPECT OUTLIER RESULTS (N=5)
Hampton .979349 -.5619o6 97.9% 41.7%
Chamberlain -.222805 1.057536 -22.3 83.5
Non-Voters .243455 -.495630 24.3 -25.2
C. SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTIES WITH NO SUSPECT OUTLIER RESULTS (N=27)
Hampton 1.026784" -.924009* 102.7% 10.3%
Chamberlain -.o55914 .942658* -5.6 88.7
Non-Voters .029130 -.o018649 2.9 1.o
*p < .05
percent to 67 percent. In Laurens, it declines from 62 percent to
52 percent. Williamsburgh's net change, however, is relatively
small and in an anti-Republican direction, confirming our supposition that a computational mistake in the sign-in number, not
fraud, made the county appear anomalous. Although this analysis
has shown that the Board of Canvassers was somewhat arbitrary
and myopic in giving its full attention to only Edgefield and
Laurens, the simulation adjustments from these two counties alone
would have been sufficient to change the gubernatorial outcome.
Importantly, the core finding of this study-that, by an accounting more informed than the one performed by the state
Board of Canvassers, the Republican party should have remained
the winner of the 1876 elections in South Carolina-is robust,
given alternative specifications of the main variables. For example,
Democrats at the time argued that the election bias was more
heavily weighted to favor Chamberlain. Beaufort and Charleston,
the focus of the attack, do not appear as outliers in any version of
the analysis. Yet, Colleton and Orangeburgh, as the only two
counties with a Chamberlain vote greater than black males over
twenty-one according to the 1875 census account, may well de-
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I88 RONALD F. KING
Table 4 Electoral Outcomes, Actual versus Simulated, Based on 1875 Census,
Males Twenty-One and Older
ACTUAL ACTUAL SIMULATED ACTUAL SIMULATED
NON-OUTLIER OUTLIER OUTLIER ALL ALL
COUNTIES COUNTIES COUNTIES COUNTIES COUNTIES
Hampton 73,2Io 19,o51 14,358 92,261 87,568
Chamberlain 79,871 11,256 14,182 9I,I27 94,053
Not Voting 2,788 -1,233 534 1,555 3,322
Total 155,869 29,o074 29,o74 184,943 184,943
Table 5 Comparison of Outcomes Across Various Vote Counts
HAMPTON CHAMBERLAIN TOTAL
Official vote
count 92,261 (50.3%) 9I,I27 (47.7%) 183,388
Board of
Canvassers count 83,078 (49.1%) 86,216 (50.9%) 169,294
Simulated count
(census) 87,568 (48.2%) 94,053 (51.8%) 181,62I
Simulated count
(outliers +) 87,326 (48.6%) 92,411 (51.4%) 179,737
Simulated count
(Sign-ins) 90,477 (49.8%) 91,271 (50.2%) 181,748
serve outlier status on that basis. A second counterfactual simula-
tion, adding Colleton and Orangeburgh to the list of outliers,
subject to re-estimation based on the central tendency of the other
twenty-five counties, does not change the outcome. Chamberlain's margin remains more than 5,000 votes, and his calculated
percentage declines by only 0.4 percent. Similarly, the counterfactual analysis was performed based on the 1876 sign-in data. Despite implausibly low sign-in totals for Edgefield, Laurens, and
Williamsburgh, Chamberlain still wins upon re-estimation, with
50.2 percent of the total vote.
The object of this analysis is to bring rigorous social science methods to bear on a question that more traditional historiography has
not been able to answer. As in any research project, quantitative or
qualitative, the cumulative effect of findings in the same direction,
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Table 6 County Details, Outliers Subset-Eligibile Voters, Actual Vote, and Simulated Vote
WHITE BLACK HAMPTON CHAMBERLAIN NOT VOTE HAM
COUNTY ELIGIBLES ELIGIBLES ACTUAL ACTUAL ACTUAL SIMULA
Anderson 3,329 2,215 4,155 1,124 265 3
Barnwell 2,583 4,734 3,956 2,778 583 3
Edgefield 2,722 4,400 6,267 3,10o7 -2,252
Laurens
2,259
2,844
2,916
1,804
383
Williamsburgh 1,412 2,576 1,757 2,443 -21
Total 12,305 16,769 19,o51 11,256 -1,233 1
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190 RONALD F. KING
rather than any single piece of evidence, is ultimately what makes
a conclusion convincing. In the 1876 gubernatorial election in
South Carolina, whites voted with virtual unanimity for the Dem-
ocratic candidate, and approximately Io percent of the eligible
black voters (according to the 1875 census) did so as well, under
normal conditions-about 9 percent of all those who signed in to
vote in 1876. Hence, black defectors constituted between 9,ooo
and I I,ooo votes out of 183,ooo cast. Given the size of the black
majority in the state, this number was not enough to make
Hampton the winner.
Hampton's apparent victory depended upon extraordinary
outcomes in a few outlier counties. The qualitative record indicates the presence of extensive fraud and intimidation, especially
concerning Edgefield, Laurens, and Barnwell counties. This quantitative analysis suggests that such fraud and intimidation were re-
markably effective. It further suggests that the state Board of
Canvassers was correct in the general direction of its adjustment
when it rejected certain county returns. Chamberlain, who lost
the election according to the count of ballots actually cast, would
probably have won had the election not been so corrupt.
This analysis should be viewed as a segment within a much
larger research project. For example, this article does not discuss in
detail the extensive record of partisan charges and counter-charges
compiled in response to the 1876 election. It is restricted only to
the South Carolina gubernatorial vote and does not incorporate
the Electoral College and other statewide contests. Because it focuses mainly on the direction and degree of South Carolina's estimated fraud, it does not delve into exactly where and why this
fraud occurred. Nor does it compare the South Carolina result
with those of the other main contested states in 1876, Louisiana
and Florida. Nevertheless, preliminary analyses in general confirm
the main hypotheses. Implausible election returns, predominantly
in a pro-Democratic direction, occurred most often where racial
tensions were high. When adjusted under simulation, the elections of 1876 show majorities for Reconstruction state govern-
ments, which, under normal conditions, were supported
overwhelmingly by black voters. Redeemer victories in the South
could be sustained solely on the basis of extraordinary electoral irregularities. Hence, the state returning boards seem to have acted
with justification in overturning the ostensible outcome and de-
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COUNTING THE VOTES 191
claring Rutherford B. Hayes the victor over Samuel J. Tilden.
However, the federal government's decision to withdraw federal
troops and allow Reconstruction state governments to collapse
was most likely contrary to the democratic will. It certainly seems
to have been so in South Carolina.13
Elections are rule-governed activities. The rules determine
not only who can vote, when and where voting occurs, and what
outcome constitutes winning; they also determine which officials
are to count the votes, certify the victor, and validate the electoral
procedure. This is not a trivial task, as shown by 2000 presidential
election. A vote intended is not the same as a vote cast, which is
not the same as a vote recorded. The differences do not often af-
fect the result of a major election, but they can-and they have at
certain critical points in American political history.
During his final days in office, Chamberlain complained that
the legitimate state government in South Carolina, abandoned by
the federal authorities, would fall before "insurrectionary forces
too powerful to be resisted." The consequences, he predicted,
would be tragic. " [I]f a majority of the people in a State are unable
by physical force to maintain their rights, they must be left to political servitude."'14
13 King, "Hayes Wins: A Revisionist Account of the Presidential Vote in 1876," PRG( Report, XXIII (2000), 20-25.
14 Zuczek, State of Rebellion, 201.
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