Personality and Individual Differences 47 (2009) 481–486
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Personality and Individual Differences
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid
Negative feedback and performance: The moderating effect of emotion regulation
Jacquelyn N. Raftery a, George Y. Bizer b,*
a
b
Clark University, Worcester, MA 01610, United States
Union College, Schenectady, NY 12308, United States
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 29 August 2008
Received in revised form 8 April 2009
Accepted 22 April 2009
Available online 28 May 2009
Keywords:
Emotion regulation
Test performance
Personality
Negative feedback
a b s t r a c t
Whereas prior research has shown that individual differences in emotion regulation have important
implications for relationships, affect and well-being, we investigated whether such individual differences
also impact how people respond to negative feedback. Participants completed an ambiguous test on
which they would be unable to gauge their performance. Some participants were told that they performed poorly, while others were told that they performed slightly above average. Participants then completed a second test that ostensibly measured a similar construct. Finally, after taking part in an unrelated
task, participants completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003) to assess reappraisal (thinking about a situation to change its emotional impact) and suppression (inhibiting emotionexpressive behavior). Among reappraisers, those who received negative feedback completed the second
test more quickly and performed better than did such people who received moderate feedback. No such
effects were found among suppressors. These findings suggest that individual differences in reappraisal
and suppression are meaningful in terms of how negative feedback affects subsequent cognitive
performance.
Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
People use a variety of strategies to manage or regulate their
emotions. According to the process model of emotion regulation
(Gross, 1998), emotion response tendencies are coordinated responses that involve changes in expressive behavior, subjective
experience and physiological systems (Gross & John, 2003; John
& Gross, 2004). Emotion response tendencies are elicited only by
situations evaluated as significant, such that they offer rewarding
opportunities or aversive threats (Frijda, 1986). Once generated,
emotion response tendencies can be modulated (Gross & John,
2003; John & Gross, 2004), which will ultimately shape the observable emotional response. The process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998) categorizes emotion regulation strategies
according to when they impact this process, whether during the
evaluation of potential emotional situations or during the modulation of response tendencies.
1.1. Cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression
Cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression are two commonly investigated strategies of emotion regulation that can be
differentiated in terms of whether they occur before or after emotion response tendencies have been triggered and have changed
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 518 388 6228; fax: +1 518 388 6177.
E-mail address: [email protected] (G.Y. Bizer).
0191-8869/$ - see front matter Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2009.04.024
physiological, behavioral and experiential responding (Gross,
2001; Gross & John, 2002; Gross, Richards, & John, 2006; John &
Gross, 2004). Cognitive reappraisal is a strategy in which a person
thinks about a situation to change its emotional impact. For example, a person utilizing cognitive reappraisal during a job interview
might interpret the interview as an opportunity to learn more
about a position rather than a judgment of his or her potential as
an employee. As a result, the interview may not be evaluated as
nerve-wracking and thus would not elicit corresponding response
tendencies. For example, in an early study on cognitive reappraisal,
Lazarus and Alfert (1964) found that leading participants to reappraise a film about a primitive ritual sub-incision as a joyful celebration (instead of a painful procedure) minimized physiological
and subjective emotion responses.
Expressive suppression, in contrast, refers to the inhibition of
emotion-expressive behavior (Gross & Levenson, 1993). Unlike
cognitive reappraisal, expressive suppression affects the modulation of emotion response tendencies already generated. For example, a person may suppress his or her feelings during an argument
with friends by concealing his or her feelings of anger from others
during the confrontation. Gross and Levenson (1993) found that,
compared to control participants, participants assigned to suppress
their emotions while watching a disgust-eliciting film demonstrated decreased emotion-expressive behavior (they were less
likely to move/touch their face or body) but were equally likely
to report feeling disgust. Suppression also produced a physiologically mixed state: signs of both greater arousal (increased
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J.N. Raftery, G.Y. Bizer / Personality and Individual Differences 47 (2009) 481–486
cardiovascular, electrodermal responses, and blinking) and lesser
arousal (decreased heart rate and somatic activity) were observed.
This suggests that while suppression may inhibit expressive
behavior, it may actually increase other aspects of the emotion response with changes in subjective experience and physiological
systems.
1.2. Consequences of reappraisal and suppression
Cognitive reappraisal requires individuals to reinterpret a
potentially emotion-eliciting situation so that it will be perceived
as less emotional. Researchers have found that reappraisal decreases the experience of negative emotion. Specifically, Gross
(2001) found that participants asked to reappraise an amputation
film as though they were medical professionals reported feeling
less disgust compared to participants assigned to either a suppression or control condition.
Unlike cognitive reappraisal which occurs before emotion response tendencies have been triggered, expressive suppression requires individuals to manage these rising emotion response
tendencies. Such effortful management of response tendencies
has been found to require cognitive resources that could otherwise
be used for functioning in emotional contexts. Richards and Gross
(2000), for example, found that participants asked to suppress
while watching a film eliciting negative emotion showed poorer
memory of auditory and visual details of the film compared to participants given no such instruction. This suggests that there are
cognitive costs to suppression, specifically poorer recognition and
recall.
1.3. Individual differences in emotion regulation
There is an extensive literature investigating individual differences in people’s emotional responses. One such area involves
emotional intelligence, the ability to perceive, understand, and regulate emotions (cf. Mayer & Salovey, 1997). A wide body of research has shown that the construct predicts a variety of
important life outcomes. For example, children higher in emotional
intelligence are more socially competent (Denham et al., 2003) and
perform better academically (O’Connor & Little, 2003), while adults
higher in emotional intelligence are more productive in the workplace (Elfenbein, Der Foo, White, & Tan, 2007) and more satisfied
with their lives (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999; see Mayer, Barsade, & Roberts, 2008, for a review).
Stemming from this body of work, other researchers were
interested to learn which specific strategies people use when they
attempt to regulate emotions. This interest prompted research on
individual differences in emotion regulation. Most significantly,
Gross and John (2003) developed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) to measure the habitual use of suppression and
reappraisal. The ERQ includes a six-item reappraisal scale and a
four-item suppression scale. For example, two items assessing
reappraisal are, ‘‘When I want to feel more positive emotion
(such as joy or amusement), I change what I’m thinking about,”
and, ‘‘When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the
way I’m thinking about the situation.” Two items assessing Suppression are, ‘‘I keep my emotions to myself,” and, ‘‘When I am
feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them.”
Gross and John (2003) examined the convergent validity of the
ERQ by assessing how cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression are related to four conceptually relevant constructs: perceived emotion regulation success, inauthenticity, coping style,
and mood management. They found that reappraisal and suppression were related to these constructs to varying degrees as
would be predicted by the general process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998). Gross and John (2003) also assessed the
divergent validity of the ERQ by examining associations between
these two emotion regulation strategies and the Big Five personality dimensions, as well as impulse control, cognitive ability and
social desirability. Correlations between emotion regulation strategy and these four constructs were significant but modest
(bs < .41) suggesting that the ERQ converged with these conceptually similar personality dimensions but is not simply an indicator of any of them. Finally, the scale was shown to be reliable
both internally (as > .73) and in terms of test-retest reliability
(rs = .69).
The ERQ has been used to predict meaningful outcomes. For
example, Gross and John (2002) administered the ERQ and asked
participants to complete self-ratings of their emotion experience.
Gross and John (2003) found that cognitive reappraisal was related
to more positive emotion experience and less negative emotion
experience. Further, in a study attesting to the ERQ’s ability to predict meaningful cognitive consequences, Richards and Gross (2000)
assessed participants’ memory using two measures: by asking participants how well they generally remember conversations and by
asking participants to complete a free-recall test of their own emotion regulation episodes (that they had been reporting to the
experimenter for two weeks). Participants who habitually used
suppression had worse self-reported memory and had poorer
memory of the emotion regulation episodes. Therefore, there appear to be cognitive costs for expressive suppression but not for
cognitive reappraisal.
Clearly, then, a person’s chronic style of emotion regulation
plays a role in a variety of situations. One situation which has
yet to be investigated in the context of emotion regulation, however, is a situation in which a person receives negative feedback
after performing a task. Such situations are common in everyday
life, whether it be a student learning that he or she performed
poorly on an examination or a salesperson learning that he or
she was not successful in ‘‘closing” a contract. How might a person’s dispositional style of emotion regulation impact his or her response to negative feedback? To gain insight into this question, we
turn to research on how personality moderates the effects of negative feedback.
1.4. Negative feedback and personality
In an early study on negative feedback, Waterhouse and Child
(1953) assessed whether the effects of such feedback on subsequent performance would differ as a function of personality. These
researchers found that the effect of negative feedback on ongoing
performance varies with participants’ dispositional habits of
responding to frustration. Waterhouse and Child (1953) asked participants to respond to a personality questionnaire that included
six scales measuring the participants’ tendency to respond to frustration with preoccupation, ‘‘defendance,” aggression, pessimism,
self-aggression or distractibility. Scores on these six scales were
combined to form an overall measure of the tendency to habitually
respond to frustration with disruptive reactions. Participants who
scored above the median of the overall measure formed the
‘‘high-interference” group, while participants who scored below
the median formed the ‘‘low-interference” group. Results showed
that negative feedback produced poorer performance among participants in the high-interference group, whereas negative feedback produced enhanced performance among low-interference
participants. In a similar vein, Shrauger and Rosenberg (1970)
showed that participants high in self esteem reported exerting
more effort in a future task following negative feedback. Also, Idson and Higgins (2000) found that promotion-effective participants performed better on a task after receiving success
feedback, while prevention-effective participants performed better
on the task after receiving failure feedback.
J.N. Raftery, G.Y. Bizer / Personality and Individual Differences 47 (2009) 481–486
483
1.5. The present study
As prior research has shown, it appears that there are cognitive
costs of expressive suppression but not of cognitive reappraisal
(Richards & Gross, 2000). Other research has suggested that negative feedback produces a decrease in performance if tendencies of
responding to frustration are interfering. We conducted an experiment to examine how individual differences in the use of emotion
regulation strategies moderate the effect of negative feedback on
performance. In the study, participants completed what was ostensibly an important cognitive test. After receiving either negative or
moderate false feedback, participants completed a second similar
test. We propose two potential hypotheses.
One hypothesis is that the feedback manipulation will impact
suppressors. This hypothesis rests upon the notion that because
suppression consumes cognitive resources that otherwise would
be available for other tasks, it will serve as an interfering response.
Thus, for participants who habitually use suppression, negative
feedback may produce poorer performance on a subsequent task.
If this is the case, suppressors who receive negative feedback will
show poorer performance as evidenced by fewer correct answers
and slower response times on the second examination relative to
suppressors who receive moderate feedback.
An alternative hypothesis is that feedback will affect reappraisers. This hypothesis rests upon the notion that reappraisers may
experience decreased negative emotion and increased positive
emotion when receiving negative feedback. Indeed, Gross and John
(2003) found that participants who frequently reappraise experience less negative emotion and greater positive emotion. In addition, individuals with more positive affect have been shown to
perform better on cognitive tasks than individuals with less positive affect (Hill, von Boxtel, Ponds, Houx, & Jolles, 2005). Thus,
reappraisers who receive failure feedback might reframe the negativity in a positive light, enhancing their subsequent cognitive performance. Consequently, reappraisers who receive negative
feedback may show better performance as evidenced by more correct answers and faster response times on the second exam relative to reappraisers who receive moderate feedback.
In sum, then, although prior research has investigated how dispositional emotion regulation strategies impact a variety of cognitive processes, it remains unclear how such strategies impact
performance in the face of negative feedback. Prior research suggests that negative feedback may hinder suppressors’ performance,
enhance reappraisers’ performance, or possibly yield both effects.
We conducted a laboratory experiment to explore these
possibilities.
2. Method
One hundred forty-four undergraduates participated either for
course credit or $8. Participants were told that they would be completing two separate visual-spatial tests. Participants first completed a test that resembled the Culture Fair Intelligence Test
(Cattell, 1949). Participants were told that this test was designed
to test intelligence and that it predicted future academic success.
In this test, participants were presented with a sequence of three
ambiguous patterns of shapes and lines. The participant’s task
was to identify which of four options successfully completed the
sequence (see Fig. 1 for a sample item). The test was designed to
be ambiguous so that participants could not accurately judge their
performance (cf. Hirt, McCrea, & Kimble, 2000).
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Participants assigned to the ‘‘negative feedback” condition
were told that they had answered three of the 12 questions correctly, placing them in the 14th percentile, while participants as-
Fig. 1. Sample item from the test resembling the Culture Fair Intelligence Test.
signed to the ‘‘moderate feedback” control condition were told
that they had answered seven items correctly, placing them in
the 65th percentile. All participants then completed what was
ostensibly the ‘‘Visual Spatial Intelligence Test.” These items were
taken from the Perceptual Ability Test of the Dental Admissions
Test. The test is a good predictor of students’ future academic performance (multiple-Rs > .37) and manifests good reliability
(as > .80; Graham, 1972; Kramer, Kubiak, & Smith, 1989).
For each item in this test, participants are shown a square that
represents a single sheet of paper. In a series of images, the paper is
shown to be ‘‘folded” several times. The final image represents a
hole being punched through all layers of the now-folded sheet of
paper. Participants are then asked to identify which of five images
best represents the paper were it to be unfolded (see Fig. 2 for a
sample item). Participants were told that this test measured similar constructs to the Culture Fair Intelligence Test and that it too
predicted future academic success. After taking part in an unrelated task, participants then completed a 40-item inventory, in
which the 10 questions of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire
(Gross & John, 2003) were randomly interspersed. The ERQ items
were interspersed to reduce the chances that the participants
would perceive a connection between the negative feedback and
the emotion regulation scales and thus respond untruthfully. Participants were then thanked and debriefed.
3. Results
Participants were removed from analysis (total N = 7; 4.9%) if
they did not take the task seriously as evidenced by taking an
unreasonably short amount of time (Z < 1.5) to solve any of the
12 test items.
Fig. 2. Sample item from the Perceptual Ability Test.
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3.1. Traditional analysis
We first assessed whether the total amount of time participants
needed to complete the second task differed as a function of emotion regulation and feedback. As shown in Table 1, exam duration
and correct responses were entered into a series of regression analyses in which the outcome variables were predicted by emotion
regulation scores, a variable representing the feedback condition
(1 = moderate feedback, 2 = negative feedback), and the interaction
term. The reappraisal x feedback interaction approached significance when predicting time (b = 1.10, p = .07) and number of correct answers (b = 1.04, p = .08), but the suppression feedback
interaction was a weaker predictor of time (b = .55, p = .12) and
number of correct answers (b = .43, p = .23). Although the scores
did not reach traditional levels of significance, the valence of the
interaction terms are consistent with the notion that reappraisers
performed better after negative feedback (more correct answers
and more efficient processing), while suppressors performed worse
after negative feedback.
3.2. Global emotion regulation score
Scores from the six reappraisal items and the four suppression
items were submitted to an exploratory factor analysis utilizing
oblique promax rotation. The reappraisal and suppression items
loaded on two separate factors accounting for 60.69% of the variance, suggesting that each set of items reflected an underlying factor. Table 2 presents the factor loadings. The two factors showed a
weak but significant negative correlation, r = .19, p = .02, suggesting that information about the use of one strategy provides little
information about the use of the other strategy. Therefore, we subtracted the mean of the scores on the ERQ suppression subscale
from the mean of the scores on the ERQ reappraisal subscale to
form a global emotion regulation score. Higher scores indicate
more frequent use of reappraisal relative to suppression (we refer
Time spent
Reappraisal
Style
Feedback
Style feedback
R2
N
+
.99
.64+
1.10+
.03
137
Table 3
Regression analyses for outcome variables (global regulation-score variable).
Predictor
Time spent
Correct answers
Processing style
Feedback
Processing Style feedback
R2
N
.71*
.16
.61*
.05
137
.53+
.03
.60*
.06
137
Note: values are standardized beta weights.
*
p < .05.
+
p < .10.
Table 1
Regression analyses for outcome variables.
Predictor
to such participants as relative reappraisers), while lower scores
indicate more frequent use of suppression relative to reappraisal
(we refer to such participants as relative suppressors).
A multivariate linear regression, presented in the left column of
Table 3, was conducted with feedback condition, global emotion
regulation scores, and an interaction term as predictors of total
time spent on the post-feedback test. Of most interest, there was
a feedback style interaction, b = .61, p = .04. As shown in
Fig. 3 and the left columns of Table 4, relative reappraisers who
were given negative feedback required less time to complete the
second task than were such people who were given moderate feedback (t(133) = 1.72, p = .04). Conversely, among relative suppressors, time spent on the subsequent task was not influenced by
feedback (t(133) = 1.49, p = .07), though the means trended in the
opposite direction as the relative reappraisers. As such, among relative reappraisers, those who received negative feedback spent less
time on the follow-up task than those who did not. Conversely, relative suppressors showed no such effect.
The second dependent measure was the number of correct answers on the post-feedback test. Another multivariate linear
regression, presented in the right column of Table 3, was conducted with feedback condition, emotion regulation scores, and
an interaction term as predictors of the number of correct answers.
Again, there was a feedback style interaction b = .60, p = .04. As
Correct answers
Suppression
Reappraisal
Suppression
.40
.54+
1.51
.04
137
.79
.41
1.04+
.07
137
.44+
.37
1.20
.04
137
Note: values are standardized beta weights.
*
p < .05
+
p < .10
Table 2
Factor loadings for Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.
Fig. 3. Effect of feedback on total time to complete the follow-up examination as a
function of regulation style. Processing styles are predicted means at ±1 SD (Aiken &
West, 1991).
Items
Factor Loadings
F1
F2
Reappraisal-1
Reappraisal-2
Reappraisal-3
Reappraisal-4
Reappraisal-5
Reappraisal-6
Suppression-1
Suppression-2
Suppression-3
Suppression-4
.72
.83
.33
.91
.78
.88
.07
.21
.11
.23
.02
.07
.18
.05
-.04
.00
.88
.56
.85
.78
Table 4
Means of outcome variables.
Feedback
Negative feedback
Moderate feedback
Time to complete test
Correct answers
Suppressors
Reappraisers
Suppressors
Reappraisers
411.74
363.11
420.09
476.12
7.94
8.15
9.01
7.35
Note: processing styles are predicted means at ±1 SD (Aiken and West, 1991).
J.N. Raftery, G.Y. Bizer / Personality and Individual Differences 47 (2009) 481–486
485
framed the negative feedback in a positive way, enhancing their
subsequent cognitive performance.
4.1. Implications and directions for future research
Fig. 4. Effect of feedback on number of correct answers on follow-up examination
as a function of regulation style. Processing styles are predicted means at ±1 SD
(Aiken and West, 1991).
shown in Fig. 4 and the right columns of Table 4, relative reappraisers who were given negative feedback performed better on the
subsequent examination than were such people who were given
moderate feedback (t(133) = 3.35, p < .001). Conversely, performance among relative suppressors was not influenced by feedback
(t(133) = 0.36, ns). As such, among those more likely to reappraise,
those who received negative feedback performed better on the follow-up task than those who did not. Those more likely to suppress
showed no such effect.
4. Discussion
Previous research has examined the cognitive consequences of
different emotion regulation strategies. Richards and Gross
(2000) found that two of these emotion regulation strategies, reappraisal and suppression, have different cognitive consequences. In
another area of literature, research has shown that negative feedback impacts performance differently as a function of personality.
Building upon these lines of research, we predicted that individual
differences in the use of emotion regulation strategies would moderate the effect of negative feedback on subsequent performance.
We proposed two competing hypotheses. First, we suggested that
expressive suppression might serve as an interfering response because it consumes cognitive resources. Thus, participants who
habitually use suppression might show diminished performance
as evidenced by fewer correct answers and slower response times
following negative feedback relative to suppressors receiving moderate feedback. We also suggested a second hypothesis, that reappraisers who receive failure feedback might reframe the negativity
in a positive light, enhancing their cognitive performance. Thus,
reappraisers who receive negative feedback might show enhanced
performance as evidenced by more correct answers and faster response times on the second exam relative to reappraisers who receive moderate feedback.
In our experiment, participants received either moderate or
negative feedback after taking an examination. After receiving
the feedback, participants took a second examination. A traditional
analysis employing suppression and reappraisal scores separately
failed to demonstrate statistically significant effects. Importantly,
however, analyses employing a global measure of emotion regulation provided clear support for our second hypothesis: that negative feedback enhances relative reappraisers’ performance. The
finding that negative feedback enhanced these people’s performance is consistent with Gross and John’s (2003) research, which
demonstrated that participants who frequently reappraise experience less negative emotion and greater positive emotion. Relative
reappraisers who received failure feedback may have indeed re-
Most previous research has demonstrated cognitive costs of
suppression, suggesting that suppression is consuming cognitive
resources that could be used for other tasks (Richards & Gross,
2000). Our research extends this literature by demonstrating that
reappraisal also has important, positive, cognitive consequences.
We found that cognitive reappraisers who received failure feedback showed faster response times and better performance on
the second visual spatial task relative to reappraisers who received
moderate feedback. Suppressors, however, did not show this effect.
Thus, while previous research has suggested that suppression may
be detrimental to an individual’s cognitive performance, our research shows that reappraisal may be similarly beneficial in specific
cognitive contexts, particularly situations involving negative
feedback.
Our research also speaks to the possibility that, at least in some
cases, it may be worthwhile to consider the two emotion regulation strategies not separately but rather as composites of a global
construct of emotion regulation. Indeed, research on the two strategies has generally demonstrated adaptive social and emotional
consequences for reappraisal, and maladaptive consequences for
suppression. As such, it is sensible that people who are both high
in reappraisal and low in suppression would show especially adaptive outcomes, while people who are both low in reappraisal and
high in suppression would show especially maladaptive outcomes.
By no means do we suggest that these constructs should always be
conceptualized in this manner. However, our findings do suggest
that, at least in some situations, considering the constructs as a
global score may be warranted.
Our research also has implications for interventions. Because
the academic world, for example, often involves the use of both positive and negative feedback, children may benefit from interventions designed to teach them to increase reliance on cognitive
reappraisal. Negative feedback, after all, is a common occurrence
in daily life. Such an intervention may help students maintain or
even enhance performance in situations in which they receive negative feedback. As some research has suggested that emotion regulation processes can change (e.g., John & Gross, 2004), it is
possible that such an intervention could impact a person’s emotion
regulation pattern.
An important direction for future research involves gauging the
mechanism that underlies the effect we found. One possible mechanism deals with affect. It is possible that relative reappraisers reframed the negative feedback in a positive way (e.g., as an exciting
challenge), and that this reframing led to enhanced positive affect.
Indeed, Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) showed that positive affect can broaden the scope of attention. Therefore, it may be that
relative reappraisers performed better and faster following negative feedback because a change in affect broadened their scope of
attention. Another potential direction for future research deals
with the effect’s moderators. In particular, it is possible that the effect may be moderated by the perceived importance of the task.
Although the current study employed a task of high relevance
(i.e., a task that ostensibly predicted participants’ future academic
success), one could envision a study in which the perceived importance of the examination was controlled for in a manipulation
orthogonal to the feedback manipulation. If the effect does not appear when participants believe that the examination is unimportant, an important boundary condition would be identified. If,
however, reappraisers perform better when given negative feedback regardless of perceived importance of the task, the robustness
of the effect would be underscored.
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J.N. Raftery, G.Y. Bizer / Personality and Individual Differences 47 (2009) 481–486
5. Conclusion
People receive feedback on their performance in everyday life,
whether it be in academic, business, social, or other environments.
Our research shows that while habitual reappraisers may benefit
from receiving negative feedback, habitual suppressors may not.
Our research therefore adds to the literature by demonstrating that
a global measure of emotion regulation style impacts how negative
feedback is processed and that these individual differences impact
subsequent cognitive performance. Above all, the present research
suggests that individual differences in emotion regulation have
important implications that extend to the regulators’ cognitive
performance.
Acknowledgements
We thank Wendy Grolnick, Michelle Koo, Allison Lacoff, Lara Levine, and Ana Sobel for their assistance. The research was supported by a Union College Internal Education Foundation grant
awarded to the first author.
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