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The Infamous Stalemate:
A Historical View of U.S. Cuban Relations
Relationships between countries greatly shape policies and national influence. Through
the historical study of these relationships, present policies can be better understood. As in the
case of the United States and Cuba, often the relationship between the two nations is not
acknowledged as relevant to current policies. However, the fluid nature of history makes
apparent the importance of these policies and relations of the past. Understanding where the U.S.
Cuban relationship began, where it went wrong, and how this relationship has been continually
stalemated and neglected will provide historical insight into current U.S. policies and global
influence. The stalemated historical relationship between the United States and Cuba,
perpetuated by the leadership of Fidel Castro and sustained by U.S. actions, has greatly
influenced historical and current policies, negatively affecting human rights and the United
States’ image abroad.
Over the course of American history, a little more than two-hundred years, the United
States has transformed from a cluster of colonies to a world superpower. While that
transformation had many internal aspects such as creating a constitution, electing leaders, and
establishing a thriving economy, that same transformation also relied heavily on expanding
territory, gaining power over other nations, and entering into relationships with those nations.
Since America’s infancy, many of the country’s leaders have focused on securing Cuba
as a state and desired its acquisition. All presidents from Polk to Buchanan tried to purchase
Cuba from Spain (Herring 217). Around 1823, the same time that the United States was working
to gain the current state of Texas, they were simultaneously working toward acquiring Cuba
(Wylie 4). This illustrated the United States’ belief in the concept of manifest destiny.
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While the United States was working to grow and expand its territory, Cuba was
similarly working to establish itself and gain independence from Spain. Jose Martin became the
leader of the Cuban revolution and came to symbolize the Cuban people’s ability to gain liberty,
justice, and equality (Voices of Cuba). Martin believed there should be a balance of power in
world politics so that no one superpower could dominate smaller nation states. Spain eventually
withdrew from Cuba, and the Cuban patriots reveled in their successful revolution. However,
their independence was short lived when the USS Maine exploded leading to the “Splendid Little
War.” Following this, Cuba became a virtual colony of the United States for over 50 years. After
the Spanish-American War, the United States gave itself the right to intervene politically,
economically, and agriculturally in Cuba’s development. The Cubans felt robbed of their
revolution and saw the United States not as a defender and helper but as an aggressor (Voices of
Cuba). This act changed the perception of the United States for the Cubans as well as other
international onlookers.
A shift of focus from the Old World to the New World took place at this time. With this
shift came the Monroe Doctrine that declared a “non-colonization principle” to prevent
occupation by European powers in the Americas (Herring 156). By the 1890s, America
dominated Cuba’s economy by establishing sugar estates, mines, and ranches in Cuba (Herring
290). The United States helped liberate Cuba from Spanish rule at the end of the nineteenth
century, but the U.S. only replaced the Spanish as colonial ruler of Cuba (Brown 294).Taking
control of Cuba for sixty years following the Spanish-American war is an act still resented by the
Cubans. In 1901, the Platt Amendment, which was attached to the Cuban constitution, claimed
Cuba as a country that the U.S. vowed to “protect” (Dunne 448). Franklin Delano Roosevelt
eventually gave up America’s “right” to intervene in Cuban affairs in 1934 in an attempt to
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respect the Treaty of Relations known as the Good Neighbor Policy. While this repealed the Platt
Amendment, the United States continued to remain an influential power over the country
(Herring 500). The constant American attempts to annex and control Cuba showed the United
States’ perception of the “malleability of Cuban sovereignty” (Wylie 23). Through this
malleability, United States leaders attempted to put a Cuban leader in power that would align
with American thoughts, ideals, and policies. The United States first supported the rise of
General Fulgencio E. Batista because he was an “ardent anticommunist and consistently
supported U.S. foreign policy goals” (Wylie 4). Yet it quickly grew apparent that the Batista
regime was corrupt.
Fidel Castro, who grew up viewing the United States as an exploiter of his people, was
especially outraged by American intervention (Munton 12). Castro believed that the government
of the United States had been working to create an unfavorable image of the Cuban Revolution
in hopes of halting the influence of revolutionary ideas (Castro 256). Castro, who was offered the
opportunity to play baseball for the New York Giants as a pitcher, saw his role in the revolution
as more essential to Cuban prosperity (Herring 687). He was a law student who quickly grew
furious with the Batista regime and set out on a quest to bring political reform to Cuba (Voices of
Cuba). As a young, eager, and energetic revolutionary, he helped organize and lead a guerilla
war to overthrow the Cuban dictator Batista and came to power in 1959 (Carter 63). The basis of
the revolution was to end Batista’s corrupt and brutal rule and to restore Cuban rights and
democracy. Yet through the revolution, Batista was only replaced with the Communist Castro
(Craughwell 185). He was praised as someone who would lead Cuba to democracy, and he
pledged democratic sentiments while announcing he was not a Communist. Fidel Castro even
quoted the American Declaration of Independence in his trial speech after the revolution. He
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explained that these self-evident rights are universal and belong to the Cuban people as well
(Castro 115). Yet despite these proclamations he quickly began implementing socialist policies.
Castro intended to provide political and economic reform to Cuba but came to symbolize antiAmericanism (Langley vii). Eventually, he wanted to lessen American influence on Cuba but
still looked for allies that had the power to help Cuba maintain its independence. Castro admitted
that history would absolve him for any crimes he committed during the revolution. It appeared
that history did absolve him as he rose to power in Cuba and began drifting toward the Soviet
Union (Munton 15). This immediately strained relations with the United States, and these
tensions only continued to escalate through the Cold War.
Once Castro came to power, America quickly grew nervous about having a socialist
neighbor so close to home, especially a socialist neighbor that was leaning towards communism,
as “the spread of communism was the defining geopolitical concern of the age – the organizing
principle on which nearly every act and policy of U.S. foreign relations depended” (Rasenberger
17). Castro quickly seized farmland, executed prisoners, and nationalized companies and
businesses making it clear that Cuba was becoming a Communist state (Craughwell 186). The
turn from a ‘democratic revolution’ to communism was evident in the short time of nine months.
Fidel had successfully made out of Cuba the first socialist republic in the Western Hemisphere
(Rivero 63). During the administrations of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy,
multiple plans to oust Castro were created, including the Bay of Pigs invasion (Carter 64). After
the Bay of Pigs fiasco, tensions continued to escalate throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis (Pike
213). The missile crisis that soon ensued changed how Americans lived and how they viewed
their Cuban neighbors south of Florida. The Bay of Pigs invasion similarly changed Americans’
view of their dearly beloved President Kennedy, which reflected on the world image of the
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United States as well. It is clear that from the very beginning of involvement with Cuba, the
relationships that the United States built with Cuba as well as those relationships that they refuse
to mend affect both nations. They are influential on the world, and they shape national and global
policy.
Today, relations with Cuba are essentially “swept under the rug.” Many Americans do
not recognize the policies surrounding Cuba, restrictions placed upon both the government and
people of Cuba, or how the poor relationship between the United States and Cuba remains a
stalemate even years after the Cold War. In a telegram from Soviet Union leader Nikita
Khrushchev to President John F. Kennedy, he explained that the “little war in Cuba” could cause
a chain reaction throughout the globe, and that is certainly what occurred (Office of the
Historian). The United States was determined that the Communist domino-effect would not
occur again; for this reason, the United States’ policies toward Cuba and other Latin American
countries were greatly affected after Castro’s rise to power, and the United States began to
isolate Cuba economically and diplomatically.
Cuba’s economy survived by trade and subsidies from the Soviet Union, but with the
collapse of the USSR, Cuba faced numerous hardships. A program of economic denial was
instituted in order to demonstrate that communism had no future in the Western Hemisphere. It
also showed that the Cuban regime could not serve the interests of the Cuban people and
increased the cost of maintaining a Communist outpost in the Western Hemisphere for the USSR
(Ball 12-13). Part of this Economic Denial Program consisted of denying goods that were vital to
the operation of the Cuban economy such as industrial goods and transportation equipment (Ball
17). The embargo prevented Cuba from buying oil in the open market; the oil they produced was
heavy and harmful to the economy and the environment and often led to fuel shortages and
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electricity rationing. Blackouts, therefore, were common. The lack of fuel and raw materials led
to factory closures, and consequently, unemployment increased. These hardships snowballed to
form an economic and ideological crisis when the blockade grew stricter. This embargo program
was intended to continue as long as the Cuban government remained; parts of it are still in place
today. This proves that the embargo has seemingly affected U.S. Cuban relations permanently.
Supporters of the embargo believed that tightening economic sanctions would weaken
Castro’s hold on power by reducing his ability to “devote dwindling resources to lower ranks of
the Party faithful who may then desert him” (Schweitzer 56). Yet some scholars thought that if
the United States would “drop the embargo immediately the olas of the free market – American
ideas, American people, American investment – would roll over Cuba’s socialist system, and
bring Fidel Castrol down with less violence” (Ratliff 51). The embargo has been a policy issue of
great debate throughout the United States, presidential administrations, and the international
system.
In an attempt to isolate Cuba economically and diplomatically, the United States expelled
Cuba from the organization of American States in 1962 (Herring 707). The Kennedy
Administration developed the Economic Denial Program “to generate discontent through
economic deprivation” (Schoultz 178). This embargo began in 1962 and used unilateral U.S.
actions toward Cuba during the height of the Cold War to isolate the island (Purcell 453). They
attempted to cut Cuba off from the noncommunist world by terminating trade between the
United States and Cuba. This hurt the Cuban economy almost immediately, and it also hurt the
Cuban farmers who used American equipment and machinery (Schoultz 201). Along with the
Economic Denial Program, tourism was no longer allowed from the U.S. to any Communist
controlled country (Schoultz 203). Because of the Economic Denial Program, Cuba’s “per capita
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gross national product had dropped by an astounding 30 percent, in large measure as a
consequence of the decline in trade with the West” (Schoultz 207). Then, following this
program, the White House sponsored a Trading with the Enemy Act which froze all Cuban assets
in the U.S.; no one could engage in “unlicensed financial transactions with Cuba” (Schoultz
207).
The embargo has also been a large component of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The United
States has created policies since 1898 that “relegated Cuba to a subservient role politically and
economically” (Langley vii). The embargo, as it is currently, appears to the rest of the world to
be a selfish and stubborn act of the United States and it is acknowledged that U.S. “policy toward
Cuba has more to do with domestic issues and perceptions of identity in [the United States] than
with what is actually taking place internationally or in Cuba” (Wylie 1). This embargo is
perceived as a giant beating up a child; it puts the rest of the world on Cuba’s side. Cubans are
suffering both because of Castro’s regime and because of U.S. policy. The embargo against Cuba
is used by Castro as an excuse for further oppressing the Cuba people (Reed 39). It gives Castro
an excuse to both hide behind and justify that the suffering endured by his people is not his fault:
The U.S. embargo has done nothing but present Fidel Castro with a means for justifying
human rights violations throughout his regime. Although the United States could
intervene on behalf of the Cuban people, it has chosen to do nothing and maintains the
failed embargo only to give the appearance of holding a hard line against Cuba.
(Gonzalez 66)
The embargo is hurting the Cuban people while Castro is using it as a justification for his human
rights violations.
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The blockade and embargo continuously hurts the Cuban people in terms of health and
nutrition and damages them psychologically and medically (Voices of Cuba). The United
Nations has denounced the embargo as a violation of international trade laws, and for more than
12 years the United Nations General Assembly has been voting (almost unanimously) to
condemn the U.S. embargo on Cuba. Israel and the United States have been the only two
constant countries in favor of the embargo (Knippers Black 61). The entire world, save these two
countries with the Marshall Islands and Palau, is against the United States regarding its stance on
Cuba. This is providing an effective way to spread communism by making a heros of
communists and giving the world a reason to feel sympathetic toward them (Reed 49). The
United States’ stance toward Cuba has been criticized continuously:
Covert action in an open, democratic system, the use of pre-emptive attacks on
governments not friendly to the United States, and assassination – all violated basic
constitutional principles, traditional American beliefs, the fundamental ethics of a
republic, the nation’s own neutrality laws, and at minimum the peacekeeping mission of
the UN charter. (Jones 5)
During a visit to Cuba in 1998, Pope John Paul II criticized the embargo. This was the first time
many Americans came to question it (Wylie 10). For the first time in twenty-nine years, Castro
announced that Cubans would be allowed to celebrate Christmas while the Pope was in Cuba.
The meeting between the Pope and Castro was historic; it was a meeting that “brought together a
pontiff well known for his bold stance against communism in Eastern Europe and a bearded
dictator educated by Jesuits” (Heindl 180). During the visit, Pope John Paul II met with
opposition leaders, encouraged Castro to improve human rights in Cuba, and criticized the
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United States for the embargo. The Pope advised that the United States should engage the Cuban
people rather than isolate them.
As the United States continues to isolate Cuba, it has remained on the state sponsor of
terrorism list as a designated terrorist state since 1982. The United States refuses to remove Cuba
from that list despite the fact that in the past the United States has traded and engaged with other
Communist regimes. Cuba, unlike North Korea which was removed from the state sponsor of
terrorism list in 2008, does not have nor is it attempting to acquire nuclear arms. Cuba also does
not have a large army and is not a “rogue state” (Reed 41). Keeping Cuba on the list of state
sponsors of terrorism today “weakens and trivializes the credibility of the U.S. war against
terrorism. Cuba was, instead, highly supportive of the U.S. war on terror” (Nicol 267). Further,
with around 400 attempts made by the United States to assassinate Fidel Castro, the U.S. has
been a sponsor of terrorism against Castro and Cuba (Knippers Black 61). Because of this,
Castroism could be the inevitable product of more than a century of American meddling in
Cuban affairs and practices. Washington’s poor record of dealing with Cuba includes the long
support of the Batista regime followed by CIA funding of Castro forces. Yet after Castro’s
victory, assassination plots were designed which were then followed by the Bay of Pigs invasion.
These actions, paired with Castro’s socialist philosophy, caused Cuba to become a client of the
Soviet Union (Goodman). U.S. policy in Cuba is greatly harming the United States’ identity as a
moral leader in the Western Hemisphere, and through these policies, often times human rights
issues are overlooked and even ignored.
Fidel Castro has been in power through eleven American presidential administrations, all
of which have opposed him. Congress reinforces this stereotype of Castro that the presidents,
beginning with Eisenhower, have created. The CIA saw that the most direct way to remove Fidel
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Castro from office was to kill him, and it had been plotting to assassinate Castro since at least the
summer of 1960 (Thomas 153). During the Administration of President Eisenhower, a plan to
oust Fidel Castro was approved by both the President himself and the CIA. The CIA declared
war on Cuba without consulting Congress or the American public. This war was riddled with
illegal acts and violated multiple neutrality acts, laws, and regulations (Leonard). Eisenhower
accepted a proposal and policy which allowed for the immediate plotting of Castro’s demise in
1960, dubbed Operation Mongoose (Carter 64). The CIA and Eisenhower created a permanent
paramilitary subculture that aimed to overthrow Castro and rid Cuba of communism, a policy
that has been a repeated failure in numerous presidential administrations.
Beginning with President Eisenhower, the United States embarked on a program of
sabotage. Focusing on blowing up specific targets such as “refineries, power plants, micro wave
stations, ration and RV installations, strategic highway bridges and railroad facilities, military
and naval installations and equipment, certain industrial plants and sugar refineries” (Schoultz
175). The American leaders thought this would help stir emotions on the island, hoping that this
would somehow lead to confusion, disorder, and an eventual overthrow of Castro. Instead
Operation Mongoose was created to work on “bold new actions which ranged from heaven
(enlisting the cooperation of the Church to bring the women of Cuba into action) to hell
(exploiting the potential of the underworld in Cuban cities to harass and bleed the Communist
control apparatus)” (Schoultz 177). By the start of Kennedy’s presidency in 1961, Operation
Mongoose was in full swing. This policy was intended to have the full support of the U.S.
military and aimed to oust Castro and turn the Cuban regime away from communism, but all of
these tactics and policies put in place eventually failed to overthrow Castro.
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The first part of the plan was to turn Cuba away from Castro. To rid the country of their
loyalty to their long standing leader would be essential in the eventual overturning of
communism. The Technical Services Division (TSD) tried to undermine Castro and show him as
an unreliable figurehead. In 1960 they sprayed his broadcasting studio with a chemical that
produced behavior similar to LSD, but the chemical did not work. They also put a chemical into
his box of cigars in hopes of disorienting Castro before he gave a speech, but he could not be
convinced to smoke them (Wyden 40). These and numerous other attempts to undermine Castro
seemed useless; Castro appeared to be untouchable. The CIA then turned to assassination
attempts.
For one attempt, the CIA actually provided a Cuban dissident with several thousand
dollars to put poison pills in a bowl of Castro’s ice cream. The dissident, for some reason,
(perhaps convenience and safekeeping) put the pills in the freezer, and when it was time to
poison Castro, the pills were frozen and unusable (Craughwell 183). The Mafia and CIA also
worked together in attempts to assassinate Castro. The Mafia was contracted to assassinate
Castro the day before the Bay of Pigs Invasion (Hersh 203). It was thought that the assassination
aligning with the invasion would enforce the plan and make it a success.
The United States hoped to remove this socialist leader through military intervention and
by the destabilization of Cuba (Herring 707). Yet when ousting and assassination attempts failed,
Eisenhower began terminating all diplomatic relations with Cuba as he grew annoyed with the
“Castroite Revolution.” Following this termination, a Cuban representative to the United Nations
made charges against the United States before the Security Council. The image of the U.S.
became that of a bully which the rest of the world would grow to oppose (Langley viii). In
Eisenhower’s administration the “Cuba economy remained an appendage of the United States”
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and Castro remained an irritation (Herring 687). Eisenhower made multiple attempts to rid
himself of Castro and his socialist regime using the trade embargo, breaking diplomatic relations,
attempting to mobilize opposition throughout Latin America, launching a propaganda campaign,
preparing for an invasion, and supporting multiple CIA assassination plots (Herring 689). These
tactics showed that the United States sought to maintain both economic and political control over
Cuba to promote U.S. interests in Cuba and the Caribbean.
Through these multiple strategies it became clear that “U.S. policy toward Cuba in the
early years of the Castro government was marked by confusion and uncertainty” (Lopez 110).
This was due to two factors: the United States did not take Cuba seriously, and there were severe
disagreements in the Eisenhower administration about Castro (Lopez 110). Castro’s identity as a
communist was a common divide. Some believed he was not a communist and that he would be
able to help lead Cuba toward a democratic transition. Others regarded him as a communist with
no ability for democratic change (Lopez 111). Eisenhower at first hoped Castro would lead Cuba
toward democracy and tried to react with patience. However, with the Cold War brewing by
1960, the Eisenhower administration changed focus from patient understanding of the Castro
regime to immediate reaction with attempts to oust Castro and topple his regime (Lopez 111).
However, these plans were never completed under Eisenhower, while the already fragile
relationship continued to disintegrate.
Eisenhower repeatedly cautioned against overreacting and stressed the importance of
keeping tight controls on military expenditures throughout the Cold War (Janiewski 667). It
became clear that there was a recognized increasing network of strategists who were in favor of
hardline Cold War policies specifically against Castro in Cuba. Eisenhower recognized that a
permanent war economy was being created. He also saw that the military complex was engulfing
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the nation with personnel traveling between the military and corporate territories, science and
education began being dedicated to the “service of the warlord,” and the military was attempting
to transfer their philosophy of perpetuating a constant military state to the public to gain support
(Janiewski 672). Eisenhower and his advisors feared that with a great number of retired military
leaders taking positions in this new war-based industrial complex, they would soon come to
dictate national policy and threaten diplomacy and democracy worldwide, including efforts in
Cuba (Janiewski 675). As Eisenhower prepared to leave office, he left the nation and his
successor with a warning.
In his farewell address, Eisenhower posed the question of how to balance national
security and properly defend the United States from foreign foes without “bankrupting the
nation, undermining democracy, or risking nuclear annihilation” (Janiewski 685). This was his
concept of the “military-industrial complex,” and in his address he attempted one last time to
warn the nation of these potential dangers. This speech came as a surprise to some;
“Eisenhower’s popular image was – and remains – that of…[an] ineffectual chief executive who
delegated responsibility and stayed out of the nitty-gritty of administration…one hand loosely
clasping the tiller of state, the other clutching a nine iron” (Rasenberger 50). This has been
coined as Eisenhower’s “hidden-hand presidency” by Fred Greenstein. Yet in the midst of the
Cold War and constant growing tensions with Cuba, Eisenhower saw the importance of
remaining calm and portraying that confidence to the nation (Janiewski 668). He did not always
take the clear, obvious, or predictable path, as is evident in his somewhat unexpected and
memorable farewell address. Eisenhower aimed to warn the nation, and the newly elected
Kennedy, about the military-industrial complex that was gaining power throughout the Cold
War. Eisenhower was concerned that the young and inexperienced John F. Kennedy would not
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be able to refrain from the excessive spending that would be constantly advocated by the military
(Janiewski 668). Eisenhower “expressed his acute fear that his successor might lack his
‘understanding of where’ to cut back military expenditures, a possibility that made him ‘shudder
to think of what could happen to this country’” (Janiewski 681). While campaigning for the
presidency, Kennedy had, in fact, promised to spend more money on the military, enhance the
nation’s nuclear capabilities, and make more of an effort to combat Communism all of which
influenced his policy toward Cuba (Bacevich 78).
Eisenhower recognized that “with the country agog over Jack and Jackie, the mood of the
moment did not invite introspection,” yet he still aimed to leave one lasting warning to both the
incoming president and the nation as a whole (Bacevich 78). Since two industrialized nations
began militarizing and mobilizing for war, Cuba became their testing ground. Cuba thus became
an integral piece in this political chess match between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Through his speech, Eisenhower recognized this political game, yet he also understood that a
nation cannot pour its entire being and livelihood into permanently arming itself; to do so only
hurts the nation in the long run and hinders the ability to make peace and diplomacy throughout
the world. Had Kennedy heeded these warnings from his predecessor, he may have been more
careful and reluctant to blindly sign on to the Bay of Pigs invasion – a failure that would remain
with him and on his conscience for the rest of his administration.
John F. Kennedy, who was known for his charming good looks, charisma, and later his
ability to remain calm and avoid a devastating nuclear war with the Soviet Union, took office
inheriting many of Eisenhower’s Cuban policies. When Kennedy was campaigning for the
presidency, he was under the impression that “the United States could not get rid of Castro and
could only attempt to contain the spread of communism in Latin America” (Lopez 111). Yet
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throughout his campaign, Kennedy made promises to pursue more successful policies toward
Cuba (Bonsal 181). When Kennedy took office and heard of the plan for the Bay of Pigs
invasion, he consented to the continuation of the planning, “but was not committed to its
eventual implementation. He just wanted to have the option of deploying the exiles, a
contingency plan” (Lopez 111).While Kennedy is certainly due a great amount of respect and
praise for his policy work, early in his presidency certain actions tainted both his reputation and
his conscience. In 1961, Kennedy agreed to launch the Bay of Pigs Invasion. This invasion was a
huge failure that paved the way for an even greater potential catastrophe: the Cuban Missile
Crisis.
Just three months after taking office in 1961, John F. Kennedy was briefed on the basic
information surrounding the situation with Cuba. Kennedy aimed for social change and wanted
an alternative to Castro’s violence. America seemed to “preach reform in Latin America but
practiced power politics” (Langley x). CIA Director Allen Dulles and his Deputy Director
Richard Bissell met with Kennedy to brief him on Cuban policy and the plans for invasion.
Through this they aimed to win Kennedy’s approval for a planned invasion of Cuba without
giving him all the details or explaining the many risks. After this briefing, Kennedy “had become
so tempted by the opportunity to score an early victory in the Cold War that he ignored his
instincts warning against such actions and followed the advice of his experts in the CIA and Joint
Chiefs of Staff in approving the amphibious operation” (Jones 2).The CIA leaders presented the
information in a way that made JFK believe he had no other option but to invade Cuba. While
Kennedy had many doubts about the whole situation, he felt “it was almost impossible [for him]
to disregard the heritage that his predecessor had left” (Morales 55-56). Leading with the
inherited plan of Eisenhower, the Bay of Pigs plan quickly took shape.
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Kennedy continued with the plan handed down by Eisenhower because he feared if he
canceled the invasion the exiles who were being trained would leak the plans and Republicans
would criticize Kennedy for not following through. He similarly feared that Latin Americans
would not fear that the United States would intervene as they claimed they would in communist
countries (Lopez 112). Many influential members of the Kennedy administration opposed the
Bay of Pigs invasion, including J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Chester Bowles, undersecretary of state, and Arthur Schlesinger, assistant to the
president. They were concerned about the negative impact the invasion would have on the
public’s opinion toward the administration and the nation as a whole (Lopez 111). These
concerns led to changes in the plan which in effect weakened the invasion as a whole.
Specifically, the location of the invasion was changed and air support was reduced which
resulted in the failure of the invasion (Lopez 112).
Kennedy and Eisenhower both agreed that the Bay of Pigs invasion should be carried out
with the ability to plausibly deny U.S. involvement (Bohning 13). Allen Dulles explained that a
planned invasion would take place in the small city of Trinidad. There would be aircraft bombing
missions over the city and surrounding area, then 750 recruited Cuban exiles would storm the
beach. Because Washington wanted to covertly overthrow Castro without U.S. troops or
involvement, they planned to aid these recruited exiles with weapons and training (Wylie 6).
This demonstrated the United States’ indirect involvement in Cuban politics. The CIA expected
that the invasion would inspire anti-Castro Cubans to rise up and overthrow Castro in hopes that
he would be assassinated before any Cuban exiles stepped ashore in Trinidad (Craughwell 183).
The location was later changed to the Bay of Pigs. This invasion was fully planned during the
Eisenhower administration which Kennedy inherited. When Kennedy took office, “he found on
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his desk in the White House an Eisenhower administration policy paper, known as the ‘Castromust-go’ paper, which ruled that the communist infection in Cuba must be eliminated” (Rivero
182). Kennedy did not closely scrutinize these plans because he assumed Eisenhower, a great
military leader, fully knew what he was doing and would plan a successful invasion (Herring
706). Kennedy approved these plans for invasion in hopes of gaining a major victory in office
during his first few months.
On April 17, 1961, 1,300 American-trained Cuban exiles, who called themselves Brigade
2506, stormed a stretch of beach along the south central coast of Cuba, the Bay of Pigs
(Craughwell 178). These Cuban exiles thought that the air strikes scheduled previous to their
invasion would cripple Castro’s air force. They also thought that other anti-Castro Cubans would
join them on the beach and rise up against Castro. However, none of this happened. The CIA had
failed to confirm that an opposition group would show up and help, and their cover was blown.
Waiting patiently on the other side, Castro was prepared and informed of the mission that he had
been predicting for months (Rasenberger 51). Before the invasion he arrested thousands of
dissidents who would have otherwise risen up against him (Craughwell 180). The Bay of Pigs
invasion was essentially doomed before it began.
In the end, the Bay of Pigs invasion proved to be a complete failure and “raised questions
about core American values” (Rasenberger xiv). Kennedy refused to provide air support in hopes
that he might still be able to conceal U.S. involvement and America’s role in the Bay of Pigs
invasion. In the end, 68 Cuban exiles were killed, 1,209 were captured, and after lengthy
interrogations, all other prisoners were given show trials and then sentenced to life in prison
(Craughwell 187). Clearly, denial was impossible, and Kennedy had to face this tragic failure.
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The transition from Eisenhower to Kennedy became a “switch in how a president used
his advisors. Eisenhower had a hands-off approach to his advisors, while Kennedy particularly
questioned his military advisors after the Bay of Pigs” (Goduti 109). He faced confusion and
humiliation at the outcome of the invasion, and the humiliation would have been enough to
greatly change America and the world’s opinion of this already popular president. In a speech to
the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Kennedy explained that “if the nations of this
Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration – then
I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary
obligations which are to the security of our Nation” (Benson xv). However, despite his strong
anti-Communist beliefs, Kennedy took full responsibility for the failed invasion during a
televised news conference. The Bay of Pigs failure was a huge presidential mistake, and it
“turned the U.S. democratic image into a mirage and lowered John F. Kennedy’s prestige to the
level of Richard Nixon’s” (Light 42). Yet because he admitted his responsibility his presidential
approval ratings increased immediately even after a complete failure of American
interventionism (Herring 706). After the failure, military force was replaced with covert
measures and continued attempts to oust and assassinate Castro.
Shortly before the Bay of Pigs invasion it became clear that Washington was determined
to destroy the Cuban Revolution (Morales 49). In the American lexicon, in addition to good and
bad missiles, there are recognized good and bad revolutions, and “the American and French
Revolutions were good. The Cuban Revolution is bad” (Blum 185). This view of the Cuban
Revolution determined how the United States dealt with policy and relations toward Cuba, and
this greatly affected the U.S. image abroad as a leader and in terms of U.S. influence in the
Western Hemisphere. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion, “U.S. credibility as a leader was also
Litt 19
dealt a harsh blow” (Kornbluh 3). Washington was now perceived to be self-righteous, trigger
happy, and inept. Kennedy even admitted that allies of the United States saw them as being “a
little demented on Cuba” (Kornbluh 3). Yet rather than working to promote positive policies, the
United States continued to destroy its relationship with Cuba and consequently was perceived as
a menace by the rest of the world.
There was a shift in the balance of power after the Bay of Pigs failure. The Communists
appeared to have the upper hand, and “together, these conditions produced what came next: the
Kennedy administration’s multi-faceted attack on the Cuban government: diplomatic isolation,
sabotage and assassination, and economic pressure” (Schoultz 172). Kennedy quarantined all
ships and weapons that were going to Cuba. The quarantine of Cuba showed naval power and
force in the Caribbean. The United States stopped and searched all vessels that were headed
toward Cuba and forced any with military cargo to turn back (Blum 185). Kennedy then
blockaded Cuban ports and prohibited offensive cargo from going from Cuba to other
Communist countries. While the USSR claimed that these actions by the United States violated
international law, the U.S. claimed that they were acting in the best interest of the U.S. and all
free nations in the Western Hemisphere (From the Bay). While these actions harmed U.S. Cuban
relations, they also damaged the international view of the United States.
These actions made the United States and Cuba permanent enemies. John F. Kennedy
still aimed for social change within Cuba and other Latin American countries. He wanted to
prevent another Cuba in the hemisphere, and he therefore meddled in other Latin American
politics and governments. Kennedy admitted that the American people worried about “Iron
Curtain tanks and planes less than 90 miles from [the American] shore” yet at the same time
confessed that “a nation of Cuba’s size is less a threat to [America’s] survival than it is a base for
Litt 20
subverting the survival of other free nations throughout the hemisphere” (Benson xvii). The
Kennedy administration even undermined elected officials that did not agree with the United
States on Cuban policy (Herring 717). Kennedy set up an economic and military aid program for
Latin America to act as a political deterrent which would prevent other countries from falling to
communism. This program, known as the Alliance for Progress, became a major tool in
Kennedy’s Cuban policy. The Alliance for Progress was “conceived as a direct response to
Castro’s Cuba, it was meant to prove that genuine social change could take place in Latin
America without resort to revolution or socialism” (Blum 191). This multi-billion dollar program
had ambitious goals for the next decade including economic growth, distribution of national
income, reduced unemployment, education, and health improvements throughout Latin America
(Blum 191). It was to be similar to NATO and CENTRO in order to establish a hemispherical
alliance to prevent the Red Tide from rolling in and to establish economic progress and improved
human rights throughout Latin America. The Alliance for Progress was to be composed of
“common effort” but would be backed by the leadership, and consequently great influence of, the
United States (Smith 198-201). This program aimed to limit Cuba’s influence over other Latin
American countries.
Yet even with taking preventative steps such as developing the Alliance for Progress,
Cuba still appeared as a threat to the United States. When Cuba went red, Kennedy said it was a
“dagger pointed at the heart of America” (Farber 28). This proved to be an interesting case
because Cuba was not seized by the communist party but rather gradually turned into a
communist state (Brown 293). As Castro drifted toward the Soviet Union, the Cold War came to
the United States’ backyard (Herring 686). After the Bay of Pigs invasion, coupled with other
warlike preparations, the Mongoose Plan, and a hardening of the blockade, Khrushchev’s
Litt 21
concerns for Cuba grew, and he suggested to Castro that nuclear missiles be installed in Cuba
(Morales 63). Oceans could no longer protect the United States from foreign attack, and as a
result, American policy with Cuba became a global issue.
A year after the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Soviet Union began sending weapons and
military personnel to Cuba. The Russians asserted that the “arms they were shipping to Cuba
would enable Fidel Castro to defend his regime against future American attacks” (Divine 9). The
build up of weapons quickly alarmed Americans, and Kennedy was called upon to take a stand.
On September 4, 1962, a White House statement of policy given by Press Secretary Pierre
Salinger explained that:
The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by
Communist threats to the peace. It must be dealt with as a part of that larger issue as well
as in the context of the special relationships which have long characterized the interAmerican system. It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro regime
will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force.
(Divine 11)
This threat quickly consumed American and political policy, and out of this the Cuban Missile
Crisis arose when Cuba decided to accept Soviet nuclear weapons. Cuba believed that if they did
not accept this offer the United States would be undeterred to carry out invasion plans that were
clearly being formed after the failure of the Bay of Pigs (Morales 64). Kennedy ordered that U-2
spy planes be sent to investigate the growing nuclear arms in Cuba. After U-2 planes confirmed
that there were nuclear missile bases in Cuba, the United States stood ready to deliver “the
nuclear equivalent of thirty billion tons of TNT upon the Soviet Union at the command of the
President” (Divine 4). Kennedy felt as if the missiles in Cuba were of grave concern to the
Litt 22
United States’ national security but did not threaten the security of the Soviet Union (R. Kennedy
97). However, Kennedy’s advisors were divided on what the appropriate strategy would be. The
hawks in the administration favored an air strike to destroy the Cuban bases while the doves
favored a blockade (Alsop 71). In the end, a blockade was agreed upon with the option to invade
and destroy the missiles waiting as a backup plan if the blockade was unsuccessful. Kennedy
refused to immediately bomb the missiles placed in Cuba and instead imposed a naval blockade.
This was key to preventing “any more missiles [from] being delivered and [provided] a breathing
space for negotiations as well as more time for the Soviet Union to dismantle the sites under
construction and to remove the missiles that were already there” (Brown 302). In the end,
Kennedy never gave the command to strike the base in Cuba nor send missiles to the Soviet
Union; he was instead able to convince Khrushchev to remove his missiles in exchange for
American agreement not to invade Cuba. Khrushchev “was apparently again gripped by war
fears: Castro was recklessly urging him to launch a nuclear attack to stave off an imminent
invasion, and Khrushchev feared that the situation might slip out of control” (Thomas 230).
Khrushchev did not hesitate to accept the agreement to withdraw missiles in Cuba in return for a
pledge not to invade Cuba and to withdraw missiles from Turkey.
Kennedy was instantly praised for this victory and his “courage, his coolness, above all
his carefully calculated combination of firmness and restraint won him the plaudits of the
American press” (Divine 4). Many saw this as Kennedy’s finest hour and greatest success. In
such a short time the young President Kennedy had grown in his position. He learned many
lessons quickly:
From the Bay of Pigs he had learned not to accept the unanimous recommendations of his
civilian and military advisers without subjecting them to a rigorous interrogation; from
Litt 23
the Cuban missile crisis he had learned the value of gathering a select group of advisers
in a room, listening as they debated policy options, then having the courage to make a
contradictory decision. (Clarke 91)
Yet not all were pleased with Kennedy’s decision. Some right-wing leaders attacked Kennedy
for promising not to invade Cuba. They believed that Castro was an ever-growing threat that was
dominating Cuba with the potential to influence other countries. Through this agreement not to
invade, they saw a missed opportunity to overthrow Castro. Because the Castro government
could seemingly only be overthrown militarily, many Americans saw this agreement reached by
Kennedy and Khrushchev as the perpetuation of the permanence of the Castro regime. As a
result, the basic U.S. policy with Cuba became a policy of containment which seemed a
continuation of George F. Kennan’s Cold War policy (Lopez 113). What many regarded as a
victory in the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the October Crisis as referred to in Cuba, some viewed as
a continuing stalemate with Cuba (Divine 5). This made the relations between the United States
and Cuba even more divisive.
The Cuban Missile Crisis, thirteen days of walking the line of nuclear war, proved a
turning point in the perception of America and of President Kennedy. The American people lived
under the threat of nuclear disaster and the world came close to destruction from the moment
Kennedy told the world about the missiles to the time Khrushchev agreed to remove them.
Kennedy believed that Khrushchev finally removed the missiles because he came to understand
that the missiles in Cuba were a threat to the United States’ national security rather than the
security of the Soviet Union (R. Kennedy 97). JFK was praised, and rightly so, for avoiding
nuclear war. However, this crisis could have been avoided if the Bay of Pigs fiasco would have
been better executed or prevented completely (Craughwell 179). After the Missile Crisis, the
Litt 24
embargo was tightened, travel to Cuba was prohibited, and all trade with Cuba was forbidden
(Wylie 6). Through the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted. Castro’s
power over Cuba, now with the support of the Soviet Union, simultaneously seemed to
strengthen, and “the Cuban missile crisis serves as a reminder that history is full of unexpected
twists and turns” (Dobbs xv). President Kennedy was careful to consider the Russian’s possible
reactions to the United States’ actions. Bobby Kennedy explained that “miscalculation and
misunderstanding an escalation on one side brings a counterresponse,” and these reactions are
often the beginning of unpopular and unintended wars (R. Kennedy 96). Because of the United
States’ “non-intervention, Khrushchev and Castro could proceed to contrive a scheme that might
have inflicted enormous damage on Western power, influence and prestige” (Lowenthal 93).
This became a turning point in policy and relations between the United States and Cuba by
bringing it to the world stage.
In 1964, the Department of State acknowledged that Cuba was neither a military threat to
the United States nor to any Latin American country; instead the Cuban regime was regarded as
a “menace of subversion – the undermining of existing governments, the arming of organized
Communist minorities, and the mounting of campaigns of sabotage and terror” (Ball 2). This
clearly represented the United States’ fear about the Domino Theory, the idea that if one state or
nation falls to communism, all surrounding nations will likewise fall. John F. Kennedy worried
that “the wild, angry, passionate course of the revolution in Cuba demonstrates that the shores of
the American Hemisphere and the Caribbean islands are not immune to the ideas and forces
causing similar storms on other continents” (Kennedy 132). With Cuba heavily leaning on the
Soviet Union and quickly adopting Communist ways, the United States took action to prevent
the spread of this political philosophy. The State Department’s strategy was to strengthen Latin
Litt 25
American nations and employed “all available instruments of power less than acts of war to limit
or reduce the ability of the Cuban government to advance the Communist cause in Latin America
through propaganda, sabotage, and subversion” so those nations could resist communism (Ball
7). Through this strategy, the United States justified the Cuban embargo that is still enforced
today.
While Americans always saw Castro and his Communist regime as a large threat and
challenge to the U.S. identity as the leader of the Western Hemisphere, American policy has
never understood Cuban patriotism and pride in their revolution (Wylie 10). Castro overthrew
Batista in order to assert independence from the United States, yet the Bay of Pigs invasion made
the U.S. and Cuba permanent enemies and changed Cuba and the United States in the mind of
the international order. This faulty invasion made the United States appear weak and soft.
Specifically it showed Kennedy as a weak, indecisive president who was able to be pushed
around. Soviet Union leader Khrushchev took advantage of this at the Vienna Summit and again
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy and Khrushchev met at a summit conference in
Vienna in June 1961, and the result was “a dramatic American military buildup, threats and
counter threats of war, and in August the Soviet erection of a concrete and barbed-wire wall
separating East and West Berlin that symbolized the great chasm between the two chief
antagonists in the Cold War” (Jones 153). Khrushchev was determined to exploit this mistake
made by the United States and began building the Berlin Wall and strengthening his relations
with Castro. The Soviet Union befriended Cuba and installed missiles which led to the Missile
Crisis. Cuba became the center of the United States and the Soviet Union’s power politics at the
height of the Cold War. This attracted attention to Cuba and portrayed American policies in a
different light. The United States believed that the Cuban government threatened the pro-U.S.
Litt 26
governments in Latin America by influencing them. This influence, the United States thought,
presented a risk that these other Latin American governments might fall to socialism and
communism (Wylie 3). This only propelled Kennedy and the administration to work even harder
to rid themselves of the Castro threat.
The Kennedy administration grew ever more determined to get rid of Castro, and
Kennedy’s only lesson from the Bay of Pigs was that he must keep trying, though in a more
underhanded way, to defeat Castro (Thomas 149). John and Bobby Kennedy, both naturally
competitive, hated that they were defeated in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. While the Cuban Missile
Crisis ended Operation Mongoose, it did not end Robert Kennedy’s attempts to subvert Fidel
Castro. While President Kennedy promised not to invade Cuba, Bobby Kennedy did not stop
continuing to try to stimulate a revolution in Cuba to overthrow Castro (Thomas 233). They now
felt they had to prove themselves and “they became obsessed with Castro, for them [he became]
a cancer that had to be removed” (Herring 707). The Kennedy brothers felt they had to vindicate
their failure with Cuba in the Bay of Pigs:
To restore U.S. prestige, [John and Bobby Kennedy] would have to take a firm stand, not
only in Cuba but also in Berlin, Vietnam, and other trouble spots. Cuba, though, was the
centerpiece. Castro’s removal became the top priority on the administration’s agenda, for
it would help to determine the course of the Cold War, refurbish the stature needed by the
White House to pursue its ambitious domestic program, and, no less important, satisfy the
Kennedys’ growing obsession with eliminating their Cuban adversary. (Jones 132)
In attempts to be more covert, Bobby Kennedy decreed that “no time, effort, money, or
manpower” was to be spared in the assault on Castro” so the CIA quickly spent $100 million to
create a base for clandestine operations out of Miami. Yet this station did not accomplish much
Litt 27
(Thomas 151). They engaged in plotting numerous assassination plans, many of which would be
considered impractical and ridiculous.
Because of this, Castro felt justified accepting Soviet Union missiles after so many
attempts to assassinate or overthrow him. The Missile Crisis was caused by the roots of the
Cuban-American conflict. It began with America’s disapproval of Castro and his government in
1959 when he called for nationalization of foreign-owned property and his acknowledgment and
acceptance of Marxism-Leninism (Langley vii). Since that time the United States has only
continued to sever relationships with Cuba.
The United States has a reputation of leading from a stage of confrontation and threats;
however, those threats have not worked in the case of Cuba. It is important to note that
“compromise is not always the answer, and sometimes it's precisely the wrong answer. But
policymakers and politicians have to be able to examine it openly and without fear, and measure
it against alternatives” (Gelb 24-26). American foreign policy toward Cuba during the past 50
years has not shown remarkable results, and compromise has been almost nonexistent, especially
in the area of human rights.
According to a study completed by the U.S. Department of State in 1986, Cuban citizens
are facing multiple hardships and are being denied human rights in numerous areas. The
Communist party dominates all aspects of life in Cuba, and the aims of the party are of greater
priority than human rights (U.S. Department of State 1). Freedom of expression is disrupted by
the inability to criticize policies, the governmental system, or the leader. Daily life is closely
monitored, and great fines or punishments can be attained by speaking poorly of Castro.
Freedom of assembly is likewise hindered; all associations are controlled by the government.
Membership in government associations is essentially a requirement for admission to
Litt 28
universities, promotions in jobs, or to gain access to vacations (U.S. Department of State 2).
Because the Cuban state is firmly controlled by the Cuban Communist party and dominated by
Castro, there is essentially no political freedom and no direct elections for political offices.
Political opposition is not permitted, and dissidents are often jailed. There is also no freedom of
the press. Media outlets are controlled by the state and used for Cuban propaganda. Artistic and
religious freedom is also nearly nonexistent. All art must actively serve the revolution and the
state. Construction of new churches is forbidden, and religion is repressed throughout Cuba.
Education is also censored, and all schools are required to follow Marxist-Leninist guidelines
(U.S. Department of State 3). The U.S. Department of State claims that human rights are being
denied in Cuba:
No free society, and, indeed, few authoritarian ones, executes its young people for
painting slogans on walls, preachers for passing out religious pamphlets, workers for
putting up posters, or farmers for protesting a low grain price. Nor does a society having
any claim to be just condemn to death workers for talking about a union, judges for
refusing to give a stronger sentence, or lawyers for effectively representing their clients.
(U.S. Department of State 7)
It is clear that many human rights issues are being obstructed in Cuba and “Cuba has become “a
cultural wasteland” owing to the “ideological straitjacket” Mr. Castro has imposed on his
people” (Goodman). The United States’ policy in Cuba will not succeed as long as “threats
against the Cuban government stand at the center of the strategy and human rights violations by
the U.S. at Guantanamo Bay serve as the example of democracy in Cuba” (W. Smith 35). The
United States expects Cuba to transition to a democracy based on examples of the democratic
system and ideals presented by the United States; however, the faulty relationship between the
Litt 29
United States and Cuba that continues today is only helping to perpetuate these human right
issues.
Today, Cuba continues to stand as a totalitarian Communist state controlled by Raul
Castro with Fidel still holding great power and influence. The embargo put in place by the
United States “severely restricts direct and indirect trade and financial transactions between
persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction and the Cuban government or its nationals” (Schweitzer xx).
The Libertad Act, which was passed in 1996, codified the trade embargo, and it “denies to Castro
the legitimacy of a relationship with the United States. It denies legitimacy of the U.S. market to
Castro, and it uses whatever available leverage the United States has to exert pressure on that
regime” (Fish 7). The purpose of the embargo was to quickly dispose of Castro and his regime
and support a transition to democracy. Yet the embargo has failed to provide those desired
results. The embargo is no longer necessary because Cuba is no longer the spearhead of the
Soviet Union (Reed 44). The stalemated and continued embargo seems to stem from the United
States’ desire for revenge and retribution against Castro. By imposing a trade embargo on Cuba
and by making it difficult for citizens of the United States to visit the island, the American
government has helped sustain the leadership of the Castro regime by perpetuating the external
threat of the United States which, in turn, reinforces Cuban patriotism and anti-Americanism. It
has also reduced the ability and opportunity for the United States and Cuba to interact which
might allow for understanding and growth in the diplomatic relationship (Brown 312). Yet the
embargo is hurting the Cubans, not Castro. For Fidel, “the embargo was the best thing that could
have happened to him. It insured that he would remain in power and maintain his [regime]”
(Gonzalez 69). Castro remains wealthy and provided for while the Cubans are living in poverty
and growing angry and resentful toward the United States.
Litt 30
The former Republican senator from Nebraska and current Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel believes that the 50-year-old trade embargo is an "outdated, unrealistic, irrelevant policy"
and said the United States should resume relations and engage with the island, just as it does with
other Communist countries such as Vietnam and China (Haven). It is often difficult to
understand how the United States maintained its policy toward Cuba for such a long time
without the Castro regime falling.
In the 1990s all Cuban products were rationed, the standard of living was extremely poor,
there were shortages of food and gasoline, as well as numerous black-outs all due to the
economic decline in Cuba that has been occurring throughout the years. Unemployment has
remained high and inflation has rapidly increased (Dominguez 435). Yet while the fervor of the
revolution began dwindling in the past, it is confusing as to how Castro’s regime has remained so
powerful.
Many Cubans fear the Cuban exile population and fear that their lives and possessions
would be at risk due to a sense of revenge and property restitution by the exiles if the regime
were to topple. Castro has remained in power because, due to the poor conditions, Cubans often
work from early in the morning to late in the evenings, having long commutes on bicycle due to
the embargo taking away a great deal of public transportation and waiting in lines to get their
rationed food for their family. At the end of a long day they do not have the energy to organize
themselves for opposition; they are too busy surviving (Dominguez 437). The government is
similarly silencing many Cubans by offering “freedom from prison simultaneously with exit
permits to opposition members in order to get them out of Cuba” as well as allowing tens of
thousands of Cubans, mainly intellectuals, to leave the country in exchange for their political
Litt 31
silence (Dominguez 438). In this way, many Cubans who would naturally step up to organize
and lead an opposition movement are essentially being exiled.
Cuba is the only case of a ‘Third World’ country prevailing and sustaining communism
in the Americas or in the Caribbean (Brown 293). The survival of the Cuban regime is due to
multiple characteristics of communist leaders:
However economically inefficient in many respects and however lacking in democratic
accountability [the leaders are] – are very effective at maintaining political control by a
party elite over an entire society. These controls are all the more effective if the political
elite are self-confident…and have faith in the superiority of their system over capitalism
and ‘bourgeois democracy’. That has certainly been true of the top Cuban leadership, preeminently so in the case of the brothers Fidel and Raul Castro. (Brown 308)
Fidel Castro has been successful in using his ability to fanaticize the people of Cuba and in
taking advantage of the Cuban classes that lack leaders. He has also understood that the Cuban
people believe that the United States would come to their rescue. Yet with the numerous failed
attempts taken by the United States to overthrow Castro, he now knows that little will be done to
bail out the Cuban people. Castro’s success is also due to the fact that the United States created
economic sanctions which gave the Soviet Union no other choice than to come to the rescue of
Castro’s Revolution (Bonsal 7). Castro’s regime has remained strong, and while it is difficult to
imagine a change in Cuba with the Castro regime still in place, it is just as difficult to continue
with a foreign policy locked in a stalemate.
This embargo is the central element preventing a working relationship between the
United States and Cuba (LeoGrande Interview). President Obama claims his new policy is one of
change, yet it “shared two premises common to U.S. policy since the end of the Cold War: (1)
Litt 32
Significant progress in bilateral relations can come only if Cuba dismantles its political and
economic systems, replacing them with a multiparty electoral democracy and a free-market
economy, and (2) even the smallest steps toward reducing tension have to be met by reciprocal
steps from the Cuban side” (LeoGrande 40). William LeoGrande, Professor of Government at
American University and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward
Latin America, explained that this policy rests on the sole issue of instituting a democratic
transition. Yet a democratic transition is merely an excuse. This policy is built on politics
surrounding Cuba and the Cuban exile population in Florida, and if the political price was low
and there was a larger gain to be made for the United States, a democratic transition would be
irrelevant (LeoGrande Interview). This relationship has yet to be reexamined or altered because
of the politics at play.
After Castro rose to power in 1959, large groups of Cubans fled the country to the United
States. In the early years the regime was organized by Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution. These committees had the ability to send anyone to trial who had anti-Castro
sentiments. This led to many being sent to prison or being murdered by firing squad. Often,
children witnessed the beating and killing of their own parents or other family members. If they
had the opportunity to flee the country, families were likely to be separated from other family
members, and “these traumas left deep scars in the Cuban exile community, which translated into
a visceral, uncompromising hatred of Fidel Castro” (Heindl 167). After the failure of the Bay of
Pigs invasion, the Cuban exile community felt betrayed by the United States’ government that
was further fueled by the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis when Kennedy agreed to never
invade Cuba again if the Soviets removed their missiles (Heindl 168). These events have enabled
many Cuban exiles to gain both momentum and passion for policies that affect Cuba.
Litt 33
The Cuban exile community in the United States is the “archetypical example of a
numerically small group that has dictated American policy toward Cuba for the last three
decades” (Heindl 161). While most Cuban emigrants are unified by their anti-Castro feelings,
they differ on their preferred policy preferences in dealing with Cuba. When Cubans first began
fleeing to the United States, they fled for primarily political reasons in the 1960s and 1970s.
Emigrants from the 1980s and 1990s, however, came to the United States for better economic
opportunities. These Cuban émigrés have concentrated in two main areas of the United States:
Miami, Florida, and Union City, New Jersey (Heindl 166). Just as many of these Cuban
emigrants are separated by location and by emigration time, they are also separated by political
ideologies and policies toward Cuba.
Many “hardline” Cuban emigrants oppose any form of relation or interaction with Cuba
because they feel that will give the Castro regime a form a legitimacy which they do not believe
it deserves, and they oppose most efforts made to loosen or ease the embargo. Moderate
emigrants, on the other hand, favor communication and dialogue between the United States,
hoping this will allow for a gradual transition of Cuba to a democracy. These moderates also
believe the embargo is “counterproductive, because it gives Castro an easy scapegoat for the
government’s economic ineptitude and an excuse to restrict political freedoms” (Heindl 167).
Many Cuban exiles have taken political action to influence policy. One of the most violent acts
masterminded by two Cuban exiles was the blowing up of a Cubana Airlines plane in 1976
which killed 73 people (Blum 190). Cuban exiles have taken both direct and indirect paths of
influencing policy toward Cuba such as taking part in the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 as well as
lobbying policymakers to tighten the embargo against Cuba (Heindl 161). Through their
Litt 34
lobbying, advocacy, and political action, the Cuban emigrants are influential in the United
States’ policy decisions toward Cuba.
The Cuban exile population in Florida is also influential in the United States’ foreign
policy. Although many were born in the United States and have never been to Cuba, they still
hold a hatred for Castro. Apart from that, they hold an influential voting bloc for American
elections, and “as is so often the case in foreign policy, domestic politics trump national interest
and coherent thought” (Reed 46). Yet despite the Cuba exile population’s views, “in an age of
interconnectedness, the United States’ continued efforts to isolate the island of Cuba strike many
as anachronistic at best and self-defeating at worst” (Heindl 161). Many of these efforts revolve
around the embargo that was placed upon Cuba by the United States.
Scholars and policy analysts on the conservative side argue that these economic sanctions
encompassed in the embargo were meant to leverage the regime to move towards conducting fair
elections and lifting restrictions on press and speech (Walser). Dr. Ray Walser, a Senior Policy
Analyst at the Heritage Foundation who has previously worked in the Foreign Service Office of
the U.S. Department of State, explained that the United States is wary because Cuba conducts
espionage and is diplomatically friendly with North Korea and Iran. Yet, he also admitted that
there have been no recent incidents of terrorism, and Cuba has taken positive steps by supporting
peace talks between Colombia and FARC (Walser). Yet despite these initiatives, the U.S. Cuban
relations are still locked in a stalemate. Further, few policy analysts today would argue that the
embargo toward Cuba and the “policy of isolating Cuba from hemispheric affairs have advanced
the main objectives of U.S. policy, which continue to be the destabilization of Castro’s
government and the enhancement of democracy and political pluralism in the island” (Randall
Litt 35
87). Yet though the embargo has continuously proven its failure to achieve United States’
objectives, it has not been changed or altered dramatically since Castro took power.
Obama’s foreign policy in dealing with Cuba is a strategy of accommodation; he believes
that international rivalries can be resolved by providing a strong American example and showing
leadership (Dueck 14). Yet the American example provided by the harsh economic sanctions is
not gaining the desired results. With “the loss of the annual US$4.5 billion Soviet subsidy, which
totaled 21 percent of Cuba’s Gross National Product, the economy went into a tailspin” after the
fall of the USSR, and it was expected that Cuba’s government would not survive and would
instead be forced into a regime change (Gershman 36). However, Castro’s government has
remained, and in the past two decades “Cuba-United States relations have remained highly
strained, despite the potential for accommodation one might have expected as one of the “peace
dividends” provided by the end of the Cold War and the effective termination of the SovietCuban threat in the Western Hemisphere” (Randall 75). While loss of Soviet aid and Castro’s
poor management of the Cuban government are key factors to the poor economy, the embargo is
playing a large role. There is widespread malnourishment, the rationing of milk, and large
numbers of children suffering from anemia. However, embargoes generally do not work without
international support and cooperation. Through the sanctions from the embargo, “no matter who
[they] are shooting at [they] are hitting the people” (Ratliff 48). The embargo is also currently
providing a strong propagandistic pillar for the Communist government, and many Cubans are
blaming the United States for the current conditions (Schweitzer 58). Latin American countries
as well as numerous European nations and Canada are growing tired of the embargo (LeoGrande
Interview). In addition, while the United States continues to claim that Cuba is a threat, Cuba
provides no real military threat. The “main rationale for the economic embargo was the threat to
Litt 36
U.S. national security posed by a Communist Cuba that, by February 1962, had become allied
economically and militarily with the Soviet Union” (Purcell 454). It was implemented after the
Bay of Pigs invasion failed and represented the United States’ effort to make the best of a bad
situation (Purcell 454). Yet with the end of the Soviet Union, any security threat from Cuba
disappeared. Further, the United States has virtually no international support and vanishing
internal support for this policy toward Cuba (Reed 39). This, in effect, is harming foreign
relations and U.S. image abroad.
It is noted that Cuba has taken steps that “would normally be welcomed by Washington
such as freeing dozens of political prisoners, opening the economy to limited capitalism, hosting
peace talks for war-torn Colombia and eliminating most restrictions on travel for its own
citizens” (Haven). The Cuba Study Group, an organization that aims to create multilateral policy
recommendations to facilitate peaceful change and lead to a democracy in Cuba believes that it
is:
fruitless to gauge the effectiveness of a Cuba policy by the actions or inactions of the
Cuban regime, because no other nation, but Cuba itself, has the power to cause change.
Ultimately, Cuba will change from within. The success of a Cuba policy ought to be
assessed on how it helps to shape the future outcome. (Cuba Study Group 6)
Any transition, even a faltering one, offers hope for democratization and is better than no
transition at all. Because Cubans are making small changes in the direction toward democracy,
the United States can now step in and act as a supporter by normalizing relations. By creating an
atmosphere where political elites are less fearful of the United States destabilizing the Cuban
government, better relations can ensue (LeoGrande Interview). The embargo itself is not enough
to cause a political transition in Cuba. Instead, it is essential for the United States to supplement
Litt 37
the embargo with other forms of assistance to the people of Cuba who are in opposition to Castro
(Lopez 157). There could be an easing of internal political controls in Cuba and improved human
rights resulting from improved relationships.
Cuba and communism were the main issues on the foreign policy agenda throughout the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, yet today Cuba appears to be forgotten and ignored.
The faulty and stalemated U.S. Cuban relations have been perpetuated by Fidel Castro’s reign as
the Communist leader. Through eleven presidential administrations, Castro has been the target of
U.S. intervention, and “intervention by force became predictable, justified by claims that these
figures [of foreign and communist leaders] constituted threats to the Free World and hence to
American security” (Jones 4). Castro’s power has remained strong in Cuba and has likewise
remained an issue of political concern for the United States. Today, few Cubans see themselves
as Communists but closely identify themselves as revolutionaries; they want Jose Martin’s vision
of a socially just society (Voices of Cuba). While Castro claimed history would absolve him,
historical revisionism questions whether a totalitarian state was necessary to gain the benefits of
a revolution. Similarly, history has yet to absolve the United States for all the actions, legal and
illegal, that have been taken to undermine the Castro regime. The relationship between the
United States and Cuba has been continually stalemated, neglected, and ignored which continues
to cause human rights issues in Cuba as well as world image problems for the United States. The
United States’ policies of economic disruption and plots for Castro’s assassination have escalated
the situation in Cuba which only necessitates the demand for attention in the policy arena today;
now is the time to revisit Cuban policies and reexamine the broken relationship.
Litt 38
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