WORKING PAPER
Cuban Sustainability: The Effects of
Economic Isolation on Agriculture and
Energy
M. Dawn King
Department of Political Science and Environmental Studies
Lehigh University
Paper Presentation for the Western Political Science Association
Portland, OR
March 21-24, 2012
ABSTRACT: Cuba is well-known for its alternative model of agriculture that focused on
diversifying crops, increasing organic production, and localizing the food economy. While Cuba
adopted this agricultural model out of necessity due to the massive decline of petroleum imports,
their localized, organic food system was heralded world-wide as a model of sustainability.
However, a less studied aspect of Cuban sustainability is how limited petroleum imports affected
Cuban energy use and energy policy, and how the recent opening of the energy economy affects
their organic agriculture model. Despite investments in solar, wind, and hydroelectric projects,
Cuba’s main source of renewable energy, sugar bagasse, declined significantly due to the
economic collapse of the 1990s and subsequent crumbling of the sugar industry’s infrastructure.
Further, Cuba relies heavily on crude and liquid fuels for electricity generation, hardly a
sustainable model. This paper argues that Cuba’s economic isolation during the early 1990s led
to an environmentally friendly agricultural model, yet this same isolation could cripple the
realization of a sustainable energy model and reduce their agricultural sustainability. The recent
economic opening of the country to foreign investment could boost Cuba’s potential for
increasing renewable energies, but it is also leading to increased chemical fertilizer and fossil
fuel use – weakening Cuba’s sustainability.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifty years, increased access to electricity and intensified agricultural
production lifted millions out of extreme poverty. However, the world is consuming fossil fuels
at a record pace to satiate global demands in the transportation, agriculture, and energy sectors
while the effects of global warming, caused by this fossil fuel use, are already threatening human
security by shifting agricultural zones and causing extreme weather patterns (USDA 2012). The
same practices meant to solve the world’s resource and poverty problems, are now creating them.
As energy prices soar, scholars often discuss the economic and environmental repercussions of
hitting “peak oil” as something that may happen in the future. This study looks at Cuba, a
country that faced “peak oil,” and argues that the world can learn valuable sustainability lessons
from the Cuban experience. Cuba’s relative economic isolation in a globalizing world forced the
country to adopt agricultural sustainability practices and invest in domestic energy sources (both
renewable and non-renewable) when USSR petroleum imports were severely restricted, yet this
same economic isolation impeded the Cuban government from achieving a sustainable energy
system. Effective sustainability policies must strike a balance between purposive, centralized
actions to reduce dependence on fossil-fuels coupled with decentralized capital investments that
allow for new research, development, and infrastructure. Cuba is currently trying to find this
balance.
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The alternative Cuban agricultural experience, which began in the late 1980s, is now well
documented and researched, but very few studies look at the interplay between agriculture and
energy sustainability in Cuba. This paper begins with an overview of Cuba’s reliance on the
classical model of agriculture and then explains the agricultural and economic changes in Cuba
from 1990-2000 that transformed its reliance on this model to a more sustainable “alternative”
model of agriculture that is less dependent on fossil-fuels. Cuba concurrently attempted to
strengthen both energy and food security in the 1990s, but while Cuba’s organic urban
agriculture practices successfully increased the diversity of food crops, it also indirectly lead to
an increased dependence on fossil fuels in the energy sector due to the decreased availability of
sugar byproducts.
The goals set forth by the Cuban Energy Sources Development Program in 1993 included
increasing domestic energy sources, renewable energy sources, and efficiency, and while Cuba
has increased domestic energy sources and energy efficiency, it currently lacks the capacity to
harness many potential renewable energy sources. The recent opening of the economy to more
joint venture projects is promising in that many foreign energy companies are investing in
updating old sugar mills to cogenerate much needed alternative energy from sugar bagasse
(fibrous bi-product). However, this same economic opening is spurring more domestic oil
extraction and funding the construction of a major petrochemical plant that will produce the
same pesticides and fertilizers that led to Cuba’s food insecurity in the 1990s, potentially
thwarting any chance of Cuba achieving a truly sustainable model of development.
The Cuban Transition from a Classical to Alternative Model of Agriculture:
1989-2000
During the “green revolution” of the 1960s, many thought the use of chemical pesticides
and fertilizers were necessary to feed an expanding world population. Certainly this classical
model of agriculture increased crop yields world-wide; chemical fertilizer applications kept the
soils viable enough to sustain crops, and pesticide spraying prevented invasive insects from
attacking susceptible monoculture fields. Mechanization made the process of farming more
3
efficient and farm plots became larger as the amount of farmers shrank. A once labor intensive
practice, dependent on crop diversity, became petroleum dependent. Cuba, led by Dictator Fidel
Castro since 1959, embraced this agricultural model whole-heartedly. As a strategic ally of the
Soviet Union, Cuba received heavily subsidized petroleum imports and a guaranteed market for
their sugar exports, accounting for three-quarters of their foreign exchange earnings throughout
the 1980s (Elledge 2009). Export-led agricultural policy began to worry Cuban scientists in the
early 1980s, but forced implementation of new practices did not come until the late 1980s with
the fall of the Soviet Bloc. Fidel Castro had a choice to make: either join the capitalist system
with an export economy or retain socialism and move toward a more self-sufficient, sustainable
agricultural system – he chose the latter.
Due to Castro’s decision, and the US Cuban embargo, a majority of Cuba’s staple
imports were cut off and caloric intake decreased by 30 percent due to an 80 percent drop in the
availability of chemical pesticides and a 50 percent drop in petroleum for agriculture in the early
1990s (Rosset and Benjamin; 1994, 80). From 1989 to 1993, Cuba went from one of the best
nourished nations in Latin America to falling only behind Bolivia and Haiti as the most
malnourished, but by 1994 many farmers were claiming that they had “increased the quality and
quantity of crop yields at lower costs and with fewer health and environmental side effects”
(Zunes; 1994, 19). The centralist, socialist system aided in a rapid transition to an alternative
model of agriculture, and the progressive research of scientists, rather than legislative debate,
guided the sustainable agricultural policies.
Agricultural Changes: The Alternative Model
In remarks made by Fidel Castro to the 5th Congress of the National System of
Agriculture and Forestry Technicians, he laid out the goals for what he branded the “special
period in peacetime.” The goals to achieve economic independence included: making food the
number one priority, producing food without feedstocks or fertilizers, and converting farming
into an honored and respected profession (Rosset and Benjamin; 1994, 33). With these goals in
mind, Cuba changed its institutional framework to promote greater self-sufficiency. The Organic
Farming Association played an important role in the institutionalization in the alternative model.
Together with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Association developed a program to recover
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traditional farming techniques, including: taking maximum advantage of the land, human
resources, community participation, organic fertilizers, crop rotation, biological pest controls,
biological cycles and seasonality of crops, natural energy sources (hydro, wind, solar, biomass,
etc…), and animal traction (Rossett 1997, 164).
Many developed nations would find these “new” farming techniques unconventional and
backwards. While machinery required petroleum, the new form of agriculture depended more on
human and animal labor, machines were replaced by citizens and tractors replaced by oxen.
Although this system may seem parochial, a Cuban farmer notes, “before, you could only fit two
cycles into the rainy season. For more than a month each year we couldn’t prepare the land
because the tractors got stuck in the mud. But an ox doesn’t have that problem. You plough the
day after it rains or even while it’s raining if you want.” As a result, the farm harvests three crops
a year instead of two (taken from Rosset; 1997, 158). Although the yield per cycle was lower,
the annual yield was higher. While the method of using oxen goes back hundreds of years,
farmers had to rely on the old campesinos (farm workers) in order to learn even basic concepts
such as hitching the animals.
Conservation was at the heart of the organic agricultural transition during the “special
period,” and, coupled with the low-input agricultural model, resource recovery and recycling
programs were implemented on a countrywide scale. Cuban scientists converted “waste” into
energy and fertilizer, utilizing everything from animal waste to crop harvests to be collected and
processed into bio-fertilizers (Rosset and Benjamin; 1994, 61). Cuba also developed more
efficient means of utilizing sugar byproducts. In many sugar mills, the bagasse (fibrous waste)
produced during processing is used as biomass, which is in turn burned to cogenerate electricity
for the machinery (Rosset and Benjamin; 1994, 17). While the use of bagasse ebbs and flows
with sugar production, which has declined since 1990 (Pérez et. al 2005), the attitude set forth by
Castro conveyed a new Cuban identity based on a holistic approach to sustainable development.
The Cuban agricultural and environmental transformation plan of the 1990s certainly
went above and beyond what any other country enacted during that same decade – at least on
paper. Further, the institutional changes to the agricultural system seemed to be working. By
1995, food shortages precipitated by the Soviet collapse had been overcome, and in the 1996-7
growing season, the harvest produced the highest-ever production of ten basic food items
(Warwick; 1999, 458). This was largely due to returning production to the traditional way of
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farming by encouraging an exodus to the countryside. Cuba did so through creating more
attractive housing in rural areas as well as encouraging people, many who lost urban jobs due to
Cuban de-industrialization, to work on farms for periods of two weeks to two years (Rosset and
Cunningham; 1994, 11). However, despite the relocation of many to more rural areas, Cuba is
perhaps more internationally praised for encouraging organic urban gardens throughout cities
such as Havana (Koont 2009). Expanding home gardens and transforming abandoned urban lots
into community gardens were necessary practices to diversifying and increase food crops. Home
gardens act as a subsistence tool to supplement diets with a diversity of non-staple foods such as
citrus fruits, herbs, bananas, and avocados (Buchmann 2009, 712-713). While strong centralized
political institutions were critical in the quick transformation from the classical to the alternative
model of agriculture in Cuba, aiding in organic farming techniques in both rural and urban
settings, the highly centralized economic system proved to be an impeding factor in increasing
total food production.
Economic Institutional Changes
During the “special period,” the socialist economy had to sustain levels of efficiency that,
even under more amenable international circumstances, it had never attained. Agriculture was
not the only sector in need of change; farmers needed to be economically linked to the land, and
the socialist economic model needed to adjust accordingly. This occurred in 1993 with the
creation of Basic Units of Cooperative Production (UBPCs). In September 1993, the Cuban
government issued a decree turning over 80% of state-owned land to the workers in an attempt to
tie farmers to their agricultural output. While workers still had to fill state quotas, the excess
could be sold by the cooperatives at farmers markets (Buchmann 2009; Rosset 1997, 163). After
the failure of large-scale monoculture practices and a need to increase basic food crop
production, it was crucial to break farms into manageable units, where managers are intimately
familiar with the land. Without chemical imports, a farmer must know every inch of soil, instead
of just applying pesticides over a large tract of land.
Unlike other Latin American models of import-substitution that focused on
manufacturing, where economic power was more centrally controlled, Cuba needed to
decentralize their economic system to push production in the agricultural sector. Cooperative
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organizations remain the main mechanism of agricultural production, but Cuba also granted
usufruct titles to individual farmers and urban gardeners who wanted to work their own piece of
land, commonly referred to as parceleros. These parceleros act more autonomously, but often
still sell goods through Credit and Service Cooperatives (CCSs). Indeed, throughout the 1990s,
Cuba seemed on track to fulfilling its goal of becoming ever more self-sufficient with
agricultural production that was increasing Cuban food needs in an environmentally friendly
manner. Since 2000, however, there have been differing opinions on what seems to be working
with the Cuban system and what needs to be changed to secure both food security and economic
growth in the coming decades.
CUBAN AGRICULTURE FROM 2000-2010: BRING BACK THE SUGAR?
The “special period in peacetime” transformed Cuban agricultural practices toward a
more sustainable, organic, low-input system. However, from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s,
Cuban agricultural outputs began decreasing. Sugar production went from around 8.4 million
tons per year in 1990 to a meager 1.5 million tons by 2007-2008 (Elledge 2009). Given the goals
of the “special period” to decrease monoculture practices and increase food production, this
statistic may not be all that surprising, yet total agricultural production fell 22% from 2000-2005
(Nova-Ganzález 2006) while basic food production declined another 8% from 2007-2008
(Elledge 2009). Further, Cuban dependence on U.S. food imports increased from $4.3 million in
purchases in 2001 to $340 million in 2006 (Alvarez 2004, 1; Weissert 2011)1, and urban
agricultural plots decreased from 26,600 in 1997 to 9744 by 2000 (Premat 2005, 154-155)2.
Certainly, the decrease in sugar production is attributable to more than just increasing basic food
production.
In the early 2000s, the Castro government shut down half of the countries’ 156 sugar
mills due to deteriorating infrastructure (Elledge 2009). A lack of national capital has led to
many infrastructure problems throughout Cuba, but the disappearance of the sugar industry, once
the cause of Cuba’s depleted soil conditions and lack of diverse food production, may lead to
1
The US exports certain food products to Cuba - despite the embargo.
Some attribute Cuba’s decline in food production to the economic recovery of the early 2000s (Premat 2005) while
others argue that the decline in production is due to an inefficient economic system that relies on centralized,
monopolistic control of output, denying farmers autonomy to make real management decisions (Nova González
2006).
2
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even more economic vulnerability for the country. Most of Cuba’s electric cogeneration is
coupled with sugar production. A decrease in sugar production equates to a heavier reliance on
fossil fuels, something Cuba does not want and cannot afford. With global sugar prices on the
rise, partially due to an increase in world demand for sugarcane ethanol, Cuba can use what it
learned in the “special period” to produce more sustainable sugarcane. Nicholas Elledge (2009)
from the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, argues that by “using state of the art technology, a
sugar mill can generate over 10 times the electricity needed for its own operation…roughly
equivalent to adding 4 power plants to the island” and that “an action as simple as modernizing
the existing mills would… represent more than a 50% increase…to the system’s power
capacity.” Given Cuba’s dire need for capital and the fact that food production has decreased
over the past decade anyway, one means to achieving Cuba’s goal of self-sufficiency could be
increasing sugar production. This, of course, requires opening the market up to partial outside
investment – an institutional change that may also aid in increasing total food production.
Cuba still imports 60% of its food (Robles 2010, 5), and many argue that the centralized
economic system must be further decentralized since farmers are desperate to be free of
government control. Armando Nova González (2006), a Cuban agricultural economist, argues
UBPCs should be granted more autonomy since they are obligated to sell 70% of their produce
to the state for below market prices, making the larger rural cooperatives inefficient and
unprofitable. The most efficient agricultural practices in Cuba are those that are guided by a
strong central government but also have autonomy and economic incentive to produce as much
as possible, such as the parceleros operating small urban agricultural (UA) plots. Smaller plots
within cities, as mentioned above, have usufruct rights to the land and often produce food for
their own consumption. Given the average Cuban spends around 75% of their income on food
(Nova González 2006), this makes UA gardens economically viable because gardeners now
produce food they otherwise would have to buy and some make a little extra money in markets
without being forced to supply government produce for below market cost (Enríquez 2003, 211;
Buchmann 2009). However, even larger cooperatives within urban settings that are required to
sell to the government, particularly Havana, are more productive and environmentally friendly
than their rural counterparts.
While overall agricultural production decreased in Cuba throughout the 2000s,
production levels of vegetables and herbs from small UA plots increased from 4000 tons in 1994
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to 4.2 million tons in 2005 due to an increase in cultivated urban areas and increased yields in
those areas from 1.5 kilograms per square meter to close to 30 in the most successful
organoponico gardens (Koont 2009, 47). This is mainly due to research and development
conducted by the Cuban government thought the Ministry of Agriculture on intensive, organic
urban gardening practices. In a comparative study of the poorer Santiago region to Havana,
Laura Enríquez (2003) argues that the use of organic inputs is more prevalent in Havana (90
percent) than in the rural region of Santiago (69.2%), hence the most productive plots are also
the most sustainable plots. Sinan Koont (2009) attributes this to the Cuban governments’ focus
on training and education, sustainability research and development, provision of agro-ecological
inputs, and material and moral incentives.
With regards to training and education, the beginning of the “special period” stressed the
role of scientific experts, paired with citizens familiar with ideographic knowledge of agroecological farming practices, in diffusing high yield organic know-how as quickly as possible.
Indeed, many of the workers on the most successful urban cooperatives have their Masters
degrees in fields such as engineering and botany. Further, these experts are teaching elementary
and secondary school children practices in urban agriculture to guarantee a new generation of
UA farmers. This leads into another important variable- the provision of material and moral
incentives to farmers. Cuba successfully rebuilt the image of the farmer from a poor peasant to a
dignified scientific expert contributing to the revolutionary goals. The top urban agriculturists
receive prestigious “excellence” awards and are respected in the community. Most UA farm
laborers work from 7am to 3pm with an hour lunch that is provided by the cooperative (Koont
2009, 56-57). In addition, while many rural UBPCs lack material incentives to increase
production even the poorest of these farmers make about the same income as the average Cuban
citizen (Enríquez 2003, 216). In one successful UA cooperative, workers made a monthly
income of 815 pesos, compared to 385 peso salary of state workers (Koont 2009, 57).
Besides taking pride in their farmers, Cuba also takes great pride in their research and
development of agricultural practices. The National Urban Agriculture Group, the central
organizing body, works with scholars throughout Cuba. For example, there are hundreds of
projects working on food production for the population by sustainable methods (Koont 2009).
Organoponicos, raised-bed constructions measuring 30 meters by 1 meter, attribute their
continuously growing yields to committed scientific research on intensive organic farming.
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These organic farming methods are aided by the government’s provision of agro-ecological
inputs to farmers in need. From free farming advise to the provision of organic fertilizer and
seeds, the ruling motto is: “We must decentralize only up to a point where control is not lost, and
centralize only up to a point where initiative is not killed” (Fuster taken from Koont 2009, 47).
Cuba seems to successfully accomplish this in the UA setting, although less so in the countryside.
The last decade has seen both successes and failures in Cuban agricultural practices, yet
there is strong agreement that Cuba’s strides toward localizing sustainable farming for selfsufficiency is by far the most comprehensive national attempt at ecologically complex biological
farming to date. Worldwide, the neo-liberal economic model encourages widespread
monoculture practices that are heavily reliant on chemical pesticides and fertilizers while
discouraging crop diversity and regionalized food systems, making many countries vulnerable to
food insecurities. The Cuban experiment demonstrates the importance of crop diversity and delinking agricultural production from petroleum-based inputs to increase food security. However,
Cuba’s relative economic isolation after the collapse of the USSR also led to diminished
investments in much-needed energy infrastructure, and the decrease in sugar production, that was
necessary for such an agricultural system, deprived Cuba of their most reliable source of
alternative energy. Cuba’s outdated generation facilities produce about 85% of Cuban power
using liquid fuels (mostly diesel fuel) – a very high percentage when compared to the world
average of ten percent (Belt, 2009, 4). Cuba’s highly polluting, unsustainable reliance on crude
oil for power generation, coupled with massive energy loss due to an outdated grid, led to major
blackouts in 2004-2005 and civil unrest. These blackouts forced Fidel Castro to focus on energy
efficiency and sustainability during the “Energy Revolution” of 2005-2006.
THE CUBAN ENERGY SECTOR
Cuba reorganized its society during the “special period” in an attempt to become as
economically independent as possible in a world that was quickly becoming more globalized.
The immediate restructuring of the agricultural system demonstrates the fragility of our global
food systems that are almost completely dependent on fossil-fuel inputs and energy-intensive
global transportation. For Cuba, the immediate emergency was not heating, cooling, and
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transportation, but, rather, feeding its population. The harsh reality of a 53% decline in
petroleum imports over the course of three years (1989-1992), however, also crippled an already
dilapidated energy sector. Castro understood that energy reforms would be just as vital to
Cuba’s self-sustainability as agricultural reforms and initiated the National Energy Source
Development Program in 1993 – focusing on reducing energy dependence, increasing renewable
energy, and improving energy efficiency. By 2002, electricity use was back to 1990 levels.
The objectives of the National Energy Source Development Program clearly illustrated
Cuba’s mission for self-sustainability, but not necessarily environmental sustainability. To
reduce their dependence on petroleum imports, Cuba increased domestic crude production by
540% and gas production by 1,735% from 1990-2002 (Perez et al 2005, 302). While an
impressive increase in production, Cuba is nowhere near achieving its goal of energy
independence as they are now dependent on subsidized Venezuelan crude and gas imports. In
2007, Venezuelan imports accounted for 60% of Cuba’s total energy consumption (Belt 2009, 4).
The second objective of increasing renewable energy failed. The percentage of electricity
generation from fossil fuels increased from 80% in 1970 to 93% by the mid-2000s, while the use
of sugar biomass fell from 18% to 6.7% of total electricity generation in the same time period
(Cuba’s National Office of Statistics 2010). The government invested in photovoltaic systems,
mini and micro hydroelectric plants, wind generator, and hybrid systems, but these projects were
small in scale.3 Cuba did make some strides in achieving the goal of improving energy
efficiency by strategically installing new meters that decreased total energy loss from 23% in
1995 to 18% in the mid-2000s (Perez et al 2005, 302). Additionally, the Cuban government
introduced a new electricity tariff system and used the money to help Cuban residents change to
more efficient light bulbs and appliances. Still, in 2004-2005 Cuba experienced over 400
blackouts and found itself in the midst of an energy crisis and civil unrest.
The 2006 Energy Revolution took drastic steps to further the objectives first laid out in
the National Energy Source Development Program, and by 2006-2007, mass blackout decreased
from hundreds to three. In the first 6 months of the Energy Revolution, Cuba replaced all
incandescent light bulbs (9 million+) to compact fluorescents, making Cuba the first country in
the world to do so (Guevara-Stone 2009). Further, Cuba instituted a residential tariff structure
which begins at the very low rate of .34 US cents/kWh for the first 100 kWh per month and
3
Although many were installed in rural areas that previously did not have access to the electric grid.
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increases after every 50 kWh increase per month with a maximum price of 5.4 US cents/ kWh
(Guevara-Stone 2009). Increasing prices coupled with a massive public education campaign, in
schools and through the media, increased energy efficiency. Further, Cuba continued investment
in distributed power generation, installing over 1800 diesel and fuel oil micro-electrical plants
across the country (Guevara-Stone 2009). While not powered by renewable energy sources,
Cuba’s distributed power generators are less vulnerable to natural disasters and have the
potential for renewable conversion in the future. Cuba realizes the need for renewable energy
sources if they are to achieve energy independence.
Currently, Cuba is installing 100 wind measuring stations with 2 new wind farms that
produce 7.23 MW, developing a grid-connected 100kW solar electric plant, using 180 microhydro systems (31 connected to the grid), increasing the number of independent solar electric
systems in rural areas from 5,300 in 2002 to over 8,000, and adding 300 biogas plants (GuevaraStone 2009). In 2008, the country consumed 66% less kerosene and 20% less gasoline for
electric generation than in 2006 (Guevara-Stone 2009). However, while renewables account for
17-20% of total production of primary energy (Trading Economics 2012, Avila and GuevaraStone 2010), they account for less than 4% of total electricity production (Trading Economics
2012), compared to 9% in the United States (EIA 2012)4. If Cuba is serious about sustainable
development and self-sufficiency, it must wean itself off of heavily subsidized Venezuelan oil
and invest more in alternative energy sources, but Cuba does not have the capital to take on such
a feat.
Since the mid-2000s, Cuba, faced with dilapidated infrastructure and negative cash flows,
began opening its state-owned companies to partial foreign investment. Slowly, this increase in
joint venture partnerships and capital investments is changing Cuba’s potential for non-fossil fuel
based electric generation. Nicholas Elledge (2009) of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs argues
that if sugar mills are updated to “ cogenerate electricity from bagasse, the island could add up
to four gigawatts of power to its grid, roughly equivalent to adding four nuclear power plants.”
Further, many argue that producing sugarcane ethanol for export could bring much needed hard
currency into the country for future energy investments (Elledge 2009, Pinón 2010b).5 Some of
these new ventures focus on increasing renewables. Cuba’s joint venture with the British
4
5
although much of that is due to large hydro-electric projects
It should also be noted the Castro regime consistently argues they will not use “food” for fuel.
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company Havana Energy is in the process of developing a 30 MW wind farm, and they are
currently working on plans to increase biomass energy plants (BBC 2011). However, many of
these energy partnerships focus more on Cuba’s energy independence with respect to increasing
the use of fossil fuels.
In 2010, Cuba signed agreements with the Russian Electric Company to update its
Maximo Gomez thermoelectric power plant and announced a $6 billion expansion project of the
Cienfuegos refinery. Part of the expansion will include a liquid natural gas (LNG) regasification facility to receive Venezuelan sourced LNG. This LNG project is a joint venture
between Venezuela’s PdVSA (51%) and Cuba’s Cupet (49%) and part of a larger project to
make Cienfuegos Cuba’s oil refining and petrochemical center (Pinón 2010a). The natural gas
will be used to power the city’s thermoelectric power plant as well as provide feedstock
(hydrogen) for a planned $1.3 billion petrochemical complex to provide Cuba with fertilizers for
agriculture (Pinón 2010a). The new refinery, petrochemical complex, power plant, and LNG
terminal will certainly help Cuba increase energy efficiency and security. Outdated, heavily
polluting refineries need to be updated, and LNG is a more environmentally friendly energy
source than the high sulfur crude that currently accounts for 64% of Cuba’s petroleum
consumption (Pinón 2010a). That being said, the multibillion dollar investment in updating the
Cienfuegos complex trumps the investments in non-fossil fuel sources. Further, Cuba’s focus on
building a petrochemical/fertilizer plant seemingly discounts Cuba’s success at building
community and national pride around creating one of the world’s most dynamic organic
agricultural systems. As noted above, Cuba’s agricultural system should not be overromanticized - the country is still importing a lot of their food staples and continues to struggle
with food security. Opening the country to an increasing amount of foreign investment in the
energy sector, however, should be further evaluated as a possible impediment to Cuba’s
realization of being one of the world’s only “sustainable” countries.
CUBAN AGRICULTURE AND ENERGY SUSTAINABILITY
In the 2006 Living Planet Report, which assesses sustainable development based on the
United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index Score coupled with a
counties’ ecological footprint, Cuba was heralded as the only country to fall into the “sustainable
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category” with both a low ecological footprint and a rather high quality of living, but by 2010
Cuba slipped just out of the sustainable category and could be at risk for slipping even further
(WWF 2010, 34). While it is too soon to gauge the effect of foreign investment on Cuban
sustainable development practices, this section looks at sustainability indictors over the 2000s
and finds that Cuba is increasing chemical applications to soils and fossil fuel consumption as
venture capital projects increase. Further, I evaluate the change in sustainability indicators from
the Environmental Performance Index and find that Cuba’s drop from the ninth ranking country
in 2010 to the fiftieth ranking country in 2012 is largely due to changes in air pollution, water
pollution, and coastal area protection.
While only a limited amount of data is available for Cuba, the World Bank successfully
traced Cuban fertilizer consumption, fossil-fuel energy consumption, and foreign direct
investment from 2000-2010 (see graph 1). When these numbers are plotted out over a time,
fertilizer consumption and fossil fuel energy consumption increase steadily over the decade
while direct foreign investment spikes dramatically from 2008-2010. The same agricultural
system praised internationally for its decreased use of chemical fertilizers throughout the 1990s
is slowly bringing these less sustainable inputs back into the farming system. Certainly, the real
Cuban goal of the “special period” was to increase Cuban self-sufficiency and decrease
dependence on foreign imports, not sustainable development per se. With the increased
availability of domestic and Venezuelan oil, more chemical fertilizers are produced in Cuba,
with a plan for increased production in the next few years (Pinón 2010a) in an attempt to grow
more on their limited agricultural land. The increase in fossil fuel energy consumption (as a
percentage of total consumption) can also be attributed to an increase in domestic drilling and
Venezuelan crude imports. This strengthens Cuba’s ability to develop without US assistance,
but contributes to increased air pollution and a continued reliance on crude for electricity
generation. The effect of the dramatic surge in foreign direct investment is yet to be determined,
but it could lead to much-needed grid efficiency improvements and the ability to substitute LNG
for crude oil as a power source.
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Graph 1: Cuban Fertilizer and Fossil Fuel Energy Consumption in Relation to FDI and GDP per
Capita from 2000-2010
100
80
Cuba's Fertilizer
Consumption (Kg/hectare)
60
Cuba's Fossil Fuel Energy
Consumption (% of Total)
40
Foreign Direct Investment
(In US Millions)
20
GDP Per Capita ($100s)
0
20002001200220032004200520062007200820092010
-20
Source: World Bank Data from Trading Economics: www.tradingecomincs.com/cuba
Beyond exploring the trends of fertilizer and fossil-fuel use, I also evaluate the
Environmental Performance Index (EPI) Scores for Cuba in 2010 and 2012. The EPI replaced
the Environmental Sustainability Index in the mid-2000s to better rank countries on performance
indicators tracked across ten policy categories (EPI Summary 2010). The indicators changed
dramatically from one Index to the next and then changed once again from 2008-2010. While
data is available for Cuba in 2008, it would not be comparable to later indicators, hence why I
only include data from the last two studies. Cuba dropped from the 9th ranked country in the
world to the 50th in this two year time period, and below I compare indicator scores in an attempt
to make sense out of such a dramatic drop (see Graph 2).
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Graph 2: Cuba EPI Scores 2010-2012
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Cuba 2010
Cuba 2012
Data from 2010 and 2012 Environmental Performance Index Reports: http://epi.yale.edu
In 2010, Cuba ranked particularly high on their environmental health score due to low
levels of industrial pollution. The 2010 performance indicators for air pollution (ecosystem
effects) measured nitrogen oxides, ecosystem ozone, sulfur dioxide emissions, and volatile
organic compounds (VOCs) while the 2012 indicators only measured sulfur dioxide per capita
and sulfur dioxide per gross domestic product. Cuba’s increasing reliance on high sulfur crude
for electricity generation, paired with a push to expand its oil refining capabilities could help
explain why Cuba’s air pollution scores dropped dramatically over the two year period since the
study placed more emphasis on sulfur dioxide emissions than the 2010 measurements. The
water quality indicators (both effects on human health and the ecosystem) stayed the same for
both studies, however, and Cuba’s score also dropped significantly. This is most likely also tied
to the modernization of once dormant oil refineries. In Cienfuegos, “almost 85 percent of the
river basins in the province…empty into the marine ecosystem around which all the industrial
and urban development…is linked” (Grogg 2011). The more industrialization, the more
freshwater pollution that drains into the sea – perhaps also explaining Cuba’s diminished
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“fisheries” score over the two year period since the 2012 indicators focused more on coastal
shelf fishing pressure and overexploitation of fish stocks.
Cuba maintained exemplary scores in agriculture and forestry due to their pesticide
regulations and focus on re-forestation. It should be noted that the agriculture scores could
potentially underrepresent the true sustainability of the Cuban model since it does not measure
actual pesticide use or the percentage of organic agriculture. Given the consistency between the
2010 and 2012 EPI indicators, however, it is likely that Cuba is, in fact, becoming less
sustainable as their GDP per capita and level of foreign direct investment grow. Some scholars
argue that environmental degradation may occur during a period of increased trade or industrial
growth before eventually getting better (see Grossman and Krueger 1993; Inglehart 2000), but
Cuba is one of the few countries in the world that embraced environmental stewardship when
economic indicators were depressed. This leaves Cuba in a precarious position – they need
further foreign investment and economic growth to bolster their renewable energy potential, but
this comes at risk of becoming even more dependent on fossil fuels, including the use of fossil
fuels in agricultural production.
CONCLUSION
Cuba needed an alternative agricultural model when foreign oil imports were cut off
significantly at the end of the 1980s, and the partial opening of the Cuban economy, focused on
creating more autonomous agricultural cooperatives, in the 1990s helped diversity food crops
and set Cuba along a path of increased food security. The Cuban model was initiated out of
necessity, not because of any sort of Cuban environmental consciousness, yet better
environmental conditions went hand in hand with the new development strategy. Cuba learned
the limits of their agricultural model under their socialist economic system and it is in need of
further transformation in both the agriculture and energy sectors. A further opening of the
economy to joint ventures could help with updating the power grid and providing more sources
of renewable energy – potentially expanding Cuba’s potential for a more sustainable means of
energy security. Further, Cuba needs foreign investment to update agriculture facilities and take
maximum advantage of cogeneration and biofuel potential with sugarcane waste. The strong
state control of farming practices, used to successfully jumpstart the alternative model, has hit its
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limit. The Cuban government must begin loosening its grips on the domestic economy to allow
for more competition in the farming sector.
Despite the potential to become more sustainable with a purposive and focused opening
of the economy, the recent surge in joint venture investment on expanding domestic oil
extraction, petrochemical facilities, and oil refinery infrastructure reveals a trend toward
decreasing environmental sustainability. Once heralded as the world’s most sustainable country
by coupling environmental performance indicators with their human development scores, Cuba
is slipping further away from this goal. Perhaps the most distressing part of this current trend is
that it took Cuba decades to create a national identity that embraced sustainable environmental
practices in both the energy and agricultural sector, and it seemingly took only a couple of years
to derail these efforts. Undoubtedly, conservation efforts and sustainable education programs
can only satiate citizen’s energy desires to a certain point. In order to further the quality of life in
the country, electric production must increase to rural areas with little energy infrastructure and
to Havana in order to spur foreign investment and domestic small business growth.
Cuba’s trade agreement with Venezuela is bringing in much-needed petroleum for
electricity production, but their dependence on a relatively unstable country for crude is trapping
them into the same relationship that crippled their economy in 1990 – impairing their original
goal of self-sufficiency. Cuba is at a turning point in their path toward environmental
sustainability, and the current need for immediate foreign capital and increased energy
production seem to be trumping its desire to achieve development sustainably. Cuba still has
enough centralized control to leap-frog dirty electric production for cleaner renewable forms of
energy and the potential to guide development strategies that emphasize investments in and
research on renewable energy. It can utilize its expertise on organic farming strategies to increase
sugar production in a much more ecologically friendly manner than their monoculture approach
in the 1970s and 80s. Decisions made in the next five years will demonstrate whether Cuba
embraces their newly created national identity as a society striving for sustainable development
or rejects the goal of sustainable development to increase short-term capital and energy needs.
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