Blinded by Technology: American Agriculture in the Soviet Union, 1928-1932
Author(s): Deborah Fitzgerald
Source: Agricultural History, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 459-486
Published by: Agricultural History Society
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Blinded by Technology:
American Agriculturein the Soviet Union, 1928-1932
DEBORAH FITZGERALD
Historians of agriculturehave long been drawn to study the "farmcrisis"of
the 1920s and the New Deal of the 1930s. Both of these periods give form to
the dominant images of early twentieth-century agriculture, with farmers
producing crops and livestock ever more abundantlybut facing farm bankruptcies just the same. Long-awaitedfederal assistanceprograms created by
New Dealers not only helped stabilize the farm economy but also the rural
mentalit that had sufferedfor more than a decade. But while historians now
know quite a lot about the political and economic causes and effects of these
two events, we know much less about the intellectuallandscapeof farm leaders of the 1920s, and in particulartheir distress over the postwar crisis and
intense desire to solve production and pricing problems.
For some farm leaders,the farmcrisis provided a grim opportunity to take
stock, reevaluate,and even consider new ways of organizingagriculturalproduction. One agriculturalexperiment that received a great deal of thoughtful attention from American agriculturalistswas the Soviet collectivization of
agriculture. American farm leaders were fascinated with the Soviet project
and followed it in both the farm and popular press. Their interest stemmed
from several factors. First, the Soviets had run advertisements in the farm
is an associateprofessorin the historyof Americanscienceand technolDEBORAHFITZGERALD
ogy in MIT'sProgramin Science,Technologyand Society.Sheis the authorof TheBusinessof Breeding:HybridCornin Illinois,1890-1940, and is currentlyworkingon a book concerningthe industrializationof Americanagriculturein the 1920s.She thanksLorenGraham,Paul Josephson,Dana
Dalrymple,Olga Elena,and Douglas Hurtfor theircommentson an earlierdraftof this paper;Tom
Frolickand SergeyZhurovlevfor discussingtheir own work on Americansin Russia;and the History of Scienceand Technologycolloquiaat the Universityof Minnesota,Harvard,the Universityof
Pennsylvania,and Stanfordfor veryhelpfulcritiques.Specialthanksgo to Jane,Ann,and JohnStirniman for generouslysharingtheir thoughtsand historicalmaterialsregardingtheir father.
Agricultural History / Volume 70 / Number 3 / Summer 1996.? AgriculturalHistorySociety
459
460 / AgriculturalHistory
press indicating a desire to hireAmericanfarmersand farmexpertswho were
willing to live in the Soviet Union for a year or so and help the Soviets modernize agricultural production. For example, a writer for Wallaces'Farmer
went to the Soviet Union to help set up a hog-breeding program.1For many
farmers who had lost everything in the postwar depression, the Soviet offer
was too good to pass up. Second, by the mid- 1920s,groups of Soviet agriculturalists visited the United Statesboth to study farming and to place orders
for farm machinery with companies such as Caterpillarand International
Harvester. As these delegations traveled around the country, many rural
Americans realized that Soviets and Americans shared many of the same interests in agriculturaltopics such as crop and livestock production and farm
mechanization. Finally,agriculturalexpertssuch as mechanics sent to the Soviet Union by implement companies to help assemble machinery,and farm
economists and agricultural engineers, who were often invited to live and
work in the Soviet Union as well-paid advisers,served as both commentators
on and participants in the Soviet "experiment."
M. L. Wilson, for example, a prominent agriculturaleconomist, spent six
months advising the Soviets on their plan to grow 400,000 acresof wheat. Edward James Stirniman, an agriculturalengineer from the Universityof California, and Leonard J. Fletcher, an agricultural engineer with Caterpillar
TractorCompany, spent two years instructing the Soviets in assembling and
operating farm machinery.John Q. McDonald, another Caterpillarengineer,
traveled around the Soviet state farms assessingthe equipment needs of different crops. J. Brownlee Davidson, an agriculturalengineer at Iowa State
College, traveledto the Siberianareaof Biro-Bidjanto advise the Soviet government on the land's agriculturalsuitabilityfor the creation of a Jewishautonomous state.2
1. GuyBush,"NineOut of TenPigsDied,"Wallaces'Farmer56
(14 November1931):1179,1202;
"WhereHired Men Issue Orders,"Wallaces'Farmer56 (28 November 1931): 1218, 1231;"WhatIs
Russia'sMajorVice?"Wallaces'Farmer56 (26 December1931): 1271, 1276;see also LewisS. Feuer,
"AmericanTravelersto the Soviet Union, 1917-1932:The Formationof a Componentof New Deal
Ideology,"AmericanOuarterly14 (Summer1962):119-49.
2. Biographicalinformationfor M. L.Wilsonis in JaquesCattell,ed., AmericanMen and Women
of Science,9th ed., vol. 3 (New York:R. R. Bowker,1956),737;for LeonardJ.Fletcher,see J.McKeen
Cattelland JaquesCattell,eds.,AmericanMenof Science,6th ed. (NewYork:SciencePress,1938),464;
and for J.BrownleeDavidson,see JaquesCattell,ed., AmericanMen and Womenof Science,9th ed.,
Blinded by Technology / 461
Figure 1. During the early twentieth century, Russian farmers relied on technology that
dated from the nineteenth century. Here a Soviet farmer north of the Caucasus turns
furrows with a single moldboard plow pulled by a camel and two horses. After the
Russian Revolution in 1917, Soviet agriculturalplanners sought the rapid adoption of
American agriculturaltechnology, particularlytractors, threshing machines, and combines. J. B. Davidson Collection, Department of Special Collections, Iowa State University Library.
For many of these agriculturalistssearching for a new and better way to
organize agriculturein America,the most interestingthing about Soviet agriculture was that the Soviets seemed to be doing what the Americanswere only
vol. 1 (Lancaster,Pa.: Science Press, 1955), 433; for Wilson see also "The Reminiscences of
MilburnLincolnWilson,"1973,OralHistoryResearchOffice,ColumbiaUniversity;informationon
Stirnimansupplied by Janeand Ann Stirniman;the trip to Biro-Bidjanis describedin FranklinS.
Harris,et al.,"Reportof the AmericanICORCommissionfor the Studyof Biro-Bidjanand Its Colonization,"1929, J. B. Davidson Papers,SpecialCollections,ParksLibrary,Iowa State University,
Ames (hereafterDavidson Papers);"Reportof M. L. Wilson,TractorFarmingSpecialist,Montana
AgriculturalCollege, United Statesof Americaon the Biro-BidjanSettlementProjectin the Amur
Districtof Siberia,"1929,M. L.WilsonPapers,Accession00002,box 10,file F-22,SpecialCollections,
Montana State University,Bozeman (hereafterMLW);McDonaldwent on to become Caterpillar's
overseaspresident,retiringfrom the companyin 1961;JohnQ. McDonald,"RussianNotes,"F Hal
Q. McDonaldReports,"SpecialCollections,UniHigginsCollection,D-56, box 340, file"Russia-John
versity of California-Davis(hereafterHiggins Collection);F.Hal Higgins to E. J. Stirniman,8 July
1961,D-56, box 340, file "Russia,"
HigginsCollection.
462 / AgriculturalHistory
talking about-industrializing agriculture.The idea of modeling American
agricultureon industry,referredto as "corporate"or "large-scale"or "industrial farming,"was expressedin the growing number of huge farms in America; at a time when the averagefarm was still 160 acres,Tom Campbell's"industrial"farm was ninety-five thousand acres,while hundreds more were in
the one-thousand-acre range.Another example was an increasinglystrident
concern with farmers who, agriculturalexperts believed, should either become trained as managersor hire themselvesout as simple laborers.Echoing
the industrial obsession with specializationand management,this approach
suggested that the averagefarmerdid not possess the knowledge necessaryto
operate the new, industrialfarms.Finally,manywere anxious to see machines
replace farmers in performing the mundane tasks that farmers faced day in
and day out. Ironically,while implement manufacturersmade gigantic farm
machinery for Argentina,Canada,and the Soviet Union, they made very few
machines scaled to suit averageAmerican farms,which in the 1920s still relied largely on horses and hired men.3
Wilson was particularly inclined to view his Russian experience in this
light. As one of the leading advocatesof large-scalefarming in America,Wilson found severalsimilaritiesbetween Americanand Russianagriculturethat
merited further study. First,Wilson's strength and the Russians'main interest was wheat farming.This was important becausewheat farmingwas more
easily industrializedthan, say,corn farming.So a great deal of the large-scale
farming enthusiasm in America was among wheat experts. Second, and not
coincidentally, the physical conditions of wheat farming in Montana were
similar to those in the northern Caucasusof Russia-a semiarid or arid climate and a vast area of flat land nearly devoid of such obstacles as creeks,
trees, roads, and buildings. In the American version of industrial farming,
this last featurewas essential to the successfuluse of farm machinery such as
tractors and combines. Not only did such machinery need the space to turn
3. Historianshavewrittenlittle on large-scalefarmingduringthis period,but see Neil F.Foley,
"TheNew South in the Southwest:Anglos,Blacks,andMexicansin CentralTexas,1880-1930"(Ph.D.
diss., Universityof Michigan,1990);DeborahFitzgerald,"YeomanNo More:IndustrialFarmingin
1920sAmerica"(unpublishedmanuscript,1993);A. Roy Stephens,The TaftRanch:A TexasPrincipality (Austin:Universityof TexasPress, 1964);David Remley,Bell Ranch:CattleRanchingin the
Southwest,1824-1947 (Albuquerque:Universityof New MexicoPress,1993).
Blinded by Technology / 463
Figure 2. Agriculturalworkers in the Soviet Union welcomed the introduction of American
technology, but they resented advice from experts such as M. L. Wilson, J. Brownlee
Davidson, and Edward Stirniman. Moreover, the Soviet government could not afford
to mechanize all aspects of its agriculture at once. This woman followed a combine,
raking hay in the traditionalfashion. J. B. Davidson Collection, Department of Special
Collections, Iowa State University Library.
464 / AgriculturalHistory
around and move continuously, but only such a large tract could financially
support an investment in this expensive equipment.4
Wilson was himself engaged in a rather large experiment in industrial
agriculture called the FairwayFarmsProject.With financial assistance from
the RockefellerFoundation, Wilson had acquiredfive farms in Montana that
he turned into laboratories for studying farm management. Here he tested
his own theories and also traditional beliefs that he often found to be erroneous. For instance, Wilson argued on the basis of his FairwayFarm study
that, while the Homestead Act designated 160 acresas the ideal size for a family farm, such a farm could not support a family in areas of light rainfall,
where crop yields were consistently lower than in wetter parts of the country.
FairwayFarms also enabled Wilson to develop empiricaldata correlating,for
instance, farm size and machinery needs, or farm size and rainfall.Writingto
his old mentor Henry C. Taylorjust before he went to Russia, Wilson described his destination as "primarilyour Lone Warriorfarm at Brockton expect [sic] on a 100,000 acre scale."The Brocktonfarm was used mostly to test
different brands and types of agriculturalmachinery,and was in other ways
the most industrialized of the Fairway Farms. Describing his hopes to a
USDA colleague Wilson wrote, "The thing of greatestinterestto me is that it
involves laying out a 15,000 acretractorexperimentalstation which would be
given over entirelyto experimentalwork in connection with tractorfarming."
Clearly,for Wilson this sojourn in the Soviet Union was connected with his
own interests and research,and indeed resonated deeply with his visions of
agriculturalchange.5
Although Russianinterest in American farm machinerypredatedthe revolution of 1917, the Soviet restructuringof Russian society and productive
enterprise provided an opportunity to reconfigure peasant agriculture as
well. Beginning in 1919, this restructuringinvolved trying to move peasants
onto collective farms.Beforethis, Russianpeasantsfollowed traditional agri4. MilbornLincolnWilson,"ResearchStudiesin the Economicsof LargeScaleFarmingin Montana,"AgriculturalEngineering10 (January1929):3-12; MalcolmCutting,"BigDoings in Montana,"
CountryGentleman94 (May 1929):22-23, 130-31.
5. M. L. Wilson, "The FairwayFarmsProject,"Journalof Landand PublicUtilityEconomics2
(April1926):156-71;Wilsonto H. C. Taylor,26 March1929,box 37,fileAK-4,MLW;Wilsonto Lewis
G. Michael,9 January1929,box 10,file F-18,MLW.
Blinded by Technology / 465
cultural patterns in which families lived in small villages and farmed many
small strips of land scatterednearby.In this system, large seasonal tasks such
as planting and harvesting were performed communally, without regard to
whose strip was whose. Most peasants resisted collectivization, apparently
because of the Soviet government'scoercive and brutal efforts, and because
the government confiscated harvested grain. In both cases the peasants and
their traditional communes were eliminated from the production decisions.
Kulaks,or rich farmers,were also brutalizedin this processof collectivization;
millions were driven into exile or killed during collectivization.6
Figure3. Soviet plannersbelievedthatAmericantractorsandcombineswouldhelpthem
revolutionizeagricultureand speed theirefforts to give it a collectivestructureon an
industrialscale. Traditional
workpatterns,however,died hard,because crop failures
and governmentrequisitionsof the harvests often left workerswithoutadequategrain
for food. Here, a groupof womengleanerscollect every precioushandfulof wheat
afterthe combinesharvestedthe crop. J. B. DavidsonCollection,Departmentof Special Collections,IowaState UniversityLibrary.
of Sovietagriculture
6. Myunderstanding
Volin,A
duringthisperiodis basedon readingLazar
Harvard
SoPress,1970);ZhoresMedvedev,
Century
ofRussian
Agriculture
(Cambridge:
University
vietAgriculture(New York:W.W.Norton, 1987);RobertConquest,TheHarvestof Sorrow:SovietCollectivizationand the Terror-Famine
(New York:Oxford, 1986); Roy D. Laird,CollectiveFarmingin
466 / Agricultural
History
The famine of 1921 and 1922 sparkedAmericans'interest in Soviet agriculture, leading severalrelief delegations into the Soviet Union. HaroldWare,
who would laterbecome the single most important figure in bringing American agriculturalmethods to Russia,and Dr. Joseph Rosen, who headed the
American Relief Administration, Jewish Joint Distribution Service (also
called Agro-Joint), both led groups to Russia. Ware'sgroup included nine
North Dakota farmers,at least some of whom had been members of the radical Non-Partisan League, as well as twenty-two tractors and several tons of
food. A brilliant social entrepreneur,Warewas one of the few Americanswho
was as interested in the Soviet's political experiment as in their agricultural
experiment; he was both an astute observer and a remarkablyeffective promoter of agricultural modernization. He was also a prominent member of
the American Communist Party,and a son of Ella Reeve ("Mother")Bloor.
Hal Ware persuaded American philanthropiststo send tractors to the Soviet
Union, where Ware and his American crew demonstrated in the fields what
the machinery could accomplish.Within a few years,the Soviet government
was ordering tens of thousands of tractorsand other farm machines from the
United States.7
For the Soviet government, industrialized agriculture seemed to offer a
means of industrializing the republic more generally. Lacking both the
money and the technical expertise to shift the economy rapidly into a manufacturing mode, leaders decided that the best way to raise the money they
Russia-A PoliticalStudyof theSovietKolkhozy(Lawrence:Universityof KansasPress,1958);Moshe
Lewin,RussianPeasantsand SovietPower(Evanston,Ill.:NorthwesternIllinoisPress,1968);Alexander Nove, Glasnostin Action(Boston: Unwin and Hyman, 1989); RobertV. Allen, RussiaLooksat
America:The Viewto 1917(Washington,D.C.:Libraryof Congress,1988);JosephFinder,RedCarpet
(NewYork:Holt, RinehartandWinston,1983);HollandHunterand JanuszM. Szyrmer,FaultyFoundations:SovietEconomicPolicies,1928-1940 (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1992);Maurice
Hindus, RedBread(New York:JonathanCape and HarrisonSmith, 1931);LouisFischer,Men and
Machinesin Russia(New York:HarrisonSmith, 1932);Anna LouiseStrong,I ChangeWorlds(New
York:H. Holt, 1935);LorenGraham,TheGhostof theExecutedEngineer(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1994).
7. LementHarris,"HaroldM. Ware(1890-1935),AgriculturalPioneer,U.S.A.and U.S.S.R.,"OccasionalPaperNo. 30, AmericanInstitutefor MarxistStudies,1978;see also BruceBliven,"Mr.Ware
and the Peasants,"New Republic43 (22 July1925):232-35; for earlytractorimports see Dana Dalrymple,"TheAmericanTractorComes to SovietAgriculture:The Transferof a Technology,"Technologyand Culture5 (Spring 1964): 191-214.
Blindedby Technology/ 467
needed to buy western industrialmachinerywas to grow and sell wheat. Russians had long participatedin the internationalwheat market,but their productive capacitywas hamperedby both a growing population and antiquated
agricultural techniques. Hundreds of thousands of acres of good wheatgrowing land had never been plowed.8
In June of 1928 the Soviet government set up the Grain Trust, or Zernotrust. Under the direction ofM. Y.Kalmanovich,the GrainTrusthad a dual
purpose: to produce massive quantities of wheat, and to train thousands of
Russian peasants to operate agricultural machinery. In a country as large,
populous, tradition-bound, and emotionally torn as the Soviet Union, these
Figure 4. During the late 1920s, American agriculturalexperts were amazed to see
Soviet farm workers using technology that farmers in the United States had not used
since the mid-nineteenth century, such as this hand-rake reaper. J. B. Davidson Collection, Department of Special Collections, Iowa State University Library.
8. Accordingto ReinholdNiebuhr,"Thefarmermust be collectivizedto destroyhis individualism, chief opposition to soviet politics.He must also be collectivizedto increasehis production.His
production must be increasedso that more graincan be exported.More grain must be exportedso
that more machines can be bought. More machinerymust be bought so that industrialplants may
startoperation.The industrialplantswill increasethe industrialpopulationand at the sametime provide machineryfor collectivefarmsin which the psychologyof the industrialworkerwill be reproduced in the country.So the logic runs in a circle";ReinholdNiebuhr,"Russia'sTractorRevolution,"
ChristianCentury47 (17 September1930):1111-12.
468 / Agricultural
History
were Herculean goals. It involved establishingfarms of hundreds of acres on
land that had never seen a plow; building housing for the peasants and advisers who would live there; procuring farm machinery from America and
Germany;and educating thousands of Soviet citizens in the details of Western agriculture.9
With the GrainTrustin operation, the pace of procuringfarm implements
increased substantially.Although reliable figures are hard to obtain, unofficial reports were stunning. In January1929,Wilson reportedthat the Soviets
bought 350 Cletrac tractors; in June, Amtorg, a New York-based Soviet
agency,reportedlyordered 6,750 tractorsfrom John Deere and International
Harvester;in August they ordered 1,700 heavy-dutytruck engines from Hercules Motor Corporation, and in December another 1,000; and in August
Cletrac sold another 708 tractors. By August of 1930, the Soviets ordered
$5 million worth of Caterpillar60s. The Department of Commerce estimated
that between Januaryand March of 1930, tractor sales to the Soviet Union
added up to about $20 million overall.In Julyof that year,the Soviets ordered
another $40 million in tractors and combines.10
In the fall of 1928, Hal Ware visited Wilson in Montana and persuaded
him to come to the Soviet Union as a farm management expert, specifically
to figure out how to physicallyand conceptually organize a collective farm.
Holed up in a Chicago hotel the first two weeks of December,Wilson, Ware,
and Riggin, who managed the Brockton farm, struggled to figure out precisely how one would turn an unplowed one hundred thousand acres of
9. Substantiveand reliableinformationon the GrainTrusthas been difficultto locate;this discussion is basedprimarilyon Wilson'slettersand journalisticreferences.The secondaryliteraturein
Sovietagriculturalhistorysaysverylittleon this.Fora typicalAmericanportrayal,see C. ParkerHolt,
"Russia'sFive-YearGrainProductionProgram,"FarmImplementNews 50 (1 August 1929):26-27.
10. Dalrymple,"AmericanTractor";Wilson to C. S. Noble, 3 January1929, box 10, file F-18,
FarmImplementNews50 (20 June1929):19;"SovietTractorPurMLW;"RussiaBuysMoreTractors,"
chases,"FarmImplementNews 50 (11 July1929): 14;"SovietsBuy TruckEngines,"FarmImplement
News 50 (15 August 1929):21;"CletracSalesin Russia,"FarmImplementNews50 (22 August 1929):
11; "RussiaOrders More Hercules Engines,"Farm ImplementNews 50 (12 December 1929): 31;
"CaterpillarGets RussianOrder,"FarmImplementNews51 (14 August1930):11;"RussianProgress,"
FarmImplementNews51 (7 August 1930):25;WilliamStoneman,"FarmingUnderthe Bolsheviks,"
SuccessfulFarming32 (May 1934): 22; "Tractorsin Russia,"FarmImplementNews 54 (16 March
1933):8;"SovietSalesBoost Exports,"FarmImplementNews51 (15 May 1930):19;"RussiaPlacesBig
Orders,"FarmImplementNews51 (14 August 1930):12.
Blinded by Technology / 469
Russian soil-land that was unpopulated,without roads, buildings, or
power-into a bustlingand productiveset of farmsproducingspringand
winterwheat,operatedby highlyskilledSovietcitizenswith the most modern westernfarmequipment.It wasa difficulttask,not leastbecausetwo of
the threehadneverset eyeson the SovietUnion.1
In the reportpreparedfor the GrainTrust,Wilson,Ware,and Rigginarguedthatthe Sovietsshouldadoptvirtuallythe samewheat-growing
system
thatWilsonurgedMontanafarmersto adopt.Theymadeveryfew concessionsto the factthatmanyfacetsof the systemwouldbe moredifficultto accomplishin the SovietUnion (e.g.,"timelinessof operations").Rather,they
presentedtheirplanas thoughit werea strictlytechnicaland nearlyformulaicproblemthatcouldbe solvedwithoutconsideringsocial,psychological,
political,or culturalissuesat all.Itwasclearlythisopportunityforseemingly
objectiveproblem-solvingactivitythatWilsonfoundso appealingin the Soviet situation.'2
The heartof Wilson,Ware,and Riggin'sreportwasa descriptionof Wilson'spet projectfor Americanwheatgrowers:the summerfallowsystem.
Thiswasbasicallya rotationalsystemin whichlandwasdividedup intowinter wheatfields,springwheatfields,and summerfallowfields.Wilsonrecommendedthis approachas a replacementfor the continualcroppingof
wheat,whichtendedto reducesoil moisture,andhe thoughtit wasparticularlyeffectivein areasof lightrainfall,suchas Montana.Thekeyfeaturesof
the systemwereto increasethewheatacreage,to reducetheamountof planting andplowingdoneeachyearon the farmthroughrotation,andto usemachineryfor all these operations.Accordingto Wilson,plantingwheat according to the summer fallow method was not practicalon small farms
becauseit requiredfarmersto keepa largechunkof landout of production
whileit was"infallow"Forexample,a 300-acrefarmmighthave100acresin
springwheat, 100 in winterwheat,and 100 in summerfallow;the farmer
11. M. L.Wilson to L.S. Margolin,22 March1929,box 10,file F-18,MLW.
12. HaroldM. Ware,M. L.Wilson,and GuyRiggin,"TentativePlanfor OrganizingDemonstration FactoryWheatFarmfor GrainTrustat VerbludeNorth Caucuses[sic],U.S.S.R.,"
February1929,
or "verblut"is the Russianwordfor camel,whichwas widelyused
box 10, file F-22,MLW."Verblude"
in the Northern Caucasusfor pullingwagons,but was rarelyused in the field;one can only wonder
why a mechanizedfarmwas named afterthe beastof burdenit would, in part,replace.
470 / AgriculturalHistory
Figure 5. In 1928. Soviet agriculturalplanners created the GrainTrust, or Zernotrust. to
train peasants to use farm machinery and to boost grain production. The workers on
this collective farm. known as Sovhoz No. 2, used imported tractors and grain binders
to cut wheat. J. B. DavidsonCollection.Departmentof SpecialCollections.Iowa
State UniversityLibrary.
would be producing on only 200 acres at a time. While the system did generate higher yields overall, a farm of that size probably could not have supported a Montana family in 1929. The summer fallow idea, then, was not an
isolated "input"that a farmercould simply adopt or not adopt; it had repercussions for other aspects of the farmers'operation.13
The most important implications of the summer fallow method were in
the ways farm size and farm machinery were used. Since wheat prices were
traditionally lower than prices for other grains,a farmerneeded to grow a lot
more wheat than he would grow corn. And since in the United States wheat
was grown in the arid West rather than the humid Midwest or South, midwestern farms of 160 acreswere an inappropriatemodel for western farmers.
Farmerscould improve their wheat yield per acreby rotating wheat with fallow, but the farms needed to be much bigger;700 or 800 acres would be the
minimum in Montana. But of course since no farmercould adequatelyfarm
that much land by himself, particularlysince wheat planting, harvesting,and
threshing were highly sensitiveto timing, a farmerneeded to invest in the new
13. Wilson,"ResearchStudiesin the Economicsof LargeScaleFarmingin Montana,"3-12.
Blindedby Technology/ 471
harvesting machinery. Finally, in order to pay for this expensive new machinery, farmers needed to produce as much wheat as possible, starting the
logical cycle all over again.14
Clearly, the summer fallow method was important not just because it
changed the way wheat was grown, but because it changed the way farmers
operated their farms.As an exercisein careful,systematicmanagement, it was
a sharp departure from traditional farming. The central problems of this
method were as much in organizing and ordering things as they were in understanding agriculturalscience. Along with others in the new field of farm
management, Wilson was interested in redefining agriculturalproblems so
that a problem in wheat yields was not simply a problem of poor seed or too
much rain but also of proper management of machinery,labor, credit, and
time. For example, since the wheat crop was split between spring and winter
crops, machinery and labor use was spreadout over the year ratherthan concentrated in one short burst of activity.Similarly,spreadingthe crop out over
the year reduced the risk from a single weather or insect disaster.As Wilson
pointed out, if the farmerwas going to spend a lot of money on machinery,
it was absolutely necessary to have as dependable and predictable a crop as
possible.
The tricky thing about this kind of industrial farming was that since each
element was highly dependent on all the other elements, a problem in any one
area could foul up the entire system. For example,"the advantagesof factory
wheat farming lie entirelyin its abilityto use largepower units. If small power
units are used, the number of operating laborersis accordinglyincreasedand
the advantagesof low cost factorywheat farmingover small scale farmingbegin to disappear."It was this interdependenceamong factorsthat, first, made
fussy management so critical in the process, and, second, made the Soviet
context so risky.'5
Two examples from Wilson, Ware,and Riggin'sreport should suffice to il14. Ibid.Some difficulties,such as too much rain,werebeyond evenWilson'scontrol.But when
Soviet fields were too wet for tractorsto pull plantersin 1931, Stirnimanpersuadedthe Soviets to
providehim with a bombingplaneso thathe couldsow the wheatfromthe air,a trickthathadworked
in California;see HenryWales,"Russianto SowWheatFroma BombingPlane,"ChicagoDaily Tribune, 22 May 1931.
15. Ware,Wilson, and Riggin,"TentativePlan,"5.
472 / AgriculturalHistory
lustrate the high degree of planning they thought essential to their system.
The first was a "standardseasonal program"for the four land units of 2,500
acres each, in which they listed what would be done to each field, when, and
with what equipment from late March to early October. For instance, from
June 1 to June 8, Field 2 would be cultivated with the duckfoot cultivator.It
would take eight days and 147 tractorhours to accomplish this with two tractors. On June 9 the rotary rod weeder and duckfoot would cultivate Field 4,
ending June 17 and spending 147 tractor hours. From August 10 to August
20, Field 4 would be cultivated with the disc-plow; it would take 292 tractor
hours, so with three machines it should takejust under 10 days to complete.
Obviously, the breakdown of even one machine could wreakhavoc with such
a precise system.16
Cletrac40
Figure6. On 29 June 1929, these Soviet workersused an American-made
of the Caunorth
No.
farm
on
Sovhoz
a
tractorto pulla four-bottomplow
2, collective
casus nearRostov.One workerrode alongto cleanthe stickysoil fromthe moldboards.J. B. DavidsonCollection,Departmentof SpecialCollections,IowaState UniversityLibrary.
16. Ibid.,8-12.
Blindedby Technology/ 473
The second examplecomes from Wilson,Riggin,and Ware's"Planof
Managementand Personnelof StandardLandUnit,"in whichthey lay out
the operationsof a mobilegroupof nine men who travelfromone fieldto
anotherin a completelyequippedportablefieldstation.Whereasthe traditionalAmericanfarmfeatureda farmerwho traveledfromhis farmto the
fieldseachday,the landunit ideafeaturedsuchlargeparcelsof landthat it
was more practicalfor the farmworkersto campin the fieldsuntilthe jobs
weredone.Thusthe landunitconsistedof a bunkwagon,restaurant
wagon,
electric
and
club
tent
("forbooks, games,
generator),
shop wagon (with
was
as
that
and
well
as
field
radio"),
machinery
keptin a convemeetings,
nient,centrallocation.Thestaffforeachlandunitwouldincludea manager,
field foreman, mechanic,cook, two greasers,and three tractordrivers.
Wilsonhada veryclearvisionof howthesemenwouldoperateas"afighting
unit,"as he put it, ableto workin a timelymannerwithlittlewastedmotion.
Operatingon the notion that"theprincipleof labormanagementis a high
Wilsongaveanexampleof this
anddivisionof labor,"
degreeof specialization
in action,"Atnoon the thermoslunchboxesinsurehot lunchesforthe men.
Whiletheyareeatingthe greasersshouldcometo the fieldandbe oilingthe
drillsor combineswith extraoil carriedin tractorcabsforthe purpose.The
tractorsareso constructedandequippedthattheydo not requireserviceexceptat 12-hourperiods.Thusthey get a completeserviceeachnight at the
Unit Camp."Clearly,Wilson had a lot of confidence in the persuasive
power of organizationalstrategy.17
Butif theAmericanswho thentraveledto the SovietUnionbetween1929
and 1931hadanyillusionsaboutthe extentto whichtheycouldharnessSoviet energiesand modernizeSovietagricultural
practice,they surelywould
havebeen broughtup short upon arrivingin the Sovietcountryside.The
in agriculturewas
sheer scale of what was calledthe Soviet"experiment"
overwhelming.By 1928,for instance,the Sovietshad establishedfifty-three
stategrainfarmson sevenmillionacresof land;only fouryearslaterthere
wereovertwo hundredfarmson 41 millionacres.Scatteredwidelyaround
or sovhoz,wasa vastand isothe Sovietempire,eachandeverystate"farm,"
anddirectionsfromthe
latedexpansethatwasfedseed,peasants,machinery,
17. Ibid., 14.
474
/ Agricultural History
Figure7. These threshingmachineswere destinedfora Soviet collectivefarm.Russian
agricultural
plannersbelievedmechanizedequipmentsuch as this wouldenablefarm
workersto greatlyincrease grainproductionwhichwould,in turn,supportthe purchase of additionalfarmmachinery.J. B. DavidsonCollection,Departmentof Special
Collections,IowaState UniversityLibrary.
andcommunication
GrainTrustin Moscowbut,due to poortransportation
connected
to
the
rest
of
the
farmsin the system.
was
networks, only loosely
The Sovietsalso establishedhundredsof MachineTractorStationsin the
northernCaucasusand Ukraine.Thesewerecentralizedlocationsthatheld
tractorsandotherbigfarmimplementsthatthevillagesandcollectivescould
taketurnsusing.'8
Most of the Americanexpertswerelocatedon the Verbludfarm,called
SovhozNo. 2, locatedabout1,000milessouthof Moscowand40 milessouth18. This discussionis basedlargelyon EdwardJ.Stirniman,"AnAgriculturalEngineerLooksat
MechanizedFarmingin Russia,"a three-partspeechhe gaveto the WorldGrainConferencemeeting
in Regina,Ontario,in 1933;I am gratefulto Ann Stirnimanfor sharingthis manuscriptwith me. For
machine tractorstations,see J.W. Pincus,"Agricultural
Machineryin the Soviet Union,"FarmImplementNews 51 (5 June 1930):36;"CentralPowerFarmingin Russia,"FarmImplementNews50 (5
December 1929):27.
Blindedby Technology/ 475
east of Rostov-on-Don. When Wilson got there in 1929, Verbludhad a total
of 375,000 acres, of which 150,000 were alreadyplanted in wheat. The farm
had enclosed many small villages, where small peasant strips of land were
now owned by the state, as well as several largervillages in which peasants
were still allowed to work their own small plots. The farm headquartersat
Verblud constituted a sort of"boomtown," in which nearly all the buildings
were new and many were equipped with modern conveniences such as
plumbing and electricity.Some of the buildings were made out of the shipping crates in which tractorsarrivedfrom the United States.Most of the residences were large, multifamily,or dormitory-style buildings, which Stirniman described as "high, huge, straight,box-like, hideous... as graceless, as
soulless [sic] as the culture and creed of the modern communist."Nonetheless, these dwellings seemed to the Americans a huge improvement over the
peasants' little mud houses, which were dark and dirt-floored. Other new
buildings included an administrativeoffice, postal and telephone offices, a
cooperative store, a restaurant,a workers'building, a clubhouse, and a large
building for the experiment station and library. The latter building also
housed the institute, which was a two-year school in farm machinery attended by about 1,000 students. Finally,separatedfrom the housing and offices was "machinery park,"where the machine shops, garages, and warehouses were located. Likening its appearance to "a display at a State Fair,"
Stirniman reported that with a "huge woodworking shop, machine repair
shop, warehouse for repair parts and an electric shop," it was one of the
biggest and best equipped machine shops anywhere.19
All the sovhozes were operated on the unit plan, in which the sovhoz was
divided up into separate units (Verbludhad eight units), each with its own
offices, warehouse, machine shop, a club tent and dining area, and in 1931
most planned to build bunkhouses for the workers.Accordingto Stirniman,
the field workers generallystayed at the unit throughout the season, return19. Whethertryingto tallythe numberof tractorsatVerbludor the numberof acres,it has been
extremelydifficult to find figuresthat agree.For example,Wilson says that Verbludhad a total of
375,000 acres,while Stirnimansays287,000.Forthe descriptionof Verblud,see Stirniman,"AnAgriculturalEngineer,"part II, 2-3. On the use of cratesfor housing,see LeonardJ.Fletcher,"Observations on RussianAgriculture,"FarmImplementNews 51 (13 March 1930):26-27. See also Harris,
"HaroldM. Ware,"43-45.
476 / Agricultural
History
ing to headquartersonly when the harvestconcluded.AlthoughWilson,
Riggin,and Ware'splan had suggestedcreatingportablefield stationsthat
would travelwith the fieldcrews,it appearsthatthe Sovietsinsteadcreated
morefieldunits,whichwerenot portableatall.Whilesomeportablestations
wereusedforthe mostremotesections,the generalpatternwasthatthe field
workerswentto the fieldsforan eight-hourshift,mealswerebroughtout to
the field halfwaythroughthe shift,and then everyonereturnedto the unit.
The workers,ratherthanthe facilities,wereportable.In otherways,too, the
Sovietsmodifiedthe Americanplan.Wherethe planhadsuggestedworking
sixteen-hourdayswithcrewsof nineworkers,the Sovietsworkedaroundthe
clock with field crewsof twenty-four.The ideaof reducingthe numberof
humansrequiredto raisewheatdidnot seemto haveasmuchcurrencyin the
SovietUnionas in the UnitedStates.20
Duringthe firstfewyearsatVerblud,manypeasantsweregivenverylittle
trainingbecauseleaderswantedto getthe cropsin andout asquicklyaspossible.Peoplewho hadperhapsneverseena tractorbeforewereassignedto a
field crew and expectedto operateand maintainthe equipment.Not surDiscussingthe short life-spanof
prisingly,therewere misunderstandings.
machineryatVerblud,Stirnimanrecalledhis horrorat discoveringone tractor crewtakinga breakanddrainingall the hot waterfromthe tractor'sradiatorso that they could maketea. JeanWalker,a tractorengineer,complainedbitterlythatthe Sovietfieldworkersrefusedto do anymaintenance
workon theirtractors,andweresatisfiedif theirtractorscouldrun on two
or threecylinders.Combinesthatwouldhaveworkedforten or twelveyears
in Americawere"ruined"
aftertwoin the SovietUnion,accordingto Walker.
In an embarrassing
Walker
relatedthatwhilehe andhis combinecrew
irony,
helpedthe peasantsfinishtheirtraditionalharvestin 1930,by 1931the peasantswerehelpingWalker,so brokendownwashis machinery.21
20. Stirniman,"AnAgriculturalEngineer,"
partII,8-11; Wilsonto ElmerA. Starch,15May 1929,
box 10, file F-18,MLW.
21. EdwardJ.Stirnimanto F.Hal Higgins,17September1961,Cat.No. 3947,HigginsCollection;
JeanWalkerto Wilson, 10 December1931,box 10,file F-21,MLW;JeanWalker,"MachinesCrippled
in Soviet Harvest,"New YorkTimes,4 November1931,24. In late 1929,beforethe Sovietsset up their
own factory,Wilsonhad blamedthe Germansfor manufacturingshoddyequipment,sayingthatthey
would duplicateAmericanmachineryusing inferiormaterials.He went on,"[T]hereareso manylittle practicalkinks about buildingmachinerythat the manufacturerhas gainedthru [sic]experience
Blinded by Technology / 477
Figure8. Soviet engineers,agronomists,andagricultural
plannersshowed considerable
tractor.Americantechnicians
interestin this two-combinehitchpulledby a Caterpillar
combine
on the corners.Techa
hitch
that
turned
the
second
automatically
developed
to
make
as
this
offered
the
such
large-scaleagriculturepossible
nology
opportunity
on an industrialmodel.J. B. DavidsonCollection,Departmentof SpecialCollections.
IowaState UniversityLibrary.
Assembling the machines as they arrivedfrom the United Stateswas similarly frustrating.Most of the implement manufacturerssent assembly crews
to oversee this operation on the farms;Stirniman'smain job was directing the
assembly and repair operations. But the system was limited. For illiterate
peasants, and for non-English-speaking students, instructions written in
English were of little use. If partswere missing from the shipment, then those
machines were as good as junk since there was no way to get spare parts except from the American factoryitself,which meant agonizing delays.Mordecai Ezekiel, who was a young USDA agriculturalistin 1930 when he visited
Verblud,reported severaldisastrousinteractionsbetween Soviet workersand
farm machinery. The Soviet worker,he argued,"especiallythe ignorant, uneducated workman, has a sublime faith in his own knowledge and ability
which is ludicrous."Ezekiel described how such workmen hated to be told
that the Germanmanufacturershave entirelyoverlooked.Forthis reasona greatlot of the German
equipmentthat wasshippedinto Russialastspringis not muchmorethanjunknow and even though
the Germanmanufacturersgavethem fiveyearscredit,the Russianshavefound that it was expensive
machineryafterall."Wilson to L. C. van Patten,5 December 1929,box 10, file F-19, MLW;see also
202-8.
Dalrymple,"TheAmericanTractor,"
478 / AgriculturalHistory
how to do things by Americans, and would insist on figuring out their own
way to assemble machinery. One vivid example involved a combine that
would thresh soybeans:
One of the Americanspecialistssuggestedhow to set the teethin the cylinder and adjustthe speeds to do the job properly.Laterhe found the machine set as had seemedrightto the workers,runningfull blastand churning the beans into an excellentimitationof soybean-oilbutter.Againthe
workersannouncedproudlythat they had discoveredsomething.No one
beforehad everhadthe ideaof threshingbeanswith a combine-they were
the firston earthto try it! The engineer'sstatementsthat it had been done
for twentyyearsin America,and couldbe done with the samecombinefar
betterthan they weredoing it, fell on deaf ears.The Russiansthoughtthey
had discoveredsomething new under the sun-and both the joy and the
arroganceof discoverywas theirs.22
Ezekiel interpreted this behavior as resulting from the Socialist philosophy: "EveryRussian worker,"he argued,"has been told that he is as good as
every other man... he feels that he is his own boss; he alone is responsible for
what he does; and no one has the right to tell him what to do."Whateverthe
validity of this explanation, other Americansreported similar experiences in
which their advice was rejectedby Soviet workers.23
In Wilson's view, this Soviet resentment of the Americans was the most
difficult problem the Americans had to face in transferringindustrial methods to Soviet agriculture.Wilson attributedthis attitude to a "verystrong nationalistic feeling"among the Soviets,an explanationthat could have applied
to workers in any country, communist or not, who were being instructed by
22. MordecaiEzekial,"Showingthe RussiansHow ItsDone,"Wallaces'
Farmer56 (18 July1931):
848,857. A. J.Bruman,an Americanwho wasworkingin Biro-Bidjan,wrote to Wilson,"Thisis our
firstventureinto combine workand, if you know how McCormickDeeringsareshippedfor export,
you will realizewhat a time I had assemblingthem with an inexperiencedcrewno memberof which
has ever seen a combine,"Brumanto Wilson,22 June1930,box 10,file F-20, MLW.Wilsontold the
manufacturersof CheneyWeedersthat, in the future,the companyshould includepictorialinstructions for assemblingthe weeders;see Wilsonto L.C. van Patten,24 December1929,box 10,file F-19,
MLW.
23. Ezekial,"Showingthe RussiansHow Its Done" 857; see also WalterDuranty,"ExpertsSee
Failurein Big Soviet Plant,"New YorkTimes,22 November1930,9.
Blindedby Technology/ 479
experts from another country. For Wilson, though, the most serious problems this caused had to do not with poor machine building or shoddy workmanship, but with authority. If Soviet workers were resentful, and Soviet
leaders were unwilling to give Americans authority on the project,then, Wilson felt, the Americans were doomed to fail. Indeed, one of the outcomes of
the tensions between Soviets and Americanswas that the Soviets decided not
to bring many Americans over as advisersafter 1931.24
The training institute at Verbludoffers a good example of the peculiarities
of the Soviet approachto agriculturalmodernization.As describedby Stirniman, it was a cross between college and the military.Most of the students
had "the equivalent of sixth grade schooling,"and very little experience in
agriculturalmatters.Those with mechanical abilityhad come from factories,
although this was a very small group. As Stirniman put it, "Jobsas students
were much coveted."This was because the students were paid a stipend that
exceeded the rate that laborers or office workers were paid, were furnished
with room, board, clothing, and books, and were guaranteedjobs on other
state farms upon completing their agriculturalstudy.They lived in dormitories, had playing fields for sports, and, unlike peasants, had little to lose and
much to gain by embracing industrial agriculture.25
The Soviets' goals for industrializingagriculturealso extended to the factory production of farm machines, and by 1930 a tractorfactoryhad been established in Stalingrad. Here again Americans were brought to the Soviet
Union to help set things up. In August of 1930,300 American engineers,foremen, and skilled workers arrived in Stalingradto oversee production. Another factory was opened at Kharkovin 1931,and one in Cheliabinskin 1933.
Over the next few years, production figures were impressive. In 1934, both
Stalingrad and Kharkovwere producing more than 40,000 tractors, and at
the end of its second year,Cheliabinskwas making over 10,000.26
24. Wilsonto C. D. Kinsman,7 November1929,andWilsonto E.J.Stirniman,6 November1929,
box 10,file F-19, MLW.
25. Stirniman,"AnAgriculturalEngineer,"
partII, 11-13.
26. See"RussianProgress,'FarmImplementNews51(7 August1930);J.W.Pincus,"TractorProduction in USSR,"FarmImplementNews56 (1 August1935):23.Accordingto LementHarris,the Soviets made Caterpillartractors"unencumberedby patentrestrictions.Any objectionsthat the Caterpillarcompanymay havehad weresoothed by a five million dollarorderfor 60 horsepowertractors
which the Soviet governmentplaced."It is not clear to what yearsthis refers;see Harris,"Harold
480 / Agricultural
History
But problems plagued the tractorfactories.American engineerswho consulted in the tractor factory in Stalingradwere surprisedby the "lack of coordination" and absence of a "routing system"that might keep production
orderly.According to engineer John Bekker,the Stalingradfactory was beset
by both gross mismanagement and duplicity.He recounted that the Soviets
finished building the factory ahead of schedule, that its director promised to
produce 37,500 tractors between May and October 1930, and that the very
first tractor rolled off the line to become the centerpieceof the May Day parade. But soon thereafterthe factory declined; as materials failed to arrive,
workers sat idle, or tractorswere built with defective or insufficient parts. By
October the workers were cynical and demoralized and the tractorswere all
but ruined.27
By the time Wilson submitted his final report to the Grain Trust in September 1929, he and the other Americans were beginning to realize their
naivete in thinking that industrialization was primarily about mechanization. He tried to balance the theoretical, idealistic quality of the "Tentative
Plan"with the harsh and perplexing realities of life on the state farms. He
reemphasized the interrelatednessof machinery and management, pointing
out that "in American industry... organization and administration are as
important as machines or technical systems,and... large-scaleproduction is
the result of an economic complex in which the organization,business administration, machines, technique, and labor, all function in a harmonious
way."More to the point, he continued, "no matter how well mechanical
equipment is selected and agronomic scientific theory applied, unless there
is comparable organization and administrationwheat will not be produced
at low cost."After observing the situation on the statefarms all summer,however, Wilson was worried that "the managerial side is not developing as
rapidly as the mechanical, and there is a tendency to carry over into the
Ware,"47-48. Norton T. Dodge and Dana G. Dalrymple,"TheStalingradTractorPlantin EarlySoviet Planning,"Soviet Studies 18 (October 1966): 164-68; Dalrymple,"The American Tractor,"
197-202.
27. The lack of coordinationwas noted by WarrenNoble of Noble EngineCompanyof Cleveland, as reportedto WalterDuranty,"BigFactoriesTestSovietSystem,"New YorkTimes,24 November 1930, 13;JohnBekker'sassessmentis in WalterDuranty,"FindsSovietPlantBadlyMismanaged,"
New YorkTimes,9 October 1930,5.
Blinded by Technology / 481
Figure9. Soviet agricultural
plannersauthorizedthe establishmentof Sovhoz No. 2 durcenterfor this coling the 1920s near Rostovandthe Sea of Azov.Theadministrative
lectivefarmincludedwarehousesand maintenanceshops for the assemblyand repair
of agricultural
equipmentimportedfromthe UnitedStates and othercountries.
E. J. StimimanCollection.ShieldsLibrary,
Universityof Califomia-Davis.
sovhoz administration a peasant or prerevolutionary estate management
idea rather than starting with an assumption that a definite managerialpsychology and administrativetechnique must develop to control the new type
of mass production."28
Wilson by then was of two minds about the Soviet wheat situation. On the
one hand, his ideas about the best way to industrialize wheat production,
hatched on the plains of Montana,were proving difficult to accomplish in the
Soviet Union. While he could continue to insist that his recommendations
were a rigorously interdependent package,there was little he could do if the
Soviets decided to disaggregatethe package and choose only the machinery
28. M. L.Wilson,"SuggestedPlanfor the Organizationand Systemof Operationof Demonstration Wheat Sovhoz at Verblude,North Caucasus,USSR,"3, box 10,file F-22,MLW.
482 / AgriculturalHistory
component. On the other hand, as Wilson was to tell his Americancolleagues,
even with this imperfect transferof Americanmethods, the Soviets would be
a realthreat in the world wheat market.Afterstrugglingto get Montana farmers to increase their acreagesfrom 160 to 800 acres,it seemed inconceivable
that the Russians, who opened over 500,000 new acres to wheat, and who
bought hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of machinery,could fail to
be a huge threat.
Indeed, for Wilson, the threat of cheap Soviet wheat on the world market
was worrisome, and it indicated that industrializedagriculturehad come of
age. Predicting that the Soviets would soon be exporting 200 to 300 million
bushels of wheat per year, Wilson suggested that Montana wheat farmers
should consider how that would affect their own wheat operations, saying
"there never was a time when our Montana wheat farmersespeciallyshould
be so concerned with efficiency and lowering costs than they are at the present time."And for Wilson, that meant doubling or tripling the size of wheat
farms and investing in the new farm machinery.Wilson was not alone in this
assessment. As early as 1925, journalist Bruce Bliven put the equation in
somewhat starker terms after visiting Ware'sRussian farm: "The ignorant
peasant in his village is not the only person who needs to have pounded into
him the principle of large-scale,efficient and intelligent operations. Here in
our own United States, most of our farms are still too small to make profitable the sort of machine operation which is most economical."29
While the Russiansdid constitute a realpresenceon the world wheat market, the more profound phenomenon in 1932-34 was the famine which killed
an estimated five million people. As describedby Dana Dalrymple, the brutality of the famine was enhanced by the fact that it resulted,not from environmental causes such as drought or crop failure,but ratherfrom state policy. In the process of collectivizing the peasants,accordingto Dalrymple, the
peasants were forced to give up their independent sourcesof support, such as
garden plots and livestock.And the collective farms themselveswere devoted
29. Wilsonto C. S. Noble, 6 November1929;Wilsonto J.V.Bennett,8 November1929,and Wilson to E. C. Leedy,15 November 1929,box 10, file F-19,MLW;Bliven,"Mr.Wareand the Peasants,"
234; WalterPitkin, "The Great Dirt Conspiracy,"The Forum86 (August 1931): 118-23. Wilson's
friend Noble was written up in "BeatingRussianin Gameof CheapWheatProductionis Objectof
Experimentsin Cost Reductionson Big Noble Farms,"Lethbridge(Alberta)Herald,30 April 1931.
Blinded by Technology / 483
Figure10. These Soviet farmworkersare dryinggrainon Sovhoz No. 2. The agricultural
plannersin the Soviet governmentand Communistpartyintendedto use foreigntechnologyto modernizeand increasegrainproduction.Soviet politicalproblemsand the
inabilityof Americanexperts to accountforculturaldifferencespreventedthe rapid
industrialization
of Soviet agriculture.J. B. DavidsonCollection,Departmentof Special
Collections,IowaState UniversityLibrary.
to wheat production, rather than to the somewhat more diverse food production of before. When the wheat was harvested in 1931, the government
confiscated it all, leaving virtuallynothing for the peasants.This was repeated
in 1932 and 1933. Because the Soviet government had begun preventing foreigners from traveling to the grain regions, however, most Americans were
largely unaware of the famine at the time.30
After his return from the Soviet Union in October 1929, Wilson decided
not to write an article or book about his trip, but he did write to friends and
colleagues about his experiences abroad.In general he was extremely upbeat
about the Russian people and the living conditions, and was clearly thrilled
30. Dana Dalrymple, "The Soviet Famine of 1932-1934,"Soviet Studies 15 (January 1964):
250-84. While much of this wheat was used by the governmentfor export,a fair amount was also
held backin reservefor the militaryor routedto industrialworkers.Dalrymplearguesthat this was
also the ultimateweapon in persuadingthe peasantsto collectivizeor punishingthe peasantswho refused to collectivize.In this sense the faminewas deliberate.
484 / AgriculturalHistory
by the entireexperience.The hotelin Moscow,forexample,wasthe besthotel he hadeverstayedin;the Ukrainianwomenwhothreshedthewheat,with
their colorfuldressesand kerchiefs,strongmuscles,and beautifulsinging
voices,were a movingsight;the youngSovietstudentswerequickto learn
mechanicalprinciples,andweresureto becomefine agricultural
engineers.
He was good-humoredand philosophicalabout the Sovietway of doing
things, was interestedin absolutelyeverything,and developeda genuine
warmthand admirationforthe Sovietpeople.As he wasquickto point out,
althoughhe wasnot a socialist,he admiredthe Sovietsfortacklingsucha seriousproblemin sucha sustainedand,fromWilson'spoint of view,intelligent manner,and seemedpleasedwiththeirsuccess.31
On the otherhand,Wilsonreturnedwith a much morerealisticunderstandingof whatthe Sovietswereableandwillingto do in regardto wheat
production.As Stirnimanwas preparingto leavefor his stint in the Soviet
Union,Wilsonconfidedthatthe planshe andWarehadpreparedforthe Sovietswerenot likelyto be carriedout.Bythe timeStirnimanandJeanWalker
returnedto the UnitedStatesin early1932,theexperimentseemedto be over.
"TheGrainTrustas a whole,is no more,"wroteWalker,referringto the fact
thatthe highlycentralizedtrusthadbeensplitup anddisaggregated.
In terms
of suggestinghow to organizeand operatethe wheatfarm,Wilsonfelt that
the Americanshad ultimatelyfailed;"I am afraidthat we missed it very
badly,"he confessedto Stirniman.32
YetfortheAmericansin general,the"failure"
of the Sovietprogramwasa
failureto properlytransferthe Americanideas,not a failureof the ideas
themselves.The entireexercisewaspremisedon a set of widelyheldbeliefs.
The firstbeliefwasthatscientificprincipleswereuniversal,thatis, thatthey
of social,political,or economiccontext.
wouldholdtrueanywhereregardless
The second belief was that the Americanideas about industrialfarming
wouldfitintothiscategory.In a sense,allofWilson'sfarmmanagementwork
in Americawas directedat makingthe secondpropositiontrue,andhe was
31. Wilson to E.A. Starch,15 May and 17 June1929,box 10,file F-18,MLW;Wilson to Starch,
6 August 1929,box 10,file F-19, MLW.
32. Wilson to Stirniman,6 November 1929, box 10, file F-19, MLW;JeanWalkerto Wilson,
10 January1932,and Wilson to Stirniman,2 February1932,box 10, file F-21,MLW.
Blindedby Technology/ 485
by no meansalone.The notion thatfarmscouldbe likenedto factories,and
in factturnedinto outdoorfactoriesby a sustainedapplicationof engineerandroutine,waspremisedon sucha scimechanization,
ing,rationalization,
entificreductionism.The"Tentative
Report"preparedby Wilson,Ware,and
which
to
create
an
abstracttemplatefor industrialwheat
Riggin
attempted
farming,reflectedthisbelief.TheplandetailedwhattheAmericanswoulddo
if they had millionsof acresof flatland,lots of laborers,and a government
commitmentto spareno expensein meetingproductiongoals.As such, it
matchedneitherAmericannor Sovietconditions,but some hypothetical
kindof placedesignedto testout scientists'predictions.
in the sensethatthey
Butwhilethe ideasthemselveswerequasi-scientific
werebasedon quantitativedataandcorrelations,
theywerestill fairlytheowas
data rathersparsein 1929.This
retical,in the sensethatthe experimental
in thatthe SovietsinvitedtheAmericansbecause
wassomewhatparadoxical,
they werethoughtto haverealexpertisein the subjectsof large-scaleagriculturalproductionand agri-industrial
management.But in point of fact,
Americanexpertisein thiswaslargelytheoreticalin 1929.Thelargestfarmin
Americaat this time-Tom Campbell'sfarmin Montana-was a garden
farmwas
comparedto the Soviets'collectivefarms.Andof courseCampbell's
exceptional.Similarly,the Sovietswantedthe Americansto teachthem all
about mechanizingfarmoperations,althoughat this time most American
farmswerejust beginningto investin mechanicalequipmentsuch as tracwantedadvicein howto organizehundreds
tors.And the Sovietsdesperately
of thousandsof peasantsinto workingandlivingunits,trainedto farmcollectivelyand efficiently,but in this theAmericanswerewoefullyout of their
league.Nonetheless,theyattemptedto helptheSovietsin muchthesameway
the industrialengineershad,thatis,by promotingthe applicationof FrederickTaylor'sprinciplesof scientificmanagementwhereverpossible.
Ultimately,if the programdid not workso well in the SovietUnion,the
Americansunderstoodthatas a resultof the Soviets'lackof abilityandwill,
not from a problemwith the ideasthemselves.Regardlessof its successfor
the Soviets,the"experiment"
providedtheAmericanswithmuch-desiredinformationregardingindustrialfarming:the durabilityof variousmachines,
the properschedulingof field operations,the degreeof skill necessaryfor
486 / AgriculturalHistory
farmlaborersto operatemachineryreliably,the amountof landthatcould
be "efficiently"
handledby a smallgroup,and so on. In this sense,then,the
Soviet programfunctionedmuch like laterinternationalassistanceprograms.Partwell-intentionedbenevolence,andpartdatagatheringfor scientificand/ordomesticinterests,suchprogramsemergedfroma growingconfidencethat "scienceand technology"could,and should,be disaggregated
from"culture."
In the Sovietcase,the Americans'
blindnessto Sovietculture
and politics,andthe Soviets'blindnessto the capitalisticsystemthatcreated
and sustainedindustrialagriculture,led to misunderstandings
that shaped
both
at
home
and
abroad
for
to
come.
agriculturalpolicies
years