„Joseph Fouché and the Austrian State Police after the Congress of Vienna“
Michal Chvojka, Ph.D.
Ss. Cyril and Method University
Trnava, Slovakia
The personality of Joseph Fouché has been attracting attention of historians and writers for
many years.1 Being police minister during the Directorate, Consulate, Napoleon’s Empire,
Hundred Days and even at the beginning of the Bourbon’s restoration, he is often
characterized both as a political opportunist striving to maintain his influence and power at all
costs and as an admirable genius deceiving Robespierre or Barras, Metternich or Wellington,
Bonaparte or Bourbons.2 Most of these works concern especially Fouché’s life and activity
until 1815, whereas the period of his following exile lacked more detailed investigation. In
consequence of the fact that Fouché spent his last years in the Habsburg monarchy, the
Austrian historians3 tried to fill this gap by bringing new information with respect to Fouché’s
stays in Prague, Linz and Triest in particular.
This treatise lays the main stress on the reasons, methods and tools of the Austrian police’s
surveillance over some prominent French exiles and especially Fouché after expelling him
from the French Kingdom as a „régicide“ in 1816, its reflection in the Austrian high police
and its consequences for the next Pre-March period policing in Austrian Monarchy. The
Austrian police was faced, as we are going to see in a moment, with one of the most
renowned police experts in Europe and this confrontation almost cost the Chief of the
Austrian Police and Censorship Court Office, Count Sedlnitzky, his position. Let me give you
an example in this respect in order to introduce the core of this study.
At the end of August 1817 Austrian police authorities obtained a letter written by the
French ambassador’s secretary in Vienna, Chevalier Artaud, for the French Prime Minister
Richelieu. Artaud mentioned there his conversation with Austrian chief of police Count
Sedlnitzky and his criticism of his own subordinates as well as inadequacies of Austrian
police precautions with respect to French exiles in particular. Artaud added further some
1
There is a large number of books concerned with Fouché, such as Louis MADELIN: Fouché. Paris 1901, 2
vol.; Jean TULARD: Fouché. Praha 1999; Antoine SERIEYS: Fouché (de Nantes). Paris 1816; Pierre-Joseph
PROUDHON: Commentaires sur les Mémoires de Fouché. Paris 1900; Stefan ZWEIG: Josef Fouché. Portrét
jednoho politika. Praha 1973; Léon KAMMACHER: Joseph Fouché. Paris 1962; Henri BUISSON: Fouché, duc
d´Otrante. Bienne 1968; Hubert COLE: Fouché, the Unprinciped Patriot. London 1971; André CASTELOT:
Fouché. Paris 1990; Riuji NAGATSUKA: Fouché. Tokio 1997 and many others.
2
TULARD, Fouché, p. 10.
3
Eduard WERTHEIMER: Die Verbannten des ersten Kaiserreiches. Leipzig 1897; Reinhold
HINTERLEITNER: Die Linzer Polizeidirektion in der Ära Metternich. Linz – Graz 1973 (dissertation thesis)
and Eduard DANIEK: Joseph Fouché als Emigrant in Österreich. In: Historisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Linz. Linz
1961 (Sonderdruck), p. 139 – 162.
1
remarks about the relationship of the Austrian chief of police with them. As Donald Emerson
put it, such a delicate affair could have even endangered Sedlnitzky’s position.4 Austrian
Police President denied at once Artaud’s allegations and defended himself - by writing a
detailed account of what had happened - to Prince Metternich.5 He described there in detail,
how he had noticed Artaud among other guests6 at the dinner in Vienna given by Count
Stackelberg on 26th of August, 1817. Sedlnitzky went on saying, he had sought to avoid the
company of Artaud, who was supposed to be a doublespeaker. The French ambassador’s
secretary, however, was said to push his way to Count Sedlnitzky, to intrude himself into his
company and almost to compel him into a conversation being able to bring it round to French
exiles. Count Sedlnitzky confined himself to express some general statements assuming
Artaud to be familiar with. “I remained to stay at the general assertion”, wrote Sedlnitzky to
Metternich, “that our government had been producing a distinct evidence of her honest
participation in the peace in France and in Europe in general by careful supervising of so
many exiles living in imperial and royal states7 as well as that we actually didn’t need to
complain about their conduct in particular and that I could assess especially Made. Murat’s
and Fouché’s conduct as peaceful and decent. (...) I assured him that Savary had been kept
under careful surveillance according to the principles of our police combining strictness and
humanity as much as possible.”
Thereafter, Artaud was said to express praise for the way how the Austrian police had been
treating French exiles. “He gave me his assurance”, Sedlnitzky remembered, “that French
government felt the difficulty of my relationship to the former Police Ministers Fouché and
Savary vividly and acknowledged with much gratitude that we had not only been supervising
precisely these exiles, who would have never ceased to be French, but we had also been
treating them with respective discretion and courtesy.” Count Sedlnitzky replied guilelessly
“that my behaviour towards Fouché had been determined just in terms of the position
actually taken up by the latter and based on the observations made on him and regardless of
his peaceful conduct I could oftentimes find an opportunity to notice, how difficult it actually
was for our government proceeding according to the human and loyal principles to treat
properly such a man, who had had so many police means to be used unscrupulously at his
4
See Donald E. EMERSON: Metternich and the Political Police. Security and Subversion in the Hapsburg
Monarchy 1815 – 1830. The Hague 1968, p. 41.
5
Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Vienna, Staatskanzlei (State Chancellery), Noten von der Polizeihofstelle (Notes
from the Police Court Office), carton 34, Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 1.9.1817. All the following quotations
regarding the affair with Chevalier Artaud have been extracted from this archival document.
6
The chief of police remembered for instance Count Stadion and Hofrat von Wacken.
7
In German language „kaiserlich – königliche Staaten“ or „k. k. Staaten“, e.g. imperial and royal states of the
Habsburg monarchy
2
disposal.” The French ambassador’s secretary was afterwards supposed to assure Sedlnitzky
“that great merit he had earned for the French government so far, seemed to lay accurately in
this difficulty.” The Austrian chief of police rejected such praise replying: “If your
government approved of our behaviour towards the exiled Frenchmen, just the instructions I
was given to conduct accordingly are to be praised and as I avow with pleasure I strive to
carry them out most zealously in double respect; firstly in order to fulfill my duty imposed on
me by my Monarch, secondly because the fulfillment of that duty harmonizes with my personal
dutifulness and convictions. I have always adhered to the object of legitimacy ardently and
considered all its enemies to be enemies of peace in Europe and of my Monarch.” At this very
moment the conversation was interrupted and there was – according to Sedlnitzky – no
mention neither of Thibaudeau nor of Maret.
After having mentioned all these circumstances Count Sedlnitzky expressed his strong
belief, Prince Metternich himself “would take into account that it hadn’t occurred to me to
complain neither about inadequacies of our police precautions nor my subordinates.” Count
Sedlnitzky pointed out in his account, he had acted just in accordance with the instructions
concerning the behaviour towards the French exiles as far as his duty required. Subsequently,
“the storm of official dissatisfaction dissipated”8 and there were no further serious
consequences for Sedlnitzky9, who remained in his office for more than three decades.
On the one hand, this “affair” provides us with one of the very rare opportunities to
observe Count Sedlnitzky acting from the autobiographical point of view10, but, most
importantly, on the other hand it points out the delicacy and importance of guarding French
exiles in the Habsburg monarchy. But how did Fouché and the other prominent French come
to Austrian Empire? In what way were they to be treated and what implications should result
from their surveillance?
8
EMERSON, Political Police, p. 41.
Today, we can just rack our brain over how the whole affair with Artaud proceeded in reality (I haven´t noticed
this document among the restored „burned archival resources“ (Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv Vienna, fund
Polizeihofstelle, e.g. Police Court Office) concerning the French exiles). Sedlnitzky´s version, however, as well
as the style and way of his account demonstrate precisely that he conducted himself like a bureaucrat much more
than a diplomat. Replying in a quite extensive way, the Chief of police broke not only the reticence (See
Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv Wien, Pergen – Akten, XVIII/A1 H 18, ctn. 16, folio 42 nn.; BENNA,
Polizeihofstelle, p. 128 and 130 n.) required from all police officials to some extent, but also provided Artaud
with an opportunity to wordplay and free interpretation. From this point of view, the unpleasant consequences
for Sedlnitzky seem to be not so surprising any more. After having made such experience, the Austrian police
president became increasingly cautious with respect to treating the French exiles as well as to the surveillance
activity anyway. Prince Metternich noticed this change and praised Sedlnitzky´s cleverness and circumspection
two months later (S 17 XI 1817 - „Niemand erkennt mehr als ich das hohe Verdienst, welches Euere Exzellenz
sich durch Organisierung und Leistung der Polizei – Beobachtungsgeschäfte erworben haben und leiste ihm
volle Gerechtigkeit ...“). See also EMERSON, Political Police, p. 41 n.
10
There are neither his letters nor memoirs left up to the present time.
9
3
Both the final defeat over Napoleon I. and the new order established in the aftermath of the
Congress in Vienna had resulted in setting new tasks for the Habsburg state police. Four
victorious powers – Russia, Austria, Great Britain and Prussia – reached an agreement on
condemning to exile11 the members of the Family Bonaparte as well as those, who came to
prominence during the French Revolution and could expose the restored Bourbons to
danger.12 As a result of this, the ministers of allied great powers rallied in Paris agreed on the
provisions13 concerning whereabouts for these so-called “French exiles”. Foreign Minister of
the Habsburg monarchy, Prince Metternich, brought it to the then Austrian Police President
Baron Hager’s notice without delay. At the same time, he emphasized the danger being
recognized by great powers, to allow these individuals to choose countries to stay in, where
they would be able to exert strong influence while not being watched accordingly.
Subsequently, the German medium states, Netherlands, Italy as well as Switzerland were to
be excluded, English government feared the force of public opinion encouraged by the
opposition and, as Metternich added, there was just Russia, Prussia and Austria left in order to
accept these people.14 In this way, the Danubian monarchy became the country providing an
asylum for these exiles. It was regarded as Austrian contribution to the maintenance of peace
and order in both France and Europe. As Donald E. Emerson put it in his outstanding work on
Metternich and the Habsburg state police, „in the years immediately after 1815, exiles from
France (...) received almost as much attention as foreign diplomats.” 15
In Austria, a very colourful society got together gradually, such as the members of the
Bonaparte family – Jerôme Bonaparte, former king of Westphalia (resided in Graz, Triest,
Schönau in Niederösterreich), the oldest sister of Napoleon and former Grand Duchess of
Tuscany, Elisa Bachiocchi (resided in Brünn and Triest) or Caroline Murat, former queen of
Naples (resided in Hainburg and Triest).16 In addition, Prague was chosen as an appropriate
11
Through the so-called „royal ordonances“ from July 24th, 1815 were all those, who had supported deposed
Emperor Napoleon I. during Hundred Days, put in the proscription list. Through the so-called „Amnesty bill“
from January 12th, 1816 were among others the regicides (article 7) banished from France. See TULARD,
Fouché, p. 234 nn., 245 nn.; WERTHEIMER, Die Verbannten, p. 192 nn.; ZWEIG, Fouché, p. 229 nn. The last
mentioned book is very interesting especially because of the psychological survey of the former French Police
Minister.
12
Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Vienna, State Chancellery, Noten an die Polizeihofstelle (Notes for the Police
Court Office), carton 4, Metternich to Hager, 3.9.1815 („... Klasse Menschen, welche durch ihre bekannten
Absichten nicht ohne augenscheinliche Gefahr in Frankreich geduldet werden könnte und dennoch nicht
straffällig genug ist, um von den Gerichtsstellen zur ewigen Haft verurteilt zu werden...“) – Herafter I shall cite
this correspondence simply by the letter „S“ (abbreviation for State Chancellery) and the date abbreviated, thus S
3 IX 1815.
13
Taken in accord with French government.
14
S 3 IX 1815. See S 28 VI, 6 VIII 1817 as well.
15
EMERSON, Political Police, p. 40 nn.
16
The acceptance of all these so-called „Napoleonics“ (members of Napoleon´s family) in Austria depended on
condition, they had to be deprived of their previous titles, that would evoke memories of the past. As a result of
4
location for an eager republican and former senator Antoine Thibaudeau and finally for the
„main craftsman of high policing“, French ex – Police Minister Joseph Fouché17. On top of
that, former French Foreign Minister Hugues Maret as well as the other Napoleon’s Police
Minister, Anne-Jean Savary were granted a residence in Graz, metropolis of the Austrian
province Styria. Donald Emerson marked down in his well-written book on Metternich and
the Austrian State Police, „the new inexperienced Habsburg Police Minister could boast that
he guarded two of Napoleon’s Ministers of Police.“ 18
Not only Fouché, but also the other personalities inevitably represented a group of people
able to attract full attention of the protectors of peace and order in the Habsburg Empire. On
that account, the Austrian Emperor Francis I. didn’t waste his time but proclaimed already in
Paris the necessary directives19 with respect to the acceptance and the treatment of the French
exiles:
a) the entry passports for these persons into the Habsburg Monarchy were to be issued
only by Foreign Minister Metternich
b) the Emperor determined exclusively the bigger cities in the German provinces of the
Austrian Monarchy as appropriate places to place these foreigners
c) while stipulating the particular whereabouts, it was possible to take some desires into
account, however, subordinating them constantly to the well-being of the Monarchy
d) the members of the Napoleon family were to be supervised strictly but considerately,
the other foreigners were to be kept under the appropriate surveillance20
If we pay closer attention to the first point, it is quite clear that Prince Metternich (together
with Emperor Francis I.) had to make decisions, which exiles were to be accepted in the
Austrian Empire due to “higher state considerations”. This proved to be the point especially as
far as the former French Police Minister Joseph Fouché was concerned. Prince Metternich
was not favourable to his request for asylum in Austria, he declared however that „higher and
state considerations speak in favour of the acceptance of this man in the Austrian Empire.“
Foreign Minister argued further, he couldn’t imagine any other country, where Fouché
„would be able to live to greater satisfaction, than in the fortunate states of Your Majesty. His
this, Jerôme Bonaparte was to be called „Prince Montfort“, Karoline Murat „Countess of Lipona“ or Elise
Bachiocchi „Countess of Compignano.“ See Hanns SCHLITTER: Kaiser Franz und die Napoleoniden vom
Sturze Napoleons bis zu dessen Tode. In: Archiv für österreichische Geschichte. Vienna 1888, vol. LXXII;
WERTHEIMER, Die Verbannten, p. 86, 113 n., 143.
17
He moved to Linz at the end of August 1818 and thence to Triest around the turn of 1819/1820, where he died
on December 26th,1820.
18
EMERSON, Political Police, p. 41.
19
S 3 IX 1815, resolution of the Emperor Francis I. to Hager, Paris, 3.9.1815.
20
Ibid. „...welche in ihrer mehr oder minderen Ausdehnung besonders nach der Kategorie der Personen und
ihrer bekannten moralischen Tendenz zu bemessen ist.“
5
machinations that could be directed just against France wouldn’t pass us unnoticed
considering the strict surveillance to be imposed on Fouché.“21
This fact was of fair importance, considering that such “extremely suspicious and
dangerous foreigners” ought to be usually excluded from Austria on the basis of general
police directives. The remaining three points represent general instructions for the treatment
as well as the supervision of French exiles in the Habsburg monarchy.
The surveillance over exiles ordered from above was quite extensive and was carried out at
three levels. The governor22 of the relevant Habsburg province was in charge of the
supervision itself and had to organize all the necessary local surveillance precautions.23 All
the acquired data and information regarding the activities and behaviour of French exiles were
consequently sent to the Police Office in Vienna. At the higher level, the (new) chief of
Habsburg police, Count Joseph Sedlnitzky, communicated with Foreign Minister, Prince
Metternich and provided him with respective documents and reports. Based on the
instructions evolved from this communication, Count Sedlnitzky ordered the governors with
respect to the supervision progress and the treatment of the exiles. In addition to that, Prince
Metternich kept up correspondence24 with both French Foreign and Police Office by means of
embassies and discussed this affair at the Congresses of Great Powers as well.
The choice of the German provinces of the Austrian Empire in order to place there the
French exiles was justified by the fact that the police in newly (1815) acquired Lombardo –
Venetian provinces hadn’t been fully organized yet and as a consequence of it, the police
surveillance could not be performed in accordance with the regulations. The proximity to
France, where they had been exiled from, was crucial as well. Yet, it would have been
possible to count upon an extensive police system in bigger25 German cities – especially in the
provincial capitals, not to say upon a so called “Post Lodges”26 being of great importance.
21
Quotation according to DANIEK, Fouché, p. 142 n.
Especially in Prague, Graz, Linz and Triest.
23
It has a logical implication that the Police Directors, normally responsible for the police affairs in the
respective province capitals and its surroundings, were completely subordinated to the governors in this issue.
24
This concerned requests and wishes of French exiles living in Austria in particular, for instance with respect
to the change of their residence (see S 29 VIII 1816, 18 V 1817, 14 I 1818), it could serve, however, as a way of
identifying the authors of the letters to French exiles as well (Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Vienna, State
Chancellery, notes from the Police Court Office, carton 32, Sedlnitzky to Metternich, 29.8.1816. Herafter I shall
cite this correspondence simply by the letter „P“ (abbreviation for Police Court Office) and the date abbreviated,
thus P 29 VIII 1816) or in order to communicate an impending journey of exile’s confidents to France (S 18 II
1817).
25
As distinct from the countryside or smaller cities, because the gendarmerie hadn’t been established yet.
26
Also called „a black room” or “a black workroom“ within a respective post station. These institutions carried
out so-called censorship of mail. Specially trained officials opened up the letters here and made copies or
extracts (so-called „intercepts“) of it. After having done it, the letters had to be closed again perfectly. See Josef
Karl MAYR: Metternichs geheimer Briefdienst. Postlogen und Postkurse. Vienna 1935, p. 3 nn.; Anna – Hedwig
22
6
Prague, the capital of Bohemia, seemed to be the most appropriate residence for French
exiles, last but not least because of the “wise and enthusiastic” activity of the Bohemian
governor, Count Francis Kolowrat – Liebsteinsky.27 He retained his leading role in
supervision of French exiles even during his vacation and ordered his subordinates to provide
him with the most interesting spoils.28 While organizing this surveillance, Count Kolowrat
made use of his experience as former police director of Prague in a very professional way and
hence both Metternich and Sedlnitzky set his respective behaviour as a norm and paragon for
other governors.29
In spite of all the satisfaction with police surveillance in Prague, however, the Austrian
Police President wasn’t favourably disposed to seeing a too great number of French exiles
gathered in the Bohemian capital.30 No doubt, he wasn’t willing to “overburden” a well
functioning supervision system there nor to expose it to new revolutionary dangers. Anyway,
the international circumstances overshadowed such police standpoint. Prince Metternich had
to make it clear to him, “that the French exiles were not to be tolerated in the medium
(German – M.CH.) states and especially at the frontier of the French kingdom” and “on the
basis of the agreements between powers, we are not supposed to hesitate to grant a residence
permit for them at least partially in our German provinces.”31 The head of Austrian police
acknowledged the inevitable need of accepting these exiles in the Habsburg monarchy and
didn’t have at least the decision to determine the residence wasn’t taken out of his hands.32
Comparing the possibilities being at his disposal, he pointed out Prague33 again, where the
surveillance had been carried out with the biggest “conscientiousness and urgency” and Graz,
BENNA: Die Polizeihofstelle. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der österreichischen Staatsverwaltung (dissertation
thesis). Vienna 1942, p. 99 nn.
27
Thus, both Police President SEDLNITZKY („Da ich keinen Augenblick zweifeln kann, dass die Überwachung
derselben (der französischen Verwiesenen) nirgends mit mehr Sorgfalt und zweckmäßiger Eindringlichkeit, als
unter der Leitung des Oberstburggrafen von Böhmen wird erzielt werden können ...“), and Foreign Minister
METTERNICH („Diese Bemerkungen liefern einen wiederholten Beweis des umfassenden Eifers, welchen
ersterer (Graf Kolowrat) dem ihm anvertrauten Geschäfte widmet und sprechen nicht minder für den richtigen
Beobachtungsgeist des Verfassers – Euere Exzellenz dürften sich daher bei dieser Gelegenheit veranlasst finden,
der regen Tätigkeit des Grafen v. KOLOWRAT für alles, was den ah. Dienst betrifft, das verdiente Lob
angedeihen zu lassen ...“) expressed their satisfaction with his activity. See P 15 XI 1816, 20 IV 1817, 14 VII
1817; S 19 XI 1816, 4 X 1817.
28
See P 11 VIII 1816.
29
S 5 VII 1817; P 15 V 1818.
30
See P 23 VI 1817 – Sedlnitzky was given information about the conspiracy organized by the Jacobin Felix
Desportes in Wiesbaden in Hessen – Nassau in Germany, who had been forcing „revolutionary efforts on the
threshold of France“ together with his complices. The Austrian chief of police was afraid that after dissolving
such or similar clubs some of their members would be granted residence permit in Prague.
31
S 5 VII 1817.
32
S 5 VII 1817; P 14 VII 1817.
33
Ibid. („Nur solche einzelne Exilierte, deren Beisammensein in Prag besonderen Bedenken unterliegen würde,
dürften nach Graz /:wenn anders die Vergesellschaftung derselben mit Savary zulässig werden sollte:/ gewiesen
werden.“)
7
the capital of Styria. Against the choice of the Moravian metropolis Brno mentioned by
Metternich counted the fact that there hadn’t been any post lodge yet. Olmütz, in addition,
lacked its own police office and Count Sedlnitzky expressed justified doubts that concerning
this Moravian military fortress one could hardly expect “something beneficial” to the higher
police purposes, neither from the military nor from the local authority or from the municipal
government.
From this time onward, the chief of Austrian police seemed to have overcome his initial
anxiousness and to gird himself for the coming of the new exiles. He supported the proposal
to place the exiles in different cities, because police reading of their private correspondence to
be kept up among them would provide him with some particular circumstantial evidence
possibly leading to next information and discoveries. The so-called mail and correspondence
interception34 belonged to the most important information sources in the course of supervising
the expelled Frenchmen. The police desired to get an idea of their hopes and plans, especially
as far as Joseph Fouché, Duke of Otranto35 was concerned. Moreover, “exploring his real
opinions as well as keeping track of the communication channels which he had used in order
to send a secret correspondence”36 represented one of the most important tasks of Habsburg
police. While confronting the former French police minister, the most diligent activity and
investigation were to be demanded. In any case, they had to keep him under constant
surveillance. This had been a case even before Fouché came to Habsburg monarchy from
Dresden as a banished regicide, because he – after being expelled from France in consequence
of the aforementioned “Amnesty Bill” from January 12th, 1816 – had requested for asylum in
Prague. Thus, Prince Metternich had already ordered the Austrian envoy in Dresden, Count
Bombelles, to pay the closest attention to everything concerning Fouché and his
correspondence.37 It took a great deal of work in spite of its looking quite “easy”, because
they had to detect his code names38 and secret communication channels39 as well as to
34
Producing of so-called „intercepts“, e.g. copies of letters.
„In his letters, however, that he (Fouché – M.CH.) had sent by mail and which he knew to be opened and
read, he used to mention just his faithfulness to the King (Louis XVIII.) (...). In his secret letters sent on various
circuitous routes to his friends, however, he didn´t keep it secret that he had been cherishing a determined
intention to come forth outside his insignificance as well as to assume again his leading position.“ – Quotation
according to WERTHEIMER, Die Verbannten, p. 199 n. See also P 20 X 1816.
36
S 19 XI 1816.
37
S 4 I 1817 – After having been forced to resign as a Police Minister of Bourbons (September 1815), Fouché
held a function of a French envoy in Dresden in Saxony, actually of little importance. See MADELIN, Fouché,
p. 330 nn.; TULARD, Fouché, p. 240 nn.
38
S 16 X 1816 (correspondence with Lazare Carnot under the name „le notaire“); P 14 XII 1816, S 28 XII 1816
(discovery of Fouché´s correspondence with Lazare Carnot under the name „Marigny“).
39
P 28 IX 1816, 7 IV 1817 (correspondence Fouché´s to Bavaria, through Neuburg an der Donau, where
Berthier´s widow resided).
35
8
decipher his encrypted letters40. The Vienna merchant Count Fries, who had bought some of
Fouché´s possessions in France41, was justifiably suspected of delivering mails of the exiled
French by Austrian police. Consequently, Police President Sedlnitzky ordered a precise mail
control of his department store.42 More interestingly, the chief of Austrian police had learned
of an important letter from Gaillard43 to Fouché to be delivered to the latter by Count Fries
personally and suggested to make an attempt through the Linz Police Director in order to get a
copy of it in Fouché’s house secretly. Prince Metternich made also an obviously interesting
proposal. Baron Hingenau, the governor of Upper Austria, was supposed both to invite Count
Fries immediately after his arrival in Linz and to put his cards on the table without delay,
saying “our government took notice of the letter Mr. Gaillard had given him for Fouché. He
must be comprehending that both governments are concerned about to find out the content of
the letter to a person exiled by law; he, Count Fries, is expected consequently to hand this
letter in for a while. Provided that Count Fries was supposed either to deny the fact he had
been entrusted with such a letter or to be reluctant to get it out of his hands, which is hardly
to be the case, we would still have the last mean at our disposal in order to get the letter”44,
e.g. aforesaid proposal of Count Sedlnitzky.
The Austrian police had to keep a watchful eye on supervising Fouché’s travelling
servants, confidents or foreigners coming to visit him as well. As a consequence of it, Louis
Martraignes (or Martagny), Fouché’s confident courier, travelling to France and supposed to
be delivering encrypted letters hidden in hollow coins apart from a request of Duke of Otranto
to the French King Louis XVIII. in order to invalidate his banishment, was searched carefully
at the French frontier according to French – Austrian conformity.45 Count Sedlnitzky
suspected naturally also Jean – Pierre Guilloux, a “former secret agent” and actually a
40
P 11 XII 1816 (Count Kolowrat’s report from Prague on obtaining a key to Fouché´s encrypted
correspondence), P 30 XII 1816 (sending a cipher to be used by Fouché in order to write his secret letters), P 10
III 1817 (original example of an encrypted letter Fouché’s), P 24 IV 1817 (letter to Fouché from Brussels of such
a peculiar contents that there was an assumption on a chemical handwriting between the lines), S 28 XII 1816
(cipher by means of a dictionary in Fouché´s correspondence with Gaillard), S 15 I 1817 (Metternich held back
Fouché’s cipher and wished to obtain an original letter written in it). – These documents refute Edmund
DANIEK’s argument [it was not police of Prague, who had found the Fouché’s cipher and a key to it, but the
Police Court Office in Vienna (See DANIEK, Fouché, p. 145)] and simultaneously vindicate the contrary, at
least concerning the discovery of the cipher! A so-called “Secret Cipher Chancellery” in Vienna, however, was
entrusted with deciphering such a correspondence. See Karl MAYR: Metternichs geheimer Briefdienst.
Postlogen und Postkurse. Vienna 1935.
41
Count Fries bought them together with Simon von LÄMMEL, the Prague merchant of Jewish origin.
Intercepting Fries’s letters, the Austrian police found out further, how these merchants had deceived Fouché,
because Duke of Otranto received far less money for his sold possessions than the selling price actually was (P
31 I, 1 II, 12 VI 1817).
42
P 9 VI 1817.
43
A confident advisor of Duke of Otranto in Paris.
44
P 13 IX 1818; S 22 IX 1818.
45
P 29 I 1817, 4 II 1817; S 4 II 1817, 18 II 1817.
9
Fouché’s dismissed servant, of “carrying out a secret mission of the latter in France”. Count
Kolowrat, the Bohemian governor, ordered to search him at the Bohemian frontier, but no
important documents were found.46 Similarly, there was a suspicion of “secret mission”
thrown on a long-lasting secretary of Fouché and a tutor of his sons, Demarteau, who had got
out of his service as well and intended to go back to France.47 We are going to discuss him
more in detail a little bit later. We can see that the agents of Fouché were permitted to leave or
enter the Austrian monarchy in order to search them ordinary and fortunately to discover
some interesting documents or letters to be delivered in this way.48 Generally, the Austrian
police strove not to underestimate any single fact or association linked with the French exiles.
In Linz for instance, Fouché´s communication with Baron Stingelheim, who “in spite of being
branded an importunate beggar, had been well accepted in his house”. Taking this into
account, Linz Police Director Hoch assumed, Stingelheim would soon appear in Vienna
carrying the letters of Fouché. Police President Sedlnitzky didn’t miss the opportunity in order
to “arrange all the necessary measures” 49.
With respect to these surveillance activities, it is not easy to determine exactly, to what
extent the Austrian police had achieved success. On the one hand, a lot of interesting and
important information were found out, especially in Prague, on the other hand, other activities
either escaped their attention or came just subsequently to its notice.50 Yet, it has to be
recognized that the police used the most various means to its advantage. Before Fouché
arrived in Linz, Sedlnitzky had ordered the local police “to put one or another confidential
subject in touch with Fouché in an inconspicuous way and to take all preventive measures to
supervise Fouché in his own house in Linz.”51 Count Sedlnitzky repeated this order after
Fouché had personally arrived in Linz at the end of August 1818. At the same time, he drew
the police director’s of Linz attention to “keep himself informed of the secret ways to be
46
P 1 VI, 1 VII 1818.
P 24 VIII 1818.
48
Bernhard Carl Schwabe, another Fouché´s suspicious agent had been granted visa from Dresden to Prague for
this reason („weil die Korrespondenzen, welche er bei sich führen mag, ... eine interessante Ausbeute zu
versprechen schienen“.) Graf Sedlnitzky ordered the Bohemian Governor, Count Kolowrat, to arrange „the most
precise visitation of Schwabe at the Border Customs Office“ (S 16 VII 1818; P 23 VII 1818).
49
P 27 X 1818.
50
The arrival of female agent of the ultra-royalist party in France, Madamme Bienassis, to Fouché stands as a
classic example of it. In spite of being searched precisely at the Austrian frontier, the Habsburg police didn’t
manage to discover anything (P 9 VIII 1818). Thanks to Demarteau, a dismissed servant of Fouché, it was found
out later that she managed to conceal letters from Count Vitrolles (confidant of Count Artois, brother of the
French King Louis XVIII.) „in her hat and hem of her clothes“ (P 19 VIII 1818). Later investigations of this
agent haven’t led to any discoveries as well (P 29 I 1819, 9 II 1819). See. WERTHEIMER, Die Verbannten, p.
226 n.
51
HINTERLEITNER, Linzer Polizeidirektion, p. 96. (Sedlnitzky to Hoch, Vienna, 10.4.1818).
47
10
possibly used by Fouché in order to convey his correspondence in Linz” and requested at least
weekly supervision reports along with the annexed intercepts.52
Dr. Weiß, Fouché’s later advocat and tutor53, proved to be a willing confident54 of Linz
police for “higher purposes”. Furthermore, police director Hoch in Linz managed to win the
exiled French general, Count Carneville, by means of a counterfeit letter written by an “ultraroyalist from France” for the sake of close supervising Fouché and even to convince the
general to send reports on this subject to the particular address in Strasbourg.55
The Austrian police took also advantage of growing apart between Fouché and his longlasting secret secretary Demarteau in Prague. The latter didn’t follow Duke of Otranto to
Linz, but stayed in Prague and earned his living as a French and math teacher and applied for
asylum and residence permit in Prague.56 Prince Metternich considered this to be a great
opportunity to gain new information about Fouchés intrigues and connections.57 Police
president brought it to Demarteau’s notice in a way that “the time extension of validity of his
residence permit in Prague would depend on his willingness to provide information about
Fouchés plans and secret connections.”58 Count Sedlnitzky received the questions to be asked
from the State Chancellery. At first, Prince Metternich was interested in his political opinions
or relationships during the first restoration and Hundred Days, especially with royalists.
Austrian Foreign Minister intended to find out apparently, to what extent Fouché had sought
to get closer to the King in order to be appointed to a French Police Minister as well as
whether the ultra-royalist party of Count Artois, brother of the King, had not taken advantage
of Fouché for its own purposes59 and if he had been informed of the Elbe - expedition. Not
surprisingly, the last mentioned question was answered positively. Finally, the last set of
questions related to these issues focused on whether Fouché had wished Bourbons or other
dynasty to be restored after having been opposed to Napoleon I. during Hundred Days or
whether he would have preferred another form of government. Well, based on a multitude of
52
Ibid., p. 97 n. (Sedlnitzky to Hoch, Vienna, 1.9.1818).
The Austrian police made use of similar measure during the supervision of French Exminister Maret, who had
moved from Graz to Görz. In order to keep him under constant surveillance, there was not only a special police
commissioner from the Police Directorate in Triest assigned to a County Office in Görz (P 26 XI 1816), but the
local police also managed, „to recommend Maret a language and musical tutor for his sons in a person of the
brave, wise and reliable financial official and to increase the supervision precautions within the Maret´s
family“. (P 5 XII 1816, 21 XII 1816). Prince Metternich could just approve of such activity (S 14 XII 1816).
54
S 15 X 1818, P 27 X 1818. DANIEK, Fouché, p. 153; HINTERLEITNER, Linzer Polizeidirektion, p. 96, 98 n.
55
P 8 IX 1818; HINTERLEITNER, Linzer Polizeidirektion p. 96.
56
DANIEK, Fouché, p. 149, 153 n. Daniek stated as a reason of their quarrel and split that Fouché had refused to
pay Demarteau 500 Francs having owed to him for a longer period of time.
57
S 22 XI 1818 („...um nach und nach durch diesen ehemaligen Vertrauten Fouchés nicht unwichtige Daten
über die Ränken, die Korrespondenz und die Pläne dieses Exministers sich zu verschaffen. (...)“). See DANIEK,
Fouché, p. 153 n.
58
P 18 II 1819.
59
See WERTHEIMER, Die Verbannten, p. 225 nn., DANIEK, Fouché, p. 153 n.
53
11
surveillance results, Count Kolowrat expressed it very aptly: “Fouché had never yearned for
anything but to reassume his property and minister post. All his activities from 1812 on might
be assessed from this point of view. (...) He would welcome every government that would
enable him to repossess it, be it under Napoleon, Bourbons or Regents.”60
The second sphere that the representatives of the Austrian State police wished to make
clear concerned both Fouché’s stays in Dresden and Prague and his relevant relationship he
was looking for both inside and outside France. Demarteau hadn’t seemingly reported on
everything he knew, especially regarding Fouché’s connection with Baron Vitrolles, who had
previously sent Mme. Bienassis to Prague and Linz in order to visit Fouché and carry out their
mutual correspondence. The third and the last area of interest comprised Fouché´s own
attitudes, hopes and plans in terms of assuming his previous political power and influence.
According to the secret police observations, he seemed to prefer an unlimited monarchical
form of government to any other one and to regard representative government form as a
“practically unrealisable brain bogeyman leading to disorder”.61 As to the last question,
Demarteau sought to make the police officials in Prague believe, Fouché had been relying
especially on Austria and felt supported by the Habsburg authorities. The protectors of
Austrian peace and security, however, didn’t have any doubt, as we have already mentioned
above that Fouché would cooperate with anybody so as to reassume his position in France.
Both Demarteau and Fouché shared the opinion, the French ex - Police Minister was still
expected to play a great role in Europe.62
It can be seen as a repeated evidence “of a proved judgment and working experience” of
Count Kolowrat to let him choose the way “to pose such questions for Demarteau in order to
be answered as completely as possible and not compromising the highest (Habsburg –
M.CH.) Court”.
63
The governor of Bohemia succeeded in finding such a way. He had
communicated with Prague Police Director Ehrenburg in a manner of not letting the latter
know that there had been a higher order for the governor behind. The police governor was
acting under the illusion that Count Kolowrat would verify the genuineness of Demarteau’s
mind through gradual posing of questions.64 On the one hand, Kolowrat pointed out Fouchés
political opportunism clearly in his report, on the other hand he recognized that Demarteau
had been afraid of the rise and political recovery of Fouché and thus held back a lot of facts.
For that reason, Demarteau had not been granted the residence permit in Prague, but was just
60
P 13 VI 1819 (Kolowrat´s report to Sedlnitzky, Prague, 9.6.1819).
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
S 28 II 1819.
64
P 13 VI 1819, Kolowrat to Sedlnitzky, Prague, 9.6.1819.
61
12
tolerated there instead. This wellspring of information didn’t prove to be especially
informative, but confirmed at least the general police suppositions with respect to the
activities of Fouché.
Further information about political opinions, hopes and plans of French exiles were to be
obtained through social intercourse. This task demanded, however, very close attention,
because the persons to be treated would be able to exercise their “dangerous influence” on the
Austrian subjects.65 On that account, it had to be clearly distinguished, which exiles and under
which circumstances would be allowed to socialize.
Prince Metternich had already 1815 classified two French exiles expelled to Austria,
Thibaudeau and Maret, with respect to their “suspiciousness level” by labelling Duke of
Bassano to be “far less dangerous”. The former senator Thibaudeau was in Metternich’s
opinion considered to be “one of the most determined revolutionaries. All his steps had to be
watched much closer and provided that he had got into a tricky situation during his stay in
Prague, he was to be kept under much closer surveillance.”66 Joseph Fouché, the former
Police Minister under the Rule of Directorate, Consulate, Napoleon I. and the Bourbons
represented the most specific person. The Austrian chief of police, Count Sedlnitzky, was
completely clear about the “cunning character Fouché’s, launching a charm offensive to
every party and pretending to bow out of politics”67 and Foreign Minister Metternich had
already had an option to get to know then French ex – Police Minister as a former Austrian
ambassador in Paris.68 One can’t wonder that after such considerations the aristocracy in
Prague as well as later in Linz had been forbidden to socialize in any way with Fouché just
confining its activities to exchanging courtesies.69 The respective governors, and police
directors as officials however, had to behave kindly towards French exiles in order to gain
their trust that would enable them to discover their intentions and secret plans.70 When Count
65
This precaution was totally inevitable. Later, for instance, the Austrian police learned of a zealous activity of a
Jacobin Felix Desportes in Wiesbaden, who had repeatedly urged Thibaudeau in his letters, „to recruit
proselytes of jacobin teaching in Prague“. The former senator under Napoleon Bonaparte followed this appeal
willingly and informed Desportes in a not indistinct way „that he would succeed in posing as an apostle of his
jacobin principles in Prague.“ (P 9 VI 1817, 23 VI 1817) Subsequently, Count Sedlnitzky drew the Bohemian
governor´s attention to such pernicious activities.
66
See P 30 IX 1815, Metternich to Hager, Paris 3.9.1815.
67
P 20 X 1816.
68
Metternich portrays the Duke of Otranto as an „extreme politician of an extreme opportunism“ in his memoirs
(„Fouché (...) hatte sich mit Blut und Kot befleckt. (...) Fouché war ein Feind aller Theorien; er war ein Mann
der Praxis, der vor keinem Hindernisse zurückschreckte. Ein tiefer Kenner des französischen Geistes, schritt er
mit seiner Zeit fort, immer aber auf den extremen Wegen; überzeugt, wie er war, dass nur auf diese Weise ein
gleichfalls extremer Zweck zu erreichen sei.“ – See Metternich. Denkwürdigkeiten. München 1921, vol. 1, p.
150).
69
P 20 IV 1817, 27 X 1817, 15 V 1818; S 26 IV 1817, 6 XI 1817. See also HINTERLEITNER, Linzer
Polizeidirektion, p. 99, WERTHEIMER, S. 207 f.; DANIEK, Fouché, p. 145; MADELIN, Fouché, p. 345.
70
WERTHEIMER, Die Verbannten, p. 207.
13
Sedlnitzky found out that the Linz Police Director Hoch wasn’t treating Fouché with an
appropriate readiness, he brought it immediately to Hoch’s notice, how such a flexible and
apparent behaviour could have encouraged secret purposes as well as made easier his attitude
towards Duke of Otranto.71 The Habsburg police chief made just one exception to the rule of
social intercourse with aristocracy, namely as far as Duke of Bassano was concerned. It
wasn’t just lower level of suspiciousness of Hugues Maret or the fact he was no regicide72
inducing Count Sedlnitzky to do so, but lacking of the supervision tools in Görz73, where
Maret and his family had moved to.
In general, chief of police was unfavourable to give his permission for French exiles
requesting to change their residences. He emphasized the difficulties that had emerged for the
police service as a result of moving from Graz to Görz74 and gave the reasons why Fouché
shouldn’t move from Prague to Linz.75 There were just two cities according to Sedlnitzky,
where the French exiles could be supervised properly, i.e. Prague and Graz. It was Prince
Metternich together with the Emperor Francis I., however, who made the final decision on
this issue and Count Sedlnitzky was obliged to accept this fact. He didn’t miss therefore the
opportunity to draw the attention of his immediate subordinates in the provinces to as close
supervision as possible as well as to increased eagerness during the investigations.76 Quite
surprisingly, Police President raised no objection77 against Fouché’s moving from Linz to
71
P 15 V 1818, 27 II 1819.
This fact alone would lead to great disgust of conservative aristocratic families.
73
P 14 XII 1816. (Count Sedlnitzky expressed his hope, social intercourse with the aristocracy in Görz would
support the secret surveillance of Maret in some particular way as well as increase the relevant means and
strategies in order to become more and more familiar with Maret´s political attitudes and hopes). Görz (Italian
“Gorizia”, Slovene “Gorica”) is a capital of the Austrian crown-land Görz and Gradiska. Since 1751 Görz has
been a seat of an archbishop, metropolitan of the ecclesiastical province of Illyria. See Ritters geographisch statistisches Lexikon, Leipzig 1898, vol. 1 (A - K), p. 691.
74
P 25 IX 1816; S 21 IX 1816, P 12 X 1816 („(...) erlaube ich mir, Eurer fürstlichen Gnaden die bereits
geäußerte Besorgnis zu wiederholen, dass die Beobachtung des Fürsten Maret und seiner Familie weder in
Triest, noch in Görz so umfassend und ergiebig sein werde, als sie in Gratz (...) gewesen ist. Es dürften selbst
einige Wochen vergehen, bis es in Görz und Triest gelingen wird, die Aufsicht auf das Benehmen und die
Verbindungen der zur Familie des Herzogs Maret gehörigen Individuen gehörig in Gang zu bringen und die
Korrespondenz derselben mit dem so nötigen richtigen Takte und mit jener Genauigkeit zu kontrollieren, welche
die Nähe des Triester Seehafens und die Unmöglichkeit, die über Meer versendeten Briefe streng zu überwachen,
immer sehr erschweren wird. Ich werde gewiss das Möglichste tun, um diese Hindernisse, wenigstens
größtenteils zu besiegen (...)“). See also WERTHEIMER, Die Verbannten, p. 290.
75
P 9 III 1818 (Sedlnitzky feared the proximity of Prince Eugéne Beauharnais and other French exiles living in
Bavaria, as well as the fact that Linz was located on the main route between Paris and Vienna. Against sending
Fouché to Graz, however, spoke the presence of another former French Police Minister Savary and the
possibility they might use in order to keep in touch), see WERTHEIMER, Die Verbannten, p. 220 n.; DANIEK,
Fouché, p. 146 n.
76
P 31 VII 1818 („Man darf sich wohl nicht darüber täuschen, dass Maret die Hebel der wider ihn agierenden
Polizeiaufsicht zu erforschen und zu entkräften, oder ihnen auszubeugen stets nach Möglichkeit trachten werde.
Dies Bewusstsein muss aber der Polizei zu desto höherem Antrieb gereichen, nicht nur die Mittel und Wege der
Polizei dem lauernden Auge des Maret zu entziehen, sondern auch durch Mittel, deren dieser nie gewahr worden
sein sollte, sich in den Besitz der geheimen Kanäle des Maret selbst zu setzen. (...)“)
77
P 29 X 1819.
72
14
Triest at the end of 1819, focusing more on keeping the latter under the most precise
surveillance. He denied him for instance the access to an “own craft equipped with oars and
sails” for the sake of taking rides at the open sea for safety reasons.78
Not only moving of the supervised Frenchmen aroused suspicions of the Austrian chief of
police. The same could be said about their travel plans, because the French exiles had to dwell
within the city determined for them. Whether these travel plans were to be realized, it all
depended on how Prince Metternich, Count Sedlnitzky and last but not least the Emperor
Francis I. assessed it. Let me give you one example illustrating clearly the respective
principles of the police president.79 On May 11th, 1817, the former French Foreign Minister
Maret made a request for a trip to Triest, Venice, Idria, Cornale and Pola, further to Styria and
Bad Gastein. Visiting Venice was out of the question for Sedlnitzky from the beginning,
because the French exiles were not permitted to enter Italy. Concerning the remaining places
– with the exception of Graz, where the encounter between Maret and his earlier colleague
and Napoleon’s ex - Police Minister Savary was to be feared – Duke of Bassano was granted
a permit. He had to follow the proposed route and during the whole journey was kept under
constant surveillance. 80
Considering the attitudes of Prince Metternich and Count Sedlnitzky, Foreign Minister was
making the same or more moderate decisions as the chief of police, changing his promise just
in exceptional cases.81 In accord with Sedlnitzky, however, Metternich didn’t permit the exsenator Thibaudeau to make a journey to Wiesbaden because the latter was willing to join the
revolutionary activities of the Jacobin Felix Desportes there, as the Prague police had
78
P 20 III 1820 („...als dadurch nicht nur die besondere Beschaffenheit des Freihafens von Triest höchst
erschwerte Überwachung der mancherlei Kommunikationen der dort anwesenden Mitglieder der
bonapartischen Familie und der sonstigen Exilierten ganz vereitelt würde, sondern auch selbst ein
Entweichungsversuch eines oder des anderen dieser unserer Aufsicht anvertrauten Individuen begünstiget
werden könnte.“)
79
P 11 V 1817, 30 VI 1817.
80
In Idria, Cornale and Pola the relevant governor, in Bad Gastein the local Police Inspector at a spa
(Badepolizeiinspektor), would take the respective responsibility. Concerning the aforementioned spa located
near to Salzburg, Count Sedlnitzky didn´t neglect to express some misgivings about the possible future efforts of
Maret in order to establish closer contacts with both “badly thinking” local French and French exiles in near
Bavaria. – At the same time, Sedlnitzky enabled Maret to visit Triest, empowering the Head of the County Görz,
Baron v. Lago, to issue the respective passport for Maret, as often as he would wish to make a trip to Triest,
without having asked the governor previously. The mentioned Head of the County was just supposed to report it
to Triest in advance.
81
For instance, Metternich had to reject Fouché’s request to move from Linz to Vienna that had already been
approved previously. („Was anfangs Oktober (1819) für die Dauer einiger Tage ganz unbedenklich gewesen
wäre, müsste jetzt, wo die Bevollmächtigten ganz Deutschlands hier versammelt sind, Aufsehen erregen.“, S 15
XII 1819; P 23 XII 1819) The Fouché’s appearance in the Austrian “Capital and Residence City” at the very
moment, while the representatives of various German states were negotiating the consequences of Carlsbad
Decrees of September 1819 there, would have certainly thrown suspicion on the Austrian government that it had
intended to take some specific secret advantage of the French ex – Police minister. See WERTHEIMER, Die
Verbannten, p. 237 n.
15
previously reported.82 Thibaudeau accepted this refusal seemingly as cool as a cucumber and
decided to make a journey to Carlsbad, a well-known spa in Bohemia. This decision related to
the fact that French exiles were allowed to visit both Austrian and Bohemian spas for the sake
of their recovery.83 It goes without saying that there had been organized an appropriate police
surveillance there. A so-called “Badepolizeiinspektor”, i.e. police inspector at a spa, had to
supervise all the guests, among whom there were many foreigners. This special police watch
on the guests included mail interception as well as domiciliary visit, understandably in guest’s
absence. This inspector received not only registration form from every guest at a spa, but also
had to report to the respective governor on their “political conduct”. Such reports proved to be
sometimes quite extensive, while personal or moral characteristics often played an anchor
role. 84
After having made a review of police methods and treatment strategies concerning the
exiled Frenchmen in the Habsburg monarchy, I can confirm a claim suggested by Eduard
Wertheimer, that Prince Metternich had to exert moderating influence upon a strict and
rigorous measures proposed to be taken against all members of Bonaparte family as well as
against the other significant French exiles with Fouché in the lead. Not to be misunderstood, it
had been the Austrian Foreign Minister’s intention to supervise them precisely too, but he had
rejected any redundant surveillance mania.85 These divergences had referred to partially
different attitudes and characters of both men. Foreign Minister Metternich acted as a
statesman as distinct from Count Sedlnitzky, ho was a strict and pedantic bureaucrat. The
chief of police sought to organize as complex surveillance as possible and regarded it as a
hindrance to the police service, if the determined living conditions of French exiles should
have been facilitated. In case of such divergence of opinion, however, Prince Metternich had
always won his way against Count Sedlnitzky86 as a result of a specific state police character
of this police activity and its dependence on the international policy. Nevertheless, we cannot
deny the chief of police in this case not to be charitable or incapable of a humane approach at
all.87 On one hand, he was seeking to act in a way to avoid reproach of being harsh and on the
82
See P 21 V 1817, 9 VI 1817; S 26 IV 1817, 27 V 1817.
Insbesondere nach Karlsbad und Teplitz in Böhmen. Vgl. P 11 V 1817, 9 VI 1817, 22 IV 1818, 10 V 1818, 21
V 1818, 1 VI 1818, 23 VII 1818; S 27 V 1817, 21 III 1818, 16 VII 1818.
84
See Joseph RAUSCHER: Sedlnitzkys Polizeiorgane in Marienbad. In: Heimat und Volk. Festschrift für
Wilhelm Wostry zum 60. Geburtstage. Brünn 1937, p. 482 nn., p. 497, p. 501 n.; EMERSON, Political Police, p.
37 n.
85
WERTHEIMER, Die Verbannten, p. 95.
86
To give an example, just look at the acceptance of new French exiles in Austria as well as the Fouché´s and
Maret´s efforts to move from their residencies to another.
87
French exiles were permitted to subscribe to French newspapers, even though they were prohibited in the
Habsburg monarchy (P 24 V 1819; S 17 VI 1819), to publish their accounts in foreign (but not in Austrian)
83
16
other hand to keep the surveillance almost unobserved as far as possible. An activity like this,
however, resembled an unattainable ideal that was hardly to be carried out in spite of
proceeding with the utmost caution.
The Frenchmen expelled to Austria complained a lot about how the Austrian police was
treating them. Their frequent complaints concerned especially distrustful treatment from the
side of police officials88, interception and holding back their correspondence89 as well as
travel and residence choice limitations.90 The second kind of complaint in particular didn’t
show the best colours of the Austrian police’s dexterity, although it used to be more effective.
French exiles were not entitled to claim “a total non-surveillance” for them otherwise at all.
Furthermore, every single foreigner had to be kept under surveillance according to the general
police directions in the Austrian Empire91 and even then Emperor Francis I. ordered their
strict supervision. It is difficult to comprehend that the frontier of discretion could be crossed
very easily.
Now, what kind of conclusions do we draw from this extraordinary story? The Habsburg
police and its new chief, Count Joseph Sedlnitzky, were confronted with an uneasy task in
order to supervise prominent French exiles and Fouché especially, that is to keep them and
their correspondence under constant surveillance, to detect their code names and secret
communication channels as well as to decipher their encrypted letters. They had to supervise
precisely Fouché’s travelling servants, confidents or foreigners coming to visit him. In
addition, safety measures were to be taken in case of his trips or moving to other cities.
Finally, the Austrian state policemen were ordered to prevent the former French Police
Minister from peddling or exerting any influence upon the Austrian citizens or abroad and to
bring more important observations to French Foreign and Police Office’s notice. Police task
of a such character required day-to-day endeavour and influenced also the performance of
day-to-day policing, if we take into account that secret service hadn’t been institutionalised
newspapers (P 4 V 1819; S 17 VIII 1817, 19 V 1819), or to some extent to enjoy the local “travelling freedom”
under exactly prescribed precautions (P 29 X 1816, 30 VI 1817).
88
However, one shouldn’t wonder at the fact that the Austrian Police President so-to-speak radiated mistrust and
urgent cautiousness. On the other hand, Count Sedlnitzky rebuked „unwise activity” of an agent entrusted with
supervision of Maret in Görz causing his mission to be uncovered easily. It speaks just in favour of Sedlnitzky,
after all, that he had sought simultaneously to comprehend or to justify it if possible. („Allein selten kann eine
geheime engere Beobachtung, wenn sie länger währet, zumal in einer so kleinen Stadt wie Görz, unbemerkt
geführet werden und ein in diesem Fache so sehr bewanderter Geschäftsmann, dem überdies weibliche
Argusaugen zur Seite sind, muss umso leichter auf einen und den anderen Gegenstand seines Misstrauens
stoßen.“ - P 30 VI 1817).
89
P 30 VI 1817, HINTERLEITNER, Linzer Polizeidirektion, p. 99 (Hinterleitner states even the fact that the
intercepted correspondence was always (!) delivered to Fouché in a very desolate state, what cannot be
considered as a positive testimonial about the skills of Police in Linz.)
90
See the respective paragraph of this study.
91
See Chrysostomus FAULLER: Gesetze, Verordnungen und Vorschriften für die Polizei – Verwaltung im
Kaiserthume Oesterreich. Wien 1827, vol. 1, p. 473 nn.
17
independently yet but recruited itself from the ordinary police staff on the basis of selection
and secret higher orders. As mentioned in the beginning, the acceptance and complex
surveillance of French exiles in the Austrian Empire was regarded as a contribution to peace
and stability in Europe from the perspective of legitimacy and restoration settled at the
Congress of Vienna (1814/1815). Such transfer of foreign issues into the affairs of Habsburg
police mirrored at the same time an active Austrian approach to the matters of foreign policy
and demonstrates its role as a main conservative power in Europe (next to Russia) seeking
both to maintain the status quo after 1815 and to prevent as well as to suppress every possible
threat to it, be it of revisionist, liberal, national, democratic or whatever origin.
The Austrian police, led by Joseph Sedlnitzky, who had got the taste of his own medicine,
how delicate the treatment and guarding the French exiles could be92, had been collaborating
closely with Foreign Office represented by Prince Metternich, causing multiple interactions
between high and low policing even during the period of relative peace after Napoleonic wars.
Apart from that, the rigid political attitudes of the Austrian Emperor Francis I. - being
confronted with the challenge of multinationality manifesting itself in German
(Burschenschaften), Italian (Carbonari) and Slavic movements for the sake of cultural and
political achievements - were holding sway over the performance of the Habsburg police,
while Count Sedlnitzky had remained a faithful and loyal executor of the Emperor’s will. As a
result of this, the Austrian state police acquired some sort of dimension branding the
performance of public police as well and became a distinctive feature of the whole Pre-March
period for more than 30 years. The Habsburg police preoccupation with the “French question”
beginning with facing the consequences of French revolution and Napoleon’s bid for
supremacy in Europe, continued with supervising Joseph Fouché and Co. after the Congress
of Vienna and finally “solidified” the belief of the Austrian police authorities considering
France as a source of potential disorders, seedbed of revolutionary activities in Europe and the
potential challenge and “threat” to the Habsburg absolutistic rule.93
92
See the „Artaud-affair“ at the beginning of this treatise.
In the first half of 1820s, both Prince Metternich and Count Sedlnitzky suggested the theory, there was a socalled „Comité directeur“ in Paris as a seat and executive commitee of the centralized „sect“ seeking to bring
about all the legitimate monarchical governments (see Michal CHVOJKA: Joseph Graf Sedlnitzky als Präsident
der Polizei- und Zensurhofstelle in Wien (1817 – 1848). Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Staatspolizei in der
Habsburgermonarchie (dissertation thesis). Opava 2007, p. 108 n.) The revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in Europe,
breaking out in France at first, seemed to „support“ this claim, even though this assemption had been based more
on their fear of the revolutions and conspiracy theories than on real evidence.
93
18