APPENDIX 2
CIVILIAN WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN TH E
TERRITORIES OF PAPUA AND NEW GUINE A
By A. J . SWEETIN G
N 1941 Australians in general knew far more about countries half
I world away than they did about the Territories of Papua and Ne wa
Guinea to their immediate north . This island chain, soon to become a
bulwark of Australia's defence, to the average mainlander was a remot e
country, peopled by bearded missionaries, miners and patrol officers an d
by whisky-swilling planters and traders who made a handsome livelihoo d
out of exploiting the indigenous population ; if the European did not di e
there of drink or disease, he was equally likely to die of the spear . Wit h
Japan's attack this outlook was radically changed . New Guinea and Papu a
became Australia's front door, with the enemy knocking hard upon it .
Hardly an Australian home was left untouched by events taking place there .
Tiny hitherto unknown villages were soon to become household names ,
and in time to take their place in military history with other famed place s
where Australians had fought and died .
The New Guinea territory, first to come under Japanese attack, include d
that part of the main island of New Guinea east of the Dutch New Guine a
border (excluding Papua), New Britain and the arc of islands extendin g
south-east from Manus through New Ireland to Bougainville in the Solomo n
Islands . Formerly a German colony, it had been administered by Australi a
under a mandate from the League of Nations since 1920 . Papua, th e
south-east portion of the New Guinea mainland, had been an Australia n
possession since 1906 . Administration was separate but similarly constitute d
in each territory . New Guinea was divided into seven districts, Papua int o
nine, each district under a district officer or resident magistrate assiste d
by patrol officers .
The size and physical difficulties of both territories and the relativ e
slenderness of Australian resources had combined to prevent the whol e
area being brought under effective control . By 1939, for example, less than
half the Mandated Territory was officially classified as "under control" ,
about 18,000 square miles were considered to be "under influence", an d
some 5,500 square miles were classed as having been "penetrated b y
patrols" . Exploration and the spread of influence, however, were bein g
persistently extended by officers of the administration .
In New Guinea in June 1941 the European population numbered 4,10 0
of whom about 400 were employed in the Administration . Some 600 were
serving as missionaries or on mission stations, about half this numbe r
being of German descent . There were 2,200 Chinese, and an enumerated
native population of about 685,000 . About 34,000 natives were employed
on contract, more than half of them on plantations . In Papua Europeans
CIVILIANS
IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
66 9
numbered 3,070 and the native population was estimated at 300,000 o f
whom about 20,000 were in employment, 17,000 under contract of service .
Ships regularly visited the islands on their way to and from other Pacifi c
trading centres, and the use of aircraft as a means of transport within th e
territories had been developed to a degree probably unparalleled elsewher e
in the world .
Rabaul, at the north-eastern tip of New Britain, capital of the Ne w
Guinea territory since the beginning of the twentieth century, lay round th e
northern shores of spacious Simpson Harbour . It comprised a European
town of bungalows and a few larger buildings and offices, set in tree lined streets, and a Chinatown of crowded galvanised-iron shacks an d
shops . The population in 1941 consisted of about 1,000 Europeans, 70 0
Asians and 3,000 natives . Since May 1937 when the town had bee n
overwhelmed by ashes and dust from a volcanic eruption, a change in
the site of the capital had been under consideration . The most favoured
alternatives were Lae and Salamaua on the New Guinea mainland .
A decision, slow in coming, was accelerated by volcanic activity whic h
recurred in June 1941 . This continued for some months, culminating in
the biggest blows of all on 19th November, when hot rocks were hurle d
into Matupi Harbour, more than 100 yards from the foot of the volcano .
South-easterly winds carried across the township clouds of pumice an d
choking sulphur fumes, which settled on desks and documents, irritate d
eyes and throats and blackened and corroded metal . On 4th September th e
Minister for External Territories recommended that the Administration b e
removed from Rabaul and next day Cabinet a greed that Lae, thoug h
it lacked a good port, should be the site of the new capital . '
The transfer began in October 1941 when the Department of Distric t
Services and Native Affairs moved to Salamaua, preparatory to moving t o
Lae as accommodation became available . The Department of Lands ,
Surveys and Forests went direct to Lae, and a small section of the Department of Works also moved there to prepare for the arrival of othe r
departments . Brigadier-General Sir Walter McNicoll, 2 who had held th e
appointment of Administrator since 1934, arrived on 24th November ,
leaving the Government Secretary, H . H . Page, as Deputy Administrator .
McNicoll revisited Rabaul in December and gave instructions for th e
remaining departments to transfer to Lae as soon as transport becam e
available . They were to leave Rabaul in the steamer Macdhui due to sai l
thence on 21st January . 3 It was not clear what the rest of the town would
do . In 1937 the official view had been that "other interests" would remain .
In 1941 it seemed likely that business firms would move to Kokopo and ,
New Guinea Branch of the Australian Labour Party disagreed with the choice of Lae an d
r The
urged Port Moresby as the only "practicable solution" . The branch consistently advocated a policy
of "amalgamation with the Papuan Administration" . (Before the war the two Administration s
had operated to a great extent in isolation from each other, and there was insufficient contac t
between the Territories . )
2BrigGeneral Sir Walter McNicoll, KBE, CB, CMG, DSO. (1st AIF : CO 6 Bn' comd 10 Inf
Bde 1916-18 .) MHR 1931-34 ; Administrator of Mandated Territory of New Guinea 1934-42 .
B . South Melbourne, 27 May 1877 . Died 26 Dec 1947 .
S . A . Lonergan, Assistant Government Secretary, in report dated 8 Feb 1942 (on Territorie s
file DD 16/2/1) .
670
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME
PAPUA-NEW GUINE A
as that new centre developed, some administrative services would nee d
to be represented there .
For 20 years Australia had adhered to the terms of the Mandate, whic h
required that no military or naval bases and no fortifications should b e
established in the New Guinea territory, and prohibited the military training of natives for other than internal police work and local defence . The
New Guinea police force commanded by a superintendent consisted of
European commissioned and warrant officers, and native non-commissione d
officers and constables . 4 The strength of the native constabulary in June
1941 was 1,200 ; in December about 350 were stationed in the Rabau l
area under the acting Superintendent, W . B . Ball .
In December 1940 German raiders had attacked Nauru, sinking fiv e
ships and shelling the phosphate loading plant . Protective measures were
plainly needed, and on 18th February 1941 the Australian War Cabine t
authorised the dispatch to Rabaul of an A .I .F . battalion and the installatio n
of coast defences . The question of raising a native battalion was also t o
be examined . 5 It was estimated that with the locally raised New Guine a
Volunteer Rifles, the native police and proposed additions, the equivalen t
of about an infantry brigade, plus coast defences "would be provided in
the New Guinea (Mandate), mainly around Rabaul" .
Although expectations far exceeded results, rapid action followed . I n
March-April the 2/22nd Battalion of the A .I .F. arrived at Rabaul, an d
before the end of the year a coastal battery of two 6-inch guns and search lights was established there. With other small military detachments, including an anti-aircraft battery of two guns, the ultimate strength of the garriso n
reached about 1,400-a token force perched in the probable path of an y
Japanese advance .
Returned soldiers played a leading part in establishing the Rabaul detachment of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles, and for a time the headquarter s
of the unit was at Rabaul . Enthusiasm dwindled, however, as member s
of the N .G .V .R . volunteered for service overseas and numbers decreased ;
by the end of 1941 only about 80 men at Rabaul were regularly attendin g
training parades .
An Inter-Services Committee, with the Government Secretary, Page, a s
Chairman, and representatives of the Services and the Chief Civil Warden, °
drew up an Air Raids Precautions plan . The detailed instructions issue d
in June specified a general refuge area in a valley on Namanula Ridge .
They urged that, since sufficient warning might not be received to allo w
civilians to reach the area before the commencement of an attack, eac h
householder should construct trenches or select drains in which members
of his household could take shelter in the event of sudden attack . Air raid
signals were notified, wardens appointed and first aid posts selected . A
register of privately-owned motor vehicles was drawn up, school childre n
were drilled in escape from school buildings, and arrangements were mad e
• ADO's and Patrol Officers were ex-officio Inspectors and sub-Inspectors respectively .
• War Cabinet Minute 816, 18 Feb 1941 .
• R . L. Clark, a member of the Legislative Council and President of the New Guinea Returne d
Soldiers League .
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME
PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
67 1
to cut off the town electricity supply in the event of night raids . Rathe r
surprisingly, considering the circumstances, the instructions seem to hav e
attempted to preserve the existing racial and social structure of the Rabau l
community . "The upper portion of the valley is reserved for Europeans ,
and the lower portion for Asiatics," ran the instructions . "A smaller valle y
immediately south of the European section is reserved for native servants . "
The A .R .P . plan stated that "no special instructions have been issued t o
natives" .
Apprehension about the presence of women and children in the territor y
increased after the first enemy reconnaissance plane appeared over Rabau l
on 10th December . Successive Governments, unwilling to grasp the nettle ,
had sought to encourage rather than to order their evacuation, which wa s
to be done "as unobtrusively as possible to avoid panic" 7—a fear frequently
uppermost in the minds of politicians of all parties . There was some limited
response to this and later moves, but as time went by the evacuees, mad e
lonely by the absence of loved ones, began to exert pressure to be allowe d
to return . On 17th November the War Cabinet decided that furthe r
encouragement to voluntary evacuation was needed, and issued a warnin g
that in the event of war it would not be possible to make any specia l
arrangements to transfer women and children to Australia . Permits were
no longer to be issued to tourists .
On 11th December, the day after the first enemy reconnaissance plan e
appeared over Rabaul, the War Cabinet confirmed a decision made thre e
days earlier that there should not yet be any compulsory evacuation of
women and children from Papua and New Guinea, but next day reverse d
its decision . The evacuation, in accordance with a plan already drawn up ,
was virtually completed by 29th December when 592 women and childre n
from Papua, and 1,210 from New Guinea had arrived in Australia . Nevertheless a number of women (other than nurses$ and missionaries to who m
the orders did not apply) still remained . Despite the lateness of the hour ,
however, the evacuation had proceeded smoothly, and no bombs had falle n
on Rabaul before the bulk of the women and children had departed .
Paralleling the army build-up, there had been some slight developmen t
in air force strength at Rabaul . By the beginning of January 1942 th e
R .A .A .F . was manning two airfields—one at Lakunai on the northern ar m
of Blanche Bay, between the town and Praed Point, and the other a t
Vunakanau, south of the Bay—and four Hudson aircraft and ten Wirraway s
were stationed there . Aircraft spare parts and ammunition, however, wer e
in short supply, servicing facilities were inadequate, and the Wirraway wa s
a trainer rather than a fighter aircraft, of whose defects their pilots were onl y
too well aware .
A disturbing picture of civil affairs in Rabaul was provided by ai r
force reports .
+War Cabinet Minute 904, 18 Mar 1941 .
a Dr E . T . Brennan, the Director of Health at Rabaul, decided that seven nurses employed by th e
New Guinea administration came with in the "essential" category, but at the direction of the
Government Secretary, made it clear to them that if they wished they also could leave th e
territory . Only one elected to do so .
672
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINE A
Works and operations were continually delayed and hampered because of the lac k
of control of civilian personnel and activities (stated one account) . Signals requestin g
the imposition of martial law brought no response, nor were senior administrativ e
officials in the civilian service given satisfactory directions or special authority b y
Canberra . The lack of control over native labour caused the loss of valuabl e
government equipment which could not be replaced . . . equipment which shoul d
have been available to the three services was being used by civilian personne l
in carrying out their normal trading and commercial avocations . . .
Suspected fifth column activity also caused considerable concern . It was foun d
impossible to secure any control over civilian personnel visiting the aerodrome . As
numerous enemy aliens, principally Germans, were not interned and appeared t o
have a free run of the town, R .A .A .F . officers in control became satisfied that a
considerable amount of information was being passed to the enemy . Definite cases
of jamming began to occur on WT operational wave-lengths . a
The first raid on the territories came about 10 .30 on the morning of
4th January . As the sirens at Rabaul wailed their warnings, servicemen an d
civilians alike hastened to shelter in nearby gulleys, drains and slit trenches .
Thence, far out to sea over Watom Island, they saw the aircraft approaching—18 heavy long-range bombers, in perfect arrowhead formation, "flashing silver in the bright sunlight" . "It seemed impossible to believe tha t
they were bent on destruction, so serene and beautiful did they look, "
wrote one observer . l
The aircraft pattern-bombed Lakunai, dropping more than 50 bomb s
from a great height, but only three hit the runway, the earth at one en d
erupting in a swirling brown column as the salvo fell across it . There wa s
a muffled roar of more explosions as 17 bombs fell in the native compound ,
killing 15 people and wounding as many more . The rest fell harmlessl y
in the sea . Two Wirraways which took off from Lakunai failed to intercep t
the raiders ; anti-aircraft shells burst in white puffs far below them . In the
early evening of the same day about 11 flying boats made two run s
over the Vunakanau airfield . One pattern of bombs straddled the en d
of the strip, but the others fell wide of it . Another native was killed .
Between 6th and 16th January three more raids by aircraft flying a t
high levels occurred .2 They concentrated on the air force and militar y
installations, avoiding the town and port facilities, giving rise to the belie f
that landings were imminent and that these facilities were being preserve d
for the enemy's own use . On the 8th the Malatai left Rabaul, havin g
embarked all Japanese internees from the territory and a number o f
medically boarded soldiers . Since the outbreak of the European war a
curfew had been imposed on enemy aliens—usually German or Austrian
missionaries—restricting them to their quarters between the hours of 6
p .m . and 6 a .m . No additional restrictions were imposed after Decembe r
1941 . Instructions issued by the Chiefs of Staff to prepare the airfield s
RAAF narrative, "New Guinea Campaign", Vol 1, pp . 62, 71 .
1 D . M. Selby in Hell and High Fever (1956), p . 15 . Selby commanded the anti-aircraft battery .
a During the initial raids there was lack of co-ordination between the services, civil police and th e
A .R .P . organisation which resulted in air raid signals being sounded independently, or sometime s
not at all . The number of sirens—five in all—their limited range and the time-lag in passin g
warning messages, sometimes by police boys on foot, to the various posts heightened the feelin g
of uncertainty . On 5th January, after the first raid, the Government Secretary cabled Canberr a
for an air raid siren with a range of four miles . An electrically-operated siren was neede d
since no steam was available at Rabaul . None was forthcoming within the limited time available .
CIVILIANS
IN WARTIME
PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
67 3
for last-minute demolition in the event of invasion added to the prevailin g
anxiety .' Rabaul, rightly, saw itself in the direct path of the Japanes e
advance . For a week before the Japanese arrived—at the New Guine a
Club (headquarters of the A .R .P .) and other places where the almos t
entirely male population gathered—the prospect of invasion was commo n
talk . Rabaul, in the words of one civilian "became a typical frontier town ,
dropping any semblance of social life, and facing, without subterfuge, th e
grim possibilities of front-line warfare" . °
There was a swift lowering of spirits among the Asians . On 24th
December the Chinese telephonists ceased work . On 14th January the
Government Secretary reported to Canberra that the morale of Chines e
artisans was so low that they could no longer be depended upon to carr y
out urgent works required for defence purposes . Page suggested the pro vision from the services of a fully equipped engineer unit .
On 15th January, convinced that an early attempt at a Japanese landin g
could be expected, Page telegraphed Canberra :
It now appears that the defence policy for the territory is to be limited to demonstration of force rather than any serious attempt to hold the territory against an y
enemy attack in force and there are indications that such an attack will take plac e
in the very near future . For these reasons it is considered urgent that consideratio n
should be given to the position of civil population of the territory and if necessar y
their evacuation . The Administrator at present very ill at Lae and it is not practicabl e
to confer with him prior to dispatch of this telegram but the position is regarded as
sufficiently serious to warrant representations for immediate consideration of th e
Minister and/or War Cabinet .
My personal view is that no good purpose can be served by the Administratio n
maintaining officers at island locations including Rabaul if the only prospect i s
internment on enemy occupation which might be effected in a matter only of days .
It is pointed out that dependants of civil officers retained by the Administration an d
ultimately interned by the enemy have no claim for protection or financial assistanc e
from the Government as is the case with dependants of soldiers .' I would be gla d
to receive the observations of the Minister for transmission to the Administrator a s
to the policy it is desired to adopt in regard to civilians and withdrawal temporaril y
of all civil administrative officers to the mainland or if considered necessary t o
Australia . The civil population is looking to the Administration for some indicatio n
of the action to be taken by them .
Page's message was submitted to the Prime Minister, and on the 17t h
Canberra notified Page that :
. and the matter will be conThe Chiefs of Staff are considering proposals
sidered by War Cabinet on Monday, 19th January . '
Not possible to anticipate decision . Please supply information as to the number
of persons it is desired to evacuate .
Chiefs of Staff emphasise it is important that all Government officials shoul d
remain at their posts until directed to leave .
s Similar instructions were issued to Kavieng and Port Moresby . Chiefs of Staff Report, No . 101 ,
3 Jan 1942 .
•Gordon Thomas, "In Rabaul, Under the Japs" (Pacific Islands Year Book, 1950, p . 30) .
5 This was afterwards remedied by the New Guinea Civilian War Pensions scheme .
5 War Cabinet had last met in Melbourne on the 13th . Its next meeting was also to be in
Melbourne .
674
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IN
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GUINE A
When Page's telegram of the 15th was sent the Norwegian freighter ,
Herstein, a 5,000-ton motor vessel easily capable of taking out the remaining civilians, was in Rabaul discharging cargo . In accordance with instructions from the Copra Marketing Board she began loading copra ove r
the weekend during which Page's proposals lay awaiting consideration i n
Melbourne . Once that highly inflammable cargo was taken aboard the
danger of using the ship to remove civilians was greatly increased . Reports
by survivors suggest that Page had in view the use of the Herstein t o
evacuate all the civilians .' Others vessels also were available, even up t o
the day preceding the invasion .' Shipping was not lacking ; what was
lacking was a clear and prompt direction from the Government . '
On the 20th a message was drafted in Canberra indicating that the Wa r
Cabinet had approved the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff that i t
was "undesirable" that any unnecessary civilian personnel should remain i n
Rabaul and the adjacent islands and that such people should be evacuate d
as and when transport became available . The Government asked to be
informed of the "numbers of civil population that could advantageousl y
be evacuated", but stressed that it was important that civil administratio n
of the territories controlled by Australia should be maintained for as
long as was necessary and possible ; the withdrawal of administrativ e
officers so long as there was work for them to do was deprecated . Thi s
final injunction, repeating that of the 17th, seems unrealistic so far a s
Rabaul was concerned . As noted earlier, the New Guinea Administratio n
planned to close at Rabaul and complete the evacuation of its officers t o
Lae on 21st January . The decision to advance the date by a few day s
was surely only an administrative one that might well have been handle d
within the department after consultation with the Minister ?
On 20th January Rabaul was attacked by the largest number of aircraf t
assembled by the Japanese in 1942 for a single attack against a target i n
the Australian territories outside the mainland' Soon after midday Rabau l
was warned by a coastwatcher on Tabar Island that 20 enemy aircraf t
v Gordon Thomas, editor of the Rabaul Times (in an account published in the Cairns Post, 17
Oct 1945) ; and S . A. Lonergan, Assistant Government Secretary, who had left Rabaul for La e
on 17th January, in his evidence at the military Court of Inquiry . This Court of Inquiry
assembled on 13 May 1942, by order of Major-General V . P . H . Stantke, the Adjutant-General ,
to inquire into and report on the landing of Japanese forces in New Britain, Timor and Ambo n
(including the circumstances of the massacre at Tol) . Much of the information in the sectio n
of this narrative relating to Rabaul has been drawn either from Volume II (Evidence re Ne w
Britain) or from statements filed with the war diary of the 2/22nd Battalion at the Australia n
War Memorial . Files of the former Department of External Territories have also been consulted .
The narrative has benefited from the comment and assistance of a number of people who wer e
present but whose experiences did not then or later form the subject of diaries or reports .
•The last sizeable sea transport that offered was the Mata)ele (330 tons) which arrived at Rabau l
on 21st January. She left at 4 p .m . next day, taking with her as passengers Judge Bathgate, a
member of the audit staff and others . Many more might have accompanied them .
.Gordon Thomas wrote afterwards that "the reason why more civilians did not avail themselve s
of these opportunities of escape was through total lack of information as to enemy dispositions ;
a total ignorance of what form the invasion would take and from which direction it would come .
Sea travel at that time, with constant air raids in progress, seemed fraught with greater danger
than remaining in Rabaul." Sydney Morning Herald, 17 Dec 1945 .
(The message drafted in Canberra on the 20th never reached Rabaul, although the AWA statio n
at Rabaul, which normally handled civilian radio traffic, continued to operate until the afternoo n
of the 22nd . It reached Lae, on the morning of the 21st, but had only been partly deciphere d
when the Japanese attacked that town .
'Probably 120, including fighters . The Japanese mounted their largest attack against a territorie s
target on 12th April 1943 when 43 bombers and about 131 fighters struck at the Port Moresb y
airfields.
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME
PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
67 5
were headed towards the town . A further formation of 33 approaching
from the west was not detected until it was over Rabaul at 12 .40 . A fe w
minutes later another 50 aircraft were over Duke of York Island . Th e
watchers on the ground looked up in tense expectancy as two Wirraway s
on patrol turned to meet the enemy . One Wirraway, engaged by mor e
than six Zeros, went down in flames ; the other went into a spin after a
brief one-sided combat and crash-landed . Other Wirraways, "whose gallantry is a lasting memory to those of us who saw the sacrifice", 3 too k
the air but, outgunned, outmanoeuvred and outpaced, were shot down .
Within minutes the air was clear of opposition and the Japanese wer e
free to deliver leisurely high-level bombing attacks against shipping ,
wharves, airfields and other objectives . Giving a daunting display o f
superiority, heavy bombers, flying boats and seaplanes patrolled in pageant
formation while Zero fighters swept down to attack wharves and militar y
encampments or performed impudent aerobatics . The ground shook and
trembled under the bombardment .
Two of my boys beat it for the bush (wrote an eyewitness} afterwards) but Isa ,
our Nakanai cook, remained by his trench and just before the fireworks started I
called him over to my dugout for company . Both of us were too proud to show
how frightened we were, but I could see Isa's knees shaking with the noise an d
hear the rustle of the kunai grass as the bomb-blast waves swept through, and th e
chatter of machine-guns as the fighters strafed or let go at our gallant Wirraway s
overhead . Our ack-ack guns, manned by young militia lads, had a merry time an d
were credited with a couple of Japs . The Norwegian ack-ack crew also did a
grand job, but their gun was knocked out and eleven seamen were killed .
The raid lasted three-quarters of an hour . At its end the Herstein was
ablaze in the harbour, the hulk Westralia had been sunk and a Japanese
heavy bomber, brought down by anti-aircraft fire, was smouldering agains t
the largest of the volcanic cones flanking Rabaul to the east . Only three
aircraft remained undama ged . That afternoon these were concentrated a t
Vunakanau, and the air force handed over Lakunai to the army fo r
demolition . The N.G .V .R . were called to parade at 5 p .m . in the Botani c
Gardens, and told "to hop home, have a feed and parade again with ful l
kit at 6 p .m ." On return most of them were attached to the company o f
the 2/22nd Battalion at Lakunai .
There was a lull on the 21st in the air attacks on Rabaul, but earl y
that morning the army intercepted a message from a flying boat that fou r
enemy cruisers were 65 miles south-west of Kavieng, heading toward s
Rabaul . The military commander decided that the cruisers could b e
expected to arrive at Rabaul that night and ordered that the army cam p
at Malaguna, which was in an exposed position along the foreshore o f
Simpson Harbour, should be evacuated . Two Wirraways left for Lae that
day and the remaining aircraft—a Hudson, carrying the wounded—too k
off before daylight next morning . On the 21st the remaining members of
the air force set out for pre-arranged extrication points on the south coast .
•Gordon Thomas, in Pacific Islands Year Book, 1950, p . 30 .
, B . G. Challis, in Stand-To, Oct-Dec 1966, p . 3 .
676
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Late that night all civilians had either taken shelter in Refuge Gully
or left the township by car for distant plantations . The bulk store o f
bank notes was destroyed by the manager of the Commonwealth Bank .
Next morning the Chief Warden was advised that the threatened attac k
had proved a false alarm and that civilians should "carry on with normal
duties" . Between 7 .20 and 8 .15 a force of 45 aircraft launched the enemy' s
pre-invasion air attack . They machine-gunned Vunakanau airfield, and the n
dive-bombed and silenced the 6-inch fixed gun defences at Praed Point .
The Deputy Administrator and the Treasurer (H . O . Townsend) left
Rabaul for Kokopo after the raid .
During the 22nd more left for Kokopo ; in the early afternoon th e
remaining civilians again collected in Refuge Gully . Though dejected,
there was no panic among them, only confusion and uncertainty . Abou t
2 p .m . soldiers came to the car park and commandeered a number of
civilian cars . These, together with two ambulances, were used to clea r
the civil and military hospitals of the sick and wounded, who were accompanied by the service and civilian nurses to Vunapope Mission . Seekin g
instructions the Chief Warden attempted to telephone the military commander in Rabaul, but the line was silent . The Japanese convoy of 1 1
ships, steering south-west, was now visible on the horizon . The arm y
abandoned Lakunai that afternoon, demolished the aerodrome, and concentrated south of the harbour . In a borrowed car, A . J . Gaskin, a hotelkeeper and Secretary of the Rabaul R .S .L ., toured the almost deserted town .
Government and commercial stores and the shed on Government Wharf ,
packed with cargo brought in by the Berstein, were still intact, he sai d
later . "A bomb, believed to have been . . . time-delayed . . . had burs t
on the southern half of the Malaguna Road between battalion headquarter s
and Anzac House, and near where three stacks of aircraft bombs had bee n
placed . . . . The crater was about 25 feet across by 8 feet deep and . . .
had caused considerable damage to the Administration residences betwee n
battalion headquarters and Anzac House . The eastern wall of Anzac Hous e
had been blown in and the building generally had sustained other damage . "
Most of the wardens left for Kokopo about 4 .30 p .m . After thei r
departure about 30 Europeans, a dozen or so native servants who woul d
not leave their masters, and some 200 Asian men, women and childre n
gathered in quiet, cheerless groups in Refuge Gully . One of the Chie f
Warden's duties was to issue a clearance certificate to the Matafele which ,
as mentioned earlier, left Rabaul at 4 o'clock, her departure cloaked b y
blinding rain .
The New Guinea Constabulary also left Rabaul that afternoon accompanied by their European warrant-officers . One group of about 300 went
to Toma where, next morning, the Europeans had "a devil of a job stoppin g
the native police from making an attack" on the Japanese . The rifle s
and ammunition were buried and the police dispersed because of lac k
of food . °
H. O . Townsend, OBE . (1st AIF : Capt 1 Anzac HQ .) Treasurer NO Administration 1922-42.
B . Brunswick, Vic, 8 Oct 1892 . Lost in sinking of Montevideo
Motu, 1 Jul 1942 .
e Warrant-Officer A . M . Sinclair in evidence before the army Court of Inquiry .
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
67 7
Another group led by four European warrant-officers and accompanie d
by 90-100 native prisoners went to Vunakanau, where the native polic e
were ordered to take provisions and lead the prisoners into the bush . "If
we held Rabaul I intended to have the prisoners brought back again," a
warrant-officer said later . Next day they met the prisoners at Malabunga ,
now burdened with provisions that civilians had given them to carry . The
civilians joined the police officers, making their way on foot across th e
Bainings . That night the native prisoners, together with the native police ,
"cleared out with most of our stores" . '
Rabaul's hour had now arrived . An eyewitness account of the Japanes e
invasion, written soon afterwards by N . H . Fisher, 8 Government geologis t
and vulcanologist of Rabaul, is typical of the experiences shared by man y
New Guinea citizens or soldiers of only the briefest standing . Fisher ha d
paraded with the N .G .V .R . on 20th January .
After destruction of Praed Point battery, defence of lower drome was abandoned ,
drome mined, Rabaul evacuated, stocks of petrol and bombs destroyed (he wrote
succinctly) . NGVR gun teams and mortars of "A" Company (2/22 Bn) and
some of anti-tank personnel transferred to beach defence positions betwee n
Malaguna and Vulcan . Task of two Vickers and mortar team to cover road fro m
Rabaul and bring fire to bear in vicinity of Catholic Church, some 500 yards o n
Rabaul side of New Road turn-off. Mortar, of which I was in charge, with tea m
of three other men only, accordingly set up on beach 300 yards past New Roa d
turn-off .
Action commenced at 2 .40 a .m . Friday, 23 .1 .42, following bright flare at 2 .15 a.m .
Japanese attempted landing on beach immediately on Rabaul side of Vulcan . No . 1
Section, "A" Company, stationed 300 yards from Vulcan, 200 yards from beach ,
were first into action, immediately followed by machine-gun and mortar fire whic h
continued sporadically until after sunrise . Japanese were repulsed by No . 1 and 2
Sections "A" Company, and moved across foot of Vulcan in westerly direction .
Fire was later heard from No . 8 Platoon stationed farther along than No. 1 and 2
Sections "A" Company, but whether against this landing party or against othe r
Japanese forces moving around from southern side of Vulcan is not known . Wir e
barricade in front of No . 1 Section was to some extent effective and Japanes e
casualties from mortars and machine-gun fire before reaching this wire are reporte d
to have been heavy. . . . Japanese landing during the night were lightly clad in darkcoloured singlet and shorts, carried small bore Tommy-guns and light machine guns . . .
At 4 a .m. a green flare was sent up to a height of about 1,000 feet over Rabaul
and this appears to have been signal for general action by Japanese . Immediately
afterwards a Japanese (presumably) launch was seen to leave the vicinity of th e
Burnt Wharf (Customs House) and proceed out along the eastern side of th e
harbour, proving that the Japanese had established some contact in town of Rabau l
by this time . . . . A string of 7 transports was seen approaching the entrance t o
the harbour from the east, at about half-mile intervals . Transports were not large
—all calculated less than 2,000 tons—and proceeded to a point between Raluana an d
Praed Point, then turned and headed up the harbour . After 3 had turned this corne r
all suddenly changed course and sent out landing parties, the first towards Malaguna ,
another effected landings on Matupi Island, the others at Vulcan, Raluana and a t
least two places on the Kokopo coast . Technique appeared to be to send out small
° Warrant-Officer R. W . Feetum in evidence .
of NG 1934-42 ; Chief Geologist, Burea u
°Dr N . H . Fisher . Govt Geologist, Mandated Territory
of Mineral Resources, Geology and Geophysics 1942-69, Director since 1969 . B . Hay, NSW,
30 Sep 1909.
678
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINE A
landing parties to locate defence points which were then dive-bombed . One party
attempted landing in front of Catholic Church between Vulcan and Malaguna .
Consisted of ship's motor launch towing two boats similar in appearance to ordinar y
life-boats, apparently made of wood . Each boat contained about 20 men. Owing to
mortar being trained on this position, with measured distance, the third or fourt h
bomb landed in the second boat, demolishing it and probably all in it . Several mor e
bombs were landed in the midst of the landing party, which was also being attacke d
by machine-gun and rifle fire . It was by this time about 6 a .m . and dive bomber s
of various types made their appearance, some similar to those used in previou s
day's raid, also small seaplanes with large floats . Defence having been by this tim e
located by enemy as being concentrated between Catholic Church and Vulcan, thi s
area was subjected to intense dive-bombing. Our mortar received a direct hit an d
was demolished . Landings by this time were effective at Vulcan and Japanes e
troops were coming around from Rabaul so a party under Lieutenant Archer , °
NGVR, retreated through bush under constant heavy bombing, found native trac k
and joined the New Road about Ii miles from beach . One transport was foun d
waiting here, all others from beach positions having gone . After waiting for some
time to make sure no more were coming, truck proceeded up to 3-Ways where
instructions were received to proceed to Malabunga crossroads, side-tracking Vunakanau aerodrome by detour in convoy . This journey occupied some time, as convo y
was subject to repeated dive-bombings . Arrived at Malabunga turn-off wher e
several lorries had already gone down, received instructions to proceed to Tama .
Here on advice being received that further resistance was considered useless by th e
commanding officers, lorries proceeded to end of road, going down on eastern sid e
of Mt Varzin . Transports were here abandoned and personnel proceeded along trac k
which led first to terminus of Malabunga-Rabata road, thence up head of Warango i
River, where Lamingi Mission Station is situated . On this track at least 300 troop s
were moving by the time I started—about midday—and probably many mor e
came behind .
Meanwhile in Refuge Gully the civilians, though knowing little of event s
along the beaches, had been warned by the incessant rifle fire and bom b
explosions that the Japanese had arrived . Overhead, planes were zooming ,
and occasional bursts of machine-gun fire raked the hillsides where th e
civilians were hiding . At daylight a white-flag party, consisting of th e
Chief Warden, the senior Government official present (Hector E . Robinson) and Gordon Thomas went forward to the town to arrange terms an d
prevent wandering Japanese patrols from attacking the unarmed civilians .
The Japanese looted houses and offices in the town, wantonly destroyin g
property apparently for the mere sake of seeing the wreckage . Man y
thousands of books in the Agnes Wisdom library and all Government offic e
papers were put in a pile and burnt . Later in the morning all civilians were
mustered on the baseball oval where they remained under armed guard s
until nightfall . Then, foodless and bedless, the Europeans, together with
their servants and the Asians who had been rounded up in Refuge Gully ,
were crowded into Kuomintang Hall in Chinatown . In a small room at th e
entrance to the hall some 20 A .I .F . prisoners were kept apart from th e
civilians . The following days were spent unloading the many transports tha t
arrived with the invasion convoy . The numbers of prisoners swelled daily
as more civilians and soldiers were brought in from outlying areas . At
o Lt J . C . Archer, OBE . NGVR. Administrator
of Rabaul; b. Castlemaine, Vic, 28 Jul 1900.
of
Northern Territory 1956-60 . Public servant ;
CIVILIANS
IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
679
length, when their accommodation became impossible, they were transferre d
to the camp on Malaguna Road formerly occupied by the Army . At it s
peak Malaguna housed about 240 civilians, including 110 administrativ e
officials, and about 900 soldiers, including more than 100 intercepted b y
the Japanese as they attempted to escape from Kavieng . l
Occasional Allied air raids broke the monotony and helped lift th e
prisoners' spirits, but generally the days spent at Malaguna were grim ones ,
with echoes of Japanese and Axis victories from almost every front.
In June the Japanese shipped 208 civilians and 845 military prisoners
from Rabaul in the Montevideo Maru . The ship was torpedoed by an
American submarine off Luzon in the South China Sea on 1st July . Excep t
for a few Japanese who got ashore, all on board perished . The loss was a
tragic one, not only of young life but of a large number of the older me n
who had been responsible for the development of the Territory in th e
previous two decades . Later, in July, 60 Australian officers and about 2 0
women prisoners, including army and civilian nurses, were shipped safel y
to Japan in the Naruto Maru . Very few European civilians (as distinc t
from missionaries) then remained at Rabaul . 2 Of about a dozen who
did so, only four survived—three engineers and a journalist, Thomas —
who had been retained by the Japanese to run the Rabaul power hous e
and freezing plant .
After the invasion about 60 civilians made good their escape by following army routes of withdrawal . One such route travelled westwards alon g
the north coast as far as Pondo, where a flotilla of small craft, includin g
canoes, organised by an energetic District Officer, J . K . McCarthy,3 assisted
in ferrying escapers to Iboki . Thence the largest group of escapers (abou t
200, including 22 civilians) were transferred to Vitu Island, and on 20t h
March embarked in the motor schooner Lakatoi for passage to Australia .
Some who took the alternative south coast route joined the air force an d
were picked up by flying boat ; others got as far as Adler Bay befor e
deciding to surrender ; a small group crossed the mountainous countr y
between Wide and Open Bays, led by a civilian timber getter, Fran k
I See Pacific
Islands Year Book, 1950, pp . 31-2 for Gordon Thomas's account of Rabaul durin g
the Japanese occupation .
Catholic
Mission of the Sacred Heart at Vunapope—a predominantly German Mission —
'The
became a gathering ground for the New Britain missionaries. Thither many were brought fro m
outer stations by the Japanese . At its peak the strength of the missionaries numbered about 35 0
including people of 14 nationalities . They remained in occupation of the mission buildings at
Vunapope until October 1942 when the Japanese took over and established a 1,500-bed hospita l
there . The missionaries were moved to a near-by barbed wire compound where they rebuilt thei r
station. In May 1944, after constant air attacks which reduced the mission and every buildin g
around it to "matchwood and ashes", the Japanese agreed to allow the missionaries to fin d
another site for the station . For eight weeks they had lived almost entirely in tunnels . They
. torn out of the soft volcanic rock of th e
chose Ramala Gorge, "a wild fantastic place
Bittagalep Hills", six to seven miles from Kokopo . Beginning with nothing they again rebuilt
their station, including an elaborate system of tunnels for protection against the air raids . There,
suffering only occasional raids and in "almost pleasant uneventfulness", they remained until th e
end of the war . About 20 missionaries captured at outer stations in the Mandated Territor y
were executed for helping Australian servicemen or other reasons . Eleven were Germans .
(Detailed accounts of the experiences of the missionaries during this period may be found i n
This Crowd Beats Us All (1960) by Bishop Leo Scharmach, and in Prisoners Base and Home
Again (1957) by Rev James Benson, an Anglican missionary, captured in Papua and afterward s
transferred to Rabaul . )
*IA-Col J . K . McCarthy, CBE. Coastwatcher, Angau and BBCAU 1942-46 . District Commissioner,
New Britain 1949-54' Director, Dept of District Administration 1960-68' MHA Papua-New Guine a
1964-68 . District Officer ; of New Britain ; b . St Kilda, Vic, 20 Jan 1905 .
680
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME
PAPUA-NEW GUINE A
Holland, 4 and native constables, and took part in the north coast evacuation .
Most, however, continued westwards on foot, generally in small separat e
groups of soldiers or civilians—the civilian frequently revealing discomfor t
at the presence of soldier. Many paused at Tol and Waitavalo to gathe r
strength for the crossing of the rivers that flow into Henry Reid Bay .
The Japanese arrived by sea in landing barges on the morning of 3r d
February and accepted the surrender of 22 Australians who awaited the m
at the beach near Tol under a white flag . At the Tol and Waitaval o
Plantation houses were some 70 other troops . No lookouts were poste d
and these men for the most part were surprised and captured while stil l
asleep or preparing breakfast . That day and early next morning th e
Japanese combed the area for more escapers, concentrating those capture d
at the Tol labour quarters .
Early on the morning of the 4th the prisoners were assembled outsid e
the labour quarters and after a preliminary check marched to Tol Plantation
house . There the 22 men who had surrendered on the beach were separated .
Eight members of the medical corps who indicated their Red Cros s
brassards to the Japanese had the brassards torn from their arms . Identity
discs were then removed from the prisoners, whose names, ranks an d
numbers were entered in a book . Personal articles, such as paybooks ,
letters and papers were collected and heaped together . The hands of th e
prisoners were tied behind their backs with a fine cord, and they wer e
broken up into groups of 9 or 10, in most cases roped together . Accompanied by small escorts these parties were marched in various directions
through the plantation . The parties were halted after travelling a shor t
distance and individuals or groups of two or three were cut adrift and le d
away . Then the sounds of rifle and sub-machine-gun fire, grunted Japanes e
commands, and the cries of the wounded broke the silence of the bush .
Tol became a grim killing ground as men were ruthlessly bayoneted, cu t
down by the sword or shot . Probably 158 Australians perished . How man y
were civilians will never be known . Six soldiers, five of whom bore
bayonet or bullet wounds, survived the massacre . One survivor bore
ten bayonet wounds . Other refugees who passed through the Tol-Waitaval o
area in the following days spoke of the stench of death that pervade d
the area, of the piles of partly burned equipment and paybooks ; of scrap s
of letters and torn photographs—the nostalgic impedimenta of civilia n
and soldier alike . The area inspired dread ; few lingered to investigate .
Desperately short of food and medicines and their way made harde r
by the constabulary who, travelling more swiftly than the bulk of th e
refugees and interpreting too literally instructions to live off the country ,
looted and pillaged the villages and antagonised their occupants, the bul k
of the south coast escapers at length reached Drina, 120 miles to the west .
On 10th April about 150, including 21 civilians, were picked up in th e
CaO F. Holland, MBE . "Z" Special Unit. Tractor driver and timber getter ; of New Britain;
b. Enfield, England, 15 Oct 1907 .
Estimate of War Graves officers in 1945, after the area had been recaptured by the Australia n
Army. The original estimate, based on the interrogation of survivors, was 141 .
CIVILIANS IN
WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
68 1
area by the Laurabada (captained by the noted explorer Ivan Champion° )
and taken to Port Moresby . Other groups of enterprising soldiers and
civilians salvaged launches or pinnaces and by long and lonely sea voyages
made good their escapes, sometimes well after the main evacuations ha d
taken place. Many others might also have escaped had plans been mad e
beforehand for organised evacuation in the event of the inevitable—as
seems universally to have been recognised—Japanese invasion and overrunning of Rabaul .
In this respect the civilians were in much the same plight as the service men, to whom orders had been issued that it was "every man for himself" .
Though leaders among the soldiers quickly emerged, their efforts migh t
have been nullified without the local knowledge and enterprise of some
outstanding civilians, or servicemen of a few weeks' standing . Many escapers
were indebted to the missionaries, most (though not all) of whom stoo d
to their posts and careless of creed, colour or reprisals, fed and sheltere d
those who passed their way .
Throughout the period soldiers complained of the lack of realism o f
the civilians, particularly those who remained at their plantations . The
civilians were equally critical of the soldiers who, they believed, wer e
running away . In retrospect much of the criticism seems ill-judged . The
civilian who remained at his plantation, unwilling perhaps to desert hi s
servants or to put aside his lif-'s work, or the missionary who stayed a t
his station, hoping to carry on as before, was obedient to principle s
probably equally as cogent as those of the soldier who believed it hi s
duty to escape in order to fight again .
Meanwhile Kavieng, the administrative centre of the New Irelan d
District, 140 miles north-west of Rabaul, had also been invaded and th e
defence force put to flight . The little town, perched on the reef-shore d
northern tip of elongated New Ireland, had a population in normal time s
of about 50 Europeans and 250 Chinese . As well as the District Office r
and his staff at Kavieng, there was an Assistant District Officer statione d
at Namatanai on the south-east coast . The total European population o f
New Ireland in 1941 was only about 200 . Development had all take n
place along the coastal areas, and there was an excellent road traversin g
almost the whole east coast and ending at Kavieng . The road and an airfield
added greatly to the importance of Kavieng as a port . Most of th e
indigenous people lived along the coastline in small family settlements ,
sometimes only a few yards apart, with a plot of land, clumps of coconu t
trees and two or three houses .
Kavieng had been heavily attacked by about 60 Japanese aircraft o n
the morning of 21st January . The aircraft concentrated their attacks o n
the town and on machine-gun positions on the airfield and along the ridg e
running laterally to the western beaches .
Lt I . F . Champion, OBE . RANVR . Director, District Services and Native Affairs TPNG 1949-51 ;
Chief Commissioner, Native Land Commission 1952-64 . Resident Magistrate; of Misima, Papua ;
b . Port Moresby, 9 Mar 1904 .
682
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINE A
The army force defending Kavieng, consisting of an Independent Company numbering about 150 men, claimed to have shot down four aircraft .
When the raid was over the picture was the characteristic one of helples s
and hopeless Asians and native people barely able to comprehend th e
disasters that had befallen them . Bombs which fell on the outskirts o f
Chinatown, with its crowded galvanized-iron dwellings, sent debris rainin g
down over the area and machine-gunning Zeros caused havoc among Asian s
sheltering there . Dozens of natives, carrying their few possessions, th e
women with their babies strapped to their backs and the men carryin g
toddlers, sought to flee the town, the old men and women struggling to
keep pace with them . The copra sheds were a blazing inferno . '
The District Officer, J . H . McDonald, 8 after consulting the senior army
officer, Major Wilson, 9 organised the movement by road of most of th e
civilians to a camp set up at Kaut, about ten miles south-east of Kavieng .
He himself with the District Office staff moved to Kaut by Governmen t
pinnace . Soldiers wounded in the air raid were moved to Lemakot Missio n
and left in the care of Miss Dorothy Maye (a devoted nursing siste r
of the Kavieng European Hospital)" and the Mission nuns . The Independent Company also withdrew to Kaut except for a small group retaine d
at the airfield for demolition purposes .' Early on the morning of the 23rd ,
almost simultaneously with Rabaul, Japanese marines made an unoppose d
landing at Kavieng . Major Wilson and six civilians who had gone bac k
to Kavieng for food and drink and passed the night there witnessed the
landing . A biographer of one of the civilians (Murray 2 ) wrote later :
Machine-gun fire was coming from all directions. All along the shore coloure d
flares were rising into the air ; red, blue, green and yellow Very lights illuminate d
the sky. A burst of gunfire hit close to the house and as Murray looked into the
half light dozens of white objects seemed to be running towards him, firing wildl y
as they came. He realized that the white objects were sandshoes . . . . The Japs were
coming! There was no time to say more than "Quick Jackie, over the hedge!" [t o
his native boy] . They
. got to their feet and ran . Jackie cleared the hedge
.
Murray plunged straight through it . He kept on running through the coconut palm s
and light bush, edging towards the road . Gunfire was close behind him . . . H e
could hear the shouts of the Japs as they surrounded his house and scoured the bus h
near by. . . . He kept running . . . hoping he could make the airfield ahead of th e
Japs, but as he looked back . . . [and] saw the headlights of an approaching vehicle
(See M . Murray, Escape : A Thousand Miles Co Freedom (1965), pp . 53-61, for an account o f
the attack on Kavieng .
is Major J. H. McDonald, DSO, MC . (1st AIF : Maj 20 Be .) Angau . District Officer; of New
Ireland ; b. Summer Hill, NSW, 2 Nov 1887 .
9 Major J . Edmonds Wilson . OC 1st Independent Company. Farmer ; of Georgetown, SA
; b. Red
Hill, SA, 16 May 1907 . Died 4 Jan 1951 .
', Sister Maye had been evacuated from Kavieng with other European women and children i n
December, but on arrival at Rabaul had expressed a wish to return to Kavieng . This wa s
agreed to .
(Another group of 17 civilians, of their own initiative, loaded five vessels with supplies and se t
out from Kavieng . The vessels might have been used to embark most of the remainmg European s
had they been commandeered for the purpose . McDonald, however, considered himself powerles s
to act in this way without proper authorisation. In fact the vessels were fated not to go far .
One of them broke down, and all felt into Japanese hands when the other vessels delayed to g o
to its assistance .
s Capt H. J . Murray, MC, DCM . (1st AIF : Lt 2 Be.) Coastwatcher . Planter
; of Kavieng, Ne w
Ireland ; b . Bowral, NSW, 13 Nov 1896 . Died 22 Oct 1968 .
68 3
IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
he knew his hope was in vain. Then as the vehicle came closer he recognized it a s
Major Wilson's grey staff car . 3
Murray boarded the car and reached the airfield where Wilson ordere d
the demolitions to be blown . A trench a few feet deep and wide, soo n
to be repaired by the Japanese, was blown across the strip . Then togethe r
with the demolition party they withdrew to Kant to join up with th e
Independent Company and the civilians . On 30th January the Independen t
Company set sail in the motor vessel Induna Star, damaged in the air raid
of the 21st and since repaired, leaving behind the civilians, including te n
Europeans . Though the Europeans were afterwards severely critical of th e
Independent Company on this score, not to have been embarked was t o
prove a piece of their good fortune . The Induna Star was intercepted ,
bombed and disabled on its way south and later towed into Rabaul by a
Japanese destroyer . Most of the men, like other prisoners doomed to b e
transported in the Montevideo Maru, perished at sea a few months later .
The Europeans of whom Murray was to become leader tapped out a
last message to Port Moresby recording the departure of the Independent
Company and their own discomfiture at being left "like shags on a rock" ,
destroyed their teleradio and then, on 31st January, their numbers reduce d
to nine by one man who considered himself unfit to undertake the arduou s
march, themselves set out in a bid for safety ." They crossed to the east
coast road where they commandeered a truck, joined a Japanese convo y
and made a swift but perilous journey south to the Fangalawa crossing .
Moving to the west coast they abandoned the truck and set off south o n
foot, eventually reaching Panaras Plantation, where they found the manage r
still in residence and playing host to other planters . The planters declare d
that the war would be over in a few months, they had plenty of foo d
and liquor and native servants were available to look after their needs ;
they argued their views so effectively that four of Murray's party decide d
to stay with them . The five pushed on to Patalangat Plantation wher e
Murray, hearing of a cutter some 80 miles to the north, retraced his steps ,
found the cutter and sailed it back to Patalangat with the aid of a nativ e
crew . Partly by road, partly by sea, aided by some, discouraged by others ,
their numbers increased to eight, they at length reached the Kamdur u
River, where it became evident that with Japanese camps scattered alon g
the coast as far south as Cape St George the risk of proceeding furthe r
along the west coast was too great . They returned to Ulaputur, where the y
obtained a truck from a friendly missionary, and thence crossed to th e
west coast . Driving through sleeping Japanese guards at Namatanai the y
at length reached Samo where they met the Assistant District Officer, Kyle, 5
and Patrol Officer, Benham,° as well as another Australian planter .
CIVILIANS
5 M. Murray, Escape : A Thousand Miles to Freedom, pp . 75-6 . Murray, whose biographer was hi s
wife, was President of the Kavieng RSL and a born leader .
g McDonald, a 1914-18 veteran with the DSO and the MC, was later to encounter hostilit y
from Europeans who regarded him as the representative of a Government which had let them
down.
a Lt A . F. Kyle, DSC; RANVR. Coastwatcher . Asst District Officer ; of Namatanai, New Ireland ;
b . Toowoomba, Qid, 1897 . Presumed killed 1 Sep 1942 .
sub-Lt G . M . W . Benham, DSC ; RANVR . Coastwatcher. Patrol Officer ; of Carlton, NSW.
Presumed killed 1 Sep 1942 .
684
CIVILIANS
IN
WARTIME
PAPUA-NEW
GUINE A
It transpired that Kyle and Benham, after reporting the movement of
the Japanese against Rabaul, had set off down the east coast fro m
Namatanai, collecting eight planters and missionaries on the way . At th e
end of January they had reached Cape Metlik, whence they signalled Por t
Moresby, stating that they had a boat and a party of ten and seekin g
directions . Kyle was requested to remain and report and Benham electe d
to stay with him . They sent on the others, who reached safety by way
of Buka and Bougainville . Later they were joined by a group of soldier s
who had escaped from New Britain . At the end of February Murray's grou p
and the soldiers—21 in all—came together. Japanese ships had destroye d
the pinnace which brought the soldiers from New Britain, but a Chines e
trading vessel was commandeered at Tanga in which both groups se t
out on 30th April . Carried off course by currents they landed about 3 0
miles east of Buna on 5th May, narrowly missing becoming involved i n
the Coral Sea battle . At Buna they reported to F . A . Champion,] the
Assistant Resident Magistrate, whose station was "in full working order" ,
took on stores and sailed to Moresby . Kyle and Benham after watching
the rest sail to safety, remained to continue to report . In May and Jul y
unsuccessful attempts were made to bring them out by American sub marines . Their end, typical of the fate of many brave men who undertoo k
the task of coastwatching in overrun territories, was capture and execution .
The New Ireland planters and traders who remained on their plantation s
after the invasion led for a time an untroubled existence . The European s
were subject to little interference provided they obeyed the rules laid dow n
by the Japanese . 8 Later they were rounded up and interned at Kavieng .
The ultimate fate of individuals can only be surmised . Some were transferred to Rabaul where they shared the fate common to those who
embarked on the Montevideo Maru . Probably the majority were murdere d
by the Japanese at Kavieng in March 1944 . In January 1946 Pacific Islands
Monthly published a list of servicemen and civilians of the South Pacifi c
Territories who became casualties during the 1939-45 war . The list
includes 36 New Ireland civilians, mainly planters, who are recorded a s
* Capt F . A . Champion . Angau . Asst Resident Magistrate ; of Buna, Papua, and Kalinga, Qld ;
b. Port Moresby, 27 Apr 1905 .
s Some insight into life in New Ireland under Japanese control is provided by a proclamation issue d
by the commander of the Japanese garrison at Kavieng on 12th February 1942, and afterward s
brought out by escapers.
It proclaimed that :
(1) No trade, viz . neither buying or selling of any commodity is permitted unless a writte n
licence is previously applied for and obtained .
(2) All or any one of the citizens of Kavieng shall be required from time to time to
engage in such labours as are ordered by me for any purpose as I think necessary . In
such cases appropriate reward shall be given to labourers .
(3) No traffic, either on land or sea including harbour limits is permitted from 6 p .m. to
5 a .m ., and
. no sea traffic is permitted unless provided with a written licence by me .
(4) No removal of any commodity is permitted unless provided with a written licence by me .
(5) No light or fire is permitted to leak out of doors from 6 p .m . to 5 a .m . A strict and
complete blackout shalt be observed during the hours ordered .
(6) Every house shall hoist a Japanese National Flag as a token of the relative citizen' s
allegiance to the Empire of Japan . All and every one shall bow their heads (makin g
Keirei) whenever they see Japanese soldiers .
(7) All and every citizens are required to learn the Japanese language in the earliest possibl e
time now that all the Territory of New Ireland belongs to the Empire of Japan .
Any breakage of any one of the above-mentioned orders shall be punishable .
Commander of
Japanese Garrison at Kavieng
CIVILIANS
IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
68 5
"missing fate unknown" . Australian investigating officers who sought earl y
in 1946 to ascertain the fate of these civilians were told by Rear-Admira l
Tamura, the commander of the Japanese naval units in New Ireland, tha t
the civilians had been embarked for Rabaul on the Kowa Maru in Februar y
1944 . En route, however, the ship had been attacked by Allied aircraf t
and had sunk with all hands . Though the story was made credible by th e
fact that the Kowa Maru had indeed been sunk, the investigation continued . At length, by great good fortune, a survivor of the Kowa Maru
was located . He was definite that no civilians had been embarked a t
Kavieng . Eventually, in June 1947, after 70 Japanese who had serve d
at Kavieng had been interrogated, one broke down to provide detail s
that led to the indictment of the Japanese commander and others concerne d
in the disappearance of the Kavieng civilians .
It transpired that in February 1944 Kavieng had been subjected t o
Allied naval and air bombardments which Tamura feared was a prelud e
to invasion . Accordingly he issued orders for the disposal of the civilian s
"numbering approximately 32" (another account says 23) who had bee n
interned near the Kavieng airfield . "Disposal" was arranged by movin g
the civilians from their camp to the vicinity of Kavieng South wharf some
time in March . They were then blindfolded and, one by one, taken to th e
wharf where they were killed by "jujitsu and strangulation" . After death
the bodies were loaded on to two barges which then proceeded to th e
vicinity of Nago and Edmago Islands where the bodies, weighted with
cement sinkers, were thrown overboard . The Japanese informant had been
in the crew of one of the barges .
Tamura was sentenced to death by an Australian military court an d
executed by hanging at Stanley Gaol, Hong Kong, on 16th March 1948 . 8
Five of his subordinates received long terms of imprisonment .
The seas surrounding New Ireland and New Britain were for a tim e
dotted with small groups of desperate escapers . One such was K . W.
Chambers, a civilian in charge of a teleradio on Emirau Island, 80 mile s
north of Kavieng . He was one of the coastwatchers responsible for th e
timely warnings Rabaul had received of impending air raids, and ha d
the rare experience of seeing the Japanese preliminaries to the invasion o f
Rabaul and Kavieng from the dispatching end . About dawn on 21s t
January, from the direction of near-by Mussau Island, his account states ,
he heard the sound of many aircraft engines, evidently warming up . Soon
afterwards he sighted an aircraft carrier, a destroyer and a transport . H e
counted 46 Japanese aircraft as they passed overhead, flying south-east ,
and sent a message to Rabaul to this effect, telling them to "Warn Kavieng" ,
"Warn Kavieng" . Rabaul replied "Sorry, we cannot get in touch wit h
Kavieng until 8 a .m ." Between 10 and 10 .30 a .m . Chambers watched th e
aircraft returning, one plane failing badly and losing height .
All next day he could hear the noise of many aircraft engines in th e
'Trials of Japanese War Criminals (Attorney-General 81645) .
686
CIVILIANS IN
WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINE A
vicinity of Mussau, and continuous flights of planes in formation passe d
overhead . Chambers, unable to obtain instructions from Rabaul abou t
whether he should remain at his station, decided to leave in the last avail able craft and on the night of the 22nd set out for Kavieng in a pinnac e
with his radio equipment and two Seventh Day Adventists . About 2 a.m .
"we could see a terrific glow on the horizon", he wrote afterwards . "W e
knew it was Kavieng going up . The huge copra sheds full of copra wer e
ablaze . . . . We saw continual explosions as of bombs or mines going up —
a terrific stab of angry red darts to each side and a huge stab into th e
heavens . It was an amazing and awe-inspiring sight ." They by-passed
Kavieng, and hugging the west coast of New Ireland by night and hidin g
up by day at length crossed to New Britain . There the pinnace was chase d
ashore by a Japanese destroyer . Scrambling hastily up a steep cliffsid e
to a place of concealment Chambers and his companions watched helplessly
as the Japanese wrecked their boat . The missionaries decided to return to
the Seventh Day Adventist station at Put Put, but Chambers joined othe r
New Britain escapers, pushed on, and eventually reached safety .
South-east of Kavieng and Rabaul were Buka and Bougainville, most
northerly of the Solomon Islands, separated from each other by Buk a
Passage . They were part of the Kieta District, administered by a Distric t
Officer at Kieta and an Assistant District Officer, W. J . Read, l at Buka.
The painfully weak defence force comprised 25 soldiers detached fro m
the 1st Independent Company at Kavieng under the leadership of Lieu tenant Mackie? The weakness of the defenders was well known and i t
was perhaps not surprising that a section of the European communit y
round Kieta, recognising discretion as the better part of valour, shoul d
choose to make a prompt departure—precipitately and as a result of a
false alarm as it turned out . More surprising was the tenacity with whic h
others, particularly round Buka, sought to cling to their holdings .
There Read responded to the emergency by establishing hideouts nea r
Aravia on Bougainville, and stocking them with stores . He urged th e
civilians to do likewise, but though the Chinese followed his advice, th e
Europeans, "a refractory bunch, resentful of any interference by th e
Government" declined, declaring that such a move would be "derogatory
to their prestige with the natives" . 3
Read had no authority to order them to take measures for their ow n
safety, but was well aware that when the emergency arrived they woul d
be likely to turn to him, as the representative of the government, for help .
The emergency was not long delayed . On 24th January six Japanese
aircraft attacked the Buka Passage area . They bombed Sohana Island ,
Chinatown and Buka airfield . At the airfield the Independent Compan y
W. J . Read ; RANVR. Major, Angau 1944-46. Asst District Officer ; of Buka Passage ,
I Lt-Cdr
Bougainville ; b. Hobart, 18 Sep 1905
.
s Major J . H . Mackie. Ist Independent Company, "M" Special Unit . Electrician ; of Kyabram,
Vic ; b . Kyabram, I Feb 1919 .
•B . Feldt, The Coast Watchers (1946), pp . 118-28, from which the information in this section ha s
been drawn .
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
68 7
detachment fought back with machine-guns, and one aircraft flew off ,
losing height. The others then bombed Soraken . The soldiers blew up the
fuel and bombs at Buka Passage and left for Bougainville . Read an d
his staff pushed on to Aravia . Other civilians—planters who had no w
decided that safety lay in the jungle—were already in the vicinity .
Next day news was received that Kieta was occupied by the enemy .
The news was false but it alarmed Bishop Wade, head of the Roma n
Catholic Mission in the North Solomon Islands, and he set off fro m
Buka for Kieta to plead with the Japanese for fair treatment of th e
mission sisters . Then news came to Read that the Japanese had occupie d
neither Buka Passage nor Kieta . He ordered more supplies to be brough t
out from Buka Passage and himself set out to investigate reports o f
disturbances at Kieta .
On his way he passed Bishop Wade, who had abandoned his intentio n
of going to Kieta when he too heard that the Japanese were not there .
At Kieta Read was met by two loyal native policemen, Sergeant Yauwig a
and Corporal Sali, and learnt from them of the orgy of looting an d
destruction that had taken place after the hurried departure of th e
Europeans . Yauwiga and Sali had armed the police and endeavoured t o
control the natives who had flocked in from the surrounding villages . The y
had received no aid from the remaining missionaries, but Dr Kroening, a
survivor of the old German administration, had seized the opportunit y
to reinstate himself and had, in fact, joined with the police in restorin g
order of a kind . Kroening retired to his plantation, and Read set abou t
the major task of recovering the food, rice, meat and other tinned good s
which had been carried away by the natives . By the end of February th e
long task of recovering and transporting the food northwards along th e
coast to inland supply dumps had been completed and Read was bac k
at Buka Passage . There he found the Independent Company men ha d
withdrawn inland, food dumps had been established and the area prepared
for siege .
Meanwhile the planters had suffered a change of heart . Their first
decision had been to continue to work their plantations . Many now felt
that no good purpose would be served by remaining, and joined in th e
fairly general exodus that followed . A minority, including three women ,
evidently unable to comprehend the dangers involved, were still resolve d
to remain and look after their properties .
On 8th March six Japanese cruisers and two destroyers anchored i n
Carola Haven near Kessa . The Japanese came ashore and met Percy Good ,
an elderly planter of Kessa Plantation, formerly a coastwatcher . They
placed Good on parole and forced the coastwatching party established a t
Kessa to flee . Read, informed by runner of the arrival of the Japanes e
at Carola Haven, signalled Port Moresby . The news of the arrival o f
Japanese ships at Carola Haven was broadcast in Australia on 14th March .
Two days later, evidently as a result of this unwitting betrayal, th e
Japanese returned to Kessa, brutally handled and killed Good . Read now
688
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINE A
persuaded the remaining Europeans to evacuate Buka while there wa s
still time . The fate of Good precipitated action to enlist the civilia n
coastwatchers into the services . Early in April Read, P . E . Mason4 o f
Inus Plantation, and others were appointed to the R .A .N .V .R . Th e
Japanese were by now on the move all round Bougainville . On 30t h
March they occupied Buka Passage, and sent parties scouring the nort h
end of Bougainville . Read attempted to persuade the missionaries no w
at Tarlena to accompany him to Aravia on the east coast, but the y
would not go . Soon afterwards they passed under Japanese control .
On 30th March also the Japanese occupied Faisi in the Shortlands . They
attacked Kieta, then Buin, driving away the coastwatching parties . As
time went on Japanese propaganda and the obvious weakness of the Australians began to turn the natives against them . Their safety was furthe r
imperilled when Japanese patrols began to penetrate inland . By the end
of the year the planters, now living in the hills, were clamouring to b e
taken out to safety . Bishop Wade, prohibited from teaching by the Japanese ,
was also anxious for the Mission Sisters to be removed .
At length in response to signals from Read, a rendezvous with a
submarine from the South Pacific Area was arranged at a small harbou r
on the north-east tip of Bougainville . Thither the nuns from Tarlena Missio n
and the planters made their way . On the last night of the year the sub marine slipped into harbour to pick up the refugees and take them to safety .
Away to the westward of Kavieng in the Admiralty Islands, Lorengau ,
headquarters of the Manus District, had been attacked on 25th Januar y
by a force of eight Japanese float-planes . The aircraft began bombing at
7 .40 a .m . and persisted for five hours and a half . Two planes were shot
down and another damaged . Most of the native police deserted after th e
raid, but were afterwards rounded up . Anticipating an enemy landing, a
section of the ubiquitous 1st Independent Company stationed at Lorengau ,
destroyed all houses, the petrol dumps and small shipping in the harbour .
Then they withdrew inland . Other raids followed on 1st and 15th February .
On 29th March three aircraft searched Manus, apparently in an attemp t
to locate the headquarters of the soldiers . On 8th April the Japanese arrive d
at Lorengau in a transport, escorted by two cruisers and a destroyer .
Warned of their approach by Tupling, 5 a coastwatcher in the lonel y
Ninigo Islands to the west, the Australians withdrew to the south coast .
There two schooners were waiting . On the 11th the men of the Independen t
Company, accompanied by the Assistant District Officer, Vertigan, s an d
three other civilians, embarked for the mainland of New Guinea . The y
landed at Bogadjim on 14th April, pushed inland to Mount Hagen ,
whither they were evacuated by civil aircraft, initially to Thursday Islan d
and then to Cairns .
+Lt P . E . Mason, DSC ; RANVR . Coastwatcher . Plantation manager; of Bougainville ; b . Sydney ,
30 Apr 1901 .
Blu ely Officer W . L . Tupling; RANVR. Coastwatcher. Plantation Manager . Presumed killed
20 Mar 1943 .
e major D . II . Vertigan, MBE ; Angau . Asst District Officer ; of Manus I ; b . Forth, Tas,
27 Aug 1906 .
CIVILIANS
IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
68 9
On the New Guinea mainland the plight of civilians in the threatene d
areas during this period, though still acute, was less complicated than i n
the islands, where dangerous sea voyages confronted would-be escaper s
and invasion had usually followed hard on the heels of major air attacks .
Women and children generally had gone, but at the settlements along th e
coast as far west as Wewak were bands of men whose best hopes of
reaching Port Moresby were by aircraft . If these hopes were not realised ,
arduous marches through wild, forbidding country and across dauntin g
mountain ranges faced them .
On 21st January the Japanese had begun widespread blanketing raid s
—the first on the New Guinea mainland—which preceded the landing s
at Rabaul and Kavieng .
A few minutes before noon that day the operators in the A .W .A . Wireless Station at Lae picked up a warning flashed by Patrol Officer Pursehouse '
at Finschhafen that "60 enemy aircraft [were] headed south" . They passe d
on the message to Bulolo, but were unable to warn Salamaua . The air
raid siren sounded, and the population of Lae (about 120 Europeans an d
60 Chinese), many still believing the alarm to be only a test, took cove r
in slit trenches which had been wisely provided . '
The aircraft divided as they swept in over the sea, about half headin g
towards Salamaua, five fighters in the direction of Bulolo, and the remainde r
estimated at 9 fighters and 15 bombers concentrating on Lae . The attac k
began at 12 .5 p.m ., and continued for three-quarters of an hour . The
fighters machine-gunned the area indiscriminately, nearly every hous e
being damaged, while the bombers flew over several times in formation ,
dropping bombs . The Guinea Airways hangars and six civil aircraft on th e
aerodrome were destroyed, but the field remained serviceable . The A .W .A .
office and the power house plant were destroyed, the hotel was strafed, an d
the Burns Philp store suffered bomb-blast .
About half an hour after the raid at his house in the town, th e
Administrator, so ill that he had had to be helped into a slit trench, sa w
Major Jenyns,2 the senior N .G .V .R . officer . "I suppose a state of emergenc y
exists," said Jenyns . "I suppose so, Jenyns," said McNicoll . "You ca n
take over ." Thus without any formalities so far as the Administrator wa s
concerned the civil administration of the Territory of New Guinea terminated, and control passed to the army .
That afternoon the Administration staff including the Assistant Government Secretary, Lonergan," the senior administration officer at Lae ,
E . Taylor,2 and the civilians went to a previously arranged rendezvou s
a Capt L . Pursehouse, AIF . Coastwatcher; Angau ; "M" Special Unit 1943-44 . Patrol officer ;
of Finschhafen, TNG ; b. Goulburn, NSW, 4 Nov 1912 . Killed in action 17 Jan 1944 .
e The Administrator remarked afterwards that it had been "difficult to suggest measures of
protection
. without causing the population to leave the town" . The slit trenches, however ,
proved their worth .
°Major E . W. Jenyns. (1st AIF : Lt 26 Bn .) NGVR and Angau . Gold miner and planter; of
Lae, TNG ; b. Beaudesert, Qld, 7 Sep 1893 .
1 Lt-Col S. A . Lonergan; Angau . Asst Government Secretary TPNG 1949-51, Govt Secretary 1951-55 ;
Director of Civil Affairs 1955-60. Public servant ; b. Hobart, 29 Mar 1899 .
z Lt-Col E . Taylor, MBE; Angau . Assistant Director of District Services and Native Affairs ; of
Lae, TNG ; b . Mt Morgan, Qld, 29 May 1888 .
690
CIVILIANS IN
WARTIME
PAPUA-NEW GUINE A
near Jacobsen's Plantation, about 3 miles out of Lae . At Lae, as elsewhere
on the mainland, food dumps had been established outside the town i n
anticipation of such an emergency .
No news of the events at Lae reached Port Moresby until the 24th
when a small transmitter taken from the Administrator's yacht was established at the hidden camp . The evacuation of the civilians was complicated
because the Markham was in flood at its highest level for years . Afte r
several days in camp Taylor decided to move the refugees to Nadzab .
Thence they were ferried by Moth aircraft to Wampit and led by Taylo r
on foot through Sunshine and Bulolo to Wau .
Fifteen, including some elderly civilians who did not join the mai n
group, remained at Lae until the evening of 23rd January when the y
were sent by launch to Salamaua, to walk thence to Wau .
At Salamaua, where the warning message from Finschhafen had no t
been received, the raiders, variously estimated at between 35 and 50, too k
the town by surprise . They bombed the airfield, destroyed one R .A .A .F.
Hudson and 10 or 12 civil aircraft on the ground, and machine-gunned
the town . Despite the intensity of the attack there was only one Australia n
casualty . Kevin Parer, a member of a well-known goldfields family, wa s
in his loaded aeroplane, its engine running, waiting to take off for Wau
when the Japanese came in on their first run . Hit in the base of the spine ,
Parer was killed instantly . Another pilot, who had just landed, was taxiin g
to the hangar when bullets ripped through his plane, setting it on fire . H e
flung himself out of the plane into the kunai grass .
As at Lae there was no opposition to the Japanese, who bombed fro m
about 8,000 feet then strafed at will . After the raid all business halted ,
and "everyone adjourned to the pub" to discuss the situation . A confusin g
picture faced them . They were out of touch with Wau and Bulolo, bu t
believed both those places had suffered severely ; they were also out of
touch with Lae where thick black smoke could be seen rising . Expectin g
further attacks on Salamaua, the civilian population withdrew on the night
of the 22nd to a previously prepared camp in the bush behind Kela .
Next day the police deserted the post at Salamaua and released the gao l
prisoners . Armed with confiscated firearms, the prisoners took to the bush ,
and began indiscriminately to shoot up the area round Salamaua . That day
the civilians picked up sufficient news on a small wireless set to make it
evident that Rabaul had been attacked . There was general agreement tha t
a Japanese landing at Salamaua was imminent and that all civilians shoul d
leave as soon as possible . Assuming that air traffic out of Wau had ceased ,
they decided that only two routes of escape were left to them : on foot
south to Port Moresby ; or by sea, down the coast, in the only two smal l
craft available or in canoes . Finally it was decided that R . Melrose, th e
Director of District Services and Native Affairs in the Administration ,
who was suffering from heart trouble, would take out the obviously unfi t
and Sister Stock,' from the Salamaua Hospital, by sea, while Penglase ,
+Kavieng,
Salamaua and elsewhere the administration nursing sisters were uniformly stoica l
Al
and courageous .
CIVILIANS
IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
69 1
District Officer in charge of the Morobe District, would lead the remainde r
towards the south coast. Both parties set out on 24th January . '
At Madang, on the 21st, four Japanese aircraft destroyed a copra stor e
and damaged other buildings . One R .A .A .F . Hudson was destroyed and
W. R . Carpenter's hangar damaged, but the airfield was usable . As else where the civil administration was interrupted and most of the civi l
population of the town (about 70 all told) gathered at a pre-arrange d
assembly point about two miles to the south . On the 22nd they set out
on foot along an evacuation route which took them in planned stage s
extending over about a fortnight to Kainantu in the Central Highlands .
There the fit men of military age were called up for service . The others
went on to Mount Hagen to await air transport to Australia .
The little gold-mining town of Bulolo was also attacked on the 21s t
by five fighters—part of the force first sighted by Pursehouse . They swep t
low up the valley, destroyed three Junkers on the ground at Bulolo, an d
then, turning east before they reached Wau, missed five aircraft on th e
Wau field which were later to prove invaluable during the evacuatio n
of civilians by air .
On 22nd January the Defence Committee ordered that all aircraft
capable of flying from New Guinea should do so, carrying as many civilians
as possible . The heaviest concentration was on the Morobe goldfield s
where 450 European men and over 100 Chinese awaited evacuation . Th e
War Cabinet, believing the concentration to comprise "450 females, 100
Chinese and children", on 24th January ordered that three civil aircraf t
from New Guinea, then in Queensland, should be used for the task .
On the 26th the War Cabinet learned that the pilots had refused t o
return to New Guinea . They were grounded and their licences cancelled .
The true figures of civilians at Morobe were also made available to Wa r
Cabinet . 5 The Director-General of Civil Aviation instructed Carpenter' s
to send a machine for the women and children .
On 29th January, Lonergan, the former Assistant Government Secretary ,
now with McNicoll at Port Moresby, reported that "all towns except Wau "
had been evacuated ; movement by air from Morobe was continuing bu t
"shortage of aircraft and engines and health troubles were causing delay" .
He and McNicoll left Port Moresby in the Macdhui for Cairns that day .
From then until early March Wau became the main evacuation centr e
for the goldfields population . Thither other civilians from distant parts
also made their way . Most of the Europeans and Asians who gathere d
there believed that little time remained for them to quit the threatene d
area . They were joined by the civilians from Lae, who came in on foo t
under the leadership of Taylor, and walkers from Salamaua, whom Penglas e
had diverted to Wau when he discovered that town still intact .
Meanwhile the Assistant District Officer at Wau, McMullen, 6 wh o
'Melrose's party reached Kokoda on 9th February, whence they were flown to Port Moresby .
The actual figures were 450 men, 100 Chinese women and children and three white women .
', Colonel K . C . McMullen . Angau ; Directorate of Research LHQ ; BBCAU. Asst District Officer ;
of Wau, TNG ; b . Sydney, 17 Nov 1904 .
692
CIVILIANS
IN WARTIME
PAPUA-NEW
GUINE A
had been requested by Canberra "to take control of all administrativ e
activities in New Guinea with which he was in contact"," aided b y
Assistant District Officer Niall,8 had succeeded in evacuating a numbe r
of civilians to Port Moresby, frequently in aircraft that would not normall y
have been considered airworthy.
On 1st February, however, Wau airfield was heavily attacked . Th e
airfield remained serviceable, but the risk of allowing in unescorted aircraft
was evident . McMullen, when reporting the bombing, asked whether it wa s
intended to continue to evacuate by aircraft . "Is any alternative unde r
consideration?" he asked . "Essential that some definite decision be mad e
in order to permit of organisation here . "
The R .A .A .F . was unable to supply fighters and temporarily halte d
the evacuation, stating that the Lockheeds which had been engaged in th e
operation would go to Australia on the 3rd and remain there .° About 15 0
Europeans and 95 Chinese were still awaiting evacuation . The Chines e
at Lae had refused to leave .
Taylor meanwhile had taken charge of a refugee camp set up at Edi e
Creek . The civilians themselves were willing to face almost any hardship s
to avoid capture . After expert local advice had been obtained, it wa s
decided that a party should be sent out to blaze a track to Bulldog and
build camps between there and Wau . It was planned that parties of
carriers, each under an administration official, should begin leaving Wa u
daily to build up stocks of food at the camps . Port Moresby was asked to
arrange the provision of food at the mouth of the Lakekamu and se a
transport thence to Port Moresby for 250 people from 25th February .
The staging camps were established but the plan to stock them with foo d
was not realised .' Consequently the refugees carried their own rations ,
supplementing them from a dump at Kudjeru .
Penglase and a surveyor, Ecclestone, 2 led out one party to Bulldog.
Taylor took out about 60 Europeans and Chinese on 7th March . 3 In thi s
fashion the refugees at length reached Port Moresby .
Even more arduous marches confronted civilians seeking safety from th e
Sepik area . Many of these were from Wewak, administrative centre of th e
Sepik District, which stretched from the Dutch border eastward along th e
coast and then south almost to the Papuan border . Between the coast
and the Sepik River ran the rugged Bewani and Torricelli Mountains .
South of the river lay almost unknown country shut in by great range s
'A liaison officer between the New Guinea and Papuan administrations at Port Moresby wa s
also appointed at that time—a step that seems to have been long overdue .
"Major Hon H . L. R. Niall, CBE. Angau . District Commissioner, Morobe, TPNG 1950-64 ; Speaker,
House of Assembly 1964-68 . Asst District Officer ; of Wau, TNG ; b . Coolah, NSW, 14 Oct 1904 .
'McMullen continued to seek aircraft, but unavailingly.
'There had been some 10,000 to 12,000 natives on the goldfields when the goldfields life-line—th e
airways—ceased operations . Of the natives about half were from areas to which they coul d
walk home . They were given rations and sent on their way . About 4,000 to 5,000 "foreign "
natives remained. Many "went bush" after the first air raids, but gradually they were rounde d
up until their numbers reached about 2,500, a force of fit and loyal labourers upon who m
the army was for a time completely dependent .
•Capt J . W . Ecclestone . Angau ; RAE (Forestry) 194445 . Surveyor ; of Lae, TNG ; b. Carlsruhe ,
Vic, 15 Apr 1898.
"Next day the Japanese landed at Lae and Salamaua .
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
69 3
running from east to west . The Sepik River people were head-hunters an d
likely to prove dangerous . District Officer Jones, 4 who was in charge of
the district, at the beginning of January had worked out an overland escap e
route by way of the Sepik and the Karawari (a tributary of the Sepik) ,
and thence to the Strickland River and Daru on the south coast of Papua .
After hearing of the air raids of 21st January, most of the 30 to 4 0
European settlers in the district assembled in the camps which Jones was
stocking up on the Karawari, and awaited further instructions abou t
evacuation . By mid-February they had become restless and began to leav e
the Karawari for Angoram, an Administration post about 60 miles upstrea m
from the mouth of the Sepik . On the 19th Jones sent the Administration
launch Thetis and four schooners to Madang, to assist in evacuating survivors from Rabaul and building up supplies along the route to the Ram u
River . Jones meanwhile had informed the people at Angoram that he woul d
remain at Wewak and that there and elsewhere in the district th e
Administration staff would remain on duty .
At this stage the Assistant District Officer at Angoram began to behav e
strangely and Jones, on 10th March, ordered J . L . Taylors to take over
the post. The Angoram officer refused to hand over his station ; he arme d
about 40 native police and on the 20th, after a three-hour battle during
which Taylor was severely wounded, drove all the Europeans fro m
Angoram .
Jones (from Wewak) with a small band of seven other Europea n
volunteers and seven natives, advanced on the station on the 23rd bu t
found that the Assistant District Officer had killed himself and his polic e
had fled. Next day Jones departed for Wewak leaving Assistant District
Officer Bates° in charge at Angoram . Soon Bates received news that som e
of the rebel police had killed Patrol Officer R . Strudwick on his way from
the Karawari to Angoram . Later the rebels also killed three Europea n
miners, two Chinese and many natives and caused disorder among th e
natives generally until they themselves were finally killed or apprehended .
By this time practically all the European residents, except the Administra tion staff, had departed . Jones had sent about 12 off in the schoone r
Nereus with instructions to land at Bogadjim and thence make their wa y
overland to safety . J . H . Thurston, a goldfields pioneer, took a party u p
the May River as far as they could travel by water . Thence, at the end
of April, eight Europeans and 82 natives set out through the mountains ,
arriving safely at Daru on 21st September .
Jones and his men were kept busy maintaining their administration ,
subduing the rebellious police and restoring order among the native s
generally . On 19th May, hearing that the Japanese had occupied Hollandia ,
the capital of Dutch New Guinea, Jones decided to go there and discove r
for himself what was happening . He left Wewak on the 25th with thirtee n
• Lt-Col J . H. Jones . (1st AIF : Sgt 2 Fd Amb.) Angau . District Officer ; of Sepik River District;
b . Liverpool, England, 7 May 1897.
• Major J . L. Taylor. Angau . Ass( District Officer ; b . Sydney, 25 Jan 1901 .
• Major C . D. Bates, MC. Angau . Asst District Officer ; of Rabaul, TNG ; tr. Uitenhage, South
Africa, 4 Aug 1907. Died 1 Jan 1954 .
694
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME
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men in a small motor vessel . From the border he sent scouts forwar d
and they reported that the Japanese had been at Hollandia but ha d
gone again . Jones and his men thereupon sailed into Hollandia harbou r
on the afternoon of the 28th, set up a flagpole on the jetty and hoisted
the Australian Blue Ensign . A Javanese medical officer told them tha t
the Japanese had arrived at Hollandia on the 6th ; after landing about 200
marines, who raided the Government stores, they left, taking with the m
the Dutch Controleur, his wife and child and a Dutch priest . The Japanes e
had said they would return in three weeks . The Australians lowere d
their flag at 6 p .m . and sailed at 7 p .m ., narrowly escaping capture by a
Japanese destroyer on their way back to Wewak .
The effect on the natives of the collapse of the administration i s
illustrated in a report by Penglase, who went to take charge of th e
Madang District the same month .
Natives found themselves in circumstances to which they were not accustomed
(he wrote) . Overnight the Government, with its benevolent policy in which the y
had the greatest confidence and respect, no longer functioned . Roads, gardens and
villages were neglected, and some natives, hitherto residing in villages near Madang ,
evacuated and moved to safer locations in the bush, Vast numbers were passin g
through the district from Morobe and other places of employment, whilst others
were travelling to the Markham, Finschhafen and Waria, spreading the mos t
impossible rumours . Japanese bombs had struck fear into their very hearts an d
they were bewildered and apprehensive about the future . In addition the town ha d
been looted, plantations were deserted and practically every unprotected home ha d
been ransacked . In this connection it can be said that not only the natives wer e
responsible . The District Office had been demolished, all records destroyed and th e
safe blown open and robbed of its entire contents of value . Missionaries, however ,
had remained at their respective stations and were exercising their influence in a n
endeavour to maintain control of the natives, and members of the New Guine a
Volunteer Rifles also did good work in this respect . . . . The only [Administration ]
officers remaining in the district on the 24th May were Lieutenant J . R . Black .;
at Bogia, who had not received any instructions and decided to remain at hi s
post, and Lieutenant R . H . Boyar' s who was actively engaged assisting in the
evacuation of troops from New Britain »
The handful of Administration officers had not been helped in thei r
attempts to evacuate the north coast country by the uneasy situatio n
which was developing at Port Moresby between the headquarters of th e
Papuan Administration and Headquarters 8th Military District, as the arm y
headquarters in Papua-New Guinea was known .
Port Moresby occupied the saddle and slopes of a promontory which
ended in Paga Point, where fixed defences of two 6-inch guns had bee n
installed . The advent of about 1,250 troops in 1941 had almost double d
the population of the territory and greatly taxed essential services in th e
little town . The people of Papua had shown a similar eagerness to bac k
the war effort as their Australian counterparts . A local Red Cross comfort s
fund had sent £1,000 to London, subscriptions to a War Fund opene d
Lt-Col J . R . Black. Angau and BBCAU . Asst District Officer ; of Bogia, TNG; b . Adelaide ,
12 May 1908 .
e Cap( R. H. Bnyan ; Angau . Patrol officer; of Aitape, NO; b. Sydney, 10 Jun 1913 .
This extract appears also in McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area—First Year, pp. 49-50 .
CIVILIANS
IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
69 5
in June 1940 amounted to £5,750 and had been sent as an unconditiona l
gift to the Commonwealth Treasury . Sixty men had enlisted in the A .I .F .
-26 from the Administrative service .
The Administrator of Papua on the outbreak of the Japanese War wa s
Hubert Leonard Murray,' who had been appointed for a term of fiv e
years from 16th December 1940 . Though his tenure of office was thu s
less than a year old, he was a nephew of the former Lieut-Governor ,
Sir Hubert Murray, whose private secretary he had been for the 24 year s
before he became Administrator. Under the Papua Act 1905-1940, th e
Administrator was appointed by the Governor-General by commissio n
under the Seal of the Commonwealth to hold office during the pleasure o f
the Governor-General, and charged with the duty of administering th e
government of the territory on behalf of the Commonwealth s
The military commander of the 8th Military District was Brigadie r
B . M . Morris, whose headquarters had been established at Port Moresb y
in May 1941 . He was a plain-spoken artilleryman, gifted with common sense and fully aware of the increasing importance of his command, a n
outcome of which was his promotion to major-general on 1st January .
There was no evidence of strain between Administrator and Commandan t
before Japan's entry into the war, and their cordial relations continue d
for some time afterwards . Military measures and civil requirements kep t
in step, each being instituted with proper regard for precedent and protocol .
One of the first steps taken was the internment on 8th December of al l
Japanese . That day also the Administrator took up the question of the
evacuation of the European women and children with the naval officer i n
charge at Port Moresby, and on the 10th with the Department of Externa l
Territories . The first and major evacuation took place in H .M .A .T .
Katoomba on 20th December and substantially the whole of the under taking had been completed without noticeable hitch by 29th December— a
considerable achievement .
From 12th December the army had begun gradually to encroach o n
civilian accommodation and offices . That day the Department of Land s
Section was taken over for a composite battalion headquarters and 70 troop s
were moved into the Port Moresby Institute Hall . On the 14th th e
Roman Catholic school was taken over to house pay, records, stationer y
and other army sections . For some time the acquisition of the Port Moresb y
sports ground had been under discussion . Now the Administrator took th e
sensible view that altered circumstances justified his acceding to arm y
requirements . The construction of public air raid shelters was begun, an d
the digging of private shelters encouraged .
On the 19th the Administrator learned from the Department of
Official Secretary to the Lieut-Governor of Papua 1916-40 ;
I Hon H. L . Murray, CBE. Private; and
attached Allied Geographical Section GHQ SWPA 1942-45 .
Administrator of Papua 1940-42
B . Sydney, 13 Dec 1886 . Died 10 Dec 1963 .
'The circumstances relating to the suspension of the Civil Administration of the Territory o f
Papua in February 1942 were closely examined by a Commission of Inquiry to which Joh n
Vincent Barry, K .C ., was appointed Commissioner . The inquiry, opened at Melbourne on 1s t
December 1944, took evidence over 18 days and examined 40 witnesses . The evidence and
exhibits covered 702 pages of transcript . Inevitably much of the facts and opinions set out i n
the following brief account are based on the Commissioner's findings .
696
CIVILIANS
IN
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GUINE A
External Territories that a proposal to use the Papuan and New Guine a
Constabulary as an armed force would not be proceeded with . The Department of the Army advised the Commandant direct tha t
it is not proposed to use Royal Papuan Constabulary as armed force—could usefull y
be employed civil guards as part of normal function—inform administration Papua .
There were conferences on the 21st and 23rd December between th e
Administrator and the Commandant about liaison between the two
authorities and the quartering of defence personnel .
On the 23rd the Administrator wrote to the Department of Externa l
Territories regarding the powers vested in the Commandant under th e
Defence Quartering Order, and the probable use of such powers . 3 Th e
apprehensions expressed by the Administrator later proved unfounded but ,
in the opinion of the Commissioner, the matters raised revealed "a laten t
resistance on the part of the Administrator which arose . . . from his fea r
that the military were increasingly encroaching on his authority" . Yet th e
Administrator's memorandum to his department clearly recognised th e
compelling needs of the military .
On 3rd January the liner Aquitania arrived with about 3,700 "young
and untrained troops" . 4 Almost overnight the garrison's strength jumpe d
to about 5,500 . Civilians were outnumbered by nearly 15 to 1 . The military
police who accompanied the newly-arrived troops were insufficient an d
described as "worthless in the performance of their duties" . Their officers
were "inexperienced" . The ships' cargoes were stowed in such a way tha t
camp equipment was at the bottom of the holds . Thus when the troops
were disembarked there were no facilities to enable them to be properl y
fed and encamped . These conditions contributed to disorderly and undisciplined conduct . The troops made use of the town's available amenities ,
crowded shops and cafes, thronged the local picture theatre and dran k
the civilians' beer—greatly increasing tension. The sanitation of the camps ,
due to lack of sanitary pans, was for a time unsatisfactory, and led t o
complaints to the Department of External Territories from the Administrator . 5 On the 13th the Administrator asked his department to arrange
with the army for instructions to be sent to the heads of the respectiv e
services at Port Moresby that he should be kept fully informed of al l
developments that might affect the territory . He pointed out that hi s
liaison officer rarely saw the Commandant, who supplied no informatio n
that could not have been obtained from current wireless broadcasts .
These complaints, of a minor character in themselves, are symptomati c
. His letter was described by the Commissioner as "a secret memorandum of complaint" ; th e
"would have been better if, at this stage, the Administrator ha d
Commissioner
that it wtih
discussed fullyadded
and frankly
the Commandant the matters raised in that memorandum" ,
and that "such a course might have cleared the air to the advantage of all concerned" .
The Administrator
said
afterwards
that the memorandum was "secret" only because it related
to defence matters. He had not sought to conceal from the Commandant the protests an d
complaints he had been receiving about military quartering, but in fact had written to hi m
about them. (Letter from Administrator to Minister for External Territories, dated 12 June 1945 . )
1 Barry Report, p . 4 . The Commissioner added that the troops were of an "average age of 18 1
their average ag e
years", but an analysis of the records of over 3,000 men in the convoy8shows
to have been 23-25 years, and the average length of their
training .3 months . The average
age of the infantry officers in the convoy was much higher . (War Cabinet Agendum 299/1945 . )
'The use of deep trench latrines in the field later became practically universal .
CIVILIANS
IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
69 7
of the predicament in which the Administrator found himself . The civilians
looked to him to obtain redress for the increasing (and necessary) encroachments of the military at a time when events were rapidly reducing th e
Administrator's powers . A less conscientious man might have surrendere d
more readily to the tide of circumstance enveloping him .
On 23rd January a false air raid alarm was sounded . The natives ,
already agitated by the departure of the European women and children ,
became panic stricken and fled to the bush . Although many returned t o
the town later, it was evident, as the Administrator pointed out, that "fear
of the unknown" had taken hold ; few expected the natives to remai n
when air raids began . As all labour at Port Moresby was performed by
natives their departure would result in the collapse of the civil way of life ,
and the end of the effective functioning of the civil administration . By
arrangement with the Administrator the army took over control of th e
power house and telephone exchange . The local newspaper ceased publication . Few functions of a municipal character then remained for the civi l
administration to perform at Port Moresby .
Meanwhile, on 16th January, as a result of the representations made fro m
Rabaul about the evacuation of unessential civilians, the Chiefs of Staf
f
had issued their general recommendation that the civil administration shoul d
be maintained as long as possible and deprecating the withdrawal o f
administration officers so long as there was work for them to do .
Although obviously of general application this recommendation wa s
not communicated to the Administrator of Papua . It has been remarke d
earlier how little contact there was between the two administrations ,
although supervised by the same department in Canberra. It seems possibl e
that the functions of the newly-created department were similarly separate ,
or at least not functioning smoothly at this time . °
On the 23rd the Administrator and the Commandant had also discusse d
the question of the evacuation of civilians from Samarai, which the O .C .
there had recommended . The Administrator telegraphed the Government
next day asking whether consideration was being given to the evacuatio n
of civilians and the continuance of industry generally, and adding tha t
all Port Moresby service heads considered that removal to Australia o f
all civilians was desirable . On the 25th a reply was being drafted by th e
Department of External Territories embodying the views of the Chiefs
of Staff as mentioned above, when the War Cabinet decided that all ablebodied white males in Papua and New Guinea should be called up ?
The Administrator and the Commandant each learnt in separate message s
of this decision next day . Neither telegram mentioned exemptions, but i n
a later message of the 26th (received on the 27th) the Commandant' s
9 "The Department of External Territories was not created until June 1941 ; previously the wor k
proper to such a Department had been entrusted to a section which over the years found itsel f
attached to various Departments, usually under an Assistant Minister . At the relevant perio d
although there was a Minister for External Territories and the separate Department had bee n
established, the Secretaryship was held by the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Departmen t
and many of the facilities of this latter Department had still to be used by the new Departmen t
of External Territories ." Barry report, p . 51 .
*The proclamation calling up Classes I to IV under the Defence Act did not appear in the
Commonwealth Gazette until 11th February 1942 .
698
CIVILIANS
IN
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PAPUA-NEW
GUINE A
attention was drawn to Section 61 of the Defence Act and the essential
service exemptions under National Service Regulations .
Meanwhile, on the 26th, the Administrator had dispatched a telegram t o
his department stating that he "presumed the necessary call-up proclamatio n
would be issued by the Governor-General immediately, and that thi s
would mean the closing down of all industry and the end of civil
administration" . The message though silent on a matter of first importanc e
—native affairs—was significant as demonstrating that before the call-u p
actually took place the Administrator had accepted the fact that hi s
Administration was to come to an end . He sought the Governor-General' s
pleasure in regard to himself and members of the Executive Counci l
holding Governor-General's Commissions .
General Morris issued a call-up notice on the morning of 27th Januar y
requesting all male inhabitants between 18 and 45 years of age to repor t
for enrolment that afternoon . The call-up inevitably resulted in the closin g
of the commercial houses, and signified the end of the civil administratio n
and the substitution of the military as the supreme authority—in fac t
if not in law . The Administrator, however, still continued to receiv e
instructions that the civil administration, banks, works department an d
other civic services were to be maintained .° So too did Morris, who chos e
to disregard them .
The Administrator's message of the 26th, referred by the Departmen t
of Defence Coordination to the Department of the Army, resulted in th e
army signalling the Commandant direct on the 27th, stating that they ha d
sighted the Administrator's message of the 26th and that it was no t
intended that the call-up of able-bodied men should mean the end of al l
industry and administration or that the army should take over all essentia l
services . Two voices were calling out confused instructions . The call-u p
had taken place in accordance with the unequivocal message from Arm y
Headquarters of the 25th and the War Cabinet decision that "all able bodied white males in Papua and New Guinea who are British subject s
should be called up for military service" . a But General Morris, in order
to obey the latest direction, would be required to discharge a goodly
number, if not a majority, of those already enlisted .
Morris was afterwards criticised on two counts : for acting with "undue
precipitancy" over the call-up ; and on the grounds that the call-up ha d
been taken deliberately to close up civilian businesses and bring an end t o
the civil administration . The call-up was in obedience to a direction fro m
The confusion that reigned at Port Moresby is illustrated by a message from the Work s
Director, Moresby, dated 28th January, addressed to the Interior and to the Director-Genera l
of Works, stating that subject to a ten days exemption "to enable completion of essential portion s
of both day labour and contract works" the Interior officers and workmen were expected t o
go into the army; the men of all other contractors had already been called up . Bankin g
facilities "being suspended today and this office unable to pay local accounts and wages a t
Moresby" . On 29th January the Savings Bank of Sydney asked that ledgers and other vita l
records should be forwarded to Sydney at the first opportunity . The Bank of New South Wales
sought advice about closing on the 3rd and continued until the 5th .
In accordance with Morris's belief that "a stage had been reached when everyone shoul d
have been in the Army
. at any moment any white individual here, whatever his occupatio n
or vocation might have to drop his pen and pick up a rifle", all Government officers were calle d
up . The liaison officer between the two administrations went in on the 26th but was release d
shortly afterwards.
• Message 64384; War Cabinet Minute .
CIVILIANS IN
WARTIME
PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
69 9
Army Headquarters at a time of emergency, and was obeyed with prope r
celerity . As to the second criticism Morris declared in evidence : "I can
give you my assurance that no such thought entered my head ." 1 There wa s
the usual criticism of the manner of the call-up . Medical examination s
were carried out "in disregard of decency" ; there was "an unnecessar y
show of military authority"—in fact the indignities common to every call-up ,
of which all become painfully aware during the awkward period o f
transition from sheltered civilian to soldier .
Moves and countermoves as between the Department of the Army i n
Melbourne and the Department of External Territories in Canberra, resulting in messages sent to the Commandant and to the Administrator in th e
following days in an endeavour to rescind the obviously inevitable con sequences of the general call-up, are insignificant except to demonstrat e
muddled thinking and lack of realism on the part of the department s
concerned .
On the 28th the Department of External Territories in reply to th e
Administrator's message of the 26th notified him that it was not intende d
that the army should take over essential services, that the Commandan t
had been so informed and that men required for essential services wer e
exempt from military service unless required in their trade capacity . Th e
Administrator was also informed that the civil administration should b e
maintained for as long as necessary and possible . This message wa s
received by the Administrator on the morning of the 29th . That day th e
Commandant signalled Army Headquarters requesting that unwante d
European males in Papua should be evacuated . The Commandant reporte d
that there might be embarrassment as the Administrator had declare d
that he had been supplied with this authority . 2 It was probable that a
ship would leave that night . After consulting the Minister for the Army a
reply was sent to the Commandant that day . It said :
All European males unfit or overage or not required for military or essentia l
services may be evacuated immediately . Administrator being advised by Externa l
Territories Department . ]
After consultation with the Department of the Army, the Assistant Secretar y
of the Department of External Territories, Mr Halligan,' on the 30th sen t
a message to the Administrator varying the advice on the evacuation o f
unessential civilians so that their evacuation became permissible rathe r
than compulsory, and endeavouring to clarify the Administrator's role a t
Port Moresby . Received by the Administrator on the 31st, it read in part :
All European males unfit or overage or not required for military or essentia l
service may be permitted to proceed from Territory . . . . Army state . . . that Com ' Transcript, pp . 501-2 .
No attempt appears to have been made to sort out the functions of the civil and military authorities in the Territories or indeed to decide whether they should remain together in time of war .
Message 4884 of 29 Jan . The Commandant was in the happy position of receiving immediat e
response to messages sent to Melbourne, whereas advice to the Administrator frequently traile d
by two or three days .
1I . R . Halligan, OBE . Secretary Dept of External Territories 1944-51 ; Senior Commissioner ,
South Pacific Commission 1948-59 . Public servant ; of Canberra ; b . East Melbourne, 8 Nov 1894 .
Died 21 Nov 1968 .
700
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINE A
mandant has again been informed that the call up of males is to be on the sam e
basis as in Australia, i .e. essential civilian activities to proceed in normal way an d
personnel required for such services to be exempted from military service. Have bee n
informed that Banks and Works Dept have ceased functioning owing to staff having
been called up for military service ; this is not intended and it has been made clea r
to Commandant by Army that exemptions from military service should be granted
to enable Administration and other civic activities to function . Suggest you discuss
with Commandant to clarify position and then advise whether position clear . 5
This message substantially altered the Administrator's conception of hi s
role . Hitherto he had been passively resigned to the gradual takeover o f
control by the Commandant . A natural assumption now was that Morri s
had acted with undue precipitancy ; it was within his (the Administrator's )
power to correct matters . After receipt of the message he instructed th e
Crown Law Officer, Mr Bi g nold,° to take steps to obtain the release o f
24 men required by the commercial houses to enable them to resum e
business .
That day Morris had signalled Army Headquarters that in conferenc e
with the Administrator and the Department of the Interior nominal roll s
of all essential personnel had been prepared,' but to avoid complication s
in an emergency (i .e . invasion) such personnel had been enlisted subjec t
to medical fitness and age and granted leave without pay whilst engage d
on essential duties—a sensible precaution and in the interests of the me n
themselves. He reported that of 307 civilians called-up, 79 marched int o
camp, 61 were medically unfit, 156 were granted leave without pay a s
being engaged on essential service and 11 granted exemptions unde r
Section 61 of the Defence Act . He considered the position "entirely satisfactory" . When Bignold at length reached him with the Administrator' s
request that a further 24 of the 79 marched into camp be released t o
enable the commercial houses to resume normal business, Morris with goo d
reason refused to agree .
At this stage civilian stores had pooled their businesses and arrange d
that one should remain open for business for a limited period each day o n
a cash basis, making no deliveries . Food depots had been establishe d
outside the town . The freezing plant continued to function, but the hotel
had already ceased to serve liquor . Soon it would close altogether and a
principal source of meals for the remaining civilians would disappear .
Next day an interview took place between the Administrator and th e
Commandant, attended by the Crown Law Officer, Morris's senior administrative officer, Lieut-Colonel E . B . Serisier, and the Commandant's A .D .C .
The Administrator expressed regret that the only time that the Commandant and he had not been in complete harmony was when the
. Radio message No. 28 . The words italicised were corrupted in transmission and rendere d
. Mr Halligan said afterwards that the word "civic" though correctly transmitte d
indecipherable
was intended to read "civil" .
The Commissioner commented that "expressions such as 'essential services' and 'civic activities'
may have an ascertainable meaning in Australia, but they were ambiguous phrases of obscure
application to conditions in Papua and Port Moresby" .
4 E . B . Bignold . Crown Law Officer, Papuan Administration 1928-42 ; served RAAF ; Judge ,
Supreme Court of TPNG 1948-62 . B . Kirribilli, NSW, 27 Apr 1900 .
'The Administrator was unable to remember these rolls being prepared, but the 8 MD War Diar y
entry of 31st January 1942 suggests that they were .
CIVILIANS
IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
70 1
general's instructions from the army clashed with those from the Prim e
Minister's Department to himself . "Unfortunately," he declared, "that i s
the present position in regard to the continuance of business here . I a m
directed to carry on normal civic activities and administration whereas th e
General disagrees ." 8
The Commandant said that "the time had come for instructions fro m
Canberra to be disregarded, that the Administrator and he could surel y
run this little place without outside interference" . The Administrator
declared that this he absolutely refused to do . He was bound by his
commission and instructions and so long as he continued to function h e
could not depart from them. "You sir," he said to the Commandant ,
"would not disregard army instructions as a soldier ." "That is rather
different," replied Morris .
It seems likely that the Administrator read into General Morris's remark s
more than was intended . Both the Administrator and the Commandan t
were greatly handicapped by the necessity to refer to authorities on th e
mainland, "who had no clear understanding of the local situation an d
were content to give instructions in general terms without condescendin g
to particulars" . 9 In the course of the interview the Administrator agai n
pressed for the release of more men for carrying on commerce . Again
the Commandant refused . The Administrator said that the refusal lef t
him with no alternative but to report, if the businesses did not open, tha t
it was due to the Commandant's unwillingness to comply with the directio n
to the Administrator shown by him to the general . The Commandant
agreed that was so .
The Commissioner did not consider that the Commandant was extendin g
an invitation to the Administrator to disregard his oath of office, only tha t
the time had come for the affairs of Port Moresby to be dealt with b y
the responsible persons on the spot .' Properly interpreted it amounte d
to an invitation by the Commandant to the Administrator to concur wit h
him in the view that the instruction which the Administrator had receive d
from the Department of External Territories that civil activities were to b e
resumed was unrealistic and one which, in the circumstances, could no t
and ought not to be carried out .
The sanity of the military viewpoint was soon demonstrated . On 3r d
February Port Moresby was attacked for the first time . About six aircraft ,
four of them in arrowhead formation, with one in the lead and on e
bringing up the rear bombed from an altitude of about 8,000 feet betwee n
s A record of the interview was made at the time by the Crown Law Officer, and subsequentl ye
tendered as evidence before the Commission of Inquiry . "The whole conversation," recorded th
Crown Law Officer, "was upon a very dignified and restrained level and with the utmost courtesy .
The only time there was any departure was when the general put his head down and said Bah ,
these stores,' when the question of normal business requirements was under discussion . "
Barry Report, p. 15 . Murray said afterwards that so long as he held office and civil law ran i n
Papua, he could not avoid his duty to uphold its main features and to administer in accordanc e
with his oath of office . He had no precedent to guide him or any instructions from Canberr a
to assist him .
' After the interview the Administrator advised his Minister, Senator Fraser, who was als o
Assistant Minister for the Army, of General Morris's proposals . He received no release fro m
his legal obligations, and in fact no reply at all . He was convinced, he added, that as soon as h e
"faulted" himself "by acting illegally, it would have been said Murray is acting illegally, h e
has panicked and lost his head' or words to that effect" .
702
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME
PAPUA-NEW GUINE A
3 .10 and 3 .40 a .m . in clear moonlight . At least 21 bombs were droppe d
in the Ea Beach, Kela and Seven Mile areas . The ground defences remaine d
silent ; minor damage was suffered to some civilian premises and on e
serviceman was killed and two were wounded . 2
A second raid occurred about the same time on 5th February, th e
leading plane approaching from the south over Paga Point . It made a
reconnaissance run over the town, R .A .A .F . hangar and Konedobu, circle d
twice over the harbour in a west to south direction, and then about 3 .3 5
led in two flights each of three planes in stepped-down echelon formation .
When they passed over Paga Point the leading plane emitted two re d
flares which curved slowly to earth under an overcast sky as the tw o
formations broke into a straight line for their bombing run . Twenty-on e
bombs were dropped ; nine fell harmlessly in the water, but four fell on
the town near the harbour, another four on land at Konedobu, and fou r
around the western end of Ea Beach . There were no casualties, but a
number of buildings were destroyed, including Burns Philp's offices an d
their retail and bulk stores, the post office and army offices and quarters .
Civilian dwellings on Ela Beach, Paga Hill and Douglas Street were als o
demolished . 7 here were no casualties, and once again no response fro m
the ground . Next day about ten craters were also found at the Boman a
gaol gardens .
The pattern of events at Rabaul had by now been well established . A t
Port Moresby there was an almost universal belief that the bombings wer e
a prelude to invasion . Natives fled inland after the first raid and coasta l
shipping was immobilised through lack of crews . Many of the 300 stron g
Royal Papuan Constabulary deserted but about 70 remained at their posts ;
some native prisoners were either released or escaped from Bomana Prison .
Some thieving and lawlessness had become apparent before the air
raids, but after the second raid had damaged stores and given them a
derelict appearance looting became widespread .
Crowds of soldiers looted homes and shops, both day and night, using trucks (sai d
a former A .D .O . later) . 3 There was only one civilian policeman, and no arm y
picquets or sentries were put on town . Captain Fitch of the Steamship Tradin g
Company caught an officer walking off with his golf clubs from the shipping com pany's offices . They took refrigerators and wireless sets . Damage was done by me n
throwing silks, etc . about and breaking bottles . The bulk store of liquor was loote d
and taken into the bush . There was no wild revelry in town ; it took place out i n
the bush . It was safe to enter town in early part of night . All this time Government
officials came into their offices during daytime under Murray . But he gave no lead .
Officials just sat around waiting .
The Commandant was hampered by the poor quality of his militar y
police and by the general conviction that the stores in the forthcomin g
invasion would either be destroyed by air attack or bombardment or fal l
into enemy hands . The contents were therefore stripped of much of th e
sanctity which applies to private property in peacetime .
"Between 3rd February 1942 and 20th September 1943, when the last raid was made, th e
Japanese carried out 113 air attacks on Port Moresby .
"Captain F . P. Brewer, of Angau, in an interview .
CIVILIANS
IN WARTIME
PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
70 3
Meanwhile on 4th February the Administrator had received a lon g
personal telegram from Mr Halligan, who from many years of experienc e
had become a kind of father-confessor to senior officials in the territories ?
The telegram sought his personal views and recommendations on whethe r
the time had arrived for the functions of the administration to be suspende d
or transferred to the army . The Administrator summoned the Executive
Council and other officers to a meeting . There was no longer room fo r
doubt . Their unanimous decision that it was "neither necessary nor possibl e
to maintain the administration" was communicated to the Department of
External Territories in Canberra that day .
Other informed people, including members of the New Guinea Service ,
who had now arrived in Australia, supported the Administrator's recommendation, and on the 6th the Administrator was advised that th e
Government had authorised temporary cessation of civil administratio n
in Papua. The Army would take over complete control . Advice woul d
follow about any legal action necessary in connection with the relinquishment of civil service duties of the Administrator and other officers . The
agendum which the War Cabinet had before it when reaching its decisio n
that the Army should take over had been drafted by the Chiefs of Staff .
The local knowledge it contained, however, plainly revealed that General
Morris had had his say.
Civil administration in Australian Territories are unacquainted with the rigour s
of war, and are unprepared to take responsibility for initiating action demanded by
necessities of war unless they are fully covered by precise documentary authorisatio n
from Canberra to take specific action . It is physically impossible for anyone at
Canberra to foresee the very many important problems that must arise in Moresb y
and give the Administrator the "cover" that he obviously desires . The delay i n
referring to Canberra these many matters (no doubt of major importance in peace )
that become matters of ordinary concern in war, may make all the difference betwee n
success and failure of the defence of Moresby .
It is abundantly clear that the time has now arisen when complete control mus t
be taken over in Moresby by the senior officer of the fighting services stationed
there, viz, Major-General Morris . The civil administration should continue to functio n
under the general direction of Morris and assist him in every way possible . Any
other control is likely to hinder arrangements for the defence of Moresby . °
The Administrator had evidently reached the conclusion that the cessatio n
of the civil administration would mean his withdrawal from the territory .
On the 4th he had telegraphed the department that "if withdrawal
administration approved grateful you assist providing transport" . On the
6th he sent a further telegram requesting that Army Headquarters instruct
the Commandant that Bignold and other officers should accompany him
when the administration was withdrawn . On the 9th he received a reply
dated 7th February from the Department of External Territories .
Regulations are being prepared (the message said) to give effect to the decisio n
for a temporary cessation of civil government of Papua . Regulations will take the
e Halligan had been associated with the administration of New Guinea since 1922, and had been
in charge of the Territories Branch of the Prime Minister's Department from 1941 . When th e
Department of External Territories was created in June, Halligan was appointed Assistan t
Secretary, the titular head of the Department being the Secretary, Prime Minister's Department .
R War Cabinet Agendum No . R2 . 5 Feb 1942.
704
CIVILIANS IN WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINE A
form of National Security Territories Emergency Regulations and will vest in th e
Commandant 8th Military District power to give any directions or orders necessary
to existing circumstances even though such directions or orders inconsistent wit h
existing laws of the Territory . This does not mean that you and other officers o f
Administration have been instructed to leave your appointments and withdraw fro m
the Territory . The effect of the Regulation will be that the Commandant wil l
have supreme control of all Territory affairs and that all persons in the Territor y
including yourself and officers of Administration and members of Executive an d
Legislative Council are subject to the directions of the Commandant . Whether you
or any officer of the Administration will be required to perform duties in the
Territory as directed by the Commandant or whether you may leave the Territor y
will be matters for the decision of the Commandant . Please show this to an d
confer with Commandant on above basis and advise results .
The Administrator regarded the terms of this telegram as "extremely
humiliating" . He considered that it ill-befitted the status of the representative of the Crown in Papua that a military authority in the territory shoul d
be empowered to order the immediate departure of the civil administration or to compel officers of the administration to do anything else h e
thought fit . He felt also that the text of the telegram implied that th e
members of the civil administration were straining to escape from th e
territory and their responsibilities .
The Administrator was in an unhappy position, made the worse b y
his conscientious attempts to obey unrealistic and imprecise instruction s
from Canberra . He was the senior representative of the Government i n
the Territory and in more leisured circumstances a more formal method
of terminating his appointment would undoubtedly have been employed .
The telegram was prepared under the pressure of urgent and unprecedente d
events and its terms may have seemed ill-chosen . It is most unlikely ,
however, that any reflection on the Administrator's courage or that o f
his senior officers was intended .
The Administrator saw the Commandant as directed and learnt tha t
he desired the Administrator, the Judge and members of the Executiv e
and Legislative Councils to leave the territory . Morris was prepared to
assume control at once . All men over 45 would be compulsorily evacuated .
The Administrator telegraphed his department to this effect on th e
10th and requested instructions . On the 12th February National Securit y
(Emergency Control) Regulations were notified in the Commonwealth
Gazette providing that for the purpose of meeting any emergency arisin g
out of the war the Minister for the Army could declare that the regulations should apply to any part of Australia as from a date specified in a
notice published in the Gazette . Regulation 5 provided that
The Senior officer of the military forces for the time being exercising any comman d
in any part of Australia to which these Regulations apply . . . may do or may cause
or direct to be done any act or thing which he thinks necessary for the purpos e
of meeting any emergency arising in that part out of the war or for the purpos e
of providing for the defence of that part .
Regulation 6 required all persons to comply with the Senior Officer' s
direction . These regulations were applied to the Territory of Papua by
CIVILIANS IN
notice published in the
WARTIME
PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
Commonwealth Gazette
70 5
on 12th February. Tha t
day the Commandant instructed the Administrator that under powers
derived from these regulations he required the Administrator, the members
of the Councils and the Judge to leave for Australia at the earliest oppor tunity . The Administrator, still seeking to follow a proper course, again
telegraphed his department ; he saw the Commandant next morning an d
said that he was awaiting instructions ; he could not leave without bein g
relieved of his responsibilities . With a view to resolving the situation th e
Administrator suggested that the Commandant should place him, member s
of the Councils and the Judge under formal arrest . The Commandan t
declined to do so . Later in the day the Administrator learned of th e
passing of the above regulations and became aware that supreme power in
the territory had passed to the Commandant . Next day he obtained th e
Commandant's signature to a document instructing that he and the remaining members of the Executive Council should leave the territory . The
Administrator caused to be published a Gazette Extraordinary which contained a public notice in the following terms :
His Honour the Administrator desires it notified for public information tha t
pursuant to a decision of the Commonwealth Government, Civil Government in th e
Territory of Papua temporarily ceased at noon on the 14th day of Februar y
according to standard time in the Territory of Papua . His Honour the Administrato r
desires it further notified that, from that time, the General Officer Commandin g
the 8th Military District assumed supreme control of the said Territory .
H . W . Champion
Government Secretar y
On 15th February the Administrator and members of the Councils lef t
by flying boat for Australia . The Judge had left the previous day . On the
15th the Commandant issued an order under which he assumed al l
governmental powers . "
•The legal position relating to what has been loosely described as the suspension of the civi l
administration in Papua is set out in Barry's report, pp . 47-8 .
"The legal source of the Government of the Territory," he declared, "is the Papua Ac t
1905-1940, a Statute of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, and the instruments of th e
Government created by that Statute continue until terminated in accordance with law .
"The mere proclamation of martial law, assuming the circumstances were sufficient to justify
the exercise of the prerogative, would have had no legal effect, for such a proclamation is 'the
statement of an existing fact rather than the creation of that fact' . A proclamation of martial
law made because an invasion of the Territory was apprehended would not have suspended th e
exercise of legislative authority 'which may or ought to continue to act as long as the publi c
exigencies require' . If the state of affairs in the Territory was such that undivided control b ythe military authorities was necessary, the only method by which that position could be satisfac
torily brought about was by means of an executive measure such as the National Securit y
(Emergency Control) Regulations, which would take effect notwithstanding any Statute .
(National Security Act 1939-43, Section 18 . )
"As the Senior Officer of the military forces in Port Moresby, the Commandant possesse d
the widest powers under the Regulations and it was competent for him to require th e
Administrator and the civilians concerned with the civil administration to leave the Territory . In
the exercise of his judgment he did so, and it was this action that in fact brought the civi l
administration to an end . The public notice gazetted by the Administrator on 14th February 194 2
does not appear to me to have had any legal effect, except as evidence that, in the Administrato r 's
opinion civil government in the Territory had ceased at noon on 14th February 1942 . Legall y
the Civil administration was not suspended by the Emergency Control Regulations nor di d
Telegram No . 44 [dated 6th February, advising that the Government had authorised temporar y
cessation of civil administration] have that effect . The factual cessation of the civil administratio n
resulted from the circumstances that the persons legally entitled to carry on the civil governmen t
relinquished their functions and left the Territory . Their departure was in compliance with a n
instruction which, by virtue of the terms of the Regulations, they were bound to obey . On th e
day of the Administrator's departure, the Commandant, in the exercise of his powers unde r
the Regulations, issued an order under which he assumed the powers of the Administrator an d
the Legislative Council and all other governmental powers . Whatever the legal effect of tha t
order may have been, the Commandant's powers under the Emergency Control Regulations wer e
sufficient to enable him to administer the Territory thereafter ."
706
CIVILIANS IN
WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINE A
There remained the vital question of the native population . McMulle n
expressed the view of the New Guinea Administration in a radio message
from Wau to his department on 9th February .
Strongly recommend that civil administration operate this territory to the last.
New Guinea Volunteer Rifles not capable of administering native population . Consider utter chaos would result if the civil administration should cease .
The Administrator of Papua was afterwards criticised because he hel d
opposing views .
In none of his communications with the authorities in Australia
. did the
Administrator advert to the consequences which would result to the natives fro m
the withdrawal of the white administration officers from the Divisions in whic h
they maintained law and order and such native welfare services as had bee n
instituted. ?
Murray, who felt this criticism keenly, said afterwards that he and hi s
advisers were of the opinion that little real harm would have bee n
suffered by the natives through the temporary withdrawal of the whit e
officers .
An integral part of our native policy in Papua has been to keep every native 's
village rights intact (he declared) . His house, land, garden, fishing and huntin g
rights were scrupulously preserved . . . . There were no detribalised natives dependen t
on the white man to live as are found in large numbers in other countries . In an y
crisis natives who were away from their villages could return to them and resum e
their village life .
The temporary cessation of civil administration meant, in our considered opinion ,
that natives would resume their ordinary village life in which they were self supporting, and in which they were considerably controlled by tribal sanctions .
Government control had been so effective and complete for many years that we fel t
confident that its impetus would serve for some time to prevent any serious outbrea k
of tribal fighting.
So far as native welfare was concerned, we were mindful of the facts that th e
missions had not been compelled to cease, or been rendered impotent, nor ha d
they been ordered out of the Territory . They have always been partners of th e
Papuan Administration in the work of native welfare and their work was continuing .
When war operations came to any district we considered that the natives' abilit y
to live on the land, their unrivalled knowledge of bushcraft and their mobilit y
ensured them a degree of safety which could not have been increased by th e
presence of white officers . 8
General Morris, however, took the opposite view . Indeed, the Administrato r
in his final paragraph, listed cogent reasons why the army should creat e
an organisation which would enable it to employ the natives as fightin g
men, scouts and labourers . Experience was to prove that the support o f
the natives was to be of immense value .
On 7th February the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major-Genera l
S . F . Rowell, signalled to Morris that the Chiefs of Staff had requeste d
clarification of the Cabinet decision in order to ensure that administratio n
and staff, including District Officers, would remain at their posts an d
', Barry report, pp . 54-5 .
5 Murray, letter to Minister for External Territories, 12 Jun 1945 .
CIVILIANS
IN
WARTIME PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
70 7
render the assistance required to carry on civil and native administration .
Rowell presumed that, after consultation with the Administrator, Morri s
had established working arrangements and decided what civil personne l
were to remain in their present posts . Morris replied on the 8th tha t
as soon as civil administration Papua ceases I propose also institute militar y
administration under myself Territory of New Guinea remaining to us . Consider
essential district officers remaining loyally doing good work various centres shoul d
have some head to look to . Will appoint small staff of previous administratio n
officers for each territory . Please confirm .
In a later message that day Morris declared that he was "quite prepare d
to carry on civil and native administration under existing ordinances a s
soon as Murray goes . All arrangements completed . Propose enlisting certai n
civil staff and promoting to warrant rank . . . . Personally consider th e
sooner the change-over is effected the better for war effort here ." 9
Morris's contention in a message of 10th February to the Chief of th e
General Staff that "control of natives all areas practically non-existen t
and anxious regain control and obtain renewal of confidence" was a n
exaggeration of the facts, but perhaps permissible in the circumstance s
if the end is considered to justify the means . '
Because military operations would be dependent in many respects o n
native labour, the Papuan Administrative Unit and the New Guine a
Administrative Unit, afterwards merged as A .N .G .A .U., were conceived .
Henceforward the civil administration functioned in army uniform . The
Commandant announced the new arrangement in a message to al l
magistrates on 16th February . 2
The Port Moresby episode provided an interesting example of th e
problems which the civilian encounters in the face of the enemy . Certai n
lessons of continuing value emerged . On the one hand is the need for
the civil government to recognise that in war military requirements ar e
paramount and to adapt the machinery of government to meet thos e
requirements . On the other hand the military authorities should recognis e
their obligation to keep the civil administration fully informed of th e
military situation . They should be precise and definite in their request s
and be guided by the views of the civil government on the local civilia n
situation, but not beyond the point where those views might detrac t
from the military effort .
The Administrator and the senior members of the administration were
unwitting victims of the failure to devise plans for cooperation with th e
army . Years of indifference on the part of the Commonwealth and th e
° Signals A2194 and A2199, 8 Feb .
+The difficulties which arose with the town natives were not general . A report, for example, bya
Melrose, who arrived at Kokoda on 9th February, testified to the conditions at Duna and Kokodof
stations . Hs observed that "village life was functioning normally and the ordinary machinery y
government so far as the native administration was concerned had not been disturbed In an
way either by the attacks on Salamaua or on Moresby" .
•The message read : "Carry on as usual . Vigorous patrolling to be carried out. Establishmen t
embodies all into Army and will be increased . Instructions re Army pay and establishments
an d
all allotments to dependants will be effected at an early date
. Morale amongst RPC must b e
maintained. Endeavour recruit additional RPC's . Ranks will be RM's captain, ARM's lieutenants,
PO's warrant-officers . Dependants will be provided for . Await further instructions."
708
CIVILIANS
IN
WARTIME
PAPUA-NEW GUINE A
pattern of life in the territory left them ill-prepared to cope with sudde n
emergencies without guidance from Canberra . There were signs also tha t
the stores and trading concerns in the town found it difficult to adap t
themselves to the needs of the military forces preparing to resist a n
invader. A fundamental difference in outlook between the soldier an d
civilian was evident . The one, as part of his training, must turn to accoun t
anything that comes to hand—if he does not the enemy will ; the othe r
held peacetime beliefs about the sanctity of personal property whic h
could not be put lightly aside .
The time for the rehabilitation of the territory was in the future—afte r
Australia had learned its importance the harsh way, at the cost of th e
lives of many young men and almost universal hardship on the part of
those who fought there . Meanwhile Angau had arisen as an essential an d
invaluable body to meet the requirements of the times . It was a military
unit, however, and when army requirements conflicted with the welfare
of the indigenous people, their welfare became of secondary importance .
Means were afterwards devised for compensating them for the broke n
promises and hardships that sometimes became their lot . 3
In the following three years and a half the European and the nativ e
peoples of the New Guinea territories made a contribution to the militar y
effort that was out of all proportion to the numbers of those who wer e
actively involved . Their story is told in part in the Army volumes of thi s
history . By the end of the war there were some 350 officers and 1,60 0
other ranks in Angau . Perhaps two-thirds of the officers were old Ne w
Guinea hands .' At this stage some 35,000 natives were working under
contract to the Army, generally under the supervision of Angau men .
Many other natives were working as locally-recruited labourers, and fa r
and wide whole tribes were engaged in guerilla warfare against the Japanese ,
generally under European leadership but sometimes independently . B y
1945 four New Guinea Infantry Battalions and the Papuan Infantry
Battalion were in existence, plus the Royal Papuan Constabulary ; the
combined strengths of these fighting units included about 6,500 nativ e
troops .
°The Australian Government took steps to ensure full reparation to natives who had suffered as a
result of the war. The pertinent features of their plan implemented in 1946 were to honour
promises, relieve hardship and to pay compensation for all property lost, damaged or destroyed ,
as well as for loss of life and personal injuries sustained in war operations .
A War Damage Compensation Scheme made similar provision for other civilians .
4 It is impossible to be precise because many were enlisted on the mainland and therefore wer e
not allotted "P" or "NG" numbers.