German Society, Hitler and the Illusion of Restoration 1930-33
Heinrich August Winkler
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 11, No. 4, Special Issue: Theories of Fascism. (Oct.,
1976), pp. 1-16.
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Journal of Contemporary History, 1 1 (1976). 1-16
German Society, Hitler and the
Illusion of Restoration 1930-33
Heinrich August Winkler
Most historians are now agreed that the National Socialists achieved
their growth into a mass movement thanks t o a dual strategy which
no other party in the Weimar Republic had so perfectly mastered.
On the one hand, individual social groups were wooed with promises
which could only have been kept a t the expense of all the other groups.
On the other hand, conflicts of interest were universally denounced
and apparently removed by a movement which claimed to stand above
classes. The contradiction between the t w o levels of National Socialist
agitation was striking but did not prove to be disturbing. The party
leaders obviously felt that the individual groups were interested
primarily in what had been promised t o them, rather than what the
National Socialists promised others. In the last phase of the Weimar
Republic the NSDAP included such heterogenous elements that it
could justifiably be called a 'People's ~ a r t y ' . I~t had convinced a
majority of social groups that it was the only alternative t o the political
status quo.
There were, however, sectors of German society which remained
largely immune to National Socialist propaganda before 1933. This
is true above all of Catholic circles, which, from the time of Bismarck's
establishment of the German Reich and the Kultuvkampf, had formed
a community of defence with its own meta-economic ideology of
integration. I t is their awareness of being a minority which accounts
largely for the relative constancy of their behaviour in elections, f o r
the loyalty which they showed the parties of political Catholicism,
the Centre party and its Bavarian equivalent, the Bavarian People's
Party. Catholic Germany had participated in the general changes
of t h e political climate and from the twenties onwards moved distinctly
t o the right, but only small minorities went so far as t o vote for Hitler's
movement or t o join his party. The NSDAP did not make greater
inroads into Catholic territories until t h e March elections of 1933,
2
Journal o f Contemporary History
that is after the seizure of power.2
The other sector which showed resistance t o National Socialism,
though not as strongly as the Catholics, were the workers. The reasons
for their division from the rest of society are in part t h e same as those
cited for the Catholics: persecution and discrimination under Bismarck
had had an integrating effect o n the Social Democratic workers'
movement. In addition t o this, of course, and in contrast t o political
Catholicism, there was the influence of a n ideology which did not iron
o u t conflicting social interests, but, on the contrary, accentuated
them. German Catholics had resisted National Socialism because
the integration of different interests, which National Socialism
promised t o bring t o its Protestant electorate, was already part of
Catholic social doctrine. The working class, which was influenced by
Marxist theories, for its part remained unimpressed by National
Socialist slogans because it had learnt that real conflicts of interest
cannot be removed on an ideological basis. In contrast to political
Catholicism, the German workers' movement was, however, split
down the middle. Whereas the move t o the right within the Catholic
camp meant only a change of course for the Centre Party, the
corresponding move t o t h e left within the workers' movement meant
a strengthening of the Communists at the expense of the Social
Democrats. Another section of the workers, however, found their
way into Hitler's movement, a fact which was more forcibly expressed
in the structure of the NSDAP membership than in its electorate. If
there was a common denominator f o r that minority of German workers
who were won over b y National Socialism, then it lay in its
comparatively low degree of trade union organization. This was
characteristic of farm workers, railway workers, postal and other
community traffic and service workers; it was characteristic, too, of
home workers in Saxony and Thuringia, as well as employees in
mediumsized and small trade enterprises; of women workers, especially
in the textile industry, and also of the unemployed youth who had
been prevented from beginning their working lives b y the outbreak
of the world economic crisis and who had, therefore, hardly been
in contact with the trade union^.^
Numerous investigations have shown that the majority of the
National Socialist electorate came from the Protestant middle classes.
But in these electoral groups, too, the NSDAP had initially t o overcome
considerable resistance. The predominantly middle class supporters
of the early Hitler movement in Munich, Swabia and Franconia, were
by n o means representative of the German population as a whole.
Winkler: German Society 1930-33
3
In North Germany, during the two Reichstag elections of 1924, t h e
German Nationalists were able as a radical anti-republican protest
movement t o catch the voters who had been disappointed by the
liberal parties. In Baden and Wurttemberg, where the German National
People's Party was held to be t o o Prussian, peasant and Mittelstand
associations benefited from dissatisfaction with the established
bourgeois parties. The National Socialists and their viilkisch allies
in Northern Germany were usually regarded as a social revolunonary
force outside their early regional strongholds: 'If the German National
Freedom Party adopts a sensible economic programme', wrote the
leading North West German craftsmen's paper in April 1924, 'then
we shall have n o cause t o oppose it. But so long as it makes Marxist
gestures in spite of all its assertions t o the contrary, it must expect
us t o oppose it as we oppose any other Marxist party.' A t the same
time, the paper noted the growing attractiveness of the radical right
wing volkisch movement for young artisans.4
Indeed, the National Socialists had t o make considerable exertions
t o free themselves of t h e image of a socially revolutionary movement.
The combination of nationalism and socialism, as proclaimed in the
party's name and programme, found conflicting responses in bourgeois
circles. There was certainly a current in the academically educated
bourgeoisie which wished to oppose the Marxist workers' movement
with a synthesis of 'Prussianism and Socialism' and thereby hoped
t o overcome a class-based society. By 'socialism', however, it
understood a state of mind rather than a form of economy; the concept
was directed towards work discipline not expropriation. Similar ideas
also played a certain role in para-military associations. The largest
group, however, which showed itself susceptible t o the slogan of a
'national Socialism' was that of the white collar workers. A vague
kind of socialism corresponded t o the resentment felt by the members
of the so-called 'new middle-class' in relation t o the traditional social
elites; their ardent nationalism implied a marked separation from the
internationalist proletariat into which the Angestellten did not wish
t o sink. The economically independent strata such as the big
industrialists and large landowners, the mediumscale entrepreneurs
and members of the professions, down t o the master craftsmen,
merchants and peasants reacted quite differently to everything which
smacked of socialism. F o r the economically independent, this concept
was inextricably bound up with the abolition of private property.
If the National Socialists wished t o win over these strata, they had t o
offer an interpretation of 'socialism' less open t o misunderstanding
4
Journal of Contemporary History
than their 'definitive' party programme of 1920. This is precisely
what happened t o an increasing extent from 1927 onwards, when
Hitler rode roughshod over the opinions of the Nazi left, led by the
Strasser brothers. The workers were still being wooed by anti-capitalist
slogans, more radically by Goebbels in Berlin and some other Gauleiters
in the industrial districts than by party headquarters; but vis-a-vis
the independent middle class, t h e socialism of the NSDAP was
reinterpreted as a mere economic slant, as a general feeling for the
common weal. Five weeks before the Reichstag election of 2 0 May
1928, Hitler removed one particular offending item. The Nazi leader
obligingly explained that the expropriation of land for common use
without compensation, urged by the party programme under Point
17, referred only t o land wrongfully acquired and primarily owned
b y 'Jewish property speculation ~ o m p a n i e s . ' ~
When the world economic .crisis set in, the NSDAP had already
removed certain reservations felt by the middle classes - particularly
in areas which had, since 1927, suffered under the agrarian crisis
and had become nuclei of National Socialist propaganda. Bitterness
in relation t o the parties in power, especially the ruling Social
Democrats, who were held responsible for the so-called
'mismanagement' in the Reich, provinces and communes, rose t o
such a pitch that from the beginning of the year 1 9 3 0 the regional
electoral successes of the National Socialists were occasionally
welcomed by the press representing small businessmen. The breakthrough of the NSDAP t o a national level on 1 4 September 1 9 3 0
received a clear explanation in the columns of the Nordwestdeutsche
Handweuks-Zeitung, It was by no means the case, the paper said,
that all the 6.4 million National Socialist voters agreed with its
programme in every aspect, for instance in the area of economic policy:
'The mental rejection of certain points of the programme nevertheless
weighs less heavily with these voters than the hope that only National
Socialism is still strong enough t o pull the cart out of the mud.' But
u p to the end of 1 9 3 0 renewed doubts were expressed as t o the
reliability of National Socialist assurances with regard t o the retention
of property. The treasurer of the North West German Artisans'
Association, master mason Kuchenbuch, declared a t a local meeting
that the NSDAP would not be in a position to bring order t o the
German state. It had t o o often been associated with the extreme
left.=
The big entrepreneurs remained sceptical as t o the political aims of
Winkler: German Society 1930-33
5
the National Socialists much longer than the master artisans. In July
1930, the Arbeitgeber, the right wing conservative journal of the
Confederation of German Employers' Associations, did affirm that
a number of National Socialist slogans, like 'the common good before
the individual good' or 'property is an obligation not an end in itself'
were approved by a wide cross-section of big business. But there were
other 'utopian demands' and an 'aggressive hostility t o employers'
as represented by Feder, Gregor Strasser and Goebbels. If these ideas
were t o win the upper hand (and earlier on the paper had tried to
establish that the centre of action was being moved from Munich to
Berlin, from Hitler t o Goebbels and Strasser) then the NSDAP would
be basically opposed t o the aims of big b ~ s i n e s s .The
~ commentary
of the Arbeitgeber was t o a certain extent typical of the relationship
between big industry and the rise of National Socialism. The employers
were not made uneasy by antisemitism or antiparliamentarianism,
but rather by the anticapitalist rhetoric of the Nazi left and by the
general muzziness of their economic and social programme. The latter
was particularily true with regard to one item: the vague corporative
promises of the National Socialists. Point 25 of the 1 9 2 0 programme
demanded 'the formation of estates (Stande) and professional chambers
to carry out the framework of laws issued by the Reich in the federal
states.' Since Bismarck's time, a parliament based on estates had been
advocated by the anti-parliamentary right; it was to act as counterweight t o the Reichstag elected by universal suffrage, if not to replace
it entirely, and to secure the influence of the 'economy' over
legislation. O n the right wing of the business camp, above all in the
circles of Rhineland heavy industry, there had long been sympathy
for a corporative reform of the Weimar constitution. Once the crisis
of the parliamentary system had become manifest in 1930, interest
grew among other industrial groups in a political upgrading of thc
executive power and t h e provisional Reich Economic Council, which
had hitherto only been the advisory 'Third House' of the Weimar
Republic. But in the eyes of most entrepreneurs,chiefly those involved
in the export-orientated branches of largescale commerce and banking,
the discussion about corporatism was burdened by the fact that Nazi
advocates of such a system like O t t o Wilhelm Wagener (head of the
Economic Policy Section of the NSDAP) wanted much more than
merely a weakening of the political parliament: they were seeking
a completely new organization of the economy.
T h e majority of employers feared that such plans might lead to
6
Journal o f Contemporary History
stagnation and dirigisme. This aspect was explained in October 1 9 3 2
by the Deutsche Wirtschaftszeitung, organ of the German Federation
of Chambers of Commerce, as follows:
The economy, employers and workers, may at best express their wishes;
they have no means of seeing that these will be met even in their own organs.
Their organizations will be turned into government departments, whose
heads will be civil servants, and those they represent will have no legal right
t o choose or remove them. In the National Socialist programme the allpowerful 'total' state becomes a reality, economic selfgovernment a mere
form.8
The Nazi slogans concerning professional 'estates' did not even
find whole-hearted approval among those social groups which had
long recommended their own corporative structure as the model
for a new social order i.e. the craftsmen. What the leading associations
of craftsmen demanded was a system in which the interests of
independent producers would retain the upper hand against workers
and consumers, in the guild-like organizations of individual branches
as well as in the federal chambers of estates responsible for questions
of economic policy. The state was on no account to interfere with
the decisions of employers. A delegation of the National Confederation
of German Crafts and of the German Federation of Chambers of
Handicraft was made aware a t the beginning of 1931 in talks with
Wagener that the plans of the NSDAP were directed towards just
this, that they were 'state socialist through and through.lg It was,
therefore, good news for all sections of the business world when on
1 7 September 1 9 3 2 Hitler divided the Economic Policy Section of the
NSDAP into one main section IV A for state enterprise under Gottfried
Feder, and Section IV B for private enterprise under Walter Funk.
Thus a man trusted by industrialists received the same status as the
party ideologist, and Wagener's influence as head of the Economic
Policy Section was greatly diminished. Even earlier, in August 1 9 3 2 ,
it had been rumoured in leading industrial circles that Wagener had
been muzzled by Hitler with regard to matters affecting the
reorganization of professional bodies. One may a t least presume that
the anxious comments from business circles regarding NSDAP
economic policy did not remain without influence.1°
Even that current within heavy industry which traditionally had
been especially antiparliamentarian and nationalistic, had strong
reservations in the autumn of 1 9 3 2 with regard t o a National Socialist
seizure of power. What had strengthened sympathy for the NSDAP
Winkler : Germarz Society 1930-33
7
in parts of the Kuhr industry was the provisional toleration of Papen's
cabinet by Hitler. From the standpoint of the right-wing of German
heavy industry, to have the National Socialists providing a mass base
for an authoritarian regime friendly to big business, was an enticing
perspective. But since 1-fitler had relinquished this course again in
August 1932 in favour of a confrontation with the 'Cabinet of Barons'
and, in addition, the possibility of a coalition between the NSDAP
and the Centre Party had become stronger, the employers' camp
became increasingly worried that the Nazis were swinging towards
the left.11 A t the beginning of November 1932 the transport strike,
demonstrating a spectacular cooperation between communists and
National Socialists in Berlin, reinforced such fears. S o that one cannot
speak of the National Socialists making a consistent move towards
big industry in the summer and autumn of 1 9 3 2 , or of a rapprochement
by the latter with the NSDAP. .
'The policy of General Kurt von Schleicher, the last Chancellor
of the Weimar Kepublic, created a new situation. Schleicher's plans
for creating employment, which many industrialists regarded as 'state
socialist', his contacts with the trade unions, and his efforts to form
a parliamentary 'labour axis' stretching from the left wing of the
NSDAP t o the Social Democrats was calculated t o alarm large sections
of the employers' camp. The alternative model of a Hitler-Papen
alliance seemed the lesser evil, a t least t o those industrialists, especially
in mining, who had previously given financial support to the Nazis
in the hope that they would strengthen the national camp.12 I t was,
however, another social group which much more directly and
successfully influenced Hitler's coming t o power on 30 January 193 3.
This was the R e i c h s l a n d b ~ / ~ dalready
,
controlled by the National
Socialists to a large extent, which in fact represented the interests
of the greatly indebted East Elbian landowners. The landed gentry,
unlike the industrialists, enjoyed the privilege of immediate access
t o the decisive political factor, President Paul von Hindenburg. They
made use of this privilege when in January 1933 a parliamentary
disclosure of the Osthilfe scandal, compromising for many Junkers
as well as the President himself, seemed to approach closer. In the
final phase of the Weimar Republic economic and political power
clearly proved t o be incongruous strengths.13
The Keicbslaizdbz~~d
though the most influential was not the only
organization a t the disposal of the National Socialists as a political
instrument before the seizure of power. Within the urban and rural
middle classes, too, there was 'anticipated co-ordination' and it was
8
Journal o f Contemporary History
actively encouraged by such party sections as the agrarian political
apparatus and the Kampfgemeinscbaft Against Department Stores
and Consumer Cooperatives, from whose ranks the Fighting League
of the Commercial Mittelstand was formed in December 1932. The
National Socialists had made their impact earliest in regional interest
groupings among the peasantry in predominantly protestant areas
and had, step by step, driven existing officials from their positions.
From 1931, the craft guilds were disbanded. The officers of local and
provincial
associations,
who
frequently belonged
to
the
Wirtscbaftspartei, a pure interest grouping of house owners and small
traders, had t o give way to members of the NSDAP. In November
1932 the National Socialists broke into the Federation of German
Retail Business: the department stores which had always been
considered unwelcome competition by small shopkeepers and were
attacked by the National Socialists as being Jewish were in fact forced
to leave the umbrella organization of the retail trade; a representative
of the National Socialists' Fighting League Against Department Stores
and Consumer Cooperatives took over. The National Socialists also
succeeded in achieving a massive breakthrough into the largest whitecollar trade union, the Deutscbnationaler Handlungs-Gebilfenverband.
They were not able, it is true, t o take over its leadership b u t they
did win over large numbers of the membership and bureaucratic
apparatus. After the seizure of power they had only t o complete the
work having already gained the support of the interest groups on the
~ systematically
land as well as in the 'old' and 'new' ~ i t t e 1 s t a n d . lBy
infiltrating these interest-groups, the National Socialists increasingly
deprived the leading organizations of the rural and urban middle
strata of their base. Whereas the official leadership of these associations
adopted a comparatively moderate policy towards government and
parliament, those functionaries adhering t o the NSDAP successfully
exploited the existing groupegoism.
The campaign against department stores had the same effect as
the propaganda for compulsory guilds and masterexaminations in
the trades and crafts: the reservations which the leadership of the
associations continued to feel about the economic policy of the NSDAP
were shared less and less by their members. As far as the broad strata
of the middle-classes were concerned, there were only two factors
which carried any weight a t the height of the economic crisis. Firstly,
the National Socialists identified themselves more than any other
party with the most extreme demands of these groups. Secondly,
they had discovered the common denominator t o which the desires
Winkler: German Society 1930-33
9
of all groups could be reduced - namely a consistent struggle against
the Weimar 'system' which was made the scapegoat for the misfortunes
of the common man.
The deeper historical reasons for the success achieved by National
Socialism in non-proletarian Protestant Germany d o not lie in the
Weimar Republic. Those social strata which played the largest part
in Hitler's rise t o power considered the political system of Imperial
Germany a t the least as a far lesser evil than Weimar. For the Prussian
landowners, the politically most privileged group in German society
before the first world war, allegiance to the Hohenzollerns was as
much a matter of course as it was f o r those members of the officer
corps, who came from the same social background. What the
conservative wing of private enterprise wanted was summed up by
the powerful industrialist Albert Vogler a t a conference of leading
industrial organizations in 1 9 2 4 : 'The supra-party state is a thing
of the past. Let us hope that we succeed in recreating it for the
future.'l5
The commercial Mittelstand and peasantry for their part regarded
the patriarchal State of Imperial Germany as a system which had
introduced certain protective measures in favour of small business
and agriculture, and which would not have accepted an outvoting
of property-owners by workers and consumers. Many, particularly
among the higher civil sen7ants, along with the representatives of
private enterprise, saw in the Kaisevveicb a 'supra-party' state, in
which the impartiality of the administration had been paramount
and where the social status of bureaucracy had still been unchallenged.
White collar workers certainly had reservations with regard to the
ruling elite of Imperial Germany; but nevertheless they owed t o the
monarchy their special position in social security, which differentiated
them f r o m industrial workers. Their claim t o an elevated social position
seems at any rate t o have been respected more in Imperial Germany
than in the 'Marxist' republic.
The orientation towards the authoritarian system of the pre-1918
period did not necessarily imply preference for the Monarchy, but
it was in any case a mortgage on parliamentary democracy. This is
true not only of those strata which turned towards National Socialism
after 1 9 2 9 o r else contributed t o its rise; it is also true to a certain
extent of the representatives of Weimar democracy. The conception,
which had its origins in constitutional monarchy, that the chief task
of parliament was t o criticize the government, survived the November
revolution of 1918. The most important characteristic of a
parliamentary system, the confrontation between the governmental
majority and the opposition, was constantly obscured b y this
anachronistic dualism. The tendency of the parties, not least the Social
Democrats, t o disclaim governmental responsibility in critical
situations, can ultimately be traced back to an unconscious fixation
vis-i-vis the political system of the Kaiserreicb. This system had failed
t o motivate the parties to consistently fight for a majority of the
voters; their exclusion from active participation in government had
favoured instead the ideological orientation of political parties and
their restriction within a particular social milieu.16 Initially, the
Weimar party system was scarcely different from that of Rismarckian
Germany. It was not parliamentary, but antiparliamentary forces - the
German Nationalists and then the National Socialists - who were
the first to grasp the logic of the parliamentary system and to tailor
their propaganda entirely towards becoming the 'people's party'.
The National Socialists did not, as is well known, fully succeed
in becoming a mass movement until Briining became Chancellor,
and he consciously carried on the governmental practices of the
imperial bureaucracy. But it was precisely the experiences of the
first presidential government of the Weimar Republic which made
it clear that a simple return t o the pre-parliamentary division of power
between Reichstag and executive was no longer possible. A cabinet
which governed in opposition to society was still less in a position
t o take the wind out of the sails of an antiparliamentary mass
movement than a weak parliamentary government could have done.
No schematic restoration of the pre-republican regime could, therefore,
be the 'right' answer t o the crisis of the Weimar system, but only a
popular antiparliamentarianism. If one was successfully to declare
war on democracy, then it could only be done 'in the name of the
people.' The only possible alternative t o parliamentary democracy
was the rule of the charismatic leader, legitimized by plebiscite.
Such a system seemed t o possess a specific advantage for the middle
classes. If they wished to make their influence effective, they had
t o act in concert. The snag here was that many of their interests seemed
irreconcilable. For instance, peasant demands for higher agricultural
prices ran counter t o the interests of the consumer and t o the
protectionist limitations on competition, backed by artisans and
small traders. An umbrella movement of the middle strata could not
therefore push divisive economic questions into the foreground, but
had t o concentrate on political slogans which transcended these
conflicts. The adoption of demands made by specific social groups
could only serve therefore as one aspect of the National Socialist
strategy for winning power - and the party leadership wisely delegated
this role to its special organizations. This procedure had a double
advantage. First the NSDAP through its particular associations and
their publications reached only that part of the electorate which was
crucial a t the time - so that the irritation of other groups could in
this way be limited. Secondly, the party leadership, by thls division
of labour, avoided tying themselves to any narrow special interests.
The task of the party leadership, and, in particular, that of Hitler
himself, was the other part of the National Socialist dual strategy namely the integration of the groups they were trying t o recruit.
It may be considered a general rule, that a mass movement will be
the more likely t o produce militant reactive ideologies, the more
heterogeneous its social basis and the bleaker the prospects of its
individual constituent groups t o maintain or increase their share in
the social product. The success of National Socialism was ultimately
founded o n the fact that it seemed t o provide an answer to such
challenges. It made possible the bringing together of the intermediate
classes, which the liberal, conservative and so-called interest parties
had failed to achieve - because they were either half-hearted about
taking up the demands of individual groups, or because they had
no chance, due to the limitations imposed by narrow interests, of
ever mobilizing all sections of the bourgeoisie. Only the National
Socialists showed themselves determined to grasp the evil by its root.
They promised the radical liquidation of all factors which they held
responsible for the dissolution of the natural harmony of interests:
namely, the organizations and ideologies involved in the class struggle,
and all institutions which sanctioned the political resolution of social
conflicts. The destruction of the 'marxist' labour movement, of the
parliamentary system of government, and of political pluralism was
the undisguised expression of everything that National Socialism
promised to contribute towards the reconstruction of the German
Volksgemei~zscbaft (people's community). What one might describe
as symbolic or secondary integration served t h e same purpose: the
diversion of aggression against a 'diabolical' enemy, international
Jewry, and the fabrication of a supra-materialistic sphere in which
the nation recovered its unity. The cult of the leader and the
Volksgemeinscbaft, extreme nationalism and racial ideology had
their social function in precisely this attempt to mystically overcome
12
Journal o f Contemporary History
economically determined contradiction^.^
'
I t is difficult t o estimate the value of each individual part of this
ideological conglomerate for the electoral success of the National
Socialists. There are indications, however, that it was not militant,
antisemitism which made National Socialism into a mass movement.
Even a journal as far to the right as the Nordwestdezltscbe
Handwerks-Zeitung spoke in 1924 of the volkisch and National
Socialist movement as being 'tainted' with a 'fanatical antisemitism'
which stood in the way of 'objective work'.ls Even if one assumes
that antisemitism was stronger among farmers and petty traders than
among artisans (one thinks of the campaign against the 'cattle and
money-lending Jews' and against 'the Jewish department stores')
nevertheless, during the 1920s and 1930s other resentments, namely
against the 'Marxists' and 'anonymous big capital', played a larger
part as far as all sections of the intermediate classes were concerned.
There is no evidence that the National Socialists influenced larger
Mittelstand groups beyond the radical antisemites with their assertion
that these enemies were only two faces of one and the same 'World
Jewish Conspiracy'.
On the other hand it makes just as little sense t o argue that Nazi
antisemitism exercised a deterring effect o n the middle and upper
classes during the years 1930-32. It was certainly no accident that
in the propaganda of the NSDAP during these years wholesale
accusations against the 'system' took up more space than details
concerning the 'Jewish question'. Extreme nationalism, by itself, is
also not enough to explain the rise of National Socialism. The
traditional parties of the right were hardly less nationalistic than the
Hitler movement, yet they lost the majority of their voters. If the
cause of the success of the NSDAP among the middle classes is to be
put in a nutshell, then it was the combination of two promises which
proved decisive: the National Socialists agreed in principle t o maintain
the traditional system of property relations and at the same time
promised to radically liquidate the political system which no longer
guaranteed the preservation of this order.
T h e majority of those who brought the National Socialists t o power,
either by giving them their votes or their money, wanted something
different from that which became reality in the Third Reich. Both
the middle and upper classes assumed that National Socialism wished
to restore and modernize the political substance of the pre-republican
system. That did not necessarily mean restoration of the Empire, but
Winkler : German Society 1930-33
13
it did mean depriving the victors of the November revolution of their
power. In other words, the supporters of the National Socialists
expected the destruction of the 'Marxist' labour movement and the
'party state'; they hoped for a rigid authoritarian regime, which would
cease to tolerate class struggles and ideological conflict. But so far
as the National Socialist leadership was concerned, these were not the
aims but merely essential pre-requisites for the realization of their
aims. Hitler's long-term aspirations could not be diverted in accordance
with the economic needs of any social group; neither the fight against
the Jews, nor the essentially unlimited conquest of 'Lebensraum'
sprang from a concrete pressure of interests. Rather it was a question
of prejudices becoming autonomous, which had their social origins
in the middle classes, b u t which had been radicalized to such an extent
that they had become a political factor sui generis. Obviously, this
autonomization of ideologies was closely bound u p with a far-reaching
social process of deracination, which the first world war had set in
motion, with the formation of a class of 'military desperadoes' (W.
Sauer) who could not find their way back into civilian life after 1 9 1 8
and who played an important part in the fascist movements in Italy
as in Germany. Thisgroup, to which Hitler himself belonged, combined
profoundly bourgeois anxieties with a fundamental contempt for the
bourgeoisie. The nihilistic turn against all concrete interests with
which National Socialism ended up was implanted in the mentality
of the 'military desperadoes'.19
Such a clique could only rise to power because broad sections
of German society still clung to concepts which had their origin in
the long-lived Ancien Regime. They measured the crisis-ridden
democratic system by the yardstick of the apparently healthy world
of Imperial Germany - and rejected it. The assumption that the
National Socialists would d o no more than restore an authoritarian
order proved t o be a total misinterpretation of Hitler's movement;
but the spread of such authoritarian illusions formed an essential
element of historical continuity between the Kaiserreich and the
'Third Reich'. I t may very well be that the Weimar Republic could
have survived for a long time had there n o t been the economic crisis
of 1929. But it is just as likely that German democracy could have
survived the great crisis without the authoritarian heritage of the past.
Jozlrnal o f Contemporary History
NOTES
1. For an explanation of the thesis that the NSDAP was an antidemocratic
'Volkspartei' see my contribution, 'Mittelstandsbewegung oder Volkspartei?
Zur sozialen Basis der NSDAP' in Wolfgang Schieder, ed., Faschismus als soziale
Bewegung. Deutschland und ltalien if71 Vergleich (Hamburg 1 9 7 6 ) .
2. See Gunter Plum, Gesellschuftsstruktuu und politisches Rewusstseirr in
ezlzeu katholischen Region 1928-1933. Untersuchung a m Reispiel des
Regierungsbezirks Aachen (Stuttgart 1972) and M. Rainer Lepsius. Evtrerneu
Natio?~alismus. Struktuubedi~zgungen
uor
dev
natio~ralsozialistischen
Machtergreifir~~g
( Stuttgart 1966). 31-36.
3. The number of trrorkers who were members ot the NSDAP in September
1930 was 26.3 per cent compared with a percentage of the general working
population of 46.3 per cent (Paiteistatistik, ed. by the organizational head of
the NSDAP, Bd. 1 , Berlin 1935, 6 9 ff.). For the other groups the figures are
as follows: white collar employees 2 4 (12.5); self-employed 18.9 (9.6); farmers
13.2 (20.7); civil servants 7.7 ( 4 . 6 ) ; other groups 9.9 (6.6). For the part played
by workers in electing the NSDAP see Samuel A. Pratt, The Social Raszs of
Nazism a91d Communism in Urban G e r m a ? ~ yA. Coirelational Stud,y of the July
31, 1932 Reichstag Election in Geumat~y(M. A. Thesis, Michigan State College,
East Lansing 1 9 4 8 ) , 1 6 4 ff.; Werner Kaltefleiter, IViutschaft u91d Politik in
I>eutschland, Konjrrnktz~r als Bestimmungsfaktor des Parteiensystems (Cologne
1 9 6 8 ) , 46-49; R . I. McKibbin, 'The Myth of the Unemployed: Who Voted for
Hitler?' in ,-11lstralianJournal of Politics and History, 25 (1969), 25-40; Alexander
Weber, Soziale .Merkmale der NSD.4P-Wahlev. Eine Zusammenfassuizg bisheriger
empirischer Linters~lchunger2 und eine Analyse in den Gemeiriderr 'lev 1-under
Raden und Hessen (Ph.D. Thesis, Freiburg 1969) as well as Carl Mierendorff
'Gesicht und Charakter der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung' in Die Gesellschaft,
7 (1930-31), 489-504. For the early years of the NSDAP especially Michael H.
Kater, 'Zur Soziographie der fruhen NSLIAP' in Vieuteljahrshefte fhr
Zeitgeschichte [hereafter VfZl , 1 9 ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 124-59. For the relationship between
workers and National Socialism before 1933 see also Wilfried Bohnkr, L)ze
,VSL)A P in? Huhrgebiet 1920-1933 (Bonn 1974). Methodologically unsatisfactory,
because it constantly blurs the differences between manual workers, craftsmen
and white collar employees is .Max H. Kele, Nazis and 12'oukers (Chapel Hill 1 9 7 2 ) .
4 . ~ordwestdezrtsche Huezdwerks-Zeitung [hereafter NHZ] , 29, No.17
(24 April 1 9 2 4 ) ; No.13 ( 2 7 March 1924). See also Heinrich August Winkler,
!\,littelstarzd, Demokuatie urrd ~ V a t i o r r a l s o z i a l i s n ~Die
~ ~ s ~politisct~e Entwicklung
von Handwerk rtrrd Kleinhandel in der Il'eirnarer Kepublik (Cologne 1972).
5. For this theme see Oswald Spengler, Weussentunr und Sosialismus
(Munich 1 9 2 0 ) ; Dietrich Orlow, The Hzstory o f the Nazi Party. 1919-1933
(Pittsburgh 1969); Jeremy Noakes, The :Vnsi Partj~in Lower Saxony 1921 -1933
(Oxford 1 9 7 1 ) ; ~ u r g e n Kocka, 'Zur Problematik der deutschen Angestellten
1914-1933' in Hans Mommsen and others, Industrielles System und politische
Entwicklung in der IVeimarer Republik ( ~ h s s e l d o r f1974), 792-811; Henry A.
Turner, 'Hitler's Secret Pamphlet for Industrialists 1927' in The Jourizal of
Winkler: German Society 1930-33
15
hlodern History, 4 0 (1968), 348-73; Keinhard ~ G h n l Die
,
nationalsozialistische
Linke 1925-19 3 0 (Meisenheim 1966). Kuhnl's work suffers from numerous
distortions. The characterization of the Nazi left-wing as 'kleinburgerlich' ignores
the fact that small craftsmen feared it far more than the Munich party leadership.
Moreover, the influence of the left-wing did n o t end with the elimination of Otto
Strasser's group in 1930.
6 . NHZ, 35 No.38 (19 September 1930): No.41 (10October 1930).
7. Georg ~ c h r z d e r , 'Das nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftsprogramm' in
I)er Arbeitgeber, 2 0 No. 1 4 (15 July 1930: 'Der Sozialismus der nationalen
Jugend', in ibid, No. 8 (15 April 1930). For a more detailed analysis see Heinrich
August
Winkler, '~nternehmerverhande zwischen ~ t a n d e i d e o l o ~ i e und
Nationalsozialismus' in VfZ, 1 7 (1969), 341-71 (also in revised form in
Heinz-Josef Varain, ed., Intevessenuerbande in Deutschland [Cologne 19731,
228-58).
8. 'Das Wirtschaftsprogramm des Nationalsozialismus' in Ileutsche
U'irtschaftszeitung, 29 No. 4 0 (6 October 1932). The article, part of a longer
series of essays, after detailing the social and fiscal aims of the National Socialists,
came to the verdict that the economic programme of the NSDAP is a 'mixture
of resentment and obscurity'. The weightiest objections against the Nazi
programme would have t o be directed against its economic demands.
9 , Deutsches
Zentralarchiu (Potsdam), Keichskommissar fur den
Mictelstand, Handwerk 1 1 , Bd. 1 , No. 26. The horror which 'state socialist'
plans inspired among the official representatives of the crafts and trades reveals
how misleading is the concept of Werner Sombart, revived by Arthur Schweitzer
in Bzg Husiirrss in the Third Reich (London 1964), 1 1 0 ff. concerning
'Handwerkersozialismus' (artisan socialism).
1 0 . Winkler, op. cit., 361 f.
11. Very revealing in this connection is the letter by the editor and head
of the Rhenish-Westphalian economic service, August Heinrichsbauer, t o Gregor
Strasser, the organizational head of the NSDAP, dated 2 0 September 1932
(reprinted in Plum, op. cit., 301-04).
12. With regard to financial support for the NSDAP by big industry see
above all the works of Henry A. Turner, 'Big Business and the Rise of Hitler'
in T h e ..\meviean Histodeal Review (hereafter AIfR), 75 (1969), 56-70; 'The
Ruhrladr: Secret Cabinet of Heavy Industry in the Weimar Republic' in Central
195-228;
'C;rossunternehmertum
und
European
Historj~, (1970),
Nationalsozialismus 1930-1933' in Histonsche Zeitschrift [hereafter HZ] 221
(1975). 18-68. In the last-named essay Turner criticizes Dirk Stegmann's
objections; 'Zum Verhaltnis von Grossindustrie und Nationalsozialismus
1930-1933' in r\vchiu f u i Sozialgeschichte, 1 3 (1973), 399-482.
13. On the role of the landowners in Hitler's coming to power, see most
recently Heinrich Bruning, Memoiren 1918-1934 (Stuttgart 1970), 639-45.
14. With reference to agriculture see Rudolf Ileberle, Landbevolkerung und
IVationalsozialismus. Eine soziologische Untevsuchung in Schleswig-Holstein
1918-1932 (Stuttgart 1963) ; Horst Gies, 'NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche
Organisationen in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik' in VfZ, 1 5 (1967),
341-76. On the trading Mittelstand see Winkler, op. cit., 166-71; Peter Wulf,
Die politische Haltung des schleswig-holsteinischen Handwerks 1918-1932
(Cologne 1969); Heinrich Uhlig, Die Cliavenhauser im Dritten Reich (Cologne
16
Journal o f Contemporary History
1956). On white collar employees see Iris Hamel, Volkischer Verband und
nationale Gewerkschaft. Der Deutschnationale Handlungsgehilfeiz-Verband
1893-1933 (Stuttgart 1967). Less research has been done on National Socialist
penetration of the civil service associations, c.f. Hans Mommsen, 'Die Stellung
der Beamtenschaft in Reich, Landern und Gemeuldrn in der Ara Briining' in
VfZ, 21 (1973), 151-65. On the Il'irtschaftspartei, which in the Reichstag
elections of May 1928 received 4.5 per cent of the valid votes cast, see Martin
Schumacher, Mittelstandsfront und Republik. Die Wirtschaftspartei Reichspartei des deutschen Mittelstandes 1919-1933 (Diisseldorf 1972).
15. Veroffeentlichungen des Keichmerbandes der Deutschen Industrie, Heft
21 (Berlin 1924), 35.
16. See especially M. Kainer Lepsius, 'Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur:
Zum Problem der Dernokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft' in Wirtscbaft,
Geschicl~teund Wirtschaftsgeschicbte. Festschrift firr Friedrich Lutge (Stuttgart
1966), 371-93.
17. O n the concept and meaning of 'secondary integration' in German
society since the nineteenth century see Wolfgang Sauer, 'Das Problem des
deutschen Nationalstaates' in Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ed., Moderne derltsche
Sozialgescbichte (Cologne 1970), 406-36.
1 8 . N H Z , 29, No.13 (27 March 1924).
19. See Wolfgang Sauer, 'National Socalism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?'
in AHR, 73 (1967), 404-24; Klaus Hildebrand, 'Hitlers Ort in der Geschichte
des preussisch-deutschen Nationalstaates' in HZ, 2 1 7 (1973), 5 8 4 6 3 2 ; Henry
A. Turner, 'Hitlers Einstellung zu sozialen und okonomischen Fragen vor 1933'
in Ceschichte und Gesellschaft, 2 (1976).