NORTHERN INTERESTS AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Rob Huebert
Associate Director Centre for Military and Strategic Studies
University of Calgary
Rhuebert@ucalgary,.ca
INTRODUCTION:
The Canadian Arctic remains the forgotten region of Canada. While it contains the largest coastline of Canada’s three oceans, and has tremendous resource potential, its remoteness from large
urban centres and its harsh climate means that most Canadians remain in blissful ignorance of
this region. However, events are now developing that suggest that the Canadian Arctic will soon
be facing new international challenges. If Canada is unprepared, these coming events will have
substantial negative consequences for the region and country as a whole. However, if planning is
initiated it is possible to not only mitigate some of the negative consequences but perhaps to even
benefit from some of these changes. But, the greatest threat that has always faced the Canadian
Arctic has been its neglect by the federal government. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine
how this can be changed.
Canadian foreign and security policy in its Arctic will be facing several major challenges that
can be classified into three main categories: 1) international disputes; 2) environmental security;
and 3) traditional security. This assessment will now consider the major problems and proved
some thoughts as to how Canada can best respond.
1
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES:
While most Canadians believe that the Canadian claim over its Arctic region is complete and
uncontested, the reality is that Canada is currently facing six actual or potential international
disputes over various aspects of control of its Arctic region. The immediacy of these disputes
varies and some may not escalate for some time. Nevertheless, the fact that there are so many
disputes is troubling. Three of the disputes are with the United States, one may be with Russia
and the United States, one is with Denmark and the last is with the Faeroes Island and
Greenland. While each of the disputes is either a potential conflict or currently on hold, the fact
that Canada faces such a large number may have a serious cumulative effect on Canada’s overall
claim of control in the region. Should some or all of these disputes result in unfavourable results
for Canada, it is easy to see how the international community in general may come to view
Canadian claims of sovereignty with scepticism.
1) Status of the Northwest Passage - Canada/United States/EU: Canada claims that the
Northwest Passage is Canadian internal waters.1 This means that Canada has the right to
unilaterally pass legislation and regulations controlling the action of all Canadians and foreigners
on the land, ice and waters of the Canadian Arctic. The United States, the European Union and
possibly Japan do not accept this claim.2 In their view the Northwest Passage is an international
1
Erik Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic: Canadian and Russian Perspectives
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) 65-108.
2
Rob Huebert, “Polar Vision or Tunnel Vision: The Making of Canadian Arctic Waters
2
strait. The main ramification of this claim is that Canada does not have complete control over the
waterways of the region. Specifically this means that Canada cannot unilaterally pass its owns
laws governing international shipping using the Northwest Passage as a transit route.
It is only international shipping that is affected by this dispute. No other interest is involved.
Canada has the sovereign right over all living and nonliving resources in both the subsoil (eg oil,
gas) and water (fish) up to 200 miles from its coast line Canada also has the right to control all
maritime research in this zone.3 Thus, the issue of sovereignty in the Northwest Passage concerns
only the regulatory regime governing international shipping.
The attractiveness for international shipping is two-fold. First, passage through the Northwest
Passage can provide tremendous savings in distance travelled when sailing between Asia and
Europe/eastern US. Distances of over 4,000 nautical miles can be saved in some instances. The
second attractive feature of the Northwest Passage is that it can serve substantial larger vessels
than those that can transit the Panama Canal.4 In 1969, the Manhattan an ice-strengthened
Policy,” Marine Policy 19 no.4 (July 1995), pp.343-363.
3
Susan Rolston and Ted McDorman, “Maritime Boundary Making in the Arctic Region,”
in Douglas Johnston and Phil Saunders eds. Ocean Boundary Making: Regional Issues and
Developments (Vancouver, UBC Press, 1988).
4
See Alanna Mitchell “The Northwest Passage Thawed” (5 February 2000) Globe and
Mail A11; and Colin Nickerson “Girding for a Sea Change: With Ice Thinning, Canada Claims a
Northwest Passage” (21 March 2000) Boston Globe A1.
3
supertanker that was 155,000 tonnes made the passage.5 The Panama Canal cannot accommodate
vessels that are larger than 70,000 tonnes.
However, the ice conditions of the Passage has meant that despite these obvious advantages, it
has been virtually impossible to make the voyage. The 1969 voyage of the Manhattan while
demonstrating that such a voyage could be made, also showed that ice made the trip extremely
difficult6. Ultimately two icebreakers were needed to successfully make the transit. The renewed
interest in using the Passage has occurred because of new scientific research that has predicted a
substantial decrease of ice-cover in the Arctic. The leading scientific bodies have found that the
polar regions are experiencing the greatest increase in temperature as a result of climate change
which is causing the decrease in ice-cover.7 There is some debate as to the exact cause of the
decreased ice cover and whether or not it is part of a short term transformation or long term
5
Don McRae “The Negotiation of Article 234” in Franklyn Griffiths (ed) Politics of the
Northwest Passage (McGill-Queen’s University Press: Kingston and Montreal: 1987) 98-114.
6
John Kirton and Don Munton in Franklyn Griffiths (ed) Politics of the Northwest
Passage (McGill-Queen’s University Press: Kingston and Montreal: 1987) 67-97.
7
.Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: The Scientific
Basis. A Report of Working Group 1 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001),
pp. 2.2.5-2.2.6 [http://www.ipcc.].
4
trend.8 However, the scientific majority view is that the trend is real and that in the next 15-40
years the shipping season in the Canadian Arctic will be substantially increased.9 If this does
occur, Canada can expect to see an increase of international shipping during these this extended
period of shipping.
Policy Challenges: To most Canadians the dispute over the Northwest Passage is simply about
sovereignty for its own sake. They want to be able to say that all of this region is Canadian.
However a careful examination will show that the true issue is about the development of a
shipping regime that will best serve Canadian interests. This means the ensuring that
international shipping follow a regime that will provide the best protection of the environment;
maintain the highest ship safety standards; ensure that ships entering Arctic waters are built to
the highest technical standards for operating in ice-filled waters; and that Canadians and in
particular those living in the north share in the economic benefits of increased shipping.
However Canadian decision-makers are dealing with two areas of uncertainty. The first pertains
to the rate of warming in the Northwest Passage. As previously mentioned, there is some debate
as to whether the observed increase in average temperatures is a long-term or short-term process.
8
C. Desar, J.E. Walsh and M.S. Timlin “Arctic Sea Ice Variability in the Context of
Recent Atmospheric Trends,” Journal of Climate Vol. 13.
9
John Falkingham, “Sea Ice in the Canadian Arctic in the 21st Century” (unpublished
paper) Canadian Ice Services, Environment Canada. (September 2000).
5
If the observed increases of the last 30 years represent only a temporary increase, then there is
little likelihood that the Passage will open for shipping. Even if it the majority of scientists are
correct and the warming trend is permeant the impacts of a warmer climate is not fully
understood. Furthermore there is evidence that a warming arctic could also produce greater ice in
the Northwest Passage for at least a temporary period of time. It has been found that as the
regions warms, the melting ice cover of the Northwest Passage allows the southward flow of
thicker multi-year ice from the polar ice cap. Thus more warmth may actually mean more ice in
the Northwest Passage. Thus, policy-makers face the possibility that while the ice in the Passage
may recede quickly for the summer months in the next 5-15 years, it may take much longer even
if temperature continue to increase.
The second area of uncertainly that policy-makers face is in winning an international challenge
over the Northwest Passage.10 If Canada does nothing to increase its efforts to establish
sovereignty over the Passage and climate change does make it more accessible, Canada will not
win a challenge in the International Court of Justice. However, even if Canada dedicates a
tremendous effort to reinforcing its surveillance and enforcement capability in this region, there
is no guarantee that it would win. The ICJ has defined an international strait in the Strait of
Corfu judgement.11 Its ruling in that case stated that if a bod y of water joins two international
bodies of water and is used by international shipping, the waterway in question is an
international strait. The Northwest Passage does join two international bodies of water. Ice
conditions however have prevented it from being used by a large number of international vessels.
10
For the best examination of the requirements for Canada to make its case see Donat
Pharand, Donat
Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988).
11
International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel Case (Merits) United Kingdom v.
Albania (1949) ICJ Rep 4
6
If climate change does allow for an increase of shipping, it would seem that a conservative
interpretation of the ruling would be against the Canadian claim. Since the ICJ tends to be
conservative and unpredictable in its judgements, it is unclear how Canada could hope to
maintain its claim if international shipping begins even if Canada increases its presence in the
region.12 Thus, Canadian policy-maker must be aware of the possibility that the effort to
maintain sovereignty is worth the costs.
However, this comes back to point of the true nature of the issue. If sovereignty over the
Northwest Passage was only important in terms of national pride, then it would be hard to justify
any increased spending given more pressing national needs such as healthcare and educational
spending. However, if international shipping does commence the real issue facing Canadian
policy-makers is ensuring that international shipping is done in a manner that best protects and
promotes Canadian interests. Canada can afford to lose the ability to call the Northwest Passage
internal waters. It cannot lose the right to ensure that the best regulations are placed on shipping
entering the waters.
2) Maritime Boundary between Alaska and Yukon - Canada/United States: The second
issue of debate between Canada and the United States is over the determination of the maritime
boundary of Alaska and the Yukon. Canada maintains that the boundary needs to be drawn as a
direct continuation of the land boundary.13 The United States position is that the maritime
boundary should be drawn outward at a 90E angle to the coastline. The American claim has the
their version of boundary moving in more eastern direction than the Canadian boundary. The
result of these two positions is the creation of wedge of marine territory in the Beaufort Sea that
is disputed.
The significance of the dispute lies in the potential oil and gas resources in this region. During
the 1970s there was considerable speculation that the reserves in this region could be extensive.
Thus it was not surprising that the two governments were not able to reach an agreement as to
the nature of the boundary. However, what has kept this dispute contained was the recognition
that as substantial as the reserves may be, the severity of the climate in an offshore context made
the commercial exploitation of the region economically unrealistic. When oil price declined at
the end of the 1970s, an agreement was reached by the two governments to maintain the status
12
Hugh Kindred et al. International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada
4th ed (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publications Limited, 1987) 254.
13
Christopher Kirkey “Smoothing Troubled Waters: The 1988 Canada-United States
Arctic Co-operation Agreement,”International Journal (1995) vol.50.
7
quo. Both sides agreed not to temporarily freeze commercial development within the disputed
zone. Even exploration was contained.
Policy Issues: There are now signs that this issue will reemerge as an area of tension between the
two countries. The current American administration has signalled its intent to develop its
northern oil and gas reserves. President’s Bush’s effort to develop the oil and gas potential in the
protected land region of north east Alaska were ultimately defeated in the US Congress.
However, given the priority that the Bush administration has given to improving American
energy security, it is clear that the United States will be encouraging the development of the
northern off shore area. It is logical to assume that the disputed area will be included in the
American search for energy security.
Additionally, the economic case for the development of the offshore region will be further
strengthened if and when the new pipeline from the exiting north slope area is built. Such a
pipeline would make the shipment of oil from the north much cheaper, thus improving the
economic argument for further northern development. The Canadian Government has been
supportive of the American plan to develop this pipeline. The Yukon and Northwest Territory
governments are competing to have the route of the pipeline go through their territory. In a sense
therefore, the Canadian government is supporting a course of action that will possibly act as the
catalyst for a renewal of the dispute.
A possible solution to the dispute over this maritime area could lie in the development of a jointmanagement scheme. Given that the North American Free Trade Agreement created a shared
energy market, it does not seem improbable that agreement could be reached in which Canada
and the United States could share in the development of the resources within the disputed region.
There are numerous international examples of such arrangements. Even Australia and Indonesia
prior to the latter’s self-disintegration were able to put aside political differences to agree to the
joint management of a disputed maritime region that connected both countries. However, the
record in both Canada and the United States for the development of a joint management scheme
is not good. Such an agreement in the Gulf of Maine would have made sense but the inability of
the two countries to agree resulted in the case being sent to the ICJ. It is hard to see how the
Courts subsequent ruling can be seen as a “better” agreement that what may have been
negotiated. Even within Canada it has proven impossible to for the provinces to reach a shared
agreement regarding maritime offshore region. The recently concluded arbitration case between
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland over their maritime boundary demonstrated how bitterly these
issues are now fought.14 Thus, as practical as a joint-management scheme may seem, the politics
of reaching agreement will probably preclude such an arrangement. Furthermore, given the
currently strained relationship between Canada and the United States it is highly unlikely that
14
CBC News, “Newfoundland wins Large areas of Seabed,” April 2, 2002,
[http://www.cbc.ca/storyview/CBC/2002/04/02/seabed020402].
8
any such agreement would be reached. In this instance, it is in Canada’s interest to attempt to
delay discussion on this issue.
3) Submarine Activity in the Canadian Arctic - Canada/United States/Russia/France/UK:
During the Cold War, it is was well known that both American and Soviet nuclear powered
submarines entered Canadian Arctic waters.15 It is assumed that Canada accepted American
activity in this region as part of its commitment to the common defence against the Soviet Union.
In any case, there was little that Canada could do even if it opposed these voyages. The lack of
nuclear powered submarines or even an underwater listening system meant Canada did not have
the means of knowing when a foreign submarine entered the Arctic waters, let alone physically
responding.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and economic implosion of the Russian military has meant that
it is unlikely that the Russian navy continues to deploy their submarines into Canadian waters.
The bulk of their remaining submarines are based in the northern region of the Kola Peninsula.
But as the tragic events surrounding the sinking of the Kursk demonstrated, even their most
modern vessels are vulnerable to accidents. This sinking was probably a failure in a torpedo that
set off the chain of events that caused the submarine to sink. The inability of the northern fleet to
rescue the surviving sailors who survived the initial blast showed how badly the capability of the
Russian fleet have deteriorated. Likewise the efforts of the Russians to build new classes of
submarines has been shown to be weak. Construction on a Borey and Severodinsk class
submarine began in December 1993. Both remain incomplete to this day.16
The American navy has also reduced the number of submarines in its fleet. However, unlike the
Russians, the USN has continued the modernization of its fleet. It has also maintained the
existing fleet in a high state of readiness. The three new Seawolf class submarines are now
complete and in service. Construction has also begun on the Virginia class attack submarine. The
American navy has also revisited its interest in the operation of surface vessels in Arctic waters.
Assuming that climate change will allow for surface vessels to operate further north, the USN
has begun to consider what that will mean in terms of training and equipment for their vessels
operating in the region in the future. Such actions implies that the Americans will continue to
see northern deployments important for both the subsurface and surface fleet.
15
Ron Purver, “The Arctic in Canadian Security Policy, 1945 to the Present,” in David
Hewitt and David Leyton-Brown Canada’s International Security Policy (Scarborough: Prentice
Hall, 1995) 94.
16
Bellona, The Russian Northern Fleet- Nuclear Naval Vessels, [www.bellona.no.].
9
Policy Issues: Even after the end of the Cold war there has continued to be periodical reports of
sightings of submarines in Canadian waters. Many of these have come from Inuit hunters on the
land. In one instance in 1999 scientists studying marine wildlife also reported seeing a submarine
in the Cumberland Sound. The sighting was considered serious enough for the Canadian forces
to deploy long-range maritime patrol aircraft to investigate. According to defence officials no
submarine was discovered. It is possible that there was no submarine and that the observers were
mistaken. But it is also possible that the patrol aircraft did not locate it. It is difficult to locate
submarines in northern waters. The challenge of locating a foreign submarine in Canadian
waters that does not want to be find is so high that short of a grounding or other type of accident
it is unlikely that one would be located. This means that the Canadian Government can simply
ignore the problem if it so choses. Even if a foreign submarine was located the question arises as
to the Canadian government course of action. Would Canada wish to actively challenge one of
its allies - US, UK or France? The economic collapse of the Russian navy suggest that it cannot
currently mount a mission under the Canadian ice. Likewise the Chinese navy has a very limited
nuclear powered submarine capability and is even less capable of sending a submarine into
Canadian water. Therefore, any submarine found would probably be American, British or
French. It seems likely that unless the submarine’s presence was confirmed by non-governmental
sources, Ottawa would probably prefer to remain silent on any such sighting.
However, the Canadian Government may have to deal with the issue in the future. The Canadian
Navy intends to retrofit its new submarines with a fuel cell capability in the future. If this was
to occur, and if the ice does retreat, it is possible that these submarines may have the ability to
enter the edges of the Canadian arctic ice cover. Canada would for the first time have the ability
to monitor the southern entrances of its Arctic waters. This would give Canada a limited ability
to observe the entry of foreign submarines if they are entering these waters. The issue still would
arise as to what the Canadian Government would do with this information, but at a minimum,
foreign submarines could no longer count on their entry going completely undetected. The result
of such a capability would probably require the Canadian Navy to develop a water management
scheme with allied navies who have had submarines entering these waters. NATO currently
provides a system of notification for its navies that operate submarines anywhere on the globe.
This allows each navy to be aware of the location of any other allied submarine that is operating
in a specific region. Such a scheme is essential for safety reasons. The notification regime is
intended to reduce the possibility of an accidental collision. However, such information is only
shared with states that have submarines in a specified area. Thus Canada would only receive
such notification if it actually had submarines in arctic waters.
However, the possibility of the Canadian navy actually gaining the capability for its submarines
to operate in the fringes of the Arctic is low. The current difficulty of outfitting the submarine
will undoubtedly raise questions as to their long term viability. Even though the problems
currently being experienced is not unexpected when preparing a modern submarine for service
(as the Australians found with the Collins class), there is little doubt that critics of the
programme will try to prevent funds being dedicated to further upgrades. Furthermore, the
upgrades themselves are a unproven technology. Fuel cell technology is improving but it is still
not a mature technology. It remains to be seen what capability a submarine retrofitted with a fuel
cell would have and how deep into the Arctic waters it could safely be deployed.
10
4) Continental Shelf - Canada/ Russia/United States: The fourth international dispute that
Canada could face in the Arctic concerns the delimitation of the northern continental shelf. The
Northern Continental Shelf of Canada, the United States and Russia join in the high Arctic. Thus
there will be a need to delineate each state’s claim. The United Nations Convention of the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides for a means of determining a coastal states maritime zones
including the continental shelf.17 If a coastal state has a continental shelf it can claim rights over
the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf to a distance of 350 nautical miles from its coast. This gives
such a state the right to the resources found on the sea-bed and subsoil, including all oil and gas
deposits.
Under the terms of the Convention, a state must determine the limits of its continental shelf
within 10 years of ratification. Once it has done so, the specifics of its claim are submitted to an
international panel for review. Once this process is completed and if there is no counter claims
from neighbouring states, then the submitting state will be granted its claim. Russia ratified the
Convention in 1997 and has submitted its claim including that pertaining to the Arctic to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. It is now awaiting the Commission’s
decision. Canada and the United States have not ratified the Convention and as such have not
submitted their claims. Canada to this point has not yet undertaken the necessary hydrographic
examination to even have developed its claim should it decide to ratify the Convention.
The problem facing Canada is that it is unknown whether or not it will face overlap with the
Russian and American claims. The Canadian claim to its continental shelf in the Arctic region
has not yet been made. This was not a major problem as long as this region remained
inaccessible and neither Russia or the US attempted to determine its shelf. However, the Russian
movement on this issue now puts pressure on Canada to act. This pressure will further increase
if climate change allows for the development of resources in the region in the future. This will
not occur for any time in the immediate time-frame, but could become a possibility by 2050.
Likewise technological developments may allow for under-ice exploration of resources in this
area. It is reported that the Russian Government is currently considering the refitting of a
Typhoon class nuclear submarine to carry oil under the ice cap.18 It is already possible to build a
17
Ted McDorman, “The Role of the Commission in the Limits of the Continental Shelf:
A Technical Body in a Political World,” International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law [in
Press].
18
Fleet
Igor Kurdrik, “Typhoon Subs to Ship Oil and Gas,” Bellona -The Russian Northern
May
15,
11
2003
extraction system under the ice, albeit with considerable expense. It is not known if the Russian
Typhoon proposal is serious but the fact it is being considered demonstrate the innovative
thinking that may lead to breakthrough in the resource development in the region.
Policy Issues: Canada needs to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and
to dedicate the resources for determining its continental shelf. In doing so, Canada has the right
to submit its claim to its northern continental shelf. However, Canada needs to take action soon.
Otherwise it faces the prospect of challenging the established claims of the Russians and
Americans. As it stands, the Russians are well advanced in their claim. In all probability, the
longer that Canada takes to determine its claims, the less serious any Canadian challenge would
be taken by any international body arbitrating the differences.
5) Hans Island - Canada/Denmark: In an International dispute that has not received much
attention, Canada and Denmark have been contesting the ownership of a small island between
northern Greenland and Ellesmere Island known as Hans Island.19 This island is not much larger
than a rock and does not seem to have any known resources. However, in the summer of 2002
the Danish Government sent a ice-strengthened frigate to the island to assert its claim.20 The
island itself is small, but its ownership will affect the maritime boundary between Canada and
Greenland. If the Danish government is successful in asserting its claim Canada will be
compelled to redraw the maritime boundary agreement of 1974.
Policy Issues: Hans Island is unimportant by itself. However, should Canada lose its claim over
the island a dangerous precedent will be set. Therefore, it is in the Canadian interests to take
active steps to assert its claims over the island. This could include visits from the Rangers or
other members of the Canadian forces. Canada could also establish some form of research station
on the island. Each of these steps would be important statement of occupancy. Canada also needs
to make vigorous diplomatic statements of ownership to the Danish Government in regards to
this issue.
6) Illegal Fishing - Canada/Greenland/Faeroes Island: There is a growing fishing dispute
developing between Canada and foreign fishers in the waters between Greenland and Baffin
Island. While it has not been confirmed, Canadian Coast Guard officials believe that fishers from
[http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/northern_fleet/vessels/29577.html].
19
Nigel Banks, “Forty Years of Canadian Sovereignty Assertion in the Arctic,” Arctic 40
20
Rob Huebert, “The Return of the Vikings,” Globe and Mail (December 28, 2002).
(1987).
12
Greenland and the Faeroes Islands have been illegally entering Canadian waters.21 They are
there because of a growing fishery for shrimp and turbot. However because of the weak
Canadian surveillance capabilities, it is not know for certain if these fishers are entering
Canadian waters. NORDREG which is the regulatory body supporting the Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act does not require foreign (or Canadian vessels) to report their presence
in or near Canadian northern waters. Such vessels are only requested to report their entry.22 The
current concern is that fishers who may be in international waters between Greenland and
Canada cross over into Canadian waters to fish but do not report their position. Canadian ability
to physically detect such activity is limited. The Canadian Air Force has reduced the flights of
its long range maritime patrol aircraft in this region. This is partly in response to an increasingly
limited air force operational budget but also due to the aging nature of the aircraft. At the same
time, Canada has only a limited satellite surveillance system. RadarSat I can be used in a limited
fashion for some surveillance capability, but its has trouble detecting the smaller fishing vessels
used by some of the fishers. If and when RadarSat II is launched, its improved resolution
capability will improve Canada’s ability to detect these vessels.
Policy Issues: Canada needs to improve its surveillance and enforcement capability in all regions
of the Arctic. However the suspected illegal fishing in the eastern Arctic makes this region of
special need. Canada must redevelop its long-range maritime patrol aircraft capability. The
restraints on the current fleet are much too limiting to allow it to catch foreign fishers that are
entering Canadian waters illegally. Replacement craft will soon need to be ordered. At the same
time steps should be taken to ensure that the operational budget of the air force is increased to
allow for more deployments over the Eastern Arctic. Steps should also be taken to ensure that
RadarSat II is launched as soon as possible. When this does occur, surveillance of Canadian
arctic regions should be made a priority mission.
Canada will also need to increase its fleet of icebreakers and ice-strengthened vessels. While the
Canadian ability to know what is occurring in these waters must be improved, there is also a
need to be have the capacity to enforce Canadian laws and regulations. To do so means have
vessels that will be enter these waters and pursue and arrest foreign vessels if necessary
Canada should also make NORDREG a mandatory reporting system. If Canada is to show the
international community that it is serious about its claim to the Arctic, it needs to demonstrate
that it is willing to ensure all foreign vessels report once they are in Canadian waters. But
NORDREG can only be made mandatory with a strengthening of its surveillance and
enforcement capability. Otherwise such a move would be an meaningless.
21
Interview with Canadian Coast Guard Official, October 17, 2002.
22
Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.) c.2.
13
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY:
The Canadian Arctic is facing several series environmental challenges that threaten the long-term
health security of the people living in the north. The list is well-known: climate change; mercury
contamination, persistent organic pollutants (POP) (including PCB) and radionuclide pollutants.
Most of these pollutants originate from sources outside of Canada - hence they are collectively
known as transboundary pollutants.23
Of this list, the most significant of the environmental challenges is climate change The majority
of scientific studies strongly supports the thesis that anthropologic produced carbon gases are
causing a significant change of the Earths environment. The majority of studies demonstrate that
the Polar regions are currently experiencing and should expect to continue to experience the most
pronounce impact of climate change.24 This is supported by both western scientific studies and
traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) of the northern indigenous peoples.25
23
David VanderZwaag, Rob Huebert and Stacey Ferrara, “The Arctic Environmental
Protection Strategy, Arctic Council and Multilateral Initiatives: Tinkering while the Arctic
Marine Environment Totters,” in Alex Elferink and Donald Rothwell (eds) The Law of the Sea
and Polar Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001).
24
The literature on this subject is huge the IPCC 3rd report provides an excellent
overview. Some of the more recent materials on the impact of climate change on the Arctic are:
G.M. Flato and G.J. Boer, “Warming Asymmetry in Climate Change Simulations,” Geophysical
Research Letters vol vol 28, (2001) and P. Wadhams and N.R. Davis, “Further Evidence of ice
Thinning in the Arctic Ocean,” Geophysical Research Letters vol 27 no24(2000).
25
There is a growing literature using TEK as a means of research in the area of climate
change in the Arctic. See for example. J. Cruikshank, “Glaciers and Climate Change:
Perspectives from Oral Tradition,” Arctic vol.54 no.4 (December 2001).
14
Policy Issues: The Canadian Government has recently ratified the Kyoto Convention on Climate
Change. Critics contend that even if climate change does exist, this specific agreement will not
solve the problems. They are right, but only in the context that the treaty was never intended to
“solve” climate change but reduce its impact. The main developing states are not required to
reduce their carbon gas production, but their current output is low compared to the developed
countries. A bigger problem is faced by Canada in that the United States has refused to ratify the
Convention preferring to adopt a policy of adaptation. This was based on the argument that
climate change was not being influenced unduly by human activity. However, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency has recently issues a report in which it reverses this position.
The EPA now acknowledges that the process is being caused by human action. Regardless of this
reversal, the US still is officially dedicated to a policy of adaptation and does not accept the
current international efforts to address the problem.26
The net impact on the Canadian north is that as long as the United States refuses to address its
growing carbon gas production, the Canadian north will probably continue to face increased
temperatures. This will create a greater accessibility to the Canadian Arctic by both southern
Canadians and foreigners.
The Canadian Arctic is also facing pollution from mercury contamination.27 The sources for this
contamination has been difficult to pinpoint, but there is a growing consensus that it comes from
a range of sources. Some are foreign, some are local and some are natural. Currently the effort to
develop an international instrument to deal with the problem are in their preliminary stages.
The problem of POP was recognized in the late 1980s. The recently sign protocol on POPs
outlawing the use of the so called dirty dozen is a major achievement. This agreement requires
many underdeveloped states to reduce their use of pesticides and fertilizers. It was these that
were making their way into the Canadian Arctic regions. With the creation of the protocol, the
various countries that are using these pesticides and fertilizers are now being phased out.28
26
United States, State Department, The United States of America's Third National
Communication Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (U.S.
Department of State, May 2002).
27
“Mercury Rising,” Northern Perspective vol 27 no 3 (Fall/Winter 2002).
28
VanderZwaag, Huebert and Ferrara, pp.240-243.
15
Canada has also been very successful in the development of international organizations to deal
with the international environment challenges facing Canada. In cooperation with Finland,
Canadian officials were instrumental in the creation of the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy (AEPS).29 This organization through Canadian leadership was reformed into the Arctic
Council in 1996. Each of these organizations has played an important role in identifying the
many environmental problems facing the Canadian Arctic. However, there has been a tendency
to not provide these organizations with the resources necessary to being the process of improving
the northern environment. Canada has attempted to gain greater international support on this
issue, but has not been very successful in this matter.
TRADITIONAL SECURITY
While the focus of most security studies regarding the Canadian Arctic remain focus on the issue
of environmental security and international disputes, several traditional security issues remain.
As mentioned earlier the USN remains interested in operations in arctic waters.30 The USN held
a symposium on operation in “an ice-free Arctic” in the spring of 2001. This was based on the
assumption that climate change will reduce the ice allowing for operations further north and for
29
Rob Huebert, “New Directions in Circumpolar Cooperation: Canada, the Arctic
Environmental Protection Strategy and the Arctic Council,” Canadian Foreign Policy 5 no.2
(Winter 1998).
30
Rob Huebert, “Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War
Era,” International Journal vol. 54 no.2 (Spring 1999).
16
longer periods of time. This suggests that as the ice recedes, there will be more American naval
vessels in the region. If that happens, it is logical to assume that the Russian navy will attempt to
match such a move, if their economic circumstances improve in the future.
Canada will also face several non-naval security issues in the immediate future. In the fall of
2002, it seemed as if the Danish Government was going to grant the Americans permission to
use the Thule base in Greenland for the National Missile Defence system. However, there are
indications that this is not a done deal. There is a growing dispute between Greenland and
Denmark over the issue of homeland rule and defence policy. If this issue becomes too sensitive
for the Danish Government, it may reverse its decision to allow the American access to Thule for
its radar for the anti-ballistic missile defence system. If this occurs Canada will probably be
asked to host a northern radar site for the system.31
There is also the security problems associated with the openness of the Canadian Arctic in the
current war on terrorism. It is currently unlikely that a terrorist organization would attempt to
gain access to North America through the Canadian north. It still remains easier to try other
access points further to the south. Unfortunately there are two reasons why such a risk cannot be
completely discounted. Because of Canada’s limited surveillance capability in the Arctic, it is
impossible to know for certain who is in the Canadian north. Thus, if all other entry points to
North America are sealed, the Arctic could become a possible entry point. This possibility in turn
31
George MacDonald VCDS CF, “Canadian Security in the Arctic” Presentation at
Conference “On Thinning Ice” Ottawa January 2001.
17
creates the second problem. The United States with its current sensitivity to security issues may
come to view the Canadian north as a “hole” that needs to be plugged. This means that they will
either increase pressure on Canada to do something more, or decide to do it themselves. Both
will create security challenges for Canada even if the risk from terrorist activity in the north is
low.
CONCLUSIONS
Perhaps the greatest foreign and defence challenges facing Canada in its Arctic region is the fact
that no one issue seems to be immediately pressing. Each on its own accord seems relatively
unimportant. The problem however, is that when considered as a whole, the challenges facing
Canada are substantial. However, most will not become front-page news for some time. This
means that little will currently be done to prepare to respond to each of these issues. When they
do become urgent there is a danger that the government will respond to each on an ad-hoc and
piecemeal fashion. If this is the case, it seems unlikely that Canadian interests will be adequately
protected. What is needed is a coherent and comprehensive strategy that begins to develop the
policy tools now to ensure that Canada’s interest are protected in the Canadian north. In this
manner, the Canadian arctic will not be lost by incremental defeats.
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