1 Additional Material:
Early Spanish Conquests
Spanish experiences in Latin and South America during the late fifteenth and the sixteenth
centuries differed in some notable ways from colonization elsewhere in North America. To
begin, military adventurers and proselytizing missionaries played key roles in the Spanish
conquest of indigenous peoples. In 1492, when Columbus first discovered lands in what
became known as the New World, the Spanish also completed their centuries-long conflict
against the Muslim Moors, finally expelling them out of the Iberian Peninsula. As a result, a
large pool of men possessing military skills or a commitment to spreading the Catholic faith
were now available for other endeavors (such as creating a new overseas empire). Though
Jesuit priests did promote the cause of Catholicism among natives in Canada, seventeenthcentury French and English colonies stemmed more from efforts to establish commercial
ventures or, in the latter case, create communities where settlers had liberty to practice particular religious faiths.
Another peculiarity is that the Spanish encountered and conquered the last great native
empires in the Americas: the Aztec and the Inca. The largest native polity in North America per se—the Mississippian or mound-building culture centered around a city now called
Cahokia in what is today Illinois—had declined in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
although in 1540–42 the conquistador Hernando de Soto came across some last remnants of
it among peoples he encountered in the continent’s southeast. Whereas the Aztec capital of
Tenochtitlán (now Mexico City) had about 200,000 people when Hernán Cortés first arrived
in 1519, in the seventeenth-century French and English colonists encountered native nations
with populations of a few thousand, or an occasional confederation of peoples whose total
inhabitants numbered in the low tens of thousands. And these populations were often dispersed in numerous towns and villages.
The conquest of these empires entailed some unique fighting compared to experiences
elsewhere in the Americas. At Tenochtitlán, Spanish forces under Cortés engaged in street
combat. In the final campaign to take the city in 1521, they constructed boats and used
native allies in canoes to support soldiers assaulting causeways across Lake Texcoco. Although
precise figures are elusive, the size of the forces involved were much larger than in the majority of engagements during the contact and early colonial period, with thousands on either
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Figure 1.1 “Cortés striking a native alliance”
From The history of the conquest of Mexico by the Spaniards translated into English from the original
Spanish of Don Antonio de Solis . . . by Thomas Townsend, Esq.
Library of Congress, Rare Book and Special Collections Division, Jay I. Kislak Collection [LC control no.
16005370]
side. But this point demonstrates the need for European colonists for native allies. Cortés’
Spanish forces generally had only a few hundred soldiers at any given time, perhaps about a
thousand at the most. But native allies who fought with them numbered many thousands,
and provided crucial manpower in the final campaign.
The Aztec example also raises the issue of technology. Various treatments of initial contacts between indigenous and Western peoples in the Americans comment on native shock
when first encountering firearms. While true, such awe did not last very long. Certainly
the crossbows and arquebuses (precursors to muskets) used by Spanish soldiers in Mexico
were superior to any missile weapons possessed by the Aztec. But given the difficulty in
using them as well as their limited numbers, their contribution to the Spanish conquest is
debatable. The steel swords and armor of Spanish soldiers were at least as important, as they
were superior to the wood and bone variants used by Aztec warriors. (Metal versions of tools
and weapons already familiar to native peoples, such as axes, became very popular among
indigenous groups after contact with Europeans.) The Spanish in Mexico also had another
military advantage: horses. These large animals were not native to the Americas, and when
mounted by soldiers and used for quick attacks, were perhaps more impressive than firearms
to the Aztecs. As with guns, their contribution to the ultimate Spanish conquest is debatable.
But the introduction of horses into the Americas speaks to a broader issue. Europeans
came from a different ecological environment than Native Americans. Not only were plants
and animals different, but so were diseases. The biological interaction that occurred when
Europeans started crossing the Atlantic is today referred to as the “Columbian exchange.”
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For Native Americans the most devastating aspect of this development was the introduction
of new diseases. As children, Westerners had usually been exposed and developed antibodies to lethal diseases such as small pox (if they survived)—diseases that had not previously
existed among native American peoples. In the centuries that followed initial contacts with
Europeans, deadly epidemics periodically afflicted indigenous groups throughout the Americas. By the seventeenth century, native populations had dropped precipitously, and may
have influenced the development of mourning war (discussed in Chapter 1 of Ways of War)
and other practices whereby North American peoples limited the lethality of their conflicts.
Before then, the spread of disease assisted Spanish efforts to expand their authority over
larger areas of Central and South America. Having already established their domination over
most of the Caribbean, Spanish conquests continued after the defeat of the Aztec in 1521,
of which the most dramatic was the subjugation the Incas starting in 1532 with the expedition led by Francisco Pizarro. But numerous native groups came under Spanish influence,
who often provided labor for Spanish-owned estates or to support the Catholic missions
that endeavored to convert them to Christianity. By the seventeenth century, the northern
extreme of the Spanish empire reached what is today New Mexico. There, in the 1680 Pueblo
Revolt, local peoples inflicted what Alan Taylor has described as “the greatest setback that
natives ever inflicted on European expansion in North America.” Even so, by the 1690s the
Spanish were reasserting their control over the region.
Another region in the northern extreme of the Spanish empire was Florida. There the
main settlement was Saint Augustine, the first permanent European settlement in North
America proper. The Spanish founded it in 1565 to protect shipping routes between the Caribbean and Spain, including treasure fleets carrying gold and silver. To help defend Florida
from possible overland attacks from the north, the Spanish cultivated relations with indigenous peoples, such as the Apalachee, Guale, and Timucua, and established missions in the
area. By the early eighteenth century, rivalries between European powers and the advent of
the Indian slave trade embroiled these peoples in a series of devastating regional wars.
Carolina, the Indian Slave Trade, and Early Conflict in
the American Southeast
In 1670, a group of English colonists began a new settlement on the southern portion of
North America’s Atlantic seaboard, called Charles Town in honor of their reigning monarch
(later Charleston). Though the colony was sponsored by a group in England, the settlers
themselves had come directly from the Caribbean, where slave labor to harvest sugar cane
and similar products was widespread. One of the assumptions underlying this new venture
was that colonists would produce goods such as cattle and timber needed to maintain West
Indies’ plantations. As they cleared fields and cut trees with the labor of white indentured
servants and African slaves, they also established relationships with local native peoples.
As in other parts of North America, colonists and Indians began to trade with one another,
and native peoples here also greatly valued guns and other manufactured items. To the
north, indigenous groups traded pelts that Europeans greatly valued, but beaver do not live
in the American southeast. There natives offered deerskins, which English traders valued—
but not as much as Indian slaves. Though the Carolina settlers could use them on their own
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farms, native slaves tended to run away. The English profited more by selling them to West
Indies plantations. This development produced a situation similar to that on the African
coast. Many native peoples felt compelled to raid other Indian groups to acquire slaves and
participate in the trade with the English, rather than risk becoming targets of attacks. But
some groups who were initially slavers were later devastated by slave raids themselves.
In the 1670s, for example, Carolina colony established ties with the Westo, who raided
Guale and Mocama people on what is now the Georgia and northern Florida seacoast. By the
end of the decade, though, the English favored the Savannah, who helped destroy the Westo.
In the 1680s, the Yamasee became the most powerful group close to Carolina, and launched
slaving expeditions against natives dwelling on Spanish missions. After 1700, the English
developed relations with a loosely-affiliated group of native peoples they dubbed the Creek.
In the early eighteenth century, these conflicts intersected with hostilities between Britain,
France, and Spain, and provoked native assaults on southern English colonies (addressed in
Chapter 2 of Ways of War).
Non-English Colonization in the Northeast
After Saint Augustine, Europeans did not (successfully) establish permanent colonies in
North America until the seventeenth century. But natives and Westerners still interacted
along the Atlantic seaboard. In some areas Europeans established temporary and seasonal
settlements, particularly fishermen, who often traded with local peoples. The crucial example here was the northeastern corner of North America. Fishermen from various European
countries fished off the nearby Grand Banks throughout the sixteenth century, and the most
valued commodity they obtained in trade with local natives was beaver pelts.
Box 1.1 Samuel de Champlain Helps Defeat
the Iroquois
Please click on the following link for access to the print Defeat of the Iroquois at Lake
Champlain.
From Tarry at home travels. (New York: Macmillan, 1906) Hale, Edward Everett (1822–
1909), Author. Mid-Manhattan Library / Picture Collection:
http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/dgkeysearchdetail.cfm?trg=1&strucID=
700846&imageID=808074&r=02fLake%20Champlain%20%2D%2D%201600%2D1609&
word=&rOper=2&stype=Rel&rSource=Tarry%2520at%2520home%2520travels%252E&
rDiv=Picture%20Collection&rCol=The%2520Picture%2520Collection%2520of%2520the
%2520New%2520York%2520P%2E%2E%2E&s=3&notword=&d=&c=&f=&k=1&total=14
&num=0&imgs=20&pNum=&pos=5
In 1609, Samuel de Champlain accompanied some Huron and Montagnais allies in a
battle against the Mohawks, one of the Five Nations of the Iroquois. This was the first time
Indians in northeastern North America saw a firearm used. Initially behind and hidden
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from the view of the Mohawk, at a key moment, Champlain and other Frenchmen moved
in front of their native allies and fired their matchlocks, killing some chieftains. Shortly
thereafter the Mohawk fled. Some argue the battle demonstrates that prior to European
colonization, native foes engaged in more battles than afterwards, which resulted from
the introduction of firearms into the continent. One scholar claims the Iroquois began using “skulking” ambush and hit-and-run tactics in the 1600s because they initially lacked
firearms that the French distributed to their Amerindian allies. Champlain’s account of the
battle also demonstrates that to that time warriors often built barricades to defend their
camps—the image above includes one the Mohawk had built the previous day.
These became so popular that Europeans, particularly the French, set up seasonal or temporary trading posts around the gulf of the St. Lawrence River. In 1608, explorer and trader
Samuel de Champlain established Quebec, the first permanent French settlement in Canada,
or the colony of New France, with subsequent communities founded farther up the St. Lawrence River at Trois-Rivières (1634) and Montreal (1642). Simultaneously, the Dutch pursued
permanent posts to facilitate the fur trade to the south. In 1609, Henry Hudson (himself
English, but hired by the Dutch) sailed up the river that now bears his name, establishing
contacts with native peoples. In 1614, the Dutch established the trading post of Fort Nassau,
later replaced by Fort Orange, upriver at what is today Albany. About a decade later, to guard
the Hudson River’s mouth and provide supplies to Fort Orange and additional colonies, they
founded New Amsterdam (now the city of New York).
Trade helped foster amicable relations between settlers and natives, especially in the
French case. But because New France never possessed a large population—roughly 3,000 in
1663, compared to about 60,000 in the English colonies in 1660—its officials sought Indian
groups as allies to defend the colony. Missionary efforts were also respectful of native customs, as French Jesuits first sought to learn about indigenous societies and spiritual beliefs to
better facilitate the introduction of Catholicism to local peoples. As with other Europeans,
the French did not regard natives as cultural equals. But in other cases colonizers sought to
impose authority and beliefs on indigenous peoples, whereas circumstances motivated the
Canadian French to treat local peoples in a way where both contributed relatively equally
to their interactions, a development historian Richard White calls the creation of a “middle
ground.”
The Dutch case is more mixed. At Fort Orange, colonists generally maintained good relations with native groups. But further south, a number of wars erupted prior the English
conquest of New Netherland in 1664. In the lower Hudson River valley, trade with natives
was negligible, and colonial officials focused on enticing immigrants to the colony to cultivate land and provide manpower for local defense. Dutch demands for tribute and efforts
to extend their authority had generated tensions with local Wappinger peoples for years
before Governor Willem Kieft ordered an attack on an unsuspecting native group in 1643.
The resulting conflict, known as Kieft’s War, engulfed New Amsterdam and its environs until
1645. Kieft was replaced in 1647 by the more competent Pieter Stuyvesant, yet wars erupted
with Indians in the lower Hudson River valley in 1655, 1659–60, and 1663–64.
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These latter wars, limited to a particular area, were similar to the conflicts early English
colonies would experience. But cross-cultural trade gave rise to a much larger series of conflicts that spanned both the bulk of the seventeenth century and a large swath of the North
American interior, known as the Beaver Wars. The key belligerents in all of these wars were
the Five Nations of the Iroquois (comprised of the Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, and
the Mohawk), a large confederation of peoples located in what is now central and western
New York state. The central issue was trade with Europeans. The latter offered a number of
goods greatly valued by indigenous peoples including cloth, alcohol, metal tools, and firearms. Indian nations able to control access to and distribution of such items (and deny such
to native competitors) would greatly enhance their status and influence.
The Beaver Wars
When the French first settled the Saint Lawrence River valley, they established relationships
with both nearby Abenaki groups, and also another native confederacy known as the Huron
that resided further west in the Great Lakes region, north of Lakes Ontario and Erie. The
Huron acquired pelts through barter with indigenous bands living further in the continental
interior, and then exchanged them with the French in return for manufactured items. This
trade threatened the status of the Iroquois nations. After the Dutch established their trading
posts on the upper Hudson, the Five Nations had their own source of Western goods. But to
obtain pelts for trade, they needed access to Indian bands further west and north.
The Beaver Wars began in the 1640s between the Iroquois and the Huron. Hostilities first
consisted of Five Nations warriors raiding and ambushing Huron parties traveling down the
St. Lawrence to trade with the French. But the Iroquois dramatically escalated the intensity
and lethality of their operations by the end of the decade, culminating in 1648–49 with
campaigns that involved hundreds to over 1,000 warriors and that destroyed large Huron
towns. These assaults also disrupted Huron cycles of planting and harvesting, producing food
shortages. As a result, hundreds died, and the Huron confederacy was effectively destroyed,
though most individuals survived: The Iroquois captured and adopted a few thousand into
Iroquois communities, and the rest dispersed to join other native bands or establish communities further north, west, and south of their traditional homelands.
Warfare of this intensity had never been previously observed among the peoples of the
North American interior. Trade with Europeans provided an important new motivation for
conflict, and firearms made combat more lethal compared to the use of indigenous weapons.
But the Five Nations also chose to increase the degree of violence beyond that of previous
raids and ambushes in order to eradicate a traditional enemy, rather than simply weaken the
Huron or undermine their influence. To do so, the Iroquois pursued a number of innovations in their 1648–49 campaigns against the Huron.
These operations featured unprecedented numbers of warriors, but also winter operations
and night assaults, traditionally avoided by native peoples. Huron towns possessed palisades,
or tall wooden walls, to defend their inhabitants. To counter them, scholar Craig Keener
observes the Iroquois developed new assault tactics that took advantage of European technology, including both firearms and metal axes that were superior to indigenous stone ones.
While some warriors fired guns to engage the defenders’ attention, others would advance to
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chop holes in the palisade and enter into the town. These assault tactics proved short-lived,
for the Iroquois soon came across foes who had adopted another European ­innovation—the
bastion. A bastion is a projection from a wall that allows defenders to fire down its length
into any enemy engaged in close assault (such fire into an enemy’s side or flank is also called
enfilade fire or enfilading fire). When Iroquois warriors encountered towns whose palisades
had bastions in the mid-1600s, they reverted back to ambush and raiding tactics.
Box 1.2 Please follow the below link for an
example of a simple drawing of a Bastion
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bastion_(PSF).jpg
But the Beaver Wars did not end with the destruction of the Huron confederacy. Scholars
such as Daniel Richter note that trade with Europeans not did supplant, but rather became
an additional motivation for war between native groups. For the Five Nations, traditional
incentives for war included access to hunting grounds, extending their influence over other
groups, and pursuing mourning wars to replace those who had died in wars or epidemics.
All these reasons enticed the Five Nations to fight numerous other indigenous peoples over
the next few decades, such as the Erie and Neutrals to the west, the Susquehannocks to the
south, and various Algonquian-speaking bands and groups (including the Abenaki) to the
east and north.
Moreover, direct conflict between the Five Nations and New France also intensified. As
early as 1609, Samuel de Champlain assisted Algonquian allies against Iroquois warriors
(the first time natives of either side had seen the use of a firearm), and Five Nations war parties occasionally raided French settlements and outposts. But in the late 1600s, New France
mounted large invasions of Iroquoia, with numbers totaling a few hundred to up to two
thousand regular troops, Canadian militiamen, and native allies. Mohawk homelands were
invaded in 1666 and 1693, Seneca in 1687, and Onondaga in 1696; most inhabitants fled
from these advances, but the French always destroyed Iroquois homes and fields.
The last of the Beaver Wars coincided with King William’s War (1689–97) between England and France, addressed in Chapter 2 of Ways of War. By that time, decades of warfare
had exhausted the Iroquois. Whereas the Five Nations numbered perhaps more than 20,000
at the beginning of the seventeenth century, casualties and prisoners lost in war as well as
epidemics had reduced that to under 10,000 by the end of the 1600s—despite the fact that
the Iroquois continued to practice mourning war to replace their numbers. As a result, the
Five Nations and New France agreed to end hostilities and established peace with the Grand
Settlement of 1701. The Iroquois did not completely eschew war, though. They generally
remained neutral in the eighteenth-century imperial wars between the French and the British, but fought indigenous peoples such as the Catawba and other groups in the continent’s
southeast.
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The Beaver Wars demonstrate how the mere presence of European colonies made native
warfare more lethal and destructive. Part of this development stemmed from Western technology. Muskets were much more lethal than bows and arrows, yet even simple iron hatchets
enabled Iroquois to more effectively attack enemy palisades. Beyond weapons per se, access
to European trade goods and beaver pelts created powerful incentives to fight. These interacted with traditional incentives for war to create a series of native conflicts unprecedented
in scale. Moreover, the Beaver Wars did not just exhaust the Iroquois and destroy the Huron
confederacy, but produced a seventeenth-century exodus. To escape the ravages of the Five
Nations, Indian peoples originally residing around the eastern Great Lakes and Ohio River
Valley migrated west, most stopping on the far side of Lake Michigan. There they intermingled, creating new nations. Most remained friendly with the French, and would play an
important role in the imperial conflicts of the mid-eighteenth century.
Short Bibliography
Gallay, Alan. The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670 – 1717. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002.
Keener, Craig S. “An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Iroquois Assault Tactics Used against Fortified Settlements of the Northeast in the Seventeenth Century. Ethnohistory 46 (1999): 777–807.
Richter, Daniel K. The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European
Colonization. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.
Taylor, Alan. American Colonies: The Settling of North America. New York, Penguin, 2001.
Thomas, Hugh. Conquest: Montezuma, Cortés, and the Fall of Old Mexico. New York: Simon & Schuster,
1993.
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