Strategic Metals and National Defense:
Tungsten in World War II (and Beyond)
By Ro nald H. Lin1baugh
Tungsten in Peace and War
T ungsten, a heavy, s teel-gray element w ith
th e hig hes t m elting po in t o f an y metal, was
known to scientists 150 years before it became
commerc ially ''aluable. ~lost of the world's supply comes fro m deposits in North ~ \merica and
~-\s i a, particularly Canada, Russia, Kazahks tan,
and China. In t·he U.S., the primary deposits now mostly depleted-are in Nevada, Califo rnia, Colo rado, and ~ \rizona.1
The modern era of hig h-speed industrial techno logy began w ith th e Paris Exhibit·io n in 1900,
at w hich machinists firs t dem o nstrated the superio rity of tungsten-hardened steel cutting tools
over o rdinary carbo n-steel products. O ver the
next several decades, new techno logies and new
industrial and d o mes tic applicatio ns continued
to stimulate tungsten productio n and use. \Var
and its preparatio n also played a ro le in tungs ten's
rise. T he eno rmo us mili tary demands fo r heavy
equipment, steel tools and weapo ns, armo r plate,
~mel armo r piercing shells in the first half of the
twe ntieth cen tury made tungs te n o ne o f th e
world's strategic metals, an clemen t w ith po litical as well as econo mic impo rtance 2
Strategic Metals in World War II
For mos t d o mestic producers of tungsten and
o ther strategic minerals, the interim between th e
First and Second \\fo rld \\Iars was o ne of frustratio n and fa ilure. The tungs ten market had
boomed during \\fo rld \\far I, but the industry
collapsed in 19 19 after the government abruptly
canceled wartime contracts, and the d o m estic
building boom that fo llowed took years t·o absorb surp lus reserves. •\ government relief bill
approved in the early twenties to compensate
aggrieved contract ho lders paid o nly a fractio n
of th e claims submitted, and the tariffs of 1922
and 1930, w hich, am o ng other du ties, add ed
nearly eight do llars to fo reign tungsten impo rts,
were counterproductive in the general collapse
of markets and prices after 1929.3
Tungs ten demand in the Uni ted States remained low d uring the early depressio n years,
and fo r mos t of the thirties isolatio nist sentimen t
stymied effo rts to increase the U.S. military budget in respo nse to rising fasc ist c hallenges aro und
the wo rld. G lo bal tung"S ten prices beg(l n to climb
after 1938, as war talk gt·ew in E urope, but large
o re reserves in the United States and th e lingering effects o f recessio n o n steel plan ts kep t a lid
o n d om estic demand. Even the outbreak of war
in September 1939 did not immediately stimulate do mestic pro ductio n, in part because o f price
instability in th e tungs ten market. \\fith th e
~-\merican econo m y still recuperating and isolatio nist resistance still stro ng, mine owners feared
that fo reign pro ducers might clump tungsten o n
the ~-\merican market, furth er ero ding prices and
hurting d o mestic producers:'
Everything changed with the fall o f France
in June 1940. Even tho ugh the Uni ted States
would no t become an o fficial belligerent fo r another eig hteen mo nth s, mo bilizatio n was in full
fo rce after the N azis marched into Paris. ~-\s rearmament mushroomed, the Roosevelt .-\dmin istratio n devised new strategies to m eet wartime
Strategi~·
M.eta!J a11d Natio11ai Deje11Je
produc tion needs.
E nsuring an adequate and steady supply of
strategic raw ma te rials was the fi rst priori ty o n
th e wartime produc tio n agenda. D es pite the
proximity of i\Iexico and oth er mine ral-ric h
hemispheric nations, .-\merica faced glaring sho rtages o f strategic ma terials after 19-J.O. D efense
industry co nsum p tio n in t·he war years mushroom ed two o r three times over that o f the 1919..J.O base period. During the critical years 19..J.2..J...J., 90 percent o f chromium supplies came fro m
abroad, 86 percen t o f m anganese, 100 percent
o f nickel, and 61 percent of tungsten. _-\t least
a third o f all co ppe r, lead, and zinc- m e tals
abundant in the United States- also came from
fo reign suppliers in these years, although th e reaso n fo r that had mo re to do with "a lack o f o rganization and n1anpower," as one congressman
put it, than a lack of dom estic de posits.5
Fear o f shortages in wartime led to increased
calls fo r stockpiling stra tegic m e tals. Bernard
Baruc h, .-\merica's eco n omic " cz~1r" in \\'o rld
War 1, had first raised the idea o f a s trategic
stockpile in 1919. T he disarmam ent m ood o f
the flapper age, however, ended serious consideration until the late 1930s, when Congressman
Jam es G . Scrugham , a 1 evada D emocra t and
mining inves to r, secured a $3.5 millio n naval ap propria tion fo r purchasing s trategic mine rals to
meet current co nstruction needs. T he Scrugham
bill was fo llowed, in 1939, by the first significan t national stockpile legislation. Sponsored by
Sena tor E lbert Th o mas o f Utah and Congressm an _-\ndrew Jackso n ;\fay of [(entucky, the
"Tho m as .-\ c t" autho rized $100 millio n to be
spent over a four-year perio d. 6
The s tockpiling m om entum started slowly,
bu t accelerated as na tio nal defense took o n increasing urgency. In the summer of 1940, Congress revised the s tockpile law o f '1939, resulting in a much larger ~mel m ore co mprehensive
program. The new law gave H oover's old co rpora te lending agency, th e Reconstruc tion Fi-
39
nance Corpo ration, broad auth ority to purchase
and co ntro l stockpil ed ma te rials. Pres id e nt
Roosevelt fo llowed w ith an executiYe order establishing two RFC subsidiaries: the ~ fe tals Reserve Company, and the D efense Contracts Compan r First used to build stockpiles of rubber
and tin, th ese lending and spending fi rms saw
bo th their fund ing a nd fun ctions rapidl y expanded .Building a stnltegic stockpile during a military crisis-with defense indus tries com peting
w ith dom es tic manufac turers fo r limited sup pli es- was n ex t to impossible w itho ut both
prio ritiza tion and conser va tio n. Tn l94'1, through
th e ne\v Office of Price ;\fo bili7.a tion, th e feds
began a systematic effort to conser ve strategic
ma te rials, with co nsumer p ro duc1·s ta king t·he
biggest hit. To sa,re tungsten, fo r example, OP ~ f
first urged, then ordered the natio n's dom estic
s teel producers o utside the defense industries to
find substitutes fo r tungs ten. ;\[o lybdenum was
the gm·ernment's recommended substitute, based
o n studies begun by th e _\rmy Ordinance D epart-men t in the ea rl y t·hirties sugges ting tha t
tungs ten's " twin" co uld be used for most applicatio ns. Tung"Sten rationing began three m on ths
before the U.S. entered the war.8
Strategic planning also m eant den ying vital
mate rials to enemies, real o r p otential. In wartime tha t s trategy might be pursued llggress ively
through blockades and bombing raids, but com m erce and diplomacy played equally importan t
roles, bo th before and during th e war. Soo n after G ermany invaded Poland, th e Sta te D epar tment imposed a " mo ral embargo" o n m olybdenum and o ther dom estic me tals scheduled fo r
delivery to _-\.xis powers. \\'hen some mining offi cials protested, Cordell Hull sugges ted they
m ollify their stockho lders with a newsletter explaining th at the embargo applied to " th ose who
had bo mbed open cities killing wom en and children."9
Outside o f the United Sta tes, Hull's m oral
-+0
2006
i\ii11i1~~ HiJto~y
suas1on had little impac t. S1n1tegic ores produced e lsewhe re went to th e highest bidde r.
During the thirties Germany was the eigh t hundred pound guerrilla that domina ted the internatio nal tungsten m~trke t. I lowe\·er, the competition changed afte r '19-+0, when the governm e nt-backed ;\(e ta ls Rese n "e Co m pan y un leas hed the power of the almigh ty _-\me rican
dollar.10
To supply the stockpile program as well as
keep Chin ese o re o ut o f en em y hand s, RFC
bought eight thousand tons of C hinese concentra te, and con tinued buying after the J apanese
blocbded Jiong Ko ng. Despite enormous transpo rtatio n costs, shipments came overland via the
Burma Road un til the Japanese also cut o ff d1a t
route. l'or a few despent te m o nth s in 19-+2, some
. \m erican airmen risked thc i1· li\' CS fl ying C hinese tungste n over the Himalayas to freighters
waiting in the Indian O cean .11 Keeping s tL·a tegic metals fro m enemy hands was expensive, but
na tio nal security jus tified th e cost. O verall, during the war years RFC bid from ten to twenty
times the normal market price fo r the most critical m eta ls.12
\'l'ithin th e mining industr y, pro minent
spokesmen welcomed the governmet1t''s e mphasis o n building strategic reser ves, bu t no t at the
expense of do mes tic producers. The early talk
o f scarcity alarmed n1i l it~try plann ers, however,
and preliminary studies of dom estic miner~tl supplies were not encouraging. 0(any _-\ merican o res
seem ed too marginal to provide a steady and reliable source o f strategic minerals, but do mestic
n1ining men though t differently. .-\t the annual
meeting o f the :\me ric(ln ;\{ining Congress in
September 19-+0, they sought to reassure _-\ mericans there would be no shortages o f lead, m ercury, copper, tungsten, and o ther m etals in case
of war.13
1\'ot o n the agenda o f the .-\;\(C meeting, but
clearly o n th e minds o f mining representatives,
were the acl,'erse conseque nces of fo reign o re
.Jo!lrllcrf
purc hases 0 11 dom estic produc tio n <1 11d profits.
These were o ld econo mic fears, re fl ec ted in bo th
testimo ny <1nd legisla tive langu age elating back
to the tariff debates o f the la te twenties, but old
wine cou ld be p,.ckaged in new bo ttles. Co rporate \'iabili ty was no longer the primary ra tio nale fo r pro tecting th e natio n's mining industry
fro m " low cost a nd low priced fore ign co mpe titio n." The new justificatio n was na tional security. In the words of tl1e pre,.mble to th e 1939
T homas bill- langu age provided by th e mining
lo bby- the natio n in wartime faced a "d~mger­
ous and cos tly dependence" on fo reign supplies
unless .-\me ric7t's mines were healthy and procluc tive .11
N,. tio nal security gave new meaning to the
mining industry's call for military and industry
procuren1en t agen ts to "buy .-\merican." The
phrase came from de pressio n-era eco n omicstimulus legisla tio n requiring goYernme nt agencies to purchase do mestic co mmodities, but· two
glaring looph oles made the law virtuall y une nforceable. _\.ny departmen t head could demur if
he decided that the purchase was too expensive
o r "in co n sis tent with the publi c inter es t."
Th e refo re, despite th e co nce rn s o f do m es tic
mining m en, unti l _-\ merica entered th e wa r and
natio nal securit·y became th e o ve rriding issue,
procurement o fficers could safely ignore " buy
_-\ merican" s tipulatio ns.15
Th e failure o f " buy .-\merican" laws to pro tect the dom estic mining industry made the tariff th e las t bulwark against fo reign compe titio n .
D om es tic producers had ma ny allies in Washingto n, but the '1932 election altered the po litical landscape. D em ocrats had carried the ball
fo r free trade ever since Grover Cle,,eland's firs t
term in o ffice; now they were in power again
after a lo ng hiatus and clamo ring for tariff reform. Re taliatory rate hikes by trading partners
in the wake o f high Smoot-H awle y duties made
reform ,.]] th e mo re imper,. tive.16
E ncouraged by Secre tary o f State Cordell
Strategit· i\lletals and National Difenie
Hull, the lead ing free trader in the Roosevelt
"-\dministration, the Democratic majority pushed
a reciprocal trade bill thm ugh Congress in 1934.
It revolutionized tariff policy by authorizing the
president to negotiate reciprocal rate changes up
to 50 percent either way from then-existing levels. ~ [oreover, it paved t·he way fo r what was
later called the "fast track," by giving the president power to implement rates without additional
legislation. Soon trade harriers began to ease
under Hull's vigorous leadership. Up to 1938,
some eighteen treaties had bee n negotiated .17
Rearmament and th e emphasis on natio nal
security complicated tmiff red uction efforts.
Metal sho rtages a nd rising prices after '19-J.O in creased the demand for i mports, !Jut free traders
made little headway during the crit·ical war yea rs.
\\lhile State Department officials opposed any
"special in t·erest" legisla1tion that· tended to un dermine the expansion of trade, the tungste n
duty remained intact: un til the shooting stopped.
Indeed, as foreign trade routes reopened later in
the war, at least one congressman called for increasi ng the tariff to protect horne industry fro m
cheaper minerals pouring into the coun try. 18
Despite the tariff protection, domestic mine
owners clamored for more government aid to
stimulate the nation's stntegic minerals industry. In the summer of 1941, they found a new
champio n in Secretary of the Interior J-brold
Ickes, one of several progressive Repu blicans in
Roosevelt's cabinet. In testimony before a congressional committee, he spoke in favor of an
accelerated program to discover, develop, and
process new domestic deposits. Even low-grade
ores, he argued, should be investigated, even if
no t mined until they wet·e needed. 19
Congress and the Roosevelt .--\dmin istration
soon responded with ftworal>le legislation and
new executive orders, us.ing the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation as the governmen t's principal fiduciary link with corporate .·\ merica. \\'ith
expanded powers and ~111 enormous l>uclget, R FC
41
soon begtln pumping money into domestic strategic production, first by purchasing domestic
minerals at a premium over fo reign supplies of
similar ores, next by raising the ceiling prices the
government paid fo r tungsten and other strategic m etals, then by subsid izing major mines to
expand production and development, and later
hy using low-cost loans to help even marginal
producers open and develop lmv-gt·ade deposits. To encourage smaller producers, the government also lowered the t<l.'.: on excess profits and
eased red tape by simplifying reporting procedures.20
Federal subsidies to the domestic mining industry did not end with fi nancial support. ~ lin ­
ers h ~1 d always welcomed government help in
locating o re bodies and figuring out the best mining and milling methods-provided, of course,
t·hat· government did not become a competitive
threat to private industry. The 1939 T ho mas
bill reflected this traditio n in a clause providing
special funds for federal research and development of strategic deposits.
Bolstered by periodic funding supplements,
field crews from the Bureau of Mines and the
Geological Su rvey investigated nearly every mineral district, mountain range, surface deposit, and
likely outcrop in the United States. T hey built
pilot plants, conducted beneficiation studies, discovered new milling processes, aided and advised thousands of private operators, and wrote
hundreds of reports. Focusing initially on seven
cri tical metals-an timony, chromium, manganese, mercury, nickel, tin, and tungsten- th e
bureau enlarged its mandate over the years to
include twen ty-six additional metals and minerals-an indication of shifting defense needs and
technologies as the war continued . i\ [any new
deposits proved vital to the war industries, a nd
private industry was quick to exploit them 2 1
Even these federa l benefits, however, were
not enough to sustain a vigoro us domest·ic mining industry, at least in the eyes o f mining men
42
2006 i\lfi11i11g f-IiJiory .Jo11r11ctl
who faced wartime shortages and an unpredictable future. They placed much of the blame on
New Deal labor laws, especially the imposition
of collective bargaining and the minimum wage. 22
Roosevelt's re-election in 1940 disappointed
most industrial leaders, and the imposition of
wage and price controls as the economy heated
up was a mixed bag. i\fine owners, for example,
welcomed efforts to hold wages in line, but con1plained loudly about price ceilings for commodities d1at d1ey produced . From their perspective,
commodity prices still reflected depression conditions, while production costs soared in the redhot wartime economy.23
As Roosevelt's po in t man in the Office of
Price ~-\dministration, Leon Henderson tried to
keep a tight lid o n inflation pressures after 19-H.
But there were exceptions, especially in the difficu lt months of 19-l-2, with "\ merica on the defensive and m obilization just beginning to reach
its stride. Skyrocketing demand for base metals, coupled with a steady drain of mine and
smelter workers, complicated OPA's effort to cap
domestic prices for copper, lead, and zinc while
holding down wages at d1e same time. In the
Rocky i\foun tain \\fes t, base-metal mines lost
men underground to higher-paying and less-difficult defense jobs on d1e \'\lest Coast, despite
government decrees closing all "non-essential"
precious metal operations, pressuring former gold
m iners to take base-m etal jobs, placing a "freeze"
on workers already in strategic industries, and
expanding the strategic workweek to -l-8 hours.24
The draft also took its toll on mining employees. f'rom its inception in 19-l-0, the Selective
Service system had the difficu lt task of deciding h ow to apportion the nation's li mited
workforce to meet the accelerating needs of both
the m ilitary and industry. The first peacetime
draft in ~-\merican history authoril:ed deferrals for
me n needed in agriculture and industry, but up
to 19-l-2 miners, especially single males under
thirty-five, were fair game for local draft boards.25
Easing the shortages of meta ls and
mineworkers took nearly a year of pragmatic tinkering. In January 19-l-2 d1e i\fetals Reserve Company announced it would pay up to 58 percent
above 19-l-1 prices for copper, lead, and zinc .
When production still lagged, the War ;\ fan power
Commission, under Paul i\IcNutt in the Department of Labor, recommended an increase in the
pay of copper, lead, and zinc miners by one dollar a clay, and a raise in wages for _-\S_-\RCO
sm elter workers by a smaller amount. Some copper m ines began recruiting women for surface
work in repair shops and concen trators, adding
a sign ificant new dimension to "Rosie the Riveter," but the low numbers involved did not materially ease the labor shortage.26 Skilled underg round workers remained in short supply, and it
took too long to recruit and train able-bodied
civil ian s.
Copper productio n continued to slide until
October 1942, when the army stepped in . Under pressure from industry, agriculture, d1e Selective Service, an d critic s of the War
Department's concept of total mobilization, it
agreed to furlough four thousand enlisted or
drafted miners for temporary duty. ;\lost went
to underground copper mines, but tungsten, lead,
zinc, and mo lybdenum o pera6ons got furloughed
men as well _27
By en1phasizing labor efficiency; by m obilizing women, students, the elderly, prisoners of
war, and other "labor reserves;" by shifting workers from low- to high-priority positions; and by
working wid1 d1e Mexican government to devise
a "temporary" alien work program that actually
lasted n•ore than twenty years, administration
officials eased the labor crises in the mines, fields
and facto ries. By the sp ring of 19-l-3, Charles
\\/ilson, vice-chairman of the \\far Production
Board, assured a co ngressio nal subcommittee
that labor shortages could no longer be used as
an excuse for scarcity of strategic metals. "1\finers required in producing these m etals," he said,
Strategi~·
MetalJ
"will be made available fron1 some source." 28
Iron ically, just ~t s d omestic production gained
momentum it began to wind down . Soon after
_-\merican military o perations shifted fro m defensive to offensive, \\fashington policy-makers
shi fted gears. Remembering the post-war econo mic consequences of the First World War, they
warned of surpluses instead of shor tages in strategic materials. By mid--1943 the same agencies
that had stimulated domestic production began
canceling con tracts, eliminating subsidies, lowering priorities, and forcing marginal producers
to face real market conditio ns. \\fith two years
of in tense warfare still to come, _\merica n military a nd industrial planners were already anticipating the problems of postwar economic reconversion.29
Conclusion
For nearly two decades federal mineral policies hinged on two ideas the domestic mining
industry had b een advocating sin ce th e early
1920s : that domestic mines have strategic as well
as econo mic importanc,e; and that the nation's
strategic mineral producers must be protected
from cheap foreign competitio n. The tungsten
duty was lowered in 1948 at the Geneva trade
talks as a concession to C hina, but was soon reimposed after China fell to the Communists.30
D o mestic m ineral producers continued to usc
national security as a justificatio n for federal economic interventio n on rtheir behalf. From the
fall of Paris through the Korean War, assumptions about stockpil ing strategic materials and
protecting the na tion's mineral industry were
impo rtant compo nents of military planning. By
reiterating national defense needs, by intensifying th e explo ration and development of domestic o res, and by continuing to pay premium prices
for do m estic copper, lead, zinc, tungsten, and
other strategic m etals, federal programs offset
the lower prices of foreign metals and helped
tllld
NatioNal Difeme
43
subsidize do mestic producers:' 1
That domestic mining became so dependent
o n federa l support was ~tn ironic outcome for
mining executives, traditionally hostile to the
political and social implications of big governmen t. But the d isrup tive decades of war and
depression had forced it to forsake ideology in
favor of the practical needs of an industry in
trouble.
Epilog ue
The formative years of the stockpile program
e nd ed in the late 1950s, but· issues invo lving
"strategic and critical m aterials" still trouble us
today. During the cold war, political and economic issues frequently got in the way of rational strategic planning. Disputes over the nature,
cost, extent, and even justificatio n fo r stockpiling plagued every administration from Truman's
to that of the first Geo rge Bush . _-\ journalist in
the 1970s called stockp il ing the "mother lode
for mining industry representatives and lobbyis ts." 32
D irect government subsidies and price supports for domestic mineral producers ended after 1958, but indirect aid co ntinues through Buy
.American laws and othe1r federal and state legislation. Defense contractors and the Pentagon
must now warrant that a t least SO percent of the
materials and labor that go into products made
for national defense-illtcluding food, clothing,
metals, and tools-are produced w ithin o ur borders. Offsetting the impact of such restrictio ns,
however, arc exceptions built into the legislatio n due to d omestic scarcity or for strategic, diplomatic, economic, or other reasons. _-\s a result, "Buy .-\merican" is m o re of a ho llow slogan than a practical guidleline.33
Though amended man y times since its New
Deal origins, "strategic and critical materials" legislatio n is still a key component of the U.S. Code.
• \ s of 2002, fifty-eight varieties of minerals were
2006 Mi11i11g J l iJ"tory .Jo11ma/
still being added to the natio nal stockpile, including three types of tungs ten. Over the years,
the list of stockpiled materials changed as strategic concepts changed, but the rationale for
those code provisions reminds us that strategic
stockpiles are still necessary to protect ~-\merica
from a "dangerous and costly dependence" on
foreign sources in times of emergency.3·'
\\'hat long-range impact the "global war on
terro rism" will have o n th e na tio n's s tra tegic
thinking is anyone's guess, but it seems safe to
suggest that few politicians will advocate eliminating or seriously reducing our in ventory of
"strategic and critical materials" an)rtime soo n.
That may be little comfort to the domestic mining industry, howe\·er. Despite legislation to "Buy
. \merican," m ost of our strategic metals now
come from abroad, and that situation is not likely
to change in the foreseeable future . ~
D1: Ro11a/d H. Umba11gb iJ ProjeJJor of T-liJtory
(emeJitiiJ) at U11it-e1Ji(J• of tbe Pcu!fl~; a11d a jreq11e11t
~·o11t1ibutor to the ;\lining History J ournal. Hisprel'iouJ· a~tideJ· iJJd11de a st11rfy of Net'Clda mi11i11g ellgimer 1171/licwl I Loli11g, a11 CHC!J OJJ Hcrbc1t Hoot-er~·
formatit-eyecuY as a mi11i11g e11g,illeeJ; and all cutide a/Jo11t
.fobJJ l\tf11ir a11d tbe mi11i11g iJJdt!J'try. He baJ' mud 011
tbe 1'.1illillg Histo~y AHodatio11s C..\.'et'/ttiu coiiJJd/, a11d
iJprm11tfy a IJ/em/Jerof tbe Mining History J ournal's
edit01ia/ board. '1 'bis paper 1/'tiJ' jiJ"J't prcmJted at tbc
CIJSOdatiOII ~· CIIIIIIICI/ 1J1eeti11g ill .f1111C 200../..
Notes:
1
3
Charles II. Segerstrom, "Operations in l\(iJford District,"
J\1iningtmdConlmt1ing Re1iei/I(Salt I.ake City) -1-1 (31 i\ lay
19-12): 22-7, Segerstrom Collection, H olt-.-\therton
Library, Uni\·ersity of the Pacific. Cornelis Klein :mel
Cornelius S. Hurlbut, Jr., Mt11mal of Mi11emlogy (qjier
}tlllles D. Da/1{1, 21" Rditio11 (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1977),430- 1. L. P. Larson,ct al., " .-\vailabilityof
Tungsten at Various Prices from Resources in the
United States," U.S. Bmeau o f t\ lines Jnjomltllioll
Cimtlar8500 (\\ 1ashington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O, 1971), 37. •\ nthony P. D. \Verner,et al., "lntemational StrMegic
i\fineral Issues, Summary Repo rt-Tungsten," U.S.
Geological Survey Cimtlar 930-0 (\Vashington, D.C.:
U.S.G.P.O., '1998), 12-3, at http:/ /pubs.usgs.gov.
Colin G Fink, " Review of the Strategic l\[etals," 1HetaLr tmd
Allf!p 12 (Oct. 19-10): -11 9-20. Frank L.I-Iess, " Rare
i\ (etals fmd i\linemls," Mi11ing a11d Metallml.Y '19 (hm.
'1 938): 5-9. Nathan Robertson, "Nazi Deal Kept
Tungsten Rare," unidentified clipping, c. 15 .-\pr. 19-12,
Segerstrom Collection.
U.S. House Committee on Rules, 69'h Congress, 2r.d
Session, lf.Var Mi11emls Reliif Q1earings on proposed
amendment S.36-11), 2 1 Feu. 1927 (\Vashington D.C.:
U.S.G.P.O ., 1927), 2-12. U.S. Bureau o f the Census,
Histo1imt Statistit'S of tbe U11ited States, Colo11iaL Times to
1970, Bicentennial edition (\\ 'as hington D.C.:
U.S.G.P.O., 1975), 200 (online at http:/ I
www2.census.gov.). U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Wholesale Commodity Price Index, as quoted in 1\'e/11
}'ork Times, 1929-33.
J
5
6
David t.I. Kem1edy, Freedo111 From Fear: TbeAme1iam People
i11 DepressioN a11d lf.Vm; 1929-19-15 (New York: O xford
Uni ve rsity Press, '1999), 158-9. New )-o,k Times, 1l
l'ov. 1938. Charles H. Segerstrom to Gco. l. Emery, lO
Oct. 1939, Segerstrom Collection.
Alan ,\ [. Bateman, "Foreign and Domestic Production,
Critical i\linerals, 19-l2--l-l" (chart presented at a hearing
before the Subcommittee on Surplus Property of the
Senate Committee on t\lilitary Affairs, 30 Oct. '19-15),
reprinted in Stmtegit' and Ditiml Minem/s a11d Metals:
T-lemi11g.r before tbe SllbtYJI!IIIIillee 011 Mi11es & Mi11i11g of tbe
Commillee 011 PnMi· LondJ, House of Representatives,
80'h Congress, 2"d Session, .. . Committee Hearing No.
38 (\\lashington D.C.: U.S.G .P.O ., 19-18), 'l'l35-6
Q1ereafter J letlliiiJ,J). Statement of John .-\. Church
before the Subcommittee on i\lines and ~lining,
House Committee on Public Lands, 7 .-\pr. 1947,
J-Iemi11gs, 1300- l.
( hades H. Segerstrom to E dw. R. I-Iagenah, 23 _·\ug.
1938; Segerstrom to.J.J. 1-Iaesler, 23 :\ug. 1938; Haesler
to Segerstrom, teletype, 20 Oct. 1939; Segerstrom to
George I. F.mery, 26 Oct. 1939; Segerstrom Collection.
"Bids on Strategic l\linerals O pened by Treasury;
Offerings of O res of !\[anganese, Chromium, :mel
Tungsten for Emergencr Stockpile," E11ginem'ng rmd
Mini11g }o11mal 1-10 (Nov. 1939): 29-30. IVa/1 Street
]o11mal, 28 Oct. 1939, 26 Sep. 19-10. Charles H.
Segerstrom, "\Var's Effect on Tungsten," 11li11ing
Co11gn!JS }o11mal 27 (Feb. 1941): 38--10. 'l D. Conover
Holds Stockpiling as \'ita! to Nation:1l Securitr,"
S tnttegic i\tfetct!r and National Difeme
Amelitmu\Ieta! Market (}:-Jew York), 18 .-\pr. 19-1-1, 1, 7.
".-\ Report to the Congress on Strategic i\laterials"
(submitted 2 Jan. 19-15 to the President and Congress
by the .-\nny and N;wy i\ !unitions BoMd, pursuant to
sec. 22 (d) of Surplus Property .-\ct of 19-1-1), reprinted in
1-lemi11gs, 987-8. The T homas bill (Public No. 117, 76th
Congress, 1st Session, Senate 572) is reprinted in the
appendix to this cloc ume ntar~· collection, 88 1-2.
7
Hnni11gs, 98-1-'i. lll'a!/.'ltll'P.f]nllmal, 19 and ?.5 Sep, and 3
Nm-. 19-1 1, 31 ~da r. 19-13.
s S. B. Ritchie, "i\fol~·bdenum in High-Speed Steel: The
E limination of Tungsten, a Strategic Material," AmQ'
Ordilltlllt'l! XI (luly-..-\ug. 1930): 12-9. Wai!Stmt }olfma!,
25 1\lar., 13 June, 2 Sep., lmd 6 Dec. 19-fl.
9
i\!arx Hirsh (president, 1\ lolybdenum Corp. o f . \me rica)
to Charles H Segerstrom, 26 Dec. 1939, Segerstrom
Collection.
lu .J. W. Furness, "The i\larketing of Tungsten O res and
Concentnltes," U.S. Bureau of Foreign Rnd Domestic
Commerce Trade T'!f'ommtioll B11llettil No. 6-13 (\\lashington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1929), ii . .J. .J. Haesler to Geo. I
E mery, 9 i\lar. 1937; .J. J. Haesler to Charles H.
Segerstrom, '! July 1937 lltlcl19 Feb. 1938; Segerstrom
to Geo I E mery, 10 Oct. 1939; all in Segerstrom
Collectjon. lfYaft Jrm1 }olfmtll, 11lmd 1-11\fay 19-10, 13
Feb. 19-11. j\ifimm!T!Idlfsll)' -19 ( 19-10): 605-20.
11
Charles I I. Segerstrom, Sr., "\\fa r's Effect on Tungsten"
(l!ddress before the .-\merietu\ !\lining Congress, 19 Sep.
1940), MiHiHg ()mgreJ'S }o11mal 27 (Feb. 19-11): 38-40.
Fink, " Review of 1·he Strategic f-ler:ds," -11 9-20. fiYall
Street]omual, 26 Sep. and 22 Oct. 1940, 17 Dec. 1942.
"The Tungsten Situation," Metat7i'(l(/c, 11 Feb 19-11 ,
clipping, Segerstrom Collection. "Conove r Holds
Stockpiling," 'I, 7.
12
"Tungsten !\ liners E njored Big Boom and Did Fine
J ob," j\1imi~g Heron/ (Denver) 55 (18 i\lar 19-1-1): 1-2.
Statement of Dr. .-\Jan i\L Bateman, Consultant on
l'oreign i\fetrus lUld Minerals, Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, before Subcommittee on Surplus Property of SenHte Committee on 1\ ulitar~· _\ffairs, 30 Oct.
'1945, f-feaJiHg.t·, 11%-7.
u E. R. Hagenah to Charles H. Segerstrom, Wash., D .C. 11
i\[ar. p939], Segerstrom Collection. Ne111York T1il!es, 29
Sep. 1939. Hess, " Rare i\letrus and i\uHerals," 9. lfYa!!
Street .Jo11mal, 20 Sep. '19-10. Segerstrom, " \Var's Effect
on T uHgsten," 38--10.
1
" The "low cost and low priced" phrase com es from the
mining lobby's 1933 ~·pescript document, "Tungsten
lU1d Tungsten Products Industries 'Code o f Fair
Competition'," Segerstrom Collection.
15
"The Buy .\Jllerican .\ ct o f 'l933, .\ct of 31\lar 1933" (-17
Stat. 1520); and Public :\lo. 117 (the Thomas bill), 6'h
Congress, 1'' Session, Senate 572 (1939); both reprinted
.fS
in He(Jiil{gS, 98'1-2, 1235-6. Charles H. Segerstrom to
Geo. I. E mery, 25 Feb. 1938, Segerstrom Collection.
16
Charles .-\ . and i\ larr R. Beard, Tbe Rise rf Alllelim/1
Ci1ili::;ption, rev. eel. (:\lew York: i\facmillan, 1935), 3156. Stephen Haggard, "The Institutional Foundations
of Hegemony: E xplaining the Reciprocal Trade
.\ g1·e ements Act of 1934," llltemariolltil Q,gtmizatioll 42
(\\ 1in. 1988): 91-119.
1
' Paul H Douglns, AJJmim 1i1 the 1Hmket Pl11te: Tmde, Tmijfi·
rmd !be Balallt'e rf Pr!)'IJ/ei/IJ' (NY: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 1966), 88-91 . :\rthur t\L Schlesinger, Jr., Tbe
Comi11g rf tbe Ne111 Deal (Boston: Houghton Mif£Iin,
1959), 253-9. U.S. Congressman Chaka Pattah at
www.house.gov.
!s J J Haesler to Charles H. Segerstrom, teletype, 21 !\ fay
1941; Segerstrom (as president) to the members of the
•\merican Tungsten :\ssociation, telegram, 6 June
1941; Segerstrom, "Statement ... made on behalf of all
hmgsten miners and htngsten producers in .-\me rica to
be used in connect·ion with trade ngreemetH negotiations with ...:\rgenti na," 9 June 19-11; Segerstrom,
'Statement ... on Behalf of Tungsten i\ finers Rncl
Tungsten Producers in the United States ... 20 .Jan.
19-12, to Committee for Reciprocity fnfonnation, Wash
DC," 20 .Jan.19-12;J C. Trimble to Segerstrom, 1.July
19-11; U.S. State Dept., "Trade .-\greement Between the
United States ;U\d :\rgentina Signed October 14, 1941.
.. text o f agreement including related notes," Press
release #-19'1; "Trade-.\ greement Negotiations with
Bolivia; public no tice -1 :\pr 1942," Press release# 138;
Segerstrom to Geo. I. F.mery, 22 Oct. 19-11; :\merican
Tariff Leag·ue, "Trade .\greement Negotiations with
Pe ru," 31 Dec.l9-11; all in Segerstrom Collection. !Walt
Stmt]o11mal, 7 Sep. 19-13.
19
l..:..ennedy, Frtiedomfrom Fem; 127. Ickes' 1941 testimony is
reported in "Testimony of the Secre tary of the Interior
on stock piling and the conduct of the minerals
procurementprogrrun to_lrumnry 1943. Hearing before
U.S. Senate, Speciru Committee to Stud y and Survey
Problems of Small Business Enterprises, l3 Jrul. 1943,
flemi11gs, 1-150-63.
:.:· J17a!L Street]oHrnrtl, '10 Aug. 1940, 13 Feb., 25 Sep., and 3
Nov. 19-11, 13.June, 31 Oct., and23 Nov. 19-12. Nell'
1·ork Times, 3 Sep. 19-12. Statement o f Donald H
Nelson, Chairman of tl1e \\far Production Board, to tl1e
President, '17 .\pr. 1943; Sratementof.John A. Church,
Consulting i\J:injHg Engineer, Washington, D.C., 7
Apr. 1947, 1-lcmil{gS, 1300-1, 146-1-7.
1
- IJYall Street }olfmal, 31 l\far. 19-11. " .\ctivities iUld
.\ccomplishments o f the Uni ted States Bure11u of
!\Lines during World \\'ar II ru1d \\'ork Proposed under
the Stock Piling .-\ct.... In formation Submitted to the
Subcommittee on N ational Resources o f the Senate
2006 i\tfi11i11g l-liJtory jo11mttl
Public Lands Committee, t\ lay 19-47," HemiJ!f,J', 1471 94. S. H. \Villiston, "Testimony before the Subcommittee o n l\lines & l\lining," 20 l\lay 1948, HemiJ!f,S,
895.
22
J. J. Haesler to Charles H. Segerstro m, teletrpe, 10 June
1940, Segerstrom Collection.
23
Wall Street joHmal, 28 i\lar. 1942. Kennedy, hl•edom jivm
I~em; 637-41.
2 " f17ai1Sttl!et jolfmal, 17 Feb., 17 .-\pr., 2 June, 12 :\ug., and
10 Dec. 1941, 13 Jan., 15 i\ !ay, Hnd 16 .July 1942, and I I
Feb. 1943. Ne1v Y01k TimeJ8, '13 and 17 Sep., and 24 Oct.
1942. J J. llaesler to Charles 1-1. Segerstrom, 21 .\lay
1941,Segerstrom Collection.
2
~ See Sec. 5 (e) of the \Var and National Defense Selective
Training and Service_ \ct of 19-10, 16 Sep. 1940, 58 Stat.
885. New} 'o1k Ti111es, 15 Sep. 1940, '17 t\ lay 1941, 'IOJan.
1942. IW'ali Stmt }olfmal, 3 Sep. 1942. Charles H.
Segerstrom to Geo. F. Sawyer, 23 Sep. 1942, Segerstrom
Collection.
26
Ne11' York Ti111eJ, 13 Sep., 17 m1d 24 Oct. 1942. f17all Str11et
.foHmal, 7 Julr 1942.
27
David Hinshaw, Tbe Ho111e Front (New York: G .P.
Put11m11's Sons, 1943), 62--1. Ne1v} 'o1k Ti111es, 17 Sep., 21
Nov. 19-12. fl7all Stmf ]oHmPI, 2'1 Oct., 2'1 Nov., and 8
Dec. 1942, 1 t\ lar 1943.
28 Chas. E. Wilson to Senato r .James E. t\lurray, 1-1 i\lay
1943, as reported in F-/e(llings, 1-16-1-7.
29
Hinshaw, Tbe llo111e FJVnt, -16-59.
3
'·'
L' .S. Tariff Commissio n, Till!f,Sien Oll!S and ConcentmteJ.
Repo11 to the Pn!Jidelll
011
JnreJiigatioll 1\ 'o. 120. . . .
(\\ 'ashington D.C., Feb. 1958), -1.
31
!Wall Stmt.Joumal, 29 .July, I!6 .-\ug., m1d 2 NO\·. 1950, 5
.Jm1. 1951, 23.July 1953, 16July 1956. New} 01k Ti111es, 22
: -\ug. 1956.
Jl II/'all Stlvt•t}ollmfll, 31 Dec. 1965.1\'ell' } -01k TimeJ, 28 ~0\'.
1976. See also Charlotte Twight, "The Political
Economy of the National Defense Stockpile," Polio·
S111dieJ Re1ie1J1 8 (Sum. 1989): 77-1-99. Peter Harben,
"Srnnegic 1\ [inerals," Earrb 1 (I ul r 1992): 36--1-1.
JJ foor Bur .·\meric1m provisions :mel political repercussions
see -11 U.S.C. lOa; http:/ /www.bxa.doc.gov. Paul
Gessing, ~ational Ta.xpay.ers' Unio n website at http:/ I
www.ntu.org. PR NeiiJJ'II'il•l!, II 0Jov. 2003, at website
http:/ /goliath.ecnext.com. Ironically and perh:tps
intentionally undercutting Bur .-\mericm1 laws is the
State Department's diplomatic proviso known as the
t\lemorandum of Understmlding (t\IOU). : \n i\ IOU,
110\\' applied to at least twenty-one countries, regards
defense materials produced in those countries as
essentially ":\merican made." Criticism of t\ lOUs can
be found on the Intemational Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers website~ at http:/ /www.ibew.org.
3
" For current stockpile statulto rr provisions see 50 U.S.
Code 98. See also U.S. !Department of Commerce,
Bureau of lndustr)' ;mel Secmity, Press Release Oct 29,
2002, on website http: / /www.bxa.doc.gov.