Immigration and ethnic change in low-fertility countries – towards a
new demographic transition?
Paper presented to Population Association of America Annual Meeting, Philadelphia
March 31 – April 2 2005, Session 98, I April.
David Coleman, University of Oxford
Sergei Scherbov, Vienna Institute of Demography
Abstract
This paper presents a comparative analysis of the likely future effects of immigration
on the ethnic or foreign-origin composition of the developed world, using projections
from various European countries, with new projections for the United Kingdom. On
conservative assumptions, the foreign-origin proportions are projected to rise to
between about 20% and 30% by mid-century with almost linear rates of change.
Variant migration assumptions are more important than fertility assumptions in
determining this outcome. Interethnic unions, incorporated only rarely in such
projections, moderate the growth of immigrant populations of immigrant origin while
generating complex rapidly growing heterogeneous mixed origin populations which
may eventually defy categorisation. Given the dependence of this ethnic change
upon immigration, it is not inevitable, but most official projections show no end to the
process up to mid-century. Further continuation of ethnic transformation into the
longer term might be regarded as a ‘third demographic transition’.
Introduction
While fluctuating and, in 2004, not generally increasing, immigration to Western
Europe has persisted at a high level. It is likely to stay high for some time, and may
increase further. Labour demand from some European countries will grow, especially
from those unable or unwilling to mobilise their demographic reserves into their
workforce (European Commission 2004). Some ethnic minority populations, which
are increasing rapidly in numbers, show little sign of abandoning their preference for
arranged marriage with spouses from the countries of origin (e.g. Lievens 1999).
Asylum claims to Europe fell to 314,300 in 2004, the lowest since 1997 (UNHCR
2005) but still a substantial number.
Natural increase, immigration and contemporary population growth
Migration is becoming the driving force behind demographic change in many
European countries. In a few, for example Norway and France, with robust natural
increase and moderate migration, the current migration effect is relatively minor. In
others, in Italy and Germany, where deaths exceed births, net immigration now
accounts for all remaining population growth (Héran 2004, OECD 2003, Salt 2003).
Immigration adds to population growth both directly and indirectly through the
natural increase of populations of immigrant origin, over several generations. The
natural increase of foreign-origin populations is often greater than that of the
indigenous population, thanks to a more youthful age-structure, higher age-specific
fertility rates, and transient distortions in family - building arising from the migration
process itself (Thompson 1982, Toulemon 2004). It should be noted, however, that
1
immigrant groups may have lower, not higher, age-specific birth -rates compared with
the national average. The overall effect, as in Germany, may be to create overall
omnibus foreign-population fertility rates little higher than the national average, even
if their more youthful age-structures generate a higher level of natural increase. In
France between 1991-98, TFR was raised from 1.65 among natives only, to 1.72
including immigrants in France (Héran 2004). Some examples are given in Figure 1
below.
Figure 1
TFR of native and foreign populations - selected European countries 1975 2001. Sources: SOPEMI, national statistical offices.
5.5
E&W New Commonwealth
France all women
France all foreign
Sweden all foreigners
Dutch
Turks in the Netherlands
Swedes
England and Wales all birthplaces
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1.0
The foreign-origin population - a broader picture
Evaluation of the number of people of foreign origin in European countries is
complicated by problems of categorisation. Most European counties routinely define
foreign origin populations on the criterion of citizenship, and births of foreign origin
by the citizenship of the mother. That creates confusion. Recent high levels of
naturalisation in many countries have exceeded the inflow of immigrants. That has
diminished statistically, but not in reality, the numbers of people, and of mothers, of
foreign origin in countries such as Belgium, France and the Netherlands. To present a
more accurate picture, some European countries are adopting statistical definitions of
foreign origin population that include the second ‘immigrant generation’, although not
the third. For example, in the Netherlands the ‘foreign background’ population now
defined statistically through population registers, includes any person with a parent
born abroad. (Alders 2001). Everyone else, including persons with third generation
foreign ancestry, is assumed to be Dutch. No ‘third generation’ or subsequent
generation is included, leading to a progressive under-estimate of the population or
foreign origin compared with more enduring ethnic or racial criteria used, for example
in the US and UK population estimates and projections. This conservative approach
2
yielded a foreign origin population of 3.04 million out of the 16 million total
population in the Netherlands in 2003 (19%), compared with the 700,000 persons of
foreign citizenship. Furthermore, the foreign origin population has increased fast,
unlike the ‘foreign citizen’ population, which has declined since 1995 (Figure 2).
Figure 2
Foreign citizen and 'foreign background' population, Netherlands 1956
- 2003 (thousands).
Source: CBS. For definitions see text.
3500
Foreign citizens
3000
All foreign origin
First generation, all foreign origin
2500
Second generation, all foreign
origin
f i
i i
2000
1500
1000
500
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
1975
1973
1971
1969
1967
1965
1963
1961
1959
1957
1955
0
Note: Persons of from the Dutch West Indies of Antillean origin, and of Surinamese
origin before 1980, are of ‘foreign origin’ but are not foreign citizens.
Ethnic classifications
Where the cultural characteristics of immigrants, and their self-identity, endure over
generations an ‘ethnic’ classification may give a more truthful picture of demographic
and other consequences of the migration process, as long as identity and the official
categories are stable and inter-ethnic unions are not too common. Such ethnic
classifications are favoured in the countries of the English-speaking world, both for
new immigrants from outside Europe and for old or indigenous minorities (Lee 1993,
Coleman and Salt 1996, Statistics Canada 1993). In the UK, the 1991 and 2001
censuses and the Labour Force and General Household Surveys have requested selfidentification to an ethnic group. No other Western European country has done so
apart from the UK. In France the concept has traditionally been considered to be
fundamentally contrary to the principles of the equality of citizenship (Haut Conseil
1991), and the collection of statistics on ethnic criteria is forbidden. In some East
European countries however, ethnic questions do feature in the census and in other
statistics (e.g. Bulgaria, Romania) mostly for indigenous minorities such as Magyars,
Turks, Gypsies, Germans and others (Courbage 1998).
3
Population projections
Immigration, then, contributes generally to national population growth and
specifically to the growth of foreign-origin populations, through the immigration
process and through natural increase. That contribution can be substantial. In Great
Britain, for example, the non-white ethnic minority population (4.5 million in 2001),
irrespective of nationality or birthplace, increased from 1991 to 2001 by about 5% per
year. Some of its components grew even faster: the population of African origin has
doubled every ten years, it was 108,000 in 1981, 212,000 in 1991 and 440,000 in
2000 – growing at 7.9% per year in the 1990s. In the Netherlands, the foreign
background population grew on average by 2.7% per year between 1995 and 2003.
That is important for two reasons. First, because it promises to add substantial
numbers to the total population size of various European countries where growth
would otherwise tail off, or turn to decline: for example Belgium, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Sweden (see e.g. Haug et al. 2002, Poulain 2003 pp 85-86, Nilsson
2004 p.117). Second, because most of the additional population comes from origins
different from those of the original inhabitants, increasing their ethnic and racial
diversity. The ethnic (cultural) diversity, often originally closely linked with visible
(racial) differences, may remain permanent or it may become dissociated from it as
time goes on. That will depend partly on national government policy, partly on the
scale of inflow, partly on the preferences of the populations concerned: some may
become assimilated (like the Poles and Italians in pre-war France) or remain
encapsulated: like the Turks in Belgium (Lesthaeghe 2000) and the Bangladeshis in
the UK (Eade et al. 1996). National policies promoting assimilation or multicultural
diversity, and requiring or forbidding official ethnic labelling, may have strong effects
here, although not always in the intended direction. The trend in numbers of ethnic
populations is of considerable social and political interest both to the native
population and to the ethnic populations themselves, especially in those countries that
have developed group rights and entitlements. Sometimes welfare considerations are
ostensibly paramount, as in the projections for Denmark, intended to ‘foresee the
likely impact of their relative size on the labour market, education, day-care and care
of the elderly’ and in those forthcoming for the UK (Think Tank on Integration in
Denmark 2002; Haskey 2002).
Population projections to evaluate these future effects of immigration and minority
growth upon future population and society have been prepared by a number of
European statistical offices and by demographic researchers. Not all have done so,
both for political and for technical reasons. European statistical systems do not make
it easy to determine current levels of foreign origin population, fertility, mortality or
migration, quite apart from assumptions about their future levels. None records the
race or ethnic origin of vital events, unlike, for example, the United States. Usually,
births and deaths are recorded by citizenship or (as in the UK) by the birthplace of the
mother or of the deceased. Current and future levels of mortality do not pose many
difficulties. Such evidence as exists suggests that foreign-origin mortality is not very
different from that of the national population and in some cases is less heavy. Fertility
levels present more difficulties. In general, the fertility of foreign populations in
industrial countries has tended to converge somewhat on the national average, as
would be expected from demographic transition theory. But only in a few cases is
that process complete. Fertility differences may persist if immigrant groups do not
achieve socio-economic equality, if they retain strong attachment to religious or other
4
elements of foreign culture, if they continue to be numerically and culturally reinforced by large-scale migration, especially through importing spouses from highfertility countries. Their actual minority status per se may make some groups resistant
to change (e.g. Siegel 1970, Goldscheider 1999, MacQuillan 2004).
For example, among Indians in the UK and people of Caribbean origin in the
Netherlands and the UK fertility rates have fallen to about the same as the national
average. Among Turks and some other Muslim populations where women are less in
contact with the wider society and usually do not work, fertility has fallen much less
(Coleman, 1994a). In Great Britain in 2001, the TFRs of women born in Pakistan and
Bangladesh were 4.67 and 3.89 respectively (ONS 2004). Reinforcement of the
unacculturated population by arranged marriage and other migratory processes may
sometimes drive up immigrant fertility rates, as among the African population in
Sweden and the UK.
Examples of projections of the population of immigrant origin
The best known examples are those made in respect of the United States by the US
Bureau of the Census (1996, 2000) and by the US National Research Council (Smith
and Edmonston 1997). These are too familiar to need repetition.
Projections of the foreign-origin population in Denmark
Recent Danish projections incorporated seven categories: the Danes themselves,
immigrants and their descendants from developed countries, immigrants and their
descendants from more developed, and from less developed, third world countries on
the UN classification. (Think Tank on Integration in Denmark 2002). Coefficients
derived from information from the population registers on origins and on
naturalisations determines the distribution of the numbers of ‘descendants’ and
‘Danes’ among the offspring of immigrants born in Denmark in the projections.
Children with one parent who is a Danish citizen born in Denmark are ‘Danish’. If
both parents are foreign or born abroad, the child is a ‘descendant’. Children of two
‘descendants’ who choose not to naturalise, or of one such with an immigrant, are also
descendants, and, potentially, subsequent generations (Larsen, C., pers.comm.).
In 1996, the TFR of foreigners from more advanced countries (like the ‘Western’
foreign population defined in the Dutch projections) was 1.73, about the Danish
average. This was assumed to increase, in step with that of the Danish population, to
1.85 by 2020, the limit of the projections at that time. Net immigration from such
countries was assumed to be 6200 per year. The TFR of the less developed countries,
equivalent to the ‘Non-Western’ foreigners in the Dutch classification, was 3.12 in
1996. The principal projection assumed that would decline to 2.1 by 2020, a variant
assumed no change. Net immigration from those countries was assumed to be 7000
per year. To put these modest figures in perspective with the larger European
countries such as France, Italy or the UK, a multiplier of about 11 would be
appropriate.
On the relatively short time scale to 2020, those fertility variants make a surprisingly
small difference, thanks to the youthful age-structure of the immigrant generation
(Danmarks Statistik 1997). Overall, 6.1% growth in total population to 2020 was
projected from 1998 (Figure 3). Without immigration, population would decline
slightly. Later projections lack a zero-migration variant so the total demographic
5
effect of immigration cannot be estimated. But in the later, 2002-based projections the
non-Danish population amounted to 14% of the total by 2020, and in 2050, according
to the 2004-based projections, to 18%.
Figure 3
Denmark 2000-2050: Danish, non-Danish and total populations.
Source: Statistics Denmark 2002, 2004.
7000
6000
5000
4000
Total 2002-based
Danes 2004-based
Non-Danish 2004-based
Total 2004-based
3000
2000
1000
0
2002
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
The ‘zero immigration alternative’ assumption makes a much bigger difference to the
projections of population foreign origin, compared with the fertility variants. With
zero net migration, the immigrant population declines to 115,000 from 126,000 and
the descendants – even with unchanged fertility – declined to 131,000 (Danmarks
Statistik t. 17, page 21; Table 1 below). Danes themselves were projected to decline
Table 1. Denmark: population of foreign origin as % of total population, 19952020, on two alternative projections.
Net immigration 13,200
Zero migration
year
TFR of third-world populations TFR of third-world populations
falling from 3.25 to 2.1
3.25 constant
1997
6.4
6.4
2000
7.1
6.7
2005
8.6
6.9
2010
10.2
6.9
2015
11.6
7.0
2020
13.1
6.9
Source: Danmarks Statistik 1997, tables 15, 17.
slightly in absolute numbers (from 4.95 million to 4.93 million, to 87% of the
population). The principal projection assumed declining fertility on the part of
immigrants, falling by 2020 from a TFR of 3.25 to 2.1 (still higher than the projected
Danish level of 1.85; Table 1).
6
Since those very detailed 1997 – based projections were made, 2002-base projections
made on only slightly different assumptions, have taken the projection to 2040. In
these, net immigration, 10,000 in 2020, declines to 5,300 by 2040. Only two
immigrant categories are recognised; from more and less developed countries, on the
UN definition. As before, the categories into which subsequent generations fell were
carefully specified: 46% of the children of mothers born in more developed countries
becoming ‘Danes’ in the next generation, compared with 12% of the children of
immigrant mothers from less developed countries
Since then further projections have been necessary following a change in immigration
policy in 2002. That has substantially changed the actual trend, and the assumptions,
relating to immigration to Denmark. A more restrictive policy has curtailed a number
of avenues of immigration streams; restricting marriage migration to spouses aged 24
and over, and imposing further conditions on the criteria for marriage migration,
asylum, and other channels. On the new assumptions, the proportion of the Danish
population of foreign origin rises only to 11% in 2020 compared with the 2002-based
projection estimate of 14%; in 2040 to 13.8% compared with 18.4% and finally to
14.8% by 2050 (Figure 4). No zero-migration variants are presented for 2002 or 2004
so the total effect ignoring ‘naturalisation’ cannot be estimated.
Figure 4.
Denmark - percent population of foreign origin ; three projections.
Source: Statistics Denmark
20
2002-based 16 - 12k migration
2004 based
1997-based zero migration
1997 - based 13.2k migration
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Projections of the foreign-origin population in Sweden
In line with the practice in Denmark, the Netherlands and elsewhere, the Swedish
2000-based projections of the population of foreign origin define a population of
‘foreign background’ (‘Ultändsk bakgrund’) that comprises persons born outside
Sweden together with persons born in Sweden with both parents born abroad. Persons
born in Sweden with one parent born in Sweden are defined to be of Swedish
background (Statistics Sweden 2003, p 17, 77). That is more conservative that the
definitions used in the countries noted above.
7
The projections are complex, made separate assumptions about fertility, mortality and
migration for six populations: of Swedes, populations from the Norden countries
(excluding Sweden, of course), the EU 25 (excluding Norden), and separately for
countries with high (excluding the EU25), middle and low Human Development
Index. Countries of the Balkans and former Soviet Union, not in the EU25, are
classed as ‘middle HDI’. That procedure resembles somewhat the ‘western and ‘nonwestern’ distinctions made in the Dutch projections and the ‘more developed’ and
‘less developed’ distinction in those for Denmark.
Net immigration to Sweden in 2002 was 31,100, including a net loss of 2,500 people
born in Sweden and a net gain of 33,600 others, including 20,100 from countries of
middle or low HDI. Those are projected to fluctuate somewhat but generally decline
slightly to 31,100 by 2020, of which 20,400 are projected to be from countries of
middle or low HDI (Table 2). Immigration and emigration are projected separately,
Table 2 . Assumptions behind Swedish 2002-based projections.
Total Fertility Rate
Norden EU25 Other countries according to HDI
Sweden excl. Sw excl. N
Higher Middle
Low
All
1980
1.64
1.86
1.99
1.93
3.53
2.52
1.67
1985
1.71
1.74
1.76
1.79
3.05
3.06
1.74
1990
2.09
2.18
1.98
2.12
2.82
2.80
2.13
1995
1.65
1.59
1.53
2.01
2.54
3.46
1.73
2000
1.49
1.40
1.46
1.57
2.19
2.88
1.54
2005
1.72
1.63
1.67
1.88
2.00
2.72
1.79
2010
1.78
1.69
1.72
1.95
2.00
2.50
1.85
2015
1.78
1.69
1.73
1.95
2.00
2.50
1.86
2020
1.78
1.69
1.73
1.95
2.00
2.50
1.86
Standardised Mortality Ratio (ages 0-100) 1992 – 2001.
males
131.5
95.2
97.6
84.8
females
112.7
90.5
104.0
81.8
Net Immigration (thousands) according to birthplace.
born in Norden
EU25 According to HDI
Sweden excl Sw excl N Higher Middle
1980
-5.90
3.80
1.90
2.10
7.00
1985
-3.70
-0.20
2.40
2.20
9.50
1990
-2.80
3.70
4.30
5.10
20.80
1995
-9.00
-0.10
1.90
7.90
9.00
2000
-4.80
3.10
4.00
5.10
14.80
2005
-4.60
4.70
8.70
3.80
17.50
2010
-5.60
3.70
4.10
4.20
18.80
2015
-5.90
3.20
4.30
4.00
18.40
2020
-6.10
2.90
4.20
3.60
17.70
104.7
91.4
All
Low countries
0.60
9.50
0.90
11.00
3.90
34.80
1.90
11.50
2.30
24.60
2.70
32.80
2.90
28.20
2.80
26.90
2.70
25.10
Statistics Sweden 2003, table 9, table 19, table 20.
8
the former reaching a plateau by 2025, the latter increasing slightly. These unusually
detailed time trends of observed data, and projections from 2002, are sufficiently
interesting to present in detail in Table 2 below.
There is just one principal projection, with no variant projections. The projection of
the population by background is a combination of those projected by birthplace and
those, born in ?Sweden, with foreign or Swedish background. The outline is given in
Figure 5 below. The population of Swedish background is kept almost constant
because the relatively high projected fertility (1.78) is supplemented by constant
recruitment from the foreign population, among whom all the third generation, and
those with a Swedish –born parent, are classified as ‘Swedish background’.
By 2020, the limit of the 2002-based projections, the number of overseas-born
residents is projected to rise to 1.49 million and the children of immigrants to 0.55
million, giving a total population of foreign-background of 21% of the total Swedish
population (Figure 5, Statistics Sweden p 18). Further projections based on 2003,
which extend to 2050 (Statistics Sweden 2004), enable these proportions to be taken
forward on a different basis. The new projections do not subdivide the population by
background as above, although they do project the population born abroad – expected
Figure 5.
Projection, Sweden 1980-2002 by background. Source: Statistics Sweden 2003
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
Middle and low HDI background
Swedish background
All
All foreign background
3000
2000
1000
0
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
to rise to 15.3% by 2020 and 18.0 % by 2050. A zero-migration projection, however,
provided by Mr Å. Nilsson of Statistics Sweden (pers. comm), enables the additional
foreign-origin population arising from immigration from 2004 to be determined, by
simple subtraction from the principal projection, using the foreign-origin population
in 2004 as a basis. That process, inevitably, assumes zero naturalisation among the
post-2004 foreign origin population. It also enables the increment of population due to
immigration to be calculated. This estimate by subtraction is a more strict definition
9
of further foreign-origin increments, in that all the additional population is deemed to
be non-Swedish, while on the other hand all the future natural increase of the
population as it existed in 2004 will be regarded as ‘Swedish’ even though a
(diminishing) proportion will be of ‘foreign background’. By interpolation in the
previous projection, the proportion of foreign background in 2004 was 1.44 million or
Figure 6.
Foreign -born and foreign origin population in Sweden, 1980 - 2020,
percent of total population. Source: Statistics Sweden 2003, 2004, Akers pers. comm.
35
30
Foreign birthplace 2000-based
projection
Foreign background 2000-based
projection
Foreign background 2003-based
projection by subtraction
25
20
15
10
5
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Addition of all population differences between the zero migration and principal
projections gives the proportions in Figure 6, indicating that on those assumptions, the
foreign-background would reach 32.3% by 2050. The projection on this simple
assumption from 2005-2020 is identical with that on the previous basis, giving some
Figure 7.
Population projections, Sweden 2004-2050, standard and zero
migration. Source: Statistics Sweden.
11.0
10.5
Zero-migration projection (millions)
Standard projection (millions)
10.0
9.5
9.0
8.5
2050
2048
2046
2044
2042
2040
2038
2036
2034
2032
2030
2028
2026
2024
2022
2020
2018
2016
2014
2012
2010
2008
2006
2004
8.0
10
confidence in the soundness of the procedure adopted. The assumptions behind the
new projections are very similar to those in the previous ones. That is; TFR rising to
1.85, expectation of life for males rising to 80.8 years by 2020 and to 83.6 by 2050;
and for females to 84.2 and 86.2 respectively; net immigration to 25,000 by 2020 (the
same, for all birthplaces as in the previous projection) and 24,000 by 2050 (Statistics
Sweden 2004 t 9.1). The effect on the total population size is also fairly potent. In the
principal projection, population rises from 9.01 million in 2003 to 10.63 million in
2050, compared with 8.64 million for the zero migration assumption – an increase of
1.6 million or 19% (Figure 7).
Projections of the foreign-origin population in The Netherlands
The relatively larger foreign origin population of the Netherlands has been projected
to have a substantial impact on the size and the composition of the national population
up to 2050 (Alders 2001b, Statistics Netherlands 2001, 2003). Overall, on the 2003based medium variant projection the Dutch population was expected to increase from
15.9 million in 2000 to 17.6 million by 2050; slightly fewer than the 2000-based
projection (18.0 millions). A zero-migration variant projected a total of 14.9 million,
so according to that 2.7 million additional population is added, directly and indirectly
(down from 3.3 million projected in 2000), by post-2003 net immigration. That would
increase the population by 18% (Figure 8).
Figure 8.
Netherlands 2003-2050 projections, medium variant and zeromigration (millions). Source: Statistics Netherlands 2003-based projections.
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
total-medium variant
total-zero migration
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
12
native - zero migration
Two major foreign groups are distinguished: ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ foreigners.
The latter include Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans, and others.
Only two generations are recognised; ‘First Generation’ immigrants and the ‘Second
Generation’. As noted earlier, the ’First Generation’ is defined as a person born
outside the Netherlands with at least one parent born outside the Netherlands. The
‘Second Generation’ is a person born in the Netherlands with at least one parent born
outside it. These are the same definitions as those noted above in the definition of the
11
‘foreign origin’ population. Subsequent generations are assumed to be Dutch. As with
most other projections, this definition therefore progressively understates the
demographic impact as time goes. That is similar to the convention used (e.g.) in the
Danish projections but not in all others. That should be kept in mind when making
comparisons with other projections, made on a different basis.
By 2050, 5.7 million people, 32% of the total population, would be of foreign origin
on the limited definition noted above: two thirds of ‘non-western’ origin and one-third
of ‘western’ origin (Figure 9). By this time the ‘western’ foreign origin population
(2.2 million) was projected to have ceased to grow and to be in slight decline. That of
‘non-western’ origin, having increased from 1.41 million in 2000 (8.9% of total
population) to 3.46 m in 2050 (19.6 %), was projected still to be increasing in 2050.
The Dutch population itself would have declined slowly after 2007; falling eventually
from 13.1 million in 2000 to 11.9 million in 2050 (and from 82.5% to 67.8% of the
total population.).
Figure 9.
Netherlands 2003-2050. Percent of population foreign, medium variant
and zero-migration projections. Source: Statistics Netherlands 2003-based projections.
35
Percent population foreign - medium variant
30
percent population foreign - zero migration
25
20
15
10
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
The latter figures include as ‘Dutch’ most of the third and subsequent immigrant
generations, although the second generation total includes a mixed second/third
generation because it includes Dutch-born children with a Dutch parent and foreign
parent. The relative increases in the Western foreign populations according to the
2000 based projections are shown in Table 3, and in the non-Western populations in
Table 11 (de Jong 2001, Alders 2001 b,c).
Table 3. Projection of ‘Western’ foreign population in the Netherlands, 2000 and
2050 (thousands)
Year
First
Second
Total
generation generation
Total Western
2000
545
822
1367
12
European Economic Area
Other Europe
Indonesia
Other outside Europe
2050
2000
2050
2000
2050
2000
2050
2000
2050
833
269
367
103
381
141
36
32
49
1178
474
535
54
367
264
173
29
103
2011
744
901
156
748
405
209
61
152
Source: de Jong 2001 page 25
This projection assumes considerable further immigration from Eastern Europe. The
Indonesian population is included in the ‘Western’ category as a highly-assimilated
immigrant population, of mixed European-Asian origin.
Table 4. Projection of non-Western foreign population in the Netherlands, 2000
and 2050 (thousands)
Foreign origin
Year
First
Second
Total
generation generation
Total non-Western
2000
886
523
1409
2050
1804
2090
3894
Turkey
2000
178
131
309
2050
201
304
505
Morocco
2000
153
110
262
2050
237
333
570
Surinam
2000
183
119
303
2050
150
215
365
Netherlands Antilles, Aruba
2000
69
38
107
2050
139
170
309
Africa
2000
102
50
151
2050
278
318
596
Asia
2000
169
57
226
2050
696
614
887
Latin America
2000
33
18
51
2050
102
136
238
Source: Alders 2001 page 30.
On these projections, the Surinamese population increases only to a modest extent, the
Turkish population more substantially. Together with the Antillean and Moroccan
populations, these currently dominate the Dutch immigrant scene. However the
projections assume a substantial increase in ‘new’ foreign immigrant populations, at
present not so numerous in the Netherlands. The biggest increases are among Africans
(from 151,000 to 596,000), and Asians; projected to increase over five-fold from
226,000 to 1,311,000. This follows high projected levels of future asylum-claiming
(Alders 2001c). Latin American populations also projected to increase five-fold from
a modest 51,000 today, to 238,000. This is not the only European projection to
assume that much of Europe’s ethnic growth may come from relatively new
13
populations, especially from asylum claiming, rather than from older established if
still imperfectly assimilated ones.
Revisions to the Dutch projection based on 2003 yielded a lower projected nonWestern foreign origin total than in the tables above (3.46 million rather than 3.89
million) and rather more ‘Western’ foreign origin population (2.22 million compared
with 2.01 million). The latter data were used in Figure 9. In December 2004 the
projections were further revised downwards (especially of Africans and Asians) to
reflect the decline of asylum claims following the introduction of more restrictive
policies. The ‘non-western’ population for 2050 is now projected to be 2.80 million
out of a foreign origin total of 5.03 million (29.7%). Tables and figures will be
adjusted accordingly in future revisions of this paper.
Projections of the German foreign-origin population
The German projections of foreign-origin population, which also run to 2050 (Ulrich
2001), provide three scenarios together with a ‘control’ scenario of zero immigration
from 2000 onwards. Overall, the medium scenario projects a 17% drop in the
population of Germany from 82.2 million in 2000 to 68.3 million in 2050. The zeromigration ‘control‘ scenario projects a total population of 59.7 million in 2050; 22.5
million or 27% fewer people than in 2000 (Table 5).
Distinctions are made between German citizens on the one hand and Turkish,
(former) Yugoslav, EU foreign and other foreign citizens. The familiar problems of
the ‘citizenship’ criterion are sidestepped by taking parentage taken into
consideration, by calculating the growth in the number of persons of German
nationality with two foreign parents, and thus allowing in part for the effect of
naturalisation. That allows categories to be projected of ‘second generation’ persons
of foreign origin, even if they are naturalised Germans. However, as with most of the
other projections, the third generation is assumed to be German.
Within the total the foreign origin population is expected to double from 8.1 million
(9.9%) in 2000 to 16.1 million or 23.6%. In the zero-migration scenario, the foreign
origin population declines from 8.1 million to 7.7 million. The importance of
naturalisation in determining the scale of the ‘foreign’ contribution to future
population is revealed in Table 4. On the simple criterion of citizenship, the foreign
population in the medium variant scenario merely increases from 7.4 million to 11
million, not to the 16.1 million on the criterion of foreign origin. The difference of 5.1
million is accounted for by people of foreign origin (that is, with two foreign parents)
being naturalised into German citizenship. As well as those 5.1 million naturalised
foreign persons, a further 1.9 million of the German citizen population in 2050 are
projected to be of aussiedler origin (there were 2.5m in 2000). As in the Dutch
projections, the expected increase in the more established foreign populations (e.g.
Turkish) is relatively modest, while the greater part of the future growth of foreign
population comes from ‘other non-EU foreigners’.
14
Table 5. Population and citizenship scenarios, Germany 2000 - 2050 (millions)
Citizenship
Ancestry
Medium
Zero
Medium
Zero
variant Migration
variant
Migration
German
2000
74.8
74.8
74.1
74.1
2030
68.0
67.4
64.0
63.9
2050
57.3
55.6
52.2
52.0
Turkish
2000
2.1
2.1
2.5
2.5
2030
0.9
0.6
3.1
2.6
2050
0.7
0.3
2.9
2.1
Yugoslav
2000
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.8
2030
1.1
0.6
1.4
0.9
2050
1.1
0.4
1.5
0.7
Other EU states
2000
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
2030
2.0
1.5
2.2
1.7
2050
1.8
1.0
2.2
1.3
Other foreign
2000
2.7
2.7
2.9
2.9
2030
6.1
2.9
7.5
3.8
2050
7.4
2.4
9.5
3.6
All foreign
2000
7.4
7.4
8.1
8.1
2030
10.1
5.6
14.2
9.0
2050
11.0
4.1
16.1
7.7
All
2000
82.2
82.2
82.2
82.2
2030
78.1
73.0
78.2
72.9
2050
68.3
59.7
68.3
59.7
Source: Ulrich (2001) tables 12-14.
Projections of the Austrian foreign-origin population
The projections for Austria (Lebhart and Münz 2003) differ from those above in
dealing only with ‘citizens’ and ‘foreigners’, with no broader ’foreign-origin’
population. There is no ‘medium variant’ projection, although one has been issued
separately by Statistics Austria (2005). Instead three scenarios are presented. The first
is a ‘Compensatory’ scenario with migration managed to keep the population of
working age approximately constant (‘1/KZ’ in the original paper). In the second
‘restricted’ scenario (‘2/RZ’), immigration is restricted to a lower ceiling, with a quota
on non-EU immigrants, and in the third (‘OZ’) all migration is stopped. The TFR
overall is assumed to rise to only 1.5 by 2050 and that of the foreign population does
not exceed 2.0. The TFR of Austrian citizens was 1.32 in 1995/8 compared with 1.95
for foreigners, and these are assumed to increase modestly to 1.40 and 2.0 by the end
of the projection period. The unusually large TFR difference arises because almost
90% of Austria’s foreign population are from non-European countries. Those low
fertility rates are the fundamental reason why the population fails to increase in any of
the scenarios. Instead, as Figure 10 shows, it is almost maintained in the first scenario
and falls in the other two. The ‘compensatory’ scenario is closest to the Statistics
Austria main projection, which leaves the population slightly higher in 2050 than in
2000, primarily because of relatively high migration assumptions. With restricted or
15
with zero migration, Austrian population would fall by 1.1 and 1.5 million
respectively by 2050 in the other two scenarios.
Figure 10
Austria 2000-2050 - effect of three migration scenarios on total population
(millions). Source: Lebhart and Munz 2003.
9
8
8
Compensatory migration ('1/KZ')
7
Restricted immigration ('2/RZ')
Zero immigration ('OZ')
7
6
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
In the three main scenarios, naturalisation is assumed to proceed at the same rather
high rate as in Austria in 2000 (about 20,600 in 2000). Under that assumption, even
under the highest immigration flows projected, the foreign-citizen population does not
rise above 1.03 million or 13.1% of the population by 2050 (Figure 11). However,
two of the scenarios are presented without naturalisation. Without naturalisation, not
only do immigrants retain their foreign citizenship but so also do their children. So in
Figure 11.
Austria 2000-2052: the effect of immigration on percent of population with
foreign citizenship. Source: Lebhart and Munz (2003).
30
Zero immigration with no naturalisation
Zero immigration: percent foreign, with naturalisation.
25
Restricted immigration without naturalisation
20
Compensatory immigration without naturalisation
15
10
5
0
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
16
effect the ‘no naturalisation’ scenarios are projecting what in the UK or US would be
described as ‘ethnic minority ‘ populations that remain permanently distinct.
In the ‘Compensatory’ variant ‘1/KZ’, immigration is managed at a variable net
inflow increasing from the current level of 6000 per year in 2000 to a maximum of
18,000 per year, to keep the population of working age approximately constant.
Naturalisation in Austria at the moment is running ahead of net immigration, at about
20,600 per year. Without naturalisation the ‘Compensatory’ variant would lead to a
foreign-origin population of 28% of the total by 2050 compared with 8.9% in 2000
(that was calculated by subtracting the ‘no immigration and no naturalisation’
(‘OZ/OE’) scenario from the former; it is not provided in the published data). In the
restrictive migration variant (‘2/RZ’), with net immigration limited to a maximum of
11,000 per year, and with non-EU immigrants subject to a quota, population falls
slightly further to 7.4 million while in the zero-migration scenario (‘OZ’) population
fall to 6.3 million, 19% fewer people than under the compensatory scenario. The
proportion foreign falls to 5.1% with naturalisation. In the variant without
naturalisation (‘OZ/OE’) the proportion foreign rises by 2050, through natural
increase only, from 9% to 13.1%. It will be recalled that the foreign population is
assumed to retain a higher fertility than average (2.0 compared with 1.5) to the end of
the projection.
Projection of the ethnic minority population of the United Kingdom
In 1979 the UK Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (now Office for National
Statistics, ONS) published simple projections of the ‘New Commonwealth ethnic
minority’ populations – that is, non-white populations of recent immigrant origin,
born in born in the ‘New Commonwealth’ of Asian, West Indian and African
countries (Immigrant Statistics Unit 1979) or with parents born there. That category
roughly corresponded to ‘non-Western’ foreign origin populations, or ‘middle and
low HDI foreign background populations’ discussed above, except that the categories,
being ‘ethnic’, were potentially permanent and did not disappear after the second
generation. Those projections extended only to 1991 and were not too inaccurate up to
that date, although they under-stated the out-turn of actual events. Political
considerations have inhibited any repetition until recently. Following the 2001
Census, however, the Office for National Statistics is developing new projections
(Haskey 2002) on a more subtle methodology and a more complex set of ethnic
categories, as yet unpublished. Other projections have been made of the New
Commonwealth (NC) population on various assumptions, but these assumed the
diminution of the then modest levels of immigration and have been eclipsed by events
(Brass 1982, Coleman 1995).
Some preliminary work on new simple projections of the UK ethnic minority
populations is presented here. Without a population register, and without detailed data
on the nationality or other attributes of net migrant flows, all estimates of vital rates
must be made indirectly. For example, the TFR has been estimated by the own-child
method from the Labour Force Surveys (LFS), and the net immigrant flows by
adjusting broad-brush estimates of net immigration from the International Passenger
Survey by the ethnic distribution of recent arrivals in the UK derived from the LFS.
Work is in progress on the mortality estimates; for the time being, it is assumed that
they are the same as the national level and trend (Coleman and Smith 2005). Total
17
fertility rates averaged from the trends illustrated in Figure 12 below were used as the
starting point.
Figure 12.
TFR Estimates by Ethnic Group: United Kingdom, 1980-2001.
Source LFS by own-child method. Data points are 7-year averages
7000
White
Chinese
Black-Caribbean
Indian
Black-African
Pakistani
Bangladeshi
TFR (Births per 1000 women)
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1000
Source: Labour Force Survey 1979, 1983, 1984-91; Quarterly Labour Force Survey 1992-2001 (Autumn)
Two level of convergence of fertility were used in most groups, according to curves
fitted to the rate of change; one converging to the national average, the other to a
slightly higher asymptote. In some cases, e.g. the Indian and the Chinese populations,
mean TFR has already fallen to the national average or below. To begin with, a
projection of the total non-white ethnic minority population is given below, on some
simple assumptions. The projections are for England and Wales, not for the UK
(most immigrants to the UK settle in England and Wales). Fertility is assumed to fall
to an overall level of 1.9, slightly higher than the projected national total (1.75). On
that assumption, immigration makes a powerful difference. Assuming a net annual
inflow of 70,000, probably an under-estimate, the minority population rises to about
13 million by 2050, increasing in a linear fashion (Figure 13). 50% higher
Projection of UK non-white population to 2051 (1000s) at three levels of
immigration mortality constant EW 1998, TFR declining from 2.14 - 1.90
18000
Zero migration
High migration 108k/yr
Medium migration 70k/yr
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
18
2000
2001
2006
2011
2016
2021
2026
2031
2036
2041
2046
2051
immigration would take it to almost 16 million; with zero immigration it tails off to
stabilise at about 7 million, from 4.5 million in 2001. To make for more comparability
with other estimates, a projection is also made of white immigrants who are not Irish
or British. At present their net immigration is very high – estimated at 108k per year.
That would generate considerable growth, as Figure 14 shows, in the white nonBritish population, to over 9 million by mid century if migration remained constant.
That seems unlikely; neither asylum inflows from Eastern Europe nor those from the
recent EU accession countries are likely to be enduring. But the result is presented
below for illustrative purposes. The white British population is assumed to lose
population by migration by about –53,000 per year. On those assumptions, the
population of England and Wales would rise from 52 million to 62 million (more than
GAD projects). The white British and Irish population would decline from 88.7% to
64.3% by mid century, a non-British proportion therefore of 35%, similar to that
projected for (e.g.) the Netherlands as the same date. Of that, the non-white
proportion would have risen from 8.7% to 19.9% and the white non-British from
2.7% to 15.8%.
Figure 14.
Sample projection, ethnic composition trends ,
England and Wales 2001- 2051 (thousands)
70000
60000
50000
Non-white population
40000
British and Irish pop
30000
White non-British population
20000
Total England and Wales pop
10000
0
2001
2006
2011
2016
2021
2026
2031
2036
2041
2046
2051
For the non-European populations, separate projections are being prepared to take into
account their different fertility and migration characteristics. An example relating to
the Pakistani population, one showing the most vigorous growth, is shown below
Here the contrast is made between four scenarios. These combine two alternatives in
migration and in fertility. Net immigration is assumed either to end, or to continue at
the rate current around 2001, conservatively estimated to be 12,000 per year. Period
TFR is assumed either to decline from the current 3 to 1.75 by 2016, or to decline
more slowly, to 2.05, by 2051 (Figure 15). Given these alternatives it is clear that the
alternative migration assumptions have the more powerful effect than the two very
different assumptions about (partial) convergence to lower fertility levels. In that
19
respect the general conclusion is similar to that derived from projections in other
European countries.
Figure 15.
British Pakistani population projections 2001-2051
(thousands)
2300
2100
1900
1700
1500
1300
1100
900
700
2001
2006
2011
2016
2021
2026
2031
2036
2041
S 6 No mig, TFR 1.75 2016
S 8 Mig 12k, TFR 1.75 2016
S 9 No mig, TFR 2.05 2046-51
S 10 Mig 12k, TFR 2.05 2046-51
2046
2051
20
Probabilistic projections of the UK population by major ethnic group.
As well as these incomplete projections made in the conventional manner, some
experimental projections of the UK population have been made using the LSSI
probabilistic basis (the ‘random scenario’ approach). This has various advantages.
First, the probabilistic nature makes explicit the uncertainty which inevitably attends
projections and especially projections of ethnic minority populations, the
demographic responses of which are even less well understood than those of ordinary
populations. The justification for probabilistic projections had been made elsewhere
(Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov 1997, 2001, Keilman, Dinh et al 2002). The
probabilistic population projections are based on the multi-state cohort component
model of population projections. This model applies a set of given age specific
fertility, mortality and migration rates to the age and sex distribution of the starting
population along cohort lines. The limits of likely variability must be set a priori for
each variable. They cannot be known in advance. Usually, advice is sought from a
panel of experts to define the likely maximum and minimum values of the variables at
various points into the future, to cover (say) 90 per cent of all future paths of TFR, life
expectancy at birth, and net migration (Lutz and Scherbov 1998). Because the
resulting distributions of assumed values in previous exercises have turned out to be
symmetrical, normal distributions are fitted to those ranges. In this case, symmetrical
limits were imposed on future variability by the authors. They were guided, where
appropriate, by the limits imposed by the variant projections for the UK provided by
the UK Government Actuary’s Department (2004). For each of the three variables, a
single draw from a standard normal distribution determined its relative position within
its range of future values at selected dates. The values at intermediate dates were
determined by piece-wise linear interpolation. The results of 1000 of these random
simulations were analysed.
These projections also incorporate populations of mixed origin (that feature, of itself,
does not require the method to be probabilistic, of course). The demographic attention
given to mixed unions has not been commensurate with their prevalence in many
populations. Most projections of foreign-origin or of ethnic minority populations
noted above have ignored mixed unions and populations of mixed origin, generally
assuming that any offspring of a mother of a given population sub-group will
themselves also be considered to be part of that sub-group. In some societies, where
individuals with some foreign background normally identify themselves with the
minority group and are so treated by the rest of the population, that will not be
unreasonable. However, given the opportunity in censuses and surveys, large numbers
of people in the UK and the US actively identify themselves as having multiple ethnic
origins, from the parental or even earlier generations (e.g. Goldstein and Morning
2002). However the rules governing the attribution of ‘foreign origin’ to the secondgeneration in some of the projections (e.g. those of Denmark) incorporate a set of
coefficients to determine the status of children of different combinations of parental
origin. The projections of the US ethnic groups by Smith and Edmonston (1997)
explicitly incorporate both mixed unions and change of ethnicity by individuals. The
latter is not done here.
The projections here are made for a maximum of 100 years, although the results for
2025 and 2050 are clearly the most important. Although it is obvious that much can
21
and must change over the longer period, there is at least some merit in showing the
long-term consequences of current trends and their (at least plausible) future
evolution, and the range of possible likely outcomes. The policy of the UK GAD is to
give most attention to its projections to 2051 although detailed projections are made
up to 2071 (GAD 2004) and some have been published to the end of the century
(Shaw 2001). The UN now routinely produces longer-term projection, and even to
2300 (UN 2004) although not without some scepticism as to their value.
Assumptions behind the projections
The probabilistic projections presented here are based approximately upon the
demographic experience of the ethnic minority populations of the United Kingdom,
but using a very simplified scheme of ethnic classification. That was done in order to
gain experience of this type of simulation before attempting a more complex
operation. The ethnic groups used in the collection of official statistics in the UK
have changed in a number of ways since the practice first began in the 1971 census
and in the 1979 Labour Force Survey (see Bulmer 1996). The scheme used in recent
Labour Force Surveys and in the 2001 census is given below (Table 6) together with
the drastic amalgamations made necessary by the requirements of the current
probabilistic projection program. These amalgamations undoubtedly do serious
violence to reality. ‘Black’ and ‘Asian’ are the two major clusters of ethnic minority
groups recognised in the UK ethnic taxonomy. However, the demographic
characteristics of the two main Black groups (Caribbean and African) are rather
different; the latter having higher fertility and higher immigration, especially from
asylum-claiming. But they do share relatively high levels of inter-ethnic unions.
Likewise the ‘Asian’ group brigades together Indians, of relatively high status and
low birth rate, with Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, of lower average status and higher
birth rate. All share, however, in having high migration rates driven substantially by
arranged marriages as well as by
Table 6.
United Kingdom ethnic population distribution 2001 (thousands)
ONS category
E&W Scotland Northern
United
United Final groups
Ireland
Kingdom Kingdom
Bangladeshi
280.8
0.2
281.0
2578.7
2705.3
Indian
1036.8
15.0
1.5
1053.4
(‘Asian’)
Pakistani
714.8
40.0
0.7
755.4
Chinese
Other Asian
226.9
241.3
16.3
4.2
0.2
247.4
241.5
Other
219.8
30.4
3.0
253.2
253.2
African
Caribbean
Other Black
479.7
563.8
96.1
0.5
0.3
0.3
480.2
564.1
96.4
1140.7
1267.3
(’Black’)
661.4
661.4
(‘Mixed’)
0.3
237.4
78.9
189.0
156.0
White/Caribbean
237.4
White/African
78.9
White/Asian
189.0
Other Mixed
155.7
Source: ONS 2001 Census
22
asylum-claiming, and low levels of inter-ethnic union and of births outside marriage.
In UK usage, the Chinese population is not normally included in the ‘Asian’ group
but is so here, along with any ‘Other’ groups, in practice including many from the
Middle East (Peach 1996). These projections therefore can only be semi-realistic. But
they have the merit of showing some possible long-term consequences of the
continuation and development of various demographic patterns now in evidence,
some of which are unlikely to change radically.
The starting point for the projections is the population by ethnic group enumerated in
the 2001 Census, given in Table 6. Vital rates are not differentiated according to birth
cohort or to birthplace, whether in the UK or abroad, or by duration of residence. For
the most part, the differences between the UK-born and the foreign-born in respect of
birth rate are not usually great (see Coleman and Smith 2005). Total fertility rates
have been estimated for the ethnic minority populations from the 1970s to 2002 using
the own-child method from the Labour Force Surveys (Cho and Retherford 1986,
Smith 2005), weighted according to the relative population size of each of the
constituent parts of the major groups defined here. The future trend of fertility in most
groups is based upon the historic trend observed from the 1970s to 2001. In some
cases (Indian, Caribbean, Chinese, Mixed populations) the level of TFR is now close
to the national average. In other cases it remains substantially above (Pakistanis and
Bangladeshis) although trending downwards (Figure 12). The TFR of the African
population showed a contrary trend; increasing in the 1990s, probably as a result of
high immigration through asylum-seeking.
Assumptions
Two versions of the projection have been attempted. The assumptions for the first
projection are summarised in Table 7 below. A second version was constructed with
slightly different assumptions (Table 8) which the authors believe to be more
plausible. Discussion will be concentrated on the second one. In essence, version 1
assumes that by 2025, white fertility will increase somewhat to 1.74 (which happens
to be the GAD assumption for the whole country) and remain there until the end of
the simulation. At the same time the fertility of the two main ethnic groups is set to
decline to 1.99 by 2050 and then all will converge on 1.85 to the end of the
simulation. The latter is the standard UN assumption for developed societies in the
2002-based population projections (UN 2003). Complete convergence of all minority
fertility with the lower UK current TFR of 1.73 was not assumed to be imminent, for
reasons outlined above. A slow and sometimes incomplete convergence is assumed in
most of the European projections described above. The eventual level of uncertainty
in fertility rates is based on the range of the period TFR adopted in the 2003-based
variant projections of the UK Government Actuary's Department. Total annual births
increase slightly from 705000 to 725000.
The analysis of age-standardised mortality of immigrant populations (as opposed to
ethnic minority populations born in the UK) has not revealed very large differences;
some are to the advantage of the immigrant population (Maxwell and Harding 1998).
No life tables for UK immigrant or minority groups have yet been produced. For the
purposes of this projection, the sex and age-specific mortality rates for the whole
population employed by the Government Actuary’s Department in the UK 2003based national projections are used (GAD 2004), together with their projected future
23
trend up to 2040 which is then assumed to continue. The authors feel that the
assumptions about future mortality of Government Actuary’s Department are too
conservative. But they are employed here in order minimise areas of controversy. No
variability is assumed for the mortality at the start of the projection; the upper and
lower bounds are set in accordance with the higher and lower mortality assumptions
in the GAD variant projections based on 2003 (the latest at the time of writing).
As noted above, migration is poorly measured in the UK. Only estimates of flows are
available (using the UN definition), based on the small samples of all international
passengers into and out of the UK made by the International Passenger Survey (IPS),
supplemented by other data (ONS 2004). In recent years many more British citizens
have left the UK than have returned to it. This net annual outflow, recently about
80,000, is assumed to be white. However there is a substantial net inflow of white
persons of other citizenships, almost all from countries of the developed world (i.e.
born in those countries, or citizens of those countries) including the poorer parts of
Europe. Taking all migration inflows together, about half are thought to contribute to
the ethnic minority populations. The migration assumptions here are somewhat higher
than used above
Table 7. Basic data for Version 1 projections of major UK ethnic groups.
TFR
White
Black
Asian
Mixed
All
2001
1.66
2.16
2.32
2.00
1.72
annual LFS ‘births’
29940
653
1884
88
2016
1.71
2.06
2.13
2.00
1.77
2051
1.74
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.81
2100
1.85
1.85
1.85
1.85
1.86
upper bound 2016
1.94
2.22
2.22
2.22
lower bound 2016
1.54
1.76
1.76
1.76
White
Black
Asian
Mixed
Migration (1000s)
total
2001
51
43
51
4
149
2016
53
44
53
4
153
2051
53
44
53
4
153
2100
53
44
53
4
153
upper bound 2016
75
63
75
6
219
lower bound 2016
28
23
28
2
81
Expectation of life - all groups as GAD 2002 and 2003 PP and variant
male female
2001
76.1
80.6
2051
81.9
84.3
upper bound 2042
85.2
88.2
lower bound 2042
78.6
83.3
2100
86.9
89.2
Proportion of births to given group that are 'mixed', 2001
White
Black
Asian
Mixed
0.015
0.27
0.13
0.7
Note: variant net migration based upon GAD 2003 assumptions ratio
24
between high and low but scaled to total net 150000, not GAD 130000.
Variant e0 high-low range are the same as GAD 2003 variant assumptions.
Variant TFR high-low ranges based on GAD 2003 variant assumptions.
GAD 2003-based assumptions are essentially the same as 2002-based
assumptions except for the abolition of ‘unattributable population change’.
Projection of future migration flows is exceptionally difficult; probabilistic
projections have been recommended (Wilson and Bell 2004). The official GAD
projections simply assume a flat level of net immigration in perpetuity, currently
(2003-based) at a level of 130,000 per year: about 20,000 fewer than the actual
current level (151,000 in 2003) as reported by ONS. In version 1, net migration into
all groups remains unchanged throughout the simulation, an important assumption
being that net immigration of whites should remain at a net annual level of 53000.
Much of the immigration (mostly but not all white) from the developed world, is
fuelled by UK economic growth and the ease with which employers are now
permitted to access overseas labour. Further, the UK is the only major EU country to
admit migrants for work without limit from the ten new EU accession countries. From
May to December 2004, 133,000 persons from those countries registered for the work
scheme (of whom about 40% were already in the country), and not all have to register
(Dept of Employment 2005); an annualised rate of entry of about 120,000 per year.
These are not immigration figures, however, as departures and length of stay are
unknown. High levels of inflow can be expected from these countries for some time
and also from the even poorer countries of Bulgaria and Romania scheduled to enter
in 2007, not to mention Turkey. Successive UK Home Secretaries (ministers in charge
of immigration) have declared that they see ‘no upper limit’ to the level of
immigration into the UK, and most commentators believe that high level of
immigration are here to stay.
The assumptions for version 2 are the same as those for version 1 in respect of the
future evolution of mortality, shared as before with all groups, and the proportions of
births that are mixed. The important differences relate to fertility and migration. TFR
is the same in both runs up to 2050. In version 1, TFRs converge between 2050 and
2100 on 1.85, which is the normal final level for West European TFR in the recent
UN population projections. This version 2 simulation assumes, as do others for some
European countries noted above, that cultural and other differences promoting
relatively high birth rates will not entirely disappear. TFR of the main ethnic groups
remains at 1.99 while that of whites and of the mixed population falls to 1.85, yielding
a national total average of 1.91. On average, annual births increase from 704,000 to
771,000 over the course of this simulation.
In version 2, it is assumed that Black and Asian immigration will continue at a high
level and indeed increase somewhat. That assumption is made for the reasons noted
above, for example, third-world immigration is driven to a considerable extent by
marriage-migration, which in the UK has increased pro rata with the growth of the
young age-groups of the Asian ethnic minority populations (Coleman 2004).. It also
assumes that other migratory pressures will remain important: the persistence
of major economic differentials between the developed and the third world, the
25
Table 8. Mean and interval assumptions for Version 2 probabilistic projection.
TFR
Mean and 90% Interval in 2001
White
Black
Asian
Mixed
2.16
2.08
2.24
Mean and 90% Interval in 2021
1.99
1.76
2.22
Mean and 90% Interval in 2051
1.99
1.76
2.22
Mean and 90% Interval in 2100
1.99
1.76
2.22
2.32
2.24
2.40
2.00
1.92
2.08
1.99
1.76
2.22
1.99
1.76
2.22
1.99
1.76
2.22
1.98
1.76
2.22
1.99
1.76
2.22
1.85
1.62
2.08
51.0
51.0
51.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
43.5
116.5
2.5
7.5
40.8
109.2
2.5
7.5
76.1
76.1
80.6
80.6
76.1
76.1
80.6
80.6
78.6
85.2
83.6
90.2
78.6
85.2
83.6
90.2
81.0
87.5
86.0
92.5
81.0
87.5
86.0
92.5
Births of mixed origin
100% Interval in 2001 (uniform distribution)
0.15
0.10
0.25
0.16
0.38
0.62
Mean
Low value
High value
1.66
1.63
1.69
Mean
Low value
High value
1.74
1.54
1.94
Mean
Low value
High value
1.75
1.54
1.94
Mean
Low value
High value
1.85
1.62
2.08
Mean
Low value
High value
51.0
51.0
51.0
Low value
High value
16.3
43.7
Low value
High value
-13.7
13.7
Low (m)
High (m)
Low (f)
High (f)
76.1
76.1
80.6
80.6
Low (m)
High (m)
Low (f)
High (f)
78.6
85.2
83.6
90.2
Low (m)
High (m)
Low (f)
High (f)
81.0
87.5
86.0
92.5
Low value
High value
Net migration (thousands)
Mean and 90% Interval in 2001
43.0
43.0
43.0
90% Interval in 2021
42.3
117.2
90% Interval in 2051
37.4
102.6
Life expectancy
90% Interval in 2001
76.1
76.1
80.6
80.6
90% Interval in 2050
78.6
85.2
83.6
90.2
90% Interval in 2100
81.0
87.5
86.0
92.5
26
Low value
High value
100% Interval in 2050 (uniform distribution)
0.26
0.19
0.44
0.31
0.64
1.00
growth of chain migration, and pressures of various kinds from the poorest
populations in Africa and in Asia which are expected to increase disproportionately in
numbers for the next century or more (UN 2004). In the medium term, however, the
UK economy is unlikely to retain its current superiority over those of its neighbours,
The prospects for economic convergence and of political stability to a degree likely to
moderate flows are greater in Central and Eastern Europe than in many third-world
sending countries. Furthermore, when their cohorts born since the early 1990s mature
to working age, Central and Eastern Europe will start to run out of young people.
Therefore the version 2 projection assumes that net white immigration will decline
substantially down to 30k by 2021. The probability bounds assumed here are again
pro rata with the those adopted by the GAD for its high and low migration variants
(that is, 60000 above and below the principal projection figure of 130,000). Migration
of whites is assumed to tail off to net zero by 2050, while that of the two major ethnic
groups is assumed to increase to 68 and 74 thousand respectively, keeping overall net
immigration constant throughout the period at 146,000, similar to version 1.
Correlations between variables in the projections
In projections of this kind, the future path of any given variable in the various
different groups can either be independent or correlated to some degree. As noted
above, the mortality rates for each group were defined to be the same and furthermore
were perfectly correlated (r=1.0) throughout the simulations. As regards fertility, the
future paths of the fertility of the white population was independent of all others (r =
0.0). The other three were correlated 90%; that is r (tfr (g1,t), tfr (g2,t)) = 0.9, where
g1 and g2 are any two of three minority groups except whites and t = time.
As regards migration, the correlation was 50% between all groups including whites;
that is r (mig (g1,t), mig (g2,t)) = 0.5, where g1 and g2 are any two of three minority
groups and t = time. The proportions of mixed births to each group, which is defined
to increase over time, were uncorrelated between minorities (except with whites).
The different variables were not correlated with each other.
Births of mixed origin
All mixed-origin births were assumed to have one white parent. It is assumed that the
proportion of mixed births to white mothers, with fathers from any specified group, is
half that of mixed births to mothers of that group, with white fathers. Thus if 2000
children were to be born from black mothers and white fathers, then 1000 children
would be born to white mothers by black fathers. This device, which does not accord
with the reality of the situation, was made necessary to balance the early results of the
simulation with the input data and will need to be revised. But without that, the
number of mixed births would have been much greater than the number implied by
the number of young children of mixed origin in the 2001 census. It is possible that
the mismatch could be resolved by assuming that a considerable proportion of births
of mixed origin to white mothers are not considered to be mixed, but are attributed to
the majority group. The simulation does not incorporate a variable for change of
identity or ‘ethnic migration’; that is proposed for future development.
27
Results.
The results of the two sets of simulations, together with their detailed assumptions
about means and 90% probability intervals for each variable at different times, are
given below in outline in Figure 16, and in more detail in Appendix Tables 1 and 2
and in the figures that follow.
Figure 16.
UK Version 2 probabilistic projection: mean of percent of each major ethnic
group in the total population, 2001 - 2100.
100
90
80
70
60
White
50
Black
Asian
40
Mixed
30
20
10
2100
2095
2090
2085
2080
2075
2070
2065
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2001
0
Figures 17 and 18 below illustrate the contrast between the distribution of the
population by age, sex and ethnic group in 2001 (census data) with the average
Figure 17.
Age
105
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
500.0
UK,Population by age, sex and major ethnic group - 2001
males
400.0
females
300.0
200.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
Population (thousands)
200.0
300.0
400.0
Period of Birth
1896
1901
1906
1911
1916
1921
1926
1931
1936
1941
1946
1951
1956
1961
1966
1971
1976
1981
1986
1991
1996
2001
500.0
28
distribution in 2050, according to the version 2 probabilistic projection. In these
figures green represents ‘Whites’, yellow ‘Asians’, black ‘Blacks’ and red ‘mixed’.
Figure 18.
Age
105
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
500.0
UK,Population by age, sex and major ethnic group - 2050
males
400.0
females
300.0
200.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
Population (thousands)
200.0
300.0
400.0
Period of Birth
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
500.0
Comparison of overall results with official UK population projections
The central projection of the total population for the United Kingdom in the version 2
projection produces rather higher medium-term population growth than the 2003based official GAD projections. For example, by 2050 the average total of the
probabilistic projections is 1.7 million higher (68.5 million people compared with
66.8 million in the GAD principal projection for 2051), and by 2070 (the limit of the
GAD projection) the disparity widens to about 3.4 million (70.1 compared with 66.4
million). The GAD principal projection then declines, but that presented here
continues to grow slowly to reach 73.2 million by 2100. That is within the GAD highvariant projections (higher migration = 190,00) or higher fertility (TFR = 1.94).
These both yield population sizes in 2051 of 71.3m, and in 2071 of 74.4 million
(GAD 2005). The mean of the runs of the first version of the probabilistic projections
yielded almost exactly the same population totals as the GAD 2003 principal
projection, to within 17,000 people in 2050. The second half of the projections, from
2055-2100, are necessarily much more speculative. The final population, however, is
still within the limits of the GAD 2003-based high variants. The assumed TFR never
rises above 1.85 and net immigration is limited to 147,000 per year.
Overall, in version 1 the ‘minority’ populations increase from 8% of the total in 2001
to 25% by 2050 and to 47% by 2100. By 2050 the minority component (17 million;
25% of the total) is similar to the 16 million (24%) expected from the simple non29
probabilistic projection for the UK described above. In version 2, the overall minority
population rises to 20 million by 2050, or 29% of the overall population. The
difference up to 2050 is entirely due to the different migration assumptions for the
white and non-white groups. Beyond 2050 the average projections diverge more. In
version 1 the minority population reaches 33 million by 2100; 47% of the total. In
version 2 this total reaches 43 million, or 59%.
Up to 2050, that is roughly in line with some of the projections for other European
countries, and the longer-term proportion is in line with the projections of the
immigrant-origin population only from the US Bureau of the Census, i.e. excluding
the black population (2004). When considering these results; however, two important
provisos should be kept in mind, the effects of which tend to cancel each other out.
The UK ethnic minority populations are less numerous than the ‘foreign origin’
population, as immigrant groups of European origin and from the US, etc, are not
included. On the other side of the balance, in many of the European populations
described in earlier sections, the ‘third generation’ is absorbed into the ‘native’
population, but not so here.
Perhaps the most surprising outcome is the substantial growth of that ‘mixed’
population even over the first fifty years of the simulation. In version 1, it increases to
5 million or 7% of the total, slightly greater than the ‘Black’ total. According to the
assumptions of version 2, where the black and Asian population are re-inforced by
higher levels of immigration, in proportional terms the mixed group increases eightfold from 1% to 8% of the total, just under the ‘Black total. The other two major
groups increase about four times (Black; 2% to 8.5%) and by about three times
(‘Asian’; 4.7% to 12.7%) respectively, over the same period. By 2100 the ‘mixed’
population has become by far the largest minority group in both variants: 18 million
or 25% in version 1; 22 million or 30% in version 2, compared with 12% for ‘Black’
and 17% ‘Asian’ in the latter scenario. This is not a consequence of differential
fertility: that of the mixed population is assumed to be just below replacement at all
times, although at a varying level. Much more it is because the mixed population is
the only terminal or ‘absorbing’ state in the projection. All the other groups have a
proportion of their fertility attributed to the mixed group; while all the offspring of the
mixed group are by definition mixed. That is an assumption based entirely on mixed
parentage; it does not take into account self-identification.
In due course the entire population, on these assumptions, would end up in a mixed
category. That is an inevitable consequence of any system where unions take place
between members of groups and all the offspring of those unions were not ‘captured’
by one or other parental group, as many ethnic projections have assumed. A similar
outcome would be yielded by a ‘marriage-matrix’ simulation unless all entries were
on the diagonal. In reality the attrition would not be so rapid; some of the children of
mixed unions would identify with one or other of the parental groups. In the UK
situation a high proportion of people of mixed origin themselves form unions with the
white majority group. As regards self-identification, not enough is known. In a small
sample of teenagers of mixed white/black parentage, 46% regarded themselves as
‘black’, the majority as ‘mixed’ and a few considered themselves to be white, and
were considered by others to be white (Tizard et al. 1993). Their self-identity was;
however, rather fluid. The mixed group itself is not at all homogeneous, as Table 7
showed. In the UK, members of black and of other ethnic groups form unions with
30
each other less frequently than would be expected at random from their relatively
small numbers in the population. It is not known if that remains the case with persons
of varied kinds of mixed origin and this simple projection does not incorporate such
detail.
The range of inputs and possible outcomes
The variability of the inputs to the projections naturally grows with time, increasing
the degree of uncertainly. Thus the maximum and minimum levels of migration
rapidly expand to 20% and 80% bounds of 111,000 and 180,000 per year, with
maxima and minima of 300 and 5 thousand, with bounds of 52 and 85 for black
immigration and 57 and 91 for ‘Asians’. For reasons of space only the ‘Asian’ data
will be shown. (Figure 19). That figure shows that even on the 95% level, net ‘Asian’
immigration does not fall below about 30,000 per year. Uncertainty in the number of
births continues to increase over the projection., for the whole country from 696
thousand to 712 in 2001 to 664 and 794 in 2050, and more for minority groups: 70
and 90 respectively among the mixed groups by 2050, 66 to 96 among blacks, and
100 to 137 among ‘Asians’ (Figure 20).
Figure 19..
Uk,Asian,Both Sexes
Fra cti les
140.00
120.00
migration
100.00
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
2100
2095
2090
2085
2080
2075
2070
2065
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
0.00
Year
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Figure 20.
Uk,Asian,females
Fra cti les
250.00
Number of births
200.00
150.00
100.00
50.00
Year
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2100
2095
2090
2085
2080
2075
2070
2065
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
0.00
31
Only at the lower extreme of the distribution does the number of ‘Asian’ births remain
at the 2001 level. The range expands throughout the projection but the average
appears to be approaching an asymptote, being moderated both by the convergence of
fertility rates to a sub-replacement level and by the transfer of a minority of births to
‘Asian’ mothers to the ‘absorbing’ mixed category. Variability of expectation of life
has less effect on the projections; by 2050 for example the upper and lower limits of
the 60% bounds were 80.2 and 83.5 years.
Growth of total population
Accordingly uncertainty increases throughout the projection in respect of total
population, especially the populations of the minority groups, and their proportion of
the total. For the total population, by 2050 the limits of likely outcomes within the
60% bounds rises to 6 million people (65.5 and 71.3 respectively), to 9.5 million in
2070 (65.2 and 74.7 million) and to almost 16 million by 2100 (65.3 and 80.9) (Figure
20). The upper limits on the 80% bound are very close to the upper limits on the GAD
high migration or high fertility variant projections (the maxima are identical) in both
years: 71.3 million in 2051 and 74.5 million in 2071.
Figure 20.
Uk,The whole country,Both Sexes
Fra cti les
100 000.00
Total population (thousands)
90 000.00
80 000.00
70 000.00
60 000.00
50 000.00
40 000.00
30 000.00
20 000.00
10 000.00
2100
2095
2090
2085
2080
2075
2070
2065
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
0.00
Year
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The lower limit of the 60% bound for the total projection remains at about 65 million
throughout, guaranteeing, as it were, a minimum of 6 million population increase over
the current level. Only the absolute mimina of the probabilistic projections provide
forecasts that are close to the GAD zero migration variant: 57.3 million compared
with the the GAD’s 58 million in 2050, and 51.2 million in 2073 compared with the
GAD’s 50.6 million. The final minimum by 2100 is 42.7 million; the maximum 103.1
million.
Growth and decline of each major group
In the medium term the white population is assumed to decline in all outcomes of
version 2, although the mean of the projections does not fall before 2025 (Figure 20).
32
That eventual result is inevitable in this simulation given the persistent low fertility,
and the running down of white net immigration to zero by 2050 that has been
assumed. By that year the white population would have a 60% chance of falling
between 46.6 and
Figure 20.
Uk,White,Both Sexes
Fra cti les
Total population (thousands)
60 000.00
50 000.00
40 000.00
30 000.00
20 000.00
10 000.00
2100
2095
2090
2085
2080
2075
2070
2065
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
0.00
Year
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50.0 million population, that is a decline from the 2001 total of 7.5 million and 4.0
million respectively. The 95% range is between 44 and 43 million. Inevitably by 2100
the range has widened. By then there would be a 60% chance of being between 25.5
Figure 21.
Uk,Black,Both Sexes
Fra cti les
16 000.00
Total population (thousands)
14 000.00
12 000.00
10 000.00
8 000.00
6 000.00
4 000.00
2 000.00
2100
2095
2090
2085
2080
2075
2070
2065
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
0.00
Year
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million and 34.4 million and 95% between 21 and 42 million. Inevitably, all the other
groups grow over time, to varying degrees, and their bounds expands faster over time
than do those of the white population especially in the earlier part of the projection.
By 2025 the ‘Black’ group would have a 60% chance of expanding to between 3.0
and 3.6 million, a range of 21% (that is, 3.6 million is 21% greater than 3.0 million).
By 2050, the bounds would be between 4.9 and 6.8 million, a range of 37%, with 95%
33
limits of 3.8 and 8.1 million. By 2100 that population would have a 60% chance of
being between 7.0 and 10.8 million (Figure 21).
The range of variation of the ‘Asian’ population is more moderate. By 2025 the 60%
bounds are 5.3 and 5.9 million, a difference of 11%. By 2050 that has doubled to
24%; between 7.8 and 9.6 million, and by 2100 doubled again to 43%, between 10.3
and 14.7 million (Figure 22).
Figure 22.
Uk,Asian,Both Sexes
Fra cti les
20 000.00
Total population (thousands)
18 000.00
16 000.00
14 000.00
12 000.00
10 000.00
8 000.00
6 000.00
4 000.00
2 000.00
2100
2095
2090
2085
2080
2075
2070
2065
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
0.00
Year
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The mixed population shows the least variation over time despite its rapid increase.
By 2025 it is projected to have a 60% chance of lying within 2.0 and 2.2 million
(8.9%) and by 2050 of being between 5.0 and 6.1 million, a 21% difference. By 2100
Figure 23.
Uk,Mixed,Both Sexes
Fra cti les
35 000.00
Total population (thousands)
30 000.00
25 000.00
20 000.00
15 000.00
10 000.00
5 000.00
2100
2095
2090
2085
2080
2075
2070
2065
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
0.00
Year
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34
all bounds of probability place it as the most numerous minority group. Indeed its
upper 60% bound is equal to the lower 60% bound of the white population at that time
(Table 9).
Table 9. Summary table of projected 60% and 95% bounds, population size of UK major
ethnic groups 2001-2100 (millions), with difference between lower and upper limits as % of
lower (‘range’).
2025
2050
2100
60%
95%
60%
95%
60%
95%
lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper
White
53.3 54.4 52.7 55.1 46.6 50.0 44.4 52.5 25.5 34.4 20.8 41.5
% range
2
5
7
18
35
99
Black
% range
3.0
21
3.6
2.6
55
4.0
4.9
37
6.8
3.8
8.1
116
7.0 10.8
55
4.6 13.9
199
Asian
% range
5.3
11
5.9
4.9
30
6.4
7.8
24
9.6
6.3 11.0
74
10.3 14.7
43
7.0 17.9
157
Mixed
% range
2.0
9
2.2
1.9
24
2.3
5.0
21
6.1
4.4
54
17.9 25.5
42
14.0 31.6
125
6.8
Differential growth and decline
As we have seen, the differential growth and decline of the population sizes of these
four sub-populations entail a major shift in their relative representation in the total
population. The uncertainty involved is best summarised by the figures and summary
table (Table 10) below. As expected from the variability of the number of births, the
decline of the proportion white in the total is relatively constrained in the first 25 and
50 years of the projection.
Table 10 Summary table of 60% and 95% projected bounds, UK major ethnic
groups 2001-2100 as percent of population, showing lower and upper limit of
proportion of the population within each bound, and the range as % of the lower
limit.
2025
2050
2100
60%
95%
60%
95%
60%
95%
lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper
82.3 83.8 81.2 84.7 68.5 72.9 65.8 75.8 35.3 47.1 27.2 55.4
White
2
4
6
15
34
102
% range
Black
% range
4.6
19
5.5
4.1
49
6.1
Asian
% range
8.3
10
9.1
7.7
25
9.6
Mixed
% range
3.2
8
3.8
2.9
21
3.6
7.4
31
9.7
5.9 11.2
92
10.1 14.3
42
7.5 17.2
130
11.6 13.9
20
9.8 15.3
56
14.7 19.3
31
11.0 21.9
99
6.7
42
25.1 33.5
30
21.6 38.5
79
7.5
16
8.7
9.6
35
By 2025 the likely variation of the proportion of the white population is still modest,
with a 60% chance of being between 83% and 84% of the total population, and 95%
chance of being within 81 and 85% of the total. By 2050, the 60% bounds have
expanded to 68.5 and 72.9% of the total. In other words, by then between 27.1% and
31.5% of the population is likely to be of ethnic minority origin including people of
mixed origin. In the much more speculative longer term, the assumptions of this
simulation imply that the white population is likely to be just in a minority by the end
of the century, On these assumptions it has a 60% chance of being between 35% and
47% of the total population, and with only a 2.5% chance of retaining more than 55%
of the population. At the other extreme there is a 2.5% chance of its being below 27%.
However at 100 years distance the upper limit at 95% probability is double the lower
one and all that can be said is that there is a very wide range of possibilities but not,
on these assumptions, retaining a very strong majority position (Figure 24).
Figure 24.
Uk,White,Both Sexes
Fra cti les
1.00
0.90
0.80
Proportion
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
2100
2095
2090
2085
2080
2075
2070
2065
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
0.00
Year
S er gei s' Offi ce PI II, fil e: D:\I IASA2005\M inorities \resul ts\[ chart s_OK_2100_ok_new2_2_del.x ls] ,01-Mar -05
13:13
Of the other groups, the projected proportion of the ‘Black’ population, like that of its
numbers, develops the greatest degree of variability. Its 60% bounds in 2025 are 8.3%
and 9.1%, expanding to 7.4% to 9.7% by 2050; a 31% difference. By that year the
upper limit of the 95% bound is almost double the lower one (Figure 25). The range
of the ‘Asian’ proportions is more constrained; even by 2050 the 60% limits are
between 11.6% and 13.9%. It seems likely that the Asian group will preserve its
numerical predominance over the Black group. The 60% bounds do not overlap even
up to 2100, although by 2050 the 95% bounds do so (Figure 26). The mixed group has
the most constrained variation of the minority populations, with a 95% chance of
remaining within 2.9% and 3.6% in 2025 and between 6.7 and 9.6% by 2050. By
2100, on the assumptions made here, it is almost certain to be the largest minority
group as defined here, with only the smallest overlap between its 95% bounds and
those of the ‘Asian’ group (Figure 27).
36
Figure 25.
Uk,Black,Both Sexes
Fra cti les
0.20
0.18
0.16
Proportion
0.14
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
2100
2095
2090
2085
2080
2075
2070
2065
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
0.00
Year
S er gei s' Offi ce PI II, fil e: D:\I IASA2005\M inorities \resul ts\[ chart s_OK_2100_ok_new2_2_del.x ls] ,01-Mar -05
13:19
Figure 26
Uk,Asian,Both Sexes
Fra cti les
0.25
Proportion
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
2100
2095
2090
2085
2080
2075
2070
2065
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
0.00
Year
S er gei s' Offi ce PI II, fil e: D:\I IASA2005\M inorities \resul ts\[ chart s_OK_2100_ok_new2_2_del.x ls] ,01-Mar -05
13:16
Figure 27.
Uk,Mixed,Both Sexes
Fra cti les
0.45
0.40
0.35
Proportion
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
2100
2095
2090
2085
2080
2075
2070
2065
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
0.00
Year
S er gei s' Offi ce PI II, fil e: D:\I IASA2005\M inorities \resul ts\[ chart s_OK_2100_ok_new2_2_del.x ls] ,01-Mar -05
13:22
37
Conclusions
Immigration is making a substantial difference to the rate of population change, to the
future likely population size and to the current and future ethnic composition of many
Western European countries. Around 2000, about 10% of their populations were born
abroad, little short of the US proportion, and if the ‘second’ or subsequent generations
are taken into account, the proportion is higher than 10%. Almost 20% of births in the
early 2000s in the UK and France were to immigrant or mothers. Much of the
continued population increase in those countries arises from migration, in some cases
all of it. In some Northern European countries where natural increase is relatively
high, substantial future population growth is projected from the direct effects of net
immigration, and the natural increase of the populations of immigrant origin.
Trends in migration are becoming the major uncertain variable in these future
projected population, both on population totals and on future ethnic composition. The
assumed fertility variation is usually of lesser importance. As usual in this area,
statistics are not very satisfactory. The stock of foreign immigrant population and its
rate of increase is under-estimated in some countries, by up to half, if ‘citizenship’
data are taken at face value without correcting for naturalisation. Foreign origin
population can only be captured statistically in countries that do not extend
naturalisation to the children of immigrants, or through data on ethnic origin, or by
inference from the birthplace or citizenship of parents. Between a half and two-thirds
of the immigrant origin populations are from third world populations. Their age
structure tends to be youthful and their age-specific fertility is often higher than
average – the aggregate TFR in the third-world foreign-origin populations in the
examples here is just over 3. The reverse is true of the European immigrant
populations, so that overall the foreign-origin TFR is in the range 2.0-2.5 in many
European countries. Their contribution to natural increase is likely to remain high for
some time. Many projections assume a transition in immigrant fertility; indeed a trend
towards convergence is apparent in most but not all cases. Most of the projections
cited here assume that immigrant fertility, at least of ‘non-Western’ origin, will
stabilise at a somewhat higher level than that of the native population. Whether
‘minority status ‘ effects will impede, or accelerate the fertility transitions of
immigrant populations is not yet clear.
The few examples available of population projections according to foreign or native
origin show surprisingly parallel rates of growth. Consequently, on those trends,
Western European populations can expect rather similar increases in the proportion of
the future total population of foreign origin. On current rates of immigration,
immigrant-origin populations (defined in various ways) are projected to comprise
between 20% and 32% of the total population in a number of countries by 2050
(Figure 28). Most of these trends are linear, at least up to 2050, with little indication
of change. This is a little surprising, as all these projections were made independently
on a variety of different assumptions. Most of them however, adopt a rather restricted
definition of the foreign origin population (foreign immigrants and their children
only) so that subsequent generations disappear, while the UK projections include,
potentially, all descendants subject to changes of self-identity and the effects of mixed
marriage. None of the European projections specifically incorporate mixed origin
populations, although the Danish projections incorporate coefficients to determine the
38
proportion of each generation that become ‘Danes’. It could be argued, of course, that
the process of naturalisation is a kind of ethnic transfer. But for the most part it is an
easy process, requiring little commitment, not even, the repudiation of the original
nationality.
Figure 28. Note: projection omits US black population.
35
Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000-2050,
selected countries, as percent of total population.
Germany medium variant
USA medium variant (excludes black population)
30
Netherlands base scenario
Denmark 2002- based medium variant
Sweden foreign background 2004 based
Austria 'Compensating' scenario, no naturalisation.
percent
25
20
15
10
5
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Sources: Germany: Ulrich 2001, Denmark: Statistics Denmark 2004, US: Bureau of
the Census 1996, Netherlands: Alders 2001b, Austria: Lebhart and Münz 2003,
Sweden: Statistics Sweden 2004.
These trends are not written in stone. The likely future size of populations of
immigrant origin depends greatly on the level of future migration, nominally at least
under policy control. Comparing the ‘main’ scenarios with the zero net immigration
scenarios in some counties, immigration usually has more demographic weight than
fertility (Figure 30). Zero immigration reduces the projected immigrant population in
the populations above by 2020 and beyond, by about one-third or more. Populations
which on current trends are heading for about 25% foreign origin population by midcentury instead attain between 10 to 15%. Much depends on the assumptions about
naturalisation. In the Netherlands example (not shown in Figure 30) zero immigration
combined with naturalisation reduces the foreign population from the current 17%, to
14% of the national total. Neither of the Austrian cases above include naturalisation
and they adopt an exponential form, not linear.
39
Figure 30.
Proportion foreign: standard projections and zero-migration projections
35
Germany
30
Germany zero migration
Denmark
Denmark zero immigation
25
Austria
Austria zero immigration
20
15
10
5
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
It may be argued, of course, that a zero-migration forecast is a very unlikely one; most
commentators believe that substantial further immigration to Europe is unavoidable
and may even be 'needed’. However the recent experience from the Danish Aliens Act
and policy changes in the Netherlands show that it can at least be moderated in the
short run.
A new demographic transition?
The first demographic transition describes the reduction of vital rates from traditional
high levels to the familiar levels nearly universal in developed societies. The second
demographic transition, following hard on the heels of the first, describes and explains
the revolution in living arrangements and sexual behaviour, and the setting for
fertility, now transforming the lives of many in Western societies and, possibly, in
developed societies elsewhere. If that be accepted as a ‘transition’, and its critics
proved wrong, is there then room for a ‘third’ transition, following hard on the heels
of the second?
That would be a partial transition of ethnic composition from indigenous to immigrant
origin, not before experienced in peaceful circumstances on such a scale. Population
displacement itself is not new; it was pervasive in Eurasia and elsewhere in the first
millennium and earlier; became extreme with the colonisation of ‘New Worlds’; and
in the form of deportations, exterminations and ethnic cleansing in the old world until
depressingly recently. But those episodes were almost invariably violent or at least
forced. This transition is not, but is instead acquiescent or even unmentioned, at least
until recently, at the high political level that matters. At local level, however, the
prospect has provoked explicit opposition, for example among the municipal
authorities of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. In some cases the process is accompanied
by the reversal of previous trends to the stabilisation of population growth, as
40
immigrant populations add substantial new increments to population size in, for
example the US, the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands and in major cities such as
London.
In the long run, were below-replacement fertility to persist, the continuation of the
trends described above would eventually replace all the current ‘majority’ groups in
most developed societies. In their place would arise populations derived more from
current minorities with, to a varying degree, populations of mixed origin whose
members might, or might not, choose to identify with ancestral groups or instead
absorb the identity of the original population in a modified form. Research in Britain
in the 1980s suggested that about 60 per cent of children with one white and one
ethnic minority parent were described as being of ‘mixed’ origin by their parents,
between 28 and 35 percent as 'white' (depending on whether the husband or wife
respectively was white) and only 10 per cent are given an ethnic minority designation.
Children with one white and one mixed parent were particularly likely to be classified
as 'white' (Shaw 1988).
Any constant level of migration into a population with below-replacement fertility
always leads to a stationary population (i.e. one neither growing nor declining in
numbers) as long as immigrant fertility eventually converges on that of the native
population. The size of the final stationary population depends upon the size of the net
migration and may well be much smaller than the original one (Pollard 1973). With
below-replacement fertility the original population would eventually die out, leaving
no descendants if the populations did not intermarry. Any population with subreplacement fertility that maintains a given or a growing population size through
immigration would accordingly, acquire a population of predominantly, eventually
entirely, immigrant origin (Feichtinger and Steinmann 1993). In any population with
average fertility below replacement rate, any one minority population with higher
growth rates must in the long run become numerically dominant (Steinmann and
Jaeger 2000).
The social, cultural and political impact of such projected changes could be
substantial, as the centre of gravity of political power swings away from traditional
interests, identities and pre-occupations. As numbers grow, populations of foreign
origin may feel less pressure to adapt to local norms and become more confident in
extending their own to a wider society In the UK, some Muslim organisations, citing
the increase in numbers revealed by ethnic questions in the 1991 and 2001 censuses,
are pressing for the introduction of shari’a law. Tax concessions for second wives
have been considered by HM Treasury. The influence of immigrant minorities on
foreign policy is beginning to make itself felt, for example on Middle Eastern issues.
Under such circumstances religion may regain, at least for a while, the salience that it
had mostly lost in Western Europe. As numerical balance changes, assimilation will
become more and more a two-way street, and the old assumption about assimilating,
or acculturating to majority values and identity may cease to be tenable.
All this is sensitive to policy change and in some cases is policy-driven. The natural
experiment of Denmark in 2002, and of the more recent Dutch restrictions on
immigration policy through the Aliens Act, have had measurable effects on net
inflows, at least in the short term, just as policies to expand migration have been
correspondingly effective, as in the UK since 1997. In respect of migrants who are
41
likely to be permanent or long-term, union-formation migration is the biggest openended migration channel. Insofar as preferences for arranged marriage persist, that
inflow expands in proportion to the population size of ethnic minority populations.
That is susceptible both to policies on immigration, affecting the conditions to be
satisfied for such migration, and to policies of a multicultural kind and to cultural
change affecting, for example, the propensity to form inter-ethnic unions.
A growth in inter-ethnic unions would generate in the long run a variety of new
populations of mixed origin, and a transformation into a broad population of
inextricably mixed multiple origins. Perhaps in the long run a homogeneity may
emerge, in which ethnic labels will cease to be meaningful or identifiable except to
genealogists. While continuing high levels of immigration will continue to supply the
developed world with new populations of well-defined third world origins, the
boundaries of some of the existing populations may become increasingly blurred. The
children of these mixed unions are likely to identify themselves in a diversity of ways,
a process already recognised and probably encouraged in the increasing complexity of
the ethnic categories used in UK and US censuses. In the end, this may make the
identification of separate groups, which has been taken for granted in the descriptions
above, more and more difficult or even meaningless.
Acknowledgements
The authors are indebted to the following for their advice and for help with statistical
material: Drs M. Alders of Statistics Netherlands, Mr C. Larsen of Statistics
Denmark, Mr G. Lebhart of Statistics Austria, Mr Å. Nilsson of Statistics Sweden,
Prof. Dr. R. Ulrich of the University of Bielefeld. Mr M. D. Smith of the University of
Oxford prepared the material for the UK projections. Some of this work was
supported by the Nuffield Foundation, London. All errors are the responsibility of the
authors.
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47
Appendix Table 1a. Basic results - UK version 1 probabilistic projection
Means of distributions (2001 – 2050).
Means of distributions
2001 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Population (millions)
Total
58.781 59.740 60.897 62.034 63.169 64.213 65.059 65.689 66.159 66.540 66.857
White
54.158 54.335 54.435 54.446 54.414 54.272 53.901 53.253 52.383 51.379 50.284
Black
1.170 1.409 1.721 2.050 2.387 2.722 3.051 3.373 3.686 3.983 4.258
Asian
2.792 3.184 3.698 4.218 4.724 5.207 5.673 6.129 6.569 6.981 7.356
Mixed
0.661 0.813 1.043 1.321 1.644 2.012 2.435 2.934 3.521 4.197 4.959
all minority
4.623 5.405 6.462 7.589 8.755 9.940 11.158 12.436 13.776 15.160 16.573
Population (percent of total)
Total
White
92.1
91.0
89.4
87.8
86.1
84.5
82.9
81.1
79.2
77.2
75.3
Black
2.0
2.4
2.8
3.3
3.8
4.2
4.7
5.1
5.6
6.0
6.4
Asian
4.7
5.3
6.1
6.8
7.5
8.1
8.7
9.3
9.9
10.5
11.0
Mixed
1.1
1.4
1.7
2.1
2.6
3.1
3.7
4.5
5.3
6.3
7.4
all minority
7.9
9.0
10.6
12.2
13.9
15.5
17.1
18.9
20.8
22.8
24.7
Total Fertility Rate
Total
1.72
1.74
1.76
1.77
1.78
1.79
1.79
1.80
1.80
1.81
1.81
White
1.66
1.67
1.69
1.71
1.72
1.74
1.74
1.74
1.74
1.74
1.74
Black
2.16
2.13
2.10
2.06
2.02
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
Asian
2.32
2.27
2.20
2.13
2.06
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
Mixed
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
Expectation of life (all groups)
males
76.1
76.6
77.2
77.8
78.4
79.0
79.5
80.1
80.7
81.3
81.9
females
80.6
80.9
81.3
81.6
82.0
82.4
82.8
83.1
83.5
83.9
84.3
Net migration (thousands)
Total
149.0 150.2 151.6 153.1 153.1 153.1 153.1 153.1 153.1 153.1 153.1
White
51.0
51.5
52.1
52.7
52.7
52.7
52.7
52.7
52.7
52.7
52.7
Black
43.0
43.2
43.5
43.8
43.8
43.8
43.8
43.8
43.8
43.8
43.8
Asian
51.0
51.4
51.9
52.5
52.5
52.5
52.5
52.5
52.5
52.5
52.5
Mixed
4.0
4.0
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
Population of voting age (thousand)
Total
45.4
46.6
48.1
49.4
50.5
51.4
52.2
53.0
53.6
54.0
54.3
White
42.4
42.9
43.6
44.1
44.4
44.4
44.2
43.9
43.4
42.9
42.1
Black
0.8
1.0
1.3
1.6
1.9
2.1
2.4
2.7
3.0
3.3
3.6
Asian
1.9
2.3
2.7
3.1
3.5
4.0
4.5
4.9
5.3
5.7
6.0
Mixed
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.9
1.2
1.5
1.8
2.2
2.6
48
Appendix Table 1b. Basic results - UK version 1 probabilistic projection contd.
(2055-2100).
Means of distributions
2055 2060 2065
Population (millions)
Total
67.12 67.38 67.72
White
49.11 47.92 46.76
Black
4.51 4.74 4.96
Asian
7.69 7.99 8.26
Mixed
5.80 6.73 7.75
all minority
18.01 19.46 20.96
Population (percent of total)
White
73.2 71.2 69.1
Black
6.7
7.0
7.3
Asian
11.4 11.8 12.2
Mixed
8.6 10.0 11.4
all minority
26.8 28.8 30.9
Total Fertility Rate
Total
1.82 1.83 1.84
White
1.75 1.76 1.77
Black
1.97 1.96 1.95
Asian
1.97 1.96 1.95
Mixed
1.98 1.96 1.95
Expectation of life (all groups)
males
82.42 82.92 83.42
females
84.76 85.26 85.76
Net migration (thousands)
Total
153.1 153.1 153.1
White
52.7 52.7 52.7
Black
43.8 43.8 43.8
Asian
52.5 52.5 52.5
Mixed
4.1
4.1
4.1
Population of voting age (thousand)
Total
54.5 54.7 55.0
White
41.2 40.3 39.5
Black
3.8
4.0
4.2
Asian
6.4
6.7
6.9
Mixed
3.1
3.7
4.4
2070
2075
2080
2085
2090
2095
2100
68.11
45.61
5.15
8.49
8.87
22.51
68.52
44.41
5.32
8.69
10.10
24.11
68.89
43.13
5.47
8.87
11.42
25.76
69.27
41.79
5.60
9.05
12.84
27.48
69.71
40.44
5.73
9.20
14.35
29.28
70.23
39.08
5.84
9.34
15.96
31.14
70.78
37.71
5.95
9.46
17.67
33.07
67.0
7.5
12.4
13.0
33.0
64.9
7.7
12.6
14.7
35.1
62.7
7.9
12.8
16.6
37.3
60.4
8.0
13.0
18.5
39.6
58.1
8.2
13.2
20.6
41.9
55.7
8.3
13.3
22.7
44.3
53.4
8.4
13.3
25.0
46.6
1.85
1.78
1.93
1.93
1.93
1.85
1.79
1.92
1.92
1.92
1.86
1.80
1.90
1.90
1.91
1.86
1.81
1.89
1.89
1.89
1.86
1.82
1.88
1.88
1.88
1.86
1.84
1.86
1.86
1.86
1.86
1.85
1.85
1.85
1.85
83.92 84.42 84.92 85.42 85.92 86.42
86.26 86.75 87.25 87.75 88.25 88.74
86.92
89.24
153.1 153.1 153.1 153.1 153.1 153.1
52.7 52.7 52.7 52.7 52.7 52.7
43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8
52.5 52.5 52.5 52.5 52.5 52.5
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
153.1
52.7
43.8
52.5
4.1
55.4
38.7
4.4
7.1
5.1
55.8
37.9
4.6
7.3
5.9
56.1
37.0
4.7
7.5
6.8
56.4
36.0
4.9
7.7
7.8
56.8
35.0
5.0
7.8
8.9
57.2
34.1
5.1
8.0
10.1
57.7
33.1
5.2
8.1
11.3
49
Appendix Table 2a. Basic results - UK version 2 probabilistic projection.
Means (2001-2050).
2001
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Population (millions)
Total
58.781 59.749 60.969 62.236 63.576 64.885 65.985 66.841 67.503 68.038 68.475
White
54.158 54.326 54.387 54.321 54.172 53.868 53.292 52.393 51.225 49.870 48.368
Black
1.170 1.419 1.787 2.224 2.726 3.273 3.820 4.359 4.883 5.384 5.855
Asian
2.792 3.191 3.748 4.353 4.989 5.642 6.286 6.924 7.546 8.140 8.695
Mixed
0.661 0.813 1.047 1.339 1.689 2.102 2.587 3.165 3.848 4.644 5.557
Population (percent of total)
Total
1.66
1.67
1.69
1.71
1.73
1.74
1.74
1.74
1.74
1.74
1.74
White
92.1
90.9
89.2
87.3
85.2
83.0
80.8
78.4
75.9
73.4
70.7
Black
2.0
2.4
2.9
3.6
4.3
5.0
5.8
6.5
7.2
7.9
8.5
Asian
4.7
5.3
6.1
7.0
7.8
8.7
9.5
10.3
11.2
11.9
12.7
Mixed
1.1
1.4
1.7
2.2
2.7
3.2
3.9
4.7
5.7
6.8
8.1
Births (thousands)
Total
704
694
701
720
733
729
717
714
719
726
730
White
606
581
567
568
565
546
515
490
474
462
446
Black
26
30
39
48
56
62
67
72
77
81
85
Asian
62
71
80
85
89
93
100
107
112
116
119
Mixed
10
12
15
19
23
28
35
45
56
67
80
Total Fertility Rate
Total
1.72
1.74
1.76
1.78
1.79
1.80
1.81
1.81
1.82
1.83
1.83
White
1.66
1.67
1.69
1.71
1.73
1.74
1.74
1.74
1.74
1.74
1.74
Black
2.16
2.13
2.10
2.06
2.03
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
Asian
2.32
2.26
2.20
2.13
2.06
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
Mixed
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
Expectation of life (all groups)
males
76.1
76.6
77.2
77.8
78.4
79.0
79.5
80.1
80.7
81.3
81.9
females
80.6
80.9
81.3
81.6
82.0
82.4
82.8
83.1
83.5
83.9
84.3
Net migration (thousands)
Total
149.0 157.4 167.8 178.3 188.7 184.9 177.4 170.0 162.6 155.1 147.7
White
51.0
46.7
41.3
35.9
30.5
25.4
20.4
15.4
10.4
5.4
0.4
Black
43.0
49.9
58.6
67.3
76.0
76.4
74.8
73.2
71.5
69.9
68.3
Asian
51.0
56.6
63.5
70.5
77.4
78.2
77.3
76.5
75.7
74.9
74.1
Mixed
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
4.9
4.9
4.9
4.9
4.9
4.9
Aged Potential Support Ratio
Total
3.71
3.73
3.66
3.38
3.22
3.02
2.74
2.52
2.46
2.46
2.42
White
3.52
3.50
3.38
3.05
2.85
2.63
2.33
2.11
2.02
2.02
1.98
Black
9.55
9.48 10.96 12.98 13.69 11.63
8.72
7.11
6.43
5.64
4.68
Asian
11.92 11.13 11.13 10.28
8.81
7.72
7.02
6.11
5.26
4.45
3.77
Mixed
13.22 14.83 16.90 17.45 16.91 15.32 13.00 11.70 11.50 11.38 10.84
Population of voting age (thousand)
Total
45.4
46.6
48.2
49.6
50.8
51.9
52.9
53.7
54.5
55.1
55.5
White
42.4
42.9
43.6
44.0
44.2
44.1
43.7
43.2
42.6
41.7
40.7
Black
0.8
1.0
1.4
1.7
2.1
2.6
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.4
4.9
Asian
1.9
2.3
2.7
3.2
3.8
4.3
4.9
5.5
6.1
6.6
7.1
Mixed
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.9
1.2
1.5
1.9
2.3
2.8
50
Appendix Table 2b. Basic results - UK version 2 probabilistic projection contd.
(2055 - 2100).
Means of distributions
2055
2060
2065
2070
Population (millions)
Total
68.827 69.174 69.581 70.050
White
46.738 45.051 43.363 41.669
Black
6.293 6.709 7.099 7.457
Asian
9.212 9.693 10.135 10.539
Mixed
6.584 7.721 8.984 10.385
Population (percent of total)
White
68.0
65.2
62.4
59.6
Black
9.1
9.6
10.1
10.6
Asian
13.3
14.0
14.5
15.0
Mixed
9.6
11.1
12.9
14.8
Births (thousands)
Total
731
731
733
739
White
427
405
383
364
Black
87
89
91
93
Asian
121
124
128
130
Mixed
95
112
131
152
Total Fertility Rate
Total
1.85
1.86
1.87
1.88
White
1.75
1.76
1.78
1.79
Black
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
Asian
1.99
1.99
1.99
1.99
Mixed
1.98
1.97
1.95
1.94
Expectation of life (all groups)
males
82.4
82.9
83.4
83.9
females
84.8
85.3
85.8
86.3
Net migration (thousands)
Total
146.2 146.2 146.2 146.2
White
-0.6
-0.6
-0.6
-0.6
Black
68.0
68.0
68.0
68.0
Asian
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
Mixed
4.9
4.9
4.9
4.9
Aged Potential Support Ratio
Total
2.31
2.21
2.16
2.12
White
1.88
1.78
1.71
1.65
Black
3.92
3.37
2.99
2.73
Asian
3.33
3.05
2.85
2.67
Mixed
10.04
9.76
9.78
9.17
Population of voting age (thousand)
Total
55.7
56.0
56.4
56.8
White
39.5
38.2
37.0
35.9
Black
5.3
5.7
6.0
6.4
Asian
7.6
8.0
8.4
8.8
Mixed
3.4
4.1
4.9
5.8
2075
2080
2085
2090
2095
2100
70.516
39.905
7.778
10.908
11.926
70.946
38.028
8.062
11.250
13.607
71.381
36.064
8.318
11.572
15.427
71.888
34.067
8.556
11.877
17.388
72.488
32.054
8.779
12.162
19.493
73.170
30.013
8.990
12.428
21.739
56.7
11.0
15.4
16.9
53.8
11.3
15.8
19.1
50.7
11.6
16.1
21.6
47.6
11.8
16.4
24.1
44.4
12.0
16.7
26.8
41.2
12.2
16.9
29.6
746
346
95
132
173
752
327
96
133
195
757
306
98
135
217
761
283
99
137
241
765
260
100
139
266
771
236
102
141
292
1.89
1.80
1.99
1.99
1.92
1.90
1.81
1.99
1.99
1.91
1.90
1.82
1.99
1.99
1.90
1.91
1.83
1.99
1.99
1.88
1.91
1.84
1.99
1.99
1.87
1.91
1.85
1.99
1.99
1.85
84.4
86.8
84.9
87.3
85.4
87.7
85.9
88.2
86.4
88.7
86.9
89.2
146.2
-0.6
68.0
73.9
4.9
146.2
-0.6
68.0
73.9
4.9
146.2
-0.6
68.0
73.9
4.9
146.2
-0.6
68.0
73.9
4.9
146.2
-0.6
68.0
73.9
4.9
146.2
-0.6
68.0
73.9
4.9
2.08
1.60
2.55
2.50
8.39
2.06
1.55
2.39
2.36
7.63
2.02
1.48
2.25
2.25
6.97
1.98
1.40
2.06
2.17
6.42
1.95
1.32
0.86
2.10
5.95
1.93
1.24
2.03
2.04
5.51
57.2
34.6
6.7
9.1
6.8
57.6
33.3
6.9
9.5
7.9
57.9
31.8
7.2
9.7
9.2
58.3
30.3
7.4
10.0
10.5
58.8
28.9
7.6
10.3
12.0
59.3
27.4
7.8
10.5
13.7
51