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JOP Module
Syndicate Tutorial
Elements of Operational Design Case Study – Korean War
(Op CHROMITE)
Activity Type(s)
Syndicate Tutorial
Date of Delivery
Time of Delivery
17 June 2015
Location
Syndicate Rooms
• Review the strategies and operational level concepts
employed during selected operations of the 20th and
21st centuries.
• Explain the theory of the JMAP and JIPOE.
• Examine the political, diplomatic, and economic and
aid considerations of operations.
• Evaluate the planning and conduct of expeditionary
operations – historical and contemporary – embracing
force projection and logistics, command and control,
joint force integration and coalition operations.
• Apply creative thinking and analytical tools and
techniques to curriculum problems.
• Apply critical thinking skills to curriculum problems.
Activity Objectives
Delivered by
0830-1000
Syndicate DS
JOP Team
Aim
This JOP Module case study is used to examine elements of design for the planning
of Operation CHROMITE (Op CHROMITE), the United Nations amphibious landing
at Inchon, Korea, on 15 Sep 1950.
The intent of this Syndicate Tutorial is to use contemporary planning language and
concepts to examine and explain the planning considerations, options and plan
development for Op CHROMITE.
By examining historical operations using components of the contemporary Joint
Operations Planning Process (JOPP), such as the elements of operational design,
CM will understand the concepts necessary for applying operational art to the
development of operation plans.
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Key Questions for Syndicate Tutorial
1. What are the strategic and operational end states for Op CHROMITE, the UN
amphibious operation at Inchon, Korea?
2. What is/are the Operational Objective/s for Op CHROMITE?
3. What is/are the operational Centre(s) of Gravity (CoG) for each side of the
conflict?
4. What would you identify as Decisive Points (DP) for each side of the conflict?
5. What Lines of Operation would you use to align the identified DP?
Conduct of the Activity
The case study has two parts. The first part is conducted at syndicate level by the
syndicate DS. The focus of the first part is to discuss and examine the questions
listed above. The second part of the activity will take place in Blamey Theatre and
will be conducted by the JOP team. The focus of the second part is to compare and
contrast syndicate answers to the key questions. The aim of the second part of the
activity is to provide insights into how other syndicates approached the problem and
to consolidate knowledge and understanding of the key concepts at the course level.
Essential Reading
Reading 1 – United Nations Security Council Resolution 82 (25 Jun 1950). Found at
http:// unscr.com/en/resolutions?y=1950
Reading 2 - A report to the (USA) National Security Council - United States Courses
of Action With Respect to Korea - dated 01 Sep 1950. Found at
http:/www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/inde
x.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1950-09-01&documentid=ki-17-1
Reading 3 - Joint Military Operations Historical Collection - Chapter 2 - Operation
Chromite. Found at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/history/hist.pdf
Reading 4 - The United Nations Landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite. A US Naval
War College Paper by Eric D. Sweeney, Major, USA. Dated 8 Feb 2000. Found at
http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA378567
Version date: 03/06/2015
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
( 1 of 3 )
82(1950) Resolution of 25 June 1950
The Security Council,
Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution 293 (IV) of 21 October
1949 that the Govern-ment of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established
government having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where
the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and
consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this
Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of
the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary
Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea,
Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 195 (III)
of 12 December 1948 and 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 about the conse¬quences
which might follow unless Member States refrained from acts derogatory to the
results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete
independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation
described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report 9 menaces the
safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and might
lead to open military conflict there,
Noting with grave concern the armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from
North Korea,
Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace; and
Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities;
Calls upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed
forces to the 38th parallel;
Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea:
(a)
To communicate its fully considered recom¬mendations on the situation
with the least possible delay;
(b)
To observe the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel;
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
(c)
( 2 of 3 )
To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution:
Calls upon all Member States to render every assistance to the United Nations
in the execution of this resolution and, to refrain from giving assistance to
the North Korean authorities.
Adopted at the 473rd meeting by 9 votes to none, with 1 abstention ( Yugoslavia).
83 (1950). Resolution of 27 June 1950
The Security Council,
Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from
North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,
Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities,
Having called upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed
forces to the 38th parallel,
Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea 11 that the
authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed
forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore
international peace and security,
Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for
immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,
Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance
to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack
and to restore international peace and security in the area.
Adopted at the 474th meeting by 7 votes to 1 (Yugoslavia).11
84 (1950). Resolution of 7 July 1950
The Security Council,
Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from
North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
( 3 of 3 )
Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to
the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore
international peace and security in the area,
9
10
11.
12
See Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 15, 473rd meeting, p. 2,
footnote 2 (document S/1496, incorporating S/1496/Corr.1).
One member (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was absent.
Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 16, 474th meeting, p. 2
(document S/1507).
Two members (Egypt, India) did not participate in the voting; one member (Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics) was absent.
National Security Council, NSC 81 (Korean War)
( 1 of 9 )
Pagination not correct
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
UNITED STATES COURSE OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO
KOREA
References:
A.
NSC Action No.
B.
Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, Subject. "Future United States
Policy with Respect to Korea", dated July 17 and August 30, 1950
Pursuant to the President's request the enclosed report on the subject prepared by
the BSC Staff, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security
Council and the Secretary of the Treasury at the next regularly scheduled Council
meeting on Thursday, September 7, 1950.
It is recommended that, if this report is adopted, it be submitted to the President for
consideration with the recommendation that he approve the Conclusions contained
therein and direct their implementation by all executive departments and agencies of
the US Government.
Signed
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
National Security Council, NSC 81 (Korean War)
( 2 of 9 )
REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT
TO KOREA
THE PROBLEM
1.
To determine what United States course of action with respect to Korea would
be best calculated to advance the national interests of the United States.
ANALYSIS
2.
The present United Nations action in Korea is being taken in pursuance of the
Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950. The Resolution of June
25 called for "the immediate cessation of hostilities", called upon "the authorities of
North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel", and
celled upon all UN members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the
execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean
authorities." The Resolution of June 27 noted the failure of the North Korean
authorities to comply with the resolution of June 25 and recommended that "the
Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as
may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and
security in the area."
3.
In a third resolution (July 7, 1950), the Security Council requested the United
Nations to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United
Nations On the Korean operation, and authorized that these forces fly the UN flag. In
response to this resolution, General MacArthur has been designated Commander of
the UN forces in Korea. The Republic of Korea has also placed its forces under
General MacArthur, command.
4.
The political objective of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about the
complete independence and unity of Korea in accordance with the General
Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21,
1949.
5.
The United States has strongly supported this political objective. If the present
United Nations action in Korea can accomplish this political objective without
substantial risk of general war wit, the Soviet Union or Communist China, it would be
in our interest to advocate the pressing of the United Nations action to this
conclusion. It would not be in our national interest, however, nor presumably would
other friendly members of the United Nations regard it as being in their interest, to
take action in Korea which would involve a substantial risk of general war.
Furthermore, it would not be in our national interest to take action in Korea which did
National Security Council, NSC 81 (Korean War)
( 3 of 9 )
not have the support Of the great majority of the United Nations, even if, in our
judgment, such action did not involve a substantial risk of general war.
6.
As UN forces succeed in stabilizing the front, driving back the North Korean
forces, and approaching the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the
United States and other UN members which are supporting the Security Council
resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities are
confined to Korea or spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly
increased.
7.
It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will passively accept the emergence of a
situation in which all or most of Korea would pass from its control, provided it
believes that It can take action which would prevent this and which would not involve
a substantial risk of general war. The Soviet Union may decide that it can risk
reoccupying Northern Korea before United Nations forces have reached the 38th
parallel, or the conclusion of an arrangement with the North Korean regime under
which Soviet forces would be pledged to the defense of the territory of the "Peoples
Republic of Northern Koreas. Alternatively, the Soviet Union might initiate some
move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities are still in progress south of the
38th parallel. In view of the importance of avoiding general war, we should be
prepared to negotiate a settlement while refusing terms that would leave the
aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of the
aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United
Nations,
8.
Although It does not appear likely that Chinese Communist forces would be
used to occupy North Korea (because the Soviet Union probably regards Korea as
being in its own direct sphere of interest), this contingency cannot be excluded. It
also seems unlikely that Soviet or Chinese Communist forces will be openly
employed in major wits in the fighting in the southern part Of the peninsula, for it is
believed that neither the Soviet Union nor the Chinese Communists are ready to
engage in general war at this time for this objective. It is possible that the Soviet
Union may endeavor to persuade the Chinese Communists to enter the Korean
campaign with the purpose of avoiding the defeat of the North Korean forces and
also of fomenting war between the United States and the Chinese Communists
should we react strongly.
9.
It is possible, but not probable, that no action will be taken by the Soviet Union
or by the Chinese Communists to reoccupy Northern Korea or to indicate in any
other way an intention to prevent the occupation of Northern Korea by United
Nations forces before the letter have reached the 38th parallel. In this unlikely
contingency it would seem probable that the Soviet Union had decided to follow a
hands-off policy, even at the expense of the loss of control of Northern Korea. Only
in this contingency could the UN forces undertake ground operations north of the
38th parallel without a substantial risk of general war. It is difficult to appraise this
National Security Council, NSC 81 (Korean War)
( 4 of 9 )
risk at this time, and our action in crossing the 38th parallel would create a situation
to which the Soviet Union would be almost certain to react in some manner. While
the risk of Soviet or Chinese communist intervention might not be lessened if only
the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) forces conducted the operation north of the 38th
parallel, the risk of general hostilities as a result of such intervention would be
reduced. In no circumstances should other UN forces be used in the north-eastern
province bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.
10.
It will be desirable to bear in mind in the contingency stated in paragraph 9
both the importance of securing support of the majority of UN member, for any action
that might be taken north of the 38th parallel and the advantage of establishing a
record that will clearly show that every reasonable effort has been made to avoid
carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th
parallel. At some point after the UN forces begin to take the initiative and to drive
bank and destroy the North Korean forces, terms of surrender should be offered. The
question of the acceptance of such terms by the north Koreans would of course be
determined by the U.S.S.R. in the light of its appraisal of its interests under all the
circumstances then existing.
11.
The UN forces are clearly committed by the Security Council resolutions to
compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel and there
is a clear legal basis for taking such military actions north of the 38th parallel as are
necessary in accomplishing this mission.
12.
Military actions north of the 38th parallel which go beyond the
accomplishment of this mission as, for example, to accomplish the political objective
of unifying Korea under the Republic of Korea, are not clearly authorized by existing
Security Council resolutions. Accordingly, United Nations approval for such further
military actions is a prerequisite to their initiation. Should such approval not be
forthcoming, accomplishment of this political objective would not be feasible. It would
have to be recognized that a stalemate freezing the UN forces indefinitely in Korea
or returning to the status quo ante June 25, would be undesirable.
13. Soviet domination of North Korea has brought with it the pattern of police and
propaganda control well known throughout the Soviet world. Since the existence and
stability of a unified Korea must in the long run depend largely upon the Korean
people themselves, the tasks of the United Nations will include the reorientation of t.
North Korean people toward the outlook of free peoples who accept the standards of
international behavior set forth in the United Nations charter.
CONCLUSIONS
14.
Final decisions cannot be made at this time concerning the future course of
action in Korea, since the course of action which will best advance the national
interest of the United States must be determined in the light of: the action of the
National Security Council, NSC 81 (Korean War)
( 5 of 9 )
Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, consultation and agreement with friendly
members of the United Nations, and appraisal of the risk of general war.
15.
The United Nations forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north
of the 38th parallel to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this
line or to defeat these forces. The UN Commander should be authorized to conduct
military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations
in pursuance of a roll-back, north of the 38th parallel for the purpose of destroying
the North Korean forces, provided that at the time of such operations there has been
no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no
announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in
North Korea. UN operations should not be permitted to extend into areas close to the
Manchurian and U.S.S.R. borders of Korea.
16.
Concurrently UN forces should be developed and plans should be perfected
with a view to the possible occupation of North Korea. However, the execution of
such plans should take place only with the explicit approval of the President, and
would be dependent upon prior consultation with and the approval of the UN
members.
17.
The United Nations Commander should undertake no ground operations north
of the 38th parallel in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or
Chinese Communist forces, but should reoccupy Korea up to the 38th parallel.
Bombing operations north of the 38th parallel should not be discontinued merely
because the ores-cove of Soviet or Chinese Communist troops is detected in a
target area. However, if the Soviet Union should announce in advance its intention
to, reoccupy North Korea, either explicitly or implicitly giving warning that its forces
should not be attacked, the matter should be immediately referred to the Security
Council with the stated purpose of securing the cooperation of the Soviet Union (or
the Chinese Communists) in UN action to achieve the unity and independence of
Korea. Since such cooperation would not be forthcoming, an attempt should then be
made in the General Assembly to secure the condemnation of the Soviet Union (or
the Chinese Communists) for flouting the will of the UN majority. Military action
against North Korean troops south of 38 would continue, but action north of 38
should not be initiated or continued and if any UN forces are already north of 38 they
should prepare to withdraw pending further directives from Washington.
18. In the event of the open employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th
parallel, the UN Commander should defend his forces, make no move to aggravate
the situation, and report to Washington. The same action should be taken in the
event that UN forces are operating north of the 38th parallel and major Soviet units
are openly employed. In either of these events the United States in common
prudence would have to proceed on the assumption that global war is probably
imminent. Accordingly, the United States should immediately:
National Security Council, NSC 81 (Korean War)
a.
( 6 of 9 )
Make every effort in the light of the circumstances to localize the action, to
stop the aggression by political measures and to ensure the unity of the free
world if war nevertheless follows. These measures should include direct
diplomatic action and resort to the United Nations with the objectives of:
(1)
Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful
settlement and the conditions upon which the United States would, in
concert with other members of the United Nations, accept such a
settlement.
(2)
Consulting with members of the United Nations regarding their
willingness to join with the United States in military opposition, if
necessary, to the aggression.
b.
Give consideration to the possibility of a direct approach to the highest Soviet
leaders.
c.
Consult with selected allies to perfect coordination of plans.
d.
Place itself in the best possible position to meet the eventuality of global ear,
and therefore prepare to execute emergency war plans; but should, in so far
as it has any choice, enter into full-scale hostilities only at the moment and in
the manner most favorable to it in the light of the situation then existing.
e.
While minimizing United States military commitments in areas of little strategic
significance, take action with reference to the aggression to the extent and in
the manner best contributing to the implementation of United States national
war Plans.
19.
In the event of the open employment of major Chinese Communist units south
of the 38th parallel:
a.
The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general
war with Communist China.
b.
As long as action by UN military forces offers a reasonable chance of
successful resistance, the UN Commander should Continue such action and
be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against
Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of
US military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine
further US courses of action.
c.
The United States should take the matter to the Security Council with the
purpose of condemning the Chinese Communists as aggressors.
National Security Council, NSC 81 (Korean War)
( 7 of 9 )
20.
In the event of an attempt to employ Soviet or Chinese Communist units
covertly south of 38, the United Nations Commander should continue the action as
long as he believes his forces capable of successful resistance.
21.
The United States should immediately make an intensive effort, using all
information media, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the warvictimized Korean people away from the United States and to direct it toward the
Korean Communists, the Soviet Union, and, depending on the role they play, the
Chinese Communists, as the parties responsible for the destructive conflict. Special
assistance should be given to the field commander and the US Embassy in Korea to
augment their present propaganda and information programs. The Government of
the R.O.K. should be encouraged to increase its propaganda output and should be
given material assistance in this effort.
22.
In order to effect the reorientation of the North Korean people, to cause
defection of enemy troops in the field, and to train North Korean personnel to
participate in activities looking to unification of the country, the following steps should
be taken:
a.
Establish the principle that the treatment of POW's, after their transfer to
places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and
use for psychological warfare purposes, and for the tasks specified above.
b.
Set up immediately on a pilot-plant scale an interrogation, indoctrination and
training center for those POW's now in our hands in Korea. Personnel in
charge of this project must be selected with the greatest care, taking into
consideration Korean or Far Eastern experience, language qualifications, and
temperamental aptitude. Full advantage should be taken of World War II
experience in the indoctrination of German and Japanese prisoners of war, of
experiences in Greece, and of recent experience with Soviet escapees.
23.
In preparation for the possible eventual retreat or sudden collapse of North
Korean forces, the United States should immediately discuss with certain friendly
members of the United Nations the terms to be offered the North Korean forces. This
will serve to develop support for action north of the 38th parallel to accomplish the
political objective of the United Nations in Korea in the event that the terms are
rejected and there is no evidence of a substantial risk of a clash with Soviet or
Chinese Communist forces. If the terms offered are not accepted, the UN
Commander should continue his efforts to destroy as many of the enemy as possible
before they retreat across the 38th parallel. He should request new instructions
before continuing operations north of the 38th parallel with major forces for the
purpose of occupying North Korea. He should not in any circumstances permit the
use of UN forces other than R.O.K. contingents in the northeast province or along
the Manchurian border.
National Security Council, NSC 81 (Korean War)
( 8 of 9 )
24.
If operations are undertaken to occupy northern Korea, the United Nations
Commander should, in consultation with the Government of the 8.0.K., determine the
timing and method of subjecting occupied territory north of the 38th parallel to its
jurisdiction. He should forbid, as commander of the UN forces, reprisals against the
forces, officials, end populace of North Korea, except in accordance with
international law, and take such measures as are within his power to secure
compliance with this directive.
25.
In performing their mission beyond the 38th parallel, the general posture of
the United Nations forces should be one of liberation rather than retaliation. An effort
should be made to encourage the voluntary adherence of ever larger areas of North
Korea to the R.O.K.. The United Nations forces should attempt to exert a stabilizing
influence during the transition period. They should endeavor to conduct themselves
in such a way as to emphasize the non-aggressive and temporary nature of the UN
occupation.
26.
When organized armed resistance by the North Korean forces has been
brought substantially to an end, the United States should attempt to reduce its share
of the UN responsibilities for Korea, and announce its desire to do so, without,
however, implying any unwillingness to fulfill its UN commitments. The 8.0.K. forces,
operating under principles established by the UN Commission for Korea, or such
body as may be established to take its place, should take the lead in disarming
remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activity
should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea with minimum
participation by UN contingents, unless the Korean forces alone should prove unable
to cope with the guerrilla activities.
27.
The United States should recognize that the Government of the R.O.K. will
have to take strong measures against Communist efforts to cause trouble in Korea
and that it may require support in these measures from the United States. At the
same time, the United States should recognize that social and economic reforms will
be necessary in order to reduce the Communist menace to manageable proportions.
28.
The United States should advocate in the United Nations the adoption of the
following principles to govern the action of the United Nations in Korea in the posthostilities period:
a.
The unification of Korea should be arranged by representatives of the Korean
people chosen in free secret-ballot elections on the basis of universal adult
suffrage, the elections to be held under the auspices of the United Nations.
b.
The Government of the R.O.K. should be recognized as the only lawful
government in Korea and should be consulted on problems arising in
connection with the unification of Korea.
National Security Council, NSC 81 (Korean War)
c.
( 9 of 9 )
An obligation rests upon the members of the United Nations to contribute to
the solution of the tremendous economic, social and political problems certain
to confront a unified and independent Korea. Asiatic members of the United
Nations should be urged to make a substantial contribution to the assistance
program in view of their special regional interest in Korea.
29.
In consonance with the above principles, the United States should take the
following steps:
a.
Take vigorous action through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations
Security Council and General Assembly to assure and solidify United Nations
support of necessary action in Korea.
b.
Se prepared to announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a
solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous
United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United
Nations Charter and the general aims and principles which the United States
believes should underlie such a solution.
c.
When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend
or urge others to recommend the creation of an appropriate United Nations
body which would study and make recommendations to the General
Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with the principles enumerated
above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as
chairman of such a body.
30.
The United States should urge that the UN Commission on Korea or such
body as may be established to take its place be charged with continuing
consideration of Korean problems and instructed to make recommendations as to
the size and character of the military and internal security forces needed by the
R.O.K.. The US should recommend that the UN Commission should consider the
desirability of permanent neutralization of Korea accompanied by political
undertakings by the R.O.K. and by other states separately to refrain from any
aggression. The question of UN guarantee should be studied but no US commitment
on this point should be made at this stage.
31.
The United States should urge that UN forces be retained in Korea until a
stable, unified, and independent state has been firmly established and should be
prepared to make available United States forces as a contingent of the UN forces for
the purpose of deterring renewed aggression or internal strife. The number of our
forces should be reduced so far as possible, however, and should serve only in
conjunction with other UN contingents, preferably including some Asiatic
contingents.
CHAPTER II
OPERATION CHROMITE
“The military student does not seek to learn from history the minutiae of
method and technique. In every age these are decisively influenced by the
characteristics of weapons currently available and by means at hand for
maneuvering, supplying, and controlling combat forces. But research does
bring to light those fundamental principles and their combinations and
applications, which in the past, have been productive of success. These
principles have no limitation of time. Consequently the army extends its
analytical interest to the dust buried accounts of wars long past as well as to
those still reeking with the scent of battle.”
General Douglas MacArthur
“The vulnerability of the enemy is his supply position.”
General Douglas MacArthur
1. Introduction
mobility. The Korean infrastructure was
woefully inadequate; the scarcity of improved
a. In the predawn darkness of 25 June roads, airfields and ports in particular would
1950, forces of the North Korean People's frustrate and complicate the application of US
Army (NKPA) smashed southward across military power (Figure II-1).
the border marked by the 38th Parallel to
invade the Republic of Korea (ROK). The
c. Within hours, news of the invasion was
NKPA was a formidable force of at least flashed to General MacArthur in Tokyo. On
135,000 men. Many had been conscripts 25 June 1950, President Truman ordered
of the Chinese and Japanese armies and they MacArthur, as Commander-in-Chief Far East
were equipped with modern Soviet-supplied (CINCFE), to use his air and sea forces to
tanks, artillery and aircraft. In comparison, support the ROK forces south of the 38th
the ROK armed forces were trained only as Parallel. MacArthur personally visited Korea
a constabulary force and poorly equipped. on 29 June to protect evacuation of US
Numbering less than 100,000, the army personnel, help formulate an appreciation of
lacked armor, antitank weapons, and heavy the situation, and to develop recommendations
artillery. Most soldiers were conscripts, and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the
few units had ever trained above the President.
company level. Air and naval forces were
nearly nonexistent.
2. Status of US Military Forces
b. Although an ancient culture, Korea
was an underdeveloped nation which had
suffered greatly under Japanese occupation.
The entire peninsula was extremely
mountainous and compartmentalized, while
the limited number of north-south and eastwest lines of communication constricted
a. American military power available
within the theater was unprepared for the
struggle it would face in the next few months.
Army forces consisted of four understrength
divisions equipped with worn-out weapons
from WW II. They were manned by young
men who, for the most part, lacked combat
II-1
Chapter II
Figure II-1. Joint Campaigning in Korea 1950
II-2
Joint Military Operations Historical Collection
Operation CHROMITE
seasoning. Focused on occupation duties, degree offset the disadvantages that faced the
training was marginal and most units lacked United States that gloomy June morning.
the heavy weapons called for by their Tables
of Organization.
3. US Response to the Invasion
b. The newly independent Air Force was
represented in theater by the Far East Air
Forces (FEAF) commanded by Lieutenant
General George E. Stratemeyer. FEAF was
primarily equipped with jet interceptors,
designed for air defense of Japan against the
perceived Soviet and Chinese threats.
Reconnaissance, transportation and ground
attack aircraft were scarce. Despite the
shortage of transport aircraft, the Air Force
was to play a critical role in delivering
supplies and personnel to support ROK and
US forces in the early stages of the war.
a. Half a world away, President Truman
and his advisors viewed the invasion from
the north as a part of the ongoing communist
confrontation with the free world. The
President reversed previous US policy (which
did not see Korea as vital to US interests)
and ordered that actions be taken to evacuate
US and United Nations (UN) dependents
from Korea and to supply the ROK forces
with ammunition and equipment. At the
same time, the UN called for the People's
Democratic Republic of Korea to halt its
aggression and withdraw north of the 38th
Parallel. This resolution was ignored, and
c. Vice Admiral Charles T. Joy, the North Korean onslaught continued.
Commander, Naval Forces Far East While some ROK units resisted heroically,
(COMNAVFE), led a force which consisted of others dissolved in panic.
just one cruiser and four old destroyers. However,
the US 7th Fleet, with an aircraft carrier, a cruiser,
b. The President placed the US 7th Fleet
eight destroyers, and three submarines and under MacArthur's operational control
commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur Struble, (OPCON) and authorized its movement to
would soon be made available and would the waters off Formosa. This move signalled
significantly improve the naval posture.
the Chinese that the United States would not
tolerate any widening of the conflict.
d. American forces in the rest of the world Concern about expansion of the fighting,
were just as poorly manned and prepared. both in the Pacific and to other parts of the
This situation was the legacy of the rapid world, overshadowed all US decisions that
drawdown following the end of WW II and followed.
post-war budget cuts, driven partly by the
belief that the atomic bomb had made 4. United Nations Reaction
conventional forces less relevant to national
On 27 June, with NKPA forces continuing
defense. The failure to maintain an
adequately prepared force would extract a the invasion, the UN passed a milestone
high cost in human suffering over the next resolution calling on member states to furnish
military assistance to the ROK to “. . . repel
few months.
the armed attack.” This was the first time
e. MacArthur’s experience and capability that the UN took such action. On that date
as a joint force commander, the experienced Truman expanded his 25 June authorization
Far East Command (FEC) joint planning staff of air and naval attacks south of the 38th Parallel
in his headquarters (HQ) in Tokyo, and the to include all of Korea. He also authorized the
leadership abilities of the officers who would employment of Army forces at the southern port
serve as his subordinate commanders to some of Pusan. The next day Seoul fell.
II-3
Chapter II
5. MacArthur Assesses the
Situation in Korea
“The deep envelopment based on
surprise, which severs the enemy's
supply lines, is and always has been
the most decisive maneuver of war.
A short envelopment which fails to
envelop and leaves the enemy's
supply system intact merely divides
your own forces and can lead to heavy
loss and even jeopardy.”
a. On 29 June, MacArthur arrived in Korea
and rapidly assessed the situation. He realized
that he was facing a tough opponent and that
half measures would not be effective. From the
south bank of the Han River, he watched the
retreating ROK forces and realized that “only
immediate commitment of ground troops”
General Douglas MacArthur
could stem the invasion. Unfortunately, he had
few ready forces and only limited transport 6. Communist Forces Advance
available to rapidly commit them. Additionally,
a. Unconcerned with UN and US
he had no authority to commit ground forces
actions,
and ignoring significant losses
outside of the southern port of Pusan.
inflicted by the retreating ROK forces, the
b. MacArthur quickly informed the JCS that enemy reinforced its initial success and
he felt the ROK forces would be unable to stop continued the advance. On 3 July the airfield
the invasion and that a major commitment of at Kimpo and the port of Inchon fell. Enemy
American power was required. His clear aircraft began operating out of Kimpo,
understanding of the nature of modern warfare although US forces soon secured air
was evident in his words — “. . . To continue to supremacy and NKPA air played little role in
use the forces of our air and navy without an the battles to come. Concurrently, the small
effective ground element can not be decisive. northern navy was completely destroyed and
Unless provisions are made for the full a tight blockade of the sea approaches to the
utilization of our Army-Navy-Air team in this peninsula established. By 4 July, the enemy
shattered area, our mission will at best be ground advance had reached Suwon, 25 miles
needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. south of Seoul. At the same time the lead
At worst, it might be doomed.”
The elements of the 24th Infantry Division, better
employment of ground forces was authorized known to history as Task Force Smith, were
landing at Pusan.
within 24 hours of receipt of this message.
c. MacArthur first began to consider an
amphibious landing in the enemy rear area
while he stood on the south bank of the Han
River. He was predisposed to favor this type of
an operation; his successful campaigns across
the Pacific in the Second World War were based
on the concept of applying Allied air, naval,
and ground strength against enemy weakness.
Amphibious landings in areas where they
weren’t expected had kept the enemy off balance
and allowed the Allies to maintain the initiative.
It was only natural that he would consider this
type of operation when assessing his options to
save the situation in Korea.
II-4
b. These unprepared soldiers were
committed to buy additional time to bring
appropriate forces into the area.
MacArthur later characterized his costly
piecemeal commitment of these units as
an “arrogant display of strength.” He and
his staff hoped that this desperate rear
guard action would stabilize the front by
causing the enemy to slow his advance and
proceed cautiously when he realized he was
up against US troops. It would also boost
the morale of the ROK armed forces by
showing them they were not alone. Dawn
on 5 July found Task Force Smith blocking
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Operation CHROMITE
the main road between Suwon and Osan. from Korea, and the 140 mile long Pusan
Despite the task force’s heroic efforts, a lack Perimeter (Figure II-2) was established. The
of effective anti-tank weapons led to defeat. desperate fight to keep this foothold on the
peninsula absorbed all reinforcements
arriving in theater. Without the strength and
7. The Defense of Pusan
resilience these forces provided, it is doubtful
a. While these desperate battles were that Eighth Army could have held on.
fought, the United States and UN continued
to take the actions necessary to bring their 8. MacArthur Plans His Riposte
power to bear on the peninsula. On 8 July, at
the request of the UN, Truman named
a. While these events transpired,
MacArthur Commander-in-Chief of the MacArthur remained focused on regaining
United Nations Command. On the 13th, the initiative. Already he had intuitively
Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, arrived at the solution; now he needed a
commanding the Eighth United States Army, fleshed-out plan and a force to execute it.
assumed command of all ground troops and Elements of his staff at FEC, led by Major
responsibility for ground operations in Korea. General Edward M. Almond, went to work on
MacArthur’s air and naval component the plan as early as 4 July. In his first request for
commanders likewise assumed responsibility for reinforcements sent to the JCS on 7 July,
their respective areas, with forces of other nations MacArthur stated that his main purpose was to
joining them as they arrived in theater.
“. . . fully . . . exploit our air and sea control and,
by amphibious maneuver, strike behind his mass
b. As June gave way to July, NKPA of ground forces.”
spearheads continued their southward
advance. South of Taejon they divided into
b. Preliminary planning called for a late
two separate thrusts, one along the west coast July landing, but the reality of the strength
and the second straight for Pusan, but their of the enemy and the weakness of the UN
pace was slowed by logistic difficulties and forces compelled delaying the operation. The
terrain and by the increasing tempo of air forces which would have conducted the
interdiction. The cost of advancing in the landing were instead being rushed ashore to
face of heavy and effective UN air attacks maintain the defenses around Pusan.
continued to mount for the NKPA. Air
interdiction alone, however, would not
c. Planning for the landings was
suffice. By late July, the US 25th Infantry conducted at FEC HQ in Japan by the Joint
and 1st Cavalry divisions had deployed from Strategic Plans and Operations Group
Japan and joined the 24th Division in Korea. (JSPOG). A number of alternatives were
They were shortly followed by elements of developed and considered in great detail. By
the 5th Marine Regiment, filled out to a the 23rd of July, JSPOG came up with three
provisional brigade by other Marine units. options for consideration. Plans 100B, 100C,
This infusion of fresh manpower, armed with and 100D called for landings at Inchon (west
3.5 inch anti-tank rockets airlifted from the coast), Kunson (west coast), or ChumunjinUnited States along with other US and UN up (east coast), respectively.
troops deploying from around the world,
d. On 12 August, MacArthur issued
began to turn the tide. UN forces were slowly
pushed back until they reached the Naktong CINCFE Operation Plan 100B, code named
River. Here Walker and MacArthur decided Operation CHROMITE, with Inchon as the
that they must stand and fight or be ejected target to be seized by the amphibious assault.
II-5
Chapter II
Figure II-2. The Pusan Perimeter, September 1950
In recognition of the complex nature of an from the FEC staff. The staff assumed that
amphibious operation, ten Marine Corps the landings would end the conflict and they
officers and two Navy officers were attached would return to their normal billets in Japan.
to the planning staff on 19 August. This
“The history of war proves that nine out
would guarantee that their special expertise
of
ten times an army has been destroyed
was immediately available.
e. The plan called for X Corps (to be
formed around the 1st Marine Division and
the 7th Infantry Division) to execute a phased
amphibious landing at Inchon (Figure II-3),
then drive inland to secure Seoul and cut the
enemy’s main lines of communications and
resupply to his forces committed in the south.
The initial assault by the 1st Marine Division
was to be followed by the 7th Infantry
Division and ROK Marine Forces.
Simultaneously, the Eighth Army would
launch a major supporting attack, eventually
linking up with X Corps forces south of Seoul.
MG Almond was named to command the X
Corps, with the staff primarily hand selected
II-6
because its supply lines have been cut
off . . . We shall land at Inchon, and I
shall crush them [the North Koreans].”
General Douglas MacArthur
9. Forces for the Landing
a. Putting together the forces to make the
landing was a major challenge. The enemy
continued to threaten the Pusan perimeter,
and MacArthur had no forces to spare. The
continued NKPA pressure on Walker at Pusan
forced MacArthur to throw units into the fight
as they became available. Additionally,
MacArthur felt strongly that a successful
amphibious operation required a Marine
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Operation CHROMITE
division. Washington initially balked because
a Marine division was not available, the
Corps having shrunk to a post war low of
less than 80,000. A major reserve callup
would be necessary to field a full division;
but MacArthur was adamant and his
persistent arguments, coupled with his status
and reputation, carried the day.
c. One brigade assigned to this newly
fleshed out division was already fighting in
the Pusan area. The 1st Marine Provisional
Brigade had been activated on 5 July at Camp
Pendleton. It was composed of the 5th
Marine Regiment, a battalion of the 11th
Marines, and Marine Air Group 33. It sailed
for Japan on the 14th, but the situation at
Pusan was so desperate that it was diverted
directly to Korea. It landed at Pusan on 2
August and went straight into the battleline.
Prior to the Inchon landing, it had to be pulled
out of combat, moved back to Pusan, refitted,
embarked, and landed as a part of the assault
force — all in less than 10 days.
b. Major General Oliver P. Smith assumed
command of the 1st Marine Division at Camp
Pendleton in late July and was ordered to
bring it to full strength (less one regiment)
by combining it with the cadre forces of the 2nd
Marine Division and recalled reservists. The
division was to sail for Korea by 15 August.
d. The Army's 7th Division was, by
Trained Marines were so scarce that, in order to
August,
at less than half strength. Key
fill the division, a battalion was pieced together
from various Marine forces in the Mediterranean officers and noncommissioned officers as well
as equipment had been diverted to bring the
and sent directly to Korea.
24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry Divisions up to
Figure II-3. The Inchon Landing
II-7
Chapter II
strength. Between mid-August and early
September, the 7th received priority of
replacements and was augmented with nearly
8,000 Korean soldiers. By the time of the
landings, both the 1st Marine and 7th
Infantry Divisions were fully manned and
equipped.
“The best I can say about Inchon is it is
not impossible.”
RADM James H. Doyle
Commander Assault Force (TF 90)
23 August 1950
10.
Amphibious Landing
Challenges
b. Washington was concerned that the
geographic problems at Inchon would cause
the landings to flounder and result in a major
reverse and heavy loss of life. Conversely,
MacArthur was utterly convinced that the
landings would succeed, and his confidence
won the day. Weighing the risk against the
potential gain, MacArthur was certain that a
less ambitious amphibious envelopment at a
less difficult site, as favored by many in
Washington, would not be decisive and would
condemn the Eighth Army to a brutal fight
north from Pusan.
c. Two weeks prior to the landings, the
Navy introduced a three-man team into the
Inchon area to pinpoint enemy defenses and
verify tide and terrain data. This daring and
resourceful team, led by LT E. F. Clark
(USN), enlisted the aid of loyal ROK civilians
and succeeded in passing a great amount of
essential information to the planners. On the
night preceding the landings Clark even
succeeded in lighting one of the principal
navigation lights in the approach channel to
guide the attack fleet.
a. Inchon presented a vast array of
challenges to the landing force (Figure II-4).
Extremely high tides, narrow channels, high
seawalls, extensive mudflats, and enemy
resistance would all have to be overcome if
the landings were to succeed. Additionally,
the harbor approaches to Inchon were
guarded by the fortified island of Wolmi-do.
While the staff worked to address these
d. Even without the geographic challenges
problems, MacArthur focused his effort on
convincing the JCS that the risks were presented by Inchon, MacArthur understood
minimal and that the operation should go amphibious operations to be highly complex.
He established Joint Task Force (JTF) 7,
ahead.
under the command of Admiral Struble, to
“The Marquis de Montcalm believed in
finalize the plan and execute the landings.
1759 that it was impossible for an armed
The operation plan (OPLAN) directed naval
force to scale the precipitous river banks
Task Force (TF) 90, RADM J. H. Doyle
south of the then walled city of Quebec,
commanding, to isolate the landing site,
and therefore concentrated his
formidable defenses along the more
conduct the amphibious assault to secure the
vulnerable banks north of the city. But
Inchon area, land the follow-on and reserve
General James Wolfe and a small force
forces, provide air and fire support, and
did indeed come up the St. Lawrence
provide other support as necessary. The
River and scale those heights. On the
landing was to be preceded and supported by
Plains of Abraham, Wolfe won a stunning
victory that was made possible almost
a heavy naval bombardment from US and
entirely by surprise . . . Like Montcalm,
British ships of the naval Gunfire Support
the North Koreans would regard an
Group (TF 90.6, RADM J. M. Higgins)
Inchon landing as impossible. Like
anchored close offshore.
Wolfe, I could take them by surprise.”
General Douglas MacArthur
II-8
e. Air Force bombers flying from Japan
would help isolate the landing area by
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Operation CHROMITE
INCHON CHALLENGES
'Necessity to hold Pusan perimeter
'Extreme operational reach for US based forces
'Lack of US operational amphibious landing or sufficient practice since 1945
'Military requirement and political effect of recalling reserves to provide
sufficient forces
'Scarcity and piecemeal arrival of trained and ready forces
'Limited operational range and numbers of land-based close air support aircraft
'OPSEC
'Potential for discovery of invasion fleet in Yellow Sea
'Hours of daylight available
'Number of days available per month with sufficient channel depth for large
craft
'Extreme tidal range, causing inability to reinforce from sea except at high tide
and immobility of landing craft at low tide
'Landing sites featured concrete seawalls, not shelved beaches
'Unknown number and strength of defenders
'Restricted, narrow, tortuous, single ship channel for entry
'Fortified Wolmi-do Island dominated the single harbor entry channel
Figure II-4. Inchon Challenges
attacking strategic targets so that the enemy
could not move reinforcements by land. While
these actions were underway, TF 91 (RADM
W. G. Andrews, R.N.) would serve as a blocking
and covering force so the landings would be
free from interference from the sea.
b. Fifth Air Force (Major General Earle E.
Partridge) provided general air support for the
invasion by isolating the objective area. As part
of this effort commencing on D-10, a major, 7day effort was launched against the rail network
north of Seoul. Fifth Air Force was also charged
with furnishing air-ground support to the Eighth
Army in the south and with the on-order mission
11. The Amphibious Landing
of air delivery of the 187th Airborne Regimental
a. The amphibious objective area was Combat Team.
established as an arc extending 30 miles
inland from the landing beaches. Priority
c. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, the lead
close air support within this area would be element of the 1st Marine Division — the
provided by Navy, Marine Corps and British Landing Force — made the initial assault on
air units of the Fast Carrier Group (TF 77) Wolmi-do with the high tide at dawn on 15
and the Air Support Group (TF 90.5). Air September and crushed enemy resistance.
Force close air support for the landings was The main landings by the rest of the division
not part of the plan. Long flight times from followed on the next high tide 11 hours later.
Japan as well as communications and other The enemy was completely surprised.
coordination challenges made such Intelligence estimates prior to the landings
geographic divisions of labor among the put as many as 18,000 troops in the Inchon Seoul area but, as it turned out, only 5,000
components the norm in Korea.
II-9
Chapter II
Inchon presented a vast array of challenges to the Marine landing force, including
the Inchon sea wall.
combat troops were there initially to oppose
the operation. Although they put up stiff
resistance, X Corps’ powerful and
unexpected thrust could not be turned back.
By the evening of the 16th, MajGen Smith
informed Admiral Struble that he was
sufficiently established to assume
responsibility for operations ashore.
12.
A Simultaneous Attack
a. As events unfolded in the north, the second
part of the operation was about to kick off in the
south. On the morning of 16 September, Eighth
Army launched its supporting attack against the
more than twelve enemy divisions deployed
against it. The enemy had just drained its
strength in an unsuccessful 2-week offensive
aimed at breaking the UN perimeter. Attacking
UN forces still met fierce resistance but, under
heavy air attack by Fifth Air Force (over 640
close air support sorties were flown in support
of the US I Corps on 18 and 19 September),
with its rear area threatened by X Corps, and
with its supply lines under increasingly heavy
air attack, NKPA resistance began to wane. On
19 September US and British units succeeded
in breaking out, and by the 20th were exerting
strong pressure as they moved toward Taejon.
II-10
b. The two nearly simultaneous attacks
were beginning to have the desired effect.
Unable to resupply or reinforce, and under
constant air and ground attack, the enemy
was pushed back along the entire Pusan line
more than 70 miles within a week. To help
demoralize the enemy, tens of thousands of
psychological warfare leaflets were dropped
over enemy lines to encourage surrender.
UNITED NATIONS FORCES HAVE
LANDED AT INCHON
Officers and men of North Korea.
Powerful UN forces have landed at
Inchon and are advancing rapidly.
You can see from this map how
hopeless your situation has become.
Your supply line cannot reach you,
nor can you withdraw to the north.
The odds against you are
tremendous. Fifty-three of the fiftynine countries of the UN are opposing
you. You are outnumbered in
equipment,
manpower,
and
firepower. Surrender or die. Come
over to the UN side and you will get
good food and prompt medical care.
Translation of UN leaflet
dropped throughout Korea
Joint Military Operations Historical Collection
Operation CHROMITE
US Marine landing forces were carefully timed for maximum effect.
c. By 17 September, the 1st Marine
Division had recaptured Kimpo airfield.
Kimpo was back in action as a UN air base
by the 18th. The Fifth Air Force immediately
began an airlift of over 200 tons of supplies a
day, which permitted Marine Aviation to
move off the carriers. Now ashore, they could
fly more, longer, and deeper missions. The
next morning, the 7th Division and ROK
Marine forces landed at Inchon and moved
rapidly inland. The 7th Division turned to
block any enemy attack from Suwon and the
south, while the ROK Marines joined the 1st
Marine Division in the attack to secure Seoul.
With its flanks secured, the 1st Marine
Division turned north on the morning of the
20th to begin the 6-day battle to clear Seoul.
Bitter NKPA resistance ultimately forced
commitment of the ROK Marines, 7th
Division’s 32nd Infantry Regiment, and
187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team
(a portion of the theater reserve) to the battle
for Seoul.
d. Constant attack on all sides finally broke
the NKPA resistance and the army collapsed.
By the end of September the North Korean
People’s Army ceased to exist as an organized
fighting force in South Korea. MacArthur's
prediction had been accurate.
13.
MacArthur and Joint
Employment Considerations
a. UN operations in Korea in 1950 showed
how a superior force can conduct
simultaneous combat operations along
external lines of communications. Despite
extremely long lines of supply (stretching to
dozens of nations), UN forces possessed
sufficient strength to successfully converge
upon the Korean Peninsula with
overwhelming power.
b. The use of asymmetric action is well
illustrated in this operation by the application
of UN air and sea combat power against the
ground forces of the NKPA. This application
of joint force strength and capabilities against
enemy weakness throughout the entire
battlespace allowed MacArthur to stabilize
the situation and find a way to exploit the
potential of his forces. Throughout the
campaign, the advantage of being able to
operate in the air and at sea, where the enemy
could not, was important to success.
MacArthur’s early and continuous
leveraging of his dimensional advantage
capitalized on UN strengths and slowed the
attack of a numerically superior ground force
operating along normally advantageous
II-11
Chapter II
internal lines. Once UN and ROK ground
forces were reinforced and re-equipped, the
synergy created by the synchronized
application of sea, land, and air power created
a favorable overall combat ratio which
secured strategic advantage for MacArthur
and allowed his forces to destroy the enemy.
c. From the start, MacArthur
demonstrated a clear understanding that to
obtain victory, he needed to seek the earliest
opportunity to conduct decisive joint offensive
operations. From the day he arrived in Korea
to assess the situation, he began formulating
a plan to capitalize on UN forces advantages
to launch an amphibious landing in the
enemy rear. While taking action to stabilize
the situation, he envisioned how he wanted
the battle to be fought and began planning
for the future. His initial concept for a landing
in July had to be delayed, but he and the
planning staff never lost sight of the real key
to victory. This vision and determination to
launch an early offensive positioned the
command for a rapid transition between the
defense and the offense when circumstances
in September permitted. Without his
foresight and the hard work of his joint
planning staff, a major operation such as
Inchon could not have been launched in the
short time available, and the final outcome
could have been decidedly different.
Preparation and continuous planning were
the keys to seizing the initiative when the
opportunity presented itself.
d. The rapid assimilation of multinational
forces into an effective fighting command in
this operation should not be overlooked. From
the beginning, Allied forces joined the
command and immediately played critical
roles. Effective coordination of US and ROK
army forces with supporting Australian and
British air and ground forces were essential
factors in stabilizing the Pusan Perimeter.
Part of this effectiveness can be traced to the
World War II combined operations
experience of MacArthur and most senior
II-12
leaders, but part must be attributed to the
clear purpose and simple objectives of the
force. UN solidarity in condemning NKPA
aggression and the willingness of so many
nations to play an active part in repelling the
invasion provided the unity of effort
necessary for smooth operations on the
battlefield.
e. The demonstrated professional
competence of the total force is another point
worthy of study in Operation CHROMITE.
US forces were able to recover from earlier
unpreparedness to a great extent because of
the residual skills of the reserve forces. Many
recalled troops were seasoned veterans of
World War II who were able to quickly
reestablish their military competence. The
expeditious integration of reserve and active
units into a highly successful fighting force,
able to conduct an extremely complicated
amphibious maneuver in an exceptionally
short time with almost no opportunity for
face-to-face coordination and no chance to
operate together, is unparalleled. While it
could be argued that MacArthur had no
choice but to use this kind of force, there is
no evidence that he or any other leader had
less than total confidence in the ability of
these units to accomplish the mission
regardless of all of these difficulties.
f. Very early in the campaign, MacArthur
perceived that the enemy relied on
overextended lines of communications for its
freedom of action and strength. Accurate
identification of the enemy lines of
communication in the Seoul area as a center
of gravity was a necessary prerequisite for
destroying the enemy force. Similarly,
MacArthur’s willingness to pay the high
price of piecemeal commitment of forces as
they became available to slow the NKPA
advance and then to maintain the Pusan
Perimeter is a good example of protecting a
friendly center of gravity. Although this
was a costly decision, he understood that it
would be hard, if not impossible, to recover
Joint Military Operations Historical Collection
Operation CHROMITE
The synchronized application of joint forces provided the United States with an
overwhelming military advantage.
from an ejection from the peninsula.
MacArthur weighed the risk and cost
associated and acted as he did because he
realized that the UN forces had to hold on to
this foothold in order to maintain their
freedom of action.
vulnerable position. When the Inchon
landing was followed one day later by the
breakout of Eighth Army, the enemy found
itself in an untenable position and was routed.
Unfortunately, UN forces would commit the
same error in the near future when they
advanced to the Yalu River.
g. The landing at Inchon was a classic
coup de main that used surprise and an
agressive supporting attack to overload the
enemy’s ability to resist. This horizontal
escalation of operations exceeded the enemy’s
capacity to respond effectively. The enemy’s
failure to anticipate MacArthur’s use of his
tried and true recipe for success, amphibious
assault in an unexpected quarter, allowed UN
forces to control the Inchon - Seoul area. This
gave the UN control of a decisive point: the
enemy communication network that
emanated from there to the NKPA forces in
the south.
i. MacArthur well understood the complex
nature of amphibious operations. He and
many of his subordinate leaders and planners
had experience with amphibious landings
during World War II. During that conflict,
amphibious operations had only been
mounted after exhaustive planning and
rehearsal. In the fall of 1950 these luxuries
were simply not available. MacArthur’s
tenacious pursuit of a Marine division to
spearhead the assault, and the assignment of
experienced Marine Corps and Navy officers
to the planning team in Tokyo, indicates
clearly that all involved understood how
h. The enemy also failed to realize that it difficult the landings would be.
had overextended its offensive operations
j. During the initial planning for
southward beyond the capabilities of logistic
support. Failing to recognize this Operation CHROMITE, X Corps reported
culmination point placed enemy troops in a directly to CINCFE, and all naval forces in
II-13
Chapter II
theater reported to MacArthur through
COMNAVFE. With the establishment of JTF
7 by MacArthur, X Corps (TF 92) became a
subordinate of JTF 7 for the embarkation and
assault phase of the operation. During this
phase, parallel chains of command for the
naval and ground forces operated within JTF
7. This technique is essential to ensure fully
integrated and coordinated effort at all levels.
The complexity of amphibious operations and
the interdependence of the Services makes
functioning parallel chains of command a key
aspect of success. Once the embarkation and
assault phase was completed and the
exploitation phase of the operation begun, X
Corps (along with its organic supporting air)
left JTF 7 and again reported directly to
CINCFE.
was permitted short of the line without
ground permission. Once the beachhead line
was secured, the assault phase of the
operation was concluded and the exploitation
phase begun.
m. The world had greatly changed in the
87 years between the fall of Vicksburg and
the outbreak of the Korean War. Economic
prosperity had cemented the American
military leadership role that emerged from
World War II and emboldened the nation to
take on a greater role in world affairs. No longer
did events far from US shores seem so remote.
Two world wars had shown the United States
how costly it was to remain uninvolved. The
UN offered the promise of resolving problems
before they became wars and, along with most
other nations of the world, our nation actively
k. Although Air Force units were not part embraced this promise.
of JTF 7, elements of the 5th Air Force did
operate in support of the amphibious task
n. While these economic, political, and
force. The attacks against the rail lines north social circumstances were unfolding, an
of Seoul certainly impeded enemy reaction explosion of technology placed additional
and contributed to creating the conditions tools in the hands of the commander. These
necessary for a successful landing. The tools were more lethal and allowed a more
synergy orchestrated by MacArthur through complete exploitation of the possibilities of
his very capable melding of the three-dimensional warfare. This same
complimentary facets of ground, air, and technology made the world smaller and
naval power led to the success of Operation quickened the pace of operations. Only 82
CHROMITE.
days elapsed between the northern invasion
of the ROK and the Inchon landing, and only
l. JTF 7 established an amphibious another 15 days passed between the landing
objective area around Inchon that clearly and the destruction of the enemy. This
defined the area that had to be controlled by operation was engineered by a UN force that
the invading force. It was sufficiently deep had to be manned, equipped, delivered,
to ensure that space would be available to assembled, supplied, and successfully
accomplish objectives and facilitate future employed on a remote, undeveloped
operations. The commander of the landing peninsula. In contrast, it took nearly 9
force established three phase lines to control months to mount the Vicksburg Campaign.
movement and attack over the approximately
8 miles between the landing beaches and the
o. The Korean War was the first armed
beachhead line. The number of control conflict the United States fought after the
measures required underscores the difficulties passage of the National Security Act of 1947
involved in coordinating amphibious assault as amended in 1949. These legislative
forces. These phase lines also served to actions formalized many concepts and
control ground attack by aircraft. No attack procedures that had informally evolved in our
II-14
Joint Military Operations Historical Collection
Operation CHROMITE
defense establishment in response to the
challenges of World War II. There were many
reasons for adopting such changes in the roles
and relationships between the Services, JCS,
and theater commanders; one of these was
the recognition that success on the modern
battlefield demanded that we capitalize on
the synergy that jointness provides. Modern
warfare demands a joint approach. This
realization changed forever the way we fight.
II-15
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 1 of 16 )
Endnotes omitted. Pagination inaccurate.
The United Nations Landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
ABSTRACT
On 25 June 1950 the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) attacked South Korea by
crossing the 38th Parallel to obtain their national strategic objective with
overwhelming force and extreme violence. During this time period, the United States
had problems with its force structure and combat readiness. In response to the North
Korean invasion, the United States acted as an agent of the United Nations. The
United States political and military leaders were confident that American forces on
occupational duty in Japan could delay or repel the advancing NKPA. Initially, United
States troops were defeated, therefore the Commander In Chief Far East (CINCFE)
had to restructure his forces to conduct a joint amphibious operation to gain the
offensive initiative from the North Koreans. Analyzing problems with the United
States forces before it conducted the Inchon landing is valuable for discussion and
military lessons learned.
Operation CHROMITE was a brilliant combined joint military operation which allowed
the CINCFE forces to defeat the NKPA center of gravity. This operation surprised the
North Korean forces allowing General McArthur's forces to go on the offensive and
cut the enemy's lines of operations and lines of communications. Operation
CHROMITE saved thousands of lives, demoralized the NKPA, led to the liberation of
Seoul, enabled the Far East forces to break out of the Pusan perimeter, and
eventually led to the recovery of the 38th Parallel. Analyzing the planning,
preparation, execution, and reviewing the lessons learned of this joint amphibious
operation are invaluable to planners of future joint military operations.
INTRODUCTION
The United States drastically downsized its military from 1945-1950 after the
unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan during WWII. The United States
strategic leaders were comfortable downsizing their forces because America had
demonstrated its technological superiority over its enemies by the use of the atomic
bomb against Japan in 1945. In 1945 America had 12 million personnel serving in its
military and was capable of meeting any challenge in the world; by December 1948
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 2 of 16 )
its military had shrunk to less than 1.5 million personnel and its combat readiness
had severely declined since WWII. In 1945 it is estimated that the United States had
an Army that numbered six million soldiers and nearly 100 battle hardened and well
equipped divisions; yet, by 1950, the Army's number of personnel was less than
600,000 soldiers that were organized to make up ten poorly trained and inadequately
equipped divisions.
In 1949, despite knowledge of a North Korean military build up, the United States
withdrew its two Army divisions stationed in South Korea because the Korean
peninsula was outside of the United States strategic interest in the Far East. After
WWII, the United States forces were in poor condition to fight a limited conventional
war against a well trained, organized, and equipped North Korean Peoples Army
(NKPA). The United States had ten divisions and eleven separate regiments on
active duty at the start of the Korean War. General MacArthur, the Commander In
Chief Far East (CINCFE), had only four divisions from the Eighth United States Army
(of which three were understrength) on occupational duty in Japan readily available
in response to the North Korean invasion. Initially, General MacArthur's forces were
inadequately structured, equipped, and prepared to fight a limited conventional war
in Korea. Many senior military leaders believed that the WWII force reduction had left
the United States military a hollow shell which lacked depth.
The North Koreans structured their forces to achieve an overwhelming offensive
capability prior to their 25 June 1950 invasion of South Korea. Before attacking
across the 38th Parallel, intelligence confirmed (through North Korean enemy
prisoners of war [EPW] reports) that the NKPA could field an Army of eight divisions
(11,000 personnel each at full strength), two divisions at half strength, a separate
infantry regiment, a motorcycle reconnaissance regiment, an armored brigade with
100 to 150 (Soviet) T-34 Tanks, and five brigades of border constabulary forces to
make a combined force of 135,000. 2 One third of the NKPA were battle hardened
veterans from WWII or the Chinese Civil War (CCW). The North Korean forces had a
remarkable force structure that resembled the Russian divisions of WWII. Its combat
divisions had adequate combined arms teams, numerous soldiers supported by 122mm howitzers, 76-mm howitzers, 45-mm antitank guns, and large amounts
3
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 3 of 16 )
of supporting weapons and mortars. The North Koreans ensured that their planning,
preparation, and force structure was superior to that of the Republic of Korea and
United States before they attacked across the 38th parallel. Once the NKPA invaded
South Korea, the United States, acting as an agent for the United Nations,
overestimated its forces capability to repel the NKPA from South Korea. After the
United States failed during its initial attempt to repel the North Koreans from South
Korea, it restructured its forces to conduct a surprise joint military operation at Inchon
that would lead to the defeat of the NKPA.
THESIS
During the initial phase of the Korean War, the United States had problems with its
force structure. This caused the United States forces to fail as they tried to repel the
NKPA from South Korea. General MacArthur tailored his forces to conduct a surprise
joint amphibious operation that was designed to take the offensive initiative from the
NKPA. Operation CHROMITE (Operation Plan 100-B) was a brilliant joint military
operation which allowed the United States to defeat the North Korean center of
gravity (NKPA). This joint military operation divided the North Korean ground forces,
it cut their main supply routes, and disrupted their command, control, and
communications. Operation CHROMITE demoralized the NKPA and allowed
General MacArthur's forces to go on the offensive. This paper will analyze specific
problems with the United States force structure before it conducted Operation
CHROMITE. It will analyze Operation CHROMITE'S planning, preparation, and
execution, and will review lessons learned that are invaluable to planners of future
joint military operations.
THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN KOREA
"War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the
road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied." 4 (SUN TZU)
After Japan's defeat in 1945, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to occupy
the Korean peninsula on opposing sides of the 38th Parallel. Once the post WWII
occupation forces withdrew from the Korean peninsula, the North Koreans had
hopes of obtaining their national strategic objective of unifying the Korean peninsula
under its Communist government. To achieve the North Korean national strategic
objective, the NKPA would have to obtain their major operational objectives of
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 4 of 16 )
seizing Seoul, Kimpo Airfield, and defeat of the Republic of Korea's (ROK) Army.
The NKPA also would have to resist any external attempt to reestablish the 38th
Parallel.
During the post WWII years, the United States focused on the Cold War threat that
remained in Europe. Although it had one combat division, two infantry regiments,
and a constabulary force in Europe, the majority of Americans forward-deployed
troops, resources, and equipment were on station in Japan. By June of 1950, the
United States had serious problems with its force structure that came as a result of
post -WWII force reductions and budget cuts. In June of 1950, the Eighth United
States Army, on occupational duty in Japan, was the United States major combat
force in the Far East. Three of the Eighth United States Army's four divisions were
severely below their authorized peacetime strength of 12,500; which, in itself, was 66
percent of their authorized war time strength of 18,900. 5 The Eighth United States
Army combat forces did not have adequate combined arms teams consisting of
infantry, combat engineers, artillery, armor, and close air support. Although before
the Korean War the Eighth United States Army was severely understrength,
inadequately trained, and poorly equipped, it would soon face the battle hardened
NKPA.
By June 1947, the United States Air Force was reduced from 218 groups to 38
groups, and of these, only 11 were combat ready. The Air Force had 48 wings
instead of its authorized 55 wings and only nine wings were in the Far East. The Air
Force was severely short on attack and close air support planes that supported
ground units. 6 In 1950, the Far East Air Force was structured primarily in the
defense of Japan. LTG Stratemeyer, the commander of the Far East Air Force had a
total of 1,172 aircraft under his control; and only 553 of these aircraft were in combat
units. The Air Force had insufficient air component commands in support of ground
combat units, and its training bases, support facilities, and communications were
inadequate for combat operations. 7 There was very little coordination and training
between air and ground units.
After WWII, the United States Navy was reduced from 3.3 million to 429,000 sailors,
and its Marine Corps was reduced from 480,000 to 86,000 Marines. 8 Although the
United States Navy suffered from force reductions and had budget problems, the
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
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North Koreans did not have naval forces capable of challenging the Far East Navy.
The Far East Navy was structured and positioned around Japan. Although it was
never seriously challenged by the North Koreans, it had adequate cruisers, destroyer
divisions, and the 7th Fleet had the aircraft carrier Valley Forge. Its units eventually
formed a combined task force which operated in Korean waters providing coastal
gunfire support, carrier air strike capability, logistics, and a transportation group to
project the invasion force for Operation CHROMITE. The Navy would eventually
prove its versatility, flexibility, and power projection capability during the execution
stage of the Inchon landing.
Before attacking across the 38th Parallel, the factors of space, time, and force were
major considerations for the North Korean strategic planners. On 25 June 1950, the
North Koreans invaded South Korea in numerous areas with speed, extreme
violence, and overwhelming force (See map one). The North Korean attack achieved
surprise on its operational objectives of seizing Seoul, Kimpo Airfield, Inchon,
Ch'unch'on, Samch'ok, Suwon, and the Suwon Airfield because it was extremely well
planned and executed. The NKPA structured their forces to concentrate on the
South Korean COG (the ROK Army), mass fires, secure its flanks, conduct an
amphibious landing, mingle with civilian refugees as they infiltrated, disrupt its
enemy's command, control & communications, and neutralize enemy defensive
positions. Their movement and maneuver supported by T-34 (Soviet) Tanks from
Kaesong to Chorwon was well timed, phased, and synchronized. The North Korean
strategic leaders maintained the offensive initiative by exploiting the success of its
initial assault force. The NKPA took advantage of the geography of the Korean
peninsula by launching their main assault force down an axis of advance that led
them down the Chorwon Valley and through the Uijonbu Corridor which led them
toward Seoul.
The South Korean Army was no match for the superior NKPA. The North Korean
attack is a good example of the principles of surprise, security, maneuver, mass,
offensive, objective, and an economy of force. This attack was a brilliant use of the
principle of surprise because the NKPA struck its enemy at a time and in places that
they were unprepared to defend. The eight division (95,000) ROK Army advised by
the United States Korean military Advisory Group ( 500 American officer and soldier
advisors [KMAG] under the command of Brigadier General William L. Roberts) was
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 6 of 16 )
inadequately trained, equipped, and structured. The ROK Army had no tanks, very
few antitank weapons, and no heavy artillery.9 The NKPA quickly defeated the ROK
Army and concentrated its forces on Seoul. The North Korean planners did a good
job developing a centralized direction of attack with a decentralized level of
execution. The NKPA attacked across the Han River then advanced southeast
toward Taejon, Taegu, and Pusan (See map two).
The United Nations (UN) Security Council convened the same day and requested
that the NKPA cease fire and withdraw their forces back North across the 38th
Parallel. Once the North Koreans refused the demands of the United Nations
Security Council, its members were called on to render support to the Republic of
Korea. President Truman committed United States Army (communication and
service support), Air, and Naval forces hoping that it would help the South Koreans
delay the rapid advance of the North Koreans. After General MacArthur conducted a
personal reconnaissance of Korea, he sent the following message to Washington:
"The only assurance for holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the
lost ground, is through the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces into the Korean
battle area. To continue to utilize the forces of our Air and Navy without an effective
ground element cannot be decisive." 10
Although General MacArthur's forces had air superiority and control of the sea, he
knew that his air and naval forces could not win the war alone because they could
not defeat the North Korean COG, the NKPA. The factor of time was critical for the
North Koreans because its number of troops and tanks were reduced by numerous
days of combat. The North Korean lines of communications grew longer as the
NKPA drove deeper into South Korea.
TASK FORCE SMITH
"No commander likes to commit troops piecemeal, and I'm no exception." 11
(Major General William Dean, CG, 24th Infantry Division)
Upon receiving Presidential approval to commit U.S. ground troops to South Korea,
General MacArthur ordered a makeshift task force to Korea to make contact and
delay or halt the NKPA's advance as far North on the peninsula as possible. Task
Force Smith concept of operation was to fight a delaying action halting the NKPA
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 7 of 16 )
north of Osan until the CINCH, could get more troops to Korea. This task force,
under the command of LTC Charles B. Smith, was not prepared to fight a major
operation because it lacked the adequate force structure, was insufficiently trained,
had no tanks, had small numbers of antitank weapons, had insufficient artillery
support, insufficient ammunition, weak communications, and had no antitank mines
or close air support to delay the rapidly advancing NKPA. Task Force Smith would
face more than a hundred times as many enemy troops, who were adequately
trained, battle hardened, and well equipped with T-34 (Soviet) Tanks. The rapid
deployment of this piecemeal task force is a good example of the poor condition of
the United States military and its force structure during the initial stage of the Korean
War. The NKPA concentrated its forces and used a mass of fire power,
synchronization, economy of force, and a unity of effort forcing the Americans to
withdraw under heavy enemy fire leaving its wounded, dead, and weapons. The
NKPA enveloped the over confident Task Force Smith, forcing it to withdraw toward
Pusan in order to avoid being completely annihilated. (See map three)
THE PUSAN PERIMETER
"The fighting forces must be destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a condition
that they can no longer carry on the fight. Whenever we use the phrase 'destruction
of enemy's forces' this alone is what we mean." 12 (Clausewitz)
The North Koreans took advantage of the factor of space during their attack by
exploiting the narrow size of the peninsula through operational movement and
maneuver. They took advantage of their geostrategic position by establishing a much
needed base of operations in Seoul. By August 1950, the United States and
Republic of Korea Armies' had been pushed back into a small corner known as the
Pusan perimeter. "They had lost mountains of equipment and thousands of men.
Staggering back into the small remaining toehold at the corner of the peninsula, the
fighting men were exhausted, dispirited, and bitter." 13 They were forced to trade
space for time to avoid being annihilated before completing the CINCFE buildup on
the Korean peninsula. The North Koreans were in a desperate race against time to
defeat Far East troops inside the Pusan perimeter before the United States could get
more troops, resources, weapons, and equipment to Korea.
Although the North Koreans had extended lines of operations, lengthy lines of
communications, and lesser numbers of troops, it maintained the offensive against
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 8 of 16 )
the CINCFE's less experienced and, by now, battle weary and demoralized forces. In
August I950, the CINCFE had about of I40,000 troops within the Pusan perimeter.
The North Koreans combat troops were down to an estimated 70,000 with less than
half of its original armor strength (50 T-34 Tanks). In September 1950, General
MacArthur had about 180,000 troops with nearly 500 tanks that were stalemated
against the NKPA within the Pusan Perimeter. 14 Although the CINCFE had more
troops, air superiority, and command of the seas, his forces could not repel the
NKPA from south of the 38th Parallel.
THE PLANNING FOR OPERATION CHROMITE
"Could I...cut those lines, then envelop and destroy the enemy's main force...?" 15
(General Douglas MacArthur)
On 29 June I950, General MacArthur made an assessment while conducting an
aerial reconnaissance of Korea, that the only way to counter the NKPA offensive was
to conduct a joint amphibious operation at Inchon. The CINCFE knew that the North
Koreans were vulnerable in their rear because most of their warfighting forces were
concentrated around the Pusan perimeter. General MacArthur knew that his forces
had a unique opportunity to attack the enemy's critical weakness, its and lines of
communications. The Joint Strategic Plans and Operation Group (JSPOG), Far East
Command initially planned on conducting an amphibious landing code named
Operation BLUEHEARTS on 22 July I950. This plan consisted of landing the United
States 15t Cavalry Division in the rear of the NKPA to cut their lines of
communications, and disrupt its command, control, logistics, and seize Seoul.
General MacArthur believed that this amphibious operation was the only way to
defeat and repel the NKPA from South Korea. Operation BLUEHEARTS was
cancelled almost immediately because the forces allocated for this amphibious
operation were needed to stop the southward drive of the NKPA. If the CINCFE had
any hope of conducting an amphibious operation at Inchon, he would have to
carefully restructure his forces to avoid being annihilated by the NKPA inside the
Pusan perimeter. Before General McArthur's forces were backed up into the Pusan
perimeter they could trade space for time, but by this stage of the war, his forces had
run out of space and there was no further time to lose. General MacArthur
considered conducting a risky joint amphibious operation at a time when General
Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed that major
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 9 of 16 )
amphibious operations had no future in modern warfare. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) were more concerned with the risk of Operation CHROMITE than the unique
opportunity that it offered the CINCFE to attack the NKPA with overwhelming force,
and demoralize them at one of the most critical points of the entire war. The location
that the CINCFE chose for conducting a joint amphibious operation was full of
controversy and was opposed by the Navy because of its difficult tidal conditions.
The Navy favored an amphibious landing at Kunsan but the CINCFE did not believe
that it would cut the North Korean's lines of communications. General MacArthur's
theory of victory was to conduct a surprise joint amphibious landing in the enemy's
rear at Inchon simultaneous with an attack out of the Pusan perimeter. These attacks
were expected to deliver both an indirect and direct decisive blow to the North
Korean COG (NKPA). General MacArthur also had to persuade General J. Lawton
Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, the Chief of Naval
Operations of the validity of conducting such a risky joint amphibious operation.
Faced with major opposition about Operation CHROMITE, in a speech in Tokyo,
Japan, General MacArthur won the support of the JCS:
"Only the capture of Inchon and Seoul with it would...cut the enemy's supply line
and seal off the entire southern peninsula...Cutting the enemy's supply lines from
Seoul obviously could not seal off the entire southern peninsula." 16
Before approval by the JCS, General MacArthur's JSPOG had courses of action
prepared for Operation CHROMITE. The first course of action was Operation Plan
I00-B, which called for an amphibious landing in September at Inchon, on the west
coast. The second course of action was Operation Plan 100-C, which called for an
amphibious landing at Kunsan on the west coast. The third coarse of action was
Operation Plan 100-D, which called for an amphibious landing near Chumunjin-up on
the east coast. 17 General MacArthur continued to favor his initial idea of an
amphibious landing at Inchon, OPLAN 100-B. He also would have a simultaneous
attack by the Eighth United States Army in an attempt to break out of the Pusan
perimeter.
The CINCFE knew that conducting Operation CHROMITE was very risky, but had a
"5000-to-1" chance of successfully seizing the initiative from the NKPA if all went as
planned. The JSPOG had to conduct a very detailed mission analysis if Operation
CHROMITE was to be a success because Inchon was divided into an outer harbor
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 10 of 16 )
and an inner one created by the small Islands of Wolmi-do. Operation CHROMITE
had to be well planned and synchronized to achieve success because its forces
were to seize the port of Inchon, Kimpo airfield, and seize and occupy Seoul. Further
it had to facilitate simultaneous attacks between X Corps and the Eighth United
States Army from the Pusan perimeter. The landing on the Island of Wolmi-do was
scheduled for 0630 hours on D-Day (15 September). The JSPOG decided that once
Wolmi-do was seized by friendly forces, the main landing would occur eleven hours
later that evening during the next high tide. 18
THE PREPARATION FOR OPERATION CHROMITE
"There is no one but yourself to keep your back door open. You can live without
food, but you cannot last long with out ammunition." 19 (LTG Walton H. Walker,
Korea, I950)
On 12 August I950, the Far East Command (FECOM) issued Operation Plan 100-B,
Operation CHROMITE. It identified Inchon and Seoul as the objectives to be
attacked by the amphibious invasion force. The CINCFE had to tailor his forces to
conduct an amphibious landing at Inchon in conjunction with an enveloping attack by
the Eighth United States Army out of the Pusan perimeter. General McArthur
selected 15 September I950 as D-Day because a favorable high tide was scheduled
and would give the Far East forces at least 31.2 feet of water allowing naval vessels
to put the assault force on shore. Maximum tidal conditions would not come again
until 27 September 1950. 20 Naval craft needed a minimum of 23 feet of tide to clear
mud flats and reach their landing sites.
Time was a critical factor for the CINCFE forces by August 1950, therefore the
CINCFE had to quickly restructure his forces to achieve surprise, mass, versatility,
flexibility, and a economy of force against the NKPA critical weakness (lines of
communications). The Navy's seventh fleet was restructured for Operation
CHROMITE to form Joint Task Force 7 (JTF-7) with Admiral Stuble as its
commander. The CINCFE expected JTF-7 to conduct a naval blockade along the
west coast of Korea, and be prepared to conduct pre D-Day operations including pre
D-Day shore bombardments. D-day would commence with an amphibious assault to
seize beachheads in the Inchon joint area of operations, provide carrier air support,
conduct coastal gun fire support as needed, and transport troops and logistics. 21
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 11 of 16 )
General McArthur requested approval for the activation of X Corps Headquarters as
the primary invasion force for Operation CHROMITE. GHQ 1-EC General Order 24
was issued on 26 August 1950 activating the invasion corps. The CINCFE selected
MG Almond, his Chief of Staff to command the newly activated Corps. General
McArthur believed that surprising the NKPA from the rear would lead to a quick and
decisive victory and that the war would be terminated. General MacArthur was very
decisive about his intention for JTF-7 during Operation CHROMITE. "Inchon will
succeed", he said, "...the capture of that port would save 100,000 lives...We shall
land at Inchon and I shall crush them." 22 General Almond could then return to his
position as the FECOM Chief of Staff. Upon the seizure of Seoul, X Corps would be
the anvil against the force of the hammer of the Eighth United States Army's attack
out of the Pusan perimeter. MG Almond's invasion force was made up of the 1st
Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division from the Eighth United States Army.
These forces offered the JTF-7 Commander great versatility and flexibility because
during the amphibious assault stage, the 1st Marine Division would be under the
control of the Landing Force Commander. Upon a successful landing, the Ist Marine
Division would be returned to the control of the X Corps Commander.
Operational intelligence about the enemy in the Inchon, Seoul, and Kimpo Airfield
area was critical before committing JTF-7 forces against the battle hardened NKPA.
The JTF-7 intelligence estimate provided by the X Corps G-2 placed the enemy's
troop strength at approximately 5,000 in Seoul, about 1000 in Inchon, and about 500
around Kimpo. 23 During this major operation, the JSPOG planned on surprising
enemy forces by attacking them with massive amounts of ground forces from X
Corps (70,000) concentrating on enemy forces around Inchon and Seoul. Kimpo
Airfield was a decisive point because it was South Korea's largest airfield and would
provide a future support base for Far East forces.
THE EXECUTION OF OPERATION CHROMITE
"Take him unaware by surprise attacks where he is unprepared." 24 (SUN TZU)
JTF-7 initiated operational fires on 4 September 1950 to isolate the joint area of
operations
for
Operation
CHROMITE.
These
fires
included
an
intensive
bombardment on 10 September to reduce enemy artillery around the Inchon Harbor.
On D-2 and D-1 (13-14 September) the Naval Gun Fire Support Group bombarded
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 12 of 16 )
the Island of Wolmi-Do. JTF-7 successfully carried out a planned operational
deception on the night of I2-I3 September to maintain an illusion of the location of the
main assault force's amphibious landing. This deception was conducted at Kunsan
by U.S. Special Operation forces and British Royal Marine Commandos.
JTF-7 Advance Attack Group began transporting Marines to their landing positions
on Green Beach at 0200 hours on 15 September. The Marines quickly seized the
Islands of Wolmi-Do and So Wolmi-Do by 0750 hours on 15 September. The initial
stage of Operation CHROMITE was highly successful because JTF-7 forces had
obtained a foothold in preparation for the invasion of Red and Blue Beaches. The
Far East forces exploited the initial attack force successes by landing Marines
simultaneously during the next high tide on Red and Blue Beaches. They were met
by very little resistance from the NKPA, as predicted by the JTF-7 intelligence
estimate. Amazingly, within 24 hours of the first landing, JTF-7 forces had seized
and isolated critical terrain in the Inchon joint area of operation preventing the enemy
from reinforcing it with soldiers from the Pusan perimeter. (See Map four)
Securing the Islands of Wolmi-Do and So Wolmi-Do cut the North Korean lines of
communications from Inchon to Seoul. Securing these operational objectives was
critical to the Far East forces because it attacked the North Korean's most important
critical weakness (LOC) that supported their concentration of the Pusan perimeter.
The North Korean soldiers in the Inchon area were surprised and shocked by JTF-7
ability to rapidly project combat power from the sea. The next stage of Operation
CHROMITE was for JTF-7 forces to seize and isolate Kimpo Airfield. This was one of
the Far East forces major objectives because its occupation was critical to the defeat
of the NKPA. On 16-17 September, JTF-7 forces occupied forward positions
securing the Seoul highway West of Ascom City, and on 17 September, positions on
the edge of Kimpo Airfield were secured. On 18 September, they successfully seized
that major objective, to the surprise of North Korean soldiers. The capture of this
hard surface airfield greatly enhanced the CINCFE air power capability to disrupt the
North Korean's lines of operations."The seizure of Kimpo Airfield also greatly
enhanced the United Nations air operations during its subsequence attacks on Seoul
and the Eighth United States Army's attack out of the Pusan perimeter.
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 13 of 16 )
JTF-7 planned to concentrate its forces in the Inchon joint area of operations as soon
as possible, therefore on I6-I7 September the X Corps landed its 7 Infantry Division
to block the escape route of the NKPA which fought along the Naktong River. 27 The
brilliant planning and execution of the initial stages of Operation CHROMITE
provided hope for the CINCFE forces, because for the first time during the Korean
War, the Far East forces achieved operational success against the NKPA. The
CINCFE did an excellent job achieving the principle of surprise, maneuvering his
forces to put the enemy in a position of disadvantage, seizing and exploiting the
offensive, massing his forces to gain desired results, securing his forces, and
achieving an economy of force by allocating combat power to decisive points in the
joint area of operations.
The most important thing about the Inchon-Seoul victory is that it saved thousands of
lives. By surprising the North Koreans from the rear, the Far East forces had limited
their losses to 3,500 casualties, which is considerably low when compared to those
that might have occurred from a frontal attack against the NKPA. General
MacArthur's forces demoralized the NKPA by destroying large amounts of
equipment, killing 14,000 of its soldiers, and capturing a total of 7,000 enemy
prisoners of war. 28 The in-depth planning and preparation for Operation
CHROMITE gave the CINCFE forces the offensive initiative allowing them to execute
an attack that led to the defeat of the NKPA and the recovery of the 38th Parallel.
Although very risky, Far East forces executed a well synchronized attack conducted
in accordance with Operation Plan 100-B. They took advantage of space, time, and
force, and employed operational intelligence, operational fires, operational
maneuver, and deception that allowed them to concentrate their forces against the
NKPA's critical weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The success of JTF-7 proved the
validity of the CINCFE's decision to tailor his forces to provide him with flexibility and
versatility during Operation CHROMITE. This major defeat of enemy forces enabled
the Far East forces to break out of the Pusan perimeter and eventually defeat the
NKPA.
CONCLUSION AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
"The history of war proves that nine out ten times an army has been destroyed
because its supply lines have been cut off..." 29 (General Douglas MacArthur)
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 14 of 16 )
A thorough understanding of the problems that the United States had with its forces
during the initial stage of the Korean War are critical to a discussion of lessons
learned. The United States planning, preparation, and execution of Operation
CHROMITE also provide valuable lessons learned and serve as a model for future
joint military operations.
During the initial stage of the Korean War, the United States forces were
inadequately structured, equipped, and trained for numerous days of combat
operations. Once the United States forces were deployed in an attempt to delay the
NKPA, they were defeated because the North Koreans had established the offensive
momentum. Although the CINCFE had more forces inside of the Pusan perimeter
than the North Koreans, they were unable to defeat or repel the NKPA from South
Korea. It is critical to maintain adequate, well-trained forces capable of providing a
rapid response to an enemy's challenge. Joint military operations offer a commander
the necessary versatility and flexibility that is needed during combat operations.
During the initial stage of the Korean War, the United States conducted inadequate
planning and preparation before committing its forces against a well prepared,
equipped, and battle hardened NKPA. Upon North Korea's initial defeat of the Far
East forces, the FECOM staff conducted the thorough planning and preparation
necessary to execute a major joint military operation. During Operation CHROMITE,
the CINCFE forces were synchronized throughout the entire operation to ensure that
follow on forces exploited the success of its initial attack forces. Before committing
forces and resources to combat, a detailed mission analysis must be conducted to
obtain the best employment of troops, and ensure that operations are synchronized
to prevent the loss of lives and equipment.
The CINCFE relied on surprise during Operation CHROMITE to counter the North
Koreans offensive. The North Koreans under estimated the power projection
capability of the United States. During combat operations, a commander must never
be surprised or underestimate the power projection capability of his enemy. The size
of the joint area of operations must be analyzed and forces structured to prevent the
enemy from freely projecting his combat power from air, land, or sea.
During the initial phase of Operation CHROMITE, operational fires were invaluable to
the success of Far East forces securing the Inchon Harbor. Air strikes, combined
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 15 of 16 )
with naval gun fire reduced enemy strong points and artillery that threatened Far
East forces in the Inchon joint area of operations. During Operation CHROMITE, the
United States Navy used a combination of air, destroyers, cruisers, and battleships
with 16-inch guns. During future Joint amphibious operations, a similar combination
of weapon systems will be needed to provide operational fires and naval gun fire
support in order to shape the battlespace to meet the operational needs of the
commander.
Operational
intelligence
during
Operation
CHROMITE
enabled
the
JTF-7
commander to adequately match his forces against the enemy in the Inchon and
Seoul joint area of operations. Accurate information about enemy forces is critical to
commanders at all levels and ensures that friendly operations are directed against
enemy critical strengths and vulnerabilities, and must importantly, their strategic and
operational centers of gravity.
Operation OVERLORD (the United Nations invasion of France) and Operation
CHROMITE proved that the concept of a Supreme Allied Commander is very
valuable for a clear unity of command. During coalition warfare a Supreme Allied
Commander is necessary for a clear command and control structure.
During Operation CHROMITE, JTF-7 had a clear command structure which gave the
CINCFE freedom of action throughout the duration of the operation. During joint
military operations a joint force commander is needed to give the CINC freedom of
action throughout the theater of operations.
Operation CHROMITE was very complex involving multiple stages, each of which
caused the CINCFE and the JTF-7 commander to accept a high level of risk. In this
operation, risk was necessary to enable Far East forces to cut the North Koreans
lines of communications. During joint military operations, commanders at all levels
need to accept the amount of risk necessary to attack the enemy's critical
weaknesses or COG.
Operation CHROMITE was a brilliant combined joint military operation that surprised
the North Koreans and eventually led to the recovery of Seoul and relief of United
Nations forces breaking out of the Pusan perimeter. This joint military operation
displayed surprise, a unity of effort, a mass of fire power, flexibility, synchronization,
Eric D. Sweeney, The United Nations landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite
( 16 of 16 )
depth, versatility, and an economy of force enabling the attacking forces to obtain
their operational objectives.
"The question now arises how success can be made likely. One way...is to choose
objectives that will incidentally bring about the enemy's collapse-the destruction of
his armed forces..." 30 (Clausewitz)
MAP 1 The North Korean Invasion
Uijongbu
THE NORTH KOREANS
CROSS THE HAN
28 June-4 July 1950
I I I Hi I II II
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Axis 0" N.K ir-ACX
levdtiors in rrs'S'S
5 MILES
KILOMETERS
D.ffo/mes ,Jr.
MAP 2
Xffal-
.MAP3
II
THE INCH'ON LANDING
15-16 Senfember 1950
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MAP 4
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