National identity in border regions –
The causal effect of homogenization policies in
Alsace-Lorraine∗
(VERY PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE,
PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE!)
Sirus Dehdari†
Stockholm University
Kai Gehring‡
University of Zurich
February 24, 2016
∗
We thank Alberto Alesina, Eric Chaney, Melissa Dell, Vera Eichenauer, Andreas
Fuchs, Nathan Lane, Horacio Larreguy, Per Petterson-Lidbom, Torsten Persson, Stelios
Michalopolous, David Strömberg, and seminar/conference participants at the ETH Zurich,
Hannover University, Harvard University, Heidelberg University and Stockholm University
for feedback and great suggestions.
†
[email protected]
‡
[email protected]
1
Abstract:
We use a spatial regression discontinuity design to derive the causal effect of homogenization policies, first by the Germans and then by the French national government, on national identity in Eastern France. Our identification strategy relies
on the quasi-exogenous historical division of Alsace and Lorraine by the Germans
in 1870/71. The reason for this locally random nature of the border were disagreements in the German leadership, in particular between Chancellor Bismarck and
army leader von Moltke, on how far the new border should reach into France. Our
results document persistently lower national identity, exemplified in higher support
for the European Union in two crucial referenda. The results remain stable and
unaffected when focusing on a subsample, controlling for distance to major cities
and neighbor countries, excluding historically German speaking communes and potential outliers, and choosing different bandwidths. We provide further evidence
based on surveys and historical data which support our interpretation of this result
as a sign of lower national identity.
Keywords: National identity, homogenization policies, Alsace-Lorraine
JEL: H77, F50, Z10
2
1
Introduction
While economists have mostly disregarded national identity as a topic of
only minor interest, the emergence of secessionist movements all over Europe signals its importance. The relative importance of regional compared
to national identity seems to fuel separatism in regions as different as Catalonia, Belgium, and Scotland. Even more obviously this is the case in
Africa or the Middle East, where arbitrarily determined national borders or
a general lack of common national identity frequently leads to often violent
struggles for autonomy.1 At the same time, there are many other examples
of formerly autonomous duchies or kingdoms in, for example, Poland, Germany or France, where we do not observe any such separatist movements.
We argue that the relative importance and strength of regional compared
to national identity, and the homogenization policies used when integrating
new regions into an existing state can help to explain this phenomenon.
Alesina and Reich (2014) emphasize the importance of homogenization
policies that each state needs to form a national identity strong enough
to allow the imposition of functioning common policies and institutions.
The stability and development of nations today can thus at least partly
be attributed to the selection and success of such homogenization policies.2
Both Thaler (2001) and Carrol (2013) highlight that border regions and
populations are particularly well suited to study the building of nations
and the creation of group identities. Still, the lack of a counter-factual
1
See for example Jega (2000), for the importance of identities in explaining the legitimacy problems many African states face when trying to establish and maintain economic
and political institutions.
2
They argue that ”[in 1880,] policies of homogenization were, in part, motivated by
concerns of secession” and distinguish between soft and hard homogenization policies. As
an example, the historian Joseph Strayer describes the (apparently successful) efforts of
France’s soft homogenization policies. He notes that ”the Languedoc seemed very much
like Catalonia and very unlike north France, yet it finally became thoroughly French
(Weber 1979, p.100). There are many more recent examples. Demirtepe and Bozbey
(2012) describes the Chinese ’hard’ assimilation policies towards the Uyghur minority.
The main argument brought forward to support these policies is that the Uyghur identity
is a threat to the social and political order in China.
3
due to the lack of variation in the status of the respective regions usually
makes it difficult to assess the causal impact of homogenization. The Basque
country, for example, clearly differs from the rest of Spain in many respects
(e.g. income, see Chaney 2014). Still, almost all border regions have a long
run history that distinguishes them from the rest of their respective nation
in many dimensions, which makes it difficult to identify the appropriate
comparison group.
This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to provide a convincing identification strategy to estimate the causal effects of homogenization
policies on national identity. We make use of a natural historical experiment
and examine the border regions between France and Germany, formerly
known as Alsace-Lorraine, to study the implications of a particular set of
homogenization policies (see for the effect of different policies, cf. AspachsBracons et al. 2008; Fouka 2014, Ortega 2008). Using a spatial RDD design
and communal level data we are able to test a set of several hypothesized
consequences of lacking national identity. First, alienation of citizens can
results in a more skeptical stance towards the central state and lead to a
lower participation in democratic processes, measured via voter turnout.
Moreover, distrust in the state and the established parties associated with
it could be associated with a higher vote shares for extremist parties, in our
case the Front National (for other negative consequences see Fouka (2014)).
Depending on the political, historical and institutional circumstances, this
can result in separatist movements and votes for autonomist parties (cf.
Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014), Van Houten, 2007) for the role of separatist parties). However, less national identity could also ease the transition
and integration into supranational institutions or unions, as it decreases the
perceived costs of weakening the associated nation state and its competences
(cf. Chacha (2013); Jolly (2007)).
The region Alsace-Lorraine is well-suited for this kind of analysis as both
Alsace and Lorraine were integrated into France for more than a century.
4
In 1871 Germany defeated France and annexed most of Alsace and parts of
Lorraine. The treated region, to which we refer as Alsace-Lorraine (AL) in
the rest of the paper, remained a German border region for nearly 50 years,
until it became French again after WW1. Important for us is that historical
evidence strongly suggests that the exact location of this border was locally
random, which enables us to isolate the effects of homogenization in a border
region from possible pre-existing differences between Alsace-Lorraine as a
whole and the rest of France.
Historical evidence suggests that the border was locally random, we can
compare a treatment group to an appropriate counter-factual under a random assignment assumption. The historical reasons for the arbitrary location of the border were the opposing interests between the more cautious
German chancellor Bismarck and his more aggressive military leaders and
Kaiser Wilhelm I. about the exact location of the new border of the Kaiserreich. Bismarck wanted to restrain territorial expansion to the German
speaking parts of Alsace and Lorraine (Lipgens, 1964), while a certain part
of the German intelligentsia and the majority of the military lead by the
influential General Helmuth von Moltke wanted to extend the German territory as far beyond the German (Alemanic-dialect) speaking territories.3
These misaligned interest on the German side and the intense negotiations with the French leader Adolphe Thiers resulted in the compromise
to split Lorraine rather arbitrarily (cf. Förster 1990, Lipgens 1964, Messerschmidt 1975 and Ziekursch 1930). As an example of the nature of these
negotiations, Thiers succeeded in stretching the border a little further by al3
The German general Moltke had from the onset of the war planned to march as far
into France as possible and capture decisive strategic positions (cf. Förster 1990). This
continued when the conditions for the French defeat were negotiated and documented
in the peace treaty on February 26, 1871. In line with certain German intellectuals the
military leadership tried to legitimize territorial gains with social-Darwinistic theories
which regarded states as species struggling for space with other nations (Heffernan, 2001).
Another reason from a military perspective was to weaken the arch-enemy for the plausible
next conflict. This highlights the fact that one side in the internal German negotiations
was trying to push the new border as far into France as possible.
5
lowing the Germans to hold a ”victory parade through the streets of Paris”.
While this obviously over-simplifies the complex historical background and
the negotiation process, most important for us is that the resulting border
can be regarded as exogenously given (at least to our outcome variables), in
particular within Lorraine.4
We demonstrate that there are no significant differences in predetermined factors like ruggedness, elevation and agricultural suitability of
the soil, as well as no differences in potentially confounding factors.
Our results come as a surprise at first sight: While there are substantial autonomy movements in many border regions in Europe, no significant
autonomy movement can be found in Alsace-Lorraine today. Moreover,
we also find no supportive evidence for other hypotheses: There are no
significant differences with regard to polarization, voting preferences, and
voter turnout. Still, the annexation and associated homogenization policies
have created some a long-term change in preferences plausibly related to
differences in national identity. The results robustly show higher support
for the European Union in the formerly annexed region compared to the
rest of France, i.e. a revealed preference towards more integration into a
supra-nationalist institution which attenuates the importance and decisionauthority of its member states and create a European identity. These differences in preferences for international integration show up for the referendum
in 1992, and remain positive in a later referendum in 2005. While the optimal bandwidth is usually above 40 kms, we show coefficients for variable
bandwidths moving as close to the borders as 10km, where we only compare
4
After elections in both French and German-occupied parts of France lead to the antiwar conservative party winning 500 out of 676 seats, their leader Adolphe Thiers negotiated
with Bismarck for 5 days. The exact outcome on the border can sincerly be regarded as exante unpredictable. France managed to keep Belfort in exchange for a humbling German
military parade in Paris. In addition, Thiers supposedly agreed to allow the Germans
keeping larger parts of Lorraine. While Bismarck was willing to hand over Metz, Moltke
and the Kaiser Wilhelm I. refused to return it (Wawro, 2005). ”Bismarck, [...], quite
uncharacteristically wilted under the pressure” (Wawro 2005, p. 305). The northern
border thus rather arbitrarily divides the former duchy of Lorraine in two parts.
6
municipalities which are direct neighbors.
The most obvious pitfall with this result is whether the annexed parts
of Lorraine are simply geographically closer to Germany and would thus,
for instance, profit more from integration. Equally problematic, the former
border could coincide with the existing historical language border which used
to divided the German-dialect from the French speaking parts of the region.
While the first issue should not affect our results if the RDD assumptions
hold, we also control for the distance to Germany and to major cities in
the region like Strabourg. We adress the second concern by geocoding the
historical language border at the communal level from historical documents.
It does not coincide with the administrative border we used for the RD
design, there is, however, a significant discontinuity at the language border.
Still, when we exclude the historically German speaking part and control
for distance to Germany, we continue to find the significant difference in
preferences in the 1992 and 2005 referendum. Homogenization policies seem
to have shaped preferences in the region in way that is still identifiable about
half a century later, but did not result in separatist tendencies.
The rest of the paper further explores this novel results and investigates
its determinants to put them into the perspective of the framework in Alesina
and Reich (2014). Our results also results to the rich literature on the determinants and incentives for regions to unite and separate (Goyal and Staal,
2004 and Alesina et al. 2000) We propose two main historical explanations:
First, after struggling with initial problems of its strict intrusive homogenization policies, France used a combination of soft homogenization policies
and patriotic appeals and managed to integrate the region into its political
and cultural discourse. In fact, there have been strong autonomous movements in the former occupied part of Alsace-Lorraine, both after German
annexation in 1870, and after WW1 when France took the region back. Both
states treated Alsace-Lorraine not as an equal rights member of the respective nation, but rather as kind of a protectorate, which was regarded with
7
suspicion as unreliable and less trustworthy than other regions. However,
regionalist movements and the associated parties after WW1 were often related to Germany. They suffered a devastating blow after Germany’s actions
in WW2. Without credible parties, autonomist sentiments lacked political
expression and dried up (cf., Loughlin 2001 for the importance of parties for
autonomist movements).
In addition, after an at least partly failed strategy to forcefully assimilate the citizens in Alsace-Lorraine, France used strategies which combined
a tough stance on some with softer approaches on other issues. On the one
hand, compulsory schooling was used to create a feeling of national identity
among younger generations. French as a first language was strictly imposed
to ensure everybodys first language in school was French. This supports the
results in Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008) that a common language can be at
the root of the process of identity formation. Using survey data from Catalonia and the Basque Country, where in 1983 the education system became
bilingual, we study how parental choices and schooling interact with each
other and contribute to the development of individual identity. The difference between the reforms implemented in the two Spanish regions is that
whereas in Catalonia the reform was compulsory, in the Basque Country
parents could choose the language used to educate their children. Results
show a significant effect of the compulsory language policy implemented in
Catalonia on identity, whereas the non-compulsory language policy implemented in the Basque Country does not have any effect. In addition, French
bureaucrats send from Paris ensured that administrative procedures were
adapted to the rest of France. On the other hand, allowing the use of German as an optional language in school as well as allowing Alsace-Lorraine
to retain some of their “local laws” curbed the feeling of annexation and
external determination among the region’s citizens.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the historical background of Alsace and Lorraine, while Section 3 puts the study in perspective
8
to the existing literature and derives the hypotheses. Section 4 presents the
data and the empirical strategy, and Section 5 presents results. In Section
6, we discuss potential channels and mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.
2
Historical background
Here, we briefly describe the history of Alsace and Lorraine, starting from
the early medieval period up until the re-annexation by France.
Medieval Alsace and Lorraine
The history of the regions Alsace and Lorraine as autonomous political entities goes as far back as the early 7th century during the Merovingian dynasty,
with the duke of Alsace being appointed by the Merovingian kings. When
the son of Charlemange, Louis the Pious, died, the Treaty of Verdun divided
the once vast Carolingian Empire into three kingdoms, where Lorraine fell
into the middle kingdom, named Middle Francia, while Alsace was assigned
to East Francia. Middle Francia – ruled by Lothair I, grandson of Charlemange – was further divided upon the death of the king, and one of the
late kings three sons, Lothair II, created the Kingdom of Lotharingia, which
now included both Alsace and Lorraine.5 However, Lothair’s inability to
produce a legal heir set the stage for a complete takeover of the Kingdom
of Lotharingia by Charles the Bald, emperor of West Francia, who, by the
Treaty of Meersen 870, agreed to divide the kingdom with the emperor of
East Francia, Louis the German.6 The Duchy of Alsace was now its own
political entity while Lorraine was part of the Duchy of Lotharingia, and
remained a part of this larger duchy until Bruno, duke of Lotharingia, de5
The Kingdom of Lotharingia also comprised of large parts of modern Switzerland and
the Netherlands, as well as all of modern Luxembourg and smaller parts of Germany and
France.
6
When Louis the Pious died his empire was divided among his three sons: Charles the
Bald, Louis the German and Lothair I.
9
cided to divide it into Upper and Lower Lorraine.7 The former comprised
of all of modern Lorraine, while Alsace was in 929 incorporated into the
Duchy of Swabia, which in turn was a part of East Francia. Although these
duchies were not officially independent, the dukes of these regions were the
only effective rulers (Vizetelly, 2009).
French incorporation of Alsace and Lorraine
After the time of the many treaties dividing Western Europe among sons
of deceased kings, the separate duchies of Alsace and Lorraine assumed a
more permanent position as direct, or in some cases indirect, vassals to the
Holy Roman Empire. During this time, the Emperor enjoyed sovereignty
of the regions while the actual administration was in the hands of dukes,
counts or fiscal agents called nuntii camerce (Vizetelly, 2009). In fact, for
long periods some cities and bishoprics, for instance Strasbourg, Metz, Toul,
and Verdun, where more or less completely independent, and after 1542 the
same can be said about the Duchy of Lorraine.8
When France engaged in the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), she first
supported the Swedish king’s campaign in Alsace before directly getting involved, with Alsace being one of the most important battlefields. During
the war, France occupied Lorraine and took control of large parts of Alsace,
and the Swedes ceded their occupied territories in Alsace to the French temporarily under the agreement that these were to be handed over to Bernard
of Weimar, duke of Saxe-Weimar, once the peace would come. The French
recognized Bernard as the duke of Alsace, but he died in 1639 before the
peace. Instead, all of Alsace was ceded to France in the Treaty of Westphalia, with Strasbourg remaining a free city until the late 17th century.
7
The Duchy of Lotharingia is also knows as the Duchy of Lorraine. The use of the
name Lotharingia is more often used to avoid the former duchy being mistaken for the
latter Upper Lorraine, although both names are used. For instance, in Hummer (2006)
the term Lotharingia is used while Vizetelly (2009) refers to it as Lorraine
8
The duchy was considered a protectorate of the Holy Roman emperor and it had to
pay some imperial taxes in return for its independence.
10
Alsace thus became a French province. The treaty, however, did not result
in the same arrangement for Lorraine. While only the bishoprics of Metz,
Verdun and Toul would be recognized as integrated parts of the French
Kingdom, the rest of Lorraine was still occupied by the French Army until
the late 17th century. During the Polish War of Succession (1733-1735),
France once again occupied Lorraine. Louis XV, king of France, appointed
his father-in-law, Stanislas Leczinski, as the duke of Lorraine after the duchy
is given to the French Crown through the Treaty of Vienna (1738). When
Stanislas died in 1767, Louis XV inherited the dukedom and Lorraine was
finally incorporated into the French Kingdom.
Franco-Prussian War and German annexation
At the time of the Franco-Prussian War, Alsace and Lorraine had been
integrated parts of France for more than a century. The Treaty of Versailles
(1871) putting an end to the Franco-Prussian War stipulated that almost all
of Alsace and the eastern part of Lorraine were ceded to the newly created
German Empire. The southern part of the new national border between
France and Germany followed the western border of the former Duchy of
Alsace, while the northern part divided Lorraine in two parts. As we mention
above, the disagreement between Bismarck and the military leaders resulted
in a rather arbitrary division of Lorraine.9
The annexed region was incorporated into the German Empire as the
Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen. In Alsace, the departements already in place
during French rule were converted into the German districts of Oberelsass
and Unterelsass, corresponding to the former (and existing) departements
Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin, respectively. In Lorraine, the district Lothringen
was created by parts of the former departements Moselle and Meurthe, and
corresponds to todays Moselle (see Figure 2). It is important to note that
9
Vizetelly (2009) describes the border dividing Lorraine as q[being] traced in a very arbitrary fashion, in order to give the Germans possession of important strategical positions
and localities which for one or another reason they particularly coveted (p. 10).
11
the annexed region was never recognized as an integrated part of the German
Empire instead it was an imperial territory under the direct authority of
Kaiser Wilhelm I. The region was the common property of the and was not
a worthy member of the decentralized federal state, and had, for instance,
no representatives in the Bundesrat nor the Reichstag (Vajta, 2013).
The inhabitants of the newly annexed region was gradually exposed to
the homogenization policies of their new masters. In order to stamp out any
attachments to France, political organizations and publications were banned
in the Reichsland, and the German state reserved the right to conduct house
searches and to expel agitators. The annexed population were also given the
opportunity to opt for French nationality, in which case they were expelled.
The actual number of people who actually opted for French nationality is
unknown. Vajta (2013) estimates it to about 130,000 in Alsace only, however, it is not clear whether the number of people who initally opted for
French nationality actually left. Vizetelly (2009) writes that “[a]t the outset, vast numbers of the people declared for French nationality, [] But when
the Germans made it known that all persons electing to remain French citizens must leave Alsace-Lorraine, thousands found themselves in positions of
the greatest difficulty.” At the same time, approximately 200,000 Germans
from other parts of the Empire move to the annexed region, and many of
the acquired high positions in the administration of the districts.
The Germans also used education as a way to assimilate the annexed
region. The German language was taught at all schools and French was forbidden to be taught in elementary school, although allowed in the secondary
schools. The university in Strasbourg was reinvented as Kaiser-WilhelmUniversitt, with the aim of promoting and spreading the influence of German
culture, and assimilating the annexed region into the state (Höpel, 2012).
These are some of the homogenization policies conducted by the German
empire during the fourty-eight years of annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. When
France regained control of the lost provinces after the Great War, her own
12
policies were set in place in an attempt to reverse the Germanization process
previously conducted.
French re-annexation and homogenization
By the Treaty of Versailles (1919), the formerly annexed region were returned to France. The families of the Germans who had settled in the region
after 1871 were deported in order to “remove any trace of German influence”
(Carrol and Zanoun, 2011), and all journals written in a “foreign language”
were banned. In addition, the German language was no longer allowed to
be taught in school and German was removed as an official language.10 A
special commission, called commissions de triage, was formed to ascertain
the “Frenchness” of the population in the re-annexed area, which, according
to Carrol and Zanoun (2011) damaged the reputation of the French regime.
In general, the assimilation policies conducted by the French were
harsher than those implemented by the Germans (Anderson, 1972), however, both made a deep impression on the regions population. As the people
of the annexed region felt alienated by the German policies, local parties addressing the issue of autonomy emerged. After re-annexation, these parties
were still active, although in slightly different constellations, and exposed
to French homogenization policies, the strength of these parties increased
rapidly. They were soon joined by pure autonomist parties.11 However, the
autonomist movement lost ground in the early 1930s due to its association
with Germany, and following unintended association with Nazi Germany,
but also by virtue of the softer, and more successful, assimilation policies
set in place by the French government (Goodfellow, 1993). Today, there
exist no autonomist parties, or local parties promoting autonomy.
10
German as a second language was not taught in schools until the early 1950s.
See, for instance, Anderson (1972) or Carrol and Zanoun (2011) for more on how both
German and French assimilation policies affected the population.
11
13
3
Literature and hypothesis
In fact, there exists a huge literature on the importance of building national
identity for the rise of the modern nation state outside economics. John
Stuart Mill already stated that some degree of homogeneity was necessary
as unassimilated democratic states will tend to dissolve into as many democracies as there are nations within them (cited by Connor 2004, p. 35). In
his seminal, though contested work, Gellner and Breuilly (2008) also link
homogenization policies to industrialization. It seems intuitive that in an
industrial society, different ethnicities, cultures and in particular languages
act as barriers that reduce efficiency, as they increase the costs of communication and reaching agreement.
There is thus the need and an economic benefit of establishing a national
identity and some degree of homogenization – in essence a form of standardized and shared set of cultural values. It is commonly assumed that the
only institution which is capable of imposing this set and executing these
policies is the modern state, usually via compulsory education. This is still
relevant in modern states as is shown by Lott (1999). Gellner and Breuilly
(2008) emphasized in particular the establishment of an official language
which is spoken by every member of society. The central role of language
in state formation in Europe can be traced back to Johan Gottfried Herder
(1724-1804), who gave rise to the thought that language formed people’s
mind and was essential to creating a national identity.12 Besides language,
homogenization can also be achieved via the imposition of a state religion,
lowering the costs of travel and exchange via institutions and infrastructure,
via the prohibition of regional cultures or most violently via genocide and
the extermination of certain groups (cf. Tilly, 1975).
12
Compare Fishman (1997), who states that this idea became central to the definition
of nationality and its popular perception. He also describes Herder’s view and its consequences on the behavior of governments who derived from it a need to establish and
impose a common language on their citizens.
14
Conversi (2008, p.1289) describes the process of nation building as one
where ”cultural entrepreneurs aim to unify, standardize and modernize popular culture so that the boundaries of the governed unit can be defined by,
and their constituencies identify with, the ruling elite. Such a top-down
process entailed assimilation and the forced erosion of cultural differences.”
Alesina and Reich (2014) build on these ideas and systematize the incentives
faced by democracies and dictatorships in the choice of such policies. We
are interested in finding an empirical example where we can isolate the long
lasting impact of homogenization policies from the impact of deeply rooted
cultural, or institutional, differences.
France is a particularly well suited place to study homogenization policies and national identity. It is nearly universally recognized to be the
source of nationalism and the attemts of nation building Conversi (2008).
Starting with French absolutism, to the French revolution (cf., Hobsbawm
1990, 1994; Connor (2004)), and Napoleons systematic attempts to enforce
a national identity France can be seen as the prime example to study homogenization and the formation of national identity. These facts help us to
be confident in assuming that the citizens in Alsace-Lorraine differ mostly
from their French non-annexed neighboring departments in that they were
subject to German homogenization policies from 1870-1918, and to French
homogenization policies in their attempts to reintegrate the lost territory
after WW1.
Historical accounts suggest, that already prior to the French-Prussian
war in the 1870s, the French central state had established a certain set of
common values and identity. Thus we can assume that prior to 1870 the
departments to the left and to the right of our historical border were comparable. Moreover, France and Germany did not differ so much in their
choice of methods and approaches to build national identity. Both built on
two pillars of vertical integration: compulsory education and compulsory
military service, which together constituted an alliance of light and power
15
or the mark of true civilization (Ferry 2005, p. 228), Conversi (2008). Thus,
this presents a unique opportunity to isolate the long-run effects of homogenization policies on national identity from the long list of possible other
influencing factors.
The most straightforward possibility to measure differences in national
identity would be a local, geo-cocded survey which elicits these preferences.
Such a survey does not exist yet, and moreover, stated preferences might
be biased and must not necessarily coincide with actual preferences. We
were thus looking for operationalizations of measures for national identity
that reveal preferences. The most direct way to detect a lack of national
identity would be regionalist parties. Due to a variety of reasons, there
are no currently active regionalist parties in Alsace Lorraine today. The
main reasons is that they were all related to Germany or German financing,
which lead to their decline after the role Nazi Germany played in WW2 (cf.,
Loughlin, 2001).
There are various other outcomes associated with homogenization policies and lacking national identity. Firstly, less identification with the nation
state could become apparent via lower voter turnout. As the individual
likelihood to be pivotal for an individual voter is close to zero, the literature
has proposed several explanations for the, from an economic point of view,
surprisingly high turnout in democracies. One of the main is that voting
is perceived as a civic duty, a way to express one’s sense of identification
with and support for the nation state. A second but related hypotheses is
that it could results for more support for parties that reject the values of
the current state and its representatives: In France that would be the Front
National. This second hypotheses might be ambivalent, though. The Front
National also emphasizes certain aspects of the Nation and uses strong appeals to a common identity. Both effects combined might cancel each other
out.
Probably the, after some reflection, most straightforward way to mea-
16
sure differences in national identity takes an indirect approach. Chacha
(2013) recognizes that individuals who have a relatively stronger regional
compared to national identity “are more likely to support European integration because the EU has facilitated regional autonomy and input in EU
policies.” One reason is that “individuals at the regional level more directly
experience EU policies that economically and politically strengthen subnational authorities” (Chacha, 2013).13 This is also visible by the attitudes
of autonomist parties in most European regions. Jolly (2007), p.124) states
that “regionalist parties, such as the Scottish National Party, favor European integration because it creates a more favorable political opportunity
structure for their subnational autonomy movements.”
There are two reasons why the attitude towards EU integration is related to national and regional identity. First, regions were to a larger degree
perceived as autonomous actors on the EU level (Marks et al., 1996). Laffan
(1996) highlights that “[w]hat is striking about regionalist movements is the
extent to which they see European integration as providing a roof or a home
within which to assert ’regional/national identities’ that had been undervalued or trapped inside existing national states.” Secondly, it is obvious that
European integration brings with it a declining importance of the respective
nation member states. The lower the distinct French national identity, the
lower the costs of giving it up partly in favor of a more European identity.
While it is clear that intensive homogenization policies shaped the attitudes and preferences of the generation directly experiencing it, it is less
obvious why we might expect the consequences to persist until today. There
exist so far a limited, but helpful set of economic models about the intergenerational transmission of ethnic and cultural traits (Bisin and Verdier,
2000). We also relate to other examples where historical factors that dont
matter directly any more today, but lead to path dependence and differ13
More specifically, Chacha also distinguishes inclusive regionalists (should be more
likely to support EU integration) and exclusive regionalists (which should be equally or
less likely likely to support EU integration).
17
ential development is Bleakley and Lin (2012). Besley and Reynal-Querol
(2014) document how historical conflict influences trust, ethnic and national
identity today. Closely related is Fouka (2014) who shows negative effects of
forced assimilation on volunteering for army, and on inter-ethnic marriage.
Algan et al. (2013) show that economic incentives do influence the cultural
transmission of values, where they identify cultural background via the origin of names. We examine the persistence of differences in national identity
between one part of a region which belonged to France for over three centuries and another part of the same historical entity which due to historical
circumstances only became French less than a century ago.
4
Data and empirical strategy
In this section, we describe the empirical strategy and the data used to test
the hypotheses mentioned above. Almost all of the analysis will focus on
communal level data, but we will also rely on some large scale surveys at
the départmental level to carve out channels and further details. France is
divided into 22 regions which consist of 96 départments. The départments
are further divided into 323 arrondisements and 1995 cantons. These two
sub-units are of lesser importance, however, and do possess the status of a
legal entity. The smallest unit is the commune (municipality) level, which is
the focus of our analysis. Out of the 3320 communes in Alsace and Lorraine,
we have data on 3143. Using this detailed level data allows us a very precise
estimation.
We make use of geospatial reference data on French communes from
data.gouv.fr , and from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic
Studies (INSEE) we get data on municipality characteristics, such as age
composition and education. Data on electoral results, such as voter turnout
and referendum results, are obtained from the Center for Socio-Political
Data (CDSP). In Table 1, summary statistics are presented for our outcome
18
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for outcome variables and treatment.
Variable
Mean
Std. dev.
Min.
Max.
Treatment
Yes 92
Yes 05
Le Pen 07
Turnout 92
Turnout 05
Turnout 07
0.52
53.91
45.51
15.98
74.40
73.28
86.29
0.50
11.39
9.96
5.36
6.04
6.40
4.16
0.00
0.00
6.67
0.00
52.44
50.79
63.38
1.00
86.25
81.01
55.56
100.00
100.00
100.00
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the treatment variable, share of yes votes in referenda 1992
and 2005, share of votes for Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2007 presidential election (first round),
turnout in 1992, 2005, and 2007.
variables of interest and treatment for our full sample of communes in Alsace
and Lorraine.
4.1
Empirical strategy
A commune located in the region formerly occupied by the German Empire
from 1871 to 1919 is in our empirical framework considered treated, where
the actual treatment consists of having been exposed to both German and
French assimilation policies.14 The treatment variable is a deterministic
function of the geographical location of a commune, with a discontinuity in
treatment at the threshold defined by the former national border. We study
differences in our outcome variables between the treated formerly occupied
area and the part of Lorraine that were never occupied by studying communes close to the former border using a regression discontinuity approach.
Formally, we estimate the coefficients from the following regression model:
yc = α + βT reatmentc + p(distance to borderc ) + z 0c γ + c ,
(1)
where yi is the outcome variable of interest for commune c, T reatmentc is
a dummy taking the value 1 for communes in the formerly occupied region,
14
Being the most recent, we expect the French assimilation policies to have a stronger
impact on present day outcomes.
19
and z c is a vector comprising of distance from commune c to the city of
Metz, city of Strasbourg, city of Nancy, and today’s French-German border.15 The function p(·) adds a function of the distance to the border for
each commune. As suggested by Gelman and Imbens (2014), we include a
linear term for the distance, allowing its coefficient to vary on either side
of the border. In practice, this means that we estimate a local linear regression model according to (1) close to the former border, using a uniform
kernel density function, for different bandwidths.16 In the Online Appendix,
we present estimates of regression models where higher order polynomials
for different bandwidths have been included. The linear term measures the
direct distance from the commune centroid to the former national border.
However, given the two-dimensional nature of the spatial data, two communes could be on the same side and have the same distance to the border,
while being on different latitudinal line. Although their treatment status
are the same, no account is taken for the difference in their geographical location. The inclusion of the four distance measures as controls are intended
to take these spatial differences into account.17
The treatment effect in (1), β, of being located in the formerly occupied
region is given by
β = lim E [yc |xc ] − lim E [yc |xc ] ,
xc →0−
xc →0+
15
(2)
There are no discontinuities at the threshold for any of these distance measures, suggesting that they are orthogonal to our treatment variable. Excluding them from the
regression model for analysis close to the border does not change our estimates notably,
but decreases estimation efficiency.
16
Dell (2010) discuss why a semiparametric approach should be used when the geospatial
data is not precise in terms of geographical location. In our case, we do not have data on
individuals and, for instance, their addresses. Instead, out outcome variables measure the
municipality level aggregate of individual actions, and we approximate their location in
relation to the former border by the distance from the commune centroid.
17
In Dell (2010), a function of the geographical location of the unit of observation
included, with latitude and longitude as main effects as well as their interaction. Including
these to our specification do not change our estimates.
20
where xc is the distance to the border normalized at 0, meaning that the
distance for communes in the treated region is equal to the actual distance, while it is equal to one minues the distance for communes in the
untreated region. Under the assumption of the conditional expectation function, E [yc |xc ], being continuous, the treatment effect is equal to the difference in outcome betweeen communes in the treated region and communes in
the untreated region, at the border. This also means that all other factors
relevant in explaining the outcome are continuous at the former FrenchGerman border. Under this assumption, the untreated communes close to
the border can be treated as controls for their treated counterparts. We test
this assumption using data geographical data on terrain ruggedness, elevation and soil suitability for the production of wheat and potatoes.18 These
variables are described in detail the Online Appendix, and the results of the
tests are presented in Section 5.
Another important assumption for identifying a treatment effect is that
treatment is orthogonal to potential outcomes. In our framework, this translates into the assumption of the former French-German border being exogenously given, at least to our outcomes. In order to answer this question,
one must understand the rationale behind the decisions made by Wilhelm
I, his Chancellor and generals. As mentioned in the introduction, historical
evidence suggests that the border was indeed locally random.
Even in the presence of an exogenously given border, migration after the
German occupation could potentially be a concern. After French annexation, many people migrated from other regions of France into the region, and
the establishment of French schools also contributed to the ”Francophonization” of the area until 1870. This is reassuring as it suggests that prior to
the war against Germany the region did not differ distinctly with regard
to national identity from other parts of France. After German occupation,
there was a large influx of about 200.000 Germans during that time. This
18
Similar pre-treatment variables have been used in for instance Dell (2010).
21
would be problematic if the descendants of these Germans differ significantly
in their preferences today for reasons other then being exposed to French
homogenization policies as part of a newly acquired border region. France,
however, engaged into the deportation of all Germans who had settled in
the region after 1871, so that the majority had to leave the region again.
Thus, this should not contaminate our results.
We first estimate differences in our outcomes for the whole treated and
untreated region. Table 2 shows ordinary least squares estimates of β from
(1), without and with controls.19 For the share of votes for Jean-Marie
Le Pen, and share of yes votes on referenda 1992 and 2005, the signs of
the slope coefficients for the treatment variable all suggest a lower level on
national identity in the treated region. For the share of yes votes in the 1992
referendum, the estimated difference between the treated and the untreated
region is almost 10 percent of the average share of yes votes in the whole
region (specification B2), while the corresponding number for the share of
yes votes in the 2005 referendum is approximately 15 percent (specification
C2). For the share of votes on Front Nationales presidential candidate JeanMarie Le Pen, the lower share of votes in the treated region is 6 percent of
the average vote share, according to specification A2.20
The results for turnout in the referenda and presidential election 2007 are
not as convincing: for 2007 and 2005. we estimate a small but statistically
significant negative difference for the treated region, which becomes insignificant as we add controls (specifications in B and E). Only turnout for 1992
is significant for both specifications with and without controls. However,
these two specifications come with different signs on the estimates and the
19
We have not added any function for the distance to the border for any of the specifications in Table 2.
20
Although the interpretation of the regression coefficient for the treatment variable is
the average difference in percentage points between treated and untreated communes, it
is important to relate them to the average vote share of the whole region. For instance,
a 2 percentage point difference is relatively large if the average vote share is 1, while it
would be considered relatively small when the average vote share is 90 percent.
22
Table 2: OLS estimates.
using whole sample of communes in all
départements in former Alsace and Lorraine. Controls: distance to Germany
(border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy.
Variable
Treatment
Controls
Obs.
Variable
Treatment
Controls
Obs.
Variable
Treatment
Controls
Obs.
A: Le Pen votes, 07
(1)
(2)
-0.691**
-0.969**
(0.236)
(0.450)
No
Yes
3142
3142
B: Turnout, 07
(3)
(4)
-1.412***
0.223
(0.175)
(0.313)
No
Yes
3142
3142
C: Yes votes, 92
(1)
(2)
11.941***
4.865***
(0.473)
(0.789)
No
Yes
3137
3137
D: Turnout, 92
(3)
(4)
-0.652**
2.081***
(0.262)
(0.470)
No
Yes
3137
3137
E: Yes votes, 05
(1)
(2)
6.990***
6.185***
(0.434)
(0.855)
No
Yes
3141
3141
F: Turnout, 05
(3)
(4)
-3.115***
-0.023
(0.276)
(0.470)
No
Yes
3141
3141
Notes: OLS estimates using whole sample of communes in all départements in former Alsace
and Lorraine. Controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy. ’***’, ’**’ and ’*’ indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels, based on Conley standard errors.
more reliable specification with added controls indicates a higher political
participation in the treated region.
Figures 3 to 5 illustrates the election and referendum results as well as
turnout for 2009, 1992 and 2005 respectively. In Figure 4a and 5a, it is
clearly visible that the share of yes votes in the 1992 and 2005 referenda
are higher in the treated region, which is to the right side of the former
French-German border. However, for turnout in these two referenda, there
does not seem to be much of a difference (Figures 4b and 5b). The same
goes for turnout in the 2007 presidential election (Figure 3b) while Figure
3a suggests a slightly lower support for Front National in 2007.
In the next section, estimates from the RD specifications are presented,
23
together with estimated differences in pre-treatment variables and relevant
covariates. We start out by considering the whole former French-German
border dividing Alsace and Lorraine, and then move on to focus on the
border segment separating the treated and the untreated region within the
former duchy of Lorraine. This is partially motivated by potential historical
differences between Alsace and Lorraine, but also, as we will show in the
next section, by differences in relevant factors between treated Alsace and
untreated Lorraine.
5
Results
In our baseline RD estimation, we estimate treatment effects on all our outcomes for bandwidths at 10, 15 and 20 kilometres from the former FrenchGerman border. Table 3 presents estimated coefficients for the treatment
variable in specifications with included controls (for specification without
controls, see Online Appendix). For all presented bandwidths for the referenda results of 1992 and 2005 (Panel C and E), the estimated treatment
effect is positive and statistically significant, ranging from 4.3 percent to 5.5
percent for the 1992 referendum, and from approximately 3 percent to 6.6
percent for the 2005 referendum. However, the treatment does not seem to
affect the share of votes for Jean-Marie Le Pen: the estimated coefficient
for the treatment variable is not statistically significant for any of the three
bandwidths (Panel A). The same can be said about the turnout variables,
we do not find any significant differences in turnout between treated and
untreated communes close to the former national border (Panel B, D and
F).
In addition to bandwidths at 10, 15 and 20 kilometres, we include one
specification using one half of the optimal IK bandwidth, as explained by
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011). For all outcomes, one half of the optimal
bandwidth is larger than the ones we present in the table, suggesting that
24
smaller bandwidths are not necessarily needed, and that a bandwidth of
10 kilometres from the former border is to be considered relatively close.
Using one half of the optimal bandwidth, the treatment effect on votes for
Jean-Marie Le Pen, and turnout for the two referenda and the presidential
election, are now statistically significant. However, these are for very large
bandwidths, where the RD assumption of balanced covariates are less likely
to hold. For the rest of the paper, we only present results for the share of
yes votes in 1992 and 2005 referenda.
Our RD estimations using the whole former French-German border measures a lower level of French national identity in the previously occupied part
of Alsace and Lorraine. Given the RD assumptions, the estimated coefficients are estimates of the effect of being treated, that is, being a commune
exposed to both German and French assimilation policies. As mentioned
above, this hinges on the assumption that the untreated communes can be
viewed as counterfactuals for the treated communes. A potential concern
is that Alsace is, for historical reasons, different form Lorraine, and since a
large segment of the former French-German border coincides with the border between Alsace and Lorraine, one would want to look for discontinuities
in relevant factors at the border. In Table 4, we estimate this potential discontinuity at the border using equation (1), for median income in 2008 and
mean age in 2006 as outcomes. In addition to analysing the whole border,
we restrict the sample of communes to allow for two département-specific
comparisons: one between Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin which is the treated
part of Alsace, and Vosges, in the untreated part of Lorraine, and another
solely within Lorraine, Moselle on one side, and Meurthe et Moselle and
Meuse on the other. For median income and mean age across the whole
border, there does not seem to be a discontinuity at the border, as shown in
Panel A. However, when comparing treated Alsace with untreated Lorraine,
we estimate large and statistically significant differences in median income,
and relatively small statistically significant for mean age, for all bandwidths
25
Table 3: RD results: whole border
Variable
Treatment
Obs.
Dist.
Variable
Treatment
26
Obs.
Dist.
Variable
Treatment
Obs.
Dist.
a
Panel A: Dep. var: % Le Pen votes, 2007
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)a
-0.247
-0.306
-0.506
-2.131***
(0.854)
(0.694)
(0.640)
(0.418)
607
904
1199
3832
10 km
15 km
20 km
75.26 km
Panel B: Dep. var: Turnout, 2007.
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)a
0.442
0.095
0.223
0.067
(0.702)
(0.608)
(0.540)
(0.299)
607
904
1199
4215
10 km
15 km
20 km
86.65 km
Panel C: Dep. var: % Yes votes, 1992
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)a
4.326**
5.482***
5.195***
4.308***
(1.745)
(1.501)
(1.310)
(1.065)
608
905
1200
1958
10 km
15 km
20 km
32.13 km
Panel D: Dep. var: Turnout, 1992
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)a
-0.484
-0.216
-0.514
2.885***
(1.077)
(0.886)
(0.786)
(0.500)
608
905
1200
3329
10 km
15 km
20 km
61.19 km
Panel E: Dep. var: % Yes votes, 2005
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)a
2.990*
3.035**
3.761***
6.578***
(1.742)
(1.471)
(1.335)
(1.072)
607
904
1199
1996
10 km
15 km
20 km
32.62 km
Panel F: Dep. var: Turnout, 2005
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)a
0.255
-0.584
-1.242
-0.338
(0.994)
(0.869)
(0.794)
(0.457)
607
904
1199
4116
10 km
15 km
20 km
83.76 km
Notes: RD estimates using bandwidth of 10, 15, and 20 kilometres from the former French-German border. Controls: distance to Germany
(border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, and distance to Nancy. ’***’, ’**’ and ’*’ indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels, based on Conley standard errors.
Estimates from using one half of the optimal IK bandwidth.
(Panel B). Since factors like income and age could potentially affect voting,
our concern is that the conditional expectation of our outcomes as a function of distance to the former French-German border is not continuous at
the border.
If we instead only focus on the comparison within Lorraine, we see that
the there are no discontinuities at the border. Panel C in Table 4 shows
the estimated difference of median income and mean age when comparing
Moselle, and Meurthe et Moselle and Meuse, with non-significant estimates
for all bandwidths.21 We therefore focus the remaining part of the analysis
on the within-Lorraine comparison.22
Panel A in Table 5 presents estimated treatment effects on share of yes
votes in 1992 and 2005. As with the case of comparisons across the whole
border, the estimated coefficient for the treatment variable is statistically
significant. Furthermore, the magnitude of the estimates are very similar to
those of the estimates for the whole border, with a treatment effect between
7 and 9.5 percent of the mean share of yes votes for all of Alsace and Lorraine
in 1992, while the corresponding numbers for the 2005 referendum are 8.3
and 10.7 percent of the mean. Thus, comparison within the former duchy of
Lorraine gives support to the results obtained in Table 3: there is a negative
treatment effect of exposure to both German and French assimilation policies
on French national identity. This results is robust to comparison at the
former French-German national border within all of Alsace and Lorraine,
but also for a subset of communes only within Lorraine.
Historical evidence concerning the decision-process in defining the border
between the French Empire and the newly created German Empire following
21
In addition to median income and mean age, we also estimate equation (1) using education, and the number of companies per capita as outcome variables, with non-significant
estimates. These results can be found in our Online Appendix.
22
When the sample is restricted to include communes only in Moselle, Meurthe et
Moselle and Meuse, we do not find any statistically significant treatment effects on the
vote share for Jean-Marie Le Pen or turnout for the presidential election in 2007 or 1992
and 2005 referenda. These results can be found in our Online Appendix.
27
Table 4: Covariate balance test
Panel A: Baseline
Variable
Treatment
Obs.
Dist.
28
Variable
Treatment
Obs.
Dist.
Variable
Treatment
Obs.
Dist.
a
Mean age
(6)
(7)
-0.445
-0.678*
(0.455)
(0.396)
905
1200
15 km
20 km
(8)a
-0.761***
(0.276)
2512
42.04 km
(1)
4.627***
(1.135)
196
10 km
Panel B: Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin vs. Vosges
Median income
Mean age
(2)
(3)
(4)a
(5)
(6)
(7)
4.345***
3.843***
4.009***
-1.414*
-1.573**
-1.406**
(0.973)
(0.910)
(0.910)
(0.841)
(0.682)
(0.608)
290
391
374
210
304
406
15 km
20 km
19.3 km
10 km
15 km
20 km
(8)a
-0.932*
(0.561)
504
24.77 km
(1)
0.236
(1.015)
311
10 km
Panel C: Moselle vs. Meurthe et Moselle and Meuse
Median income
Mean age
(2)
(3)
(4)a
(5)
(6)
(7)
0.275
-0.411
0.086
0.059
0.056
-0.085
(0.982)
(0.911)
(0.990)
(0.641)
(0.546)
(0.488)
455
588
387
394
583
744
15 km
20 km
12.56 km
10 km
15 km
20 km
(8)a
0.022
(0.486)
752
20.23 km
(1)
1.176
(0.949)
509
10 km
Median income
(2)
(3)
1.278
0.939
(0.875)
(0.809)
760
1024
15 km
20 km
(4)a
2.159***
(0.699)
1751
33.06 km
(5)
-0.342
(0.540)
608
10 km
Notes: Panel A uses all départements in Alsace and Lorraine, Panel B uses only Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, and Vosges, Panel C uses only Moselle,
Meurthe et Moselle, and Meuse. Controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, and distance to Nancy.
’***’, ’**’ and ’*’ indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on Conley standard errors.
Estimates from using one half of the optimal IK bandwidth.
Table 5: RD results: within Lorraine
Variable
Treatment
Obs.
Dist.
Variable
Treatment
29
Obs.
Dist.
Variable
Treatment
Obs.
Dist.
a
(1)
3.752**
(1.841)
394
10 km
Panel A: Moselle vs. Meurthe et Moselle and Meuse
1992 Referendum
2005 Referendum
(2)
(3)
(4)a
(5)
(6)
(7)
5.026***
4.346***
4.742***
3.810*
3.757**
4.892***
(1.611)
(1.440)
(1.340)
(2.092)
(1.775)
(1.646)
583
744
947
394
583
744
15 km
20 km
26.61 km
10 km
15 km
20 km
(8)a
3.664**
(1.763)
627
16.43 km
(1)
2.636*
(1.512)
584
10 km
Panel B: Language border (Moselle)
1992 Referendum
2005 Referendum
(2)
(3)
(4)a
(5)
(6)
(7)
4.371***
5.858***
4.619***
3.950***
5.338***
5.474***
(1.236)
(1.114)
(1.223)
(1.285)
(1.152)
(1.081)
809
1044
837
587
812
1047
15 km
20 km
15.6 km
10 km
15 km
20 km
(8)a
3.984***
(1.330)
490
7.94 km
Panel C: Moselle vs. Meurthe et Moselle and Meuse (exl. German-speaking communes)
1992 Referendum
2005 Referendum
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)a
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)a
4.126**
5.279***
4.574***
4.430***
3.830*
3.774**
4.817***
3.453*
(1.850)
(1.617)
(1.436)
(1.298)
(2.117)
(1.774)
(1.644)
(2.018)
385
553
684
886
385
553
684
410
10 km
15 km
20 km
30.98 km
10 km
15 km
20 km
10.74 km
Notes: Panel A: discontinuity at former French-German border using communes in Moselle, Meurthe et Moselle, and Meuse. Panel B:
discontinuity at language border within Moselle, Panel C: discontinuity at former French-German border using communes in Moselle, Meurthe
et Moselle, and Meuse, excluding German-dialect speaking communes. ’***’, ’**’ and ’*’ indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, based on Conley standard errors.
Estimates from using one half of the optimal IK bandwidth.
the Franco-Prussian war gives us reason to believe that the assumption of
the border being exogenously given is satisfied. However, it is desirable
to actually empirically test the assumption, preferably with historical data
before or at the time of the occupation. To obtain geocoded detailed data on
historical variables is not an easy task, instead we check for discontinuities in
factors determined before the border was defined, such as terrain roughness,
elevation, and soil suitability for production of potatoes and wheat. For any
of these variables, there is no discontinuity at the former French-German
border, as shown in Table 6. These results give further evidence of the
exogeneity of the border.
Robustness check I: Language border
We mention in Section 4.1 how the former French-German border was exogenously defined and this was motivated by historical evidence of the discussions held by Kaiser Wilhelm I, his army generals and his Chancellor, Otto
von Bismarck. Furthermore, the defined border did not coincide with the
language border separating the French-speaking from the German-dialect
region, which is located to the east of the former national border. However,
in the most southern part of Haut-Rhin, these two borders coincide, and
within Lorraine, the distance between them narrows down to less than 10
kilometres at some locations (Figure 6). If discontinuities in our outcome
variables exists at the language border, our results for all our bandwidths
– even at 10 kilometres – could be contaminated, since the presence of a
discontinuity in relevant factors would effect our outcomes.
The language border divides the département Moselle in the treated part
of Lorraine, depicted in Figure 6. Panel B in Table 5 presents estimated
difference in share of yes votes in 1992 and 2005 referenda.23 It is clear that
there is a discontinuity in both 1992 and 2005, with voters in the German23
The estimated coefficient is not necessarily an estimate of the treatment effect of
belonging to the German-dialect region, since other relevant factors could potentially be
discontinuous at the language border.
30
Table 6: Pre-treatment balance test
Variable
Treatment
Obs.
Dist.
Panel A: Dep. var: Ruggedness
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)a
-0.072
-0.037
0.044
0.183
(0.176)
(0.153)
(0.135)
(0.116)
608
905
1200
1776
10 km
15 km
20 km
28.95 km
31
Variable
Treatment
Obs.
Dist.
a
(1)
40.106
(91.211)
608
10 km
Panel C: Dep. var: Potato
(2)
(3)
19.891
0.635
(79.575)
(69.937)
905
1200
15 km
20 km
(4)a
15.017
(58.649)
1735
28.34 km
(5)
8.567
(8.336)
394
10 km
(5)
17.862
(141.469)
608
10 km
Panel B: Dep. var: Elevation
(6)
(7)
6.731
-0.137
(7.980)
(7.894)
583
744
15 km
20 km
(8)a
-2.180
(7.816)
873
24.22 km
Panel D: Dep. var: Wheat
(6)
(7)
6.473
-20.501
(122.698)
(107.510)
905
1200
15 km
20 km
(8)a
-17.523
(88.601)
1784
29.13 km
Notes: Discontinuity at former French-German border, using communes in Moselle, Meurthe et Moselle, and Meuse. ’***’, ’**’ and ’*’ indicates
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on Conley standard errors.
Estimates from using one half of the optimal IK bandwidth.
dialect region being more EU friendly. All our specifications of the treatment
effect at the former national border includes at least some communes to the
east of the language border, and the discontinuity at the language border
raises concerns about the validity of our estimates at the former border.
To address this issue, we exclude all German-dialect speaking communes
and estimate the treatment effect at the previously chosen bandwidth. This
way, the discontinuity at the language border does not affect the results at
the former French-German border. The estimates of the treatment effect
is presented in Panel C of Table 5, and are only slightly different from the
sample including the German-dialect speaking communes.
Robustness check II: proximity to Metz
Figures 4a and 5a show outcomes on commune level for all of Alsace and
Lorraine, together with the former French-German border. A visual inspection of these maps shows, besides the clear discontinuity of the outcomes at
the former border, a cluster of high share of yes votes in communes close to
the city of Metz. If communes in large cities, or close to large cities, have a
higher support for the European Union for reasons unrelated to our treatment variable, our estimates of a positive treatment effect might be driven
by these communes only. Hence, excluding communes in and surrounding
Metz could potentially affect our results.
We exclude all communes belonging to the Metz agglomeration, according to INSEE. Depending on bandwidth length, between 30 and 38 communes are excluded. Table 7 presents the results for the analysis with
German-dialect speaking communes (Panel A), and without (Panel B). Comparing to the results in Table 5, the estimated treatment effects are very
similar and are statistically significant at atleast 5 percent for almost all
bandwidths. In our Online appendix, we presents results for the case when
all communes within 5 kilometres from Metz are excluded, with similar results. We also exclude all communes within 10 kilometres from Metz, with
32
Table 7: Excluding Metz.
Variable
Treatment
Obs.
Dist.
Controls
33
Variable
Treatment
Obs.
Dist.
Controls
a
(1)
3.594*
(1.921)
364
10 km
Yes
Panel A: Moselle vs. Meurthe et Moselle and Meuse
1992 Referendum
2005 Referendum
(2)
(3)
(4)a
(5)
(6)
(7)
4.623***
3.697**
3.765**
4.152**
3.387**
4.452***
(1.663)
(1.483)
(1.464)
(2.058)
(1.724)
(1.599)
546
706
753
364
546
706
15 km
20 km
21.32 km
10 km
15 km
20 km
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
(8)a
4.181**
(1.642)
671
18.7 km
Yes
Panel B: Moselle vs. Meurthe et Moselle and Meuse (exl. German-speaking communes)
1992 Referendum
2005 Referendum
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)a
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)a
4.082**
4.928***
3.953***
3.458**
4.283**
3.455**
4.409***
3.461*
(1.940)
(1.672)
(1.481)
(1.372)
(2.087)
(1.723)
(1.596)
(1.811)
355
516
646
789
355
516
646
453
10 km
15 km
20 km
26.89 km
10 km
15 km
20 km
13.11 km
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Notes: Excluding all communes in Metz agglomeration. Panel A uses communes in Moselle, Meurthe et Moselle, and Meuse, while Panel B
excludes German-dialect speaking communes. ’***’, ’**’ and ’*’ indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on Conley
standard errors.
Estimates from using one half of the optimal IK bandwidth.
slightly smaller estimates but still highly significant.
Survey results
How well does support, or lack of support, for the European Union proxy for
national identity? Are the differences in share of yes votes in the two referenda picking up lack of national identity in the formerly annexed region, or
are the differences merely expressing different support for a supranational
entity? Clearly, a survey conducted at the border with questions related
to individuals national identity would provide us with the answers we are
interested in finding. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, surveys
with detailed geographical information about the respondents do not exist
for our region of interest. However, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducts surveys for all of France, with respondent location
information on department level. Using the survey results from ISSP, National Identity II (for 2003), we compare mean responses of all questions
related to national identity and EU support for respondents in all departements within Lorraine. The results are presented in Table 8, with questions
related to national identity in Panel A, and those related to EU support
in Panel B. For all questions, except One vs separate nations and Regional
vs national identity, the respondents were asked to agree or disagree with a
statement, with the lowest number corresponding to strongly agree, and the
highest number corresponds to strongly agree.
The first column, Mean, France, shows the mean of all respondents in
all of France, except the annexed region, while the second column, Mean,
non-treated presents mean of all respondents in the non-annexed region of
Lorraine (departements Meurthe-et-Moselle, Meuse, and Vosges). The third
column shows the OLS estimates of the difference between treated and nontreated Lorraine, controlling for age, income, employment status and sex.
Column five and six show p-values and number of observations for each OLS
estimation.
34
In Panel A, the question directly related to national identity is the last
one: Regional vs national identity, with low numbers for regional identity
and high numbers for national identity. In line with our main results, the
average respondent in the treated region is more likely to report a regional
identity, compared to the average respondent in the non-treated control
region (p-value of 0.02). For completeness, we also present estimations for
all questions related to national identity. While the estimated difference
is not statistically significant for all questions, all of them are indicating a
lower French national identity in the treated region.
Panel B shows questions related to the European Union. The respondents in the treated region agree to a larger extend with the statements
that France benefits from membership in the EU and that the nation should
remain members of the union. Given our main results, the higher support
for the EU in the treated region comes as no surprise.
The fact that we do not have precise geographical information about
the respondents, and their low numbers in the survey in the treated and
non-treated regions, raises questions about how reliable the results are. We
do not rely on them for causal inference, instead, they are presented as
suggestive evidence of lower national identity in the formerly annexed region,
and complements to our main results.
6
6.1
Channels and Interpretation
Channels
A closer look at the historical development of the European Union also helps
to explain the differences between the 1992 and 2005 referenda. In the early
90s, the EU heavily promoted a “Europe of the regions”. It emphasized that
strong regions detached from national borders can, if not replace, then at
least augment the nation states. EU integration and membership thus looked
like a promise to develop and maintain a strong regional identity, without
35
Table 8: Survey results: ISSP 2003, National Identity (II)
Survey question
36
Feel Close to City
Feel close to Province
Feel Close to Country
Important to feel French
Rather be French than any other nationality
France is better than any other country
Always support France, no matter what
Proud being French
One vs separate nationsa
Regional vs national identityb
Survey question
We benefit from EU
Always follow EU decisions
More power to EU
Vote to remain member of EU
a
b
Mean,
France
2.00
1.97
1.54
1.45
2.23
2.83
3.55
1.83
1.12
3.98
Mean,
France
2.53
2.98
3.20
1.22
Panel A: National identity
P-value
Mean,
Est. diff.,
non-treated
treated vs
non-treated
2.08
-0.49
1.97
-0.89
1.51
0.16
1.44
0.22
2.20
0.43
2.79
-0.50
3.38
0.62
1.77
-0.07
1.11
0.19
3.90
-0.86
Panel B: EU support
Mean,
Est. diff.,
non-treated
treated vs
non-treated
2.53
2.89
3.11
1.14
-0.92
-0.10
-0.19
-0.30
No. obs.
0.086
<0.001
0.500
0.325
0.114
0.197
0.175
0.704
0.133
0.020
39
36
37
39
40
39
40
40
37
41
P-value
No. obs.
0.003
0.788
0.596
0.025
34
38
35
36
Notes: Survey results from the International Social Survey Programme 2003, National Identity (II). Respondents were ask if they agreed or
disagreed with a number of statements, with low number corresponds to strongly agrees, while large number corresponds to strongly disagrees.
A negative (positive) difference means that people in the annexed region, on average, agrees (disagrees) more with the statement. Non-treated
mean and estimated difference is for within Lorraine only. The difference is estimated with OLS using the number of observations stated in
the last column, and controls for (reported) age, income, employment status and sex.
Low number corresponds to one nation, high number corresponds to separate nations
Low number corresponds to regional identity, high number corresponds to national identity
separation from the nation state into which the region was relatively well
integrated overall. The European Union was seen as allowing the citizens of
AL to finally overcome the long felt alienation and to reconcile their German
and French heritage. Many of the promises attached to the proclaimed
“Europe of the regions” could not be kept, which seems to have led to some
dis illusionization of the electorate in 2005. The language and emphasis on
the importance of regions was considerably weakened and, at least in public
perception, the EU was rather seen as developing into a centralized political
authority not necessarily associated with more autonomy and freedom for
individual regions. An alternative explanation is that the weakening of
the relationship is caused by age-related changes in the composition and
preferences of the electorate, which weaken the regional identity over time.
7
Concluding remarks
We document persistent differences in national identity in the French region
formerly known as Alsace-Lorraine, which we trace back to homogenization
policies by the German and French state aimed at assimilating the people
in the affected areas. Delegating power to the European Union is associated with a declining importance of the nation member states, and of their
respective national identity. The lower national identity, the lower the expected costs of delegation. We use localized, geo-coded results from the two
referendums on the European Union in France to document a causal long
run effect of the homogenization policies on national identity. As hypothesized, communes in the treated areas show significantly higher support for
the European Union.
These results exist when using OLS to estimate the regression model, as
well as with a regressions discontinuity design which should identify causal
effects. We demonstrate that there are no discontinuities in pre-treatment
variables, that the difference is robust to the choice of bandwidth and specific
37
specifications. Most importantly, we show that when focusing on the region
of Lorraine only, where the border can most plausibly be considered as
locally random, the coefficient estimates remain highly significant. Even
when excluding all formerly German speaking communes via geo-processing
the historical language border, the results are unaffected. We conclude that
there is a causal effect due to homogenization policies that still persists
almost a century after German annexation of the region ended.
In contrast to other regions in Europe and the World, there are no violent or very active separatist movements in the region today. Thus, while
we demonstrate a persistence and important difference, the French state finally succeeded in establishing enough ”national identity” to integrate the
region into the state. Relating to recent contributions by Alesina and Reich
(2014), our results thus also yield insights about the success of a certain set
of homogenization policies. In particular, once France switched from more
violent, intrusive policies, to a more balanced approach that took regional
particularities into account, violent autonomist movements lost in importance. Still, France consistently implemented secular schools and the use
and establishment of a common language, which resulted in a nearly universal use of French in the current generations.This seems to have succeeded
in avoiding discontinuities in the economic or social dimension. Related
to Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008) and Gellner and Breuilly (2008), it also
underlines the importance of language for integration.
38
References
Alesina, A. and Reich, B. (2014). Nation building. NBER Working Paper,
(w18839).
Alesina, A., Spolaore, E., and Wacziarg, R. (2000). Economic integration
and political disintegration. American Economic Review, 90(5):1276–
1296.
Algan, Y., Mayer, T., and Thoenig, M. (2013). The economic incentives
of cultural transmission: Spatial evidence from naming patterns across
france.
Anderson, M. (1972). Regional identity and political change: the case of
alsace from the third to the fifth republic. Political Studies, 20(1):17–30.
Aspachs-Bracons, O., Clots-Figueras, I., Costa-Font, J., and Masella, P.
(2008). Compulsory language educational policies and identity formation.
Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(2-3):434–444.
Besley, T. and Reynal-Querol, M. (2014). The legacy of historical conflict:
Evidence from africa. American Political Science Review, 108(02):319–
336.
Bisin, A. and Verdier, T. (2000). A model of cultural transmission, voting
and political ideology. European Journal of Political Economy, 16(1):5–29.
Bleakley, H. and Lin, J. (2012). Portage and path dependence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, page qjs011.
Carrol, A. (2013). In the borders shadow: Reimagining urban spaces in
strasbourg, 1918–39. Journal of Contemporary History, 48(4):666–687.
Carrol, A. and Zanoun, L. (2011). The view from the border: a comparative
study of autonomism in alsace and the moselle, 1918–29. European Review
of History, 18(4):465–486.
39
Chacha, M. (2013). Regional attachment and support for european integration. European Union Politics, 14(2):206–227.
Chaney, E. (2014). The medieval origins of comparative european development: Evidence from the basque country, mimeo.
Connor, W. (2004). Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker
Connor and the study of nationalism, volume 21, chapter Nationalism and
political illegitimacy. Psychology Press.
Conversi, D. (2008). We are all equals!militarism, homogenization and egalitarianism in nationalist state-building (1789–1945). Ethnic and racial
studies, 31(7):1286–1314.
Dell, M. (2010). The persistent effects of peru’s mining mita. Econometrica,
78(6):1863–1903.
Demirtepe, M. T. and Bozbey, İ. A. (2012). Accommodation or assimilation?
chinese government policies toward uyghur minority. USAK Yearbook of
International Politics and Law, (5):151–174.
Fishman, J. A. (1997). In praise of the beloved language: A comparative view
of positive ethnolinguistic consciousness, volume 76. Walter de Gruyter.
Förster, S. (1990). General-feldmarschall helmuth von moltke und die kriegsgeschichtlichen folgen des deutsch-französischen krieges.
Pariser His-
torische Studien, 29:86–91.
Fouka, V. (2014). Backlash: The unintended effects of language prohibition in us schools after world war i. Technical report, Mimeo Universitat
Pompeu Fabra.
Gellner, E. and Breuilly, J. (2008). Nations and nationalism. Cornell University Press.
40
Gelman, A. and Imbens, G. (2014). Why high-order polynomials should not
be used in regression discontinuity designs. Technical report, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Goodfellow, S. (1993). From germany to france? interwar alsatian national
identity. French history, 7(4):450–471.
Goyal, S. and Staal, K. (2004). The political economy of regionalism. European Economic Review, 48(3):563–593.
Heffernan, M. (2001). History, geography and the french national space:
The question of alsace-lorraine, 1914-18. Space and Polity, 5(1):27–48.
Höpel, T. (2012). The french-german borderlands: Borderlands and nationbuilding in the 19th and 20th centuries.
Hummer, H. J. (2006). Politics and power in early medieval Europe: Alsace and the Frankish realm, 600–1000, volume 65. Cambridge University
Press.
Imbens, G. and Kalyanaraman, K. (2011). Optimal bandwidth choice for
the regression discontinuity estimator. The Review of Economic Studies,
page rdr043.
Jega, A. (2000). Identity transformation and identity politics under structural adjustment in Nigeria. Nordic Africa Institute.
Jolly, S. K. (2007). The europhile fringe? regionalist party support for
european integration. European Union Politics, 8(1):109–130.
Laffan, B. (1996). The politics of identity and political order in europe.
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(1):81–102.
Lipgens, W. (1964). Bismarck, die öffentliche meinung und die annexion von
elsaß und lothringen 1870. Historische Zeitschrift, 199(JG):31–144.
41
Lott, Jr, J. R. (1999). Public schooling, indoctrination, and totalitarianism.
Journal of Political Economy, 107(S6):S127–S157.
Loughlin, J. (2001). Subnational Democracy in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities: Challenges and Opportunities. Oxford University Press.
Marks, G., Nielsen, F., Ray, L., and Salk, J. E. (1996). Competencies, cracks,
and conflicts regional mobilization in the european union. Comparative
Political Studies, 29(2):164–192.
Messerschmidt, M. (1975). Militär und Politik in der Bismarckzeit und im
Wilhelminischen Deutschland, volume 43. Wiss. Buchges.
Thaler, P. (2001). Fluid identities in central european borderlands. European
History Quarterly, 31(4):519–548.
Tilly, C. (1975). Reflections on the history of european state-making. The
formation of national states in Western Europe, 38.
Vajta, K. (2013). Linguistic, religious and national loyalties in alsace. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 2013(220):109–125.
Vizetelly, E. A. (2009). The True Story of Alsace-Lorraine. BiblioBazaar,
LLC.
Wawro, G. (2005). The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of
France in 1870-1871. Cambridge University Press.
Weber, E. (1979). Peasants into Frenchmen: Modernization of Rural France,
1870-1914. Chatto and Windus, London.
Ziekursch, J. (1930). Politische Geschichte des neuen deutschen Kaiserreiches: Bd. Das Zeitalter Wilhelms II., 1890-1918, volume 3. Frankfurter
Societäts-Druckerei.
42
"
Brussels
BELGIUM
GERMANY
LUXEMBOURG
"
Metz
"
Strasbourg
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
Figure 1: Map of treated and untreated region and surroundings
43
Legend
Legend
Region occupied by Germany
Départements before 1871
French border before 1871
Départements before 1871
(a) France before German occupation (b) France after German occupation
(1870)
(1871)
Legend
French border after 1918
Départements after 1918
Meuse
Moselle
Meurthe-et-Moselle
Bas-Rhin
Vosges
Haut-Rhin
(c) France after the occupied region was
returned (1918)
Figure 2: Historical maps
44
Legend
Former French-German border
" City of Metz
vshare_lepen07a
0,00 - 10,00
10,01 - 15,00
15,01 - 20,00
20,01 - 55,56
"
0 12,5 25
50 Kilometers
(a) Share of Le Pen votes, 2007 presidential election
Legend
Former French-German border
" City of Metz
p07_turnout
63,38 - 75,00
75,01 - 85,00
85,01 - 95,00
95,01 - 100,00
"
0 12,5 25
50 Kilometers
(b) Turnout, 2007 presidential election
Figure 3: Maps of outcomes, 2007 presidential election.
45
Legend
Former French-German border
" City of Metz
yes92
0,00 - 40,00
40,01 - 55,00
55,01 - 75,00
75,01 - 100,00
"
0 12,5 25
50 Kilometers
(a) Share of Yes votes, 1992 referendum
Legend
Former French-German border
" City of Metz
r92_turnout
33,33 - 60,00
60,01 - 70,00
70,01 - 80,00
80,01 - 100,00
"
0 12,5 25
50 Kilometers
(b) Turnout, 1992 referendum
Figure 4: Maps of outcomes, Referendum 1992.
46
Legend
Former French-German border
" City of Metz
yes05
0,00 - 30,00
30,01 - 45,00
45,01 - 65,00
65,01 - 100,00
"
0 12,5 25
50 Kilometers
(a) Share of Yes votes, 2005 referendum
Legend
Former French-German border
" City of Metz
r05_turnout
50,79 - 60,00
60,01 - 70,00
70,01 - 80,00
80,01 - 100,00
"
0 12,5 25
50 Kilometers
(b) Turnout, 2005 referendum
Figure 5: Maps of outcomes, Referendum 2005.
47
Legend
Language border
border_ASLR_FRA
French border after 1918
Départements after 1918
0
Figure 6: Linguistic frontier
48
12,5
25
50 Kilometers
60
55
45
50
Yes votes 1992, percent
65
Whole border, 3rd degree polynomial
−100
−50
0
50
100
Distance to border
(a) Share of Yes votes, 1992
48
46
44
42
40
Yes votes 2005, percent
50
52
Whole border, 3rd degree polynomial
−100
−50
0
Distance to border
(b) Share of Yes votes, 2005
Figure 7: RD plots, whole border
49
50
100
54
52
48
50
Yes votes 1992, percent
56
58
Within Lorraine, 3rd degree polynomial
−50
0
50
Distance to border
(a) Share of Yes votes, 1992
44
42
40
38
Yes votes 2005, percent
46
48
Within Lorraine, 3rd degree polynomial
−50
0
Distance to border
(b) Share of Yes votes, 2005
Figure 8: RD plots, within Lorraine
50
50
52
51
50
48
49
Yes votes 1992, percent
53
54
Within Lorraine, French speaking communes, 3rd degree pol.
−40
−20
0
20
40
Distance to border
(a) Share of Yes votes, 1992
46
44
42
Yes votes 2005, percent
48
Within Lorraine, French speaking communes, 3rd degree pol.
−40
−20
0
20
Distance to border
(b) Share of Yes votes, 2005
Figure 9: RD plots, within Lorraine, French-speaking communes
51
40
4
2
−2
0
Coefficient estimates
6
8
Share of Yes votes, 1992
10
20
30
40
50
40
50
Bandwidth, km
(a) Referendum 1992
4
2
−2
0
Coefficient estimates
6
8
Share of Yes votes, 2005
10
20
30
Bandwidth, km
(b) Referendum 2005
Figure 10: Estimates of treatment effect, bandwidth of 10 to 50 kilometres. Dashed
vertical line at one half of the IK bandwidth. Solid vertical lines represent 90 percent
confidence intervals (based on Conley standard errors).
52
4
2
−2
0
Coefficient estimates
6
8
Share of Yes votes, 1992
10
20
30
40
50
40
50
Bandwidth, km
(a) Referendum 1992
6
4
2
−2
0
Coefficient estimates
8
10
Share of Yes votes, 2005
10
20
30
Bandwidth, km
(b) Referendum 2005
Figure 11: Estimates of treatment effect, bandwidth of 10 to 50 kilometres, within
Lorraine. Dashed vertical line at one half of the IK bandwidth. Solid vertical lines
represent 90 percent confidence intervals (based on Conley standard errors).
53
4
2
−2
0
Coefficient estimates
6
8
Share of Yes votes, 1992
10
20
30
40
50
40
50
Bandwidth, km
(a) Referendum 1992
4
2
−2
0
Coefficient estimates
6
8
Share of Yes votes, 2005
10
20
30
Bandwidth, km
(b) Referendum 2005
Figure 12: Estimates of treatment effect, bandwidth of 10 to 50 kilometres, Frenchspeaking communes within Lorraine. Dashed vertical line at one half of the IK
bandwidth. Solid vertical lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals (based on
Conley standard errors).
54