The Place of India in China`s Foreign Policy

May 23, 1953
The
Place of India in China's
Foreign
Policy
( Contributed )
B
E F O R E the People's R e p u b l i c
of C h i n a was founded, the relations between C h i n a and I n d i a
were friendly.
C h i a n g Kai-shek
and M a h a t m a G a n d h i h a d met
each other.
Y e t there were few
opportunities for closer relationships.
Even in those countries such as
Indonesia where there was both a
strong' I n d i a n a n d a Chinese m i n o r i t y , each c o m m u n i t y w e n t its. o w n
way w i t h o u t very close contact. T h i s
was m a i n l y because of the differences in language, religion, customs
and philosophical outlook. Whereas Chinese tended to m a r r y i n d i genous girls and to include t h e m
in the Chinese f a m i l y system, I n dians, broadly speaking, m a r r i e d
only other Indians.
D u r i n g the war against
the
Japanese, a small group of I n d i a n
doctors and medical workers w o r k e d
with
the
anti-Japanese
Chinese
armies in the most f o r w a r d bases.
Agnes Srnedley writes:
"Jawaharlal
N e h r u was p r i m a r i l y responsible for the M e d i c a l
Mission to C h i n a .
W h e n he
f o r m e d the first C h i n a M e d i c a l
C o m m i t t e e o f the I n d i a n N a t i o n a l
Congress, hundreds of men and
women doctors and nurses registered as volunteers for C h i n a .
T h e Congress h a d enough money
to finance, equip and supply only
five men for its i n i t i a l group. It
h a d already i n i t i a t e d
' China
days ' and h a d called for the boycott of Japanese goods t h r o u g h out I n d i a . " *
These first five medical workers
d i d m u c h towards strengthening
the links between C h i n a and I n d i a .
T h e R e d A r m y , among w h o m they
m a i n l y w o r k e d , still
remembers
their assistance.
A f t e r the Peoples' Republic had
been established in Peking, one of
the earliest governments to recognise the new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was
that of the Republic of I n d i a .
I n d i a n diplomats were given a prom i n e n t place in the saluting stands
w h i l e the a r m y paraded.
The
newspapers publicised I n d i a as an
Asiatic country, w h i c h , although not
C o m m u n i s t , recognised the justice
* Battle Hymn of China, p. 162.
of China's cause in
Kuomintang.
expelling
the
At this t i m e there was a great
great deal of " hot air " in I n d i a n
newspapers about the l o n g t r a d i t i o n
of friendship between these t w o
powerful Asiatic nations, about the
sending of B u d d h i s m to C h i n a over
a thousand years ago, and the c o m m o n interests of the t w o countries.
Y e t even at this t i m e there were
misapprehensions in the minds of,
the people of both countries. Each
t h o u g h t of Asia as a u n i t y followi n g the lead of either C h i n a or
India.
But the leader was always
the c o u n t r y in w h i c h one lived.
T h i s misapprehension of the roles
of e a c h country r e a c h e d a
c l i m a x in the Asiatic sports held in
D e l h i at w h i c h there were representatives of Japan b u t not of the
Peoples' Republic of C h i n a . T h e r e
were no reports of these sports in
Chinese papers.
T h e weakening of this theory of
Asiatic u n i t y led by I n d i a or C h i n a
was reflected in the "double "
policy of the Chinese G o v e r n m e n t
towards the Government of I n d i a
a n d towards the Congress Party.
On the one h a n d there was a tendency in C h i n a to v i l i f y the C o n gress and to condemn the p a r t i t i o n
of I n d i a as a creation of " foreigners " w h i l e praising the Government
of I n d i a at the same time.
The
f o l l o w i n g is a typical q u o t a t i o n
from a Chinese magazine published
in C h i n a .
" A l l the vile machinations of
British imperialism and its henchmen in Congress as well as the
M u s l i m League are exposed—
the divide a n d rule policy by
w h i c h the great sub-continent is
bisected i n t o areas w h i c h are
neither political nor economic
entities w i t h B r i t a i n , if not fully
h o l d i n g the reins, p u l l i n g the
strings f r o m a scarcely concealed
background."
At the same l i m e the Chinese
Government was praising the Government of I n d i a for its part in
supporting the admission of C h i n a
to the U n i t e d Nations. I n c i d e n t a l l y
this attitude has been faithfully
reflected by the C o m m u n i s t Party
in India.
I n a cartoon published
593
i n the leading C o m m u n i s t j o u r n a l
of I n d i a last year, C h i a n g Kai-shek
is shown as a c r i n g i n g ghost t a k i n g
refuge o n T a i w a n w i t h P a n d i t
N e h r u i n the background m o v i n g
up to take over Chiang's position.
Congress i s the K M T o f twenty
years ago.
This double attitude of the
Chinese Government r a p i d l y came
to a head in the notes exchanged
over T i b e t . F r o m the point of v i e w
of the Republic of China, Tibet is
a p a r t of the territory of C h i n a .
Therefore any comment on T i b e t a n
affairs is an attack on China's
sovereignty. B u t w h e n I n d i a went
further than to c o m m e n t and said
that Chinese troops should not
enter Tibet at that m o m e n t to keep
the w o r l d peace, the Chinese G o v ernment replied that it was necessary " to m a i n t a i n Chinese independence, to prevent the i m p e r i a l ist aggressors f r o m dragging the
w o r l d towards war, a n d to defend
w o r l d peace ",
At the same t i m e ,
w i t h i n C h i n a , newspapers were f u l l
of the necessity of liberating 'Tibet
in order to oppose imperialism.
Since the only imperialistic nations
w h i c h could invade T i b e t must do
so t h r o u g h I n d i a , the i m p l i c a t i o n
was that the Government of I n d i a
was n o t h i n g but the tool of the
imperialists.
I n d i a was forced to
make this reply on November 1,
1950;
" The Government of I n d i a
have read w i t h amazement the
statement in the last paragraph
of the Chinese Government's reply
that the Government of India's
representation to t h e m was affected by foreign influences hostile to
C h i n a and categorically repudiate
it. At no time has any foreign
influence been brought to bear
upon I n d i a i n regard t o T i b e t . "
These notes mark the end of the
period of u n t h i n k i n g identification
of the interests of I n d i a and C h i n a .
It also marked the end of the period
when the smaller nations of Asia,
Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines
and Ceylon were looked upon as
h a v i n g no especial interests apart
from those of their big neighbours,
China a n d I n d i a .
In China it began to be recognised that a l o n g process of c u l t u r a l
T H E ECONOMIC WEEKLY
May 23, 1953
missions, friendship missions a n d
m u t u a l understanding must be u n dertaken.
T h e key to the understanding of the attitude of the
Chinese G o v e r n m e n t towards I n d i a
can be shown w i t h a q u o t a t i o n f r o m
the first copy of the B u l l e t i n of the
I n d i a - C h i n a Friendship Association
published i n C a l c u t t a i n September
1951, M a d a m Sun Yat-Sen stated;
" O u r y o u n g Republics face a
w o r l d situation m a r k e d b y the
dying stages of i m p e r i a l i s m a n d
the upsurge of People's rule.
In
such a situation, o u r countries
w i l l come under attack f r o m the
imperialists, this t a k i n g m a n y
forms a n d shapes f r o m o u t r i g h t
physical aggression to d i p l o m a t i c
baiting.
H o w successfully we
p a r r y and t h w a r t these attacks,
h o w m u c h of our weight, we can
throw o n the side of peace, w i l l
mean m u c h to the final a n d f u l l fledged
emergence
of
People's
rule in Asia and the rest of the
world.
Consequently we must
d r a w the I n d i a n a n d Chinese
peoples closer together, so that
they can defeat any enemy of
the Asian peoples, so that they
can contribute in f u l l measure to
the cause of w o r l d peace.
Long
live the friendship of the I n d i a n
a n d Chinese peoples!
A l t h o u g h the G o v e r n m e n t of
I n d i a is opposed to I m p e r i a l i s m ,
one doubts whether it sees peace
merely as anti-imperialisrn.
After
a l l . the I n d i a n Government could
easily acquire " peace " in I n d i a by
i n v a d i n g Goa and all the. o i l i e r
territories in I n d i a still held by
foreign powers.
Consequently,
several
cultural
missions w i t h expenses paid by the
Chinese Government.) flew to C h i n a .
F r o m the Chinese newspapers it
appeared a l l spoke on the theme of
h o w progressive C h i n a was a n d h o w
b a c k w a r d I n d i a was and h o w the
whole of Asia w a n t e d to f o l l o w
China's lead. 1 saw no reference to
such schemes as the Bhakra Dam
or even the Zamindaii A b o l i t i o n
Act.
On May 16, 1952 a C h i n a - I n d i a
Friendship Association was established in Peking at the conclusion of
the official I n d i a n sponsored c u l t u r a l mission headed by M r s Pandit.
M r s Panda's speech emphasised the
historical mission of the t w o nations. I n r e t u r n K u o M o H o , V i c e President of the Peoples' Republic,
of C h i n a , instead of re-asserting the
c o m m o n f r o n t against I m p e r i a l i s m
and the " C h i n a is always r i g h t "
a t t i t u d e , stated
" I n the past, w e have m a d e
b r i l l i a n t contributions t o the c u l t u r a l history o f m a n k i n d a n d i n
future, w i t h our i n d i v i d u a l endeavour and common efforts no
doubt we will, also make b r i l l i a n t
a n d new contributions to the his' tory of mankind."
Insofar as the Indian-Chinese
Friendship Association can make
contacts w i t h the mass of the
I n d i a n people, the emphasis w i l l be
o n common'" problems w i t h C h i n a
(which
China
has
successfully
solved), b u t i n official missions w i t h
the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , ' t h e
emphasis-will be less on propaganda
t h a n o n history. T h a t the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a resents this double
a t t i t u d e was shown w h e n the U S S R
(China's ally) t r i e d to distribute
food a n d 'money t h r o u g h its o w n
agency as a propaganda measure
lather t h a n t h r o u g h a n i m p a r t i a l
I n d i a n body such as the I n d i a n R e d
Cross as a h u m a n i t a r i a n means of
r e l i e v i n g suffering.
T h e stage of
a t t e m p t i n g to interfere in the internal affairs of each country by p r o paganda and, by i m p l y i n g in the
case of I n d i a , that there are t w o
representatives of the I n d i a n people, the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a a n d
the '' workers a n d peasants " of
I n d i a , has come to an end w i t h the
stabilisation of the situation in
T i b e t and the exchange of official
c u l t u r a l missions. T h i s is not to say
that it cannot arise once again if
the need arises, but w i t h the new
development of the K o r e a n w a r ,
it became necessary to regard I n d i a
not as a country likely to be split
asunder some t i m e in the future by
another r e v o l u t i o n but as an i m portant, ally, whose m o r a l prestige
was w o r t h h a v i n g in the cold war.
It is i m p o r t a n t to realise that,
w i t h i n C h i n a , there are t w o i m p o r t a n t conflicting tendencies.
On
the one h a n d there is the n a t u r a l
and
utmost emphasis upon
the
" N e w C h i n a " w i t h the development of the r e v o l u t i o n a n d the rem o v a l of "semi-feudal " elements.
On the other h a n d , there is the
pride i n China's o l d culture a n d
history. T h e r e is the surprising fact
that the Buddhist carvings in N o r t h
China have become a k i n d of
Chinese c u l t u r a l symbol. T h e y are
constantly reproduced on stamps
and elsewhere.
Y e t B u d d h i s m is
persecuted w i t h i n the country. T h e
monks a t M t O m e i are gathered
together on the t i p of the m o u n t a i n
to shout " D o w n w i t h the I m p e r i a l ist aggressors ".
T h i s is not a
594
Buddhist sentiment.
T h e stimulus
for the new C h i n a is f r o m the
Soviet U n i o n and M a r x i s m , w h i c h
is u n d o u b t e d l y encouraged a n d enthusiastically
welcomed
by
the
Chinese Peoples' R e p u b l i c , especially if it is associated w i t h technical a i d , machinery a n d jet planes.
But in the field of foreign policy,
the links w i t h l n d i a are entirely o f
the historical, c u l t u r a l sort.
It is
true t h a t on a Chinese m a p , I n d i a ,
Indonesia, C h i n a a n d N o r t h K o r e a
are a l l m a r k e d as ' l new democracies " b u t one can h a r d l y deny that
the emphasis w i t h i n each of these
new democratics is rather different.
T h e alliance w i t h the Soviet U n i o n
is w i t h the first of these tendencies,
the association w i t h I n d i a is w i t h
the second.
Since the Chinese
themselves are uncertain whether
these tendencies can be reconciled
and w h a t w i l l arise f r o m the synthesis, the foreign policy of the
Chinese
Government towards the
Soviet U n i o n and towards the Republic of I n d i a cannot hut reflect
this struggle, if, indeed, it is a
struggle and not a search l o r a
middle path.
It is against this background that
one must see the K o r e a n war as
an
attack
on
the
" imperialist
aggressors " in order to safeguard
the h a r d w o n gains of the new
Chinese democracy.
Whether north
K o r e a actually invaded south K o r e a
or south K o r e a actually invaded
n o r t h K o r e a is not a very i m p o r t ant matter to a Chinese. T h e C o m munists feel that Syngman
Rhee
tried to invade n o r t h K o r e a several
times a n d several times was h e l d
back.
It is better to get in first.
It was thus somewhat of a surprise
to C h i n a that I n d i a d i d not take
the same a t t i t u d e but argued in a
legalistic way that the n o r t h K o r e a n
troops were the first to cross over
the line.
But
this a t t i t u d e was
somewhat tempered by the fact that
while I n d i a considered n o r t h K o r e a
was legally w r o n g , m o r a l l y the
Chinese had a lot on their side.
There was the fear of losing M a n churia, the exclusion f r o m the. U n i t e d
Nations a n d the d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n
w o r l d trade on account of h a v i n g
a " c o m m u n i s t " government, even
t h o u g h K M Panikkar, the I n d i a n
Ambassador,
was
convinced
the
Chinese G o v e r n m e n t h a d the supp o r t of the Chinese people.
After
some i n t e r n a l heart searching, the
Chinese G o v e r n m e n t became w i l l i n g to accept co-operation w i t h
I n d i a in w o r l d affairs on these
terms. 1 do not believe t h a t C h i n a
entirely trusts I n d i a as free f r o m
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May 23,1953
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