Iran in Revolution: The Opposition Forces
Author(s): Ervand Abrahamian
Source: MERIP Reports, No. 75/76, Iran in Revolution (Mar. - Apr., 1979), pp. 3-8
Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project
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in
Iran
The
by
Revolution:
Forces
Opposition
Ervand
Abrahamian
"Your Majesty, Where are your supporters?"
The Shah: "Search me."
A Worker to an American correspondent:
"We want Khomeini. He will take power from the rich and give it to us.'
Historical
Background
(1949-53)
The present crisis in Iran is a classic example of a political
revolution caused by society's superstructure, especially
the state, failing to reflect, represent, and keep up with
changes in a society's infrastructure, namely its class for?
mations. The roots of the crisis reach back not to 1963,
when Ayatollah Khomeini first raised his voice, nor to
1953, when the CIA deposed Premier Mossadeq, but to 1949
when the Shah began the long process of creating an auto?
cratic state that would stifle all opposition, including aris?
tocratic and bourgeois opposition, and would attempt to
remold society in his own image?or rather, in the image of
his dictatorial father. In the period after the Allied inva?
sion of 1941 and the subsequent abdication of Reza Shah,
the present Shah kept a low political profile, retaining con?
trol of the army but permitting parliament to elect cabinet
ministers and allowing political parties, including the
Marxist Tudeh Party, to organize bazaar guilds, profes?
sional associations, and trade unions. By early 1949, how?
ever, the Shah, according to the American State Depart?
ment, was seeking an opportunity to free himself of
constitutional
restraints and to establish himself the
undisputed ruler of Iran.1
The opportunity presented itself in February 1949 when
a lone assailant tried to shoot the Shah. Although no evi?
dence was ever produced to link the would-be assassin to
any political organization, the Shah promptly declared
martial law, banned all newspapers critical of his family,
detained
many of the opposition politicians, including
Mossadeq, and, outlawing the Tudeh, arrested many of its
organizers and sentenced to death in absentia many of its
leaders who had gone underground. He convened a Con?
stituent Assembly which unanimously voted him the right
to dissolve Parliament whenever he wished, and created a
Senate, half of whose members would be appointed by the
monarch. The Assembly also voted to return to the royal
family the lands which had been stolen by the Reza Shah
and then confiscated by the government in 1941. The oppo?
sition complained that the Shah had turned the assassina?
tion attempt into a royalist coup d'etat.
Inevitably the volte face of 1949 created a public back?
lash. In the following months, a circle of prominent liberal
politicians headed by Mossadeq, a group of religious lead?
ers, notably Ayatollah Kashani,
representing predomi?
nantly the bazaar middle class, and a variety of secular,
nationalistic, and social democratic parties, articulating
mainly the interests of the salaried middle class, all allied
to form the National Front. They demanded honest elec?
tions, free press, end to martial law, and, most important,
nationalization
of the British-owned oil industry. By 1950
the National Front was holding mass rallies and drawing
large crowds. Many supporters came from the salaried mid?
dle class, especially university students, teachers, profes?
sionals, white collar workers, and other sectors of the
modern intelligentsia. Another main source of popular sup?
port was the bazaar middle class, particularly workshop
owners, shop keepers, small merchants, clergymen, and
other strata of the traditional petit bourgeoisie. Thus, the
National Front brought together two diverse forces: the
secular intelligentsia and the religious petit bourgeoisie.
and further
Frightened by the mass demonstrations
shaken by a massive general strike in the oil industry
organized by the re-emerged Tudeh Party, the Shah in May
1951 appointed Mossadeq as Prime Minister as a "safetyvalve" for public discontent. As one royalist Senator
exclaimed: "Class tensions have reached such point that
they threaten the whole fabric of society_The
only way
to save Iran is to unite all the classes against the foreign
over
enemy."2 And as the Shah himself proclaimed
national radio: "Class antagonisms
are Iran's greatest
misfortune. These antagonisms
poison our minds and
political life. If we live as true Muslims class conflict will
and national
give way to class
harmony
unity."3
The Times of London assessed the situation in these words:
"The inner tensions of Persian society?caused
by the
stupidity, greed, and lack of judgment by the ruling classhave now become such that they can be met only by an
acceleration of the drive against the external scapegoat,
namely Britain."4
however, was not willing to act as a mere
Mossadeq,
the oil company, he
safety-valve. Having nationalized
turned his attention to the Shah, accused the court of inter?
fering in politics, and in July 1952 demanded civilian con?
trol over the armed forces. When the Shah refused to
comply, Mossadeq appealed directly to the public. The pub?
Front and the Tudeh,
lic, led by both the National
responded to the appeal, poured into the streets, and after
three days of bloodshed forced the Shah to relinquish con?
trol over the army. For the first time a civilian had broken
the direct lines of command between the Pahlavi dynasty
and the officer corps.
Armed with the victory of July 1952, Mossadeq
pro?
ceeded to attack the whole military-royalist complex. He
transferred the stolen lands back to the state, shifted much
of the court budget to the Ministry of Health, forbade the
Shah to communicate with foreign diplomats, and even?
tually forced members of the royal family, including the
announced that the
Shah, to flee the country. Mossadeq
country would in the future buy only defensive weapons.
He reduced the military budget by 15 percent, and cut the
draft by 50 percent. He transferred 15,000 men from the
infantry to the less royalist gendarmerie, purged 130 senior
committees to
officers, and established
parliamentary
investigate corruption among the top brass, to scrutinize
the qualifications of senior officers, and to prove that the
constitutional laws intended the Shah to be Commanderin-Chief in name only. Convinced that without the Shah
there would be no military, the senior officers formed a
Secret Committee to Save the Nation from "republica?
nism," and established contact not only with the CIA but
also with conservative religious leaders who feared that
Mossadeq was paving the way for social revolution.
victories, however, were deceptive. For as
Mossadeq's
soon as he forced the Shah out of politics and threw the
British out of Iran, he removed the two main targets that
had united his followers, and thereby unwittingly exposed
the ideological differences between the secular and the reli?
Front. These differences
gious wings of the National
evolved over six major issues: nationalization
of large cor?
porations, especially the bus and telephone companies;
extension of the vote to women; drafting of a land reform
There
bill; relaxation of control on the sale of alcoholic beverages;
appointment of anti-clerical intellectuals to be Ministers of
Justice and Education; and the forging of an alliance, even
though a tacit one, with the Tudeh Party. Denouncing Mos?
sadeq for having "betrayed Islam"5 and imposed a "social?
ist dictatorship"6on
Iran, the clerical wing, headed by
Kashani, withdrew from the National Front and inevita?
bly weakened Mossadeq's
support among the petit bour?
geoisie. This became
apparent in July 1953, on the
anniversary of the 1952 uprising, when the National Front
rally drew only 10,000 while the Tudeh demonstration
attracted more than 100,000.7 These two meetings con?
vinced the CIA that Mossadeq had to be overthrown to pre?
vent a gradual takeover by the Tudeh.
Encouraged by the National Front split, and financed
by the CIA, the army officers took to the offensive. As
troops occupied the government offices and thirty-seven
tanks attacked the Premier's residence, thugs paid by the
clerical leaders
CIA and affiliated with reactionary
gathered mobs from the red-light district and marched
through Tehran to provide acoustical effects for the mil?
used
itary coup d'etat. Of course, Western newspapers
scenes of this mob to create the image that the Shah was
brought back by a "popular revolution" against an "unpop?
ular leftist" Prime Minister.
Repression
(1953-77)
Returning home triumphant, the Shah proceeded to create
the dictatorship he had always planned. With the help of
the U.S. and Israel, he established a new secret police,
SAVAK. And with the help of the rapidly increasing oil
revenues, he built for himself one of the world's largest mil?
itary establishments. The armed forces grew from 120,000
men in 1953 to over 400,000 in 1976, making it the world's
largest military machine. The annual defense budget rose
from $60 million to over $2 billion in 1976, adjusted to con?
stant prices. The arms bought abroad but not included in
the budget figures jumped from a mere $10 million between
1941 and 1953 to $700 million between 1953 and 1966, and
further from $2 billion between 1965 and 1972 to almost$17
billion between 1972 and 1976. By 1976, Iran was not only
the main customer for American and British arms manu?
facturers, but also the buyer of the most sophisticated
weaponry Western technology could produce.
The Shah's concern with the military was not purely
budgetary. He took a personal interest in the well-being of
the officer corps, especially in their training, salaries,
travel abroad, promotions, fringe benefits, housing, lowpriced stores, and decorations. Some of the senior officers
have so many medals that they resemble over-decorated
Christmas trees. He glorified the officer corps as the coun?
try's true elite and the nation's real savior in 1953. He also
extended his interest to the lower ranks. By 1977, a private
in the army earned as much as $600 per month while an
unskilled worker no more than $340. Thus the Shah ruled
first and foremost as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces, and only secondly as the head of state. In his own
words, he considers himself not as the state, a la Louis XIV,
but, because of his deep "devotion" to the military, as the
army, in the tradition of Reza Shah.8
Armed with the military and the secret police, the Shah
was able to dismantle the opposition. Immediately after
On
the
Front
National
Sanjabi
The two principles of the National Front have been and
will be national sovereignty and democracy, individual
and social freedom. We declare that we are advocates of
political, economic and cultural independence, and we
struggle against colonial oppression under any form,
whether in the form of a puppet regime or the form of
dependent political parties or grouping in our country. We
believe that people's participation to determine their
affairs and elect their governments through free elections
as the most fundamental rule of democracy. The activity
of the National Front for democracy is not a struggle for
power. The Front strives for a basic human ideal. And
towards this goal, we call upon patriotic individuals
and groups to unite.
Source: News conference of National Frontleader KarimSanabi
in Tehran, August 31, 1978. Translated for MERIP by
Masood Moin.
Bakhtiar
How many followers
anyway?
does
the National
Front have
The number of active members is not particularly great.
But the National Front has widely branched roots in the
a good reputation. We are considered the
people?and
honest people in the country, the patriots with the clean
escutcheon, and those who see things as they are.
Are you counting the educated people, the middle class,
among your following in the campaign against the shah?
Yes, but do not forget the businessmen of the bazaar. We
want to form a party which will be located a bit left of the
center.
Comparable
to the West German SPD?
Yes, exactly.
Do you maintain official or unofficial contacts with the
shah?
No. Impossible!
But with the government?
What are you thinking of? We will not establish contacts
with a government we consider illegal?even
worse, that
we consider incapable. These military are in no position to
rule; they must go quickly.
Do you support Ayatollah Khomeini?
We have good relations with Khomeini and the religious
leaders. We are a political movement, though. We cooper?
ate with religious leaders, but we are not their followers.
After all, the National Front existed for 30 years prior to
Khomeini taking the floor.
Source: Der Spiegel, Dec. 25, 1978; FBIS, Dec. 28, 1978.
the 1953 coup, the Shah outlawed the National Front,
arrested most of its leaders, including Mossadeq, and exe?
cuted his Foreign Minister for having advocated the estab?
lishment of a republic. After serving a three-year sentence,
Mossadeq was placed under house arrest, where he died in
1967. The Tudeh, however, bore the main brunt of the
Over five thousand
party members were
repression.
another
fourteen died under
were
executed,
arrested, forty
torture, and over two hundred were sentenced to life impri?
sonment. By the late 1950s, both the Tudeh and the
National Front had lost their vast array of grass-roots
organizations, especially their provincial branches, trade
unions, and professional associations. They were left with
scattered underground cells in Iran and a few branches in
and forming caucuses
Europe, publishing newspapers
within the Iranian Student Confederation.
In the early 1960s, moreover, both the Tudeh and the
National Front were further weakened by defections. With
the eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute, three Tudeh leaders
left the party and formed a party called the Organization of
Marxist-Leninists. At the same time, some members of the
party's youth section left and formed the Revolutionary
Organization of the Tudeh Party.*
The most significant defection, however, came from the
National Front. In 1961, a group of religious-minded tech?
nocrats, who felt disturbed on one hand by their secular col?
league's criticism of religion and on the other hand by the
clerical refusal to accept social reforms, left the National
Front and created an organization called the Movement for
the Liberation of Iran. Led by Mehdi Bazargan, an engi?
neer and staunch supporter of Mossadeq, the new organi?
Shi'ism
zation hoped to bring together Iranian
and
European socialism, and to create an ideology that would
appeal both to the religious-minded and to the nationalistic
intelligentsia. In short, they aimed at formulating a secu?
lar religion that would be acceptable both to the clergy,
especially to the lower-rank clergy, and to the moderneducated middle class.
Their aim was attained in the mid-1960s with the emer?
gence of a dynamic young intellectual named Dr. Ali Shari'ati. From a clerical family, Shari'ati had participated in
the campaign to nationalize the oil companies, joined the
Movement for the Liberation of Iran soon after it was
formed, and read widely contemporary revolutionary the?
orists, especially Fanon, while studying sociology in the
Sorbonne. Returning to Iran, he opened a religious school
where he gave a series of highly influential sermons rein?
terpreting Shi'ism to be an uncompromising revolutionary
ideology for national liberation against imperialism, for
fundamental social change against the ruling class, and
for a violent uprising against the monarchy. Although
Shari'ati borrowed heavily from Marxism, he has four cru?
cial differences with the Iranian Left. First, he considers
Shi'ism to be the essence of Iranian culture. Second, he
views Marxism to be the main ideological threat to his own
world-outlook. Third, he argues that history is made not by
but by "great heroes" such as the Prophet,
classes,
Imam Ali, and the future leader of Iranian revolution.
Fourth, he advocates neither social democracy nor the dic*AfterthedeathofMao, theOrganizationofMarxist-Leninists
alliedwith
Albania,whiletheTudehRevolutionary
Organizationcontinuedtosupport
China. In January 1979 the RevolutionaryOrganizationof the Tudeh
changedits name to the CommunistPartyof Iran.
tatorship of the proletariat, but, on the contrary, the dicta?
torship of the religious-minded intelligentsia:10
Democracy in a society that is in need of rapid revolu?
tionary change cannot be fruitful. The principle of
democracy is opposite to the principle of revolutionary
change and progress.. . . Political leadership based on a
new ideology that runs opposite to the thought and
tradition of that society, cannot be elected and supported
by that society. Revolutionary leadership is not
compatible with democracy.
Imprisoned a number of times, he was released in 1976
at the behest of the Algerian government, and left for
in 1977.
Europe where he was murdered by SAVAK
Although he was killed on the eve of the present crisis, he
can be considered the main ideologue of the Iranian Revo?
lution. His ideas found fertile ground among the highly dis?
contented lower middle class, especially among the young
university graduates and the lower-ranking clergymen.
From 1953 until 1963 the repressive state machinery
focused predominantly at the radical intelligentsia and
urban working class. After 1963, however, it broadened its
activities to include the petit bourgeoisie, especially the
clergy and the bazaar guilds. The expansion occurred
when the Shah, in announcing his so-called White Revolu?
tion, threatened to expropriate private estates, including
religious endowments, and grant women the right to vote.
Without mentioning these particular clauses, Ayatollah
Khomeini, one of the six leading Shi'i authorities, raised
the banner of revolt by denouncing the Shah for selling the
country to Western imperialism and granting legal immun?
ity to American military advisers. As the bazaars through?
out the country closed in support of Khomeini, the armed
forces struck at peaceful demonstrators, killing thousands
in Tehran alone. The Shah had declared war on the petit
bourgeoisie, a class that had helped him survive in 1953. In
the following years, the government exiled Khomeini, peri?
odically ordered vicious police attacks on seminary stu?
dents in Qom, extended SAVAK
surveillance over the
bazaars, undermined the traditional independence of the
trade and craft guilds, financed modern banks which lent
money to wealthy entrepreneurs but not to small business?
men, encouraged large corporations, such as department
stores, at the expense of small shopkeepers, imposed price
controls on the bazaars, and, most irritating of all, used the
minor merchants and the hard-pressed shopkeepers as
scapegoats for the rampant inflation that hit Iran from
1973 until 1977.
The intolerable repression of the 1960s, together with
the successful armed uprisings in Cuba, Algeria, and Viet?
nam, persuaded some radical members of the intelligentsia
that the only way to smash the police state was through
guerrilla warfare. Of the many armed groups that
appeared in Iran, the most important are the Cherikha-yi
Fedayi Khalq (The People's Devoted Guerrillas) and the
Sazman-i Mujahidin-i Khalq (The Organization of the Peo?
ple's Fighters). The first, the Fedayi, was formed of young
dissidents both from the Tudeh and the National Front
who argued that the defeats of 1953 and 1963 had shown
that a political struggle, without an armed struggle, could
not defeat the comprador bourgeois police state. Militantly
Marxist, the Fedayi, advocate a class struggle against
imperialism and the Shah's "fascist state." Since starting
There
their armed campaign, the Fedayi, together with other
Marxist guerrillas, have lost at least 150 men before firing
squads, under torture, and in shoot-outs with the police.*
The other major guerrilla organization, the Mujahidin,
was formed of dissidents from the Movement for the Liber?
ation of Iran. They too argued that the 1963 massacre
necessitated an armed struggle. Staunchly Islamic, the
Mujahidin analyze politics not so much through a class
perspective as through a nationalistic-religious
struggle
against all forms of foreign influence, including Marxism.
In 1975, however, the Mujahidin violently split into two
rival factions. One faction remained loyal to Islam, espe?
cially to Shari'ati's interpretation of Shi'ism. The other fac?
tion rejected Islam and accepted whole-heartedly a Maoist
construction of Marxism. The regime has killed as many as
200 guerrillas belonging to the two Mujahidin factions.
Unknown to outside observers, Iran between 1971 and 1977
had one of the world's worst records on the number of secret
executions, deaths under torture, and killings in the streets.
Over 90 per cent of the victims have been members of the
intelligentsia?teachers,
engineers, office employees, and
undergraduates and high school students.
Re-emergence
of the Opposition
(1977-79)
The mass uprisings of 1977-79 have shattered the dictator?
ship and thus have allowed the opposition organizations to
re-emerge into the open. The uprisings have been predomi?
nantly the spontaneous
expression of the discontented
masses, especially of the urban lower and middle classes.
Although the symbolic leader of the revolution, Ayatollah
Khomeini has intentionally talked in vague terms of
"social justice" in order not to alienate any of the diverse
social forces active in the revolution, and although the
situation remains highly fluid and unpredictable, five dis?
tinct tendencies can be identified in the opposition to the
Shah:
The Religious
This group, led by AyatolConservatives
lahs Shirazi and Shariatmadari,
wants to eliminate the
monarchy and complete the political revolution, but has no
desire to initiate fundamental change and start a social
revolution. Moreover, they argue that any attempt at radi?
cal change would invite a bloody military coup d'etat. They
obtain much of their support from the senior clergy and the
bazaar well-to-do.
The Religious
Radicals
Although the Movement for the
Liberation of Iran is the most influential of the organized
groups, it contains three nascent weaknesses. While the
older leaders of the Movement, especially Bazargan, tend
to be moderate and pragmatic, the younger rank and file
members, many of whom are Shari'ati followers, intend to
implement radical social principles. They have not yet
translated these principles into concrete programs, so their
dream of future Iran remains vague. Although the Move?
ment has attracted many followers in recent months, it has
not yet organized them into a regular political party with
branches, congresses,
programs and, most important,
elected central leaders. Time will show what will happen to
the Movement once it tries to transform itself from a revolu?
tionary movement against the Shah into an organized
party for the creation of a new Iran. Time will also show
*Thisis a conservative
estimate
basedon thenamesofthoseknownkilled.Many
observers
believe
thetotalis atuallycloserto300.
Khomeini
on
the
Left
You announced the establishment of an Islamic Revolu?
tionary Council as an opposition government to the Bakh?
tiar cabinet?
This is a consultative Islamic committee whose members I
with experienced Iranian poli?
still have to appoint?along
ticians. Their names will be released later. I only hope that
they will not misunderstand Islam and know what Iranian
society in this era demands of them.
Will there be free elections?
Free elections. But I am telling you that we will set Islamic
conditions by which the candidates must abide. By this we
want to prevent a small group from stealing in at the
expense of the masses of people.
There are Marxists in Iran who fought against the shah
jointly with you. Are you prepared in principle to share
power with them?
The future state structure will be based on the majority
opinion of the people. Those who are like a drop in the
ocean in view compared to these gigantic people's masses
cannot, and must never be allowed to, presume to impose
their will on the people. Consequently, I see no possibility
The Holy City of Qom
of cooperating with them on a government basis. Natu?
rally, they are free, however, to advocate their own views
and convictions.
The situation in Iran is still difficult to survey, and stable
conditions are not in sight. Is it not conceivable, therefore,
that this power vacuum will flush groups to the surface
which will not stop at anything.
In the event such elements, forinstance agents of the shah
or leftist opportunists, try to exploit the situation to their
own advantage, the Iranian people will foil their game. If
such troublemakers nevertheless try to impose them?
selves on the people by force, then they brand themselves
traitors. There is no longer any need to explain what the
people think of traitors.
The communist Tudeh Party announced
Do you feel involved?
afight with arms.
No state citizen and no group of state citizens should be
deprived of the natural right to freely state their thoughts
and opinions, including the right to an opinion that is dif?
ferent from that of the state power. It will not be permissi?
ble, though, to violate Islamic values, jeopardize law and
order, and undermine the state power.
Source: Der Spiegel, Jan. 22, 1979; translated in FBIS, Jan. 23,
1979.
how far Khomeini's vision of the future, which he has
intentionally kept to himself, is similar to that of the Move?
ment's. Significantly, Khomeini's many pronouncements
have never mentioned the name of Shari'ati, the admired
inspirer of the young religious radicals.
Often using the same ter?
Reactionaries
The Religious
minology as the religous radicals, the religious reactionar?
ies abhor everything Western, including technology, and
all types of cinemas, and advocate a strict application of
the early Islamic laws, particularly the stoning of adulter?
ers, the cutting off of robbers' hands, and the enforced veil?
ing of women. Unconcerned with major social issues, such
as class inequality, the reactionaries are limited to a few
scattered theologians. Unfortunately, some of these theolo?
gians are highly influential in the movement.
Led by the National Front, this
The Secular
Reformers
group focuses on the need for a modern constitution. While
favoring the eradication of the monarchy, it would prefer a
secular republic or even a democratic Islamic republic
rather than a purely Islamic Republic as advocated by the
religious groups. Some members of the National Front
favor socialism, but hope to attain it through parliamen?
tary democracy. Remembering the experiences of 1952-53,
they fear the establishment of a dogmatic religious state.
In fact, a few more outspoken socialists
within the
National Front have openly stated that they have not
risked their lives in order to exchange the "military auto?
?
cracy for a new dogmatic theocracy."1 The National Front
finds much of its support among the professionals and the
salaried middle class?among
such newly-formed organi?
zations as the Writers Association, Lawyers Association,
Engineers Association, Professors Association, Teachers
Union, and Government Employees Union.
The Secular
Radicals
Divided into the Fedayi, the
Tudeh Party, the Revolutionary Tudeh, and the MarxistLeninist Organization,
as well as a number of smaller
groups, the Left as a whole has little mass following. This
support is limited to university students, white collar asso?
ciations, and some trade unions, especially among oil
workers, newspaper printers, and modern factories located
in Tehran. Although the Left fully supports the revolution
against the Shah, many Marxists realize that the estab?
lishment of a dogmatic clerical state would endanger their
own existence. During the mass rallies of one million to two
million held in Tehran this year, the Left faced difficulties
obtaining permission from the religious organizers to carry
its own banners
and slogans.
By January, 30,000
workers and students were exasperated enough to march in
Tehran
carrying Khomeini's
picture, but demanding
and "a workers'government."
"equality," "democracy,"
Moreover, the Fedayi published a statement warning that
the people's revolution should not be monopolized by any
one group.
the religious ones have so far
five groupings,
most success in mobilizing a mass following,
especially among the bazaar population, the shanty-town
poor, and even the industrial proletariat. This can be
explained by a number of factors. First, while the regime
crushed all grass-root organizations belonging to the secu?
lar opposition, it permitted the bazaar guilds, the clergy,
the seminaries, and the local mosques to function. In fact,
the oil-boom of the early 1970s brought prosperity to the
Of these
achieved
8
and thereby increased the ranks of the lower
clergy. By 1977, the religious institutions were the only
organizations left in the country free of state domination.
Not surprisingly, public opposition to the state tended to
converge into the mosques.
Second, in recent years a religious revivalist movement
has swept the country, especially the lower middle class
and the shanty-town poor. For the lower middle class, espe?
Sha?
cially the recent college graduates, religion?notably
ri'ati's interpretation of Shi'ism?provides
a dynamic
challenge both to the regime and to the Western-oriented
upper middle class. For the shanty-town poor, all of whom
are recent migrants, religion is a valuable substitute for the
sense of community which they lost when they left their vil?
lages. Like Methodism in nineteenth-century England,
Shi'ism in contemporary Iran provides the urban poor with
a needed sense of community and collectivity. In such a
situation, it is easy for one man, whether a John Wesley or
an Ayatollah Khomeini, to appear as the savior of the com?
mon people.
Third, the Marxist Left has been hurt in the last ten
years by the fact that the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China have openly supported the Shah. This
damage can easily be undone if either of the two govern?
ments decides to actively oppose the royalist military.
Finally, the lower clergy and the Shari'ati supporters, in
their assault
on the Shah, have eagerly encouraged
workers to strike for higher wages in order to bankrupt the
state. No doubt, their eagerness and sense of "social jus?
tice" will quickly wane as soon as they take control of the
state. It is not surprising that the leaders of revolution, in
their many pronouncements, have had little to say about
the role of free trade unions in their future Islamic
Republic.
Recent events in the oil industry illustrate the present
strength, and possibly the future weakness, of the religious
groups among the modern working class. When the first
wave of strikes began in the oil industry, left-wing mil?
itants, especially from the Tudeh, managed to make signif?
icant inroads into the strike committees. But when the
second wave began, the clergy and Mehdi Bazargan inter?
vened and helped their own supporters to obtain a majority
in the strike committees. According to a BBC report, these
committees in the oil fields have received instructions by
phone directly from the Qom seminaries. It is likely that
the religious groups will soon begin to lose their hold over
the labor movement. The Left will then have an easy entry
into an arena that includes more than two-and-a-half mil?
lion wage earners and forms the single largest urban class
in contemporary Iran.
February4, 1979
seminaries
StateDepartment
totheU.S.Embassy
inIran,1February
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TheShah,"MessagetotheNation,"
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4TheTimes,
22March1951.
5Ii
H. Makki,
17thMajlis,1 February
1953.
Proceedings,
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1NewYorkTimes,
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8E. Bayne,PersianKingship
in Transition
(NewYork,1968),pp.186-87.
A.Shari'ati,
vaImamat
Ummat
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Contemporary
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Iranshahr,