WWII Unexploded
Ordnance
A Study of UXO in Four Pacific Island Countries
2011
Authors
Research team and authors
Publication produced jointly by Steven Francis and Ioane Alama
Substantial contributions from Lorraine Kershaw
Organisational Support
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Political Governance and Security Programme
Cleared Ground Demining - Palau
The analysis and recommendations reflected in this publication are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the policies and view of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS). While every care
has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the information provided, PIFS, its officers, employees, and
agents accept no liability for any loss, damage, or expense arising out of, or in connection with, any
reliance on, any omissions or inaccuracies in the material contained in this publication.
All rights for commercial/profit reproduction, in any form, are reserved. PIFS authorise the partial
reproduction or translation of this material for scientific, educational or research purposes, provided that
PIFS and the source document are properly acknowledged. Permission to reproduce the full document in
any form, whether for commercial, profit or non profit purposes, must be requested in writing.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
WWII Unexploded Ordnance
A Study of UXO in Four Pacific Island Countries
August 2011
3
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
UXO collected and stored by Royal Solomon Islands Police Force Explosive Ordnance Unit at Hell’s Point, Solomon Islands
Photo taken by S. Francis
This publication is based on a paper initially provided to the Forum Regional Security Committee to guide
discussion on avenues to assist Forum Island Countries affected by World War II Unexploded Ordnance.
While this paper was not initially intended for publication, it was recognised that the information collected
could contribute to combating UXO issues in the region. It was also recognised that one of the main
challenges faced by the countries studied was the lack of awareness regarding the extent and the severity
of UXO issues. This publication seeks to provide some guidance and act as a resource document for further
and more detailed research.
PIFS Cataloguing-in-Publication
WWII Unexploded Ordnance : A Study of UXO in Four Pacific Island Countries
prepared by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.
100 p. : ill. ; cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN: 978-982-202-017-5
1. Unexploded ordnance disposal – Oceania 2. Explosive ordnance - Oceania
3. Hazardous substance – Risk assessment – Oceania I. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
327.1’743 dc21
Contents
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................... 6
List of Acronyms ........................................................................................
7
Definitions ...............................................................................................
8
Foreword ................................................................................................. 9
Executive Summary .................................................................................... 10
Introduction and Methodology ....................................................................... 11
UXO in the Pacific Context ............................................................................ 15
Summary of Findings ................................................................................... 25
Kiribati scoping assessment report .................................................................. 35
Palau scoping assessment report .................................................................... 45
Papua New Guinea scoping assessment report .................................................... 53
Solomon Islands scoping assessment report ........................................................ 61
Recommendations and Regional Strategy .......................................................... 69
Appendices .............................................................................................. 78
Bibliography ............................................................................................. 85
Acknowledgments
The Authors would like to acknowledge the kind assistance provided by various Government officials,
international representatives and members of the community from Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea and
Solomon Islands who graciously gave their time to provide information and data regarding their experiences
in relation to UXO. Special mention to Stephen Ballinger and Cassandra McKeown from Cleared Ground
Demining who were part of the scoping mission to Kiribati and provided significant contributions to this
publication. We would also like to acknowledge the contributions by Christine Pahlman - AusAID Mine
Action Coordinator, Kerry Brinkert – Anti Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, and
Mary Wareham - Human Rights Watch New Zealand.
The Project team are also thankful to all the individuals that assisted in putting this publication together
so as to provide a resource document in an area where information is sorely needed. Particular thanks to
Cameron Noble, Atantaake Tooma, Filipo Masaurua, Mue Bentley Fisher and Peter Bednall for their kind
assistance.
We would also like to thank Rick Nimmo, Director - Political Governance and Security Programme (PIFS),
and Andie Fong Toy, Deputy Secretary General - Economic Governance and Security (PIFS) for their direction
and leadership in the development of this publication.
Last but not least, special acknowledgement is given to the brave men and women currently tasked with
UXO clearance in the various Forum Island Countries. Operating in dangerous circumstances with limited
resources, it is a credit to both their countries and their organisations that these individuals continue to
put themselves in harm’s way to serve their communities.
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WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Acronyms
ADF
Australia Defence Force
CGD Cleared Ground Demining
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOU
Explosive Ordnance Unit
EQPB
Environmental Quality Protection Board
ERW Explosive Remnants of War
FICs
Forum Island Countries
FRSC Forum Regional Security Committee
GICHD
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining IMAS International Mine Action Standard
KPS Kiribati Police Service
LEA Law Enforcement Agencies
LEU Law Enforcement Unit
NGO
Non Governmental Organisation
PNG
Papua New Guinea
PNGDF
Papua New Guinea Defence Force
RSIPF
Royal Solomon Islands Police Force
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SPREP
South Pacific Regional Environment Programme
UN PoA United Nations Programme of Action
USA
United States of America
UXO
Unexploded Ordnance
WWII
World War II
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WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Definitions
For the purposes of this publication:
Munitions is the general term that can be used to describe ordnance. Munitions are devices equipped with
explosives or other material for use in military operations which can represent a hazard to people and to
any future use of the land where they are located.
Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO) means explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed
conflict but has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under
control of the party that left it or dumped it. Abandoned explosive ordnance may or may not have been
primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use.
Explosive Ordnance (EO) means all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and
biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery,
mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters
and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro explosive devices; clandestine and
improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items or components which are explosive in
nature.
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) means Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Explosive Ordnance
(AXO).
Mine Action refers to activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of
landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) including unexploded sub-munitions. Mine action is not
just about clearing and releasing suspected land. It is also about people and societies, and how they
are affected by landmine and ERW contamination. The objective of mine action is to reduce the risk
from landmines and ERW to a level where people can live safely; in which economic, social and health
development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine contamination, and in which the
victims’ needs can be addressed.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) means the detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery
and disposal of EO. EOD may be undertaken:
1. as a routine part of mine clearance operations, upon discovery of ERW;
2. to dispose of ERW discovered outside hazardous areas, (this may be a single item of ERW, or a larger
number inside a specific area); or
3. to dispose of EO which has become hazardous by deterioration, damage or attempted destruction.
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WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Foreword
There can be little doubt that World War II was a traumatic period for
many Pacific Island communities previously isolated from the turbulence
of global contests. Foreign military forces wreaking a path of havoc across
the region used the islands as stepping stones to establish bases from which to
attack enemy forces in neighbouring islands. Introducing unprecedented levels of
destruction, the Pacific Islands became one large extended battlefield.
At the conclusion of hostilities in 1945, the foreign military forces of both sides for the most
part returned to their homelands leaving the islands littered with sunken ships, burnt out tanks,
abandoned pill boxes and large empty gun emplacements. However, left interspersed amongst these
were large quantities of war relics of a far more dangerous nature, unexploded ordnance (UXO).
For 68 years many island communities have lived and played amongst explosive material designed to sink
battle ships or destroy fortified gun emplacements. Sadly, while efforts have been undertaken to clear
this material over the years, UXO continue to be recovered regularly in many Forum island countries.
Rapidly deteriorating, UXO have become increasingly unstable and dangerous and their chemicals pollute
the surrounding lagoons and soil.
This publication, initially produced as an internal report to guide the activities of the 2011 Forum Regional
Security Committee, is one of the first studies on UXO affecting Forum island countries. In recognition of
the lack of information currently available on UXO in the region, it was decided to publish the study as a
resource document to contribute to policy and programme development.
This publication provides preliminary insight regarding the extent of UXO issues in the countries studied,
identifies national agencies and organisations currently responsible for clearing WWII Ordnance and
discusses challenges faced by respective Police and Defence forces in fulfilling their duties. Issues
pertaining to the countries studied such as the lack of available technical capacity, limited resources and
geographical challenges are all discussed.
It is also a publication which explores possible solutions at both the national and regional levels. At the
national level, several recommendations are provided on possible activities that can be undertaken by
affected Forum island countries to coordinate activities and maximise resources. At the regional level,
preliminary thinking on the development of a concerted strategy is outlined to provide for a mechanism
that can identify and raise awareness and better access available international resources to support
domestic UXO clearance activities.
We hope that this publication will provide an initial impetus to raise awareness of the continuing struggle
faced by many of our people and provide some guidance on possible paths forward. For some of our Pacific
communities, World War II remains much more than just a memory. UXO remains an unwanted legacy
which must be addressed.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Tuiloma Neroni Slade
Secretary General
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
9
Executive Summary
At the height of WWII from 1941 to 1945, military forces from the United States of America (USA), Japan,
Australia and New Zealand clashed in a series of battles throughout the Pacific Islands region. Large
stocks of munitions predominantly from USA and Japan were shipped to various parts of the Pacific to
support ongoing military operations. Many of these items when used did not detonate and were left either
strewn across islands or atolls, buried in the soil or sand, or submerged in surrounding lagoons. At the
conclusion of WWII, a large amount of ordnance remained in the islands posing a significant threat to local
communities.
After more than six decades, the presence of WWII ordnance continues to plague a number of Pacific
Island countries such as the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Republic of the Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
In the four countries studied for this publication (Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon
Islands), officials reported recovering significant amounts of WWII ordnance on a regular basis in numerous
areas, both urban and rural. The ordnance recovered included high explosive bombs, sea mines, hand
grenades, and artillery, mortar and small arms ammunition.
In the countries studied, Police Agencies and Defence Forces have been tasked with managing and
clearing WWII ordnance with only Palau having obtained the services of an international NGO to undertake
comprehensive clearance activities. All Countries reported similar challenges linked to the lack of: (1)
available resources; (2) local technical expertise; (3) modern safety equipment; (4) available data and
information; (5) public awareness, both locally and internationally; and (6) comprehensive policies /
national action plans to coordinate available resources, Government Agencies and clearance activities.
In response, the main recommendations contained in this publication explore resolving these issues by
improving: (1) local coordination and ownership through the development of national action plans and
multi-agency oversight structures; (2) local UXO clearance capacity by seeking sustainable UXO clearance
methods; and (3) access to resources by integrating UXO activities into domestic planning and budgeting
processes, and developing national and regional mechanisms to raise UXO awareness, mobilise support,
and link national needs to available international assistance.
While limited resources will always remain a challenge, effective coordination and planning will often
ensure that available resources are maximised. The lack of comprehensive UXO clearance policies or
national action plans are a major impediment and restrict the abilities of affected Forum Island Countries
to systematically clear affected areas. As a first step, the development of a detailed National UXO
Assessment would provide important baseline information allowing for the development of effective,
data based, national coordinating policies. Resources developed by the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and outlined in the International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) could
provide useful policy guidance to affected Forum Island Countries (FICs).
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WWII Unexploded Ordinance
The creation of a regional strategy by the Pacific Islands Forum is a possible initiative that could assist
Members by providing a mechanism for the coordination of international and regional resources to support
domestic UXO clearance activities among Members. Importantly, it would also provide an opportunity to
develop regional resources and raise awareness amongst the international community to mobilise resources
and technical expertise which are problems currently faced by affected Forum Island Countries.
Chapter One
Introduction and Methodology
Deteriorating UXO at Hell’s Point, Solomon Islands
Photo taken by S. Francis
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WWII Unexploded Ordinance
At the 2010 Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC) meeting held in Suva Fiji, during a discussion on
small arms and light weapons, several Member countries expressed their concern regarding the threat
caused by World War II (WWII) Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) to local communities. As an outcome of this
discussion, the FRSC requested that the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) explore the issue of UXO
in the region to assist Forum members.
In response, PIFS undertook to assess the scope of UXO in affected Forum countries. As part of this
assessment the Secretariat undertook a scoping study of four FICs affected by UXO (Kiribati, Palau, Papua
New Guinea, and Solomon Islands). The findings of this scoping study was presented to the FRSC for it’s
consideration in 2011.
Definition of Unexploded Ordnance
Technically WWII ordnance found in the Pacific Islands can be defined as either unexploded (UXO) or
abandoned (AXO). Unexploded ordnance is defined as explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused,
armed or otherwise prepared for use in armed conflict but has failed to explode. Abandoned explosive
ordnance is defined as explosive ordnance unused during an armed conflict and subsequently abandoned
or left behind. UXO and AXO are defined collectively as Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).
However, for the purposes of this publication, due to the prevalent use of the term in the Region, UXO is
used to refer generally to all explosive ordnance whether abandoned or unexploded. As such, the terms
WWII UXO and ERW are used interchangeably and are to be taken as referring to all explosive ordnance
remaining from WWII including artillery, mortar, rocket, and small arms ammunition; as well as bombs,
landmines, sea mines, torpedoes, depth charges and propellant actuated devices.
Objectives of the Study
This publication explores the difficulties faced by four Forum Island Countries seeking to address WWII
UXO. It provides an overview of the common challenges faced by Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
and Solomon Islands; reviews activities undertaken to manage UXO; and explores possible activities and
initiatives that could be undertaken at the national and regional level to enhance domestic clearance
activities.
This publication does not attempt to provide a technical survey of contaminated or affected areas. Nor does
it purport to be a comprehensive and fully detailed assessment for each of the countries studied. Rather
this publication provides a scoping analysis of activities in the study countries and is intended to highlight
the serious ongoing threat of WWII UXO. It also provides a preliminary insight into the difficulties faced
by local communities, and shares information to support the development of policies and programmes to
assist Forum Island Countries in managing UXO.
12
Structure of the Report
Chapter One introduces the UXO issue, provides background information regarding the research and
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
outlines the methodology undertaken by the Research team. Chapter Two provides a brief overview of the
WWII conflict in the Pacific, identifies Countries and islands affected by UXO in the region, and provides a
summary of international and regional frameworks that support UXO activities. Chapter Three presents a
summary of the Findings provided to the FRSC arising from the Secretariat’s consultations. Chapters Four
to Seven provide individual country reports for each of the countries studied. Chapter Eight introduces
recommendations based on the scoping reports provided to the FRSC and explores a Draft Regional Strategy
being proposed as a mechanism to coordinate regional and national UXO clearance activities.
Methodology
In 2010 and 2011, the PIFS Law Enforcement Unit (LEU) conducted a scoping study on unexploded ordnance
in the Region to assist Forum Island Countries. The scoping study involved: (1) consultations in four study
countries; (2) the distribution of UXO questionnaires to all Forum Members; and (3) a review of secondary
sources available to the Research Team.
Country Consultations
In-country consultations were held in Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands, and involved
interviews with: government representatives from Police, Foreign Affairs, Public Works and Infrastructure,
Environment and Conservation, Health, Marine and Fisheries; foreign diplomatic representatives;
development partners; civil society organisations; and local communities affected by UXO (refer to
Appendix One for list of officials interviewed).
For Papua New Guinea, Palau and the Solomon Islands only one member of the research team, Steven
Francis, undertook the country visits. In Kiribati the consultations were undertaken in partnership with
Cleared Ground Demining (CGD), a UK-based non-profit organisation currently operating in Palau.
The research team spent approximately 4 to 7 days in each of the study countries conducting interviews
and undertaking site visits. Information that could not be obtained during these periods was subsequently
sought through follow up telephone calls and email correspondence.
While UXO issues were not restricted to the countries visited, further consultations could not be undertaken
due to time and budgetary constraints.
UXO Questionnaire Survey
The research questionnaire was disseminated in September 2010 to 13 Forum Island Countries (Australia,
New Zealand and Fiji1 were not included in the questionnaire survey). The questions were organised into
three parts to:
1. Assess the extent of Unexploded Ordnance in Forum Member Countries;
2. Assess the extent of current activities undertaken by Forum Member countries to deal with UXO; and
3. Consider options to improve approaches when dealing with UXO.
Part One was designed to confirm the presence of UXO, determine if possible an estimated quantity, and
identify sites UXO were commonly found (land, sea, inhabited areas).
Part Two sought to identify and assess domestic agencies responsible for dealing with UXO, programmes
and initiatives implemented to manage UXO, awareness raising activities previously undertaken, assistance
provided and challenges/constraints faced by affected Forum Island Countries.
Part Three was designed to seek Member input on UXO activities and possible impediments anticipated
Responses were received from Palau and Samoa. Samoa indicated that UXO was not an issue while Palau
provided a full report on their UXO issues.
1
Under the auspices of the Biketawa Declaration, the Leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum agreed to the implementation of
two targeted measures against the current military regime in the Republic of Fiji Islands. These measures consisted of: (1) the
suspension of participation by the leader, ministers and officials of Fiji from all Forum meetings and events arranged by PIFS,
including the annual Leaders’ meeting; and (2) the ineligibility of the Fiji military regime from PIFS’ regional cooperation
initiatives or any new financial or technical assistance, other than assistance towards the restoration of democracy. These
measures took effect on 2 May 2009.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
when implementing initiatives.
13
Review of Secondary Sources
The Research Team undertook to collect information from secondary sources available online and at the
PIFS library. Secondary sources included research reports, policy documents, online documents, historical
books and news articles.
Following the consultation phase, initial reports were prepared and made available to the study countries.
A summary Report on the principal findings was prepared and submitted with the individual country
reports to the FRSC for its discussion in June 2011. As part of that Report, a preliminary Regional UXO
Strategy Framework was developed for Members to consider.
Limitations of the Study
The lack of UXO information and data in the study countries posed a significant impediment. While all
attempts were undertaken to obtain information regarding UXO in a number of areas, in most cases data
was unavailable or had not been recorded.
Limited resources available placed a significant constraint on the activities of the Research Team. While
the Research Team had initially intended to visit the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and Vanuatu,
this was not possible. Limitations in resources also resulted in country consultations being limited to
periods less than a week.
Many of the WWII battlefields affected by UXO were located in remote or isolated areas such as Kirimati
Island in Kiribati and Oro and Bougainville in Papua New Guinea. With information difficult to obtain from
these remote areas, on site visits were considered but costs of internal travel and the lack of available
flights were prohibitive.
The Research Team was unable to obtain information on UXO activities for the study countries in the
period prior to independence which would have provided valuable information on UXO clearance activities
undertaken immediately after WWII. Due to the short time frame of each country visit, the Research
Team was unable to review in any great depth Government records of the agencies responsible for UXO
clearance. It is proposed that these are possible areas for future research.
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WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Chapter Two
UXO in the Pacific Context
Torpedo from WWII near beach vegetation – Palau
Photo taken by T. Essick for Cleared Ground Demining
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WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Background
World War II – The Pacific Conflict
Lasting from 1939 to 1945, WWII was one of the most destructive and violent events in the history of
mankind. In December 1941, WWII came to the Pacific when Japan bombed Pearl Harbour and began
a number of military campaigns seizing several territories and islands across South-East Asia and the
Pacific. With the Allied forces focused on combating Germany and her Axis Allies in North Africa, the
Mediterranean, and Europe, Japan captured large amounts of territory in South-East Asia and the Pacific
region. To support military operations and strengthen her supply lines, Japan built a number of military
bases and air fields throughout the region.
From 1942 to 1945, the Allied forces from USA, Australia and New Zealand fought a series of bloody
campaigns across the Pacific to recapture the territories occupied by Japan. The Allied forces invaded a
number of Japanese held islands in what is now Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands, Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, Guam
and Palau.
The islands in the region were seen as important strategic prizes for both Japan and the Allied forces,
capable of being used as forward operating bases to support naval activities or for the construction of
airfields from which to launch attacks. With territories in Micronesia entrusted to Japan by the League
of Nations after World War I, the expansion of the Japanese territory into Papua New Guinea, Guam and
the Solomon Islands represented an opportunity to obtain resources and further isolate Australia and New
Zealand. On the other hand, USA and the Allied forces sought to use the islands as stepping stones across
the Pacific Ocean to halt the Japanese advance and eventually prepare for a final assault on Japan.
The battles that raged across the Pacific during this period saw the introduction of vast amounts of
ordnance into the region. In addition to the ordnance used in numerous sea engagements between naval
warships, high explosive bombs and artillery rounds were fired or dropped in large quantities onto small
areas of land occupied by enemy forces. Standard US tactics for amphibious assaults at the time called for
substantial naval and air support to bombard or ‘soften up’ land based enemy forces2 prior to, and during
assault landings. While information regarding ordnance has been difficult to obtain, levels of ordnance
used to attack island defenders were substantive as evidenced by reports claiming that over 6,800 tonnes
of bombs were dropped on Chuuk Lagoon3 alone while 4,818 tonnes of high explosives, both bombs and
artillery, were directed at Kwajalein Atoll4 by the US Armed Forces. In addition to bombs and artillery
used to defend the beaches, Japanese forces in anticipation of assault landings often prepared defensive
positions using land mines and aerial bombs converted to act as land mines.5
16
In addition, islands and atolls across the region such as Chuuk, Funafuti, Nanumea, Betio, Guadalcanal,
Tulagi, Gavutu and New Britain to name a few, were used as military bases and ammunition depots for the
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
storage of ordnance to supply naval vessels, aircraft and infantry. Land mines, grenades, flame throwers,
ammunition and in some cases chemical weapons6 were shipped into the areas of conflict for storage and
eventual use.
2
Hough (et al), pp15-17.
Chirgwin p8.
4
Spennemann.
5
Garand (et al), p72.
6
Interview with RSIPF EOU.
3
Much of this ordnance was never used. Many that were used failed to detonate. After WWII, many areas
which had seen fierce fighting were littered with abandoned machinery of war including tanks, abandoned
weapons, unexploded ordnance, pill boxes, fortified gun emplacements, abandoned fuel, hazardous
materials, and wrecks and cargoes of sunken vessels. At the 2011 FRSC meeting, officials noted that 68
years after the conclusion of WWII, these abandoned weapons and UXO continued to pose a danger to
Pacific Islanders. While figures regarding levels of WWII UXO are almost impossible to determine, it is
assumed that they are substantial given that items continue to be recovered on a regular basis throughout
the region and that for unexploded ordnance alone, the failure rates have been estimated as high as
30%.7
Countries affected
Forum Island Countries affected by UXO include Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated State of Micronesia, Nauru and Vanuatu.8 Most of the areas
affected were either battlefields or military bases during WWII.
While Australia and New Zealand are Forum Members, they are not included in this Report as their UXO
issues are largely isolated to military storage sites and training areas, and both countries have relatively
advanced Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) resources and facilities.
17
Islands. Photo by S. Francis.
7
8
CGD UXO Country Assessment.
Note Appendix 2
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Photograph 1 - UXO items currently awaiting disposal by RSIPF Explosives Ordnance Unit - Solomon
Box One – Selected WWII Pacific Battles
1941
December 7
Japan attacks Pearl Harbor, Philippines, Wake Island, Guam, Malaya, Thailand, Shanghai and Midway beginning Pacific Theatre of WWII.
January
May - July, July Aug – Feb 1943
April November Japanese Troops capture Rabaul, New Britain and land on Bougainville.
Japanese Troops occupy Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands.
Japanese land troops near Buna Mission on New Guinea.
1st US Marine Division seize Tulagi and land on Guadalcanal with naval and air support
After six months of hard fighting, US Troops capture Guadalcanal.
US Army B-24’s from Funafuti bomb Tarawa.
Japanese air raid on Darwin, Australia.
1942
1943
January June – Aug
Oct – Feb 1944 Nov – Aug 1945
November
December Allies take Buna in New Guinea.
Allies capture New Georgia, Solomon Islands.
U.S. bombers strike Japanese naval base at Rabaul, New Britain for several months.
Allies invade Bougainville finally securing Japanese surrender in August 1945.
U.S. Troops capture Makin and Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands.
Full Allied assault on New Britain as 1st Division Marines invade Cape Gloucester.
1944
February February April –May
July Sept – Nov
U.S. Troops capture Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls in the Marshall Islands.
U.S. bombers strike Japanese naval base at Chuuk (FSM).
Allies land at Aitape and Hollandia in New Guinea. Campaign lasts until end of war.
U.S. Troops capture Guam
U.S. Troops capture Peleliu & Anguar in Palau.
1945
Feb – Mar
April – June May 8 August 14
U.S. Marines capture Iwo Jima.
U.S. Tenth Army captures Okinawa.
Victory in Europe Day.
WWII in Pacific officially ends with surrender of Japan.
Source: Shaw (et. al), Hough (et. al) and Tyson.
UXO – The international context
Under international law, no treaty or agreement specifically regulates the clearance of WWII UXO.9
However, in recent years, the international community has concluded certain mine action disarmament
treaties which provide a framework through which States Parties can access assistance in relation to their
broader UXO problems. These treaties are:
- the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction,10 also known as the ‘Ottawa Convention’. The Ottawa
Convention bans the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines and require
their clearance as well as the provision of assistance to victims. This Convention entered into force on
18
1 March 1999; and
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
9
Protocol V to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons addresses the issue of responsibility for clearance of explosive
remnants of war (ERW), but only came into force on 12 November 2006 and is of prospective, rather than retrospective
operation. Under Protocol V, States Parties and parties to armed conflict are required to take action to clear, remove or
destroy ERW (Art. 3), and record, retain and transmit information related to the use or abandonment of explosive ordnances
(Art. 4). They are also obligated to take all feasible precautions for the protection of civilians (Art. 5) and humanitarian
missions and organizations (Art. 6). States Parties in a position to do so should provide cooperation and assistance for
marking, clearance, removal, destruction, and victim assistance, among other things (Art. 7 & 8).
10
For the full text of the Ottawa Convention, see: http://www.apminebanconvention.org/overview-and-convention-text/.
- the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (the ‘CCM’).11 The CCM prohibits all use, stockpiling,
production and transfer of cluster munitions. Separate articles in the Convention concern assistance
to victims, clearance of contaminated areas and destruction of stockpiles. The CCM entered into force
on 1 August 2010.
In relation to the Ottawa Convention, twelve of the sixteen Members of the Pacific Islands Forum are State
Parties to this Convention.12 In relation to the CCM, Fiji, New Zealand and Samoa are State Parties, while
Australia, the Cook Islands, Palau and Nauru have signed, but not yet ratified it.
Forum Island countries have negligible experience of the type of weapons which are the subject of
prohibition under the Ottawa Convention and the CCM. That said, in addition to advancing the cause
of universality of these Conventions’ operation, FICs’ participation in these international treaties can
further national and regional efforts in addressing the problems caused by WWII UXO. For example, State
Parties to the Ottawa Convention have adopted a formal understanding that “the lessons derived from
fulfilling Article 5 obligations [whereby a State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of
all anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control] are applicable in addressing related challenges
associated with other explosive remnants of war.”13 Furthermore, States Parties recognise that “in many
instances, the organisational structures, the capacities that have been built and the standards that have
been established largely as a result of the need to implement Article 5 are also being applied to address
weapons contamination more broadly.”14 Indeed, support provided to Palau – which will be described in
further detail in Chapter Five – was activated through Palau’s participation in the Ottawa Convention.15
International Mine Action Standards
The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) were developed by the United Nations in collaboration with
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to provide an international mechanism
to coordinate activities combating the impacts of UXO and mines on communities around the world. The IMAS
provide principles, standards, and internationally recognised operational procedures to guide the planning,
implementation and management of mine action programmes. Discussed in more detail below, ‘mine action’
refers to a group of activities which seek to comprehensively address all threats caused by mines and UXO.
Updated on a regular basis, the IMAS:
(1) provides a frame of reference that enhances effective communication between all UXO and Mine
stakeholders such as national agencies, international organisations, NGOs, and donors;
(2) provides guidance on a wide number of issues and activities such as information management, training,
safety and occupational health, stockpile destruction, and victim support to name a few;
(3) promotes a common and consistent approach to the conduct of mine action operations; and
(4) can be used or adapted by national authorities to develop domestic standards and national mine action
plans to coordinate and guide national activities.
19
For the full text of the CCM, see http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/01/Convention-ENG.pdf.
The Members which are State Parties to the Ottawa Convention are: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New
Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. The Republic of the Marshall Islands is a
signatory to the Convention, but has not yet ratified it.
13
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, p25.
14
Ibid.
15
Support is also available to FICs in relation to ratifying and implementing the Ottawa Convention and the CCM. The AntiPersonnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit provides information and advisory services to all states in
relation to the Convention: www.apminebanconvention.org. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also
provides technical assistance to states in relation to ratifying and implementing the conventions: www.icrc.org.
12
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
11
Mine Action
Mine action activities describe a comprehensive approach that has evolved internationally to remove the
threat of land mines and UXO. The term ‘mine action’ is defined by IMAS as a group of activities aimed at
reducing the social, economic and environmental impact of mines and UXO. Mine action expands activities
beyond just the physical removal of mines and UXO, seeking to develop a broad approach addressing the
effects of contamination on people and their communities. The underlying objective of mine action is to
reduce domestic risk to a safe level enabling free, social and economic development while addressing the
needs of existing and future victims.16 Mine action is made up of five complementary groups of activities:
1) Mine Risk Education;
2) humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and UXO survey, mapping, marking and clearance;
3) victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration;
4) stockpile destruction; and
5) advocacy against the use of Anti Personnel Mines.
In addition to these five core components, a
number of additional activities are required
to support action programmes. These include
activities promoting “assessment and planning,
the mobilisation and prioritisation of resources,
information
management,
human
skills
development and management training, quality
management and the application of effective,
appropriate and safe equipment.”17
Mine action activities are implemented globally by
a number of different entities and mechanisms.
International mine action operations, such as
demining and mine-risk education, are mostly
performed
by
NGOs
although
commercial
contractors and militaries also provide mine action
Photograph 2 - UXO Clearance Activity in Peleliu ,
Palau. Photo by Cleared Ground Demining.
services. Funding for these activities is usually
obtained from a number of sources that include Governments; intergovernmental, international and regional
organisations; as well as international financial institutions.18 Assistance is usually provided directly to
affected States by development partners and NGOs, or through frameworks developed by international
bodies such as the United Nations (UN).19
Various UN bodies implement mine action related activities with partners and currently implement
clearance programmes in a large range of countries. These activities are implemented mainly through funds
appropriated by the UN General Assembly for peacekeeping, and contributions received by the Voluntary
20
Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF). In 2010, the VTF received in excess of USD 63 million
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Denmark.
dollars in contributions with the top 5 donors being Japan, Canada, Netherlands, the European Union and
16
UNMAS, p23.
UNMAS , p24.
18
GICHD pp25-36
19
Activities of the 14 UN Departments, Agencies, Funds and Programmes involved in Mine Action activities are coordinated by
the United Nation Mine Action Services (UNMAS).
17
Within the region, Australia and New Zealand contribute significantly to the VTF and other mine action
activities. Australia has developed a Mine Action Strategy for the Australian Aid Programme 2010 to 2014
which includes a commitment of $100 million AUD to reduce the threat and socioeconomic impact of
landmines, cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war.20
Regional Framework
To date, regional activities related to UXO have been undertaken primarily through the Pacific Islands
Forum regional security policy framework with law enforcement partner organisations such as the Pacific
Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) and the Oceania Customs Organisation (OCO). Regional initiatives have
focused mainly on developing strategies and regional resources to assist Forum Members in controlling
weapons which also include ammunition and explosives.
In 1998, a PICP (known then as the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference) and OCO subcommittee
at the request of the FRSC developed the ‘Honiara Initiative’ which was a strategy to address illicit
manufacturing and trafficking in firearms and other related materials.
In 2000, this subcommittee at the request of Pacific Islands Forum Leaders developed the “Nadi Framework”
which established a structure for a common approach to weapons control measures based on the principles
that:
(1) the possession and use of firearms, ammunition, explosives, prohibited weapons, and other related
materials is a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety; and
(2) public safety could be improved by imposing strict controls on the possession and use of firearms,
ammunition, prohibited weapons, and other related materials.
The Nadi Framework incorporated and extended the Honiara Initiative beyond firearms to cover other
weapons such as knives, traditional weapons (clubs, bows and arrows and spears), stun guns, and military
style ordnance and explosives.
In 2003, PIFS developed the Model Weapons Control Bill. Based on the Nadi Framework, the Model Bill
provided a regional resource to update domestic legislation according to identified gaps between the
model law and existing provisions. The Model Law provided draft provisions to control arms, ammunition,
explosives, and other types of weapons in areas such as import and export; civilian possession, trade
and manufacturing; and registration and licensing systems for possession and trade. The Model Law also
provides standards on marking, record keeping and safe secure storage. In 2010, the Model Bill was
updated by PIFS to incorporate model text to control arms brokering, an area which had been identified
as not being strongly regulated in the region.
Other UXO related regional activities undertaken in the Pacific include the development of a Regional
Strategy to Address Marine Pollution from World War II Wrecks. Endorsed by the South Pacific Regional
Environment Programme (SPREP) in 2002, the strategy was developed in response to concerns caused by an
The principal aim of the strategy is to prevent/minimise damage to marine and coastal environments and
resources as a result of marine spills from WWIII wrecks. While the strategy does not consider UXO on land
and is mainly focused on marine spills, it does provide a framework for the collection of data regarding
the environmental impacts of WWII chemicals and UXO and also has developed a comprehensive database
on sunken WWII naval and cargo vessels.
20
Australian Agency for International Development, pp7-8.
21
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
oil spill in the Federated States of Micronesia due to the disturbance of a WWII wreck, the USS Mississinewa.
Box Two - Pacific Islands Forum Regional Security Architecture
Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC)
Created in 1987, the annual meeting of the FRSC is the principal forum for setting a regional security agenda
and identifying priorities for enhancing the capacity of members to respond to internal and external security
threats. The FRSC provides an opportunity for Regional Law Enforcement Organisations 21 and law enforcement
related CROP agencies22 to meet annually with Forum officials to discuss strategic issues on law enforcement
and security related matters. Forum Leaders in 2010 commended the work of the FRSC in advancing regional
cooperation in addressing the numerous law enforcement and security challenges and highlighted the valuable
work being carried out by national and regional law enforcement agencies and other relevant bodies active in
the region.
Security Declarations
In addition to the Pacific Plan, various regional instruments adopted by Forum Leaders provide guiding principles
and mechanisms to facilitate collective law enforcement and security action.
-
1992 Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation: Recognised that an adverse law enforcement environment could threaten the sovereignty, security and economic integrity of Forum members and jeopardise economic and social development.
-
1997 Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation: Forum Leaders agreed to a number of principles governing security cooperation in the region.
-
2000 Biketawa Declaration: The declaration sets the framework for regional crisis management and conflict resolution initiatives.
-
2000 Nadi Framework Initiative: Legal Framework for a Common Approach to Weapons Control in the Pacific region.
-
2002 Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security: Leaders recognised the need for immediate and sustained regional action in response to the threats of terrorist related activities..
The Pacific Plan
The Pacific Plan endorsed by Forum Leaders in 2005 is based on the four pillars of security, economic growth,
good governance, and sustainable development.
-
Good Governance
Improved transparency, accountability, equity and efficiency in the management and use of resources in the Pacific
-
Security
Improved political and social conditions for stability and safety
22
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
21
Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police, Pacific Immigration Director’s Conference, Oceania Customs Organisation, Pacific Islands Law
Officers Network.
22
Secretariat of the Pacific Community and Forum Fisheries Agency.
UXO Clearance Initiatives Undertaken to Date
Historically there have been a number of UXO clearance activities undertaken in the region by Forum
members and international military personnel. Although details are limited, various sources refer to
a number of clearance activities undertaken by military personnel from Australia, New Zealand, the
United States of America, and the United Kingdom. These activities include missions to Kiribati (1943,23
2008),24 Tuvalu (1980),25 the Republic of the Marshall Islands (several missions from 1945 to 1969),26
Solomon Islands,27 and Papua New Guinea (2009).28
In recent years however, UXO clearance activities in the region have largely been the responsibility of the
affected country. With no regional mechanisms or frameworks through which to source assistance, Forum
Island Countries have had to either develop UXO clearing capabilities or seek bilateral assistance from
countries with sufficient technical expertise and resources.
Officials interviewed in the study countries confirmed that in the past, assistance had been received in
areas such as capacity building and destruction of WWII UXO. Clearance activities had been undertaken
routinely by military forces from Australia and the USA and continue to be undertaken on an intermittent
basis upon request and availability of resources. In Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Papua New Guinea, the
personnel responsible for UXO clearance continue to receive intermittent support from Australian Defence
Force Personnel.
In some Forum Island Countries, NGOs have undertaken large scale UXO clearance projects funded by
various donors. In Palau, British NGO Cleared Ground Demining (CGD) has been clearing UXO on Peleliu
since 2009 with the assistance of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, New Zealand, USA, the United
Kingdom and Italy. This type of assistance provides the opportunity for donors to contribute varying levels
of funding which can allow funding to be more readily obtained. The activities currently undertaken in
Palau provide a model for affected Forum Island Countries and for international initiatives that can be
provided in the region.
In terms of research, there have been limited publications on UXO in the Pacific. Most of the information
obtained for this Report have been from military reports and historical text based on either WWII Battles
or the Pacific Islands.
In 2003 Landmine Action published A Global Survey on the Explosive Remnants of War which attempted
to take a snapshot of global, regional and national levels of ERW and their socio-economic impacts during
2001/ 2002. The publication provided a brief regional overview of the Pacific, highlighting Kiribati, the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (PNG). It was identified
that while ERW were present in the five Forum countries, more research was required as insufficient
contemporary data was available to indicate that the effects of contamination were more than residual.
In reviewing activities in the region, the publication noted that there did not appear to be any systematic
demining or awareness programmes being undertaken in the region.
Chirgwin, p20.
Price, p1.
25
Chirgwin, p17.
26
Spennemann
27
Chirgwin, p21.
28
Price, p1.
24
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
23
23
Also published the same year, Under the Gun; The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific by David Capie
included a Chapter on World War II Surplus and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). The Chapter discussed
UXO, SALW, and ammunition in Solomon Islands, PNG, Bougainville, and Micronesia focusing on the use of
refurbished WWII weapons and ammunition in current conflicts. Capie noted that while there was some
evidence of a number of WWII weapons being used in PNG and Bougainville, the true danger was in the
surviving stock of ammunition such as the .50 calibre rounds used in US machine guns that were readily
available.
In response to this threat, Capie recommended that UXO clearance assistance could be provided as part of
the Australian Defence Cooperation and mutual assistance programmes between Australia, New Zealand
and the Pacific States with possible financial support from Japan and USA.
Photograph 3 – Ammunition located in RSIPF UXO Storage Area. Photo taken by S. Francis.
In 2009, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), with funding from the
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), commissioned Carl Chirgwin to prepare an
interim report titled A Pre-Survey Study into ERW Contamination in the Pacific. Undertaken as a ‘desk
24
study’ exercise, the publication sought to provide an analysis for GICHD on: (1) the scope and scale of UXO
contamination in Pacific Islands Forum Countries; (2) the capacity of Forum Island Countries to deal with
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
UXO contamination; and (3) the ‘gap’ between the current capacity and those required to deal with the
identified UXO issues.
The survey provided an overview of ERW in the Pacific and provided very useful information on WWII
battles that had occurred in the subject nations. The Study focused on nine Forum Countries that had
been affected by WWII conflict and sought to collect information regarding the scale of UXO and the
number of clearance and capacity building activities that had been undertaken in the region. The study
concluded that there was a degree of ERW contamination in the Pacific Islands Countries studied.
Chapter Three: Summary of Findings
Underwater wreckage with UXO - Palau.
Photo taken by T. Essick for Cleared Ground Demining
25
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Summary of Findings
The scoping studies undertaken in Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands identified a
number of common themes and issues. For the most part, all study countries faced similar issues albeit
to varying degrees. This Chapter is based on the findings of the country reports provided by the Research
team to the FRSC in 2011.
The issues considered in the country reports focused on three main areas:
1. the extent of the problem of UXO in Member countries, and the impact on communities, the
environment and development;
2. current activities being undertaken to address UXO; and
3. the challenges and constraints faced by national authorities dealing with UXO.
Summary
In the study countries, UXO items continue to be present in varying levels in affected areas. These items
are located on the ground, sub-surface or underwater in both rural and urban areas. UXO has the potential
to cause significant impacts on local communities through (1) safety issues resulting in possible loss of
life or injuries as evidenced in PNG and Solomon Islands; (2) environmental impacts resulting from the
leaching of harmful chemicals contained in the UXO, or from the links of UXO to dynamite fishing which
damages reefs and lagoon ecological systems; (3) impeding development activities especially those linked
to excavation; and (4) impeding the ability of local communities to utilise land for economic activities
such as those related to tourism and subsistence agriculture.
Activities currently undertaken to combat UXO in study countries involve tasking organisations such
as local Police or Defence Forces, or international NGOs in the case of Palau, to undertake clearance
activities. These activities for the most part are limited to responding to public reports, making initial
safety assessments, and transportation of UXO items for storage in secure areas. While some of the
countries have undertaken activities to dispose of UXO, resources have been reported as a constraint.
With the exception of Palau, comprehensive Mine Action activities are not undertaken and information
management is limited with only Solomon Islands and Palau collecting centralised national data. Assistance
in terms of UXO clearance missions and technical capacity building have been provided in the past by
foreign external military personnel, development partners, and NGOs.
The main difficulties reported by the national UXO authorities in the study countries involve (1) limited
resources; (2) limited technical capacity; (3) lack of reliable information and clarity on extent of UXO
issues and resulting impacts on community; (4) lack of awareness at national and international levels;
and (5) limited national coordination to implement comprehensive UXO clearance activities according to
IMAS.
Detailed discussion of Findings
26
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
(i) The extent of the UXO Problems in the Forum Island Countries studied
and the impacts on communities, environment and development:
1. UXO items continue to be present in a number of areas in the study countries. The
study countries reported that UXO can be readily found in varying amounts in numerous locations.
While many of the affected sites are remote rural areas, UXO continue to be discovered regularly in
highly populated areas. A survey by CGD of the Peleliu battle site found that 26% of local households
reported UXO contamination.
2. The true extent of current UXO contamination for most of the Forum Island Countries
studied is unknown and difficult to ascertain due to the limited information available.
The quantity of UXO used in the region is almost impossible to ascertain due to the incompleteness
of records available. Many of these records may no longer be available or may have been destroyed
when military bases were being overrun. This was reflected in information available to the study
countries. As such, baseline data has not been collected in several key areas.
Photograph 4 – UXO Projectile located close to
residence in Palau. Photo provided by Cleared
Ground Demining.
Photograph 5 – UXO lying openly in bush area
in Palau. Photo provided by Cleared Ground
Demining.
3. UXO items currently being recovered for disposal vary greatly. Many different types of
UXO are currently being collected and disposed of in the study countries. Examples include aircraft
bombs, rockets, artillery shells, mortar round, hand grenades, sea mines, depth charges, and small
arms and light weapons ammunition.
4. Most WWII UXO items that continue to be recovered have deteriorated and are purported
to be in an increasingly unstable condition.
5. UXO items continue to be present in areas that can be accessed by the public. In countries
studied, the Research Team observed UXO in lagoons, forests and residential areas. Officials report
that in remote outlying areas UXO continue to be washed up on beaches or discovered in bushland.
6. UXO have caused fatalities and injuries and continue to endanger local communities.
Data provided by the Solomon Islands indicates that there have been at least 12 reported incidents
of UXO related fatalities between 2005 and 2010 although the numbers could be higher due to cases
of non-reporting. Papua New Guinea media reports also indicate a number of fatalities.
Research Team were able to observe first hand a number of UXO items visibly leaking chemical
substances due to corrosion. While officials interviewed strongly believed that leaking UXO are
contaminating the environment, no scientific research or data is available to support these claims.
Chemicals in UXO and ammunition include (1) heavy metals such as lead, zinc, copper; (2) explosives
such as TNT and nitro-glycerine; and (3) components from propellants such as dinitritoluene and
dibutylphtalate.29
29
OSCE 2008, p148.
27
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
7. It is commonly believed that chemical leakage from UXO contaminates land and marine
environments leading to possible health and safety problems. In the countries visited the
8. UXO remains an available source for
obtaining explosive material. Reports
from Solomon Islands and information obtained
from officials and secondary resources indicate
explosive material being extracted by locals
from UXO. Solomon Islands report a number
of related prosecutions for possession of UXO
items.
9. UXO and remnants of war such as firearms
have been used (1) to produce weapons,
(2) as ammunition for weapons, and (3)
to manufacture explosives. A number of
reports indicate that WWII materials such as
firearms have been refurbished or used to
produce home made weapons. Ammunition
Photograph 6 – Artillery rounds in RSIPF UXO Storage
Site leaking a white substance in the Solomon
Islands. Photo taken by S. Francis.
from WWII remains readily available30 and gun
powder from UXO has been used to manufacture explosives.
10.UXO and other WWII material have been used as weapons during internal conflicts and
also to commit crimes. Reports from law enforcement officers indicate that WWII materials were
used by militants during the civil conflicts in Bougainville and Solomon Islands. WWII materials were
also used in tribal conflicts in Papua New Guinea.31 The severity of the impacts from these activities
have resulted in certain countries visited criminalising the use and possession of WWII remnants.
11.UXO continue to be used as a source for obtaining explosive material to undertake
dynamite fishing which causes environmental damage. Dynamite fishing which involves
the detonation of explosive devices often results in environmental damage to lagoons and reefs. In
addition, while details are limited, officials interviewed reported injuries and fatalities caused by
this type of fishing.
12.UXO and other war remnants continue to be sought after by members of the public.
There is a demand for gun powder, scrap metal and other remnants of war increasing the risk of
interaction between the public and dangerous UXO materials. In Solomon Islands, it was found that
a one litre bottle containing gunpowder had been available for purchase at a local market price of
about 1,500 – 3,000 Solomon Dollars. It is foreseen that the risk of interaction between the public
and UXO in affected areas will continue to exist due to an ongoing demand for gunpowder and scrap
metal.
13.UXO currently place an additional burden on available public resources. Governments are
currently required to dedicate resources to handle, store and destroy UXO. In many instances this
28
will require Governments to recruit an Officer responsible for explosive ordnance disposal, provide
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
also be needed for additional activities such as the creation and management of databases, recovery
appropriate training and safety equipment and establish a suitable storage facility. More resources will
operations, the protection of fisheries from UXO related dynamite fishing, and the investigation and
prosecution of UXO related offences.
14.The presence of UXO acts as an impediment to development. UXO in many instances
restricts land use for farming, food gathering and other socio-economic activities. This problem can
be significant in areas where land is scarce. In many islands where residential settlements have been
30
31
Capie p112.
Capie p112.
constructed on affected areas with sub-surface UXO, activities such as gardening or construction that
require excavation can lead to potentially life threatening incidents. The Research team obtained
firsthand knowledge of this in Palau and Kiribati.
a. Officials interviewed in Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands noted that most of the UXO
recovered were in response to ordnance discovered by the public during construction;
b. Officials reported UXO discovered at building sites hindered development projects. In Kiribati, UXO
in the South Tarawa lagoon were a possible hindrance to two proposed infrastructure development
projects; and
c. Officials noted UXO affected economic opportunities such as (1) agricultural activities and (2) tourism
ventures.
(ii) Current activities undertaken in the study countries to combat UXO:
1. Most of the countries studied have adopted a two tier approach to manage UXO.
This has involved:
1. developing national EOD teams to respond to UXO reported by the public. These teams remove UXO where possible according to the resources available;
2. seeking periodic assistance from development partners such as Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America to undertake clearance activities in specific areas.
2. Apart from Palau, pro active systematic UXO Clearance activities in the study countries
were limited.
3. Limited Mine Action activities were being undertaken in study countries with UXO
Awareness raising activities being undertaken in only Palau and Solomon Islands;
4. Solomon Islands currently have a dedicated clearance unit made up of 6 members.
While this unit has personnel trained in the clearance of UXO, they report often having issues with
limited resources and equipment.
5. PNG currently utilises the expertise of its Defence Force Personnel to undertake UXO
clearance activities. While these personnel have received training for the clearance of UXO, they
frequently lack adequate resources and equipment.
6. Kiribati currently uses the expertise of the Police armourer in Tarawa for the recovery
and storage of UXO. The current police armourer has not received any formal training but has
previously assisted trained officers that have since left the Service.
7. Palau has no dedicated national UXO clearance mechanism and coordinates its activities
through Cleared Ground Demining (CGD), an NGO that began local clearance activities
in 2009. CGD are currently training a local team and implement limited awareness raising
programmes.
an ad hoc basis with of recent activities undertaken in PNG and Kiribati. ADF has provided training to
Solomon Islands RISPF as part of RAMSI and EOD support to Kiribati, Nauru, Solomon Islands and the
Marshall Islands as part of Operation Render Safe.32
32
Solomon Times Online, October 27 2009.
29
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
8. International assistance in terms of military deployments for UXO clearance in the
study countries has previously been provided by Australia, United States of America,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. External military assistance continues to be provided on
9. Notwithstanding the availability of external assistance, officials interviewed generally
were of the view that long-term local sustainable solutions for comprehensive UXO
clearance were required. It is noted however that the ADF, New Zealand and CGD have provided
in country training to the study countries.33
(iii) Challenges and constraints faced by national authorities in Forum Island
Countries studied:
1. Lack of Baseline Data and information. Baseline data is required to determine the planning and
prioritisation of resources for UXO clearance. A detailed assessment/survey of UXO affected areas
and related impacts allows each country to determine the extent and severity of the challenges
created by UXO, prioritise resources accordingly, and monitor future activities.
2. Limited Resources. Officials from all countries agreed that there were limited resources available
to allocate to dedicated UXO activities. As a result, the UXO activities in the countries studied
were mostly limited to clearance, transport and storage of UXO items in response to reports from
the public. Even in countries like Solomon Islands and PNG with trained personnel, limited modern
safety equipment posed a potential health and safety risk. Officials noted that the lack of resources
had restricted their ability to undertake UXO clearance in remote areas, or undertake additional
activities such as UXO risk reduction, victim assistance, (including rehabilitation and reintegration),
stockpile destruction, and advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions.
3. Lack of a Comprehensive Policy Framework. Most of the Countries reviewed had yet to develop
a comprehensive national UXO clearance policy framework to systematically coordinate activities,
information, resources and personnel. As a result there was often no central mechanism to prioritise
and coordinate national and international activities and resources on UXO clearance leading to many
activities being undertaken in isolation.
4. Lack of Technical Capacity. Linked to limited resources, there were a number of capacity issues
raised in the countries studied. UXO staff in many cases had not received any form of formal training
on UXO and did not have any standard operating procedures.
5. Lack of Awareness. In the Countries studied (apart from Palau), there was a general lack of
awareness at all levels (from the public to national government to international donors) regarding the
dangers of UXO, the extent of the problem, and its potential impact to communities, the environment
and development.
This can be attributed in part to:
•
Lack of information and data being collected nationally ;
•
Lack of awareness raising campaigns being undertaken nationally. Apart from Palau and Solomon
Islands, there were no UXO risk awareness programmes in the countries studied due mainly to the
30
lack of resources to undertake such activities.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
6. Competing National Priorities. UXO issues are often overlooked when the national focus is on
development. Forum Island Countries predominantly seek to focus available resources in advancing
the development agenda which often leads to a significant lack of emphasis on UXO. The absence of
UXO from national, sector, and agency development and planning policies often suggests that UXO
issues are not a domestic priority.
33
Chirgwin p21.
7. Data and Information Management. Apart from Palau (since 2009) and the Solomon Islands, record
keeping and information management activities for UXO has been generally limited. The standard
procedures set out by international best practices such as International Mine Action Standards on
data management are not adapted. Records about where UXO are located, the types of items found,
clearance activities and previous assistance provided have not in some cases been maintained by the
lead agencies.
Information on injuries and fatalities caused by UXO, with the exception of Solomon Islands, was
mainly limited to media reports and accounts from national EOD teams with a limited number of
databases available. Where information was recorded locally, this information was not made available
to the international community.
While basic records have been kept by some countries (Palau and Solomon Islands) there is significant
room for improvement.
Recording and compiling accurate data on UXO is essential as it assists national agencies in:
•
ascertaining the full extent and impact of UXO domestically;
•
providing an effective baseline to monitor future activities;
•
developing a comprehensive, coordinated and systematic UXO clearance strategy;
•
raising the awareness of UXO issues at the national, regional and international level to mobilise
resources; and
•
accessing information to justify proposals when making requests to fund UXO activities.
8. Geography. UXO in PNG, Solomon Islands and Kiribati are scattered over a wide geographical area in
various islands and provinces. Limited resources for travel make it difficult to investigate and manage
reports of UXO in isolated areas. Conversely, in Kiribati and Palau where the ordnance is concentrated
on small land masses such as Peleliu and Betio Island, land scarcity increases the risk of exposure to
UXO.
9. Limited links to international Mine Action support Frameworks. To date only Palau of the
study countries has been able to obtain significant NGO assistance with activities being undertaken
with donor funding.
Box Three: Model approach for those affected countries in the region.
In its presentation to the FRSC, the Research team highlighted the efforts currently undertaken by British NGO
Cleared Ground Demining (CGD) in Palau. The Research team noted that the types of activities undertaken by
CGD in Palau set a bench mark in the region for affected Forum Island Countries and for international initiatives
to be implemented in the region. The model used in Palau focused on enhancing information management,
building local capacity, involving all sectors of the community (community based) in a pro-active approach,
and promoting socio-economic development issues. In 20 months CGD reported that it had cleared 9,106 UXO
items and have trained seven local staff.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Activities currently undertaken in Palau provide a model national approach between Government, UXO
clearance service providers, and donor agencies.
31
32
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CGD Staff inspecting fuse of 1000lb bomb underwater.
Photo taken by T. Essick for Cleared Ground Demining
Country scoping assessment reports
This section of the publication provides country reports on Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Solomon
Islands. The background research and in country consultations were undertaken in the study countries
from late 2010 to early 2011.
The country reports provide an overview of the extent of UXO related issues in the study countries,
identifying affected locations, Agencies involved in UXO clearance, past clearance activities, institutional
capacity, policy frameworks and UXO clearance constraints. The reports reflect responses received from
various officials interviewed regarding activities currently being undertaken.
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the scoping missions highlighted that the study countries have
identified UXO as a threat to public safety and have each developed mechanisms based on available
resources to manage clearance and disposal activities. However, local stakeholders during the missions
have highlighted serious resource and technical capacity constraints requiring further support at national
and regional levels.
The analysis here is best described as a scoping study, undertaken to explore possible UXO issues in the
study countries. The scoping studies sought to (1) explore the levels and impacts of UXO; (2) identify the
current capacity available to the study countries to manage UXO issues; and (3) assess if there is added
value in undertaking further initiatives to support UXO clearance activities.
The findings were presented to the 2011 FRSC meeting where it was met with a positive response from
attending officials.
It should be noted that the country reports only provide a snapshot of the local context at the time of
the interviews with the findings being neither comprehensive nor detailed and only tentative in nature.
It explores developing assistance programmes and initiatives to coordinate national actions. The scoping
study has provided an opportunity to identify (1) programming options; (2) possible national activities;
and (3) where more detailed assessment is required.
Subsequent programme development would require national assessments to determine (1) the full extent of
UXO issues for each affected member; (2) the capacity and resources currently available to UXO clearance
agencies; and (3) possible avenues of support from bilateral, regional and international partners.
33
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Kiribati
Christmas
Islands
Tarawa
Line Islands
Gilbert Islands
Phoenix
Islands
Population (Census 2005)
92,533
Land Area (Km²).
811
Population density :( people/ Km²).
127 ( approx for 2011)
GDP Growth rate - 2010
1.8%
GDP Per Capita (PPP US$).
1479.18 Rank 127
Police Personnel
Approximately 400
No of Personnel currently in EOD Unit. 1
34
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Chapter Four:
Kiribati
Projectile next to residential area - Palau
Photo taken by S. Ballinger for Cleared Ground Demining
35
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Background
Kiribati consists of 33 islands dispersed over more than 3,500,000 km2 of ocean. With a combined land
area of approximately 800 sq km and a population of approximately 95,000 individuals,34 Kiribati was
initially a colony of the United Kingdom as part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands until its independence in
1979.
The Islands of Kiribati saw some of the bloodiest encounters in WWII with battles fought on Abemama,
Makin, Betio, Butaritari and Tarawa. The Battle of Tarawa, which concentrated on the Southern Tarawa
Atoll islands of Betio and Bairiki, took place from 20 - 24 November 1943. Over 1,000 US Marines lost their
lives while approximately 4,600 Japanese and Korean soldiers and labourers were killed as a result of the
battle.35
From 1942 to 1943, a substantial amount of ordnance was dropped or fired onto Betio Island and the
surrounding lagoon areas. In addition to ordnance fired from US naval warships, bombers flown from
Funafuti and other bases situated in the Ellice Islands (now Tuvalu) bombed Tarawa and the surrounding
lagoon areas36 repeatedly. These attacks intensified in the days leading up to the actual amphbious
assaults by the US Marines.
Mission
The Secretariat with assistance from CGD undertook an on-site visit to Tarawa and met with local officials
involved with UXO clearance from 22 March to 1 April 2011. During the mission the Team was able to
discuss a number of issues with key officials involved in UXO clearance and also witnessed firsthand
examples of UXO.
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
Scope of UXO Issue
UXO remains a serious issue for Kiribati with a number of areas currently affected. Unfortunately insufficient
information regarding the numbers of UXO introduced during WWII and removed or destroyed since 1943
make ascertaining the true extent of the current problem difficult. Discussions with local police, Government
officials and the diplomatic community in Kiribati indicated that UXO continue to be uncovered regularly in
affected areas such as Betio, Makin, Butaritari, Abemama, and Christmas Islands as well as the South Tarawa
lagoon. Kiribati Police Service (KPS) officials reported that about 800 items of UXO were buried at a WWII
Memorial Park on Betio Island approximately 10 years ago.
Sources suggest that in excess of 2,400 tons of ordnance was fired or dropped onto Betio by the US Military
during the amphibious landings.37 With failure rates for ordnance estimated between 25% and 30%38 it is
probable that a large quantity did not explode. Matters have been complicated by land scarcity resulting
36
in subsequent construction and development in this area. As such, KPS report that UXO continues to be
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
UXO contamination on Betio Island when on the last day of the scoping mission, the team was called to a
unearthed regularly during construction projects. The Team witnessed firsthand an example of sub-surface
34
Estimates based on Kiribati Government Census 2005, pix.
Cawthorne, pp220-228
36
McQuarrie, p55 -63.
37
Smith, p121.
38
CGD Interview.
35
Photograph 7: USA HE Projectile excavated behind a house in Betio at a depth of 0.3 metres. Photo taken
by Cleared Ground Demining
residence where the homeowner while planting a banana tree in his vegetable garden dug up a USA Naval
High Explosive Projectile that was armed and in an unstable condition. (refer Photograph 7)
The mission team visited Betio Police station where around 2,500 recovered UXO items were stored
and witnessed examples of WWII UXO in three different locations on the Island and in the South Tarawa
Lagoon.
37
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Table 1: Ordnance currently located at Betio Police Station Storage
Description
Quantity
Country of Origin
MK4 GP 100lb Aircraft Bomb
2
USA
M49A2 60mm HE Mortar
1
USA
Type 97 81mm HE Mortar
1
Japan
Type 94 HE Projectile
2
Japan
Type 2 Hollow Charge Projectile
2
Japan
127mm HE Projectile
1
Japan
5inch MK35 Naval HE Projectile
3
USA
75mm HE Projectile c/w M18 Cartridge
9
USA
25mm Projectile
1
Japan
Type 89 ‘Knee’ 50mm HE Mortar
1
Japan
MK2 Fragmentation Hand Grenade
4
USA
Type 99 HE Blast Hand Grenade
2
Japan
Fuse – Unknown – Heavily Corroded
3
Unknown
SAA – 6.5mm
2,465
USA
Total
2,495
38
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Photo 8: UXO of Japanese and USA origin including 60mm High Explosive Mortars, 75 & 127mm
Projectiles stored at Betio Police Station. Photo taken by Cleared Ground Demining
Personnel interviewed reported that the South
Tarawa Lagoon contained possibly several dozen
if not 100 or more aircraft bombs scattered
throughout the area. The team carried out a brief
underwater search in the lagoon and immediately
located two USA 100lb Aircraft bombs that had
failed to detonate. (refer Photograph 9). WWII
tourist guides interviewed by the mission team
also indicated the presence of UXO on the Southern
Reef line off Betio Island although these could not
be confirmed visually.
UXO Awareness
Kiribati does not have any UXO awareness
programmes. Most officials interviewed knew that
Photograph 9: USA MK4 GP 100lb Aircraft Bomb
– One of two located by Research team in the
Southern lagoon of Tarawa Atoll. Photo provided
by Cleared Ground Demining.
they had to notify KPS if they discovered UXO
items.
Condition of UXO
The types of UXO located in Kiribati are similar to
those encountered in most Pacific Island Nations
affected by WWII battles between the USA and
Japan. The UXO is primarily of Japanese and USA
origin, containing an array of chemical components,
fusing mechanisms, ammunition and high explosives.
All UXO encountered were at least 68 years old and
in various stages of deterioration, with the outer
casings heavily corroded, fuse mechanism working
parts exposed and explosive chemicals visible to
the naked eye. This deterioration and the possible
chemical leakage underground or into the lagoon
Photo10: Rusted USA Mk 2 Fragmentation Hand
Grenade stored at Betio Police Station. Photo
provided by Cleared Ground Demining.
raises possible health and environmental concerns
especially in waters where the population is very dependent on fishing and locally constructed wells
for washing and cooking purposes. In addition, the leaching of chemicals contained in UXO over time
is a potential hazard to both human health and the environment. Chemicals in UXO and ammunition
include heavy metals such as Lead, Antimony, Zinc, Copper, explosives such as TNT and nitro-glycerine,
and components from propellants such as dinitritoluene and dibutylphtalate.39
UXO Policy Framework
UXO activities in Kiribati are currently limited to ad hoc clearance responses undertaken by the Police
Service. While proactive clearance and UXO destruction activities have been undertaken periodically
information management and the lack of an effective central database to record or access data of past
activities has resulted in the lack of a coordinated approach. According to officials interviewed, while
foreign assistance received has been greatly appreciated, in most cases it has not led to the development
of a sustainable domestic mechanism to properly and safely handle UXO disposal.
39
OSCE, p148.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
with the assistance of foreign military personnel, these activities were conducted intermittently. Limited
39
Agencies Dealing with UXO
The Kiribati Police Service are the lead agency responsible for UXO Clearance in Kiribati. The clearance
activities are currently undertaken by the KPS armourer who is based in the Police Head Quarters on Betio
Island in Tarawa.
UXO Assistance Obtained
Clearance projects have been undertaken previously with assistance provided by foreign military personnel
from the USA, Australia and New Zealand.
Previous UXO Clearance Activities
Although there have been a number of UXO clearance initiatives undertaken by external military personnel
in affected areas since the conclusion of World War II, there is limited information available regarding the
details of these activities. In 1943, US Marines were reported to have destroyed large stocks of ammunition
discovered after the defeat of Japanese Forces while military specialists from New Zealand and Australia
also undertook clearance activities intermittently40 since the end of World War II.
In 2008 the Australian Defence Force deployed a small Joint Task Force of 22 personnel made up of
Air Force and Army specialists as well as a diving team to undertake land and underwater clearing
activities.41 As part of the assistance provided by the ADF, the Joint Task Force also undertook to scope
future UXO disposal requirements and EOD training opportunities for the Kiribati Police Force.
Current Methodology for Removal and Destruction of UXO
Current clearance procedures in Kiribati do not involve pro-active clearing activities. The KPS respond
to public reports when UXO are uncovered. Current procedures involve an initial assessment of the UXO
item undertaken by the ‘brave’ Armourer, as described by the KPS Commissioner, to identify any potential
risks and determine the safest method for extraction and transport. UXO items that can be moved are
transported to the Police Station for storage until a sufficient quantity has been collected to justify
seeking external assistance for disposal. The disposal of UXO utilising external military assistance (most
recently from Australia and New Zealand) have generally been undertaken by using explosive material.
While in country, the Team assisted the KPS Armourer with UXO that had been collected by an external
military team and deposited in a public area outside the Police Station. The Team assisted the Armourer
to move the ordnance to an adjacent derelict WWII bunker and erect protective works such as sandbags
around the ordnance. The Mission noted that some of the ordnance had been moved without any render
safe (disarming) procedures performed.
Domestic Capacity of Lead UXO Agency
The domestic capacity of Kiribati to manage UXO issues are currently hampered by the lack of: (1) available
resources; (2) a comprehensive national policy to coordinate clearance activities; (3) clear and accessible
40
data regarding current UXO levels and past clearance activities; and (4) training and technical expertise
available to staff responsible for UXO disposal.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
40
41
Chirgwin, Section 3.1.
http://www.defence.gov.au/opEx/global/opkiribatiassist/gallery/20080814/index.htm
Institutional Capacity
The current capacity of the KPS to safely manage UXO is limited due mainly to the lack of resources.
Discussions with the KPS Officers indicate that:
• The KPS lack technical standard operating procedures for the management of UXO events;
• The KPS Officers have limited access to formal explosive ordnance disposal training;
• The KPS lack specialized safety equipment for handling, transporting and disposing of UXO;
• The current KPS Armourer by his own admission does not have any formal training to handle UXO although he had obtained experience through assisting previous Kiribati Police Officers trained in Explosive Ordnance Disposal;
• Previous explosive ordnance training made available to KPS had not been sustainable leading to a gap of about ten years since formally trained Officers had left the Service; and
• Geography is a considerable constraint to KPS due to the difficulty involved in travelling around Kiribati to investigate and deal with ordnance reports. Kiribati covers some 3.55 million square kilometres and travel between islands can be challenging with limited transportation and domestic flights available.
The KPS Commissioner expressed concern that his personnel, who were required to respond to UXO
threats, lacked essential tools and the necessary skills to identify, assess, plan and respond appropriately
to dispose of UXO while mitigating potential risks.
Information Management
Information regarding UXO related injuries and fatalities, areas affected, items collected and destroyed,
and past clearance activities were not available and are not currently recorded or consolidated. While the
Government has historic information such as bombing maps or base and bunker fortifications, actual data
on the extent of the contamination on Betio Island does not exist, and reports on various external military
clearance activities undertaken over the years could not be located.
This has resulted in the lack of data on: (1) locations from where UXO have been removed from; (2) details
of the ordnance type and quantities discovered; and (3) methods used to dispose the UXO. Direct enquiries
have been made to the foreign Governments involved in either the initial conflicts or clearing activities for
copies of the reports to assist in compiling a working database to assist UXO disposal activities.
While there are a number of documented examples of UXO items uncovered or disposed of by both
external military forces and local Kiribati police, the information recorded is limited.
Developmental impacts of UXO
The presence of UXO in a number of affected areas both sub-surface and underwater are an impediment
to the development of these areas. The South Tarawa lagoon and Betio Island in particular continue to
show signs of UXO contamination and are a possible safety concern for individuals undertaking activities
in these areas. The problem in Betio Island is exacerbated by the fact that it is a densely populated area
likely that the land in the affected areas will be increasingly utilised to support the growing population.
Activities such as construction and gardening will increase excavation activities further increasing the
probability of human interaction with UXO.
42
Secretariat of the Pacific Community, p5.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
estimated at over 2,500 people per square kilometre.42 As land scarcity is a problem in Kiribati, it is highly
41
During the Team visit there were a number of major development projects in the process of being
implemented in Kiribati. Discussions with a number of consultants working for the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank confirmed that most projects had not developed counter-measures to deal with
the possible presence of UXO in their proposed project sites. This was mainly due to a lack of awareness
regarding the risk levels of UXO contamination, which in turn was due to the lack of awareness in the
relevant Government Ministries.
The presence of UXO in the South Tarawa lagoon created potential issues for proposed projects to: (1)
extend Betio Island Port; and (2) mine gravel to support infrastructure development.
Current constraints facing Kiribati include:
1. Limited technical capacity and specialist equipment:
a. KPS Armourer responsible for UXO clearance by his own admission lacks any formal training on b. Officers interviewed claim that the KPS record keeping ability is limited primarily because they UXO clearance;
do not possess the skills to identify the types of UXO received for storage; and
c. The Government currently lacks a sustainable approach to ensure local UXO disposal Officials are adequately trained, safety equipment provided and maintained, and storage and destruction facilities available.
2. Limited resources available to KPS Armourer resulting in Mine Action programmes and UXO activities
being limited to clearance in response to reports from the public.
3. No mine risk education activities to raise awareness of (1) national stakeholders/ public/ partner
Government Agencies; (2) international community; and (3) UXO Donor organisations.
4. Inadequate access to information and limited UXO information management.
a. No baseline data or survey information available to determine extent of threat and impacts on b. Limited UXO data currently being collected by KPS, the Ministry for Health and
community.
other Government agencies;
c. Absence of a centralised database to assist officials responsible for UXO management;
i.
The failure to record and consolidate data and information from previous UXO clearance actions hinders the safety and possible success of future activities and leads to possible duplication of activities in areas that have already been cleared;
ii. Information such as where the ordnance was located, types of ordnance located, and the number of items discovered are invaluable for determining high risk areas;
5. Lack of scientific data and research capability to determine possible health and environmental impacts
caused by leaching of chemicals contained in UXO.
6. Lack of a national overarching policy framework/ National Action Plan to coordinate resources and
activities to systematically clear and manage UXO.
7. No domestic standards or guidelines to direct UXO clearance activities.
42
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
43
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Rusting Ordnance in Solomon Islands. Photo by S. Francis
Konrei
Galap
Palau
Babelthuap
Koror
Urukthapel
Eil Malik
Ngemelis
Ngergoi
Peleliu
Angaur
Population (Census 2005)
19,907
Land Area (Km²).
444
Population density :( people/ Km²).
46
GDP Growth rate.
1.0%
GDP Per Capita - 2008 (PPP UD$).
8,100
Police Personnel
Over 300
No of Personnel currently in EOD Unit. 6
44
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Chapter Five:
Palau
Local clearance team carrying 100lb bomb found in food garden area - Palau
Photo taken by S. Ballinger for Cleared Ground Demining
45
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Background
Palau is located in the North Pacific Ocean some 2,000 kilometres (1, 2424.8 miles) north of Australia.
It is estimated that there are more than 200 islands in the chain running from northwest to southwest,
although only 8 are inhabited. The population of Palau is approximately 20,000 of whom 70% are native
Palauans who are of mixed Melanesian, Micronesian, and Austronesian descent.
Peleliu Island was the scene of one of the Pacific’s bloodiest battles when U.S. Marines made an amphibious
assault in 1944. Peleliu was heavily fortified with concrete bunkers and over 600 man-made and reinforced
natural caves which were used to shelter the Japanese forces during massive naval bombardments prior
to the assault.
Palau in recognising the threat of UXO and the limited technical capacity approached the international
community to seek assistance. In 2009 a British NGO, Cleared Ground Demining (CGD) sourced funding to
undertake a clearance project in Peleliu which to date has been highly successful.
Mission
The Secretariat undertook an on-site visit to Palau and met with local officials involved with UXO clearance
from 8 to 12 November 2010. British NGO CGD assisted with the mission providing information about their
activities. During the mission the Team was able to discuss a number of issues with key officials involved
in UXO clearance and also visited some affected areas.
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
Scope of UXO Issue
UXO continue to be regularly recovered from several areas in Palau with the clearance of affected areas
in Peleliu estimated to take between 3 to 5 years.
Japanese bases and bunker positions were located extensively across the islands of Palau, and clearance
activities have to date removed UXO from ten of Palau’s sixteen States. However Peleliu and Angaur
islands where historic land battles took place are the sites where the majority of UXO have been found to
date. A door-to-door survey on the island of Peleliu discovered that 26% of households had some form of
UXO contamination.43 Major air battles also took place over Palau’s biggest island of Babeldaob, and its
most populated island of Koror.
Although clearance activities to date have concentrated on land, some ordnance have also been removed
from some of Palau’s most famous dive sites due to safety concerns faced by this important tourism sector.
In addition, CGD reports that 1109 items of ordnance were removed from the popular diver lunch spots of
South Dock on Peleliu, and 178 from Two Dogs lunch spot.
46
Information obtained from the US Military records for Palau shows that 2,200 tonnes of ordnance was
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
major supply bases for the Pacific, and also the base for its naval fleet following defeat in Chuuk, it is
dropped by air and another 600 tonnes were fired from US Navy vessels.44 As Palau was one of Japan’s
assumed that Japanese Forces had the capacity to return fire of equal magnitude. Hence given that
military failure rates range from 20-30%, at 25% there could be up to 1,400 tonnes remaining.45 It has been
estimated that with current resources the island of Peleliu could take from 3-5 years to clear with more
time needed should it be necessary to also undertake extensive sub-surface clearance.
43
CGD interviews.
CGD Interviews.
45
CGD UXO Survey Response.
44
The above figures are consistent with CGD’s current experience in assisting the Government of Palau
with mine action activities. After five months of clearance activities by a small local team, 5,864 items
of ordnance weighing some 6.5 tonnes have been located, removed and destroyed.46 Ordnance ranges
from hand grenades to 1000lb aircraft bombs, and includes land mines, cluster munitions, armed trip wire
devices, improvised explosive devices etc.
US records also show that munitions stores were dumped at sea by US forces as the battle moved from
Palau, and today much of these UXO ordnances still wash up on Peleliu’s beaches after storms.
In May 2009, the Republic of Palau through the Ministry of State instigated an assessment of its UXO problem
by CGD, and on receiving the findings invited CGD to mobilise international donor resources so that they
could implement clearance activities. Operations commenced in September 2009, prioritising high impact
clearance, in this case where communities and visitors are most at risk. Hence, clearance to date has
been focusing on UXO contamination in households and fields, around public infrastructure, and in the
vicinity of tourist monuments and sites. All activities are conducted in accordance with International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS) and CGD’s SOPs based on international best practice. This includes a full time
paramedic on site and accident insurance for all workers. CGD’s activities have also been awarded the
relevant permits from the Environmental Quality Protection Board (EQPB) and the Historic Preservation
Office (HPO) which recognise CGD to conduct clearance.
UXO Awareness
Risk awareness sessions have been conducted by CGD on Peleliu through community meetings, and
regular sessions at the schools. Signs depicting UXO have been erected at the points of entry to Peleliu
Island, warning of the dangers which UXO pose, and advising tourists not to touch them. Leaflets are also
distributed when tourists purchase their land permits with a Japanese version now translated and awaiting
printing. Awareness has also been conducted with local and Japanese tourist guides to ensure their visitors
do not touch items discovered.
CGD is seeking additional resources to expand their awareness campaign nationally, using media such as
television, radio and newspapers. At present national newspapers are highly supportive of the clearance
work being undertaken, and provide regular updates on activities.
Condition of UXO
After exposure for over 60 years, much of the ordnance in Palau is deteriorating and leaking into the
ground and sea, with isolated incidents of self-ignition from phosphorous grenades.
47
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
46
CGD Interviews.
Photograph 11. Unexploded bomb, Peleliu, Palau. Photo taken by AJM
UXO Policy Framework
At a strategic level, the President’s Office, with the assistance of the Ministry of State, deals with the
issue of UXO. The Ministry of State has been a driver in adopting the Ottawa and Oslo Treaties, as well as
encouraging other Pacific states to do likewise. The Ministry of State has also been responsible for inviting
NGO assessments of the problem and implementing clearance activities. The Office of the President and
the Ministry of State have also been active in raising awareness of Palau’s problem with the international
community and encouraging funding support for activities.
Agencies dealing with UXO
The clearance activities are focused mainly on Peleliu and are being undertaken by CGD with the assistance
of a locally trained team.
The Bureau of Public Works has been assisting the Ministry of State in coordinating public reports of UXO.
The Governors of all sixteen States have also been made aware of the clearance programme and their
State Rangers are responsible for reporting all public reports of UXO directly to CGD, or to the Bureau of
Public Works.
48
UXO Assistance obtained
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
To date the USA, UK and New Zealand have assisted in funding UXO clearance. CGD have at their own cost
provided the use of capital equipment such as vehicles, detection gear, tools, personnel and protective
equipment (PPE). However, to ensure that clearance activities continue, it will be necessary for Palau to
seek additional financial assistance to secure a sustainable clearance programme.
Previous UXO Clearance Activities
No information regarding UXO clearance activities undertaken prior to the commencement of CGD
activities in 2009 could be obtained.
Table 2: Type, Quantities and weight of ERW located in Republic of Palau
from Oct 2009 – July 2011
Ordnance Type
Quantity
Weight Kgs
Aircraft Bomb
44
3,242.00
Landmine
43
101.16
Cluster Munition
3
27.67
Demolition Charge
275
189.15
Depth Charge
92
20,532.56
Fuse
193
43.77
Hand Grenade
563
317.46
8
160.00
IED’s
Sea Mine
7
696.59
775
1,322.04
1,394
10,809.16
Mortar
Projectile
Rifle Grenade
38
38.91
Rocket
121
1,514.48
6,246
984.86
SAA
Torpedo
2
1,672.74
286
61.40
10,090
41,705.13Kgs
Miscellaneous Items e.g. Low explosive, primary
cartridges, detonators.
TOTALS
Note: Statistics compiled and provided by Cleared Ground Demining
Table 3: Locations where ERW were Found
Location Type
Agricultural
Quantity
Weight Kgs
900
869.65
1,199
2,618.20
86
13.69
Historical Tourist Sites
6,393
11,796.54
Infrastructure
1,028
2,606.10
366
2,375.25
Beach
Construction Site
Residential
Underwater
TOTALS
118
21,425.70
10,090
41,705.14
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Note: Statistics compiled and provided by Cleared Ground Demining
49
Table 4: Land use categories and quantity of UXO found in each area.
LAND USE
%
Agricultural
15.7
Public Beaches
15.2
Historic / Tourist Site
34.3
Infra-structure
18.1
Residential
16.7
Note: 48% US origin, 52% Japanese origin
Note: Statistics compiled and provided
by Cleared Ground Demining
Current Methodology for removal
CGD and their local Team undertake systematic clearance activities in Peleliu.
For responses to UXO reported by the public to CGD or the Bureau of Public Works, the CGD Team
conduct site visits to undertake an assessment. Render safe procedures (RSPs) are then conducted by the
international explosive ordnance disposal expert to make the UXO safe for transport, after which it is
taken to secured storage areas on Peleliu Island.
Demolition of all collected ordnance are undertaken at regular intervals of approximately 2 to 3 months
at a remote demolitions facility on Peleliu Island. Since 2009, no on site demolitions have been necessary
and no ordnance has been dumped at sea.
Other related activities have included: household UXO surveys on Peleliu and Angaur; risk awareness
sessions to communities and schools; survey and underwater clearance of dive and State boat dock; and
current clearance of a tourist trail through Peleliu’s main battle field site Bloody Nose Ridge. CGD has
also established an Emergency Callout Facility to deal with immediate high risk threats to the population
and visitors nationwide. Callouts have included the removal of a 1000lb bomb from the centre of densely
populated Koror, and removal of ordnance from popular dive sites.
Institutional Capacity
A very positive aspect of Palau’s UXO clearance programme is that a sustainable local capacity mechanism
is being developed. CGD have trained a local team that currently assists with clearance activities.
This is currently possible because of the presence of an international EOD expert to provide technical
assistance.
Palau hopes that its clearance team will be able
to assist other Pacific countries with their UXO
problems, with removal and demolition activities, as
well as longer term train-the-trainer programmes.
Palau also ensures that clearance activities are
50
provided with paramedics for the clearance team
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
and boats to analyse underwater UXO situations.
Photograph 12: local staff in Peleliu involved with
UXO clearance. Photo provided by CGD- Palau.
Information Management
Since 2009, detailed records, including GPS locations, are prepared for every piece of ordnance located,
utilising the International Management System for Mine Action formats created by the international
mine action bodies including the UN. To guide activities, CGD and its local team undertake research to
determine possible UXO locations through reports, historical research and surveys etc. Governors of all
States have also been advised by the Ministry of State to report known locations of UXO.
Development Impacts of UXO
The presence of UXO in a number of affected areas, both sub-surface and underwater, are an impediment
to the development and use of these areas.
UXO continue to be located in areas frequented by the public.47 Subsistence food gathering activities
on Peleliu takes the community into all areas of the island and increases the likelihood of direct regular
contact with UXO.
Illegal explosive fishing is also a problem in Palau. A highly dangerous practice, this type of fishing is highly
destructive for Palau’s reefs and marine life on which the majority of Palau’s industries rely on.
UXO affects tourism sites which forms 60% of Palau’s GDP. A few dive sites and the majority of Peleliu’s key
battle areas are affected by UXO and can pose potential risks for tourist traffic. Any UXO incident could
have a significant negative impact on this important industry.
In addition, there has been speculation regarding possible links between UXO leakage and several health
issues reported locally. While scientific tests could be undertaken to explore these links, the EQPB of
Palau does not have the facilities to test for chemical contaminants.
Current Constraints
1. The main challenge currently faced by Palau is raising resources to allow CGD to continue its UXO
clearance efforts. With the presence of CGD, technical capacity is readily available for UXO clearance.
However, ensuring that the whole range of activities required for effective UXO clearance is undertaken
will require additional financial support.
2. Funding challenges currently prevents survey and clearance activities from expanding to all states
of Palau. Pro active clearance is currently only undertaken on Peleliu focusing on high impact areas
of contamination with serious risk to communities and visitors. However, contamination is known to
be widespread nationally and further resources will be needed to support a comprehensive national
programme.
3. Another challenge is that many individuals assume that UXO is safe due to the passage of time. The
opposite is true, with ordnance becoming more unstable with age.
4. CGD have identified that obtaining additional donors may be difficult as current conflicts occurring
in areas such as Afghanistan and Sudan are taking the greater share of donor funds for clearance
activities, therefore it is necessary to seek other sources of funding. CGD have identified that some
large scale war compensation claims across the Pacific; and (2) the low number of UXO incidents
(fatalities and injuries) do not merit intervention.
5. With the high costs of explosives and the strictly regulated environment in which to internationally
transport and store explosives, CGD arranged with the US Navy to provide the explosives required for
demolitions. Hence every 2-3 months the US Navy transports sufficient explosives to allow demolitions
by CGD to take place.
47
CGD reported locating a 1000 lb US bomb in the centre of Koror in close proximity to the town’s water storage and fuel
station while 84 items were also unearthed in a church in Peleliu. The 1000lb bomb was in mint condition, with highly
sensitive impact fuses on both ends.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
international donors may not be supportive due to: (1) concerns that clearance activities may reopen
51
PNG
New Ireland
New Britain
Port Moresby
52
Population (2010).
6.5 Million
Land Area (sq km).
462,000
Population density (people/km2 /population.
14.2
GDP Growth rate - (2010).
7.0%
GDP Per Capita ( PPP US$) 2010
2,300 – Rank 140th
PNGDF (2010).
2000 plus.
No of Personnel currently in EOD Unit.
approximately 20
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Chapter Six:
Papua New Guinea
UXO hidden amongst local vegetation – Palau
Photo taken by J. Curry for Cleared Ground Demining
53
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Background
Papua New Guinea (PNG) is located in the South Western Pacific Ocean and is one of the most culturally
diverse countries on Earth with over 850 indigenous languages out of a population of just under seven
million.48 It is also one of the most rural with only 15% of its people living in urban centres.49 Papua
New Guinea regained its independence from the Australian administration in 1975 and its capital is Port
Moresby.
During WWII, Japan used the PNG islands as a staging centre establishing a major base in Rabaul on
New Britain.50 In 1942, Japanese Forces moved into North Eastern New Guinea establishing bases on
Bougainville and New Ireland. In response, the Allied Forces landed on Bougainville in November 1943 and
Japanese resistance finally finished almost two years later in August 1945. This period saw a prolonged
campaign in which the Japanese forces were isolated and suffered tens of thousands of casualties from
combat, disease or hunger.
Mission
The Secretariat undertook an on-site visit to Port Moresby and met with local officials involved with UXO
clearance from 14 to 18 February 2011. During the mission the Team was able to discuss a number of issues
with key officials involved in UXO clearance. Site visits to the rural affected areas were not possible due
to resource constraints.
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
Scope of UXO Issue
Officials indicated that UXO remains a threat in PNG with a number of areas currently affected.
Unfortunately records on UXO introduced into the region during WWII and subsequent clearance activities
could not be obtained by the Research Team making it difficult to ascertain the true extent of UXO
contamination.
Officials reported that UXO and other WWII remnants are found over a wide area in PNG. The areas
affected include: (1) the provinces of East Sepik, Madang, Morobe, Popondette and Milne Bay which
are situated on the mainland island of PNG; and (2) the islands of New Britain, Manus, New Ireland and
Bougainville.
During WWII, most battles in PNG occurred mainly in the provinces mentioned above. It is believed that a
lot of the arms and UXO abandoned from the 20 month WWII campaign later became an important source
of weapons for the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and Resistance Fighters during the civil conflict on
the island.
UXO Awareness
54
During the course of the interviews, it was noted that there was a lack of awareness amongst many national
government agency officials interviewed in dealing with UXO. Officials from several Agencies, some of
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
which are expected to deal with UXO, were of the view that UXO was not a major development concern
being an issue for only the provinces affected. Some government agencies and community members
interviewed assumed that UXO was no longer an issue.
48
Based on estimates from National PNG Census 2000.
Based on estimates from National PNG Census 2000.
50
An important Japanese base on the Pacific island of New Britain, Rabaul was the main base in the Japanese Southeast Area
and was well situated to support Japanese advances southward to New Guinea and Australia.
49
UXO Policy Framework
Papua New Guinea has developed a two tier approach to dealing with UXO. This has involved:
1. tasking PNGDF national EOD teams to respond to UXO reported by the public. These teams remove and
dispose of UXO where possible according to the resources available; and
2. seeking periodic assistance from development partners such as Australia, New Zealand and the United
States of America to undertake clearance activities in specific areas that are known to be highly
contaminated or have reported casualties in the past.
PNGDF personnel interviewed stated that they did not have a comprehensive policy framework to guide
UXO clearance activities. Clearance activities were purely responsive depending on reports from the
public and Provincial governments, as well as the availability of resources. There was no centralised policy
allocating roles and responsibilities for all Government Agencies that are involved in various areas of UXO
clearance.
Agencies dealing with UXO
The PNGDF is the lead agency responsible for UXO Clearance and other WWII remnants. The PNGDF has
EOD units attached to its Infantry, Engineering and Navy Divisions that respond to reports of UXO and
undertake clearance activities. With assistance from ADF and the US Army, the PNGDF have undertaken
area clearance UXO activities in the past
UXO Assistance Obtained and previous UXO clearance activities
Apart from the PNGDF responses to UXO reports, area clearance activities and capacity building have been
undertaken sporadically in the past although records could not be obtained to provide further information.
During the 1980s and 1990s, officials interviewed remembered UXO clearance activities undertaken in
some affected provinces by Australian and PNG Defence Forces but actual records of these activities
could not be provided by both the PNG Foreign Affairs and Department of Defence.Other assistance has
been received as part of infrastructure development projects. In 2003 and 2004, an Australian company
(Milsearch) conducted a survey of UXO contamination as part of the Rabaul to Kokopo road repairs
development.
Clearance assistance undertaken recently include a US mission to Bougainville in response to a request
from the Government of PNG made to the US Embassy in Port Moresby. Based on that request, a team
consisting of 7 disposal technical advisers from the US Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal
and Abatement in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in Washington were deployed in 2009 to Torokina
District on Bougainville Island. The team was tasked with undertaking an impact assessment of Torokina
in Bougainville and conducting UXO clearance operations to (1) lessen the danger to local residents; and
(2) reduce the possibilities for scavenging of explosives for illicit use. The team reported disposing of over
three tons of UXO and clearing four school areas
including areas for gardening. Before departure,
the Team was reported to have trained several
locals in recognising and marking UXO items with
Photograph 13: Shows crater caused by UXO
demolition. Photo by Charlie Hollway, 2010.
Retrieved 22/05/11
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
GPS for future clearance activities.
55
Current Methodology for Removal and Destruction of UXO
Most UXO findings are reported mainly to the police and provincial authorities. The Provincial Affairs
Administrations in each province are then advised to contact the national agencies for assistance. The
government agencies consulted throughout the mission (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Provincial
Affairs) were aware of this arrangement. Funding for UXO clearance activities are the joint responsibility
of provincial and national government agencies even though the capacity of the provinces to respond to
reported cases were noted by officials as limited.
Box Four: Man killed by WWII bomb caused by bush fire
A man was killed and three others injured when a World War II bomb exploded on the Papua New Guinea island
of Bougainville during a bush burn-off by villagers.
Three men who suffered burns in the blast were flown north by helicopter to Buka General Hospital where they
were in a critical condition, PNG’s Post-Courier newspaper reported.
The man killed in the blast was reportedly blown apart.
District officials said the bomb was once dropped by the Allies during fighting against Japanese forces on
the island. It went off after villagers set a fire to clear bush land for food gardens. Torokina witnessed fierce
fighting during the war and large quantities of unexploded ordnance remain in the jungle
Source: PNG Post Courier 2009, pg 8.
Institutional Capacity
The current capacity of PNGDF to respond to UXO threats is limited by resource constraints. As the
PNGDF are only established in three major urban areas, (Port Moresby, Lae, and Wewak), their ability
to respond is severely limited by the available resources, the geographic expanse and the remoteness of
many affected areas. Due to resource constraints some officials noted that some cases reported to PNGDF
could take several months to be investigated.
Information Management
The research team could not obtain any centralised records from PNGDF on the quantities of UXO items
left behind in the provinces. While work is undertaken by various EOD units there did not appear to be any
central database to assist with the development of risk assessments for the prioritisation of UXO clearance
activities. The team was also unable to locate any centralised data on past UXO clearance activities
undertaken with support from foreign military personnel.
Development Impacts of UXO
UXO and abandoned arms from WWII have impacted on development in PNG by causing a number of
56
fatalities and injuries and impeding infrastructure development. UXO items have been used to commit
illegal activities such as dynamite fishing or violent crimes and responding to these activities require the
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
use of public resources.
Several interviews and media reports indicated that UXO had been responsible for a number of fatalities
and injuries with many caused by homemade fishing explosives. PNG has enacted legislation to prohibit
dynamite fishing due to the inherent risks to life and the environment. The National Fisheries Authority
and police statistics confirmed that there had been a recent decrease in arrests made on illegal dynamite
fishing compared to past years although no data was provided. A number of fatalities were reportedly
caused by UXO explosions in areas such as Bougainville, New Ireland, Popondetta and recently in 2010 at
Wau, Morobe Province.51 In 1999, an 8 year old girl was reportedly killed on Emirau Island, New Ireland
province, which had been a USA military base during the war. A subsequent investigation revealed the
explosion occurred when bullets buried near a traditional earth oven exploded.
Reports about tribal conflicts in the Highlands of PNG frequently mention the use of WWII weapons.
According to police reports, WWII weapons such as L40, Mark 303, Mark 304 and Mark 47 rifles had been
used in recent tribal clashes between the Wogia and Unjamap people in the Southern Highlands province,
WWII firearms and ammunition also featured heavily in the Bougainville crisis with a number of homemade
weapons produced to accommodate WWII small arms ammunition such as 0.50 calibre rounds.
A feasibility study undertaken by the Works and Engineering Department on road development in affected
provinces identified UXO as a hazard although it is unclear whether any affected provinces have undertaken
technical studies to determine the level of adverse effects caused by UXO on the environment.
Current Constraints
1. Limited information and baseline data available on UXO levels and past UXO clearance activities
resulting in difficulties with determining extent of UXO issue.
2. Limited awareness of the public, Government officials and international community regarding domestic
risks and threats of UXO.
3. Limited resources available to PNG Government and PNGDF EOD Teams resulting in:
a. UXO activities being limited to clearance in response to reports from the public;
b. Lack of ability to implement UXO initiatives to raise awareness of (1) national stakeholders / public/ partner Government Agencies; (2) international community; and
(3) UXO Donor organisations;
c. Lack of ability to implement where appropriate comprehensive ‘mine action’ activities in areas such as: (1) UXO risk education; (2) UXO clearance (UXO survey, mapping, marking and clearance); (3) victim assistance, (including rehabilitation and reintegration); (4) stockpile destruction; and (5) advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions.
4. The lack of a national overarching policy framework/ National Action Plan to coordinate resources,
identify Agency roles and responsibilities to systematically clear and manage UXO. To date, project
based clearance activities continue to be undertaken on an ad hoc basis in conjunction with the
availability of support from external assistance.
5. Limited information being collected for analysis by National Government Agencies such as Health,
PNGDF, and Works regarding UXO clearance activities and incidents such as injuries and fatalities
caused by UXO.
6. The lack of a centralized database to assist officials responsible for UXO management:
a. The failure to record and consolidate data and information from previous UXO clearance actions compromises the safety and possible success of future activities and leads to possible duplication of activities in areas that have all ready been cleared;
b. Information such as where the ordnance was located, types of ordnance located, and the number of items discovered are invaluable for determining the areas at highest risk to the population.
7. The lack of a strategy to develop a sustainable approach to ensure local UXO disposal officials are
adequately trained, safety equipment provided and maintained, and storage and destruction facilities
available.
8. Limited safety equipment available to current PNGDF EOD personnel to safely handle, transport, store
and dispose of UXO.
51
PNGDF interview.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
57
9. No awareness activities in place to inform communities about the risks and potential threat of UXO.
10.Lack of data and scientific research undertaken to determine possible health and environmental
impacts caused by leaching of chemicals contained in UXO.
11.A perception of officials interviewed that there was a relatively low priority given to UXO issues by
government and communities alike.
12.A number of areas affected by UXO, most of which do not have a PNGDF EOD personnel presence.
Photograph 14. Destruction of WWII munitions in
Torokina, Bougainville, PNG.
Photograph by Charlie Hollway, 2010. Retrieved
22/05/11 http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/
nwslter/148656.htm#story
58
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
59
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Ordnance cut open with explosive materials removed.
Photo by S. Francis.
Cholseul
Santa Isabel
New Georgia
Islands
Malaita
Honiara
Guadalcanal
Solomon Islands
San Christobal
Rennell
60
Population (2009).
535,699
Land Area (sq Km)
28,000
Population density:(people/ Km²)
19
GDP Growth rate - 2010.
5.50 %
GDP Per Capita (PPP US$) 2010.
3062.88 Rank 129
Police Personnel
Approximately 1,135
No of personnel in EOD Unit.
6
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Chapter Seven
Solomon Islands
UXO stored at Hell’s Point – Solomon Islands.
Photo taken by S. Francis
61
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Background
Solomon Islands consists of nearly one thousand islands with a combined land area of approximately 27,
986 sq km and a population estimated at about 540,000 people. Its capital Honiara, is situated on the
island of Guadalcanal and while previously a colony of the United Kingdom, the Solomon Islands regained
its independence in 1978.
During WWII, Solomon Islands was the site of several battles as the Allies began to slowly recapture
Japanese held territory and apply pressure to the main Japanese Base in Rabaul. Throughout 1942 and
1943, U.S. forces captured the islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Vella Lavella, Florida, and New Georgia in
months of fierce jungle fighting.
The Guadalcanal Campaign, which lasted 6 months, resulted in a large loss of materiel and life. The large
number of war ships and cargo vessels sunk between Guadalcanal Island and Savo Island, led to this body
of water being referred to as the “Iron Bottom Sound.”52 During this period it is estimated that hundreds
of thousands of firearms and UXO items were left behind.
Mission
The Secretariat undertook an on-site visit to Honiara and met with local officials involved with UXO
clearance from 1 to 6 October 2010. During the mission the Team was able to visit the Royal Solomon Island
Police Force (RSIPF) Explosives Ordnance Unit (EOU) Magazine to witness firsthand the large number of
UXO items currently being stored for destruction.
Box Five – UXO Incident Reported in the Solomon Star
“Discovery of 12 unexploded bombs in the past weeks has renewed police warnings in Solomon Islands for
people to report any sightings of unexploded explosive ordinances. Construction workers at a new complex
beside the QQQ Wholesale shop in Honiara’s China town said they discovered 12 unexploded bombs since they
started last month. The discoveries came under spotlight yesterday when a further three were found but one
was thrown into the Mataniko River. The workers alerted police who dispatched members of the Explosive
Ordinance Division to collect the two. The officers were surprised when the constructors said one of the bombs
was thrown into the Mataniko River. One of the constructors said they did not only discovered bombs but also
live ammunition. Members of the EOD said it is always safe for any constructors to seek EOD assistance to clear
areas before constructions are commenced”.
Source: SOLOMON STAR HONIARA, 23/11/10, Solomon Islands
62
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
52
McGee, p39.
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
Scope of UXO Issue
UXO remains a serious issue for Solomon Islands with a number of areas currently affected at varying
levels. Officials interviewed report UXO affected areas in Guadalcanal, Savo, Makira, Temotu, Florida,
New Georgia and Renell. Unfortunately, the lack of available data made ascertaining the true extent of
UXO contamination difficult.
Discussions with RSIPF personnel suggest that a large number of UXO remain to be removed from
Guadalcanal. While it has been difficult to obtain accurate figures of UXO to confirm these views, reports
and data made available by RSIPF, and the amount of ordnance currently stored by the RSIPF team seem
to verify these claims. Officials interviewed reported that a site in the Western Province called “bomb
beach” contained UXO items. In New Georgia Island, RSIPF reported large quantities of materiel still
contaminating lagoons and beaches often washing up during high seas.53 While RSIPF confirmed receiving
a number of reports from this island, efforts to effectively clear this area have been hampered by resource
constraints.
While in Honiara, the Research Team visited the EOU Storage site and noted a large number of UXO items
such as artillery shells, mortar rounds, grenades, aircraft bombs and small arms ammunition.
UXO Awareness
The RSIPF through their ordnance unit and community policing units have conducted awareness raising
programmes in communities and schools about the dangers posed by WWII ordnance. However these
programmes were not undertaken on a regular basis and due to resource constraints tended to be limited
to the main centres. It was identified that there was a need for programmes to be provided to areas known
to be contaminated and in rural areas. The RSIPF Officers interviewed stated that their activities were
limited due to insufficient resources and that they required support and assistance from other government
agencies. Officials from other Government agencies interviewed appeared aware of the UXO issues.
Condition of UXO
The types of UXO located in the Solomon Islands are similar to those encountered in most Pacific Island
Nations affected by WWII battles between the USA and Japan. The UXO is primarily of Japanese and USA
origin, containing an array of chemical components, fusing mechanisms, ammunition and high explosives.
All UXO encountered were at least 68 years old and in various stages of deterioration, with the outer
casings heavily corroded, fuse mechanism working
parts exposed and explosive chemicals visible to
the naked eye.
Photograph 15 – US Mk2 Fragmentation Hand
Solomon Islands. Photo taken by S. Francis.
53
Records of interview with Solomon Islands EOU team.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Grenades located in RSIPF EOU Storage site in the
63
UXO Policy Framework
Solomon Islands has developed a two tier approach to dealing with UXO. This has involved:
1. tasking RSIPF EOU personnel with support from the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
(RAMSI) experts to clear UXO reported by the public. These teams remove and dispose of UXO where
possible according to the resources available; and
2. seeking periodic assistance from development partners such as Australia, New Zealand and the United
States of America to undertake clearance activities in specific areas that are known to be contaminated
or have reported casualties in the past.
There is currently no comprehensive coordinated policy for the management and systematic clearance
of UXO. UXO clearance activities in Solomon Islands are currently limited to reactive clearance responses
undertaken by RSIPF.
While UXO clearance projects and destruction activities have been undertaken periodically with the
assistance of foreign military personnel, these activities have often not been coordinated as part of a
national comprehensive and systematic approach. Limited information management and the lack of an
effective central database to record or access data of past activities has impacted on local capability to
coordinate and prioritise various UXO clearance activities.
Agencies Dealing with UXO
The RSIPF is the lead agency responsible for UXO Clearance. The RSIPF have a dedicated 6 man Explosive
Ordnance Unit that undertakes clearance activities in response to reports from the public. The Solomon
Islands government provides funding to the RSIPF on an annual basis based on priority areas and daily
operational requirements.
Other agencies assisting the police are the law enforcement unit of the National Fisheries Authority,
Provincial Affairs, and Environment & Conservation. Most agencies acknowledged the risk and dangers
posed by WWII remnants but admitted that the lack of capacity and resources to assess and provide proactive initiatives were areas that needed to be addressed.
UXO Assistance Obtained
UXO clearance assistance and support has been provided in the past by foreign military personnel from the
USA, Australia and New Zealand. Officials reported that current assistance has mainly been in the form of
UXO training and clearance support provided by the ADF or through RAMSI.
Assistance provided was mainly in the form of short term training for police officers involved in ordnance
clearing activities with some officers receiving training in Australia. The request for assistance was made
to the appropriate authorities such as the Foreign Affairs who would in turn seek assistance from the
64
international community. For example, in 2006, a request for assistance was made to the US Government
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
been used with chemical weapons.
to assist with the removal of gas masks that had been discovered as it was suspected that these items had
Previous UXO Clearance Activities
There is limited information available regarding UXO activities in Solomon Islands although there have
been a number of clearance activities undertaken by external military personnel in affected areas since
the conclusion of World War II. The RSIPF EOU reported that assistance was mainly received from ADF
although assistance was also provided by US and New Zealand military personnel. In 2009 ADF provided
some clearance assistance under Operation Render Safe clearing underwater UXO off the coast of Malaita
and Shortland Harbour.
Current Methodology for Removal and Destruction of UXO
The RSIPF EOU respond to public reports of UXO and undertake UXO clearance activities. UXO items
undergo render safe procedures and are then transported to the RSIPF EOU Storage site. Large amounts of
UXO are currently stored by the RSIPF EOU awaiting disposal. Where there are no nearby police stations
in the outer islands, reports are directed to relevant government district agencies which then notify
police at the provincial headquarters. The RSIPF EOU is based in Honiara and is often requested to attend
incidents in other provinces.
Institutional Capacity
Members of the current RSIPF EOU had received formal technical training previously. In addition, the
services of an EOD expert attached with RAMSI provided additional support and welcome expertise.
However, RSIPF EOU personnel when interviewed confirmed that basic safety tools and detection equipment
required for effective clearance operations were limited. The RSIPF EOU noted that much of the current
equipment being used was donated in the 1980’s and required replacing.
RSIPF noted that limited resources affected their ability to respond to UXO threats reported or undertake
further activities. Investigations into UXO reports received from outer provinces were often delayed due
to resource constraints.
Information Management
Attempts to obtain comprehensive statistics on the number of locations cleared and the amount of items
destroyed in the past were unsuccessful. While some records were kept these could not specify the full
details of previous activities undertaken in past missions.
RSIPF EOU collected information regarding fatalities and injuries caused by UXO but these figures only
reflected cases that were reported directly to the Police. EOU personnel interviewed admitted that the
figures did not reflect: (1) cases that were only reported to Health, as Health did not collect UXO data;
and (2) UXO incidents in the remote outlying areas which were often unreported.
Development Impacts of UXO
UXO and abandoned arms from WWII have impacted on development in Solomon Islands by causing a
number of fatalities and injuries and impeding infrastructure development. UXO continue to be used to
commit illegal activities such as dynamite fishing or violent crimes, and are a drain on public resources.
RSIPF reports indicated that UXO had been responsible for a number of fatalities and injuries. Several
fatalities and injuries were caused by homemade fishing explosives. According to records held by RSIPF,
there were at least 12 fatalities linked to UXO between 2005 and 2010 although these figures are
RSIPF, most of the injuries and deaths that occurred involved youth seeking to extract explosive material
from UXO items for the production of homemade dynamite for fishing.
Reports about the period of civil unrest frequently mention the use of WWII weapons. According to
police reports, WWII weapons and ammunition were used to produce a number of homemade weapons to
accommodate WWII small arms and light weapons ammunition such as 0.50 calibre rounds.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
conservative as officials interviewed noted limited reporting from the remote outlying areas. According to
65
Deaths & Injuries by UXO
Graph 1: Number of deaths & injuries
caused by UXO Reported to RSIPF over
the last five years.
8
8
8
7
6
5
5
4
5
4
4
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
0
0
2010
2009
2008
Deaths
2007
2006
2005
Injuries
Criminal Charges
10
9
Graph 2: Indicates number of arrests
relating to UXO incidents.
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
2010
2009
2008
Possession of explosives
Improvised explosive device for dynamite fishing
Dynamite fishing
Data provided by RSIPF Explosive Ordnance Unit
In many cases the presence of UXO at work sites have resulted in development projects being delayed. In
many cases these projects were for large commercial ventures where delays cost significant amounts of
money. As a result, it is now a requirement to clear large commercial land of UXO before any development
activities can take place. The Secretary of Public Works and Infrastructure Development stated that the
issue of UXO is a growing concern and that it was important to ensure that the land is thoroughly cleared
of all UXO.
66
An additional issue in the Solomon Islands was the increasing trend for members of the public to collect UXO
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
for sale or to manufacture: (1) homemade explosives for fishing; and (2) firearms. EOU Officers interviewed
reported charging a number of people for possession of UXO. In some instances these individuals had
sought to extract the gun powder by cutting open shells with hacksaws. Officers interviewed revealed that
there had been instances where one litre containers of gunpowder had been sold locally for 1000 Solomon
dollars each.
In terms of the environment, there are common perceptions that UXO causes significant harm to ground
water and marine habitats. According to reports provided by members of the Royal Solomon Islands Police
Demolition Team (RSIPDT), UXO demolitions in the sea have caused extensive damage to the coral reef and
the marine habitat. RSIPF and representatives of nearby communities noted incidences of coral bleaching
where UXO were known to have been dumped although other causes could not be effectively ruled out.
In Russell Island, evidence was provided regarding the presence of picric acid from UXO leakage. While
officials from the Environmental Health Division and Ministry of Environment and Conservation confirmed
receiving the report, further investigations could not be undertaken due to limitations in capacity to
undertake further tests.
Current Constraints
1. Limited information and baseline data available on UXO levels and past UXO clearance activities
resulting in difficulties with determining extent of UXO issue.
2. Limited information being collected for analysis by National Government Agencies such as Health,
RSIPF, and Works regarding UXO clearance activities. While figures regarding UXO fatalities are
collected by RSIPF, these figures are incomplete.
3. The lack of a centralised database to assist officials responsible for UXO management.
a. The failure to record and consolidate data and information from previous UXO clearance actions compromises the safety and possible success of future activities and leads to possible duplication of activities in areas that have already been cleared.
b. Information such as where the ordnance was located, types of ordnance located, and the number of items discovered are invaluable for determining the areas at highest risk to the population.
4. Limited awareness of the international community regarding risks and threats of UXO in Solomon
Islands.
5. Limited resources available to the Solomon Islands Government and RSIPF EOU Teams resulting in:
a. UXO activities being limited to intermittent risk awareness activities and clearance in response to reports from the public;
b. Lack of ability to implement UXO initiatives to raise awareness of: (1) national stakeholders / public/ partner Government Agencies; (2) international community; and
(3) UXO Donor organisations;
c. Lack of ability to implement where appropriate comprehensive ‘mine action’ activities in areas such as: (1) UXO risk education; (2) UXO clearance (UXO survey, mapping, marking
and clearance); (3) victim assistance, (including rehabilitation and reintegration); (4) stockpile
destruction; and (5) advocacy against the use of anti- personnel mines and cluster munitions.
6. The lack of a national overarching policy framework/ National Action Plan to coordinate resources,
identify Agency roles and responsibilities to systematically clear and manage UXO.
a. To date UXO area clearance projects continue to be undertaken on an ad hoc basis in conjunction with the availability of support from external assistance.
b. UXO issues are not reflected in national, sectoral, and agency development plans and budgets.
7. The lack of a strategy to develop a sustainable approach to ensure local UXO disposal officials are
adequately trained, safety equipment provided and maintained, and storage and destruction facilities
8. Limited safety equipment available to current RSIPF EOU personnel to safely handle, transport, store
and dispose of UXO.
9. Limited awareness activities in place to inform communities about the risks and potential threat of
UXOs.
10.Lack of data and scientific research undertaken to determine possible health and environmental
impacts caused by leaching of chemicals contained in UXO.
11.Wide area affected by UXO in areas with no RSIPF presence.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
available.
67
68
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Chapter Eight
Recommendations and a Draft Regional Strategy
Rusting small arms ammunition at Hell’s Point – Solomon Islands
Photo taken by S. Francis.
69
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Background The scoping studies highlighted a number of common issues facing the study countries. Lack of capacity,
limited resources, geographical challenges, and poor data available restricted the ability of domestic
Agencies to undertake effective and comprehensive UXO Clearance activities.
In response, several recommendations were developed for affected Members to consider to enhance
domestic clearance activities.
In addition, the Secretariat also developed a draft Regional UXO Strategy as a possible framework to
coordinate regional activities to support affected Forum Island Countries. This Chapter discusses the
recommendations and the draft regional strategy.
Recommendations
The UXO scoping missions in the study countries of Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands
highlighted a number of concerns. Without seeking to overstate the issue, it was evident from the research
that UXO impacts development, endangers lives, and restricts social and economic activities. Responses
to date in most of the study countries have lacked coordination or prioritisation and projects based
UXO clearance activities have been based around the availability of intermittent support from external
partners.
A number of commonalities were identified in the study countries which are likely to be reflected in
other Forum Island Countries also affected by UXO. In response, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
presented to the FRSC in 2011 a number of recommendations that could be used to assist with the possible
development of national UXO clearance activities. These recommendations are grouped into four key
areas which seek to:
1. Reduce the negative impacts of WWII UXO on Pacific communities and the environment;
2. Enhance the capacity of affected Forum Island Countries to manage domestic UXO threats;
3.
Improve the mobilisation and coordination of resources among regional and domestic stakeholders;
and
4. Increase UXO awareness and promote support for international obligations on UXO and mine
activities.
1. Reducing the negative impacts of WWII UXO on Pacific communities and the
environment.
Affected Forum Island Countries are recommended to reduce the negative impacts of WWII UXO on local
communities by:
70
(1) Reducing interaction between public and UXO;
(2) Undertaking UXO clearance initiatives in high risk areas;
(3) Protecting local communities from physical and environmental harm caused by UXO; and
(4)
Supporting initiatives to assess and address the impacts of UXO on communities and the
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
environment.
Possible National Activities
1.
Undertaking systematic and prioritised clearance of all affected areas;
2.
Enhancing risk education and community awareness on recognition of UXO particularly in high risk
areas;
3.
Enhancing awareness of UXO risk among Government Agencies responsible for regulating
construction, development projects, agriculture and health;
4.
Supporting activities and research on health and environmental impacts linked to
possible
contamination by UXO;
5.
Criminalising possession of UXO, purchase of UXO scrap metal, and use of UXO as explosives for
fishing;
6.
Implementing risk reduction activities such as identification of UXO contaminated areas through
mapping, marking and surveying; and
7.
Supporting national initiatives to assist persons affected by UXO;
Possible Regional Activities
1.
Coordinating initiatives to support domestic activities of affected Forum Island Countries; and
2.
Providing assistance to international, regional and Civil Society Organisations as well as national
agencies undertaking UXO clearance and demining activities in Forum Island Countries;
2. Enhancing the capacity of affected Forum Island Countries to manage domestic UXO
threats.
Affected Forum Island Countries are recommended to enhance their capacity to respond in a coordinated
and systematic manner to UXO threats by:
(1)
Improving the technical expertise of local officials responsible for UXO clearance;
(2)
Encouraging the participation of all levels of government and development partners to mobilise
available resources and;
(3)
Promoting domestic adherence to international best practices such as those contained in the
International Mine Action Standards.
Possible National Activities
1.
Undertaking a training needs analysis for personnel and agencies responsible for UXO clearance to
determine current levels of capacity to manage all areas of UXO threat;
2.
Developing national UXO action plans to establish a comprehensive policy framework for the
systematic clearance of UXO;
3.
Undertaking technical surveys of affected areas to assess risk and determine appropriate
responses;
4.
Utilising readily available mine action resources and guidelines developed by UN Bodies or the
Geneva Institute of Humanitarian Demining;
5.
Ensuring that personnel and agencies responsible for UXO clearance are appropriately resourced
and receive adequate training and equipment;
6.
Ensuring that national agencies integrate UXO activities where relevant into national development
policies, programmes, annual plans, operational guidelines and budgets; and
7.
Ensuring that information and data on UXO obtained through assessments and technical surveys are
made readily available to stakeholders.
Possible Regional Activities
1.
Supporting the development of regional training resources and technical guidelines as well as
coordinating possible sharing of technical expertise amongst Forum Members; and
3.
Acting as a focal point to enhance the flow of information between all stakeholders.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
UXO clearance activities;
2.
71
Engaging with relevant UN Bodies, NGOs and donors to coordinate possible capacity building and
3. Improving the mobilisation and coordination of resources among domestic and regional
stakeholders.
Affected Forum Island Countries are recommended to improve the mobilisation and coordination of
resources among regional and domestic stakeholders by:
(1)Enhancing domestic information and reporting systems on UXO; and
(2)Strengthening the communication between stakeholders to ensure effective collaboration
Possible National Activities
1. Undertaking National UXO Assessments/Surveys to determine: (1) extent and impacts of UXO
contamination; and (2) domestic capacity to respond to UXO threats;
2. Ensuring that current and future activities on UXO assistance be coordinated among all stakeholders
involved through the formation of national multi-agency UXO Task Force type structures (made up
of Police, Environment & Conservation, Public Works, Infrastructure Development, Health, Land
& Physical Planning, Fisheries & Marine and Foreign Affairs)to coordinate and oversee activities of
national UXO Clearance Authorities;
3. Utilising national actions plans to coordinate activities and allocate resources and responsibilities for
UXO clearance activities;
4. Supporting UXO database development to provide comprehensive, accurate, and easily accessible
information for national authorities and all stakeholders;
5. Engaging with certified international clearance organisations to assist with UXO clearance
programmes;
6. National ownership of UXO problems at all levels of government by seeking to: (1) integrate UXO
activities into national, provincial and local development plans, programmes and budgets (such as
incorporating UXO clearance components into infrastructure development projects); and (2) developing
sustainable national capacities to undertake UXO activities; and
7. Exploring resourcing options with development partners and international UXO Agencies.
Possible Regional Activities
1. Ensuring that UXO continues to be raised at regional fora;
2. Mapping out and coordinating available international assistance and support to be matched to needs
of affected Forum Island Countries;
3. Establishing a UXO network including donor organisations and national contact points to facilitate
communication;
4. Engaging potential donors and UXO Clearance organisations to provide possible assistance; and
5. Acting as a focal point to enhance coordination between affected Forum Island Countries and donor
providers to assist with policy and programming.
72
4. Increasing UXO awareness and promote support for international obligations on UXO and
mine activities.
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Affected Forum Island Countries are recommended to increase UXO awareness and promote support for
international obligations on UXO and mine activities by:
(1)Enhancing community and government UXO awareness and risk education initiatives; and
(2)Promoting signature and ratification of relevant international conventions such as the Mine Ban Treaty
among Forum Island Countries.
Possible National Activities
1. Promoting use of media and CSOs to raise profile of UXO threats as well as personnel and agencies
responsible for UXO clearance;
2. Allocating appropriate resources to raise national awareness;
3. Utilising national assessments and data to determine extent of impacts;
4. Raising awareness on the adverse social, economic and environment impacts of UXO;
5. Advocating on UXO related activities.
Possible Regional Activities
1. Advocating ratification of the Ottawa and Oslo Treaties;
2. Supporting UXO initiatives undertaken in region;
3. Providing annual updates on UXO activities at appropriate regional fora such as FRSC and PICP; and
4. Providing support to Forum Island Countries for the development of public awareness raising
campaigns.
73
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
International
Obligations
(Ottawa
Convention)
International
Mine
Action
Standards
Members
Concerns
Regional
Mandates
UXO
Strategic
Plan
KEY
RESULT
AREAS
OUR
GOAL
Our Strategies
Our Measures
• Completion of National UXO
Assessments with baseline data;
• UXO/ERW adverse impacts identified;
• Identified UXO/ERW adverse impacts
reduced in number or level;
• Increased number of UXO items
located, removed and destroyed;
• Increased number of affected areas
systematically cleared.
• Providing support to affected Forum
Island Countries to develop and
implement UXO risk education and
awareness raising initiatives;
• Providing support to international,
regional and civil society
organizations, as well as national
agencies, undertaking UXO clearance
and demining activities in Forum
Island Countries;
• Supporting national initiatives to
assist persons affected by UXO;
• Supporting activities to assess
possible contamination and pollution
of ecological systems.
Regional
• Development of a National Action Plan;
• Increased capacity of UXO Clearance
Agencies;
• Increased number of UXO/ERW
initiatives.
• Development of regional UXO training
resources to assist sharing of technical
expertise amongst Forum Members;
• Supporting bilateral UXO clearance
programmes undertaken by
development partners or NGOs to
assist Forum Members;
• Supporting Forum Island Countries
to build local capacity to manage
domestic UXO programmes;
• Supporting Forum Island Countries
to develop and implement public
awareness campaigns to seek support
for UXO initiatives;
• Providing support to civil society
organisations and local bodies
undertaking UXO clearance activities
in Forum Island Countries;
• Enhancing the capacity of national
agencies to integrate UXO clearance
activities into their annual plans;
• Supporting affected Forum Island
Countries to obtain assistance for UXO
clearance activities.
• Funding sources identified and
assistance provided;
• Improved inter-agency coordination;
• Increased level of support from
Secretariat.
• Establishing a UXO network
including donor organisations and
national contact points to facilitate
communication;
• Ensuring that UXO continues to be
raised at regional fora.
• Mapping out of available assistance
and support to be matched to needs
of Forum Island Countries;
• Coordinating regional assistance
initiatives on behalf of affected Forum
Island Countries.
Regional
• Utilising national actions plans to
coordinate activities and allocate
resources for UXO clearance
activities;
• Promoting a whole of Government
approach to include national agencies
(Police, Environment & Conservation,
Public Works, Infrastructure
Development, Health, Land & Physical
Planning, Fisheries & Marine and
Foreign Affairs) and CSOs when
dealing with UXO activities and;
• Mapping out of national activities for
UXO clearance;
• Supporting UXO database development
to provide comprehensive, accurate,
and easily accessible information
for national authorities and all
stakeholders;
• Seeking available international
donor assistance through regional
structures;
• Development of national action
plans to establish a comprehensive
policy framework for the systematic
clearance of UXO;
• Undertaking a National UXO
Assessment to determine current
levels of capacity to manage all areas
of UXO threat;
• Undertaking a training needs
analysis for personnel and agencies
responsible for UXO clearance;
• Ensuring that personnel and agencies
responsible for UXO clearance are
appropriately resourced and receive
adequate training and equipment;
• Promoting the integration of UXO
activities where relevant into national
development policies, programs and
budgets;
• Development of appropriate
information management systems to
ensure necessary data is collected.
• Development of detailed National
UXO Assessments to determine
impacts and affected areas and
establish baseline data;
• Enhancing Whole of Government
coordination to reduce adverse
impacts;
• Undertaking technical surveys of
affected areas to assess risk and
identification of best mitigation
approaches to be undertaken;
• Integrating UXO clearance
activities into national government
development plans;
• Undertaking awareness raising
initiatives for communities in high
risk areas;
• Supporting risk reduction activities
such as identification through
mapping, marking and surveying of
UXO contaminated areas.
Regional
National
National
National
Improved Mobilisation and
Coordination of Resources
Enhanced capacity of affected
Forum Island Countries to manage
UXO threats
Reduced adverse impacts caused by
WWII UXO on Pacific communities
and the environment:
• Increased number of awareness
initiatives conducted;
• Resources for awareness raising
initiatives identified
• Increased level of support;
• Providing support to Forum Island
Countries for the development of
public awareness raising campaigns ;
and
• Advocating on UXO related activities.
• Increased number of awareness
initiatives conducted;
• Resources for awareness raising
initiatives identified;
• Providing a regional online UXO
discussion page to enhance
communication.
Regional
• Ratification and implementation of
the Ottawa and Oslo treaties;
• Supporting UXO initiatives
undertaken in the region;
• Ensuring adverse impacts identified
are effectively communicated to
stakeholders;
• Providing annual updates on UXO
activities at appropriate regional fora
such as FRSC, PICP;
• Promoting use of media and CSOs to
raise profile of UXO threats, as well
as personnel and agencies responsible
for UXO clearance;
• Raising awareness on the adverse
socio-economic and environment
impacts of UXO.
National
Increased public awareness and
support for international UXO and
Mine Conventions:
To safely manage and minimise the potential threat and socio economic impact of WWII UXO in Forum Island Countries
Monitoring &
Evaluaton
plans.
corporate
their agencies
activities in
reflect these
responsible will
Agencies
programmes.
plans and
national action
be built into
strategies will
These
plans.
national action
and develop
on ERW/UXO
working groups
multi-agency
form
countries to
Affected
NATIONAL
ACTION
PLANS
Draft Regional Strategy
Based on the findings and recommendations of the scoping studies, the Draft Strategy seeks to provide
a mechanism to coordinate activities to support affected Forum Island Countries. The draft strategy
was presented to the FRSC in 2011 which welcomed its development as a contribution to addressing the
challenges of UXO in the region.
Purpose of a Regional Strategy
The aim of a UXO strategy is to establish a framework to coordinate international and regional activities
and resources to support: (1) the development of national UXO Policies and Action Plans; and (2) the
implementation of national mine action initiatives. It seeks to provide a framework linking activities,
(based on the recommendations made by the Secretariat to the FRSC), to a regional mechanism to
coordinate and support domestic UXO clearance activities in affected countries. It allows the Secretariat
to:
(1)Support the implementation of domestic UXO clearance initiatives;
(2)Promote the development of mine action type activities; and
(3)provide strategic direction to affected Forum Members so that technical assistance and resources can
be identified and channelled efficiently for the benefit of affected communities.
This regional approach to address UXO provides a collaborative and collective effort for stakeholders as
it provides broad directions to address key areas that are critical when developing national UXO plans
of action. Individual countries will then devise detailed national plans to reflect their specific needs and
priorities.
The Strategy recognises that:
• Affected Forum Island Countries have limited resources and technical capacity to manage an issue that
was created by external military forces;
• There is a need for affected Forum Island Countries to develop comprehensive policies to undertake
systematic proactive UXO clearance activities, raise awareness, and coordinate national activities and
international assistance;
• A whole of government approach is necessary to ensure adequate support from all Agencies involved;
• International best practices as advocated for by Mine Action and the IMAS are an effective method for
developing national strategies and policies to manage UXO;
• A coordinated regional approach allows for better utilisation of limited resources;
• PIFS can play an important role as both an advocate for Forum Island Countries in engaging external
partners and as a focal point to coordinate regional activities and resources to assist national efforts
by affected Forum Island Countries; and
• A coordinated regional approach will promote regional and international awareness of the UXO issue.
Structure of the Regional UXO Strategy
Goal
of WWII UXO in the region.
Key Result Areas
To achieve this goal, the strategy proposes four Key Result Areas that reflect the groupings used to sort the
various recommendations described earlier in this Chapter. The Key Result Areas are for:
1. A reduction in negative impacts of WWII UXO on Pacific communities and the environment;
2. The development of adequate capacity in affected Forum Island Countries to manage domestic UXO
threats;
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
The goal of the Regional Strategy is to safely manage and minimise the threat and socio-economic impacts
75
Diagram 1: Four Key Result Areas for this strategy
Reduced
Enhanced
adverse impacts
capacity &
of WWII UXO
Ownership
Improved
Promotion &
Mobilisation and
Educational
Coordiantion of
Awareness
Resources
3. The mobilisation and coordination of resources among regional and domestic stakeholders; and
4. The development of UXO awareness in affected Forum Island Countries and provision of support for
international obligations on UXO and mine activities.
Activities
The Strategy proposes a number of activities or initiatives based on the recommendations provided earlier
in this Chapter that Forum Members and the Secretariat can consider implementing to achieve the Key
Result Areas. The activities listed are not exhaustive and can be implemented based on relevance to
national conditions and priorities.
Implementation
To drive regional and national activities, the Strategy proposes that:
(1) The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat act as a focal point to mobilise and coordinate regional and
international resources and activities; and
(2) Members develop National UXO Action Plans to coordinate domestic activities in affected Forum Island
Countries;
Regional Approach
• Promote awareness of Pacific UXO issues regionally and internationally;
• Support affected Members in implementing domestic UXO initiatives and developing national action
plans;
76
• Mobilise and coordinate available international and regional resources;
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
• Engage external parties on behalf of Members to explore possible areas of collaboration and
• Link affected Forum Island Countries to potential assistance and resources;
assistance;
• Explore the development of regional resources and technical guidelines;
• Act as a repository of information and regional resources regarding UXO clearance activities undertaken
in the region;
• Develop networks to facilitate the sharing of UXO related information; and
• Ensure that UXO activities continue to be raised at the appropriate regional fora such as the FRSC.
National Approach
At the national level, affected Forum Island Countries will need to consider developing National Action
Plans and policies to manage UXO. Such plans will need to focus on building domestic capacity in 5 key
areas:
• technical knowledge and skills to undertake surveys, mapping, markings and physical clearance;
• risk education;
• victim assistance;
• stockpile destruction; and
• support for international conventions related to Mines and UXO.
The main objectives will involve: (1) developing adequate coordination mechanisms; (2) developing
sufficient information to guide activities; and (3) identifying sufficient capacity and resources given
competing development and infrastructure priorities. While identifying resources will always be a
challenge faced by most small island states, the development of the UXO Regional Strategy will allow
for a better understanding of international and regional resource support currently available to enhance
domestic capacity and undertake UXO clearance activities. In addition, the policy resources developed
by GICHD and the IMAS will provide guidance to affected Forum Island Countries.
Monitoring & Evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation will be a critical element to measure the effectiveness of UXO activities
conducted. Effective monitoring requires the development of initial baseline data that can be obtained
through the development of a National Assessment. Once the initial data has been established initiatives
can be measured based on timeliness, resources utilised, UXO items cleared, and mechanisms and
processes established.
IMAS provide comprehensive uniform standards for all key areas of Mine Action activities including
programme development, UXO clearance, worksite safety, development of National Assessments,
destruction activities and Mine Risk Education. IMAS also provide standards on monitoring activities that
can be adapted to suit domestic circumstances and programmes.
Future Activities
As of August 2011, the Draft Regional UXO Strategy is still being finalised. It is envisaged that the Pacific
Islands Forum Secretariat will continue to develop the Strategy in collaboration with UXO Stakeholders
with a view to adoption by the Forum Regional Security Committee in 2012.
77
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Appendices
Appendix 1 - Consultation Meetings.
The consultation meetings were held with representatives from both Government and other
stakeholders.
Solomon Islands – Consultations were conducted from 01st -06th October 2010 with the
following stakeholders
• Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (, Police Commissioner, ACP Operations, Explosive Ordnance Unit)
• Secretary for Public Works & Infrastructure Development
• Lands Officers from Department of Lands & Physical Planning
• Under Secretary for Ministry of Police
• USA Consulate in Honiara
• Embassy of Japan Staff
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Staff
• Manager of Iron Bottom Sound Hotel
• Village representatives from Lunga and Henderson areas.
• Director for Environment & Conservations
• Director for Environmental Health – Ministry of Health
• Officer in Charge - Records & Statistics Section - National Referral Hospital
• Honiara Town Council Authority
• Representatives from National Fisheries Authority
Palau – Consultations were conducted with the following stakeholders from the 08th -12th
November 2010
• Governor of Peleliu
• Director, Public Works & Utilities
• Assistant Director, Environment & Conservations
• Police representatives from Ministry of Public Safety
• Representatives from Maritime & Fisheries Authority
• Representatives from Cleared Ground Demining
• Representative from the Ministry of Culture & Heritage
• Representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Representative from the Ministry of State
• Peleliu community representatives and community rangers
Papua New Guinea - Consultations were conducted from 14th -18th February 2011 with the
following stakeholders
• PNGDF Ordnance Dive Unit – Langrond Naval Base Port Moresby
78
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade – Port Moresby – Pacific Section
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
• ACP Public Safety Police – Police Headquarters
• Ministry of Provincial Affairs – Waigani Government Office
• Representative from the Ministry for Bougainville Affairs – Port Moresby
• Representatives from Environment & Conservation
• Representatives from National Fisheries Authority
• Community representative from Manus & Morobe
Kiribati – Consultation were conducted from the 22nd March – 1st April 2011.
• Kiribati Police Service (Police Commissioner, Armorer, Maritime Unit, other police personnel)
• Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Immigration
• Director Town Authority & Utilities
• CEO public Works & Infrastructure
• NZ High Commissioner to Kiribati
• Director of Lands & Physical Planning
• Director of Environment & Conservation
• Director for Marine & Fisheries
• Representatives from Kiribati Hospital
• Representative from Betio communities
• Molly Tours
• Australian High Commissioner
• AusAid representatives
• Officer in Charge - Kiribati Museum
79
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Appendix 2 - Snapshot of WWII UXO in FIC’s
80
Country
Snap shot of WWII ordnance in Forum Island Assistance provided.
Countries
Cook Islands
WWII UXO not an issue.
Not affected
Fiji
WWII UXO not an issue.
Not affected
WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Republic of the WWII ordnance found on land and underwater
Marshall Islands
in several areas of the Marshall Islands. Most
of the smaller surrounding atolls of Eniwetok,
Parry, Engebi, Roi , Namur and Majuro islands
were heavily bombarded by airstrikes and navy
warships prior to landings by assault craft.
UXO clearance activity was
conducted in 1950. A report
on this activity highlighted the
degree of removing the ERW and
recommended follow up activities
to clear the areas.
Kiribati
WWII ordnance found on land and underwater
mainly around Tarawa Atoll; the outer islands of
Makin, Abemama, Butaritari; and the Christmas
islands. Heavy bombardments occurred in Betio
and surrounding atolls prior to landings by
assault craft.
UXO Clearance and technical
capacity training undertaken
previously by USA and ADF.
Most recent clearance project
conducted in 2008 by Joint ADF
Task Force. Information and
records of these activities were
not provided by Kiribati Police
and ADF.
Palau
WWII ordnance found on land and underwater
in surrounding islands of Palau. The islands of
Peliliu and Angaur are areas where most of the
ordnance is located. Heavy bombardments and
ground battles occurred in these islands.
No records of assistance until 2009
when Non- Profit Organization,
Cleared Ground Demining started
clearance activities on the islands
of Peliliu, Angaur and main island
of Koror. CGD report disposing of
10,090 items between 2009 and
mid 2011.
Solomon Islands
WWII ordnance found throughout several affected
areas in Solomon Islands. The main islands with
UXO presence are Guadalcanal, Rennel, Makira,
and Savo,
Assistance
provided
mostly
by ADF and NZDF with some
activities undertaken by USA and
UK in the past. RSIPF currently
receive some support from RAMSI
EOD expert.
Nauru
Armed forces from Germany and Japan occupied
Nauru during WWII. While no significant ground
battles occurred on Nauru, the Island was
bombed several times and used as a military
base.
Reports indicate that Solomon
Islands EOU assisted Nauru in
2009 to dispose UXO items.
No information was obtained
to establish whether other
assistance was provided to Nauru
in the past by outside agencies.
Tuvalu
Funafuti, Nukufetau, and Namumea were used as
military airfields during WWII and were subjected
to several Japanese bombing raids from airbases
in Tarawa. Namumea was reported to have had
a UXO issue.
Vanuatu
Espiritu Santo and Efate Islands were reported Information on previous UXO
as the site of large military bomber airfields. clearance activity could not be
Interview with Vanuatu Police in November 2010. obtained.
Suggests presence of UXO in these areas although
a proper assessment needs to be undertaken.
Niue
WWII ordnance not an issue.
Not affected
Papua
New Guinea
WWII ordnance mainly found on the coastal areas
of East Sepik, West Sepik, Madang, Morobe, Oro,
Milne Bay and the New Guinea Island provinces
of Manus, Bougainville, East/West New Britain
and New Ireland. These areas were the sites for
numerous battles and military bases.
UXO Clearance has been provided
by ADF and US Military in the
past. Recent activities include
UXO clearance in Torokina
Bougainville in 2009 by US EOD
experts. The PNGDF is responsible
for ordnance clearance.
Tonga
WWII ordnance not an issue.
Not affected
Federate States
of Micronesia
WWII ordnance found in several areas throughout
FSM. Chuuk was the site of a major Japanese
naval base and was heavily bombarded during
WWII. Military activities also occurred on
Pohnpei, Yap and Kosrae.
Reports suggest US military
undertook some UXO clearance
activities in some of the islands.
However, no information was
available to confirm if activities
were conducted.
Samoa
WWII ordnance not an issue.
Not affected
Reports indicate New Zealand
assistance provided to Tuvalu in
1980s for the destruction of UXO
in the early 1980s .
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WWII Unexploded Ordinance
Appendix 3 - A Framework for a Strategic Mine Action Plan
(A Guide to Mine Action, GICHD 2010)
Context
Political context
Security
Economic context
Social context
Geography
Demography
Development priorities and actors
Hazards
Nature of contamination
Extent of contamination
Unknowns
Needs assessment
Vulnerability assessment (current impact)
• affected communities
• risk-taking behaviour
• victim profiles and numbers
• projected changes (e.g. refugee return, reconstruction projects underway)
• unknowns Development constraints (future impact)
• development priorities — key sectors and areas for mine action linkages
• unknowns
Description of the mine action programme
History
Current status
Problems with programme and organisations
Vision, strategic goals and objectives for mine action programme
Vision statement — A country free from the most severe impact of
landmines and unexploded ordnance and otherwise in full compliance
with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
Goal 1. Strengthen national mine action programme and key organisations
• Objective 1.1 — Pass mine action legislation
• Objective 1.2 — Mobilise national and donor resources
• Objective 1.3 — Strengthen senior and middle management in the mine action centre
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Goal 2. Goal for demining
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• Objective 2.1 etc
Goal 3. Goal for mine risk education
• Objective 3.1 etc
Goal 4. Goal for stockpile destruction
• Objective 4.1 etc….
Goal X. Research and development
• Objective X.1 — Integrated demining techniques
• Objective X.2 — Pilot project in community-based risk reduction
• Objective X.3 — Pilot project in using politicians to clear minefields
Actions to achieve goals and objectives
Mine action activities
Coordination mechanisms
Planning and sharing information with other humanitarian and
development actors
Timeframe
Resources
Available resources
Implementing organisations
Additional resources required
Plan for resource mobilisation
Key assumptions and implications
Signed peace agreement with rebels
Implementation of peace agreement with rebels
Successful negotiation of unified mine action wage structure
Successful use of mine detection rats
Risk management
Contingency plans if peace not signed
Contingency plans if peace agreement does not hold
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Appendix 4 - PIFS Circular 179/2010
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The Pacific Islands Forum
The Pacific Islands Forum is a political grouping of 16 independent and self-governing states.
Members include Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New
Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshal Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga,
Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
New Caledonia and French Polynesia, previously Forum Observers, were granted Associate Membership in
2006. Forum Observers include Tokelau (2005), Wallis and Futuna (2006), the Commonwealth (2006), the
United Nations (2006) the Asia Development Bank (2006) and the World Bank (2010), with Timor Leste as
Special Observer (2002).
The annual Forum meetings are chaired by the Head of Government of the Host Country (currently
Vanuatu), who remains as Forum Chair until the next meeting.
Since 1989, the Forum has held Post Forum Dialogues with key Dialogue Partners at Ministerial level.
There are currently 14 partners – Canada, People’s Republic of China, European Union, France, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom and the
United States.
The Pacific Islands Forum was founded in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum. In 2000, the name was changed
to the Pacific Islands Forum to better reflect the geographic location of its members in the north and
south Pacific.
Founding members of the Pacific Islands Forum were Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand,
Tonga and Western Samoa – now Samoa.
The Secretariat to the Forum was initially established as a trade bureau in 1972 and later became the
South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (SPEC). In 2000, when the name of the Forum changed,
the Secretariat became the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.
The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat is based in Suva, Fiji. The Secretariat’s mandate is delivered through
the annual Leaders’ Communiqués and high level ministerial meeting decisions.
The Forum Secretariat is led by the Secretary General (currently Tuiloma Neroni Slade of Samoa) who
is directly responsible to the Forum Leaders and to the Forum Officials’ Committee (FOC). FOC is the
88
Secretariat’s governing body comprising representatives from all Forum members.
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The Forum Secretariat is also mandated to coordinate the implementation of the Pacific Plan for
strengthening regional cooperation and integration.
The Forum Secretariat has trade offices in Auckland, Beijing, Sydney, and Tokyo that work independently
but come together as Pacific Islands Trade and Invest.
The Leaders’ Vision
“Leaders believe the Pacific region can, should and will be a
region of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity,
so that all of its people can lead free and worthwhile lives.
“We treasure the diversity of the Pacific and seek a future
in which its cultures, traditions and religious beliefs are
valued, honoured and developed.
“We seek a Pacific region that is respected for the quality of
its governance, the sustainable management of its resources,
the full observance of democratic values and for its defence
and promotion of human rights.
“We seek partnerships with our neighbours and beyond to
develop our knowledge, to improve our communications and
to ensure a sustainable economic existence for all.”
Mission, Goals & Roles
Our mission is to ensure the effective implementation of
the Leaders’ decisions for the benefit of the people of the
Pacific.
Our goals
are to stimulate economic growth and
enhance political governance and security for the region,
through the provision of policy advice; and to strengthen
regional cooperation and integration through coordinating,
monitoring and evaluating implementation of Leaders’
decisions.
In achieving these Goals, the Primary
Roles of the Forum
the Pacific Islands Forum, are to provide:
decisions of the Leaders
• Coordination and assistance in implementing the decisions of the Leaders
• Support to the Leaders’ meetings, ministerial meetings, and associated committees and working groups
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• Policy advice and guidance in implementing the 89
WWII
Secretariat, as set out in the 2005 Agreement Establishing
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Ratu Sukuna Road, Muanikau, Suva, Fiji
www.forumsec.org
<http://www.forumsec.org>