THE UYGHURS OF CHINA:
ISLAMIC MINORITIES, TERRORISM AND AUTONOMY
Doctoraalscriptie Politicologie (Internationale Betrekkingen)
Masters Thesis Political Science (International Relations).
Research Project Global Conflict
Student: Anita Jena (# 0226122)
Supervisor: Dr. Ram Mannikalingam
Second Reader: Dr. Kwame Nimako
Date of submission: July 2008
FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My interest in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was triggered by
two Masters courses which I took in the Fall semester of this academic year. Having
represented China in one course and having written a paper on China’s involvement in
Africa in another, it seemed natural to explore the situation in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) for my thesis, given that much is reported in the news
and media with regard to Islamic terrorism linked to its Uyghur Muslim minority.
My gratitude goes out to my Heavenly Father and my Lord and Friend Jesus
Christ. Thank you for Your unfailing love, patience, compassion and guidance through
a very difficult time. Thank you to my parents, Sunny, Ajit, and my brothers and sisters
at Christ Church, ISMA and Zolder 50 whose prayers, love and support sustained me
through my university years. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Ram
Mannikalingam, my supervisor, who was a constant source of encouragement and
guidance. Dr. Kwame Nimako my second reader: a thank you to you not just for being
my second reader but also for inspiring my interest in China-Africa relations. Dr.
Suransky: Thanks for picking me to represent China in your class. Who knows, I might
have never written a thesis on China had I never been Wen Jiabao.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
4
Chapter 1: Uyghurs and Islam
7
Chapter 2: Uyghurs and Violence
24
Chapter 3: Uyghurs and Autonomy
39
Conclusion
48
Bibliography
50
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INTRODUCTION
The Uyghurs (also written as Uighur), a relatively unknown minority in the People’’s
Republic of China’s (PRC) Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), have
recently caught the attention of the international media. Since they are Muslims and
have had a history of terrorial struggle with the Chinese authorities, they have been
linked to the debates on terrorism, Islamic minorities and autonomy post 9/11. After
September 11, the Chinese authorities started proclaiming that they faced a grave
terrorist threat and increasing Islamic radicalism in the XUAR region, implemented
extensive counterterrorism measures and labelled many Uyghur groups terrorist. The
capture of several Uyghurs by US troops in Afghanistan in 2002 made headlines as
many of them were shipped off to Guantanamo Bay on terrorism charges. Most recently,
Chinese authorities claim to have arrested several Uyghurs on charges of plotting
terrorist attacks during the upcoming Olympics 1 . Uyghurs leaders, however, have
denied such claims, stating that China is simply capitalizing on the War on Terror using
the latter as a cover for implementing repressive policies towards a largely peaceful
minority.
Though the problem in Xinjiang has been very much linked to terrorism,
especially after September 11, it is debatable whether Uyghurs are involved in terrorist
activities on a large scale. Similarly, there has been much talk of the Uyghurs as being
problematic due to them being Muslim minorities, another claim which requires close
scrutiny as Uyghur Islam is not known to be threatening. Finally, there is also the view
that the Uyghur problem stems from a lack of proper autonomy which is the source of
their grievances. This thesis will address the following question: To what extent is the
Uyghurs’ Islamic faith, their involvement in violence or their being an autonomous
minority responsible for the tensions between the latter and the Chinese state?
PRC-Uyghur tensions: Background and Importance
1
International Herald Tribune. 21 April 2008. ‘Uighur rejects terror claims’. Retrieved from
<ww.iht.com> on 30 June 2008.
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The roots of PRC-Uyghur tensions go as far back as the Qing period (1758-1911),
which was when the area now known as Xinjiang was brought under Qing rule. Those
centuries witnessed several armed uprisings which resulted in the establishment of two
short-lived Muslim states. In 1878 a Muslim insurrection led by Yakub Beg resulted in
the formation of an independent East Turkestan republic which was overthrown by Qing
forces in 1878 (Dillon 1997: 80). 1884 witnessed the formal incorporation of Xinjiang
into the Chinese empire as a province and the post 1911 period witnessed civil wars and
armed uprisings involving Turkic-speaking Muslims and the establishment of a second
East Turkestan Republic from 1944-1946. Generally at the heart of the conflict between
the PRC and the Uyghurs lies the question of the rightful ownership of the area known
by the Han Chinese as the “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region” or “East Turkestan”
by the Uyghurs. Both have their own versions of history to prove their claims to the
region. The Uyghurs – a Turkic people – called the area Turkestan, which means “land
of the Turks” in Persian, and base their claim to the region on the periods of self-rule
under Yakub Beg and the East Turkestan Republics. The Chinese, however, have
claimed that Xinjiang has always been a part of the Chinese empire. It is easy to see
why these contested histories lie at the core of tensions between the Uyghurs and the
Chinese as while the Uyghurs see the Chinese as colonial authorities, the Chinese see
themselves as the rightful ‘administrators’ of Xinjiang.
The importance of the Uyghur question
The conflict between the PRC and the Uyghurs is important because it has implications
not just for China but also for Central Asia and to some extent the world at large (Fuller
and Starr 2003: 33-48). Though the problem is predominantly domestic, its international
dimensions are growing with the rise of Uyghur diaspora organizations, global Islam
and national autonomy movements among dissatisfied minorities. It also affects the
Central Asian region, which is already prone to much instability and has experienced
Islamic revival. As mentioned earlier, it has implications for the international
community at large in that it addresses the issues of minority rights, human rights and
terrorism, which are gaining prominence all over the globe as many groups aspire for
ethnic survival, cultural security and greater autonomy. Moreover, post 9/11 the
Uyghurs have been linked with terrorism and become part of the larger debate on
Muslim minorities and terrorism. Problems in Xinjiang – like the rapidly spreading
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HIV/AIDS virus - are linked to neighboring states like Burma and Afghanistan which
are the sources of heroin. Moreover, China is a rising economic power and is bound to
yield great influence on Central Asian states which are ambivalent towards its rise. For
this reason, the Xinjiang conflict is being used as leverage by the Central Asian states
which are home to a vast Uyghur diaspora. Russia, US, India, Mongolia, Turkey and
Japan are lso interested in the Xinjiang conflict for different reasons and all are capable
of (and even have) exploited the Xinjiang conflict for their own benefit. Furthermore,
there are predictions that the situation in Xinjiang may become worse over time and
negatively impact surrounding regions and even the world at large. As China becomes a
more prominent world player, issues such as its handling of minorities will come under
closer scrutiny. Given these international dimensions of the situation in Xinjiang, it is of
crucial importance to examine the Uyghur situation.
Methods of inquiry
In order to answer this question, secondary literature on Xinjiang and the Uyghurs as
well as news articles and government documents have also been consulted. There is
limited academic information on the Xinjiang region due to strict controls on field
research. Also government sources and news media are biased and any academic work
taking these claims as a given should be treated with caution. The first chapter will
address the case of the Uyghurs as Muslim minorities under non-Islamic, specifically
Communist, rule. It will attempt to answer the following question: to what extent can
the stenuous relationship between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state be attributed to the
Uyghurs being Muslims? The second chapter will examine whether violence is the
cause of the tensions between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state. The third chapter will
look at Uyghurs as an autonomous minority in order to determine whether the autonomy
factor plays a role in strenuous relations between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state.
Unfortunately this thesis will not be able to answer all these questions definitively as
much information is unknown and the situation in Xinjiang is constantly evolving.
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CHAPTER ONE: UYGHURS AND ISLAM
Especially after the events of September 11 2001, the Uyghurs’ Islamic faith has been
portrayed by the Chinese government and other actors as being the cause of the unrest
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The extreme view in the debate
on Islamic minorities under non-Islamic rule maintains that Muslims can never exist
peacefully under non-Islamic rule because Islam is a way of life encompassing both
religion and politics. Although there are countless problematic cases of Muslim
minorities under non-Islamic rule, this does not automatically imply that the Islamic
faith is to blame given that the extreme view makes the faulty assumption that Muslims
everywhere are orthodox and pan-Islamic and hence problematic. In fact, the nature of
the non-Islamic rule that Muslim minorities live under and its policies towards religion
could well be the culprit.
This chapter will address the case of the Uyghurs as Muslim minorities under
non-Islamic, specifically Communist, rule. It will attempt to answer the following
question: to what extent can the conflict between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state be
attributed to the Uyghurs being Muslims? In order to answer this question, we firstly
need look at what kind of Muslims the Uyghurs are. We will examine whether the
assumptions underlying the extreme view in the debate on Islamic minorities under nonIslamic rule are applicable to the Uyghurs, hence rendering the latter a problematic
minority. The case of the Hui, another Muslim minority in China, will serve as a key
comparative test in determining whether Islam is indeed the problematic factor in the
relationship between Uyghurs and the Chinese state. Secondly, we will examine
Communism’s accommodation of religion, especially Islam, and the Communist party’s
religious policies towards Uyghurs, in order to determine to what extent it is this rather
than Uyghurs being Muslim that is problematic. We will also examine the dilemma that
the Chinese government faces with regard to lax and restrictive religious policies and
the case of other religious minorities in order to determine whether factors other than
(Islam), Communism’s hostility to religion and Chinese religious policy are the cause of
the problem.
The Uyghurs: an Islamic minority under non-Islamic rule
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This section will examine what kind of Muslims the Uyghurs are in order to determine
whether their belief makes them problematic. In theory, Islam – because it encompasses
all aspects of life and lacks separation between church and state – requires Muslims to
seek to live in a Muslim state and if that is not the case to establish Muslim rulership by
warfare (jihad) or emigrate (hijra) when the latter fails (Israeli 2002: 44; Voll 1987:
125). The lack of separation between politics and religion implies that Islam must
ultimately achieve statehood due to the separatist ideals that the Muslim minority
harbors (Israeli 2002: 54).
Hence the extreme view in the debate on Islamic minorities under non-Islamic
rule asserts that Muslims cannot exist peacefully under non-Islamic rule. Since this view
is based on the study of Muslims as a majority (Voll 1987: 126), it makes many
assumptions which if applicable to Muslim minorities like the Uyghurs would indeed
make them problematic. We will examine whether the assumptions underlying the
extreme view in the debate on Islamic minorities under non-Islamic rule are applicable
to the Uyghurs by looking at the nature of Uyghur Islam, its role in Uyghur identity,
Uyghurs’ desire for an Islamic state and radicalism among the Uyghurs.
The Nature of Uyghur Islam
There is firstly the assumption that Islam all over the world is uniform and united.
Uyghur Islam is, however, neither uniform nor united. It is eclectic, absorbing beliefs
from several religions due to the transition of Uyghurs from Central Asian shamanism
to Buddhism and finally Islam in the 10th century AD (Shichor 2005: 51; Gladney
2004a: 208). Gladney (2004a: 208) even points out that between the 10th and 15th
century, “the term Uyghur specifically referred to those Buddhist and Nestorian oasis
dwellers of the Tarim Basin who did not convert to Islam until the mid-15th century”
(Gladney 2004a: 208). Furthermore, despite being portrayed as united around Islamist
causes, the Uyghurs as Muslims are divided along religious (competing Sufi and nonSufi factions), linguistic, territorial and political lines (Gladney 2004a: 216; Gladney
2003: 457; Mackerras 2004: 8; Kung 2006: 386).
The Role of Islam in Uyghur Identity
Another assumption this view makes is that Muslim minorities’ identity is rooted
largely in Islam. With regard to the Uyghurs, the role that Islam plays in their identity is
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debated. The predominant view is that Islam is just one among several factors that unite
Uyghurs, its salience depending on whom the Uyghurs are relating to:
“For example to the Hui Muslim Chinese, the Uyghur distinguish themselves as
the legitimate autochthonous minority, since both share a belief in Sunni Islam.
In contrast to the nomadic Muslim peoples (Kazakh or Kyrgyz), Uyghurs might
stress their attachment to the land and oasis of origin. In opposition to the Han
Chinese, the Uyghur will generally emphasize their long history in the region”
(Gladney 2003: 457).
Though Islam is an integral part of Uyghur collective identity, it is not
necessarily the prevailing characteristic according to most authors (Shichor 2005: 127;
Gladney 2003: 457). Yet a minority of academics does contend that although Uyghurs
are aware of the existence of non-Uyghur Muslims globally, “dedication to Islam is part
and parcel of being Uyghur” and that Islam is intrinsic to Uyghur ethnic identity even in
the case of non-practising Uyghurs and intellectuals who oppose Islamic traditionalism
(Mackerras 2001: 296; 2004: 8; Dwyer 2005: 3; Steele and Kuo 2007: 11). The latter
shows that Islam is more of a hallmark of cultural or ethnic identity rather than a
religious badge. This enables us to conclude that Islam is an important but not the only
aspect of Uyghur identity and functions as more of a cultural than religious marker.
Islamic rule, jihad and hijrah’s appeal to Uyghurs
There is also the assumption that all Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim societies
would rather be living in a fully Islamic society and seek to establish Islamic rule (Voll
1987: 127). The case of the Uyghurs reveals that only adherents of the pan-Islamic
vision of Uyghur identity, which is funded by Al-Qaeda and Pakistan and wherein Islam
is the primary source of Uyghur identity, desire an Islamic state (Christoffersen 2007:
51). The pan-Islamists do indeed view Uyghur minority existence as a waiting game
with the ultimate goal being the establishment of an Islamic state. However, since
Uyghur identity is fragmented, there exists besides the pan-Islamic vision of Uyghur
identity, the Chinese vision, the pan-Turkic vision, the Western liberal vision and
Uyghurstan autonomy vision, each of which has different dreams and desires with
regard to the government of the Uyghurs (Christoffersen 2007: 46, 58). For example,
Uyghurs who identify themselves with their Turkic ethnicity (i.e. the pan-Turkists)
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desire a Turkestan homeland for all Turks stretching from Central Asia to Xinjiang
(Christoffersen 2007: 50).
Moreover, the pan-Islamic vision has the least number of adherents and has lost
support after September 11 as adherents of the pan-Turkic vision distanced themselves
from Islamic associations for fear of losing support from the international community at
large (Christoffersen 2007: 57). In fact, most liberation organizations in Xinjiang have
allowed religion to play a marginal role and limited the religious nature of their agendas
(Shichor 2005: 127; Fuller and Lipman 2004: 340). This is further complicated by the
north-south divide in Xinjiang, with the predominantly Kazakh northern part – where
Islam is weaker - desiring an Uyghurstan, whereas the predominantly Uyghur southern
part – where Islam is stronger – desires an East Turkestan republic (Mackerras 2003;
Christoffersen 2002). So although Uyghurs do desire a political system that is under
their control, the fact that Xinjiang and Uyghur identity is divided implies that not all
Uyghurs desire or are able to establish Islamic rule.
The view also assumes that when unable to establish Islamic rule, Muslims will
resort to jihad or hijrah. The case of the Uyghurs shows that even though the latter have
experienced a restriction in religious freedom and greater pressures to assimilate during
the Cultural Revolution and in more recent times, jihad is not a particularly viable
option for them (Bovingdon 2004: 33; Voll 1987: 142). Some scholars find that there
are almost no calls for jihad among the Uyghur online community (Gladney 2004b:
391), while others points to the fact that terrorists have used the religious term for
political purposes (Shichor 2006: 105).
While some scholars agree that are indeed some rebellious Muslim clerics in
southern Xinjiang that support the idea of jihad (Mackerras 2001: 297), others contend
that there is need to exercise caution when applying the term “holy war” to events in
Xinjiang (Harris 1993b: 122). Not only is the term misleading and misused by Chinese
authorities seeking to blame ethnic activism and political resistance on religious
“extremists”, but it is important to note that “jihad cannot easily be proclaimed and
certainly not by anyone but a qualified religious authority – which Xinjiang, from the
controlled circumstances of its Islamic establishment, may now lack by the normal
criteria of orthodox Islam” (Harris 1993b: 122). As for hijrah (emigration), more and
more Uyghurs seem to be resorting to this option as can be witnessed by the huge
Uyghur diaspora in Europe, America and the Middle East. However, the fact that
Uyghurs are not solely relocating to Islamic countries confirms that not all Uyghurs
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desire Islamic rule. Similarly, the fact that it is not just religious Uyghurs but also
secular activists who are leaving Xinjiang, many of whom have founded diaspora
organizations that promote a liberal vision of an independent Uyghurstan, shows that
hijrah is not religiously motivated (Christoffersen 2007).
Uyghurs and radicalism
Though we saw in earlier paragraphs that the overwhelming majority of the
Uyghurs are neither orthodox nor pan-Islamic, there is an ongoing debate as to whether
Uyghur Islam is becoming more radicalized, especially after September 11 and given
that the role that Islam plays in Uyghur identity is disputed. The Chinese government
strongly contends that Islamic radicalism is on the rise among Uyghurs and there are
some academics who agree with the latter’s claims. While they argue that the role of
Islam is gaining prominence in Uyghur identity and greater numbers are turning to
radical Islam due to increased suppression by the government and increasing influences
from foreign-inspired fundamentalism (Mackerras 2004: 43, 2001: 296; Dreyer 2005:
81, Oresman and Steingart 2003; Lufti 2004a; Gunaratna and Pereire 2006: 61; Fuller
and Starr 2003: 65), most academics point to a decline in radical Islam due to
increasingly tight security in the region and lack of appeal for Islamic extremism and
Islamist movements among the Uyghurs due to the non-fundamentalist and eclectic
nature of Uyghur Islam (Shichor 2006: 105; Becquelin 2000: 89; Shichor 2005: 128;
Dwyer 2005: 70; Gladney 2002: 269; Harris 1993: 122; Mackerras 2004).
Though there are pan-Islamic elements in Uyghur society, most academics
contend that Islamic radicalism and the role that it plays in the tensions between the
state and Uyghurs has been exaggerated (Shichor 2005; Clarke 2007b). They have valid
reasons for disagreeing with or doubting the government when it comes to its claims
about the extent of Islamic radicalism in Xinjiang. The latter has not only
misunderstood Uyghur Islam, labeling all Islamic movements Wahabiyya and all
Uyghurs pan-Islamic and religious fanatics (Shichor 2005: 128; Harris 1993b: 122;
Christoffersen 2007: 49; Steele and Kuo 2007: 10; Mackerras 2005: 8), but it also has
experienced enormous political gains (i.e. participation in the War on Terror and
justification and legitimization of a further crackdown campaign against the Uyghurs)
in the post-September 11 environment by deliberately misrepresenting Uyghur Islam,
claiming that the latter is radical and the cause of upheaval in Xinjiang (Shichor 2006:
108). Not only is it difficult to measure the role and growth of Islamic radicalism due to
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strict controls on field research in the region (Shichor 2005; Steel and Kuo 2007; Fuller
and Lipman 2004), as mentioned earlier security in Xinjiang is tight and Uyghur Islam
has always been firmly under governmental control (Shichor 2005: 128). Moreover,
resurgence of religious practice does not necessarily imply that religion will be used as a
political weapon (Harris 1993a 277). A small group of academics take the middle
ground in contending that even though the Chinese government has exaggerated its
claims about Islamic radicalism, Islamic revival in Central Asia, increased funding for
radical Islamist groups in the region and an increase in the number of religious
separatists in Xinjiang give some validity to the government’s claims and so concerns
about radicalization cannot be lightly dismissed (Steele and Kuo 2007: 10; Fuller and
Starr 2003: 25, 65).
There is no denying that the practice and revival of Islam functions as a
powerful and symbolic means of confrontation as it challenges Chinese atheism,
deepens the sense of separation between the PRC and the Uyghurs and consolidates
Uyghurs’ sense of belonging both to their own as well as the global Islamic community
(Finley 2007: 627; Kung 2006: 381). Especially after 9/11, disheartened moderates and
secular Uyghurs might have been encouraged to embrace more radical ideologies as a
result of U.S. support for China’s claims that certain Uyghur groups are terrorist
(Christoffersen 2007; Fuller and Starr 2003: 63). Similarly, we need to acknowledge
that the weak, fragmented identity of Uyghurs, which some academics (Gladney 2003:
457) point to as supporting the lack of radicalism among Uyghurs, also makes them
vulnerable to falling prey to Al-Qaeda funded visions (Chistoffersen 2007: 58).
However, even after taking all these points into consideration, the small niche that
Islamists currently occupy and the self-serving claims of the Chinese government which
maintains a tight grip on Xinjiang and Uyghur Islam, and has benefited from
exaggerating Islamic radicalism, leads us to conclude that currently Islamic radicalism
is not as grave an issue as the Chinese government and some academics are making it
out to be. Though there is no denial of the existence of some radical elements among the
Uyghurs (such as the pan-Islamic groups) and there is a potential for Uyghurs to
radicalize in the (near) future if the government fails to adequately address their
grievances, we can safely say that at present Uyghur Islam is not defined by radicalism.
Concluding remarks
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From an orthodox standpoint, Islam is indeed an either- or affair and hence the extreme
view in the debate on Islamic minorities under non-Islamic rule contends that Muslim
minorities cannot coexist peacefully with non-Islamic rulers. The case of the Uyghurs
shows that the extreme view makes many presumptions about Muslim minorities and
their brand of Islam which is not applicable to the Uyghurs. The view assumes that
Islam is uniform and united, that Muslim minorities’ identity is rooted largely in Islam
and that all Muslim minorities desire or are seeking to establish Islamic rule or resorting
to jihad or hijrah when this is not possible. If these features were applicable to the
Uyghurs it would indeed render them problematic. Uyghur Islam is eclectic and divided,
and not all Uyghurs are orthodox or religious. Though it is a significant feature of
Uyghur identity and important to even secular Uyghurs, Uyghur Islam’s linkage to
ethnic identity means that it functions more as a cultural marker than a religious one.
Pan-Islamists are a very small minority and have lost much support after September 11.
Despite the sporadic use of the term jihad by some terrorists and rebellious clerics, it is
neither a feasible nor a realistic option for the Uyghurs due to the strong control on
religion in Xinjiang. Similarly, though hijra is more resorted to in recent times, it is not
necessarily religiously motivated. As for radicalism, despite claims that it is on the rise
among Uyghurs, the debate on Islamic radicalism supports the view that at present
Uyghur Islam is not radical. All these features of Uyghur Islam seem to indicate that the
latter cannot be the source of tensions between Uyghurs and the Chinese authorities.
However, in order to confirm this we need to examine the relationship between the Hui
Muslims and the Chinese state. If indeed the Uyghurs’ Islamic faith is the source of the
tension between the Chinese government and the Uyghurs, we would expect the
relations between Muslim minorities like the Hui and the Chinese state to be fraught
with just as much tension unless of course other factors than adherence to Islam are at
stake.
The Hui Muslims: A Comparative Test Case
The Hui are non-Turkic, Mandarin speaking Sunni Muslims, descendants of
Persian-, Arab-, Mongolian- and Turkish- Muslim merchants, soldiers and officials who
settled in China between the 7th and 14th centuries and intermarried with Han women
(Gladney 1998b: 49). They have experienced a more easy coexistence with the Chinese
authorities and hence often been pointed to as a case of Islamic minorities coexisting
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rather peacefully with non-Islamic, specifically Communist, rulers (Gladney 1991: 106;
2003: 101). Though the Hui – just like the Uyghurs and other religious minorities - have
experienced restrictions on freedom of worship during the Cultural Revolution and
during the years that religious policy was restrictive, the Hui have still been afforded a
greater degree of freedom of worship and have known fewer tensions with the Chinese
state. Whether this is due to the nature of Hui Islam or whether other factors are at stake
will be examined in the following paragraphs.
Just as among the Uyghur, there are among the Hui highly integrated party
officials and secularists, but also religious imams and rebellious young people (Gladney
2003: 467). Islamic movements have also had a powerful appeal among the Hui and the
latter have clashed with the Chinese authorities several times (Gladney 2003: 465).
However, unlike the Uyghurs, the Hui are almost ethnically as well as culturally
indistinguishable from the Han Chinese as a result of a longer interaction with the
Chinese state and intermarriage with the Han majority (Gladney 1991: 323). So
integrated are some Hui into Chinese society that they are unaware of the Islamic
origins of the cultural practices they adhere to (e.g. no pork in ancestor worship), which
according to some academics makes it more appropriate to label them “Han Muslims”
(Gladney 1991: 323). Though this might seem to indicate that the nature of Uyghur
Islam – which though eclectic and not orthodox is less integrated than Hui Islam – is the
cause of the conflict between the Chinese state and the Uyghurs, it seems that Turkic
ethnicity and culture are more likely the source of tensions given the greater integration
of the Hui.
Secondly, Hui Muslims are spread throughout all of China (Gladney 1998b: 33)
whereas the Uyghurs are concentrated in one area, more specifically a resource-rich,
strategically-located border province which plays an important role in China’s economic,
military and political security (Ong 2007: 12; Blank 2003). Maintaining control of such
an area is thus vital to Chinese interests. Moreover, unlike the Hui, the Uyghurs live in
an autonomous region and there are among them some who desire a separate state
(Gladney 2003: 466). As in the case of Taiwan and Tibet, this is conceived by China as
a threat to territorial integrity, maintaining which is the country’s prime concern. Hence
more than Islam, it seems that security, autonomy and maintaining territorial integrity
are factors that explain China’s uneasy relations with the Uyghurs. Finally, the Hui play
an important role in China’s trade and foreign relations with Middle Eastern countries,
which partly explains the kinder treatment they have received at the hands of the
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Chinese authorities in comparison to the Uyghurs (Gladney 2003: 463, 458-459). In the
1990s, for example, the Chinese state – as part of its attempt to maintain good relations
with Islamic countries - started reconstructing mosques and historic Islamic sites as
purposes of tourism and religious pilgrimage for the Hui and foreign Muslims (Gladney
1998b: 169).
To conclude, though Hui Islam is not united and Hui Muslims are not fully at
ease with the Chinese authorities, they have still enjoyed a more peaceful coexistence
with the Chinese state in comparison to the Uyghurs. This confirms the view that more
is at stake than Islam when it comes to the strenuous relationships between the Uyghurs
and the Chinese state, namely ethnicity and culture, political, economic and military
security, maintaining territorial integrity, and foreign and trade relations. Furthermore,
since both the Hui and Uyghurs have experienced tense relations with the Chinese
authorities, it seems likely that the latter’s accommodation of religion as opposed to
Islam lies at the source of the frictitious relationship with the Uyghurs, a suggestion
which will be explored in the next section.
The Uyghurs: Communism and Chinese religious policies
We have seen that even though the Uyghurs are predominantly not orthodox, panIslamic or radical, they are still at odds with the Chinese authorities and more so than
other, more integrated Islamic minorities like the Hui. This leads us to question whether
perhaps the source of the problem lies not so much with Uyghurs being Muslims but
with Communism and its attitude to religion. This section will examine to what extent
the nature of the non-Islamic, i.e. Communist, rule that Uyghurs live under is the
source of the problem between Uyghurs and the Chinese state by looking at
Communism and its accommodation of religion, specifically Islam, and Chinese
religious policy in Xinjiang. We will also examine the dilemma that the Chinese
government faces with regard to lax and restrictive religious policies and the case of
other religious minorities such as the Tibetans in order to determine the extent to which
factors other than Communism’s hostility to religion and Chinese religious policy are
the cause of the problematic relationship between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state.
Communism and Islam
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In classical Communist theory being a Muslim and Communist is impossible to
combine (Malashenko 1993: 63; Voll 1987: 147). Communism’s core belief was that
religion would eventually disappear and therefore authorities were faced with a
dilemma: neither could they give official recognition to religious communities as
legitimate minority groups, nor could they deny the existence of Muslim communities
(Voll 1987: 140). A way out of this conundrum was to identify the different Muslim
communities as nations, thus giving partial recognition to Islam (Voll 1987: 140).
Though Communism and Islam share the assumption that identification with a nation
would in some way dilute the universalistic loyalties common to both, the recognition
of nations functioned as a mediating structure of attitudes that enabled the maintenance
of some type of Islamic identity within the Communist system, thus making it possible
for Muslim minorities to have an acceptable option other than hijrah or jihad (Voll 1987:
144-145). Besides Islamic nationality, Islamic minority life under Communism came to
be characterized by other mediating structures that linked Muslim communities to the
government, namely informal Muslim organizations and officially organized Muslim
establishments (Voll 1987: 144-145).
To a large extent, Communism’s mediating structures of Islamic nationality,
informal Muslim organizations and officially organized Muslim establishments lie at the
heart of the conflict between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state. While Voll (1987: 146147) claims that these structures have made Muslim minority life in Communist society
possible without resort to the classically defined options of jihad, hijra, or secret belief,
these structures strictly control Islam in Xinjiang and are seen by most Uyghurs as
“necessary but evil compromises with a status quo that is too strong to destroy”
(Shichor 2005; Voll 1987: 148-150). Firstly, the recognition of religious minorities
solely as nationalities is not only a manifestation of the tension between Communism
and religion but is also the source of tension between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state
(Shichor 1994: 76). Though granting minority nationality status to Uyghurs and other
religious minorities allowed the Communist government a way out of the dilemma of
full recognition or non-recognition of religious minorities, this status has become
problematic as we will see in the next chapter.
Secondly, officially organized Muslim establishments such as the Chinese
Islamic Association are considered mouthpieces for government policies. Though the
Chinese authorities claim that the China Islamic Association’s task is to assist the
Chinese government in its “implementation of Islam, cherishing the motherland, and
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16
unifying Muslims in participating in socialist construction,” this is mere rhetoric (Kung
2006: 386; Shichor 1994: 76). In reality, the organization functions as a convenient
vehicle for the government to control Islamic activities and thus limit the spread of
religion, e.g. through the closure of under-18 madrassahs and mosques (Kung 2006:
386; Shichor 1994: 76). Furthermore, it determines the curriculum of the Xinjiang
Islamic Religion Institute of which all Muslim clerics must be graduates and uses the
internal conflicts among the different Islamic groups in Xinjiang for the benefit of the
government (Kung 2006: 386). So the Chinese government cannot be applauded for
calling into existence government-supported Islamic organizations in a political system
that is officially atheistic as it is clear that they exist solely for the purposes of control.
Thus these mediating structures instead of allowing Uyghurs to survive within the
Chinese Communist structure are in fact proving to be highly problematic and
worsening the tensions between the Chinese state and the Uyghurs.
Chinese Religious Policy
Considering the inherent tension between Communism and religion, it does not come as
a surprise that Chinese religious policy is primarily one of control (Kung 2006: 377).
From the Chinese viewpoint, religious identity poses a threat to state sovereignty as a
result of which its policies are based on control, lacking any consideration of the
violation of religious freedom (Kung 2006: 377, 388). Besides control, the Chinese
government’s religious policy is also characterized by a ‘united front’ aspect, i.e.
making use of the internal conflict among its minorities for the benefit of the
government (Kung 2006: 387). Another important element of religious policy is
patriotism, which in the Chinese sense implies destroying the religious minority rather
than coexisting with it (Kung 2006: 388). Though the Chinese Constitution grants two
rights, the right to believe and the right not to believe, members of the Communist Party
must be atheist and this indeed poses a serious problem for Muslims and other religious
minorities wishing to work in government (Orr 1980: 32). This is because the
Communist Party’s denial of Islamic identity “creates a conflict in Muslim society as
those minorities in government service either have to give up the party or give up the
religious practices. This dilemma results in cadres whose reputation within their ethnic
community is less than positive or minority leaders that are unable to penetrate the party
and properly represent their minority. What is left is a lack of confidence in the
government” (Harris 1993: 57).
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The control, ‘united front’ and patriotic aspects of Chinese religious policy have
created if not exacerbated the frictions between the Uyghurs and the authorities. Despite
Xinjiang being an autonomous province, the Uyghurs have enjoyed very little freedom
of religion and have always faced many religious restrictions. Children under 18 have
been prevented from mosque attendance and Islamic education (Fuller and Lipman
2004: 338). Schools have provided children and teaching staff with special meals during
Ramadan in order to discourage fasting (Fuller and Lipman 2004: 338). There has been
regular monitoring by state security organs of mosque attendance and the sermons
preached, and Uyghurs wearing Islamic dress or skullcaps have faced the prospect of
arrest (Fuller and Lipman 2004: 324). In 1996, religious policy in Xinjiang was
tightened due to the Chinese government’s perception that violent separatism in
Xinjiang was on the rise (Kung 2006: 386). That year witnessed the launching of the
first ‘Strike Hard’ campaign, whose aim was to bring Islam in Xinjiang under control by
targeting what the government called “splittism” and “illegal religious activities” (Kung
2006: 386). This resulted in stricter rules (such as preventing religious activities from
being conducted by Muslims from outside Xinjiang and mandatory enrollment and
ongoing monitoring of religious leaders in government-run training courses), increased
crackdowns, arrests and judicial executions 2 . In 2001, even prior to September 11,
religious regulations with regard to Xinjiang became even more stringent. The scope of
normal religious activities was narrowed, the anti-separatist clause was broadened to
include all religious citizens, control over the registration and operations of religious
organizations was increased and heavier sanctions and penalties were imposed (Kung
2006: 385-386).
The ‘united front’ aspect of the government’s religious policy has resulted in
disillusionment with government-controlled Islam and Muslim clerics, who are
distrusted by the Uyghur community. The same can be said of the patriotic element of
Chinese religious policy in Xinjiang as witnessed in the ideological control that is
imposed on clerics through religious education campaigns and leadership training in
state-controlled colleges, the aim of which is to dilute religious identity and bring
religion into line with governmental polices (Kung 2006: 387). Indeed a religious policy
based on patriotism, which involves destroying as opposed to coexisting with religious
minorities, is unlikely to create long-term stability in Xinjiang (Kung 2006: 388).
2
‘Xinjiang, China’s Restive Northwest.’ Human Rights Watch Backgrounder. Retrieved from:
<http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/11/xinjiang1113-bck.htm>.
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18
Finally, the Communist Party’s denial of Islamic identity has meant that Uyghurs in
government positions have been perceived as traitors and collaborators by the Uyghur
community which shares a widespread disenchantment with the government (Harris
1993a: 203-204).
Moreover, increasingly repressive policies post 9/11 have worsened the tensions
between Uyghurs and the authorities. After 9/11, the two-year Strike Hard campaign
launched prior to September 11 was intensified (‘Strike Hard, High Pressure’). Greater
restrictions were placed on mosque construction, Islamic education and contact between
Muslims in Xinjiang and co-religionists abroad (Harris 1993a: 118). There have been
more periodic round-ups of any Uyghurs suspected of being “too” religious, greater
restrictions placed on hajj participation and stricter enforcement of rules against
religious instruction and mosque attendance by those under 18 (Fuller and Lipman 2004:
335; Gladney 2004a: 257). The patriotic element of religious policy in Xinjiang has
been intensified as witnessed by the increased frequency of government conducted
‘religious training campaigns’ and ‘political reeducation campaigns’ and stricter
supervision that clerics were placed under (Kung 2006: 387). Thus austere religious
policies prior to 9/11 and even more rigorous and repressive ones post 9/11 have
contributed to the heightened tensions between Uyghurs and the Chinese state. One can
even question whether there is any freedom of religion for the Uyghurs given the
intolerance towards even the most basic forms of Islamic expression like mosque
attendance and Ramadan fasting. However, before we can confidently assert that
Communism’s inability to accommodate religion, especially Islam, and Chinese
religious policies are more problematic than Uyghur Islam and whether there are other
contributing factors, we need to examine the dilemma that the Chinese government has
faced with regard to lax and restrictive religious policies and also the case of other
religious minorities.
The Dilemma of Lax and Restrictive Policies
When it comes to religious policy concerning the Uyghurs, the Chinese government has
faced a dilemma. Both lax religious policies in the 60s and 70s and stricter policies in
the 80s and 90s have resulted in Islamic revival and unrest among the Uyghurs in
Xinjiang (Kung 2006; Bovingdon 2002; Gladney 2003; Mackerras 2001). This is
because when suppressed, Uyghur Muslims – feeling oppressed – rose up against the
government. However, when religious freedom was increased, Muslims – though more
Anita Jena (0226122)
19
content – strengthened their Islamic identity which in turn caused them to feel more
separate from Chinese society (Mackerras 2001: 296-297, Kung 2006: 379). The
extreme view on Islamic minorities under non-Islamic rule explains this as follows:
“Oppression can be perceived, as it was indeed in many instances, as a state of
deprivation that is essential to, and symptomatic of, the coming of salvation,
since a state of chaos and want is interpreted as the clearest sign that the age of
peace and plenty is around the corner. Hence the necessity to rise in defense of
the heritage, to make it through the transitional period of uncertainty in order to
prepare oneself for messianic days. A lax government, on the other hand, can be
perceived by authoritarian-prone Muslims as a sign of weakness, as perhaps a
divine signal that the time has come to take matters into one’s own hands”
(Israeli 2002: 68).
Though the similar outcomes of both lax and repressive policies necessitates that
religious policy towards Uyghurs needs to be neither too tolerant nor too suppressive
(Kung 2006: 385), they do not however imply that it needs to be as repressive as it has
been after 9/11. There is a general consensus among academics that Chinese religious
policy, which has been increasingly repressive since the 90s and even more so after 9/11,
has contributed to worsening tensions in Xinjiang. Furthermore, since lax and repressive
policies have also resulted in increased religiosity among other religious minorities
(Mackerras 2003: 114) and not just the Uyghurs, this rules out that Uyghurs are
problematic because of their Muslim faith.
The Case of Other Religious Minorities
Though some claim that the Communist Party’s hostility to Islam is rooted in history
and is greater than to other religions (Israeli 2002: 299; Bovingdon 2004: 32-33), the
case of other religious minorities like the Buddhists, Christians and Falun Gong
practitioners reveals that these have suffered just as much subjugation at the hands of
Chinese authorities and like the Uyghurs have led an uneasy existence under
Communist China (Potter 2003). This supports the view that Chinese religious policies
in general rather than Uyghur Islam are to blame for the Uyghur-Chinese strife.
Additionally, the case of Tibetans reveals that even more is at stake than religion when
it comes to the conflict between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state. Although martial
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20
law was lifted in Tibet in the 90s and the Dalai Lama’s advocation of genuine autonomy
for Tibet as opposed to independence led to some relaxation of Chinese policies (Kung
2006: 377), the latter has not been long-lasting and anti-government sentiment in Tibet
has not abated. 3 In fact, 14 March 2008 witnessed the largest anti-government protests
in decades, which resulted in harsh crackdowns on protestors and rioters, the authorities
shutting off the area and jailing large numbers of protestors without fair trial. 4
Similarly, the arrests from time to time of Buddhist monks accused of
involvement in bombings or of planning violent attacks by the authorities goes to show
not only that repression is just as severe in Tibet as in Xinjiang, but that religion is not
the only factor that can explain the tense relations between the state and Tibetans, as
well as Uyghurs 5 . Both Tibetans and Uyghurs are not just religious minorities but also
live in autonomous regions and harbor factions that desire greater independence, which
lends support to the claim that autonomy and maintaining territorial integrity are
additional factors that play a role in the Uyghur-Chinese conflict.
Concluding remarks
In this section, we examined the uneasy relationship between Communism and religion,
and Chinese religious policies. We saw that Communism’s inability to accommodate
religion, and especially Islam, seems to be a major cause of the tensions between the
Uyghurs and the Chinese state. In fact, the mediating structures that were supposed to
allow religious minorities to exist within a Communist state like China seem to lie at the
root of the conflict between Uyghurs and the state. The recognition of Uyghurs only as
nationalities and state control and exploitation of officially organized Muslim
establishments like the Chinese Islamic Association have caused tensions between
3
International Herald Tribune. 18 March 2008. ‘Tibetan protests fed by years of frustration.’
Retrieved from <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/18/asia/beijing.php> on 30 June 2008.
4
International Herald Tribune. 30 April 2008. ‘China jails 30 Tibetans for riots.’
Retrieved from < http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/30/asia/30china.php> on 30 June
2008; International Herald Tribune. 25 June 2008. ‘Tibet reopens to tourists three
months after lockdown.’ Retrieved from
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/25/business/china.php> on 30 June 2008.
5
International Herald Tribune. 5 June 2008. ‘Police in Tibet arrest 16 monks in 3 bombings’.
Retrieved from < http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/05/asia/tibet.php> on 30 June 2008. Kerr,
D. & Swinton, L. 2008. ‘China, Xinjiang, and the Transnational Security of Central Asia’,
Critical Asian Studies 40(1): 113-142; International Herald Tribune. 13 April 2008. ‘Nine
monks arrested for Tibet bombing’. Retrieved from <www.iht.com> on 30 June 2008;
International Herald Tribune. 13 April 2008. ‘China finds dynamite and guns in 11 monasteries’.
Retrieved from <www.iht.com> on 30 June 2008.
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21
Uyghurs and the state. So has Chinese religious policy, which has been characterized by
control, ‘united front’ and patriotism, and has been increasingly repressive after
September 11, to the extent that there is practically no freedom of religion for the
Uyghurs. The case of other religious minorities also reviving their religious practice
under both lax and restrictive policies and having endured equally brutal repression at
the hands of the Chinese state goes to show that Chinese religious policies rather than
Uyghur Islam are to blame for the tensions between Uyghurs and the state. Furthermore,
the case of Tibetan Buddhists reveals that factors other than religion and Chinese
religious policy, e.g. security, autonomy and maintaining territorial integrity, also play a
role in the Uyghur-Chinese conflict, though this is not to deny that repressive religious
policies after September 11 have played an enormous role in exacerbating the tensions
between the Uyghurs and the authorities.
Conclusion
This chapter examined to what extent the conflict between the Uyghurs and the Chinese
state could be attributed to the Uyghurs being Muslim. While adherents of the extreme
view in the debate on Islamic minorities under non-Islamic rule contend that the latter
are inherently problematic to a non-Muslim state, the case of Muslim minorities like the
Uyghurs reveals a different picture. The extreme view in the debate on Islamic
minorities under non-Islamic rule makes many presumptions about Muslim minorities
which if applicable to the Uyghurs would render them problematic. However, we saw
that these presumptions were not valid for the Uyghurs as Muslims. The latter are
divided and adhere to an eclectic brand of Islam, which functions more as a cultural
rather than a religious marker. Furthermore, the lack of overwhelming support for panIslamism and radicalism and the fact that the Uyghurs have not overwhelmingly
resorted to jihad or hijrah revealed that Uyghur Islam could not possibly be the cause of
tensions between Uyghurs and the Chinese state.
This was further confirmed by the case of the Hui whose more peaceful though
not entirely tension-free coexistence under Chinese Communist rule revealed that
perhaps more than Islam, Chinese religious policies, Uyghur ethnicity and culture,
Xinjiang’s importance for China’s political, economic and military security and
autonomy are explanatory factors when it comes to the terse relations between Uyghurs
and the Chinese state. In addition to the features of Uyghur Islam and the case of the
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Hui, an examination of Communism’s accommodation of religion and Chinese religious
policies towards the Uyghurs enabled us to confidently conclude that the Uyghurs’
Muslim faith does not seem to be the predominant source of tension between them and
the Chinese authorities. Communism’s accommodation of religion, especially Islam,
through the means of mediating structures like Islamic nationality and officially
organized Muslim establishments, and Chinese religious policy towards the Uyghurs
were seen as being highly problematic. The case of other religious minorities also
confirmed this viewpoint.
To sum up, it is not so much Uyghur Islam as Communism’s inability to
accommodate Islam and Chinese religious policy in Xinjiang that lie at the root of the
tensions between Uyghurs and the Chinese authorities. Furthermore, the case of the Hui,
the religious policy dilemma faced by the Chinese authorities and other religious
minorities show that factors other than repressive religious policies and Communism’s
incompatibility with religion play a role in the Uyghur-Chinese conflict. Autonomy was
one of these factors but before we look at that we will examine the factor of violence
with which Uyghurs have been associated of late.
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CHAPTER TWO: UYGHURS AND VIOLENCE
In the previous chapter we saw that factors other than Uyghurs’s Islamic faith may play
a role in explaining the tense relations between the Chinese state and the Uyghurs. This
chapter will examine one such factor: violence. The Uyghurs have been portrayed as a
violent by the Chinese authorities, which initially linked them to separatism and post
9/11 increasingly to Al-Qaeda-inspired Islamic terrorism. The international media has
also promoted this image of the Uyghurs. The U.S. capture of Uyghurs in Afghanistan
and their subsequent transfer to Guantanamo Bay in 2002 as well as the arrest of several
Uyghurs charged with planning terrorist attacks at the upcoming Olympics has made
global headlines.
This chapter will address the following question: to what extent can the tensions
between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state be attributed to the Uyghurs being violent?
The Chinese have perceived and portrayed the Uyghurs as violent. The PRC contends
that Uyghurs engage in terrorism and that the state faces a serious security threat from
the presence of an Al-Qaeda- related group. We will examine whether there is any truth
to these perceptions by examining what kind of violence the Uyghurs have engaged in.
We will also look at the violence that the government has engaged in its efforts to
counter separatism and terrorism in order to determine whether it is this rather than
Uyghurs being violent that underlies the tensions between the Chinese state and the
Uyghurs.
Chinese perception of Uyghur violence
Before we can examine the type and extent of violence that the Uyghurs have been
associated with, we need to examine why China perceives the Uyghurs as violent. The
Chinese perception of Uyghurs as violent is rooted in a 1994, widely distributed official
internal publication warning of the dangers of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism in
Xinjiang to China’s unity. Since then, in the Chinese view, pan-Turkism and panIslamism are linked and “no distinction is drawn between Uyghurs who are pan-Turkic
in orientation and those who are pan-Islamic, no distinction between those trained in
Turkey and those trained in Afghanistan, no distinction between those advocating
Deobandism, a puritanical form of Sunni Islam that includes groups like the Taliban,
and those advocating modernity” (Christoffersen 2007: 49). However, we have seen in
the previous chapter that the Uyghurs are not only divided as Muslims, only a small
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minority of Uyghurs are supporters of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism, the majority
being everyday, silent resisters (Christoffersen 2007 and 2002). Furthermore, panTurkists and pan-Islamists are internally divided with the existence of moderate (nonviolent) and radical (violent) wings, the latter often perpetrating violence against
sinified Uyghurs and silent resisters (Christoffersen 2007 and 2002). So though a small
minority claims to engage in violence, the Chinese do not distinguish between the
different types of Uyghurs but instead seem to portray all Uyghurs as violent. While
China’s perception of Uyghurs as violent might be flawed or exaggerated, the latter
have engaged in some violence. This calls for the examination of the kinds of violence
that Uyghurs have engaged in, as well as the nature of China’s claims with regard to this
being the source of the tensions in Xinjiang.
Uyghur Violence
Uyghurs have indeed expressed their resistance to the Han Chinese in several ways,
ranging from everyday resistance via cultural and intellectual expression to violent
protests, separatism and terrorism (Bovingdon 2002: 40; Dillon 1995: 17). Uyghurs not
only make jokes among themselves about the Han Chinese and China’s minority policy
in Xinjiang, they have also spoken out through criticism and involvement in
demonstrations. China has condemned any intellectual or cultural expression of the
Uyghurs which in its perception threatens its unity and many Uyghur scholars and
intellectuals publishing books about Uyghurs as a separate nation have been arrested
(Dillon 1995: 17).
Demonstrations and Riots
Though open forms of resistance like demonstrations are not tolerated, they have
occurred in Xinjiang, instigated mostly by government actions and Uyghur concerns
with regard to the economy, environment and freedom of cultural expression. Moreover,
demonstrations triggered as a result of perceived insult or discrimination against
Muslims have not only had Uyghur participants but also involved other Muslim
minorities in Xinjiang. 1985 witnessed Uyghur protests against the use of Xinjiang as a
nuclear test site (Clarke 2007b: 7). In 1988, there were protests by Uyghurs and Kazaks
against a book that allegedly contained racist remarks about these minorities (Clarke
2007b: 7). In 1989, Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities like the Hui demonstrated
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against the release of a book called Sexual Customs, which apparently denigrated the
Islamic faith (Mackerras 2003: 125). May – June 1989 witnessed demonstrations by
Uyghur students who sympathized with those in Tiananmen Square (Clarke 2007b: 7).
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 1990s resulted in riots as Uyghurs’ hoped
for greater independence (Dillon 2004: 20).
Violent Separatism and Terrorism
Another form of resistance has been violent attacks by Uyghur separatists. Beijing has
always struggled to maintain control over the Xinjiang region, which has been the site
of many territorial struggles. Uyghur separatism according to some scholars goes back
as far as 1759 with the Qing dynasty’s annexation and renaming of Eastern Turkestan as
Xinjiang, which gave rise to a series of demands for independence (Lufti 2004a). The
East Turkestan Republic was re-established twice, in 1931 to 1934 and from 1944 to
1949, and it is in the latter era that the modern pan-Turkic separatist movement
originated (Steele and Kuo 2007: 3). Yet the movement is not uniform. Though all PanTurkic separatists desire self-determination for Turks in a Turkestan homeland
stretching from Central Asia to Xinjiang, they are internally divided with radical and
moderate wings (Christoffersen 2007: 50). The moderate wing includes nonviolent
groups like the East Turkestan Information Center (ETIC) that fuse liberalism with panTurkism hence rejecting militant violence.
Though separatist tendencies have been part of the region’s history, violence
only occurred after 1986 fomented by Han Chinese policy in Xinjiang. The two most
violent incidents that occurred in Xinjiang in the 1990s were those in Baren (April 1990)
and Yining (1997 and 1998). The years 1992 to 1993 witnessed a series of explosions
and attempted bombings involving civilian targets. The period between spring 1996 and
February 1997 witnessed protests, explosions and assassinations in response to the
Chinese authorities’ launching of the “Strike Hard” campaign which was intended to
round up suspected separatists (Millward 2004: viii). After 1998, it became more
common for the Chinese authorities to associate Uyghurs with terrorist activities due to
incidents involving Han civilians in 2000, namely the kidnapping of a Chinese
businessman and attack on a Chinese delegation in Bishkek (Millward 2004: ix).
Though there is no denial of the existence of separatist elements in Xinjiang’s
society, what most academics do question is the extent of it and, more importantly, the
linkage of Uyghur separatism to terrorism and Islamic extremism. In 2003, when
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China’s Ministry of Public Security released its list of terrorist organizations, it claimed
that separatist violence in Xinjiang was inspired by Osama Bin Laden (Lufti 2004b).
Indeed from the Chinese perspective, the Uyghur separatist movement is Islamic
fundamentalist and terrorist (Bhattacharya 2003: 372; Vicziany 2003: 244; Shichor
2005: 123). Though the Chinese government has sought to link Uyghur separatism with
Islamic extremism prior to 9/11, only after 9/11 did it succeed in convincing
international audiences of this linkage: “Since the start of attacks in the 1980s and 1990s,
Beijing has attempted to link the rise of Uighur ethnic nationalism to a wider global
Islamist terror network, and this eventually dovetailed with the Global War on Terror
following the 9/11 attacks” (Steele and Kuo 2007: 9).
In 2002, the PRC released a paper called “East Turkestan terrorists cannot get
away with impunity” – its first ever official account of terrorist and separatist activity in
Xinjiang since 1990 (Clarke 2007a: 12). The report mentioned 6 categories of separatist
and violent incidents in Xinjiang (explosions, (attempted) assassinations, attacks on
police and government institutions, crimes of poison and arson, training/arms
manufacturing bases and plotting and organizing disturbances/riots and creating terror),
identified several groups alleged to be involved in these incidents and also casualties.
Shortly after the release of this report, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
was labeled a terrorist group by the U.S. and the U.N. and said to have links with AlQaeda. This gave rise to the perception that China was faced with a severe terrorist
problem. In response, China implemented several anti-terrorism measures: it joined the
U.S.-led war on terror, put in place joint counterterrorism measures with Central Asian
states and intensified its Strike Hard campaign.
In the years that followed, news and media in Xinjiang and around the world
became saturated with items linking Uyghurs to terrorism. In 2002, several Uyghurs
were captured by U.S. officials in Afghanistan and shipped to Guantanamo Bay where
they were detained and tried on charges of having links with Al-Qaeda. More recently,
the Chinese authorities claimed that Uyghur separatists were trying to bring down a
civilian airliner 6 . In April 2008, they claimed to have detained 45 East Turkestan
“terrorist” suspects and foiled plots to carry out suicide bomb attacks and kidnap
6
The Guardian. 10 March 2008. ‘Terrorists tried to crash jet, China claims’. Retrieved from:
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/10/china.terrorism> on 30 June 2008.
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athletes at the Olympic Games 7 . Though China has attempted to portray the insurgency
in Xinjiang as being linked to terrorist organizations in Central Asia and the Middle
East, there has been very little evidence to support this and whether such ties exist has
been questioned by academics, terrorism experts and overseas law enforcement
officials 8 . The next section will explore whether there is any truth to China’s claims
regarding the extent of Uyghur separatist and terrorist violence.
Uyghur violence and China’s claims
Demonstrations and riots
Though there have been demonstrations and riots, they have occurred for valid reasons,
e.g. protests against nuclear testing, racial discrimination and discontent with Chinese
minority policies in Xinjiang and have involved other ethnic groups, which makes it
difficult to assess the nature of ethnic unrest in Xinjiang (Dillon 2005: 26). The Chinese
government has also ignored the motivations of many ethnic or nationalist disturbances,
depicting them all as riots, hooliganism or sabotage (Dillon 2005: 18). As we will see
later, many demonstrations have also been depicted as terrorist incidents by the Chinese
government.
Violent Separatism and Terrorism
While the Chinese government and to some extent the international media portrays that
separatist violence and especially terrorism in Xinjiang as being on the rise and
increasingly linked to Al-Qaeda, there is much skepticism among the international
academic community with regard to this. Based on an extensive study of the PRC 2002
document, comparing the latter with other government, international and academic
sources, most academics disagree with the view of the Chinese government. There is
general consensus that separatist and terrorist violence has occurred in Xinjiang, but
there is disagreement with the Chinese government as to the extent of it and the threat it
poses to the PRC.
7
International Herald Tribune. 25 April 2008. ‘Interpol warns China of Olympic unrest.’
Retrieved from <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/25/news/beijing.php> on 30 June 2008.
8
International Herald Tribune. 21 April 2008. ‘Uighur rejects terror claims’. Retrieved from
<ww.iht.com> on 30 June 2008.
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Firstly, there is substantial evidence and agreement among academics that both
separatist and terrorist violence in Xinjiang, which reached its peak in the early 90s, has
declined since the late 1990s (Millward 2004; Clarke 2007; Shichor 2005, 2006;
Becquelin 2004a). Though this is contrary to what the 2002 document claims, ironically
the document itself provides proof of this. 66% of the incidents in the PRC document
occurred between 1996 and 2000, with only two incidents documented for the 2001-02
period (Clarke 2007b: 17). The period 1996 to 2000 coincides with the launching and
implementation of the Strike Hard anticrime and antiseparatist campaign, which placed
a political premium on the speed and quantity of arrests and convictions and hence
resulted in an almost immediate increase in the arrest of large numbers of suspected
terrorists, separatists and criminals. This causes one to doubt whether separatism did
increase in the late 1990s.
As for terrorist violence, though Uyghur separatists have in the past have carried
out some terrorist acts, after 9/11, none or very few Uyghur groups have engaged in
terrorism or acknowledged terrorist acts committed against the Chinese state, nor have
there been any violent incidents between 2003 and 2006 that media reports or official
Chinese government statements have attributed to terrorist groups (Millward 2004: 31;
Gladney 2004: 392; Clarke 2007b: 16). In fact, the majority of the Uyghurs have always
been silent, everyday resisters, not sympathizing with terrorism and major opposition to
Chinese rule has been non-violent (i.e. demonstrations and cultural expression) though
this is not to deny the existence of radical elements (Steele and Kuo 2007: 11;
Bovingdon 2002; Clarke 2007a; Gladney 2000; Dwyer 2005: 67,70). Most academics
point to the fact that despite the government’s claims, the little violent resistance that is
present in Xinjiang is not primarily characterized by terrorism but ethno-nationalistic
separatism (Steele and Kuo 2007: 10; Millward 2004: 2, 8). Moreover separatists are
“small in number, poorly equipped, loosely linked, and vastly outgunned by the
People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Police” (Gladney 2004a: 256) and they are
divided among themselves with some advocating peaceful means and others more
violent ones (Fuller and Starr 2003: 23). Millward (2004: viii) also says that though not
negligible, the current threat of organized Uyghur separatism and particularly of
terrorist attacks on civilian targets seems less serious than is claimed in official and
media reports.
Secondly, China’s claims about the extent of violent activity cannot be trusted
according to most academics. Not only does the 2002 document contradict its own
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claims with regard to an increase in separatism and terrorism, it is generally not
systematic nor consistent. It contains several discrepancies, inaccuracies and
contradictory reporting with regard to incidents, injuries and deaths. While it claims that
200 terrorist incidents were committed, it details only 39 incidents of terrorist activity
and also leaves many deaths and injuries unaccounted for (Clarke 2007a: 15, 2007b;
Millward 2004: 12-22; Vicziany 2003: 253; Steele and Kuo 2007). There is also much
skepticism about the selection criteria with regard to the incidents chosen as separatist
or terrorist acts and questions as to why these were labeled terrorist or separatist as
opposed to criminal (Clarke 2007a: 15, 16; Millward 2004: 12; Steele and Kuo 2007: 7;
Vicziany 2003: 246). These questions becomes even more poignant as one realizes that
the Chinese government can and has been known to label many non-separatist clashes
(demonstrations and protests) and insurrectionary outbursts as terrorist acts (Shichor
2006: 101; Kerr and Swinton 2008: 137-138).
Critics of government policy have been labeled separatists or terrorists and this
tendency has only become worse after September 11 as the Chinese authorities have
sought to blur the distinction between separatism and terrorism, resorting to defining all
separatist activity as terrorist in order to gain international support for harsher
crackdowns in the region (Dillon 2004: 157; Bhattacharya 2003: 358; Vicziany 2003:
255; Dwyer 2005: 55, Steele and Kuo 2007: 7; Lufti 2004a). As Becquelin states:
“Beijing has long equated independent religious activities and political dissent with
“separatism” – a statutory crime against State Security – but never before has it
explicitly linked all dissenting voices in Xinjiang with terrorism” (Becquelin 2004a: 39).
Despite the PRC’s introduction and promotion of the discourse shift from “separatism”
to “terrorism,” many journalists and academics are recognizing that the problem is
primarily one of domestic separatism rather than international terrorism (Dwyer 2005:
55-56).
Thirdly, not only have the majority of the violent attacks not challenged PRC
interests, many of the victims of these attacks have been Uyghurs which causes many
academics to doubt whether Uyghur violence has been as much of a threat to the
Chinese authorities as the latter claim (Millward 2004: 30; Clarke 2007a: 17; Steele and
Kuo 2007: 11; Vicziany 2003: 253):
“If these acts were the work of Uyghur separatists, it is hard to understand the
motives behind them. How, for example, would kidnapping Japanese geologists
in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan (a crime that the PRC’s 2002 report blames on
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Uyghurs) aid the cause of East Turkestan independence? Or bombing a bus or
exchange office in Osh? Or destroying the livelihoods of Uyghurs selling goods
in Bishkek bazaars? Or murdering Uyghur traders on the bus home to Kashgar?
Or, for that matter, targeting the U.S. embassy in Bishkek, as ETIM stands
accused of doing?” (Millward 2004: 30)
Such acts, though they symbolize an indirect opposition to Chinese authority,
predominantly reveal Uyghur factitiousness. Also since Uyghur violence is directed
primarily against other Uyghurs, it can be explained just as much – if not more so - by
internal social fragmentation, economic factors, organized crime and rivalries over
market turf as by political terrorism or separatism (Millward 2004: 30; Vicziany 2003:
11). The majority of the casualties accounted for in the PRC 2002 document are
Uyghurs and none of the attacks since the 1997 Urumqi bus bombings have targeted
civilians (Vicziany 2003: 252-253; Millward 2004: 10). As we will see in a later section,
more Uyghurs have been killed as a result of the riots and protests and state responses to
these than Han Chinese policemen or civilians (Vicziany 2003: 248; Millward 2004: 30;
Steele and Kuo 2007: 11).
Most importantly, though the Chinese government claims that the Uyghurs have
engaged in violent separatism and especially terrorism after 9/11, it has been very
contradictory in its claims with regard to this. Though China faced problems with
violence in Xinjiang in the 90s and even back then attempted to link Uyghur separatism
with Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, it still refrained from calling this “terrorism,
splittism or Islamism” and hardly mentioned the problem in any official documents due
to the lack of desire to admit that it faced opposition (Panda 2006; Roy 2004; Kerr and
Swinton 2008: 137; Shichor 2005: 124; Fogden 2003: 62; Christoffersen 2007: 46). Yet
in early 2001, official reports and state-run media mentioned terrorism as a serious
threat domestically and internationally, and after September 11 it suddenly appeared as
a top priority in the 2002 National Defense White Paper (Becquelin 2004a: 41; Panda
2006: 201). Post 9/11, the government has raised and dealt with terrorism and
counterterrorism strategy in all significant official documents and government papers
issued either for domestic or international purposes.
Yet even while claiming to be faced with a terrorist threat, the Chinese
authorities simultaneously acknowledge that there have been no significant terrorist acts
in Xinjiang since 1998 (Becquelin 2004a: 43; Shichor 2005: 124). So the Chinese
authorities continue to manipulate Uyghur violence to suit their purposes: “Beijing
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manipulates the problem of Uyghur separatism to conform to its particular needs at a
given time. When projecting an image of a loyal and trusted partner to the global, U.S.led struggle against terrorism, the PRC tends to overestimate the threat of Uyghur
separatism to China’s regional stability and national security. However, when the
Chinese are trying to raise investments from abroad and attract foreign businessmen,
especially from Hong Kong, to become involved in Xinjiang’s economy, those same
leaders tend to underestimate the threat” (Shichor 2005: 124).
Security Threat: The Al-Qaeda Connection
China claims that Uyghurs are problematic because of the serious security threat the
pose to the PRC due to some Uyghur groups like the ETIM being linked to Al-Qaeda.
In 2002, the ETIM was designated a terrorist organization under UN Security Council
Resolutions 1267 and 1390 upon the urging of China and the United States, which
required member states to freeze the organization’s assets worldwide without delay and
prohibit making funds available to ETIM (Wang 2003: 568). The Chinese government
and some academics claim that the group’s members past training and fighting with the
Al-Qaeda and their presence among those captured by Americans in Afghanistan and
Pakistan in late 2001 functions as sufficient proof for the group having links with AlQaeda today (Gunaratna and Pereire 2006; Wang 2003; Christoffersen 2007). They also
claim that “Jihad in Eastern Turkestan” posted on a Middle Eastern website showing
“Uighur militants displaying their weapon and combat training prowess with Rocket
propelled Grenades, M-16s, AK-47, detonators, and small rockets”) and ETIM’s
fulfillment of all FBI terrorist criteria and receipt of funding and support from Al-Qaeda
confirms this link (Gunaratna and Pereire 2006: 58; Wang 2003: 576). However,
whether ETIM is a terrorist organization linked to Al-Qaeda and whether China is
facing a terrorist threat is highly debatable.
Firstly, it is difficult to obtain information about ETIM as well as any other
organization operative in Xinjiang due to the instability of such groups but also due to
the strict controls on research in the region (Millward 2004; Steele and Kuo 2007;
Shichor 2005). Even academics like Wang (2003) who label ETIM a terrorist
organization acknowledge the lack of information with regard to this group. All this
makes it hard to believe the evidence just cited by academics and China as proving the
link between Al-Qaeda and ETIM.
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Secondly, the Chinese government has been non-systematic and inconsistent in
its treatment of terrorist and separatist organizations (Bequelin 2004, Blank 2003,
Millward 2004). Its 2003 terrorist list contained besides ETIM, 3 other terrorist groups,
namely East Turkestan Liberation Organization
(ETLO), World Uyghur Youth
Congress (WUYC) and East Turkestan Information Center (ETIC), but there is no
evidence linking WUYC and ETIC to terrorist activity (Shichor 2005: 132, 2006: 103;
Millward 2004: 14, Lufti 2004b). Similarly, the PRC claimed in another document that
United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (URFET) and ETLO posed the greatest
separatist threat to China, yet did not include the former in its 2003 terrorist listing
despite the group’s acknowledgement of training militants in Pakistan (Millward 2004:
25). Millward (2004) and Becquelin (2004a) also criticize the tendency of the Chinese
government to group together all incidents of violence or opposition as the work of East
Turkestan terrorist forces, rather than identifying specific groups as perpetrators. We
should add to all of this that the ETIM’s pan-Islamic vision is supported by a very small
minority of the Uyghurs and the ETIC, despite being labeled a terrorist organization by
the PRC, is generally acknowledged as being the moderate, non-violent wing of the
pan-Turkic vision (Christoffersen 2002 and 2007). Thus it is baffling why the ETIM,
given the existence of so many different groups, has been singled out after 9/11 as
having links with Al-Qaeda. Given all of this, it is debatable whether ETIM is the
threatening terrorist group with links to Al-Qaeda as China claims it to be and therefore
its claims that ETIM is a terrorist organization need to be approached with caution.
Besides the difficulty with regard to obtaining information about the ETIM and
the Chinese government’s non-systematic and inconsistent treatment of terrorist and
separatist organizations, another reason for most academics to argue that the Al-QaedaUyghur linkage is exaggerated by the Chinese government is the claims of the
government and the organizations themselves with regard to this linkage (Clarke 2007b:
21; Steele and Kuo 2007: 11). The Chinese government itself initially overestimated the
extent of Al-Qaeda influence in Xinjiang, claiming that there were 300 Uyghurs in
Afghanistan in late 2001 and that all Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang were linked to AlQaeda. Only later did it reduce these numbers to 100 Uyghurs in Afghanistan and 1000
Uyghurs in Xinjiang trained by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, probably as it revealed poor
judgment on the part of China in its dealings with Taliban and its predecessors during
the Sino-Soviet dispute (Dillon 2004: 140; Christoffersen 2007: 47).
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ETIM leaders have also expressed disappointment with the weak connection
between the group and Al-Qaeda, though such accounts must naturally be dealt with
cautiously as they originate from ETIM members (Clarke 2007b: 20). Added to this are
doubts as to whether ETIM even remained operative after the death of several of its
leaders (Millward 2004: 31; Clarke 2007b: 21). Even with regard to the 22 Uyghurs
detained at Guantanamo Bay, there is no clear evidence linking them to ETIM or AlQaeda as claimed by China and to date 15 of the 22 detainees have been released after
undergoing interrogations and trials (Clarke 2007b: 21). Dillon (2004: 139-140)
acknowledges that though there is some proof that connections between the Uyghurs
and Al-Qaeda go back to the 1980s and that some Uyghurs may have been trained by
organizations in Afghanistan that may have links to Al-Qaeda, the extent of the Uyghur
Al-Qaeda connection is obscure even though much has been made of it by Chinese and
Western analysts.
Furthermore, China’s traditionally strong grip on Xinjiang and increasing
engagement in extensive counterterrorism efforts and cooperation which have resulted
in a tightening of security in the region is another reason to doubt its claims with regard
to being faced with a terrorist threat. Despite the government’s claims it has always
firmly controlled Xinjiang through dominantly present organizations like the PLA, PAP
and XPCC and the Strike Hard campaigns they implemented. This grip only increased
after 9/11 as the Chinese government has entered into bilateral agreements and
collective alliances with Central Asian states, such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) 9 , with the aim of ensuring that these states do not provide support
to any terrorist groups within Xinjiang (Roberts 2004: 229; Blank 2003: 138; Becquelin
2000; Fuller and Starr 2003; Clarke 2007a; Shichor 2004: 159). In 2003, SCO
undertook joint military exercises with a strong anti-terrorism focus and in 2004
established a regional anti-terrorism unit (Clarke 2007b). Thus most academics claim
that Uyghur separatist and terrorist organizations, despite their increased visibility and
vocality, are becoming weaker not stronger due to the success of Chinese-Central Asian
security and intelligence efforts in clamping down on Uyghur opposition and hence
9
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was called into existence on 15 June 2001. It consists of
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It is a regional cooperative
mechanism with the predominant aim of countering separatism, fundamentalism and terrorism in the
region. China has largely out of self-interest taken a very active role in promoting the SCO as a credible
regional organization, hoping that it will help bolster secularism, territorial integrity and economic revival
in Xinjiang and Central Asia. Also, through the SCO it hopes to exclude U.S. involvement in Central Asia,
which is of greater concern to it than the situation in Xinjiang (Ong 2007: 111; Roy 2004: 328; Chung
2004: 995)
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limiting the capacity of Uyghur separatist or terrorist organizations to actively threaten
Chinese rule (Shichor 2005: 133; Clarke 2007b: 21; Mackerras 2004). If anything,
Chinese control of Xinjiang is tighter today than ever before – a fact well known to
Beijing - thus leading one to question its claims with regard to the security threat posed
by Islamic groups (Gladney 2004a: 119; Shichor 2006: 107).
This brings us to the reasons behind China’s exaggeration of Al-Qaeda links and
terrorism and US support for the latter, which prior to 9/11 refused to acknowledge any
Al-Qaeda involvement in Xinjiang in spite of reports indicating this (Christoffersen
2007: 47). The Chinese government by adding the East Turkestan Islamic Movement to
the list of terrorist organizations was able to capitalize on the West’s War on Terror
(Bhattacharya 2003: 374). Becquelin (2004a: 45) claims that “Beijing has used the
specter of terrorism in the aftermath of September 11 as a convenient pretext to silence
opposition and dissent.” Under the guise of facing terrorism and a terrorist threat, China
was able to justify the implementation of harsh counterterrorism measures that enabled
it to tighten its grip on an economically and politically important region. Also by
labeling the ETIM a terrorist organization associated with Al-Qaeda in 2002, the U.S.
was able to obtain China’s support for the War on Terror thus indirectly strengthening
Sino-U.S. relations (Roy 2004: 326; Panda 2006; Gladney 2004b: 390). Gunaratna and
Pereire (2006: 56) therefore point to the detention of the Uyghurs on unclear charges as
being “symptomatic of post-9/11 measures by coalition forces and the “War on Terror”
label”.
Concluding remarks
The majority of the Uyghurs – despite Chinese perception of them as pan-Turkic and
pan-Islamic – are in fact non-violent, resisting the Chinese predominantly by means of
cultural expression. While a minority of the Uyghurs has engaged in separatism and
some in terrorism, this does not justify China’s labeling of Uyghurs as overwhelmingly
violent. Moreover, Uyghur separatism is also not uniform as it contains moderates as
well as radicals. While the Chinese government and certain scholars assert that China is
facing much violence in Xinjiang, such claims about Uyghur violence seem neither
accurate nor trustworthy, given that overwhelmingly the evidence points to a decline in
violent activity since the late 90s. Furthermore, China’s reporting with regard to Uyghur
separatism and terrorism is self-contradictory and inconsistent and the PRC has been
known to confuse separatism and terrorism before but especially after 9/11. Moreover,
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Uyghurs rather than civilians have mostly been the victims of Uyghur violent acts,
which go to show that factors like intra-Uyghur divisions and economic rivalries as
opposed to separatism or terrorism might motivate these incidents. The Chinese state
has been contradictory in its claims with regard to terrorism post 9/11, exaggerating and
downplaying it depending on the situation it finds itself in.
The same can be said of its claims that there are Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in
Xinjiang. Especially controversial and hard to prove is the claim that ETIM is linked to
Al-Qaeda, given that there are so many Islamic groups and that pan-Islamism occupies a
very small nice in Uyghur society. The instability of and lack of information with regard
to such groups, the tight control on researchers in Xinjiang and China’s inconsistent and
non-systematic treatment of terrorist and separatist organizations cast doubts on claims
that there is an ETIM-Al-Qaeda link. China itself has overestimated the extent of AlQaeda influence in Xinjiang and ETIM leaders have expressed disappointment at the
weak connection between the two groups. Even if there exists some linkage, doubts as
to ETIM’s operational capacity and minimal support for pan-Islamism by Uyghurs in
addition to tightening security in the region and China’s implementation of cross-border
and internal counterterrorism measures implies that China cannot be facing as grave a
security threat as it claims it is. This apparent linkage seems more likely to be
functioning as a useful playing card, enabling China to come on board as an ally in the
global war on terror, thus indirectly strengthening Sino-U.S. relations but also allowing
it to tighten its already firm grip on the Xinjiang region. The following section will
examine to what extent Chinese policies to Uyghur violence are responsible for the
tensions between the PRC and the Uyghurs.
Chinese responses to Uyghur violence
Fighting separatism and terrorism before and after 9/11
In 1996, the Chinese government implemented a nationwide anticrime and antiseparatist
campaign called “Strike Hard.” Though it was primarily aimed at separatists (“splittists”)
rather than religious terrorists, it did attempt to counter what the Chinese call “illegal
religious activities.” This campaign became a regular feature in Xinjiang after 1996,
with several more being launched with regular intervals (Clarke 2007b: 17). The
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the Xinjiang
Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) played a major role in the implementation
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of the Strike Hard, with the PLA crushing riots that ensued and the PAP making arrests.
As we read in the previous chapter, after 9/11, the Strike Hard campaign was intensified
and geared more towards religious separatism. The scope of the death penalty increased
and more PLA troops were shipped to the region.
Is Strike Hard the problem?
As noted earlier, the 1996 “Strike Hard” campaign coincided with an increase in the
number of separatist and criminal incidents and arrests as many of the protests,
explosions and assassinations that took place between spring 1996 and 1997 were a
response to the Chinese authorities’ launching of the “Strike Hard” campaign (Millward
2004: viii). Similarly, an intensification of the “Strike Hard” campaign after September
11 resulted in increased arrests on charge of “separatism”. Though the Chinese state
sees the Strike Hard campaign as an appropriate method to address Uyghur separatist
violence and discontent, and there might be some evidence that the severity of violent
incidents in the region has declined since the late 90s due to it (Millward 2004: viii, 29;
Steele and Kuo 2007: 41), it seems that such state responses to riots and uprisings have
in fact instigated more non-violent and violent opposition among the Uyghurs. This is
because measures like Strike Hard fail to deal with Uyghur grievances, something
which needs to be done if the conflict is to be solved (Vicziany 2003: 253; Steele and
Kuo 2006: 17). Indeed, claim Steele and Kuo (2007: 12), Beijing’s restrictive and at
times repressive policies have played a key role in fostering resentment and perhaps
even propelled many of the Uyghurs towards violence or terrorism.
The state forces (PLA, XPCC, PAP) have indeed responded disproportionately
to Uyghur resistance, thus suggesting perhaps that it is not so much that the Uyghurs are
violent but that state violence against the Uyghurs is the problem. The latter breeds or
exacerbates Uyghur resistance which is then easily portrayed as violent separatism and
terrorism by the Chinese state (Lufti 2004a). The Strike Hard campaign is even seen as
a system of state terrorism by some and is said to be planting seeds for future violence
among Uyghurs, ensuring long-term insecurity for both the Uyghurs and the PRC
(Fogden 2003: 66; Christoffersen 2007: 55). It should not be forgotten though that
Strike Hard is not unique to Xinjiang but was also aimed at political organizations and
separatist activists in Tibet and Inner Mongolia (Dillon 1997: 83). If Strike Hard is
viewed as a part of China’s dealings with minorities, we can also speculate that tense
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Uyghur-Chinese relations are a reflection of China’s repressive attitude towards its
minorities.
Conclusion
To what extent are the Uyghurs as a violent ethnic minority to blame for the tensions
between them and the PRC? The examination of the PRC perception of Uyghurs, the
different forms of violence that the latter have engaged in and Chinese claims with
regard to the extent of this violence shows that Uyghurs are not predominantly violent.
Though there are separatist and terrorist elements among them, the majority of the
Uyghurs do not engage in separatism and terrorism but are non-violent protestors. This
is not, however, to deny that there is no violence perpetrated by the Uyghurs. There has
been separatist violence before the 90s but it faced a decline in the latter part of that
decade. Given the additional difficulty of ascertaining the claims of the PRC with regard
to Uyghur violent separatism and terrorism, and the latter’s tendency to manipulate the
situation for political gain, it seems likely that more is at stake than Uyghurs being
violent when it comes to explaining the frictitious relations between the latter and the
PRC, namely Chinese responses to Uyghur violence
The Strike Hard campaigns seem to be the reason for cause of much violent
resistance in Xinjiang, explaining the inflation in separatist and terrorist activity
between 1996 and 1997 and after 9/11. The problem seems to be not so much that the
Uyghurs are a violent minority but that the PRC measures used to defy violent elements
and non-violent protests to some breed Uyghur resistance and worsen tensions in the
relations between the two. As the Strike Hard campaign impinges on Uyghur autonomy,
the latter might be at stake in the conflict between Uyghurs and the PRC. The next
chapter will look at Uyghurs as an autonomous minority.
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CHAPTER THREE: UYGHURS AND AUTONOMY
“Autonomy arrangements around the world have been enacted to protect both states’
territorial integrity and the fragile rights of minorities. But all autonomy regimes
privilege territorial integrity over absolute responsiveness to the demands of the
autonomous group: they are a compromise between (a) states, which want unabridged
sovereignty and homogenous populations; and (b) peoples that want self-determination,
generally meaning independence. Thus we should not be surprised to find both state
actors and autonomous groups pressing for renegotiation of their agreements. Yet there
are dramatic differences in the degree to which states have honored their formal
commitments and in the amount of pressure for change brought to bear by nominally
self-ruling groups.”
- Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent
(Bovingdon 2004: vi-viii).
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is one of China’s five autonomous
regions. In theory, the purpose of autonomy is the protection of a state’s territorial
integrity and the rights of the minority to whom autonomy is granted. In practice,
however, states often prioritize their protection of territorial integrity over minority
rights which results in autonomous systems being a source of tension and dissatisfaction
for both governments and minorities, but especially so for the minorities. In previous
chapters, there were suggestions that this might be the case in PRC-Uyghur relations.
This chapter will examine whether China’s system of autonomy and hence Uyghur
status as an autonomous national minority lies at the heart of tensions between the PRC
and the Uyghurs. The main question that will be addressed is: to what extent can the
conflict between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state be attributed to the Uyghurs being
autonomous national minorities? We will examine the origins of the autonomous system
in China, the contours of autonomy in Xinjiang and Uyghur grievances with regard to
the system. Other autonomous regions will serve as a test case in order to determine
whether autonomy really does lie at the heart of PRC-Uyghur tensions.
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Autonomy in Xinjiang
Chinese concept of autonomy
The Chinese system of creating autonomous regions for minorities is rooted in
Communism and the former Soviet Union’s nationality theory (Millward and Tursun
2004: 91; Fuller and Starr: 6; Wang 2004: 161). Identifying different communities as
nations was a compromise made by Communist countries that allowed the latter to give
transitory recognition to local identities which they hoped would ultimately cease to
exist through absorption into Communist society. As Fuller and Starr (2003: 6) point
out: “The creation of autonomous regions was therefore merely a tactic, as the idea of
national autonomy would itself ultimately become a meaningless political concept under
Communism.” While the Soviet Union theoretically granted its minorities the right to
secede, the Chinese in 1949 under the “Program for Enforcement of National Regional
Autonomy” granted only limited territorial autonomy under Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) control and later secession was made illegal (Millward and Tursun 2004: 91;
Clarke 2007a: 9; Bhattacharya 2003: 365; Hyer 2006: 77).
The grounds for regional autonomy for minorities are (1) historical, based
according to official Chinese history on the desire of various nationalities to maintain a
united Chinese nation, (2) political consensus deriving from the collective struggle of
China’s various nationalities against the imperialist invasions of the semi-feudal and
semi-colonial eras of the late 19th century and the first part of the 20th century, (3)
geographic location of various nationalities (Wang 2004:164-165). In fact, “the
relationship between the state and the autonomous regions is based on the principle that
autonomy should be exercised only in a unified nation under the leadership of a central
government” (Wang 2004: 165). It is important to note that autonomy is only one aspect
of China’s minority policy, the others being legitimizing Han Chinese rule, regulation of
religion, economic development and regulation of minority culture in the autonomous
regions. The next section will examine the character of autonomy in Xinjiang.
Xinjiang’s Autonomous Structure
XUAR was established in October 1955 and is one of five other autonomous regions in
China. Since it is home to other ethnic minorities of which the Uyghurs are the largest,
XUAR is divided into 13 autonomous prefectures. A member of the Uyghur minority
must be the head of the autonomous government and the CCP and PLA bodies in the
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region theoretically need to recruit Uyghurs. Autonomy policy in Xinjiang is
characterized by (1) immigration and family planning policies, (2) the Xinjiang
Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), (3) cadre recruitment, (4) cultural,
economic and religious policies (Bovingdon 2004: 23). The first involves the
government-sponsored immigration of Hans to the region as well as imposed birth
restrictions on Uyghurs. The second involves maintaining strong control over the region
through means of a system of joint defense that is supposed to control the economy but
also implements anticrime campaigns like Strike Hard. The third involves recruitment
of Uyghurs into local and regional government in order to win the confidence of the
Uyghurs without compromising the CCP’s policymaking autonomy. Finally, there have
been restrictions placed on Uyghur cultural and religious expression and economic and
preferential policies have been implemented since 1949 in order to appease the Uyghurs.
Autonomy and Uyghur grievances
Chinese concept of autonomy
Underlying the Chinese concept of autonomy, is the assumption that minority identities
and hence autonomy would eventually become obsolete. However, autonomy has, if
anything else, reinforced a stronger sense of ethnic identity, so much so that
increasingly more groups are seeking official recognition as ethnic minorities
(Mackerras 2003: 40). In addition to the underlying basis of China’s autonomy concept,
the fact that autonomy in Xinjiang – like in other autonomous regions - was imposed
rather than negotiated is problematic (Bovingdon 2004: 12). Moreover, the PRC
regional autonomy policy demands that the patriotic spirit – which encompasses
centralized administration and authoritarian rule - be the political basis on which ethnic
minorities practice regional autonomy (Kung 2006: 389).
The 1984 law on regional national autonomy under the pretension of
redistributing powers of autonomy to the national autonomous areas in fact curbed any
potential excesses in the exercise of autonomy (Bhattacharya 2003: 366). The 2005
white paper Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China reaffirmed the policy of
self-government for the autonomous regions, including Xinjiang, allowing “ethnic
groups to manage their internal affairs independently in the autonomous areas and to
formulate regulations for self-government and their own regulations respecting and
guaranteeing freedom of religious belief and the use and development of spoken and
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written languages” (Kung 2006: 389). However, given that autonomy is based on
patriotism, which in the Chinese sense involves destroying and not coexisting with the
enemy, it would imply that the PRC’s claims in its white paper are mere rhetoric since a
policy based on patriotism would seem inherently incapable of respecting diversity and
supporting the aim of coexistence (Kung 2006: 389).
While some ethnic minorities may submit to the Chinese authorities, others who
have experienced independence in their history (like the Uyghurs), perceive the policy
as simply being one of political absorption (Kung 2006: 389). This line of reasoning
contends that the patriotic basis of Chinese autonomy policy engenders conflict between
minorities and the state as the latter is simply perceived as a policy of political
absorption, especially in the case of minorities like the Uyghurs which due to their
separate history may never accept political absorption. Moneyhon (2002: 128) also
points out that “the Chinese [autonomy] policy towards the people of Xinjiang is
essentially integration with the implicit expectation of assimilation at a later date.” Even
though there are a very small number of assimilated Uyghurs as well will see later,
assimilation has a very negative connotation for the Uyghurs, implying death in a
cultural, religious and linguistic sense (Fuller and Starr 2003: 20), thus enabling us to
perhaps understand why China’s autonomy system is problematic, not just for the
Uyghurs but also for other autonomous minorities.
Xinjiang’s Autonomous Structure
Xinjiang’s autonomous structure has also been problematic for the Uyghurs. The
creation of subautonomies in Xinjiang has left the Uyghurs cornered and controlled as
the division of the region along ethnic lines has allowed the government to align the
interests of the different groups against the Uyghurs and simultaneously prevented them
from forming a united resistance against the Han (Bhattacharya 2003: 366; Bovingdon
2004: 13; Clarke 2007a: 10). Moreover Xinjiang’s legal autonomy framework, which
fails to satisfy the international minimum standards of autonomy, does not grant the
Uyghurs any real political power (Bovingdon 2004: 14; Gladney 2000; Moneyhon 2002:
142). While the 1982 Constitution and 1984 Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority
nationalities states that a member of the Uyghur minority must be the head of the
autonomous government, this does not apply to the more powerful institutions operative
in Xinjiang, namely the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), which are dominated by Han Chinese. Moreover, even though the head of
Anita Jena (0226122)
42
the government is an Uyghur, real political power is wielded by the Han-dominated
CCP and PLA (Clarke 2007a: 10; Bovingdon 2002: 16). Central government organs,
which are required to approve all local decisions, have the authority to override
decisions made by local bodies, hence rendering the concept of local autonomy
meaningless (Bovingdon 2004: 16; Moneyhon 2002: 139).
Given that the legal framework of autonomy in Xinjiang grants the Uyghurs
nothing more than hypothetical power, it should not come as a surprise that autonomy
policy in Xinjiang does not seem to do much more and all aspects of it are greatly
disliked by the Uyghurs. Firstly, ensuring the integration of Uyghurs through
immigration of Han-nationals and CCP-imposed birth control policies is perceived as
oppressive, forceful cultural assimilation and worsening the Uyghurs’ employment
prospects in their own homeland. Such integration policies even allow the situation in
Xinjiang to be termed ‘colonial’ and lacking any autonomy whatsoever (Fogden 2003:
68; Gladney 1998c; Shichor 2005: 124; Millward and Tursun 2004: 91). Secondly, the
XPCC, a civilian controlled body consisting of PLA soldiers and charged with the task
of improving Xinjiang’s economy, has been rightly perceived more as a means of Han
repression. The latter is not only overwhelmingly Han, its paramilitary nature,
deployment in strategic trouble zones and involvement in suppressing local disturbances,
shows that it is more of a defense organ than an autonomous one designed for regulating
Xinjiang’s economy (Bovingdon 2002: 26-27).
Thirdly, the Communist Party’s recruitment of Uyghurs in local government is
seen by the latter as merely another controlling mechanism, hence increasing distrust in
the government. Not only are such Uyghurs carefully selected to ensure compliance
with CCP views, they occupy the least-important positions and are underrepresented.
These officials are seen as being mere puppets of the Chinese government and thus
perceived by many Uyghurs as being “as useless as the laws on autonomy” (Bovingdon
2002: 59). Fourthly, the cultural aspect of the autonomy policy, though implying
regulation of the latter, has downright controlled and repressed Uyghur culture and
religion and resulted in much Uyghur discontent.
Moreover, preferential and economic policies in Xinjiang under the system of
autonomy have not significantly improved the situation of the Uyghurs, who are poor
and underemployed, though perhaps they have left them better off than they would have
been without them contend some academics (Sautman 1998; Bovingdon 2004: 28, 37;
Gladney 1998c; Wang 2004). In recent years, autonomy has been further limited by
Anita Jena (0226122)
43
increased Han immigration, reduction of the proportion of non-Han cadres and, as we
saw in the previous chapters, increasingly repressive religious and counterterrorism
policies. Though autonomy is granted in theory, in practice Xinjiang does not look very
autonomous. Before we can claim however that a lack of meaningful autonomy lies at
the heart of PRC-Uyghur tensions, we need to examine whether all Uyghurs desire
autonomy and also the case of other autonomous minorities.
Uyghurs and Autonomy
As we have seen in earlier chapters, the Uyghurs are a much divided group, when it
comes to religious practice and visions of Xinjiang’s future. Although it is clear that all
Uyghurs desire greater freedom than that granted under the current Chinese
administration, they differ in the form that this should take. We saw that pan-Islamists
desire an Islamic state, pan-Turkists a Turkestan for all Turkic peoples across Central
Asia and the majority of the Uyghurs a federated system with a more autonomous
Xinjiang. With regard to autonomy, Uyghurs are divided among assimilationists,
autonomists and separatists (Fuller and Starr 2003: 22-23). The assimilationists - a very
small minority - are willing to be fully assimilated into the dominant Han culture (i.e.
sinified) due to their desire to have an equal place in the Chinese state. The autonomists,
however, believe that Uyghur culture, identity and traditions can only be maintained if
they are granted a meaningful degree of autonomy. Autonomists give priority to the
issue of autonomy in order not “to change the political order so much as to achieve de
facto what they believe already is guaranteed to them de jure in China’s constitution
thanks to Xinjiang’s status as an “autonomous region,” thus placing a high emphasis on
the content of self-determination (Fuller and Starr 2003: 22).
Indeed many academics point out that greater autonomy rather than
independence or an Islamic state is what Uyghurs desire (Steele and Kuo 2007; Dwyer
2005; Gladney 1996). The separatists, also a small minority, feel that only full political
separation from the PRC can allow real autonomy, but are divided along secular and
religious, and moderate and radical lines (Fuller and Starr 2003: 26; Fuller and Lipman
2004: 347). We can conclude therefore that the majority of the Uyghurs – the
autonomists adhering to the Uyghurstan Autonomy vision – do desire greater autonomy
within China, hence supporting the claim that a lack of meaningful autonomy is a large
source of tensions between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state.
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44
However, if China’s autonomous system is to blame for the tensions between
Uyghurs and the PRC, we would expect this to be the case with other autonomous
regions as well. Indeed the four other autonomous regions of China share a similar fate
to that of Xinjiang. There has been much minority activism in regions like Inner
Mongolia and Tibet due to desires for greater autonomy (Mackerras 2003: 45). All areas
experience the same system of autonomy, though some academics claim that Xinjiang
may have experienced greater control due to it being a strategic region that has a
substantial ethnic minority population with a history of opposition to Chinese rule
(Clarke 2007a: 10; Bovingdon 2004). Its strategic location and its rebellion against
Chinese rule do indeed make the Xinjiang region stand out from other autonomous
regions. Also it is claimed that the Dalai Lama’s advocacy of genuine autonomy rather
than independence, the Tibetans’ Buddhist faith, their resort to less violent means of
protest and greater multi-ethnic character of Xinjiang might explain why autonomy in
Xinjiang might be more restrictive (Mackerras 2004: 49; Moneyhon 2002: 123).
However, we saw in the first chapter that religious policies in Tibet have been equally
repressive and Buddhists, most of whom do not support Dalai Lama’s views, have also
been known to engage in separatist violence. However, as opposed to Tibet and other
autonomous regions, Xinjiang’s strategic location and mineral resources might explain
why autonomy there might be more restrictive.
While maintaining territorial integrity is what is at stake with regard to all
autonomous regions, in the case of Xinjiang, strategic, economic and political factors
also play a role in China’s desire to maiantain a grip on the region (Ong 2007: 12).
Firstly, Xinjiang has the country’s largest oil and gas reserves and contains the majority
of the raw materials that a growing power like China needs (Ong 2007: 106; Chung
2002; Blank 2003: 139). Secondly, Xinjiang is strategically located (it shares borders
with several Asian and Central Asian countries which were part of the famous Silk
Route) and has over the centuries been the scene of countless territorial struggles (Blank
2003: 124). Finally, it is home to China’s largest nuclear testing site and plays an
important role in China’s maintenance of its nuclear monopoly in the entire Asia-Pacific
(Ong 2007: 102). Since Xinjiang is a resource-rich, strategically-located border
province that plays an important role in China’s security, this does give some credibility
to the claim of certain academics that “autonomy” there might be more restrictive than
in other autonomous regions and thus more problematic.
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45
This brings us to the predominant contention that autonomy in Xinjiang is the
largest contributing factor to Uyghur dissatisfaction (Bhattacharya 2003; Wang 2004;
Moneyhon 2002; Bovingdon 2004; Gladney 2003; Fuller and Starr 2004). Given that
the autonomy system does not work well in practice, that most Uyghurs do desire
greater autonomy within China and that Xinjiang’s autonomy might be more
problematic than other regions, such contentions might have some validity despite the
fact that demands for autonomy are increasing. Bovingdon claims that the “granting of
Uyghur influence over affairs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has
taken a backseat to the consolidation of CCP control and the crushing of any
movements that advocate independence, or even the more modest goal of “real
autonomy” (2004: 14).” Wang (2004: 166) points out that although “the regional
autonomy systems sounds good in theory, it does not work so well in practice. In the
absence of the rule of law, the powers and rights to which the autonomous regions are
entitled cannot be effectively implemented. Moreover, the power and rights can only be
effectively exercised in an established democratic system.” While the implementation of
the 1982 Constitution and the 1984 Law on Regional National Autonomy gave Xinjiang
a greater framework for autonomy than ever before, still minimal principles of
autonomy are lacking (Bovingdon 2004: 46; Moneyhon 2002).
Though it is not certain that more moderate policies would necessarily have
produced a better outcome, putting in place minimal principles of autonomy would
probably have reduced tensions between Uyghurs and the PRC (Bovingdon 2004: 5).
Moreover, Moneyhon (2002: 124) contends that “true autonomy is not an option for
Xinjiang, and given the current and long-term goals of the central government,
“autonomy” for the Uyghurs will mean modernization, sinification, and ultimately
integration into the greater Han framework.” Instead of granting greater autonomy,
Fuller and Starr (2003: 35) point out that China continues to favor ever tougher
crackdowns and controls. Thus Bovingdon (2002: vi) claims: “In Xinjiang, the political
system has chronically thwarted the Uyghurs’ exercise of self-rule and thus provoked
and exacerbated Uyghur discontent”. Xinjiang’s fake or “paper autonomy” is therefore
likely to exacerbate tensions between the Han majority and minorities in Xinjiang.
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46
Conclusion
This chapter set out to answer the following question: to what extent can the conflict
between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state be attributed to the Uyghurs being
autonomous national minorities? The patriotic spirit and top-down nature of the Chinese
concept of autonomy is at odds with allowing minorities freedom under an effective
autonomous system as can be witnessed by the failure of Xinjiang’s legal autonomy
framework to grant Uyghurs any real political power. All aspects of Xinjiang’s
autonomy policy, i.e. immigration and family planning policies, the Xinjiang
Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), cadre recruitment and cultural, economic
and religious policies seem merely controlling mechanisms for the PRC rather than
genuine mechanisms for ensuring proper autonomy. The domination of Han Chinese in
local governmental apparatus, their increasing immigration to the region, CCP-imposed
birth control policies, ineffective economic and cultural policies are exacerbate tensions
between the PRC and the Uyghurs.
Though the Uyghurs are internally divided, the majority of them do desire
greater autonomy within China. Although China’s policy of autonomy towards all
minorities is characterized by control and based on patriotism resulting in them all being
dissatisfied with PRC-imposed autonomy, Xinjiang’s special importance to China’s
military, economic and political security, goes a long way in explaining the stringent
autonomy policy of China towards Xinjiang and why it is a source of unrest between
Uyghurs and the PRC. Most authors contend therefore that the lack of any real
autonomy in Xinjiang is probably a major cause of the tense relations between the
Uyghurs and the PRC. Thus we can conclude that to a large extent the conflict between
the Uyghurs and the Chinese state be attributed to the Uyghurs being autonomous
national minorities.
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47
CONCLUSION
This thesis set out to examine to what extent Uyghurs’ Islamic faith, their engagement
in violence and their status as an autonomous national minority was responsible for the
tensions between them and the Chinese state. The first chapter revealed that it was not
so much Uyghur Islam as Communism’s inability to accommodate Islam and Chinese
religious policy in Xinjiang, which has been increasingly repressive since 9/11, that lies
at the root of the tensions between Uyghurs and the Chinese authorities. Though
Uyghurs are Muslims, their adherence to a largely eclectic and moderate brand of Islam
and the limited support for radical elements does not render them problematic.
Communism’s inability to accommodate religion, especially Islam, and oppressive
Chinese religious policies seem to bear the brunt of the blame. The case of the Hui
Muslims and other religious minorities also lend support to the idea that more than
religion, other factors played a role in explaining the terse relations between the Chinese
state and the Uyghurs.
The second chapter revealed that the majority of the Uyghurs do not engage in
violence despite China’s claims to the contrary. Though there are separatist and terrorist
groups present in Xinjiang, and these have engaged in violence against the state, the
extent of the violent activity that has occurred seems to have been exaggerated by the
Chinese government in order to justify a tightening of its grip on the region, before but
especially after 9/11. The majority of the Uyghurs, claim academics, are not violent but
silent resisters, expressing their grievances through cultural means or non-violent
protests. Furthermore, the violent activity that has occurred and its nature are
questionable as China has been known to conflate separatism and terrorism, labeling
non-violent protests as terrorist acts. The ETIM-Al-Qaeda connection is also
conspicuous and hard to prove and our examination of this shows that such a link
possibly does not exist. Chinese claims about such connections probably serve the
ulterior purpose of enhancing Sino-U.S. relations and giving it more leeway to
implement more stringent anticrime and antiterrorism measures like Strike Hard in the
XUAR region. More than Uyghur violence, it is the measures that the PRC uses to quell
any Uyghur resistance that worsen Uyghur-Chinese tensions.
Both chapters pointed to autonomy as potentially playing a role in tense relations
between PRC and the Uyghurs and indeed in the third chapter we saw that the system of
autonomy played a large role in the problematic relations between the two. Autonomy
Anita Jena (0226122)
48
in Xinjiang seems to be a mechanism for controlling the Uyghur minority and hence
gives rise to tensions between the latter and the state. As opposed to claims about
Uyghur Islam and Uyghurs’ engagement in violence, the controlling nature of the
autonomous system in Xinjiang can be substantiated. Though China claims that
Uyghurs are problematic because they are Muslims and engage in violence, it seems
more likely that it is China’s faux autonomy system and its generally repressive stance
towards minorities that is to blame. Moreover, examining the Uyghurs has revealed the
complexity of their case and the need to exercise caution when drawing conclusions
based on Chinese government claims and international media reports about this ethnic
minority.
Despite the limitations and bias in the available literature, the latter still revealed
the complexity of the debate with regard to the Uyghurs. There is much speculation
about the future of the Uyghurs and the Xinjiang region. While some question whether
China’s attitude to the Uyghurs and other minorities will change and whether Uyghurs
will increasingly turn to radical Islam. While some claim that the likelihood of greater
autonomy, let alone independence, is unlikely others point to the growing internal
divisions within China to suggest that perhaps independence is an option in the far away
future. More fieldwork is needed, however, especially with regard to the propensity for
Islamic radicalism among the Uyghurs and the threat of terrorism linked to Al-Qaeda,
given the research priorities that have been assigned to these worldwide due to growing
international concerns about terrorism. These debates are still evolving and only time
will tell what they will reveal about the Uyghurs, given that access to the region is
limited to researchers. Finally, it is important to remember that situation in Xinjiang is
dynamic and evolving. As Fuller and Starr (2003: 15) point out: “Facts are being
created on the ground daily. No interested party can flatter itself with the belief that the
formuli and proposals that passed for wisdom or prudence in the past can prevail in the
face of these constant changes. All must be prepared to consider their positions anew.”
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49
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