The events at the summit conference at Camp David in 1978 that led to a peace
treaty between Egypt and Israel and a framework for peace in the Middle East are
summarized in a day-by-day account based on published records and interviews
with participants. The phases ofgroup development during the 13-day
period are
analyzed from a functional perspective. The group progressed through the phases
in the expected order, dealing in turn with problems of pattern maintenance,
adaptation, integration, and goal attainment. However, three different subgroups
met before acceptable drafts of the agreements could be devised (the adaptive
phase). Even then, conflicts during the integrative phase almost led to a breakup
of the meetings.
GROUP DEVELOPMENT AT
CAMP DAVID SUMMIT, 1978
A. PAUL HARE
DAVID NAVEH
Ben-Gurion
University
On September 5, 1978, a summit conference was held at the
U. S. Presidential retreat of Camp David. At the invitation of
President Jimmy Carter, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt
and Prime Minister Menachem Begin arrived with delegations of about a dozen officials, including several cabinet
ministers and senior advisors. The host, President Carter,
had a delegation of a similar size composed of State
Department and National Security Council officials.
For thirteen days, the three delegations were locked up at
Camp David and secluded from the outside world. During
this period of intense negotiations they succeeded in
producing two documents. One was a framework for peace in
the Middle East, including guidelines for negotiations on the
Palestinian problem. The other document was a framework
for negotiating a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. The
signing of the Camp David accords was a breakthrough in
SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR, Vol 15 No. 3, August
@ 1984 Sage Publications, Inc
299
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the history of the conflict in the Middle East. It was the first
time that an Arab country was willing to recognize Israel and
sign a peace treaty to work out a permanent and peaceful
solution to the Palestinian problem based on coexistence.
The accomplishments at Camp David even surprised the
participants (Naveh, 1984). Although there were many
skilled and knowledgeable people in the various delegations,
it was not initially clear that these skills could be combined
to form a creative problem-solving group that would be able
to deal with the many differences in the positions of Egypt
and Israel. However, the group was successful. In the
present analysis, I focus on one aspect of the group dynamics
at Camp David. I test the hypothesis that the overall group
development followed the same series of phases that have
been observed in other successful groups as they deal with
the four functional problems of groups; namely, providing
values, resources, norms, and leadership (Hare, 1982: 6889). If this is true, we may also be interested in the nature of
the phases and how the group was able to move successfully
from one phase to another. If this is not true, the theory of
group development may have to be modified to take into
account the course of events at Camp David.
The data for the analysis are drawn from recent biographies
of some of the persons involved in the summit conference
(Brzezinski, 1983; Carter, 1982; Dayan, 1981; Vance, 1983;
Weizman, 1981). We have been able to add material from
interviews with members of the American, Israeli, and Egyp1
tian delegations to these accounts.’
In this study of an unprecedented event as an approach to
international conflict resolution, I will first briefly describe
the activities of the group and its subgroups in a day-by-day
account of the Camp David conference, then outline a theory
of group development, and finally provide some analysis of
the case material in terms of the theory.
The activities at Camp David were not those of a single
small group whose members met together for a series of
meetings that might be easily classified according to group
development stages. Rather, activities were carried out
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301
within and between three national
delegations and their
staffs.
all
of
the
supporting
However,
participants were at
to
David
Camp
implement the same goals so it is possible to
consider all of those present as constituting a single group
with the three delegations and the other smaller groups that
were later formed as subgroups. The three leaders, Carter,
Sadat, and Begin, formed the central subgroup. Although
this subgroup was only active during the first few days at
Camp David, all of the other subgroups worked to accomplish the task that only the three leaders could carry out: the
signing of the frameworks for peace in the Middle East.
Because President Carter was involved in most of the
activities that were important for the group’s progress, the
day-by-day summary presented here is drawn primarily
from his account that highlights his participation in the events
(Carter, 1982: 319-403).
The sessions at Camp David were not the first time that
representatives of Egypt, Israel, and the United States had
met to work on a draft of an acceptable peace agreement and
they would not be the last. Negotiations had already been
carried on through various forms of summits, shuttle
diplomacy, and conferences at the ministerial level for about
a year. As a result, all three sides had considerable experience in dealing with the issues and each other.
The summit at Camp David convened as an all-out effort
by Carter to save the peace process. In his view, the impasse
in the negotiations in the summer of 1978 may have led not
only to a serious blow to Sadat’s regime, but to a new war in
the Middle East. Carter planned to formulate an agreement
between Sadat and Begin within three days, but was willing
to stay at Camp David as long as a week (Carter, 1982:
322).
DAY BY DAY AT CAMP DAVID
On Day 1, Tuesday, September 5, President and Mrs.
Carter welcomed President Sadat on his arrival at Camp
David. Mrs. Sadat did not attend the conference. The
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302
Deputy Prime Minister,
el-Tohamey;
Foreign Minister, Muhammad
the
Head
of
the President’s Bureau, Hassan
Ibrahim Kamel;
Kameil; and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Botrous Gahli; as well as several senior officials of the
Foreign Ministry and the Office of the President. After a
brief meeting between Carter and Sadat they agreed to meet
the next morning.
Prime Minister Menachem Begin arrived several hours
later. Although Mrs. Begin had not accompanied him, she
was scheduled to arrive that evening. The Carters welcomed
Begin and the Israeli delegation; including the Foreign Minister
Moshe Dayan; the Defense Minister, Ezer Weizman; a
Supreme Court Justice, Aaron Barak (the former Attorney
General who had just been appointed to the bench); and
Egyptian delegation
Hassan
included the
the
several senior advisers.
In the afternoon, President and Mrs. Carter secured the
agreement of both leaders on the text of an interfaith prayer
for peace. After supper, Carter and Begin met for two and a
half hours, because, unlike Sadat, Begin was eager to get
down to work. According to Carter, the conversation was
&dquo;discouraging&dquo; because Begin presented the &dquo;old Israeli
negotiating positions&dquo; and expressed his opinion that the
negotiations would take a long time. Begin expected that, at
most, the summit would result in a declaration of principles
for peace negotiations. Carter made it clear that he wanted
final decisions at Camp David and that he was going to put
forward his position forcefully (Carter, 1982: 337). He also
impressed upon Begin the &dquo;advantages of good rapport
between him and Sadat&dquo; (Carter, 1982: 333).
Close to midnight, Carter met with the American Secretary
of State, Cyrus Vance, and the National Security Adviser,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, to discuss his meeting with Begin.
Also included in the American delegation were Under
Secretary of State, Harold Saunders; Middle East expert on
the National Security Council staff, William Quandt; as
well as the American Ambassadors to Egypt and Israel,
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303
Herman Eilts and Samuel Lewis. Vice-President Walter
Mondale and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown participated in some of the proceedings as did several other
members of the President’s staff and administration.
As the host, President Carter decided on an informal tone
for the meetings. The participants were encouraged to dress
informally. Meals were served in a common dining hall, food
and drinks between meals were served at all hours. For
recreation, various sports facilities and rooms for viewing
movies were available. The informal setting combined with
the close proximity of the living units made it easy to arrange
formal and informal discussions.
On Day 2, Wednesday, September 4, Carter met with
Sadat in the morning. The U. S. President found himself in
agreement with Sadat who &dquo;wanted a firm framework for a
permanent peace, and was eager to deal with all specific
issues&dquo; (Carter, 1982: 339). It should be noted that Sadat
and the Egyptian delegation were apparently convinced that
an agreement with Begin could not be worked out. They
wanted to expose Begin’s intransigence at Camp David in
anticipation of subsequent American support of the Egyptian
position (Eilts, 1980: 3). Sadat handed Carter a plan that
outlined extreme demands for Israeli withdrawal, concessions, and reparations. However, he confided to Carter that
he was also willing to make concessions.
At 3:00 P.M. the first meeting of the three leaders took
place. The opening discussion dealt with the scope of the
issue to be considered. It was agreed that all controversial
issues should be included and that the Americans might
present their own ideas at some stage. Most of the session
was devoted to Sadat reading his plan aloud. Begin, at
Sadat’s urging, saved his response for the next meeting after
he had a chance to discuss the Egyptian plan with his
advisers. Although there was underlying tension, the meeting
ended in good spirits.
The Israeli delegation met that night and heard a detailed
account of the meeting from Begin. It was decided that Israel
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304
would request that the Egyptian plan be rescinded. The
Israelis began drafting a counterproposal.
On Day 3, Thursday, September 7, Carter, Vance, and
Brzezinski met with Begin, Dayan, and Weizman. They
worked out a compromise to avoid a conflict with Sadat.
Rather than request that the Egyptian plan be taken back, it
was agreed that Israel would declare it unacceptable. The
Americans were pleased to have Dayan and Weizman
accompany Begin because they felt that the two were more
committed to making an agreement than the Premier was.
Dayan was considered very creative and kept coming up
with deadlock-breaking formulas. He was also considered to
have some influence on Begin. Weizman was thought to have
little rapport with Begin but his friendship with Sadat was
considered useful.
Later that morning, Sadat, Begin, and Carter met in the
study of Carter’s cabin. The session was full of anger and
accusations. Following an adjournment for lunch, the
session was resumed.
Given the evident failure of the Sadat-Begin meetings and
the danger of the imminent total collapse of the talks had they
continued, Carter decided to separate the two. From this
point on Sadat and Begin did not meet. Carter and his team
preferred to deal indirectly with Begin through Weizman,
Dayan, and Barak. They found the members of the Israeli
team more flexible and congenial than their chief. In the
Egyptian case, the opposite was true. Although Sadat was
flexible on many issues and receptive to changes, his
associates were not.
Later that night, after a Marine drill and a reception,
Carter and his chief advisers met with Sadat and his delegation. The American President assured them that he agreed
with their demands that the Israeli settlers leave the Sinai
and that a satisfactory solution to the Palestinian problem
should be worked out. In general, throughout the summit,
Carter was more sympathetic to the Egyptian position and
found it easier to hold discussions with Sadat than with
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305
Begin. While the Americans were meeting with the Egyptians, the Israeli delegation held a meeting to draft a
counter-plan.
On Day 4, Friday, September 8, Carter operated with the
knowledge that the Egyptians were seriously considering
leaving. The American delegation met in the morning with
the Israelis to report on the previous night with the Egyptians. In the afternoon Carter met separately with Begin and
Sadat. In the ensuing discussions, Carter emphasized the
areas of agreement and the willingness of both sides to
compromise. That evening the Carters and other members of
the American delegation joined the Israelis in a high-spirited
dinner and songfest to welcome the arrival of the Sabbath.
On Day 5, Saturday, September 9, the Americans were
busy preparing a draft proposal that was to cover more than
fifty issues of controversy. The drafting was concluded by
midnight. It was decided to exclude the issues of the removal
of Israeli settlements from the Sinai and a freeze on
settlements in the other occupied territories. Because these
were major stumbling blocks, the Americans wanted to
present them after the other issues were resolved. Carter
noted that fatigue was taking its toll. Dinner that night was a
festive occasion with special foods and entertainment.
On Day 6, Sunday, September 10, Egyptian and Israeli
delegations joined Carter for a six-hour tour of the Civil War
battlefield at Gettysburg. At that time, several members of
the Israeli delegation were busy drafting a press release that
would explain to the world why the Camp David peace talks
had failed. However, this &dquo;white paper&dquo; and those prepared
by the other delegations were never used.
In the late afternoon and, again, in the late evening until
3:00 A.M., Carter, Mondale, Vance, and Brzezinski of the
American delegation met Begin, Dayan, Weizman, and
Barak of the Israeli delegation to go over the first American
draft. Many major points in the proposal were debated
heatedly. Carter had to postpone meeting with Sadat until
the next day. The Israelis acceded to Carter’s request to wait
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306
for a revised version of the American proposal rather than
introduce an Israeli draft. After the meeting, Carter took a
walk with Dayan to discuss some of the pertinent issues.
On Day 7, Monday, September 11, Carter met Sadat to
discuss the revised American proposal that was based on the
Israeli ideas with which Carter agreed. The Sinai settlements
were still an issue as was the disposition of Jerusalem. Sadat
took the document to confer with his advisers.
Later that day, Carter met Weizman and his aide, General
Tamir, to learn about the military arrangements they had
worked out with the Egyptians prior to Camp David.
Meanwhile, Vance and Eilts met with the Egyptians who
expressed strong reservations about the American proposal.
Carter had a meeting with Dayan and Barak.
Day 8, Tuesday, September 12, the negotiations seemed
headed for a breakdown. Sadat had a rough meeting
with his senior advisers. They were very critical of the
American proposals and unhappy with the direction of
the talks. Later that morning Sadat met Carter and seemed
very troubled throughout the meeting (Carter, 1982: 385).
However, the meeting between Vance, Brzezinski, Dayan
and Barak made some progress. Given these results, Carter
proceeded to draft an agreement regarding the Sinai that he
presented to Sadat three hours later. Sadat approved it.
Still more difficulties were presented to Carter as he met
with Begin after having supper with the Israeli delegation.
The Israeli Premier expressed his firm opposition to the
On
to be
inclusion in the agreements of the clause from UN Resolution
242 concerning the &dquo;inadmissibility of acquisition of
territory by war.&dquo; He also vowed that the Sinai settlement
would not be given up. Begin offered Carter two statements
to end the summit. One simply stated the gratitude of Israel
and Egypt for being invited to Camp David. The alternative
statement listed the areas of agreement and disagreement. A
discussion that Carter described as &dquo;heated, unpleasant and
repetitive&dquo; followed. It ended with mutual accusations with
no substantive results (Carter, 1982: 386-387).
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307
On Day 9, Wednesday, September 13, Carter decided to
try a different method to break the deadlock in the negotiation
of the Israeli-Egyptian Framework. At Carter’s request, Sadat
designated Osama el-Baz, and Begin designated Aharon
Barak to work on the language of the framework with Carter
and the Secretary of State. They worked for eleven hours and
made significant progress. After the meeting was over,
Carter walked over to Begin to thank him for &dquo;the Israelis’
constructive attitude during the day&dquo; (Carter, 1982: 388).
That night Carter could not fall asleep because he was
concerned for Sadat’s safety. Carter has been told earlier in
the evening that he could not see the Egyptian President
because he had retired earlier than usual. Carter feared that
Sadat had been killed by one of his pro-PLO aides. In the
middle of the night, Carter summoned Brzezinski and the
chief of security to his cabin and ordered the strengthening of
security around Sadat’s cabin.
On Day 10, Thursday, September 14, Carter joined
Sadat’s fast-paced morning walk. Sadat accepted several of
Carter’s proposals concerning Eilat and Jerusalem. The rest
of the day was devoted to Israeli-American discussions on
the Israeli-Egyptian accord. Barak and el-Baz continued to
work on the language of the proposals. Towards the end of
the day there was a feeling that an agreement encompassing
all issues couldnot be worked out. The following discussions
focused on how to make the anticipated breakdown appear
as constructive as possible.
On Day 11, Friday, September 15, Carter decided that
the conference would end on the next Sunday and informed
Begin and Sadat. While Carter’s staff was busy drafting his
speech to Congress explaining the failure to reach an
agreement at Camp David, the Americans were told of
Sadat’s intention to leave immediately. Apparently, following a meeting with Dayan, Sadat was angered by Dayan’s
statement that no Israeli government could evacuate the
Sinai in less than five years (Eilts, 1980: 5). On hearing the
news, Carter asked to be left alone and spent some time
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308
praying for
Sadat and,
an
agreement. Afterwards, he
in
a
moving conversation,
went over to see
convinced Sadat to
stay. Later that evening, Carter and Mondale paid
a social
call on Sadat. Following a discussion of the framework, they
watched the Ali-Spinks heavyweight boxing championship
match on television.
On Day 12, Saturday, September 16, the main obstacle to
an agreement was overcome. Early in the day Sadat made it
absolutely clear that he would not tolerate Israeli settlements
in the Sinai. Later, in a meeting with the Americans, Begin
indicated that he had changed his position and was now
willing to let the Knesset make the decision concerning the
evacuation of the settlements. As a result, the road to
agreement seemed open. Given the Sunday deadline, they
rushed through the remaining issues that dealt with the West
Bank and Gaza.
On Day 13, Sunday, September 18, the framework for
peace in the Middle East and the framework for the
conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was
signed by Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat with
President Carter as witness. Yet, until the agreements were
signed at 10:00 P.M., it was not clear that they would be
signed at all. In the morning, although Sadat accepted the
draft, a crisis developed over the question of Jerusalem. The
Israelis objected to an American letter to Egypt, appended
to the agreement, restating the American position that East
Jerusalem was an occupied territory. After hectic negotiations throughout the day, a compromise was hammered out.
In the midst of the crisis, Carter went over to Begin’s cabin to
personally deliver autographed pictures of the principals at
the summit. The exchange between them was rather emotional
as they talked &dquo;about grandchildren and about the war&dquo;
(Carter, 1982: 399). Begin then expressed his sorrow that an
agreement could not be worked out because he could not give
in on the Jerusalem issue. Some time later he accepted an
alternative draft that restated the positions of the three
participants. Towards the end, some issues of language still
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309
the negotiators busy. As everyone was preparing to
leave for Washington D.C. for the signing ceremony, it
became known that the Egyptian Foreign Minister had
resigned because of the agreements. Most of the members of
the Egyptian delegation were unhappy with the agreement
and boycotted the ceremony.
As noted earlier, in the brief account of the activities of
each day, the meetings that involved Carter were stressed
because he was the principal driving force behind the
negotiations. Brzezinski observed that &dquo;this was indeed his
success. He was the one who gave it the impetus, the extra
effort and the sense of direction&dquo; ( 1983: 270-271 ). Throughout the summit there were other meetings between each of
the three principals and their delegations for briefings and
discussions of the various drafts. There were also numerous
formal and informal contacts between the various delegations.
kept
A THEORY OF GROUP
DEVELOPMENT2
The approach that we have found useful for the analysis of
group development is based on functional theory. It is
described in some detail in a book on creativity in small
groups (Hare, 1982: 68-89). In brief, the theory is as
follows. Every group has four major functional problems to
solve in order to be successful. The first problem is that of
&dquo;latent pattern maintenance and tension management&dquo; or
&dquo;L&dquo; for short. In this stage the basic purpose of the group
must be defined and the general orientation and basic
obligations agreed on. The second problem is one of &dquo;adaptation&dquo; (&dquo;A&dquo;). In this stage group members must acquire or
increase resources, skills, and relevant facts that are appropriate for the task. The third problem is one of &dquo;integration&dquo;
(&dquo;I&dquo;). In this stage the group must be reorganized and roles
redefined so that group members can use new skills or new
information without being too dependent on the leader.
Members seek to define how the group can get along better,
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310
promote harmony, and decrease conflict. They need to be
clear about the
norms governing the relations
The
fourth
between members.
problem is one of&dquo;goal attainment&dquo; (&dquo;G&dquo;). In this stage the members work to achieve the
goal. There may be several stages devoted to either L, A, I,
or G if the group has special problems to solve in one or more
of the functional areas. Eventually there is usually a
terminal L stage in which the group dissolves and the group
members assess the meaning of the group experience for
their subsequent lives.
Although it seems fairly obvious that a group should begin
by deciding what is to be done (L) and end by doing it (G), the
most effective order of the A and I stages may be less clear.
Experience in many situations suggests that group members’
roles can be adequately assigned and morale developedto an
appropriate level (I) after the group is fully equipped with the
necessary resources and member skills (A). If this has not
been done, the enactment of the group will appear premature
(Mann, Gibbard, and Hartman, 1967). However, once the
general orientation of the group has been decided upon (L)
and the resources gathered (A) to the satisfaction of the
members, if the roles are not properly assigned or if some
members are reluctant to accept their given roles there may
be a &dquo;revolution within the revolution&dquo; in the I stage. That is,
there may be resistance to moving into the G stage until the
individuals are ready to assume the required roles.
Two additional aspects of group development have been
noted by Shambaugh (1978). One has to do with the
accumulation of group culture and the other with oscillations
between positive and negative emotional feelings among
group members. Moving from the top to the bottom of Figure
1, the first row of letters indicates the major phases in the
order L-A-I-G. For any actual group, the phases will probably not be of the same length and, as indicated earlier, a
group may recycle a phase or not proceed beyond a given
phase; however, only the simplest model is given here. The
second row of letters indicates the subphases in which
specific
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311
through the first set of subphases leads to the
fulfillment of L, the next set of subphases to the fulfillment of
progress
A, and
so on.
The next line shows the &dquo;zero&dquo; level of emotionality.
When the graph, as indicated by the dashes, is above the line,
the emotions are positive; when it is below the line, the
emotions are negative. Positive feelings should reach a peak
during each &dquo;i&dquo; subphase and should fall off during the &dquo;g&dquo;
subphase as the application of dominance (leadership), in
the interest of the task, either generates hard feelings or turns
the group from a concern about the interpersonal relations to
a concern about the task. The low point of positive feelings
may be expected to continue into the next subphase of &dquo;I,&dquo;
(in the next major phase) but for different reasons. As the
group members begin the task of defining &dquo;the meaning of all
this&dquo; for the particular subphase, they will probably
discover that subgroups within the group have different
ideas, and until the unity of the group has been restored,
negative feelings will be evident as subgroups defend their
different points of view.
The bottom line in Figure 1 gives the &dquo;zero&dquo; level of
culture for the group. Shambaugh defines the group culture
as the mainly implicit, internalized totality of group-relevant
points of view, understanding, practices, and norms. Culture
&dquo;builds&dquo; duringthe positive emotional periods and shows no
growth during the negative periods. It is primarily during the
1, a, and i subphases that new points of view, understandings,
practices, and norms are developed. During the g subphase,
the various resources (a) and norms (i) are used to carry out
the task in line with the values agreed upon at the beginning
of the phase ( 1 ). We would not, therefore, expect much of an
increase in culture during the g subphase or during the first
part of the subsequent subphase (1) because group members
are still in disagreement over the guidelines for the next
phase (Hare, 1982: 82-83).
Although not discussed in the description of group development cited above, the staging of an event is important for
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312
both the major L phase and the minor I subphases. The action
area (stage) not only sets the overall mood of the performance but also indicates the limits of space and resources
that will be available to the actors (Naveh and Hare,
1984).
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP DEVELOPMENT
AT CAMP DAVID
As a first step toward the analysis of the phases of group
development during the talks at Camp David, the total
period of 13 days was divided into natural time periods. Like
the acts and scenes in a play, the beginnings and endings of
these natural time periods are indicated by changes in the
theme, the actors, or the setting. In this case, our own
estimates of the natural time periods were supported by
asking the participants we interviewed what phases they
could identify and what characterized the activity during
each of these phases. By this method, five natural time
periods were identified:
( 1 ) Days 1 through 3 when Carter held joint talks with Sadat
and Begin.
(2) Days 4 through 8 when Carter and his team were writing
the American draft of the proposals based on separate
consultations with Sadat, Begin, and their advisers.
(3) Days 9 and 10 when the drafting group featuring Barak
and el Baz was working on the details of the EgyptianIsraeli agreement with the Americans.
10 and 11I when the parties were unable to
overcome the Sinai issues culminating in the crisis in
which Sadat prepared to leave.
Days 12 and 13 when solutions were found for the
remaining problems and the Camp David accords were
assigned at the White House.
(4) Days
(5)
During the 13-day period, Carter introduced festive
meals, a Marine Corps drill, a trip to the Gettysburg
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313
battleground, and various other diversionary activities
designed to reduce tension and allow participants to meet
socially. However, there is no evidence that any of the
recreational periods should be highlighted as a separate
phase. Although some of the delegates had especially
friendly relationships both within and between delegations,
most of these (such as the Carter-Sadat friendship and
Weizman-Sadat liaison) appear to have been made during
the negotiations prior to Camp David. Throughout the
summit meetings, the small space, informal settings, and
informal code of behavior did not facilitate the interaction
between the delegates (Naveh and Hare, 1984).
In terms of functional theory, part of period 1 and periods
2 and 3 are similar in that they are each concerned with problems of &dquo;adaptation,&dquo; as will be indicated below. They can
be seen as a set because they are similar in theme, but
different in regard to task groups and details of the activity
performed. Although not singled out by the participants
interviewed in this study, the first Carter-Begin meeting and
the Carter-Sadat meeting of Day 2 were concerned with the
functional problem of pattern maintenance because it was at
this time that the three had to agree on their reason for
coming to Camp David. Given these two amendments to the
list of natural time periods, the overall development of the
activity at Camp David can be seen to have passed through
the stages L, A, I, and G in the expected order as
follows:
1 and morning of Day 2): The participants
held different ideas about the purpose of the summit before
they arrived at Camp David. Carter, in his initial meetings
with Begin and Sadat, established that his definition of the
purpose would prevail. In this initial stage, and through the
remainder of Period 1, Sadat and Begin acted primarily in the
antagonistic roles of heads of states rather than as negotiators.
L (evening of Day
A (reminder of Period 1 and periods 2 and 3): Given that the
eventual goal was to sign the &dquo;accords,&dquo; two &dquo;frameworks&dquo;
had to be constructed, one for peace in the Middle East, and
the other for the conclusion of the peace treaty between Israel
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314
and Egypt. In this case, gathering the necessary facts for
these agreements constituted the &dquo;A&dquo; phase. The phase had
three parts: the joint meetings of Carter, Sadat, and Begin;
Carter’s individual meetings with Sadat and Begin while the
American delegation worked on the American draft and
meetings were held among the three delegations to discuss
the various drafts; and the work of the drafting group
consisting primarily of Barak and el-Baz. Each of these three
parts, characterized by different combinations of principal
participants, was distinguished by different objectives (A 1 ),
different skills and backgrounds of the principal participants
(Aa), a different form of group organization or communication
network (Ai), and different specific task objectives (Ag).
However, the groups in Periods 1 and 2 failed to reach their
objectives although some progress was made. The group
consisting of Sadat and Begin, with Carter as mediator,
seems to have failed primarily in the integrative area (i).
Carter did not seem to be able to convince his guests to give
up their roles as antagonistic representatives of their states
and shift to the roles of negotiators accepting the need for
compromise. This created a need for a mediating group.
Thus, Carter and his delegation stepped into this position in
Period 2 when they started circulating the American draft
proposals. In their mediating role, they were aided by
members of the Israeli and Egyptian delegations. However,
they were unable to work out acceptable wordings or
strategies for handling all the pertinent issues. This was a
failure in the adaptive area (a). Sensing this, Carter tried a
third solution by having Barak and el-Baz serve as a drafting
team, chaired by himself, to focus on the Egyptian-Israeli
and Hare,
treaty. This was a highly creative move
forthcoming), and made it possible to produce a draft that was
close to the final version. Barak and el-Baz not only had the
experience from prior Israel-Egyptian negotiations (i), but also
had the required drafting skills and sensitivity to the issues and
cultural perspectives involved (a). However, regardless of the
understanding they had reached between them, it was still
necessary to secure agreement from their respective heads of
(Naveh
state.
I (Period 4): The stalemate and ensuing crisis of Days 10 and
11can be seen as &dquo;the revolution within the revolution.&dquo; In
laboratory groups there is often little or no commitment to
implement decisions that are reached by the group. In
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315
contrast, in many real life groups, the results of a group
decision or action can have important consequences for the
group’s members. In some cases, and Camp David seems to
have been one of them, some group members may go along
with activity in the L and A phases suspecting that something
will happen along the way to prevent them from reaching the
G phase. Thus, they will avoid doing the work the group was
designed to do. At Camp David the &dquo;work&dquo; was to sign the
accords as a first step in actually establishing peaceful
relationships in a troubled area of the Middle East. Although
there were some obvious gains for both Egypt and Israel,
there were also some obvious costs. Both sides may have
been just as well off if they could have proved that they had
done everything possible to obtain peace but that the other
side had made it impossible. Each of the three major participants had actually begun the preparation of a &dquo;white paper&dquo;
in which the blame for the failure of the talks could be placed
on the other parties. Thus, when it became apparent at the
end of the A phase that almost all the necessary information
had been collected for an acceptable draft, both Sadat and
Begin still balked at playing their roles as heads of states (I)
that would be necessary for the actual signing. To make it
possible for the work to proceed, some of the unresolved,
sensitive issues that had been left until last were not resolved
but simply bypassed. Thus Begin’s responsibility for agreeing
to the removal of the Sinai settlements was shifted to the
Israeli Knesset. The differences of opinion regarding the
disposition of East Jerusalem were acknowledged in letters
attached to the agreements. This point of the greatest resistance to change has been recorded in such traditional sayings
as &dquo;it is always darkest before the dawn.&dquo; Carter, as captain
of the ship, was able to ward off the mutiny and his
&dquo;statesman ship&dquo; was able to reach port.
(Period 5): The final phase began on Day 13 after Carter
had managed to reassure both Sadat and Begin. It reached its
climax with the evening ceremony at the White House where
both Sadat and Begin were once more in the roles of represenG
tatives of their states.
In addition to the L-A-I-G sequence, two other trends
related to group development are indicated in Figure 1, both
based primarily on observations of therapy and self-analytic
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316
groups. As described above, one trend is that of a generally
rising level of group culture as decisions and experience
accumulate over the life of the group. Because there was
ample evidence of an accumulation of experience in finding
solutions to the various conflicts of interest between Egypt
and Israel, this trend was evident at Camp David.3
On the other hand, the trend of changes in emotionality
represented by a series of damped oscillations indicating the
swing back and forth between positive and negative feelings
was not evident. A revised picture of the trends of problemsolving groups, such as that at Camp David, would show a
major fluctuation in the &dquo;I&dquo; phase, with a swing toward
negative feelings in those groups where a &dquo;revolution within
the revolution&dquo; occurs. One may also anticipate a major
swing toward positive feelings in this same phase in groups
that are organized to provide ecstatic experiences for
their members.
CONCLUSION
In terms of functional theory, the conference at Camp
David was successful because the group members, under the
leadership of President Carter, were able to deal with the
four functional problems of groups (pattern maintenance,
adaptation, integration, and goal attainment) in the expected
order. This involved being clear about the requirements for
each stage (L), gathering the necessary information (A),
working out appropriate role assignments (I), and completing
the work for that phase (G). Both the progress towards the
set of accords and the moods of the participants were
dominated by the activities of the three principals: Carter,
Sadat, and Begin.
There were many problems to be solved along the way,
beginning with the initial difference in opinion concerning
the definition of the situation held by Begin and Sadat. In the
adaptive phase, Carter was only able to arrange the most
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317
effective combination of resources and roles on the third try
when he formed the drafting group of Barak and el-Baz.
Finally, the whole conference almost floundered in the
integrative stage when both Sadat and Begin showed resistance to endorsing the final draft of the accords.
Although the conference followed an expected pattern of
group development in regard to the L-A-I-G sequence and
the continual accumulation of group culture, the damped
oscillations of emotionality were not observed. Rather,
there was a major swing toward negative reactions during the
integrative phase as the &dquo;revolution within the revolution&dquo;
occurred.
NOTES
1. We have interviewed Weizman, Barak, Dinitz, Rubenstein, Kadishai,
Rosenne, Pattir, and Proan of the Israeli delegation; Ghorbal of the Egyptian
delegation; and Brzezinski, Saunders, Quandt, Eilts, and Lewis of the American
delegation.
2. Please consult authors for figure that documents this process. Due to space
considerations, we were unable to include it.
3. One example was the priority given to discussing issues over which an
agreement was more likely while deferring the more difficult issues to the end.
Thus, negotiations could go on while giving the impression of progress. Another
example is the fact that the Egyptians and Israelis learned to talk to each other.
After over three years of virtually no communication, links between the two parties
were growing. Nevertheless, most of the Israeli-Egyptian communication at Camp
David was carried out by using Americans as go-betweens. Yet another example is
the pattern of "constructive ambiguity," as el-Baz called it, in formulating
agreements
on
controversial issues.
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HARE, A. P. (1982) Creativity in Small Groups. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
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NAVEH, D. (1984) "The missed opportunities of Camp David." Perspectives on
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A. Paul Hare is a Professor of Sociology m the Department of Behavioral
Sciences, Ben-Gunon University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel. He has
authored or edited, alone or with others, a number of books and articles on
aspects of social mteraction m small groups. His most recent authored book IS
Creativity in Small Groups (1982).
David Naveh is a Lecturer m the Division of Pohncal Science, Ben-Gunon
University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel. His research is concerned with
decision making and planning and he is currently wntmg a book about Camp
David, 1978.
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