Contents
3/2002
Sommaire
New players in the international system
by Eric Suy
Page 162
The use and abuse of ‘civil Society’ in Development
by Marcus H. Lenzen
Page 170
Challenging global capitalism: anti-globalisation organisations as a
fourth generation people’s movement (Part II)
by Ignatius Swart and Dawid Venter
Page 188
Awakening leadership in NGO’s and nonprofits
by Dave Yaffey
Page 205
Civil society’s big challenge is ending impunity
by Paul Sanders
Page 208
Document
Involvement of civil society organizations other than NGOs and the
private sector in technical cooperation activities: experiences and
prospects of the United Nations system
Page 213
Document
Droits économiques, sociaux et culturels : la reponsabilité des sociétés
transnationales
Page 217
***
La contribution de l’Observatoire européen des phénomènes racistes et
xénophobes à la promotion du caractère multiculturel des sociétés
européennes
par Petros N. Stangos
Page 218
Association News
Vie associative
Page 221
New international organisations
Nouvelles organisations internationales
Page 231
Transnational Associations
Associations transnationales
161
New players in international relations
by Eric Suy*
P
*Emeritus Professor,
Catholic University of
Louvain.
Professor Extraordinarius,
University of the Free
State, Bloemfontein.
Formerly Under-SecretaryGeneral and The Legal
Counsel of the United
Nations
Transnational Associations
3/2002, 162-169
ublic international law, as it is tought still
today, emphasizes the prominent position of
subjects of international law as the main
actors in international relations and, therefore,
in international law. The subjects are those entities which are the addressees of international
legal rules or norms, the bearers of international
obligations and rights. Traditional international
law distinguishes between states and international organizations as subjects of international
law. The latter have only recently been recognized as limited subjects of international law,
and only to the extent that states, the primary
subjects of international law, grant international
rights to and impose international obligations
on the intergovernmental organizations which,
therefore, became subjects of international law
by the grace of states which are and remain the
original subjects of international law.
The peculiarity and, indeed, the uniqueness of
international law is and remains that the very
subjects of this legal order, viz. the states, are also
the entities that create international law, either
through state conduct (practice) leading to custom, or through interstate agreements or treaties.
Intergovernmental organizations, as subjects of
international law, are created by interstate agreements or treaties called: covenant, charter, constitution, act, treaty, etc… It is important to
emphasize that states remain the primary subjects of international law and that, without these
primary subjects, there are no other subjects of
international law, be they interstate organizations
or other entities which have gradually emerged as
limited subjects of international law.
Gradually, and even before intergovernmental
organizations became subjects of international law,
entities other than states acquired the status of albeit limited – subjects of international law. In the
case of the Holy See and, to a more limited extent,
of the Sovereign and Military Order of Malta, their
acceptance as subjects of international law was
largely due to the fact that , at some point in history, they had been sovereign rulers over a given
territory (the Papal states and Malta) and, therefore, full subjects of international law. Today, these
entities remain important actors in the field of
international relations. This is particularly true for
the Holy See, although some confusion may persist because of the simultaneous existence of the
162
Vatican State, a micro-state with a given territorial
base. International law has also recognized belligerents as subjects for the very reason that they were
(and still are) a force to be reckoned with, and that
they may, through the fortune of arms, eventually
become the legitimate rulers of the country. In
other words, the status of subject of international
law of these entities depends upon their acceptance
and recognition by the original subjects of international law viz. the States, as important actors in
interstate relations. Whereas intergovernmental
organizations are accepted as subjects of international law by treaties between states as primary
subjects, the new ‘entities’ acquired the status of
subjects of international law through their own
and specific role as actors which states ultimately
recognized through practice.
Recent times have seen other significant
changes in the perception of the role of entities
other than states and international organizations
as important actors in interstate relations. These
changes stem either from the Charter of the
United Nations, or from the practice of the various United Nations principal organs. A most
important group of actors are, of course, the
non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
which have a consultative status with the
Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations (article 71, UN Charter). The General
Assembly of the United Nations has admitted
observers to either the Organization or to the
Assembly and/or its organs. The Security
Council and the General Assembly dealt with
topics and adopted resolutions concerning a
variety of non-state actors such as liberation
movements, terrorist organisations, individuals,
and private enterprises.
We purpose to examine some of the most
recent and salient developments concerning the
role mainly of non-governmental organizations
and the national liberation movements. In the
light of this, the question will be dealt with to
what extend the doctrine of state sovereignty has
been affected.
The evolution of the role of nongovernmental organizations
The Charter of the United Nations recognizes
the important role of non-governmental organi-
1. For an exhaustive commentary and literature, see
R. Lagoni, subArticle 71
in B. Simma, ed., Charta
der Vereinten Nationen.
Kommentar (1991) pp.
857-871, and also the
English edition: The
Charter of the United
Nations-A Commentary
(1995), pp. 901-915
2. Transnational
Associations - Associations
transnationales, the Review
of the Brussels based
Union of International
Associations contains, in
my view, the best series of
studies dealing with the
evolving status of nongovernmental organizations in their relations
with various intergovernmental organizations. For
a most recent, thorough
and comprehensive analysis of international nonstate actors in the era of
globalization, see W.
Hummer, Internationale
nichtstaatliche
Organisationen im
Zeitalter der
GlobalisierungAbgrenzung,
Handlungsbefugnisse,
Rechtsnatur, in Berichte
der Deutschen Gesellschaft
für Völkerrecht, vol. 39
(2000) pp. 45-230.
3. The Economic and
Social Council of the
United Nations established, by its resolution 3
(II)(1946), a Committee
on Non-governmental
Organizations with a mandate to examine and
report on the consultative
relationship which
ECOSOC should accord
to NGOs and to recommend what action should
be taken on submissions
which those organizations
may make to it. In resolution 1996/31, the
Economic and Social
Council adopted new criteria by which ‘arrangements’ on consultative status for NGOs may be
established.
zations as non-state actors in Article 71 which
runs as follows:
“The Economic and Social Council may make
suitable arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations which are concerned
with matters within its competence. Such
arrangements may be made with international
organizations and, where appropriate, with
national organizations after consultation with
the Member of the United Nations concerned”1
This is not the place to dwell upon the
‘arrangements’ for consultation with non-governmental organizations. Suffice it to say that
the relationship between the United Nations
and the NGOs has undergone important
changes during the history of the Organization2.
First, there is the number of organizations with
consultative status which stands at approximately 2.000. Second, the procedure and the type of
arrangements have recently been modified in
order to reflect the changing relationship3.
Third, some non-governmental organizations
have also been granted a special status as
observers with the General Assembly4. Fourth,
at major international conferences called for by
the United Nations General Assembly on topical issues, the participation of non-governmental organizations in parallel and simultaneous
meetings has largely contributed to the results of
these conferences. NGOs were thus given a special opportunity for lobbying and exerting an
influence on the delegations5. Fifth, frequently,
states and intergovernmental organizations call
on NGOs to participate in and even take the
lead of humanitarian operations because of their
special knowledge and experience. The awarding
of the Nobel Peace Price to the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) in 1997
and to Médecins sans Frontières in 1999 is an eloquent example of the international recognition
of the role and importance of humanitarian
non-governmental organizations as prominent
non-state actors6.
Except for their admission to the status of
consultative partners in the United Nations
Charter and in constitutions of other intergovernmental organizations, such as Unesco and
the Council of Europe, and except also for their
authorized participation at international conferences, the role of NGOs as non-state actors in
the formal decision-making-process, either in
the legislative or in the executive organs of intergovernmental organizations, has still to be institutionalized. There is, of course, one notable
exception in the constitution of the
International Labour Organization which granted such an enviable position to representative
groups of both workers and employers.
If non-governmental organizations, as the larger group of non-state actors, are gradually acquiring more weight, and as they have an increasing
impact on the informal process of decision-making, there is every reason for granting those
actors a more visible role whenever states will
proceed to a revision of existing constitutions of
intergovernmental organizations, including the
Charter of the United Nations. To put it in the
words of Secretary-General Kofi Annan: “our
post-war institutions were built for an international world, but we now live in a global world.
Responding effectively to this shift is the core
institutional challenge for world leaders today”7.
The Contribution of NGOs to the
development of international law
It is obvious that non-governmental organizations dealing with international law, such as the
Institut de Droit International and the
International Law Association are likely to have a
considerable impact on the future development
of international law. Indeed, legal advisors of
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of intergovernmental organizations, international law professors and practitioners, judges in international
and regional courts, members of the
International Law Commission usually are also
members of these learned societies, and as such
they contribute, in their individual capacity, to
the elaboration and the development of international law. Several similar associations in the
field of international environmental and space
law likewise contribute to the development of
these branches of international law8.
To the extent that other NGOs are important
non-state actors, capable of influencing the conduct of states and governments, they may also
play an important role in the formation and the
development of international law. Whoever participated in the drafting of international con163
4. Although the General
Assembly has traditionally
granted observer status to
intergovernmental organizations, non-member
states recognized by specialized agencies, and
national liberation movements, NGOs, such as the
International Committee
of the Red Cross and the
International Federation of
the Red Cross and Red
Crescent societies were
granted observer status in
1990. See in general: E.
Suy, The Status of
Observers in International
Organizations, in
Académie de droit international, Recueil des Cours
vol II-1978, pp. 75-179,
and R.N. Sybesma-Knoll,
The Status of Observers in
the United Nations (1981).
5. Thus, during the
Millenium Forum, representatives of more than
thousand NGOs gathered
at the United Nations in
New York during five days
in May 2000 in order to
formulate a collective
vision for the hew century
and the role of the United
Nations and of civil society in the major issue areas
of today. A Declaration
proposing i.a. the creation
and funding of a Global
Civil Society Forum was
presented to the world
leaders gathered at the
Millenium Summit which
took place early September
2000.
6. One may perhaps consider that most of the
recipients of the Price also
belong to the group of
important non-state
actors.
7. We the peoples: the role
of the United Nations in
the twenty-first century.
Report of the SecretaryGeneral, G.A. Document
A/54/2000, § 30.
8. See the Yearbook of
International
Environmental Law (since
1989), and the works of
the International Institute
of Space Law.
ventions in the field of modern aspects of international law will be able to witness to the often
driving force of NGOs in the international law
making process. It is true that, hitherto, states
and their representatives and negotiators are
always the final and exclusive partners in the
treaty-making process. But in some important
instances, the conduct of states has been largely
influenced by NGOs whose representatives are
sometimes members of the official state delegation. In some instances, individuals at the helm
of those NGOs were able to play a prominent
personal role in influencing changes in international law. It is, of course, impossible to give a
complete picture of those typical and topical
contributions by NGOs. Here is a largely
uncleared field for scientific research which will
have to be based on the archives of both the relevant NOGs and of states.
I merely wish to refer briefly to the contribution of the International Catholic Child Bureau
(ICCB) and of its then Director-General, the
Rev. Canon Moerman, in the elaboration of the
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.
When states, after difficult and protracted negotiations, adopted in 1988 a Convention on
theRegulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources
Activities, leading environmentalists, arguing
that the entry into force of this convention
would jeopardize the fragile ecosystem of the
region, started a vigorous campaign against the
ratification of the convention. Greenpeace and
‘Commander’ Cousteau, who in person visited
the heads of state, prime ministers and ministers
of foreign affaires of the ‘consultative’ parties,
were instrumental in obtaining that those same
states, led by Australia and France, eventually
agreed on a fifty years mining ban. This was
achieved in the Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, adopted in
Madrid on 4 October 1991.
Is it necessary to stress the prominent role of
Henri Dunant in the drafting of the first Geneva
Convention in 1864, and that of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
in the elaboration of the 1949 four Geneva
Conventions? Here again, the final text was
adopted by states in an international conference.
But the groundwork was done by experts under
the direction of the ICRC. During an interna164
tional conference which met from 1974 to
1977, two additional protocols were negotiated
again under the aegis of the ICRC. The personal role and impetus of the conference’s chairman, Jean Pictet, should also be emphasized as
an example of a non-state actor’s contribution to
the development of international law9.
In a remarkable and extremely well documented study, Ken Rutherford of Southwest
Missouri State University, examines the contribution of the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines, a conglomerate of about one thousand NGOs, to the elaboration of the Ottawa
Treaty banning anti-personnel landmines. One
of his conclusions is that “(t)he landmine case
provides a prologue to future NGO attempts at
changing state behavior in certain issue-areas”10.
In a somewhat broader context, the United
Nations Security Council dealt with problems
of international humanitarian law for the first
time during the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict. Several
resolutions condemn the violations of international humanitarian law by Iraq11. Thus, in
Resolution 666 (1990), the Council reaffirms
that Iraq remains fully responsible for the safety
of third-state nationals “in accordance with
international humanitarian law including,
where applicable, the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, of 12 August 1949”12 .
In the same resolution, the Council directs the
Sanctions Committee that it should bear in
mind that foodstuffs should be provided
through the United Nations “in cooperation
with the International Committee of the Red
Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies”13.
In Resolution 670 (1990) of 25 September,
the Security Council condemns Iraq’s continued
occupation of Kuwait and its holding of thirdState nationals against their will, in flagrant violation i.a. of “international humanitarian law”14.
In the same Resolution, the Council reaffirms
that the Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
of 12 August 1949, applies to Kuwait and that
“Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its terms
and in particular is liable under the Convention
in respect of the grave breaches committed by
it”15.
9. See: Studies and Essays
on international humanitarian law and Red Cross
principles, in honour of
Jean Pictet (1984).
10. K. Rutherford, The
landmine ban and NGOs:
the role of communications technologies, in
Transnational Associations
(2/2000) pp. 60 - 73, at
73. This study focuses on
the use of communications technologies in order
to increase the NGOs
opportunities for success
in changing state behavior.
See also ICBLs website at
http://www.icbl.org.
11. E. Suy, ‘International
Humanitarian Law and
the Security Council
Resolutions on the 19901991 Gulf Conflict’ in
A.J.M. Delissen and G.J.
Tanja, eds., Humanitarian
Law of Armed Conflict.
Challenges Ahead. Essays in
Honour of Frits Kalshoven,
(1991) pp. 515-526.
12. The United Nations
and the Iraq-Kuwait
Conflict 1990-1996, The
United Nations Blue Book
Series, Vol. IX, Document
13 , pp. 172-173.
13. SC Res 666 (1990) , §
6
14. 2nd preambular paragraph.
15. Operative § 13, Idem,
document 16 pp. 175.
16. A/Res/45/170, Idem,
document 20 pp. 178179.
17. SC Res 687 (1991),
section G, §§ 30-31,
Idem, document 35 pp.
197.
18. ST/SGB/1999/13,
reprinted in International
Review of the Red Cross, nr.
836, December 1999,
812-817.
19. See the comments by
A. Ryniker, Respect du
droit international humanitaire par les forces des
Nations Unies, supra n. 19
pp. 795-805.
20. See on this aspect: P.R.
Baehr, Mobilization of the
Conscience of Mankind:
Conditions of
On 18 December 1990, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted a resolution concerning the situation of human rights in Kuwait
which contains several references to the principles
of international humanitarian law, the ICRC and
the protection of the civilian population16.
In the famous Resolution 687 (1991) the
Council decides that “Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International
Committee of the Red Cross” in furtherance of
its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of
all Kuwaiti and third-state nationals. The
Council also invites the ICRC to keep the
Secretary-General of the United Nations
apprised of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating this repatriation17.
This survey of the prominent role of the ICRC
in the development and implementation of international humanitarian law should be completed by
a reference to two recent events. Firstly, ever since
the creation of the United Nations peace-keeping
operations, the question has been raised whether
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977
Protocols thereto are applicable to the United
Nations Blue Helmets and to their operations. The
official position of the Secretariat has always been
that the general principles of humanitarian law were
applicable to the peacekeeping operations, but not
the Conventions and Protocols as such, because
the United Nations was and is not a party to these
legal instruments. On 6 August 1999, however, a
somewhat different position was adopted when
Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a Bulletin on
Observance by United Nations forces of international
humanitarian law18. This promulgation, without
expressly referring to the Geneva Conventions and
the Protocols, states that “(t)he fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set
out in the present bulletin are applicable to United
Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict
they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to
the extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when
the use of force is permitted in self-defence”19. This
formal recognition of the applicability of international humanitarian law to certain types of
U.N.operations is a step in the right direction, but
it leaves many questions unanswered. Secondly, it
is important to draw the attention to Security
Council Resolution 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000
which deals with the protection of civilians in
armed conflict.
This Resolution is an important addition to
existing international humanitarian law in that
it confirms that “the committing of systematic,
flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in
situations of armed conflict may constitute a
threat to international peace and security “ thus
opening the possibility for the Council to take
action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations. Those few examples seem to
confirm that the Security Council of the United
Nations takes an active interest in the observance and the development of international
humanitarian law in the light of the international and, especially, of the national armed conflicts in which the Organization becomes
involved. There is no doubt in my mind that
these recent developments have been brought
about by the sustained action of the representatives of the ICRC in New York.
NGOs are active not only in the process of
developing international law and of its codification, but also, and perhaps more prominently so,
in the verification of the implementation of international commitments by states. Although actions
of NGOs as watchdogs have not been institutionalized, they are nevertheless sometimes highly visible thus contributing to a better implementation
of the law. This is undeniably the case in the field
of human rights where Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch, to name only these two,
function as efficient controllers20. Similarly, NGOs
sometimes play an effective role in the field of disarmament and arms control as well as in the proces of implementing international environmental
law. This unofficial and informal verification by
NGOs functions rather well, and any attempt to
institutionalize this role may jeopardize the independence and neutrality of the NGOs and hence
the quality and reliability of their findings.
National liberation movements,
belligerents and factions in
international conflict
During the process of decolonization, especially since 1970, the United Nations supported
165
Effectiveness of Human
Rights NGOs, in E.
Denters and N. Schrijver,
eds., Reflections on
International Law from the
Low Countries, in Honour
of Paul de Waart (1998)
pp. 135-155.
21. This formula was used
in order to avoid being
trapped into the intricacies
of having to deal with several liberation movements
operating in the same territory.
22. P.H. Kooijmans, The
Security Council and
Non-State Entities as
Parties to Conflicts, in K.
Wellens, . ed.,
International Law: Theory
and Practice. Essays in
Honour of Eric Suy (1998)
pp. 333-346.
23. See also the SC
Resolutions 1127 (1997) ,
1173 (1998) and
1229(1999).
24. On this distinction,
see P.H.Kooijmans,
Zelfbeschikkingsrecht.
Naar een nieuwe interpretatie? in N. Sybesma-Knoll
& J. Van Bellingen , eds.,
Naar een nieuwe interpretatie van het Recht op
Zelfbeschikking (1995) pp.
157 ff. For a recent view
on self-determination: Th.
Christakis, Le droit à l’autodétermination en dehors
des situations de décolonisation (1999).
25. SC Res. 1160 (1998),
SC Res. 1199 (1998) , SC
Res. 1244 (1999).
26. SC Res. 1160 (1998),
operative § 5, SC Res.
1199 (1998), preambula,
repeated in SC Res. 1203
(1998) and in SC Res.
1244 (1999), also in the
preambula.
27. SC Res. 1160 (1998),
preambular § 3
28. Idem, operative § 8,
repeated in SC Res. 1186
(1998) preambular § 2 , in
SC Res. 1199 (1998), preambular part, and in SC
Res. 1203 (1998), preambular part.
national liberation movements which existed in
various countries and territories then still under
colonial rule or under foreign domination by
giving them some sort of recognition. The most
visible form of such recognition was the decision
by the United Nations General Assembly to
grant the observer-status to these movements,
either directly, which was the case in 1974 for
the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), or
indirectly, in admitting as observers those liberation movements and organizations which had
been recognized by the Organization of African
Unity21.
The recognition of the national liberation
movements by the United Nations amounted to
the promotion as proto-states. This, eventually,
led to the sovereign independence of new states.
This newly acquired status did not exclude,
however, that competing liberation movements
continued the struggle for internal domination
once independence was a fact. This is still the
drama in former colonies in Africa, such as
Angola, where UNITA, once recognized as a
national liberation movement in the struggle
against the Portuguese colonial regime, continues to fight for domination in a civil war situation against the universally recognized government of the independent and sovereign state of
Angola.
The refusal by UNITA to accept the verdict of
free elections led the Security Council to adopt
a series of resolutions under chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter in which ‘sanctions’
were decided against UNITA22. This was the
case in Resolution 864 (1993) which was the
first one in which the Council imposed sanctions upon an entity which was not a state – and
even not a proto-state – while holding this entity responsible for its illegal conduct. In subsequent resolutions, the Security Council, still acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, condemned the attitude and actions of UNITA23. It
is submitted that the international community,
represented by the United Nations General
Assembly and Security Council, does no longer
accept any liberation movement as representing
the people under colonial yoke and foreign
domination once independence has been
achieved. Factions within an independent and
liberated country which continue to use force in
166
the struggle for political domination have no
longer anything in common with the original
liberation movement they once might have
been. Theirs is the status of belligerents in an
internal conflict or civil war. Sometimes, the
international community intervenes in an effort
of pacification which may lead to the acceptance, by all the parties involved, of a peaceagreement. The recent developments in Africa
and in Central America prove the successes, but
in some cases also the failures and weaknesses of
such agreements. In some instances, the United
Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter, has determined that the violation of those agreements to bring about law
and order in a state, may be a threat to international peace and security, either in general, but
mostly in the region.
This does not imply that the right of selfdetermination is denied. It simply means that
the right has been shifted from the external to
the internal level24, and that, consequently, the
use of force which was recognized as legitimate
in the struggle against colonialism, foreign occupation and apartheid, is no longer accepted in
the exercise of the internal right of self-determination. The handling by the Security Council of
the Kosovo question is a case in point.
It should be emphasized that the Council, in all
its resolutions dealing with this crisis, expressly
affirms the commitment of the international
community to the “sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”25.
The Council further stresses the necessity for a
negotiated settlement and expresses its support
for an “enhanced status for Kosovo which would
include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-determination”26. The
Council also condemns the use of “excessive”
force by Serbian police forces, “as well as all acts
of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army”27.
While imposing an arms embargo, the Council
decided that all States “shall prevent arming and
training for terrorist activities there”28. When,
after NATO’s military intervention in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1244 (1999), it decided “that
a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be
based on the general principles in annex 1 and as
further elaborated in the principles and other
required elements in annex 2”. The demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army and other
armed Kosovo Albanian groups is one of these
elements. One of the main responsibilities of the
international civil presence includes: “(P)romoting the establishment, pending a final settlement,
of substantial autonomy and self-government in
Kosovo”29. The pattern followed by the Security
Council is similar to solutions adopted in situations of civil strife in other countries, such as
Sierra Leone, where the Council refuses to ackowledge the admissibility of the use of force by
factions, and orders their demilitarization and
disarmament while stressing the necessity for a
political solution which would respect the unity
of the State. In other words, internal self-determination should be peaceful, and the use of force,
although a fact which has to be taken into
account, cannot be condoned because it would
affect the sovereignty of the State.
actors influencing international relations and
the development of international law. States and
their governments have become, to a large
extent, the re-actors to those new challengers.
The ever growing number of international
agreements against all forms of terrorist activities, against money-laundering and the recently
signed Convention against Organized Crime
with its two Protocols clearly indicate that, in
future, major parts of international law will deal
with problems generated by non-state actors.
It should, however, be emphasized that the
course of international relations and of international law is not only influenced by elements of
“uncivil society”, but that elements of highly
developed society have the same, and perhaps
even a more important influence. Globalization,
even if it still is a controversial term and phenomenon, has mainly to do with the communications
revolution. Another aspect is the growing trend of
transnational mergers and acquisitions giving rise
to more and more powerful transnational corporations. Globalization is brought about, not by
states or by governments, but by individual
investors and inventors and by the companies they
have created. States, therefore, tend to control the
power and influence of these corporations which
they sometimes view as a threat to their sovereign
rights. But is state sovereignty really threatened by
all those non-state actors?
Other transnational actors in uncivil
and civil society
29. Operative § 11 (a).
Our italics.
30. Doc. A/54/2000
31. Idem, § 34.
In his already quoted report We the peoples: the
role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century30 the United Nations Secretary-General
Kofi Annan discusses ‘new vulnerabilities’ which
globalization has created to old threats. He
emphasizes, in particular, “(c)riminal networks
(which) take advantage of the most advanced
technologies to traffic around the world in
drugs, arms, precious metals and stones - even
people. Indeed, these elements of “uncivil society” are constructing global conglomerates of
illicit activities”31. This problem of organized
international crime also covers other well known
modern phenomena such as: piracy at sea, terrorism in all its aspects, bribery and corruption,
money laundering, tax evasion through international havens and illegal immigration. The revolution in global communications already
changes the way many people work and live,
and some non-state actors take advantage of this
revolution to undermine the fundamentals of
state sovereignty. States and their governments
are compelled nowadays to deal more and more
with criminal challenges emanating from individuals and groups. The latter, in all their
appearences, have indeed become powerful
Non-state actors: a challenge to
state sovereignty?
States, intergovernmental organizations and
belligerents are the traditional subjects of international law. But there are many more non-state
actors which, without having formally obtained
the status of subject of international law, play an
important role in the conduct of international
relations and, hence in the formation of international law. Most of these ‘modern’ actors are
non-governmental organizations the importance of which has already been recognized in
the law of international organizations by the
possibility of granting them an appropriate,
mostly consultative, status. Nowadays, NGOs
have become much more influential, and the
states rely upon their experience in order to formulate new policies and new rules.
167
32. We the Peoples. The
Role of the United Nations
in the 21st Century. p. 13.
33. A/RES/55/2 of 8
September 2000
Other ‘entities’ have appeared on the forefront
of international relations. The international
community of states has dealt with the issue of
transnational corporations when, since the middle of the 1970s, an attempt was made in the
United Nations to curb the activities of the
TNCs by the elaboration of appropriate guidelines. The new era of globalization will, no
doubt, see an intensified effort by states to regulate the activities of corporations which they
may deem dangerous to the exercise of their sovereign rights and to their national interests.
Finally, individuals have become more and
more the concern of international relations.
International humanitarian law has, traditionally, been dealing with the conduct of combattants in armed conflicts. The development of
international humanitarian law during the last
quarter of the XXth century, and the growing
concern of its implementation through the creation of international criminal courts and tribunals clearly point to the increasing role individuals may play as non-state actors. States are
compelled to deal more and more frequently
with the activities of individuals and of groups
in a variety of fields which can be qualified as
highly criminal and which are likely to affect the
authority and the sovereignty of the states as
major actors in international relations. Nonstate actors are, therefore, a factor to be reckoned with while thinking about and preparing a
possible but necessary restructuring of the international community, while at the same time
uncivil and/àr criminal conduct of non-state
actors must be addressed effectively at the international level. The voices of the Peoples of the
United Nations should be heard and listened to
more carefully. This trend already exists. But
structural changes in the international community will be necessary allowing for the most beneficial contribution of the non-state actors to the
peaceful development of international relations.
Addressing the annual NGO conference organized by the UN Department of Public
Information, Secretary-General Kofi Annan
stated on 28 August 2000: “You are our best
defence against complacency, our bravest campaigners for honesty and our boldest crusaders
for change”. While ultimately, decisions about
the level of NGO participation in the United
168
Nations’work would be taken by the member
states, he said: “I believe that in time, they will
agree that our doors must be open”. In his
Millenium Report, which was published a few
days later, the Secretary-General stated: “the
international public domain - including the
United Nations - must be opened further to the
participation of the many actors whose contributions are essential to managing the path of
globalization”32. In the otherwise rather disappointing Millenium Declaration, the heads of
State and Government sound much more cautious when, in section VIII on Strengthening
the United Nations, they resolve, as a last point,
“to give greater opportunities to the private sector, non-governmental organizations and civil
society, in general, to contribute to the realization of the Organization’s goals and programmes”33. This remark shows the hesitation
and reluctance of states to share their power
with non-state actors.
And yet, the practice of participation by nonstate actors in the various fields covered by the
specialized organizations of the United Nations
system can be described as useful, fruitful and
rewarding. The member states of these organizations will gladly admit that the expertise of nonstate actors is a welcome contribution to the
work of the organizations. Those familiar with
the working methods of the Commission of the
European Union in preparing the various legal
instruments which make up the ‘acquis communautaire’ can bear testimony to the important
contribution of the non-state actors either as
lobbyists or as consultants. The active participation of non-state actors in the elaboration of the
law and policy does not per se go at the expense
of state sovereignty. After all, the final decisionmaking rests with the states.
The foregoing obviously does not apply to nonstate actors whose purpose is to challenge the
authority of the state such as the liberation movements in a non- decolonisation context, international criminal organizations and other organized
gangs. Similarly, the power and influence of global companies, the decisions of which may have farreaching consequences for the prosperity of peoples and countries, may affect the sovereignty of
smaller and developing countries. It is, therefore,
compelling that states remain vigilant against the
excesses of globalization. Recent manifestations by
the ‘civil society’ are there to remind us of the
potential baleful influence of those corporations
on state sovereignty.
A final question should be addressed: given
the growing impact of non-state actors on the
behaviour and decision-making of states and of
intergovernmental organizations, could an institutionalizing of this expanding relationship contribute to enhancing this cooperation? Is there a
need for regimentation?
In the course of this study, we have indicated
several times that, save for constitutional provisions on some form of relationship between
international organizations and NGOs, the
cooperation is based upon practice. States have
always shown a tendency to keep the NGOs and
their activities under some control. A minimal
regulation is required, both at the national and
international level, in order to ascertain that
interested groups fulfil certain requirements such
as legal personality, minimal membership,
healthy financing, accountability, purposes fitting with those of the international organization
with which they seek an affiliation. It is, therefore, normal and necessary, that intergovernmental organizations and their member states establish rules for the recognition of NGOs willing to
enter into some form of relationship with them.
The consultative or observer status will provide
the NGO with well defined facilities and possibilities to air their concern, present their views
and even exert pressure in order to promote and
provoke action by the organs of the organizations and by their member states. The practice of
the United Nations shows that there is some
degree of flexibility allowing for a regular adjustment of this relationship. Formal arrangements
institutionalizing the cooperation would, most
probably, amount to freezing a relationship
which is advantageous also for the member
states34. The latter will, no doubt react, if they
feel that the power and influence of the non-state
actors, and of the NGOs in particular, become a
threat to the exercise of their sovereign rights.
It would, however, be wrong to conclude that
the acquisition of some status with an intergovernmental organization confers upon the NGO
an international legal personality, even if the
NGO is entitled to actively participate in the
international decision-making process or otherwise in the activities of an intergovernmental
organization. The fact that persons deployed by
a humanitarian non-governmental organization
may, under certain circumstances, be protected
by the Convention on the Safety of United
Nations and Associated Personnel35 does not
confer upon them or upon the NGO concerned
a status of even limited international legal personality. Also in this respect do states remain the
ultimate decision makers.
It is generally recognized that the transfer, by
states, of sovereign rights to intergovernmental
organizations does not affect their sovereignty.
The powers and competence of the state may be
diminished, but the transfer is proof of their
sovereignty.
Similarly, in allowing NGOs to participate in
the decision-making process, states, directly or
through intergovernmental organizations, do
not give away sovereign rights. In many fields,
states and international organizations can no
longer do without the expertise of NGOs which
have thus become privileged partners in international relations36. The growing rôle of non-state
actors in international relations tells strongly in
favor of a healthy concern for democratization
of the international relations through the
involvement of knowledgable, experienced and
responsible non-state players.
34. See supra in paragraphs 6 and 11
35. Adopted on 9
December 1994 by GA
Res 49 (59). See art. 1,
(b), (iii).
36. This privileged partnership of NGOs is also highly
visible in national politics
and decision-making.
169
The use and abuse of ‘civil society’ in
development
by Marcus H. Lenzen*
Introduction
1. Gellner, Ernest, Conditions
of Liberty: Civil Society and Its
Rivals (London: Hamish
Hamilton 1994), p. 1.
2. Young, Crawford, “In
Search of Civil Society”, in J.
W. Harbeson, D. Rothchild
and N. Chazan (eds.), Civil
Society and the State in Africa
(Boulder, CO/London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers
1994), p. 44.
3. Throughout this paper, I
will take up the practice to
place terms such as ‘civil society’ and ‘development’ in
quotation marks to signify
my use of them as concepts
that are contested and elusive.
For, as Esteva explicates,
“Development occupies the
centre of an incredibly powerful semantic constellation.
There is nothing in modern
mentality comparable to it as
a force guiding thought and
behaviour. At the same time,
very few words are as feeble,
as fragile and as incapable of
giving substance and meaning
to thought and behaviour as
this one.” Esteva, Gustavo,
“Development”, in W. Sachs
(ed.), The Development
Dictionary (London/New
York: Zed Books 1992), p. 8.
4. A detailed discussion of the
meaning of ‘discourse’ and its
analytical utility is beyond the
scope and need of this paper.
They are “practices that form
the objects of which they
speak” (Foucault, Michel, The
Archaeology of Knowledge
(London: Tavistock 1972
[1969]), p. 49, cited by Mills,
Sara, Discourse: The New
Critical Idiom (London/New
York: Routledge 1997), p. 17)
and constitute the “process
through which social reality
comes into being – (...) the
articulation of knowledge and
power” (Escobar, Arturo,
Encountering Development:
The Making and Unmaking of
the Third World (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University
Press 1995), p. 39).
Transnational Associations
3/2002, 170-187
A new ideal was born, or reborn, in recent decades: Civil Society. Previously, a person interested in
the notion of Civil Society could be assumed to be a historian of ideas, concerned perhaps with
Locke or Hegel. But the phrase itself had no living resonance or evocativeness. Rather, it seemed distinctively covered with dust. And now, all of a sudden, it has been taken out and thoroughly dusted,
and has become a shining emblem.
Ernest Gellner 1
If discourse can be midwife, then civil society is well and truly born. Before we issue the birth certificate, however, a number of uncertainties concerning its identity require reflection
Crawford Young 2
C
oncepts of ‘civil society’3 have experienced a
remarkable renaissance in recent years,
shaken out of a peaceful slumber in the
vaults of the European history of ideas. This is
not only the case in the field of political theory,
especially in the context of debates on transformation, democratisation and governance; they
have also gained increasing prominence in current discourses of ‘development’.4 Notably, the
emphasis has to be on the plurality of ‘civil society’ concepts and ideas, for there is no single
agreed upon conception of ‘civil society’.
Meanings range “from privatizing the functions
of government to managing the global economy
through some form of world organization”.5
Some enthusiasts portray ‘civil society’ as the
“cavalry which can rescue us from war and from
unfettered global capitalism”.6 Noam Chomsky
refers to an extreme example where the U.S.
government portrays U.S. investors as the core
of Haitian ‘civil society’.7 Moreover, the debate
on ‘civil society’ is taking place in very different
forms in different regions of the world, with
perspectives and experiences from the geopolitical North8 dominating the literature.
Perspectives from the South are rarely received,
as some authors point out.9
One could be inclined to argue that the
cacophonic character of ‘civil society’ discourse
undermines the usefulness of the concept altogether. Indeed, in development practice, the
idiosyncratic use of the concept leads to many
misunderstandings and miscommunications
between the various agents who employ it.
Nevertheless, the number and variety of agents
implementing ‘civil society’ support programmes
is striking. They have been increasing dramati170
cally throughout the 1990s. Many international
development institutions, especially U.S. foundations and agencies,10 have adopted the support
of ‘civil society’ as a specific objective. It was
mentioned among the “new strategies” of a key
OECD DAC policy paper.11 The UNDP has a
long history of co-operating with NonGovernmental Organisations (NGOs), but the
1990s witnessed a shift towards a ‘civil society’
and ‘Civil Society Organisations’ (CSOs) discourse. This is evidenced, inter alii, by a 1993
strategy paper12 and the launch of a special CSO
Participation Programme (CSOPP) in 1995. A
similar, albeit later, discursive shift toward ‘civil
society’ can also be observed in the World Bank
under Wolfensohn’s presidency.13 Lastly, the concept was included in the recent Cairo Plan of
Action of the 2000 Africa-Europe Summit.14
This increased use of ‘civil society’ rhetoric
notwithstanding, one rarely finds a systematic
definition of the concept in the agencies’ documents. And yet, from the praise heaped upon
‘civil society’ one may sometimes get the impression that it is a panacea for all problems in
processes of development and democratisation.
This is a point that Fowler also makes,
Listening to supposedly knowledgeable people
talking about civil society at conferences and
other fora, it is easy to fall into the trap of thinking that civil society is a level playing field and
the new salvation for development. (...) Civil
society is a messy arena of competing claims and
interests between groups that do not necessarily
like each other.15
In light of the amorphous nature of the ‘civil
society’ concept and its ambiguous (ab)use by
the development industry, might it be nothing
5. Hunt, Louis D., “Civil
Society and the Idea of a
Commercial Republic”, in M.
G. Schechter (ed.), The
Revival of Civil Society: Global
and Comparative Perspectives
(Basingstoke/London/New
York: Macmillan Press/St.
Martin’s Press 1999), pp. 11.
6. Ball, Colin and Knight,
Barry, “Why We Must Listen
to Citizens”, in CIVICUS
(ed.), Civil Society at the
Millennium (West Hartford,
CT: Kumarian Press/CIVICUS 1999), p. 19.
7. Chomsky, Noam, Powers
and Prospects (London: Pluto
Press 1996), p. 111.
8. For convenience, ‘North’
will indicate member countries of the OECD DAC
(Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and
Development Development
Assistance Committee),
‘South’ will refer to those
countries that traditionally
receive aid, ‘West’ includes
the countries of Western
Europe and North America,
and ‘East’ the countries previously constituting the Eastern
Bloc.
9. See for instance Mitlin,
Diana, “The NGO Sector
and its Role in Strengthening
Civil Society and Securing
Good Governance”, in A.
Bernard, H. Helmich and P.
B. Lehning (eds.), Civil
Society and International
Development (Paris/Lisbon:
OECD/The North-South
Centre of the Council of
Europe 1998), p. 91; Jessen,
Brigitte, “Einleitung”, in B.
Jessen (ed.), Von der
Fremdsteuerung zur
Selbststeuerung: Alternativer
Interventionismus asiatischer
NGOs (Hamburg: Deutsches
Übersee-Institut 1995), pp.
10-13; and Serrano, Isagani
R., On Civil Society (Quezon
City: Philippine Rural
Reconstruction Movement
1993), pp. 43-58.
10. For example, influential
foundations such as Ford,
Kellogg, MacArthur, Mott,
and Rockefeller have all developed programmes to this
extent in the 1990s. See Renz,
more than a chimera with little analytical and
practical value for understanding, let alone
changing, complex social realities? I will argue
here that a sufficiently complex conceptualisation of ‘civil society’ and of its place in society as
a whole can be highly valuable for a critical,
multi-dimensional analysis of social, political
and economic realities. Such an analysis is essential for a deep comprehension of societal power
structures and processes of transformation. It
may be that such an analysis will ultimately confirm the position of some thinkers of the postdevelopment school, namely that planned,
modernising ‘development’, in its use and representation by the dominant ‘development’ discourse, is illusory. Be that as it may, any action,
no matter how it is ideologically informed or
discursively constructed, aimed at changing the
conditions of human suffering and/or environmental degradation, will be much more prone
to fail or to create many more unintended consequences when it is based on an overly simplistic, reductionist or misguided analysis of societal
structures and processes.
To arrive at a sufficiently complex model, I
believe it is necessary to understand where the
ambiguity of the concept originates and why
other conceptualisations, especially the traditional dichotomous ‘state-civil society’ model,
are inadequate for the purposes outlined above.
I will therefore present a clearing of the conceptual and analytical grounds, beginning with an
outline of the political-philosophical development of ‘civil society’ in chapter one. In the second chapter, I will synthesise and elaborate a
concept of ‘civil society’ that can be employed as
a universally applicable analytical framework to
examine societal structures and processes.
Having established an ideal-type ‘civil society’
concept for the study of human systems, I will
then provide an analysis of how and why ‘civil
society’ concepts are used and co-opted in various ways by different ideological positions in
current ‘development’ discourses in the third
chapter. Since the ‘civil society’ idea is not an
isolated phenomenon, we will need to contextualise it in this wider discourse. This chapter will
also consider some of the consequential dilemmas that occur in development practice because
of the overly simplistic or ill-informed ‘civil
society’ conceptions employed and promoted by
some discourses. The operational utility of the
concept is a key issue “in the real-world arena of
policy formation and implementation concerning state formation, socioeconomic development, and state-society relations”.16 To address
this issue, as Harbeson also emphasises,17 two
further questions will have to be answered: a), in
how far ‘civil society’ is inescapably tied into
Western political philosophy and practice and
thus ultimately inapplicable to other societies;
and b), whether the concept of ‘civil society’ is
too entangled in normative analysis as to be of
use in empirical theory. Lastly, the conclusion
will summarise my case for the usefulness of a
complex ‘civil society’ conception for a better
understanding of transformative societal
processes.
The evolution of ‘civil society’:
a short history of an idea
As Hunt highlights, even in historical perspective, the idea of ‘civil society’ has always been
“fraught with ambiguity”.18 I will therefore
begin with a sketch of the divergent historical
and conceptual roots of this idea. The modern
concept of ‘civil society’ originated in the context of anti-absolutist endeavours in the outgoing 18th century.19 Following Taylor, one can differentiate between two fundamental lines of
thought:20 The first one is closely associated with
Locke and the liberal tradition. Here, civil society signifies an autonomous public sphere that is
to be kept free from state regulations to protect
individuals and their (economic) interests.
Adam Ferguson was another thinker of the later
18th century who saw the strengthening of civic
associations as the best way to nourish a sense of
public spirit that would counter the corrupting
influence of power and wealth. Thomas Paine
developed this idea further and ascribed to it a
certain pre-political existence and autonomy
with a right to erect, limit and overthrow political authority.21
Charles Montesquieu can be seen as the originator of the second line of thought. He strongly influenced the thinkers of the Scottish
Enlightenment, notably Adam Smith and David
Hume, who “celebrated the liberation of indi171
Loren, International
Grantmaking: A Report on US
Foundation Trends (New York:
The Foundation Center and
the Council on Foundations
1997), p. 83). Two further
crucial U.S. agencies are the
U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and
the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED).
11. OECD/DAC, Shaping
the 21st Century: The
Contribution of Development
Co-operation (Paris: OECD
1996), p. 13.
12. UNDP, “UNDP and
Organisations of Civil
Society: Building Sustainable
Partnerships” (New York:
UNDP 1993).
13. Howell, Jude,
“Manufacturing Civil Society
from the Outside: Some
Dilemmas and Challenges”,
Development and the
Governance Agenda, IDS
Seminar Series, Autumn 1999
(http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/gov
ern/jh.pdf), pp. 7f.)
14. Africa-Europe Summit,
Cairo Plan of Action (Cairo:
EU/OAU 2000), paragraphs
56 and 63.
15. Fowler, Alan, Striking a
Balance - a Guide to
Enhancing the Effectiveness of
Non-Governmental
Organizations in International
Development (London:
Earthscan 1997), cited by
Holloway, Richard, “Civil
Society Toolbox”
(http://www.pactworld.org/to
olbox.html, August 1st 2000),
p. 2.
16. Harbeson, John W.,
“Civil Society and the Study
of African Politics: A
Preliminary Assessment”, in
Harbeson et al., Civil Society
and the State in Africa, p. 6.
17. Ibid.
18. Hunt, “Civil Society and
the Idea of a Commercial
Republic”, p. 12.
19. The older use of “civil
society”, which can be traced
back to Cicero’s use of societas
civilis as a translation of
Aristotle’s koinonia politike,
was more a synonym for
political society, closely associated to the “classical republi-
viduals in the market economy from the personal dependency characteristic of pre-commercial
feudal society”.22 This line of thought was much
less concerned with the separation between
“civil society” and the state and more with the
question of how “civil society” is integrated into
the state and how it can create a separate but not
autarkic sphere.
Hegel elaborated a crucial synthesis of these
late 18th century developments. He located ‘civil
society’ between the sphere of the family and the
state and substituted the tripartite division of
civil, economic and political society for the classical republican dichotomy between domestic
and political society (oikos and polis).23 To Hegel,
The irony of civil society (...) is that the individuals who compose it think of themselves as
free and independent agents, while they are, in
fact, caught up in a ‘system of all-round interdependence’, in which ‘the subsistence and welfare
of the individual ... are interwoven with, and
grounded on, the subsistence, welfare and rights
of all’.24
It is important to highlight that Hegel saw ‘civil
society’ as the product of a long historical process
that was by no means harmonious by nature, but
inherently conflictual. It needed to be controlled
politically by the state – especially because of the
commercial interests of the rising bourgeoisie.25
Marx, by comparison, although following Hegel’s
ideas in conceiving ‘civil society’ as the historical
product of capitalist developments, ultimately
saw the state dominated by ‘civil society’. The latter was in turn dominated by the bourgeoisie due
to its material, socio-economic status.26 Thus, for
Marx, “[t]he anatomy of civil society is to be
sought in political economy”.27
Another important 19th century development
was de Tocqueville’s contribution to the ‘civil
society’ idea. He emphasised the importance of
independent, intermediary associations in a
democracy to effectively limit the actions of government and as a guarantee against despotism.28
‘Civil society’ then received a crucial modification in the 20th century through Gramsci’s work.
Writing in the era of fascism, he tried to use the
concept to grasp a structural connection that
forms the organic cohesion of the capitalist economic system and the state. Only by separating
‘civil society’ from the state and the economy,
172
according to Gramsci, could one answer the
question of how societal consensus (in contrast
to state pressure and constraint) evolves through
cultural and social hegemony (in contrast to
rule). He perceived such a consensus as a precondition for overcoming the capitalist order. In
this respect, Gramsci can also be credited with
having added the concept of social movements
to ‘civil society’, although he expected their raison d’être to dissolve once ‘civil society’ had
become socialist in the course of class struggle.
Crucially, though, with Gramsci we find ‘civil
society’ cast in ideological and cultural terms,
not in material ones as did Marx, so that ideologies and cultural values are recognised as forces
that can shape, disrupt, or even redistribute
power.29
The ‘rebirth’ of ‘civil society’
This overview of ‘civil society’s’ evolution in
the history of ideas demonstrates two aspects:
for one, the idea emerged in a European context
and was thus strongly influenced by the history
of this region, and later also that of the United
States.30 Secondly, political philosophy has never
been unified about the usage of this concept.
For this reason alone, it should come as no surprise that there are still divergent, even contradictory approaches to understanding ‘civil society’ in contemporary thought.
The conceptual variety becomes even less surprising when considering the divergent sociopolitical contexts in which the idea re-emerged
in recent history. ‘Civil society’s’ revival in various streams of democratic theory has been gathering steam in the wake of what Huntington has
named the “third wave” of global democratisation.31 It began with the fall of the Portuguese
dictatorship in 1974 and spread from southern
Europe especially during the 1980s to Latin
America, East and South Asia, and Africa, reaching a climax in the collapse of the Eastern Bloc.
In the socialist systems of Eastern Europe ‘civil
society’ initially signified a programme for
establishing social forms of life independent
from the authoritarian state, as in the case of the
Solidarity movement in Poland.32 In Latin
America, the concept was employed in an effort
to publicly condemn and oppose the gross
can model of citizenship as
the active participation of free
and economically independent citizens in the affairs of
the polis or res publica” (ibid.,
p. 16).
20. Taylor, Charles, “Invoking
Civil Society”, in R. E.
Goodin and P. Pettit (eds.),
Contemporary Political
Philosophy: An Anthology
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell
1997), pp. 66-77.
21. See Keane, John,
“Despotism and Democracy”,
in J. Keane (ed.), Civil Society
and the State: New European
Perspectives (London: Verso
1988), pp. 35f. and 44-50.
22. Hunt, “Civil Society and
the Idea of a Commercial
Republic”, p. 12.
23. See ibid., pp. 16-19;
Taylor, “Invoking Civil
Society”, pp. 72-76; and most
extensively, Cohen, Jean L.
and Arato, Andrew, Civil
Society and Political Theory
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
1992), pp. 91-116). This is
not to say, however, that
Hegel was the first to use a
tripartite concept; Machiavelli
did so much earlier. My
thanks go to Paul Ghils for
stressing this.
24. Hunt, “Civil Society and
the Idea of a Commercial
Republic”, pp. 16 and 18f.
25. Cf. Keane, “Despotism
and Democracy”, pp. 50-52.
26. Cf. Bobbio, Norbert,
“Gramsci and the Concept of
Civil Society”, in Keane, Civil
Society and the State, pp. 7681.
27. Cited by ibid., p. 78.
28. For an elaboration, see
Keane, “Despotism and
Democracy”, pp. 58-61.
29. See Cohen and Arato,
Civil Society and Political
Theory, pp. 142-159; and
Bobbio, “Gramsci”.
30. Hall emphasises this point
especially. In a sweeping
overview of European history,
he develops the key argument
that “civil society gained in
self-consciousness from the
experience of fighting against
politico-religious unification
drives” and concludes that
“[c]ivil society is thus a com-
three-part model proposed by Cohen and Arato
in which ‘civil society’ is conceptually differentiated from both the state as well as from the
economy.37 This is based on the recognition that
the capitalist market economy, be it already
extant or just emerging in a given society, can
have just as much impact on aspects of solidarity, social justice and autonomy within ‘civil society’ as the power of the state. The underlying
definition here thus conceives of ‘civil society’ as
a sphere of social interaction between economy
and state, composed above all of the intimate
sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations),
social movements, and forms of public communication.38
In addition, it needs to be stressed that the
forms of association we encounter in this sphere
seek to articulate values, create solidarity, and
represent their interests.
In order to accentuate that the three spheres
are conceptually differentiated but must always
be considered in relation to one another, the
basic model is extended by two more layers:
‘political’ and ‘economic’ society. The former
includes, and therefore distinguishes from ‘civil
society’, organisational forms such as political
parties and political public institutions (parliaments and congresses), while the latter comprises organisations of production and distribution,
for example firms and co-operatives. They generally arise from ‘civil society’, and thus also
share some of ‘civil society’s’ forms of organisation and communication. The actors of ‘political’ and ‘economic’ society seek to directly control and manage state power and economic production.
This ultimately five-part model draws our
attention to the intricate interdependencies
between various structures and agents within
society. ‘Civil society’ has a political role, but it
is not with regard to the control or conquest of
power: it is with regard to generating influence
by means of association and debate in the cultural public sphere to represent interests. ‘Civil
society’ needs the mediating role of ‘political’
society in its relationship to the state, while the
latter is simultaneously rooted within ‘civil society’. There is a cognate relationship between
‘civil’ and ‘economic’ society, although the latter
human rights violations, the severe repression of
social and political organisations, and in some
cases also to oppose the neo-liberal economic
policies of the authoritarian regimes. In the
wake of democratic transitions in Sub-Saharan
Africa, it was evoked as a promising concept to
counter statism and underdevelopment.33
This chapter has traced the roots of the idea of
‘civil society’, both in modern and in most
recent history. It has thereby also exposed the
roots of the very hybridity of this concept. For it
to have an analytical value in our times, it is
essential to develop a more definitive conception here.
Toward a contemporary
conceptualisation
To begin with, let us consider what can be
crystallised as the smallest common denominator of most ‘civil society’ concepts one encounters in current literature. Most frequently, ‘civil
society’ is portrayed as an intermediary sphere of
social action that is independent of the state.34 It
is seen as the sum of all institutions between the
family (as the fundamental unit of social organisation) and the state. In addition, it is also often
depicted as separate from the market economy
and thus as one of the three integral spheres that
constitute society as a whole. In a large number
of conceptions, however, the focus is especially
on the ‘state-civil society’ dichotomy35 – a focus
considered to be insufficient here. Normatively,
‘civil society’ often is seen as influencing and
controlling the state, and thus being an important element of a functioning democracy.
Others stress ‘civil society’s’ role in holding both
the state and the private economy accountable.
However, as Cohen and Arato remark, “the relation between normative models of democracy or
projects of democratization and the structure,
institutions, and dynamics of civil society has
remained opaque, in part because there is no
sufficiently complex theory of civil society available to us today”.36
The reason, then, that the traditional dichotomous model of ‘state vs. civil society’ is rejected
here is that it is inadequate for a critical analysis
of social, political and economic realities and
stratifications. Instead, this paper adopts the
173
plex balance of consensus and
conflict, the valuation of as
much difference as is compatible with the bare minimum
of consensus necessary for settled existence” (Hall, John A.,
“In Search of Civil Society”,
in J. A. Hall (ed.) Civil
Society: Theory, History,
Comparison (Cambridge:
Polity Press 1995), pp. 5f.).
‘Civil society’ received an
enormous boost through
developments in the means of
communication, at the heart
of which lie the spread of literacy and the emergence of a
mass print culture – without
saying that there were no differences between societies
such as Britain and Prussia.
31. Huntington, Samuel P.,
The Third Wave:
Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press
1991). See also Markoff,
John, Waves of Democracy:
Social Movements and Political
Change (Thousand Oaks,
CA/London/New Delhi: Sage
1996).
32. A sense captured notably
in Keane’s collection, Civil
Society and the State. See also
Cohen and Arato, Civil
Society and Political Theory,
pp. 31-36, 58-69; and Keane,
John, Civil Society: Old
Images, New Visions
(Cambridge: Polity Press
1998), pp. 20-23.
33. Cf. Keane, Civil Society:
Old Images, New Visions, pp.
23-25; Cohen and Arato,
Civil Society and Political
Theory, pp. 48-58.
34. The ‘intermediary’ character is indeed highlighted
time and time again in otherwise fairly divergent conceptions. See, for example,
Clarke, Gerard, The Politics of
NGOs in South-East Asia:
Participation and Protest in the
Philippines (London/New
York: Routledge 1998), p. 10;
Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred,
“Toward consolidated democracies”, Journal of Democracy,
April 1996, vol. 6, p. 17;
Diamond, Larry J., “Toward
Democratic Consolidation”,
Journal of Democracy, 1994,
has historically, under capitalism, been more
removed from the influence of ‘civil society’
than ‘political’ society. And yet actors of ‘economic’ society can have a mediating role
between ‘civil society’ and the market system,
for instance in the case of trade unions.39
Concurring with Schechter, Macdonald and
Cox,40 I subscribe to a conception of civil society
as a sphere that consists of a variety of agents
with distinct agendas and that is thus inevitably
also an inherently political arena of struggle for
power and influence in the pursuit of the respective agents’ goals. These are not necessarily conducive to democracy but may just as well be
antithetical to it. It is by no means a static sphere
but a highly dynamic one in which tensions are
continually re-negotiated.
Lastly, there is one dimension that Cohen and
Arato seem to neglect in their model, namely
that of the international political economy.
Here we find actors such as International
Governmental Organisations (IGOs) and
Transnational Corporations (TNCs). I believe it
is essential for any complete societal analysis to
embed the five-part model of societal structures
and interrelations into this additional sphere to
account for the influence of exogenous forces on
each of the spheres within a society. This influence, in turn, is not necessarily unidirectional.
We are again dealing with multi-dimensional
power dynamics. Illustration 1 attempts to capture the basic character of the model I am presenting here.
A conceptual framework for ‘civil society’ analysis
174
vol. 5, no. 3, p. 5; White,
Gordon, “Civil Society,
Democratization and
Development (I): Clearing
the Analytic Ground”,
Democratization, 1994, vol. 1,
no. 3.
35. For example Diamond,
“Toward Democratic
Consolidation”; and Gellner,
Conditions of Liberty.
36. Cohen and Arato, Civil
Society and Political Theory, p.
vii.
37. Ibid., viii-ix.
38. Ibid., p. ix.
39. Cf. ibid., pp. ix-x.
40. Schechter, Michael G.,
“Globalization and Civil
Society”, in Schechter, The
Revival of Civil Society, pp.
61-101; Macdonald, Laura,
Supporting Civil Society: The
Political Role of NonGovernmental Organizations
in Central America (New
York/London: St. Martin’s
Press/Macmillan Press 1997);
Cox, Robert W., “Economic
Globalization and the Limits
to Liberal Democracy”, in A.
McGrew (ed.), The
Transformation of Democracy?
(Cambridge: Polity Press with
The Open University 1997).
41. Nerfin’s synonyms
“Prince, Merchant and
Citizen”, retaken from
Machiavelli, are often referred
to in this context: Nerfin,
Marc, “Neither Prince nor
Merchant: Citizen – An
Introduction to the Third
System”, IFDA Dossier, 56,
November/December 1986,
pp. 3-29. Two authors who
have been extremely prominent in the study of the ‘third
sector’ according to this
model are Salamon and
Anheier, e.g. Anheier, Helmut
K. and Salamon, Lester M.,
The Emerging Nonprofit
Sector: An Overview (New
York: St. Martin’s Press 1996);
Anheier Helmut K. and
Salamon, Lester M., Defining
the nonprofit sector: a crossnational analysis (New York:
Manchester University Press
1997).
42. Fowler, Alan,
“Strengthening Civil Society
in Transition Economies -
‘Civil society’ and the organisational
three-sector model: a critique
mental questions than the organisational threesector model presented in this section.
The aid industry often employs a three-sector
model of society, derived from organisational science, that differs from conceptual framework presented here. The organisational model differentiates between different types of organisation and
their respective predominant functions for and in
society as a whole: the first (government), the second (business), and the third (voluntary) sector.41
The composition, size and respective interrelations of the three sectors differ from country to
country. Nevertheless, the general thrust of the
aid system is the attempt to transform the sectors
of Southern and Eastern countries, which often
have a very dominant first sector, so that they
may become more like the Western sectors. In the
West, the first sector is supposed to be smaller
than the second and third ones – which is, of
course, very much a reflection of the neo-liberal
agenda of ‘rolling back the state’.
‘Civil society’ is often either misleadingly
equated with the ‘third sector’, or its place within the three-sector model is left rather opaque.
This equation is misleading because it casts ‘civil
society’ merely in terms of organisational functionality. Although this model informs much
programming in the development industry, it is
too flat to grasp all the institutions of ‘civil society’, the three-(or more)-dimensional patterns of
relationships “which condition what society
aspires to, how it actually works and who wins
and who loses in this process”.42 It is therefore
essential to integrate social analysis in order to
disagregate actors within and between the sectors
and to analyse their inter-relationships, as well
as to integrate cultural and historical factors,
with the aim of ultimately addressing the fundamental question of power distribution between
groups “according to race, sex, age, ethnicity,
religion, class, geography, etc.”.43 This takes us
back to three basic questions of social relations
and power:
1 Who makes the decisions in what areas of
social choice?
2 Who benefits from decisions?
3 Who bears the cost of decisions?44
I believe the five-part model outlined above is
more suitable to help understand these funda-
On the problem of who to count in and
who to count out of ‘civil society’
Moving on from the definition level, I will
turn to another major problem that contributes
to the vagueness of the concept, namely, which
forms of association are included and which are
excluded in a given conception. There are considerable differences with important implications, and I will consider four associational
forms in turn.
Non-governmental Organisations
To begin with, (development) NGOs are generally included and, as we shall see, usually the
prime focus of donors when they intend to
‘strengthen civil society’.45 They are often cast,
perhaps misleadingly, as the ‘voice of the poor
and marginalised’, and as critical agents of ‘civil
society’ that can hold the state responsible to
society. We will have to consider this ideal-type
image in more depth later on, but suffice to say
at this point that one has to pay special attention
to evidence that shows how NGOs can also have
an undermining effect on ‘civil society’ and
democracy.46
Business Organisations
There is a tendency especially in Western conceptions to exclude business organisations from
‘civil society’.47 This is largely a reflection of how
little economic activity takes place outside formal boundaries in the West. For large sections of
the world’s poor, economic activity, essentially
their daily struggle for survival, is informal. “To
exclude these people from civil society in their
economic roles and include them from many
other aspects of their lives has little theoretical
justification, even though it may be ‘neater’”.48
Even though Cohen and Arato’s model does not
include business organisations in ‘civil society’
directly, the additional sphere of ‘economic society’ does ensure an emphasis on the rootedness
of such organisations, for example of co-operatives, in ‘civil society’.
175
from Concept to Strategy:
Mapping an Exit in a Maze
of Mirrors”, in A. Clayton
(ed.), NGOs, Civil Society and
the State: Building Democracy
in Transitional Socities
(Oxford: INTRAC 1996), p
22.
43. Ibid., p. 23; see also
Trivedy, Roy and Acharya,
Jagabandhu, “Constructing
the Case for an Alternative
Framework for
Understanding Civil Society,
the State and the Role of
NGOs”, in Clayton,
NGOs, Civil Society and the
State, pp. 55-64.
44. Fowler, “Strengthening
Civil Society”, p. 23.
45. A notable exception is
Uphoff’s argument not to
include NGOs in a ‘third sector’ because of their service
provision character that
makes them more part of the
private sector, in his analysis:
Uphoff, Norman, “Why
NGOs Are Not a Third
Sector: A Sectoral Analysis
with Some Thoughts on
Accountability, Sustainability,
and Evaluation”, in M.
Edwards and D. Hulme
(eds.): Beyond the Magic
Bullet: NGO Performance and
Accountability in the Post-Cold
War Period (West Hartford,
CT: Kumarian Press 1996),
pp. 23-39.
46. See Clarke, Politics of
NGOs, p. 9; Hadenius, Axel
and Uggla, Fredrik, “Shaping
Civil Society”, in Bernard,
Helmich and Lehning, Civil
Society and International
Development, p. 45; and
Lehning, Percy B., “Towards
a Multi-cultural Civil Society:
The Role of Social Capital
and Democratic Citizenship”,
in Bernard, Helmich and
Lehning, Civil Society and
International Development, p.
31.
47. E.g. Diamond, “Toward
Democratic Consolidation”,
p. 5; Silliman, G. Sidney and
Noble, Lela Garner,
“Introduction”, in G. S.
Silliman and L. G. Noble
(eds.), Organizing for democracy: NGOs, civil society, and
the Philippine State
The family
The sphere of the family is predominantly
excluded in ‘civil society’ conceptions, largely
because it is generally portrayed as a private
sphere in opposition to the more public sphere
of ‘civil society’. Along with Cohen and Arato, I
believe this to be a misconception. The family is
a core institution of ‘civil society’. It is not just
an institution of socialisation for the individual
(as Hegel saw it) that makes it possible for him
or her to participate in ‘civil society’. Habermas
has underlined that the institution of the family
participates in social life, too,49 while feminist
critiques such as Fraser’s have alerted us to the
fact that the family is not somehow detached
from the capitalist economy and the state.50
Families are economic systems in their own
right with power relations. These are influenced
and in part constructed by the external forces of
economic and political systems. Families also
hold a key to gender relations and politics that
have important implications for gender relations
outside of the family, a point to which
Habermas did not pay sufficient attention.51
‘Uncivil’ organisations
Some authors, such as Naidoo and Tandon,
two leaders of CIVICUS, the ‘World Alliance for
Citizen Participation’, stress especially the normative aspect of ‘civil society’.52 They cast it as the
“values domain” that entails a set of civic norms
and democratic principles. They evoke Putnam’s
‘social capital’53 as the foundation or “glue” of this
domain and equate the former with “the currency of a healthy society”, comprising a set of values
that include trust, reciprocity, tolerance, and
inclusion.54 In their view, a strong ‘civil society’ is
thus almost a guarantee for more civility, peace
and equity in society.55 The point that some critics make, that some ‘civic’ associations may not
be ‘civil’ at all, such as the Mafia or the Ku Klux
Klan, is discarded on normative grounds: organisations such as these, according to Naidoo and
Tandon, are not seen as part of ‘civil society’
because they do not adhere to ‘civic’ principles of
tolerance, non-violence, commitment to promoting the public good, etc.56 Even though I believe
in the need for visions and norms (and a need for
176
a conscious awareness of the inherent biases they
incorporate) when wanting to bring about social
change, I believe that such a normative conception of ‘civil society’ undermines its analytical
value. The Mafia and the Ku Klux Klan may be
extremely obvious examples of ‘uncivility’, but
who defines the finer, capillary borders between
‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ in much more subtle cases?
And once we exclude certain associations from
our analytical concept of ‘civil society’ on normative grounds, how do we then account for them
and how do we illuminate the relationships
between ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ associations? Should
we create another conceptual sphere and label it
‘uncivil society’? These are issues that normative
conceptions do not sufficiently address. In my
view, accounting for various forms of associational behaviour within a concept of ‘civil society’ is
ultimately less prone to overlooking or ignoring
the inherently conflictive potential that exists
within ‘civil society’.57
Contextualising ‘civil society’ in
contemporary development
discourses
As this chapter will show, it is crucial not to see
‘civil society’ as an isolated phenomenon in current development discourses. The problem with
contextualising the disputed and vague discourse
of ‘civil society’ in these discourses is that they
themselves are extremely vague, broad and
ambiguous. They increasingly try to be all things
to all people and thus turn into a “discourse of
opposites”, as Leys calls it.58 Concurrently,
Moore, Schmitz and Fowler have made important contributions to unravelling these discourses and point towards the serious, impeding
implications for the implementation and operationalisation of these development paradigms. In
this chapter, I will try to dissect this entangled
web of overlaying discourses. To do this, it is
helpful to have recourse to Moore’s model of the
dynamics of development discourse. He differentiates between three interrelated and interdependent layers of discourse-generating and discourse-modifying spheres. The outer layer is the
‘International Political Economy’, which comprises the global economy as well social movements. This layer usually has more influence on
(Honululu, Hawaii:
University of Hawaii Press
1998), p. 13.
48. Fowler, “Strengthening
Civil Society”, p. 17.
49. Habermas, Jürgen, The
Structural Transformation of
the Public Sphere: An Inquiry
into a Category of Bourgeois
Society (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press 1989 [1962]).
50. Fraser, Nancy, “What’s
Critical about Critical
Theory? The Case of
Habermas and Gender”, New
German Critique, 1985, no.
35, pp. 97-131.
51. For a critical discussion of
the above, see Cohen and
Arato, Civil Society and
Political Theory, pp. 213-215,
532-548)
52. Shils is one of the most
prominent conservative advocators of a normative conception: Shils, Edward, “The
Virtue of Civil Society”,
Government and Opposition,
1991, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 320.
53. Putnam, Robert D.,
Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern
Italy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1993).
54. Naidoo, Kumi and
Tandon, Rajesh, “The
Promise of Civil Society”, in
CIVICUS, Civil Society at the
Millennium, p. 11.
55. For a critical treatment of
‘social capital’ with regard to
its undertheorisation and
oversimplification, see Foley,
Michael W. and Edwards,
Bob, “The Paradox of Civil
Society”, Journal of
Democracy, 1996, vol. 7, July,
pp. 38-52.; ibid., “Escape
From Politics? Social Theory
and the Social Capital
Debate”, American Behavioral
Scientist, 1997, vol. 40, no. 5,
pp. 550-561; and Putzel,
James, “Accounting for the
‘Dark Side’ of Social Capital”,
Journal of International
Development, 1997, vol. 9,
no. 7, pp. 939-949.
56. Naidoo and Tandon,
“The Promise of Civil
Society”, pp. 12-13; for a similar view, see Silliman and
Noble, “Introduction”, p. 13.
the continuous re-generation of their own discourses that justify their ongoing interventions
and serve their own strategic interests.
‘Civil society’ has thus been constructed as an
integral part of the currently dominant development paradigm: it is intimately tied into a set of
prescriptions that see competitive markets, (liberal) democracy (i. e. ‘good governance’ in current development lingo), and equitable ‘civil
society’ as the conditions for (capitalist) development.68 This paradigm took centre stage when
it became all too obvious that the neo-liberal,
economic growth-centred paradigm that ruled
especially during the 1980s was failing in many
ways.69 Parallely, the beginning of the 1990s was
a time when the international political economy
became increasingly dominated by the discourses of democratisation and economic globalisation. This ‘development’ discourse is seen with
Moore as an integral part of the ‘organisers of
capitalism’s’ aim to gain and maintain hegemony (in the Gramscian sense), that is to make capitalism seem the natural order of things on a
global scale. Yet, capitalism has to struggle constantly against its inherent crises, and the ‘organisers’ are by no means a cohesive group or made
up of only one class.70 This will become clear
when we discuss three major ideological positions within the ‘development’ discourse in the
following section.
‘Development Agency Discourse’ and ‘Academic
Development Discourse’ than vice versa, but the
flow can occasionally be altered.59 In other
words, “as global expansion of and shifts in hegemony go, so follows, albeit unevenly, development discourse”.60
Fitting ‘civil society’ into the development
lexicon
A number of concepts or ‘buzzwords’ have
been added to the ‘development’ discourse over
the past decades.61 They all revolve in one form
or another around the triad of equity (economic growth and distribution), sustainability (of
societies and environments), and democracy
(‘political participation’, ‘good governance’,
‘people empowerment’, and ‘order’). It is this
discourse in which ‘civil society’ has been
embedded, often used as a proxy for ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’, and ‘successful democratisation’.62 The incorporation of these qualitatively positive, value-laden words into the language of the dominant ‘development’ discourse
cloaks it in a benevolent aura that belies its
intrinsically unequal and undemocratic character;63 for in spite of adopting these notions,
“development discourse rarely engages with the
human realities of the situations in which it is
employed and applied”.64 Furthermore,
[these concepts] hold with them a vast array of
meanings from left to right, thus allowing them
to be used with remarkable facility by a multitude of institutions, agents and social movements and to take on notably different hues in
various hegemonic eras. (...) They are (...) essentially contested concepts, (...) arenas for ideological battles. They hold with them both the possibility of preserving what we know of development through the present crisis, but also have
the potential of reforming, transforming or even
transcending the current system of orthodoxy.65
Consequently, the effect of this seemingly
consonant and harmonious discourse is that it
veils rather divergent political agendas and
approaches to ‘civil society’.66 One major reason
why development agencies and institutions
attempt to co-opt concepts such as these has
been elucidated in Ferguson’s pathbreaking
study of the World Bank:67 It helps them with
Ideological currents within the
dominant discourse
Macdonald identifies three main ideological
currents with regard to conceptions of ‘civil society’: neo-conservative, liberal-pluralist, and neo(or post-) Marxist.71 This distinction provides a
useful framework for mapping the ideological
combatants within the development discourse,
both with regard to development agency and
academic spheres. Divisions between agents are
not always as clear as the map suggests since they
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but it
nonetheless helps to structure our analysis.
The neo-conservative position
The neo-conservative position is often represented by organisations like the International
177
57. Keane, Civil Society: Old
Images, New Visions, pp. 114156, provides us with a scholarly account of how and why
every form of ‘civil society’
tends to produce a violent,
uncivil antithesis.
58. Leys, Colin, The Rise and
Fall of Development Theory
(Nairobi/Bloomington/Indian
apolis/Oxford: EAEP/Indiana
University Press/James Currey
1996), p. 26.
59. Moore, David B.,
“Development Discourse as
Hegemony: Towards an
Ideological History - 19451995”, in D. B. Moore and
G. G. Schmitz (eds.):
Debating Development
Discourse: Institutional and
Popular Perspectives (London:
Macmillan 1995), pp. 10-13.
60. Ibid., p. 1.
61. The point is that the
dominant ‘development’ discourse is not as homogenous
as Escobar, for instance,
depicts it, and that it has
experienced paradigmatic
shifts. However, what has
remained the same in the
dominant discourse’s conception of ‘development’ is a
sense of an almost mystical
capacity to solve all the problems that beset humankind
without really ever abandoning its intrinsic and fundamental notions of growth,
evolution and modernisation.
Cf. Watts, Michael J.,
“Development I: Power,
Knowledge, Discursive
Practice”, Progress in Human
Geography, 1993, vol. 17, no.
2, p. 259.
62 Cf. Stanton, Kimberly,
“Promoting Civil Society:
Reflections on Concepts and
Practice”, in Schechter, The
Revival of Civil Society, p.
244; Macdonald, Supporting
Civil Society, p. 2.
63. Schmitz, Gerald G.,
“Democratization and
Demystification:
Deconstructing ‘Governance’
as Development Paradigm”,
in Moore and Schmitz,
Debating Development
Discourse, p. 55f.
64. James, Wendy,
“Empowering ambiguities”,
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, other
multilateral development banks, and various
U.S. bureaucracies.72 The latter include, for
instance, the National Endowment for
Democracy, for which Diamond and Mathews
are particularly prominent academic writers on
democracy issues.73 In this construction, the
spheres of ‘civil society’ and the state are sharply
contrasted. The former is invested with neoconservative values such as strong individualism
and self-interest, hard work, freedom of choice,
private property, and distrust of state bureaucracy,74 while this ideological framework would like
to see the state withdraw from certain social,
economic and political fields because it (supposedly) cannot or should not carry out these tasks
anymore. CSOs are equated with the private
sector as useful service providers to alleviate the
most pressing needs of the poor so as to avoid
political instability. In other words, the (poor
and marginalised) people are invited to ‘participate’ in ‘civil society’ “but discouraged from
congealing into ‘radical-populist’ social movements considering making alliances coalescing
around and permeating the state – especially a
state that just might not be strong enough (...)
to absorb any hegemonic challenges” to the productive assets of transnational capital.75 Other
actors with potential influence in ‘development’
and ‘civil society’ building efforts, such as the
media and especially the state, are thus purposefully and fallaciously marginalised by this discourse.76 This fails to take account of the fact
that governments as well as international organisations and TNCs can have both positive and
negative impacts on the genesis and maintenance of ‘civil society’ structures.
Furthermore, the neo-conservative position
(just as the liberal-pluralist one) evokes ‘civil
society’ as a crucial aspect for making young
democracies sustainable.77 This discourse constructs democracy, capitalism and free markets
as having a ‘naturally’ synergetic relationship.
They are even (in)famously depicted as being
inevitable, as constituting “the end of history”.78
In this discourse, ‘civil society’ becomes a basic
part of a very specific, ‘natural’ order. In fact,
however, efforts to statistically prove positive
relations between democracy and economic
growth have been inconclusive or unable to
178
demonstrate a stable relation between the two,
let alone between democracy and income distribution.79 These findings alone undermine this
discourse’s construct of a ‘natural order’, quite
apart from the fact that it moreover largely
ignores the structural injustices and inequalities
of this order.80
The liberal-pluralist position
The liberal-pluralist position follows in the
footsteps of de Tocqueville and adheres largely
to Dahl’s concept of polyarchy.81 CSOs are here
represented as fora for individual political participation through organisation and association
and are often cast as a counterbalance to the
(authoritarian) state. Individualism is thus
stressed as a core element of ‘civil society’: The
voluntary character of the associations, the ability of and opportunity for an individual to exit
a “social cage”, is essential for a society to be
‘civil’.82 The problems Macdonald perceives with
this position is that it ignores forms of oppression and inequality within ‘civil society’ that
ultimately always benefit those who are more
educated, better organised and more wealthy to
represent their interests in the pluralistic system.
The structural causes of these conflicts and the
structural constraints imposed on ‘civil society’
and the state by the international economic
order are too much neglected in this conception.83
The neo-marxist position
The third, neo-Marxist, position, drawing
especially on Gramsci’s writings, refutes the distinction between state and ‘civil society’ as drawn
by the other two positions. The two spheres are
highly interdependent: state power is not maintained solely by traditional, formal organisations
of ‘political society’, but also through many ‘civil
society’ institutions; ‘civil society’ does not possess the moral highground over the state. The
highly variable character of ‘civil society’ is
explicitly recognised, along with the realisation
that certain sections within ‘civil society’ can be
highly repressive and strongly undermine
democracy. Therefore, “NGOs must be ready to
choose the side of the poor, against the interests
in A. Cheater (ed.), The
Anthropology of Power:
Empowerment and
Disempowerment in Changing
Structures (London/New
York: Routledge 1999), p. 13.
65. Moore, “Development
Discourse as Hegemony”, p.
3.
66. There are insightful
anthropological studies which
reveal how discourses of
development and their concepts are not simply adopted
by the people in the developing countries who are supposed to be the ‘targets’ of
‘development’ projects.
Concepts are resisted,
hybridised with local forms
and transformed (Pigg, Stacey
Leigh, “Inventing Social
Category Through Place:
Social Representations and
Development in Nepal”,
Comparative Studies in Society
and History, 1992, vol. 34,
no. 3, pp. 491-513.); or, as
Woost demonstrates in the
case of the ‘participation’ concept in Sri Lanka, the rhetoric
is laundered and reshaped by
the ruling elite, glossing over
the stringent conditions
under which people are
allowed to ‘participate’, to
implement market-led strategies (Woost, M. D.,
“Alternative Vocabularies of
Development? ‘Community’
and ‘Participation’ in
Development Discourses in
Sri Lanka”, in R. D. Grillo
and R. L. Stirrat (eds.),
Discourses of Development:
Anthropological Perspectives
(Oxford/New York: Berg
1997).
67. Ferguson, James, The
Anti-Politics Machine:
‘Development’,
Depoliticization, and
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1990).
68. See Brett, E. A.,
“Development Theory,
Universal Values and
Competing Paradigms:
Capitalist Trajectories and
Social Conflict” (London:
LSE-DESTIN 2000) (=
DESTIN Working Paper
Series No. 00-02), p. 3;
of the rich and powerful, while the state must
create an environment in which conflicts can be
accommodated in a peaceful manner”.84 This
recognition of NGOs and social movements distinguishes neo-Marxists from Gramsci’s “insistence on the proletariat as the historical agent of
socialist change”.85 Moreover, post-Marxism
addresses the power relations within the family,
both against the discrimination of women in the
Western history of ideas behind the ‘civil society’
concept and against the ongoing discrimination
and exclusion of women in the development
process of the South. Lastly, this position incorporates the structural conditions and effects of
the international system in its analysis. An example of this position in the academic discourse are
the contributions in Harbeson et al.86 One of the
editors depicts the ‘civil society’ concept as being
able to fill “an important gap in social science
theory regarding African problems of political
and socioeconomic development on the ground.
(...) The missing dimension supplied by the idea
of civil society is that, in process terms, working
understandings concerning the basic rules of the
political game or structure of the state emerge
from within society and the economy at large.”87
It thus seems that the neo-Marxist position is the
most inclined to employ the kind of ‘civil society’
model we are advocating here.
diverging, “unorganic” trajectories in the developments of the formerly colonised territories
and their nation state formation processes.89
Another point is that the colonial legacy and the
continuing domination of the world system,
including especially the aid industry, by Western
or Northern forces has contributed to the existence of contending moralities and norms in
non-Western ‘civil societies’ that co-exist and
jostle with each other. These underlie forms of
social association and organisation that do not
necessarily match the Western conception of
formally registered or legally incorporated
organisational forms. Rather, they are informal
(in a legal sense) and/or enmeshed with indigenous ways of associating, often in terms of kinship.
These types of civicness interact with each
other in complex, and situation-specific ways,
forming a dualistic reality which is not consistent with how the West appreciates civil society.
In its turn, this means that the international aid
system does not see or cannot value informal
expressions of civic association and because it
does not appreciate them it thinks that they
either do not exist, or are up to no good.90
A calamitous consequence, as studies by
Maina and by Fatton reveal,91 is that “donors not
only de-ethnicise, de-class and de-tribalise civil
society but ultimately fail to [identify] strategic
social forces for political change”.92
Mahatma Gandhi’s remark that the idea of
British civilisation would be a good one should
alert us to the danger of submitting ourselves to
the illusion that the origins of the Western (normative) conception of ‘civil society’ are a continuous story of unique civility. Unless, as
Chomsky reminds us, one would want to see
what de Tocqueville fancied as the “triumphal
march of civilization across the [American]
desert” that, however, slaughtered the native
Americans, as a truly ‘great foundation’ of our
‘civil society’.93 Moreover, recalling the origins of
‘civil society’ in ‘Western’ history, we should not
forget that ‘Europe’ is not a homogenous entity
in itself. Its nations have had distinct historical
trajectories, certainly not independent of one
another. Nevertheless, these differences do
account for divergent ‘civil societies’, even within the West.
On the transferability of a Western
concept
A critique that is very often made from a
Southern perspective is that ‘civil society’ is
essentially a Western concept and not as easily
transferable or applicable to other societies, in
contrast to many donors’ perceptions. Fowler
makes a related point when he writes,
“Mirroring occurs in the civil society [conceptual] maze because Northern analysts are inclined
to treat the South and East as reflections of
themselves and their own historical experience
which (...) is a contestable, if not arrogant,
assumption”.88
A crucial distinction between Western and
non-Western (civil) societies has to be made in
any analysis of them: that the disjunctive and
disruptive effects of colonialism and imperialism, as well as of the Cold War, caused very
179
Holloway, “Civil Society
Toolbox”; World Bank, World
Development Report 1997
(Washington, DC: World
Bank 1997). This dominant
paradigm is, of course, not
without critics, the most
severe of which belong to the
so-called post-development
school. They attack the moral
superiority complex of the
dominant Western paradigm
(Escobar, Encountering
Development) since it gives
“global hegemony to a purely
Western genealogy of history,
robbing peoples of different
cultures of the opportunity to
define the forms of their
social life” (Esteva,
“Development”, p. 9f.).
69. For an incisive critique
especially with regard to the
disastrous human and ecological effects of the large-scale
World Bank (as one of the
key development agencies of
the ‘Washington Consensus’)
projects of that era, see Rich,
Bruce, Mortgaging the Earth:
The World Bank,
Environmental Impoverishment
and the Crisis of Development
(London: Earthscan 1994),
and earlier already Hayter, T.
and Watson, C., Aid, Rhetoric
and Reality (London: Pluto
Press 1985).
70. For an elaboration, see
Moore, “Development
Discourse as Hegemony”, p.
7f.
71. Macdonald, Supporting
Civil Society, pp. 15-22.
72. The positions within
institutions like the World
Bank are not inevitably
monolithic. The discourse of
‘civil society’, however conceived, was not unilaterally
welcomed by World Bank
technocrats. And even though
the seminal 1997 World
Development Report recognised differential power distribution within ‘civil society’, it
is generally not given much
attention in practice (see
Howell, “Manufacturing Civil
Society”, pp. 7f., 16). For an
account of how the multilateral development banks’ support for civil society is more
rhetoric than action, see
In sum, civil society is a Western construction
which cannot simply be applied as a template
for analysing how other countries function and
how state and society inter-relate. Therefore, to
be useful as a tool for understanding how societies work and how they can be changed by
whom, informalism and non-Western modes of
relating must be built into the civic picture, particularly responses to inorganic growth.94
On problems and prospects of ‘civil
society’ in development practice
For truth in its essence consists of action in
accomplishment, in creating something of oneself outside of oneself – not in constructing
beautiful images in the silence of the mind,
emotional images which are contemplated
introspectively.
Emile Durkheim
The results of ‘development’ according to the
dominant development paradigms have been
more than ambiguous to date. There has been
considerable economic growth in some regions,
but this did not depend solely on market forces.
State intervention has been crucial in the success
stories of the ‘Asian Tigers’.95 But as Brett summarises, various countries have experienced serious economic crises following market reforms;
structural adjustment programmes often do not
succeed and have been shown to have disastrous
‘side-effects’ on human beings and the environment.96 The benefits of economic growth are
still much greater for the privileged minority of
the world’s population, half of which still lives in
countries with per capita GNP below $500, and
the absolute gaps between the rich and the poor
have continued to grow since the 1960s.
Against this background, ‘good governance’
became increasingly prominent on the international aid policy agenda as official donors introduced an increasing degree of political conditionality to pressurise authoritarian and ‘corrupt’ regimes to reform.97 It was not so much a
matter of recognising inherent faults in the
‘development project’ as a whole, but rather a
shift from what can be dubbed as “getting the
markets right” (i.e. the neo-liberal development
agenda that had replaced a Keynesian “getting
180
the state right” approach) to “getting the institutions right”. Yet, donors frequently failed in
the strict and consistent application of conditionalities, and one came to realise that multiparty, democratic elections did not necessarily
result in a more democratic culture or better
‘governance’.98 Enter ‘civil society’: re-discovered
as the foundation for a democratic society, it is
invoked to ensure an accountable, transparent
and effective state by virtue of the demands a
‘strong civil society’ can voice. In addition, ‘civil
society’ was also evoked to ameliorate the negative effects of SAPs – at least within the reductionist neo-liberal discourse. This reductionism
loses (or purposefully ignores) the critical political roles and functions of ‘civil society’ that are
actually rooted, as we have seen, in modern philosophy from Locke via Hegel and de
Tocqueville to Marx and Gramsci. Leftwich, in
a critical review of the institutional focus of
‘good governance’, uncovers how much the
political dimensions are ignored by this
approach in general, while Schmitz offers an
even more strident deconstruction of the ‘good
governance’ paradigm.99
‘Civil society’ has thus received an increasing
amount of interest and resources, but too often
it has been perceived as a technological ‘fix’ that
would automatically contribute to the flowering
of democracy and – closely related – to economic growth. It should not come as a surprise
that even ‘civil society’ enthusiasts like Ball and
Knight have to recognise that even though the
paradigm of development aid may have changed
in favour of ‘civil society’ in the 1990s, the basic
methods have not.100 Fowler has shown how
much the North tries to use foreign aid to create
institutions and organisations in the South that
mirror the ones in the North.101 In the words of
other commentators,
Just as economic developers see the needs for
the infrastructure of roads, railways, telephone
poles and wires, electricity, and so on, civil society developers see the need for information,
training, and technical assistance, opportunities
for networking, appropriate legal systems, sensitive fiscal frameworks, finance, and so on.102
Hence, this is yet again a supply-side model of
development, and there is growing evidence that
supply-side ‘civil society’ development trickles
Mello, Fatima V., “Making
the World Bank More
Accountable: Activism in the
South”, NACLA Report on
the Americas 29, May/June
1996, pp. 21f.
73. See, for example,
Diamond, Larry J. (ed.), The
Democratic Revolution:
Struggles for Freedom and
Pluralism in the Developing
World (New York: Freedom
House 1992) (= Perspectives
on Freedom 12); Diamond,
Larry J., Developing democracy: toward consolidation
(Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press
1999); Diamond, Larry J.
and Plattner, Marc F. (eds.),
The global resurgence of democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press
1996, 2nd edition); Mathews,
Jessica T., “Power Shift”,
Foreign Affairs, 1997, vol. 76,
no. 1, pp. 50-66.
74. See Keane, John,
“Introduction”, in Keane,
Civil Society and the State, pp.
6f., for a critical perspective
on this position.
75. Moore, “Development
Discourse as Hegemony”, p.
19; see also Schmitz,
“Democratization and
Demystification”, p. 57; and
Hippler, Jochen,
“Democratisation of the
Third World After the End of
the Cold War”, in J. Hippler
(ed.), The Democratisation of
Disempowerment: The Problem
of Democracy in the Third
World (London/East Haven,
CT/Amsterdam: Pluto
Press/Transnational Institute
1995), pp. 19-29.
76. Cf. Lehning, “Multi-cultural Civil Society”, pp. 36f.;
Hadenius and Uggla,
“Shaping Civil Society”, pp.
49-51; and ibid., “Making
Civil Society Work,
Promoting Democratic
Development: What Can
States and Donors Do?”,
World Development, 1996,
vol. 24, no. 10, pp. 16281634. For an overview on
more positions criticising the
conception of ‘civil society’ as
an antidote to the state, see
Van Rooy, Alison, “Civil
down to the poor as little as supply-side economics. Strategies aimed at ‘strengthening civil
society’ often focus on building or supporting
NGOs (with organisational structures modelled
after Northern conceptions and bureaucratic
needs) which are more often than not based in
cities and staffed by middle-class professionals;
the notion of NGOs being able to reach the
‘grassroots’ and to ‘teach democracy’ through
their participatory approaches too often remains
a myth.103 A focus on NGOs as service providers
may fill gaps the state has created, but it may
also further undermine an already weak state, or
lead to fatally ignoring the state where it would
be a much better service provider than a fragmented array of NGOs.104
opposite effect, for instance, when NGOs
ignore local power structures. Lastly, a recurring
and still not resolved problem is the lack of
accountability and legitimacy especially of foreign or externally funded NGOs to ‘their’ local
partner ‘communities’.107
Robinson draws our attention to further problems with respect to donor-CSO relationships.
Few donors provide a rationale for selecting particular types of organisations to co-operate with,
or even a clear categorisation of those CSOs
they (intend to) support.108 On the funding side,
there has not been as much of a financial commitment to supporting CSOs as the rhetoric
might suggest,109 plus it has been much more ad
hoc and reactive than strategic and proactive.
Donors rarely seem to conduct in depth needs
assessment studies or surveys of CSOs in individual countries, and the co-ordination between
donors with regard to ‘civil society’ support is
fairly weak.
The problem of the ‘NGO focus’
It is a fundamental problem in the discourse
of ‘civil society’ that many agencies and authors
simply equate ‘civil society’ with (mostly development) NGOs. The term NGO is predominantly used with reference to advocacy NGOs
and also service-provision NGOs. This obviously excludes a large variety of other associations
that could be labelled CSOs in a more encompassing effort. Carothers demonstrates this
problem convincingly in respect to U.S.
‘democracy’ and ‘civil society’ assistance.105
NGOs are all too frequently very recent,
imported forms of organisation without strong
roots in local communities. There is a danger of
ignoring other forms of organisation that may
be much less policy-oriented, but “more sensitive to local opinion and far more likely to
endure over time”.106
Various critics have repeatedly stressed that,
apart from overlooking many other forms of
association within ‘civil society’, not all NGOs
have a good record of building links and forming alliances with, for example, mass movements, human rights groups, or trade unions.
They frequently shy away from direct confrontation with the ‘host’ state and try to circumvent a more political role in favour of
focussing on service provision. It is therefore
equivocal to assume that support for NGOs
does automatically lead to a strengthening of
‘civil society’. This may even have the exact
Distortion of power structures
Another danger, especially with neo-conservative and liberal-pluralist conceptions of ‘civil
society’, is that a focus on ‘strengthening civil
society’ can obscure some of the power relationships involved, including those between NGOs
and donors and between NGOs and states.
Dependencies in the mechanisms of NorthSouth development co-operation may easily perpetuate imbalances and contortions in Southern
‘civil societies’.110 This is in part due to the fact
that this focus, this discourse of ‘strengthening
civil society’ by channelling funds through
NGOs, often allows donors to evade a direct
confrontation of the fundamental, structural
problems and causes of poverty and injustice.111
Moreover, a donor focus on ‘civil society’ and
NGOs can distort political developments within a society, as Stanton demonstrates in the case
of US interventions in Cuba,112 and have counterproductive effects on social transformation.113
There is moreover an inherent contradiction
in claiming to want to ‘empower’ people by
‘strengthening civil society’ when it is based on
a paradigm that is constructed with the authority of ‘objective science’. The point Brett makes,
drawing on Habermas, with reference to the
181
Society as Idea: An Analytical
Hatstand?”, in A. Van Rooy
(ed.): Civil Society and the Aid
Industry (London: Earthscan
1998), pp. 24-27.
77. Cf. Mitlin, “The NGO
Sector”, pp. 83f.; Hadenius
and Uggla, “Making Civil
Society Work”, p. 1622.
78. Fukuyama, Francis, The
End of History and the Last
Man (New York: The Free
Press 1992).
79. See Sen, Amartya,
“Development Thinking at
the Beginning of the 21st
Century” (London:
Development Economics
Research Programme,
STICERD) (= DERP No. 2),
pp. 14-16; Ersson, Svante and
Lane, Jan-Erik, “Democracy
and Development: A
Statistical Exploration”, in A.
Leftwich (ed.), Democracy and
Development (Cambridge:
Polity Press 1996), pp. 45-73;
Munck, Ronaldo,
“Democracy and
Development:
Deconstruction and
Debates”, in Sklair, Leslie
(ed.): Capitalism and
Development (London/New
York: Routledge 1994), pp.
23-25.
80. Cf. Schmitz,
“Democratization and
Demystification”, pp. 59-61;
Watts, “Development I”, p.
257.
81. Dahl, Robert A.,
Polyarchy: Participation and
Opposition (New Haven: Yale
University Press 1971); ibid.,
Democracy and Its Critics
(New Haven: Yale University
Press 1989).
82. Hall, “In Search of Civil
Society”, p. 15; Gellner,
Conditions of Liberty.
83. See Macdonald,
Supporting Civil Society, pp.
153-156.
84. Ibid., p. 21.
85. Ibid., p. 20.
86. Harbeson et al., Civil
Society and the State in Africa.
87. Harbeson, “Civil Society
and the Study of African
Politics”, p. 3; see also pp. 79.
88. Fowler, “Strengthening
Civil Society”, p. 13.
effect of the dominant paradigm on local politicians,114 can in fact be extended to agents of ‘civil
society’ as well. They can be reduced to mere
agents “of a scientific intelligence, which (...)
elaborates the objective implications and
requirements of available techniques and
resources as well as the optimal strategies and
rules of control”, thus leaving them with “nothing but a fictitious decision-making power”.115
Lastly, “The mantra of civil society being
voiced by the official aid system has a tone of
harmony, suggesting a oneness of purpose which
is just not in keeping with reality”.116 As I have
already pointed out above, some of this disharmony is due to the effects of colonial disruption,
competing internal forces and the influence of
divergent external forces. It is a fallacy with
severe consequences to ignore this cacophonic
character when crafting policies and programmes intended to strengthen ‘civil society’. A
societal analysis that is to serve as an adequate
foundation for any policies and programmes
needs to account for all of these levels of influence, as suggested by the analytical framework
we have proposed here. Simply ‘creating’ plethora of associations as an expression of people’s
action is not sufficient for ‘civil society’ to function as an ‘intermediary’ sphere for the conflicting and competing interests of various social
groups and factions.117
Conclusion
If your voice and ours were united with the
voices of all the dispossessed, nothing would be
left standing of the gigantic lie they make us
swallow every day and every night.
Subcomandante Marcos
With the discussion above in mind, one may
wonder whether agents and movements of ‘civil
society’, the objects of so much conceptual and
normative debate, do in fact have the potential
to make a substantial contribution to change
(their own) development, to make it ‘more successful’ than it has been in the past, or to even
challenge the power structures that have created
and continue to influence so many conditions of
poverty and depravation. With reference to
these movements, Moore may have a point
182
when he says that, “the fact that they are the targets of much hegemonic effort in [International
Financial Institutions] and ‘development’ agencies would indicate that they have radical potential”.118 This paper has shown that such “hegemonic effort” exists with regard to the concept
of ‘civil society’. Perhaps, then, voices such as
those of Subcomandante Marcos have more
than just marginal radical potential to challenge
the dominant discourses of ‘development’.
Escobar certainly sees such potential emerging
in various parts of the Third World, but he
remains rather vague about it.119 In this regard, I
concur with Harbeson’s view that, “the elusiveness of ‘development’ or ‘progress’ – however
these may be defined – on the ground (...) is
paralleled by ongoing insufficiencies in our theoretical understanding of what is occurring and
how to effect constructive change”.120
A sufficiently complex conception of ‘civil
society’, without strong normative inhibitions,
such as the one I am proposing here, can
improve this “theoretical understanding”. This
concept can be of high analytical value to help
describe and understand intricate societal
processes and structures, including popular
political participation, in their multiple dimensions. This does not preclude considerable caution when applying this concept. After all, it has
been developed based on experiences of a specifically European socio-historical context.
We must remember that civil society (...) is a
theoretical concept rather than an empirical
one. It cannot be directly observed. Instead, it is
a synthetic conceptual construct that encompasses the wide variety of forms of popular collective action that occur in the public realm. (...)
It summarizes, at a macroconceptual level,
microempirical actions that citizens employ for
political ends in the material, organizational,
and ideological realms. Although political
resources, organizations, and ideas may be
observed, none alone can capture the quality
and complexity of civil society as a whole.121
What future research will need to pay much
more attention to is in how far actors within
‘civil society’ consciously experience themselves
as ‘active’ socio-political forces, a direction that
Harbeson points to as well.122 I have drawn
repeatedly on anthropological studies in this
89. There are authors who
might not agree with the
phrase “formerly colonised”,
as they perceive an ongoing
form of colonisation by “the
West” through language, literature and culture. For example, see Said, Edward, Culture
and Imperialism (London:
Vintage 1994 [1993]); and
Chomsky, Powers and
Prospects.
90. Fowler, “Strengthening
Civil Society”, pp. 14f. This
argument is underscored by
the findings of Harper in her
analysis of NGOs’ roles in
East Asia (Harper, Caroline,
“Strengthening Civil Society
in Transitional East Asia”, in
Clayton, NGOs, Civil Society
and the State, pp. 125-140),
and by Nuijten’s anthropological analysis of local organisation in Mexican ejidos where
‘organisation’ is a set of practices, a re-shaping process,
and not a bounded social system that formal (Western)
bureaucratic rationality
expects (Nuijten, Monique,
“Local organization as organizing practices: Rethinking
rural institutions”, in N. Long
and A. Long (eds.),
Battlefields of Knowledge: The
Interlocking of Theory and
Practice in Social Research and
Development (London/New
York: Routledge 1992), pp.
189-207).
91. Maina, Wachira, “Kenya:
The State, Donors and the
Politics of Democratisation”,
in Van Rooy, Civil Society and
the Aid Industry, pp. 134-167;
Fatton, Robert, “Africa in the
Age of Democratisation: The
Civic Limitations of Civil
Society”, African Studies
Review, 1995, vol. 38, no. 2,
pp. 67-99.
92. Howell, “Manufacturing
Civil Society”, p. 19.
93. Chomsky, Powers and
Prospects, pp. 67f.
94. Fowler, “Strengthening
Civil Society”, p. 19.
95. See Wade, Robert,
Governing the Market:
Economic Theory and the Role
of Government in East Asian
Industrialization (Princeton:
Princeton University Press
paper and believe that ethnography is an
estimable methodology to fill this model of ‘civil
society’ presented here with life in this respect.
The discussion of ‘development’ practice has
also revealed that the way ‘civil society’ is generally operationalised by the aid industry more
often than not neglects wider power structures
that affect people’s ability to be truly self-determined and self-conscious forces of change.
‘Strengthening civil society’ is often expressed in
terms of ‘empowerment’. This is another contested concept that we cannot duly deconstruct
here as Rahnema does,123 but it may be a fundamental misconception of development agencies
that they could “give” power to the people
instead of them “taking” it – on their terms.124 It
may also be an intentional process of neutralisation “by which radical ideas and agents (...) are
assimilated or coopted, leaving an existing discourse still dominant and without radical
change to entrenched power structures”.125
Authors such as Moore and Ferguson stress
how much discourse (re-) generation is a political
and ideological process. We need to pay heed to
struggles between protagonists about reforms
within the discourse “because both reform and
reaction are born of clear challenges to orthodoxy
and thus imply, in their own ways, revolution”.126
A deep analysis of a given development institution or agency is required to understand in how
far reforms do take shape and substance within
development institutions, if ‘new’ concepts like
‘civil society’ are merely co-opted by the existing
discourse of an institution to ensure its own legitimacy, and if and how such a concept or a whole
paradigm makes its way from the conceptual to
the practical level of implementation. I see a
necessity for analyses of this kind because
although writers of the ‘post-development school’
want to write an obituary of ‘development’, the
“ruin in the intellectual landscape”,127 I agree with
Moore that ‘development’ is not dead and continues to affect the lives of millions of people.
Within this discourse, the difference between ideological positions and the practical implications
of their conceptions “could spell the difference
between life and death for millions”.128
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187
Challenging global capitalism: anti-globalisation
organisation as a fourth generation people’s
movement (Part II)
by Dawid Venter* and Ignatius Swart**
Anti-globalisation organisation and the fourth generation development
concept
Significance of the fourth generation development concept
A
*Lecturer in the Dept. of
Anthropology & Sociology
at the University of the
Western Cape, South
Africa.
**Post-doctoral fellow,
School of Religion and
Culture, University of
Durban-Westville, South
Africa.
Transnational Associations
3/2002, 188-204
s indicated in part I of this paper, we take development theorist David Korten’s concept of
fourth generation development activity and
organisation as a basic working model with which to
understand and evaluate the anti-globalisation
movement. This concept falls within a scheme of
four historical phases of NGO development activity
that pertinently discriminates against strategic orientations that confine themselves to local and national settings, as we point out in more detail later.
We draw on Korten for three reasons. In the
first instance, his concept allows for a connection to be made between the movement and
development studies. More specifically, with this
concept we draw on a strategic development discourse that is found not only in Korten’s work
but in the wider corpus of NGO literature.
We hold that a linkage between strategic development discourses and the anti-globalisation
movement can be established in more general and
specific terms. In a general sense, most organisations that make up the movement are opposed to
particular institutions (IFIs, trade agreements). In
their opinion, these institutions have profound
effects on development in the Third World. In a
more specific sense, particular organisations within the movement explicitly present themselves as
development organisations. As organisations that
in one way or another exhibit a global understanding of development, and attempt through
their activities to achieve a global reach, they conform to the strategic imperative inherent to the
fourth generation concept.
The second reason for using Korten’s concept
is the way in which it is informed and guided by
a specific theoretical, ideological and political
vision (see Thomas 2000: 782-783) of development. Korten’s concept of fourth generation
development strategies dovetails with a larger
theoretical corpus on people-centred development, alternative development, and NGOs and
development in which a “development against
188
capitalism” view (Thomas 2000: 779-780) is
expressed that clearly anticipates the anti-globalisation movement’s own inclination. Basic to this
view are a severe disapproval of global (liberal)
capitalism and a growth-centred notion of development (Roodt 2001: 475), a bias towards local
or autonomous development based on the principles of justice, sustainability and inclusiveness
(cf. Thomas 2000: 783), and an emphasis on
participatory democracy (cf. Roodt 2001: 474475) and a value politics which manifest itself in
the practices of contemporary grassroots (see
Sheth 1987) and global people’s movements.
A third reason for utilising the fourth generation
concept is that it goes beyond a discourse on
development and overlaps with a wider social scientific corpus focusing on the new social movements, a (global) civil society and a global transformative politics (see Swart 2000: 171-184). First
of all, Korten’s own theorisation demonstrates that
the concept goes beyond his own perspective on
“development as a movement” (Korten
1990:127). The dominating metaphor is rather
that of a global people’s movement for transformation, made up by the various new social or people’s movements and their supporting organisations. Development here is integrated with other
pressing issues, values and concerns that drive the
contemporary movements (Swart 2000: 145).
Consequently, the main issue becomes how
individuals and development NGOs ought to
transform and reorientate to take on a movement dynamic themselves and mobilise towards
a global people’s movement for transformation.
Here the relevance for an anti-globalisation
movement theory and practice should be clear
again. In Korten’s most recent work the dominant issue is how this movement can challenge
and transform a global capitalist world ruled by
transnational corporations (Korten 1995).
Clearly, Korten and others prioritise and theorise about the role of the new social movements
as part of a global civil society that opens up new
democratic spaces and achieves an alternative
system of global governance. The objective is
nothing short of a world order based on sustainable communities (see Swart 2000: 178-184).
Anti-globalisation organisations that are not so
much interested in a development discourse, but
rather a political discourse of global economic
and structural transformation (i.e. in changing
the current global capitalist system) fit the profile here.
service provision) that may meet vital needs in
particular contexts (Biggs and Neame 1995: 35;
Edwards and Hulme 1995a: 225).
Yet, Korten’s schema does comply with the
emphasis by other critical development theorists
that development NGOs need to scale-up and
mainstream their activities. In order to be effective agents of change, this position challenges
NGOs to undergo a necessary organisational
transformation that will enable them to apply
their small-scale solutions on a large scale and
become part of the official policy processes in
order to converse their ‘alternative’ solutions and
programmes into the general and official policy
framework (see Wils 1995: 53). As argued by
Tim Brodhead, the implication here is an
unavoidable tension with earlier, traditional
modes of NGO involvement:
Just as the earlier shift in NGO attitudes and
behavior created tension and conflict, so too will
the present one. Although NGOs have in the
past proven to be adaptable, this is at times less
the response of an individual agency confronted
by the imperatives of change, than the result of
new organizations created which embody a new
perception or identify a gap which existing bodies are not filling. (Brodhead 1987: 4)
Korten’s schema clearly not only represents a
controversial typology in the NGO development debate, but also a challenging and workable one (see Smillie 1995: 31).
For Korten the fourth generation orientation
poses the ultimate challenge to development
NGOs. Third generation strategies can be
appreciated for reaching beyond the individual
community in seeking to change specific policies and institutions at local, national and even
global levels. In this way “just, sustainable and
inclusive development outcomes” can be
achieved (Korten 1990: 120, 123; cf. Brodhead
1987: 4). Yet, third generation strategies parallel
at the macro-level the deficiency that second
generation strategies display at a more micro
and community levels. Third generation strategies involve “an essential, but tedious process
that must be replicated hundreds of thousands,
even millions, of times to achieve the needed
transformation of the institutions of global society”. Moreover, each individual step towards
transforming a policy or institution is subject to
A perspective on strategy, organisation and
agents of transformation
A discriminatory strategic perspective
Korten’s concept of fourth generation development strategies could best be described as a
discriminatory strategic perspective. Korten perceives an evolutionary pattern of four historical
phases in NGO thinking, programming and
growth (see Smillie 1995: 31). First generation
strategies entail relief and welfare work, second
generation strategies comprise local community
and project involvement, third generation strategies promote sustainable systems development,
and fourth generation strategies facilitate people’s
movements (Korten 1990: 114-128). In this
schema, third and fourth generation strategies
could be taken as a cluster vis-à-vis the first two
generations. Third and fourth generation strategies could be seen as much more effective strategies, and a standard question which NGOs
ought to ask themselves is how they can move
from first and second to third and fourth generation strategies (Swart and Venter 2001: 487).
Korten intended his classification to indicate
both a chronological time-line, and a standard
by which NGO effectiveness can be judged
(Swart and Venter 2001: 487).
Korten’s conceptualisation has been strongly
criticised for being too idealistic, one-sided, and
linear. Critics who negatively assess the actual
impact of NGOs on political reform imply that
Korten’s identification of third and fourth generation development strategies is out of touch
with reality (see Edwards and Hulme 1995: 67). They also explicitly criticise his schema for
excluding a multiple approach to development
and to forms of intervention (e.g. welfare and
189
reversal by those larger forces dominating the
national and international political and institutional environment (Korten 1990: 123). Fourth
generation strategies conspicuously aspire to
meet this deficiency.
Fourth generation strategies deliberately reach
beyond the limited political space of the nation
state towards a global civil society (Swart and
Venter 2001: 489-490). For Ronnie Lipschutz
(1992: 390-391), this new reality designates the
emergence of an arrangement of political interaction parallel to state-centred politics. Anarchy
or self-help is not the central organising principles, but “self-conscious constructions of networks of knowledge and action, by decentred,
local actors, that cross the reified boundaries of
space as though they were not there”. Made up
of “many heteronomous transnational political
networks”, the significance of this global civil
society is, firstly, the challenge that it poses to
the nation-state system, “from below”.
Secondly, it manifests “an ongoing project of
civil society to reconstruct, re-imagine, or remap world politics”. “As this project proceeds,
civil society becomes global and so a political
force to be reckoned with in a way that has not
been the case since the medieval period.”
(Lipschutz 1992: 391)
The same perspective on a global civil society
is articulated by Korten and a number of his colleagues. The reality of a global civil society
means that the concept of “nation building” has
become “outdated and incomplete as it is conceived largely as a state project” (Riker 1995:
197). Through the activities of networking,
coalition- and relationship-building an independent global civil society space is shaped (Korten
and Quizon 1995: 160). Then it becomes possible for civil society actors - such as NGOs, social
movements and people’s organisations - to shift
to the centre of the development and political
discourse (Riker 1995: 198). Noeleen Heyzer
(1995: 12) argues that as a strategy of new
alliances across national boundaries and around
common issues, global civil society comes to
serve as a protective space for such actors in their
confrontations with governments and states.
But it also enables them to present an efficient
counter to mainstream, government-dominated
development policy, supported by major inter190
national donor institutions such as the World
Bank (Heyzer 1995: 12, Bhatt 1995: 86-87;
Riker 1995: 199). It constitutes the domain in
which NGOs can participate in international
inter-governmental forums (e.g. the United
Nations) and through which they can “lobby,
embarrass or dialogue with governments on an
equal footing” (Heyzer 1995: 12).
In Korten’s own analysis, however, the emphasis falls more explicitly on people’s movements (or,
the new social movements). For this reason he
also criticises his colleagues for placing too
much emphasis on NGOs/voluntary organisations at the cost of these movement actors (see
Korten 1995a: 187-188). Korten argues that the
theory of action that informs the fourth generation strategy points to an inadequate mobilising
vision as the root cause for contemporary development failure. “It calls for imbuing the public
consciousness with an alternative vision adequate to mobilize voluntary action on a national scale or global scale.” (Korten 1990: 127)
According to Korten, the new people’s or social
movements are today meeting this challenge.
The strategic emphasis should therefore fall on
such movements, and not so much on other
civil society actors such as NGOs - whose main
purpose now becomes to act as support agents of
the new social movements (Korten 1990: 127).
Put differently, Korten thus presents us with
what Martin Shaw (1994: 651) calls a “social
movement approach” in civil society/global civil
society theory. Hence, social movements are
seen as “uniquely important social phenomena”,
as “especially significant forms through which
society outside the state is represented in the
global and international arenas” (Shaw 1994:
648; cf. Henderson 1993; Falk 1987).
The discussion so far can be summarised as
follows: firstly, for Korten the new social movements represent a ‘politics of ideas’ and a ‘politics of connections’ in the strongest sense of the
word (see Swart and Venter 2001: 493; Swart
1997: 14-15; cf. Walker 1994: 699-700). They
embody the capacity of civil society “to rapidly
and flexibly network diverse and dispersed individuals and organizations that are motivated by
voluntary commitments” (Korten 1995: 297).
Their power to drive social change is concretely
manifested in the successes of movements in the
fields of environment, human rights, women,
peace and population to reshape thought and
action over recent decades. They are the primary mobilising force of a global civil society:
Social movements have a special quality. They
are driven not by budgets or organizational
structures, but rather by ideas, by a vision for a
better world. They move on social energy more
than on money. The vision mobilizes independent action by countless individuals and organizations across national boundaries, all supporting a shared ideal. Participants in successful
movements collaborate in continuously shifting
networks and coalitions. They may quarrel over
ideological issues and tactics. But where they
have been successful, their efforts have generated a reinforcing synergy. (Korten 1990: 124)
Secondly, for Korten (1990: 124) the social
movement approach is particularly relevant to
the field of development. In development thinking the power of people’s movements has largely
been neglected, despite their successes.
Positively put, their successes challenge development-specific actors (such as NGOs) to build
“alliances with other people’s movements that
deal with related elements of the global crisis”
(Korten 1990: 128; italics added). While this
does not ask such actors to lose their specific
development angle, they should be able to recognise the considerable overlapping with the new
issue-based social movements. These movements constitute the most important allies of a
fourth generation people-centred development
agenda. The various issues around which these
movements are mobilised, all comprise aspects of
people-centred development and secure its sustainability (Swart 2000: 146).
Clearly the need for development actors to tap
the “reinforcing synergy” generated in the
sphere of the new social movements is central to
the fourth generation orientation. As Korten
(1990: 125) defines the benign character of this
sphere, it constitutes the “dynamic network of
dedicated volunteers” that offers “mutual inspiration, political support, and exchange of experience and technology”. It constitutes a sphere of
“free space” through which actors of development may participate, find numerous allies to
their cause and achieve people-centred development on a global scale.
Thirdly, for Korten (1995: 301) global citizen
or social movement networking constitutes a
crucial part of the process of creating “a new
globalized human consciousness” for transformation. Thus, beyond the existing successes of
the new social movements, the expansion and
intensification of civil society networking, coalition building, and conscientisation activities
remain an ongoing challenge. Although Korten
does not present a worked out theory of communication and transformation to the same
degree as others, he does also proceed from what
a growing group of civil society theorists refers
to as the new communication perspective (see
Swart 2000: 155-156, 194-195).
The very nature of the new social movements
as idea- and value-centred actors, and the imperative of networking and coalition building, suggest that the emancipatory potential of the new
information and communication technology needs
to be recognised. It offers opportunities for countering global capitalist forces in ways not possible in previous systems (cf. e.g. Castells 1997: 2;
Williams in Dawson and Bellamy Foster 1996:
55; Waterman 1996: 50-51; Alvarez and Calas
1996: 34-36, 41-42; Welling Hall 1994: 119121). Consequently, the new social movements
and civil society should essentially mobilise
through applying this technology.
The focus is on the communication of ideas
and information through the mass media,
newsletters, recorded media, school curricula,
major media events, study groups and social
networks of all types to energize voluntary
action by people both within and outside their
formal organizations in support of social transformation. (Korten 1990: 127)
[Citizen networks’] use of the same electronic
communications technologies - phone, fax, and
computer - that corporations have used to
extend their global reach allows them to move
quickly and flexibly in joint actions at local,
national and global levels. (Korten 1995: 297)
Organisational differentiation: voluntary
organisations, people’s organisations and a
global people’s movement
According to NGO expert Ian Smillie (1995:
31), “Korten’s fourth generation is less a ‘strategy’ than an approach to the concept of organi191
zation” (italics added). Smillie (1995: 31-32)
goes on to identify two elements that define this
organisational concept: the new social or people’s development movements that we have
already discussed at some length above, and the
principle of voluntarism. As suggested by his
further discussion, it is this identification and
prioritisation that leads Korten to make the following fourfold categorisation of NGO types:
voluntary organizations that pursue a social mission driven by a commitment to shared values;
public service contractors that function as marketoriented non-profit businesses serving public
purposes;
people’s organizations that represent their members’ interests, have member-accountable leadership and are substantially self-reliant;
governmental NGOs (GONGOs) that are creations of government and serve as instruments
of public policy. (Smillie 1995: 32; see Korten
1990: 2)
It follows that Korten comes to favour voluntary organisations (VOs) and people’s organisations (POs) as NGO types of fourth generation
orientation. In terms of Ulf Hjelmar’s (1996:
177) definition, they are what can be called “a
mixture of organization and social movement”,
have a “movement identity” and use social
movement strategies.
As respectively valued by Korten:
VOs take a special place as they are by definition not driven by expectation of political or
economic reward (as is the case with the government and business sectors and the NGOs associated with them), but by “a social commitment” (Korten 1995a: 186). Consequently,
VOs orientated towards the fourth generation
fulfill a crucial task as service organisations to the
social movements they support. Their task is to
generate self-managing networks that will stimulate action beyond their own range of vision
and control. They achieve this “primarily
through the power of ideas, values and communication links” (Korten 1990: 127). Supporting
an escalating dynamic, they serve as important
mechanisms of democratisation through which
people define and voice interests, meet local
needs and make demands on government. But
they also fulfill important educational roles
through which “they provide training grounds
192
for democratic citizenship, develop the political
skills of their members, recruit new political
leaders, stimulate political participation, and
educate the broader public on a wide variety of
public issues” (Korten 1990: 99).
POs, however, represent the fourth and most
important of all the institutional sectors in the
fourth generation mode (Korten 1995a: 187).
Where the other three NGO types mentioned
above can be defined as third-party organisations
in which action and thought are initiated by
actors from outside, POs, by contrast, represent
the most basic principle of social movement theory.
They are by nature first-party organisations that
embody people’s direct and radical participation
in events. They are the potential and actual
manifestation of fourth generation development
(Swart 2000: 150). They “are membership organizations that exist to serve their members, have
membership accountable leaders, and are largely
self-reliant in their generation of resources”
(Korten 1995a: 187; see also 1990: 100).
In Korten’s definition, then, a logical tension is
sustained between the concepts NGOs and VOs,
on the one hand, and POs, on the other. In the
ideal setting of fourth generation development,
NGOs/VOs would not only be committed to
create new POs. They would also convert the
first two sectors of government and business into
POs, and let themselves be transformed into
POs. This transition spells out the necessary progression towards authentic people-centred development that truly transfers power into the hands
of people (Korten 1990: 101). In terms of
Korten’s conclusive profile, POs are the authentic instruments for redistributing power in society. They strengthen the economic and political
power of the marginalised. They are training
grounds for democratic citizenship and expressions of grassroots concerns that provide the collective bargaining power to enable landless people, small farmers and urban squatters to negotiate on more equal terms with the political and
economic powerful (Korten 1990: 101-102).
Thus, to rephrase Hjelmar (1996: 172), it can
be said that Korten presents a social movement
approach that does not “see movement organization as diametrically opposed to social movements”. He recognises “the ability of movement
organizations effectively to influence public
opinion and decision-making in cases essential
of social movements”. Yet, for Korten the “global responsibility” (Shaw 1992: 431) of these
organisations becomes the ultimate yardstick.
They ought to give formation to and become
participants of a global people’s movement, the
decisive agent in Korten’s vision of global
change:
Since the forces that have captured the land
and the sky are global in their scope, our vision
must be global as well as local. Obviously this is
beyond the capacity of any individual NGO. As
individual people and organizations we must
work to meld ourselves into a global force
through the formation of coalitions and
alliances that ultimately meld millions of people
into a global movement for change. Those of us
who have defined our roles in terms of projects
and the internal management of individual
organizations will need to expand our perspective and become adept at new modes of working. (Korten 1995a: 188)
As the above quote clearly illustrates, Korten
argues that the objective of global change can
only be achieved through the formation of
alliances across people’s movements and their associated organisations (see Korten 1990: 200). A
global people’s movement represents the ultimate driving force to carry forward the dynamics of a social movement approach to development. It embodies the ultimate integrating and
synthesising force through which the various
organisations and movements in the fourth generation can present their overlapping interests as
a people-centred development agenda in the singular (Swart 2000: 154-155).
We may point out, in conclusion, how Korten
sees evidence of such a movement in the making
particularly in the countless global forums in the
last decade, where “people from every corner of
the world” have met “to share their experiences
with an errant global system and build a cooperative agenda”.
A good case in point is the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), or Earth Summit, held in Rio de
Janeiro in June 1992. Korten labels the occasion
as “a defining moment in the global citizen dialogue” at which the people’s movement more
explicitly revealed itself as the counterpoint.
“While the official meetings were going on in
the grand and heavily guarded Rio Ventro convention center, some 18,000 private citizens of
every race, religion, social class, and nationality
gathered in tents on a steamy stretch of beachfront on the other side of town for the NGO
Global Forum to draft citizen treaties setting
agendas for cooperative voluntary action.”
(Korten 1995: 301-302) This event paved the
way for a consensus document that became
known as “The People’s Earth Declaration: A
Proactive Agenda for the Future”.
A second good case is provided by the UN’s
1994 International Conference on Population
and Development in Cairo. Here, particularly
through key organizations in the women’s movement (such as Development Alternatives for
Women in a New Era [DAWN] and Women’s
Environment and Development Organization
[WEDO]), the people’s movement demonstrated its growing familiarity with and skill in dealing with official UN processes. “Working with
and through national governments and the UN
secretariat, women’s groups set the basic frame
of the official conference document.” (Korten
1995: 302)
Alternatives to global capitalism: a
quest for project identities
Resistance and project identities
In our endeavour to understand the anti-globalisation movement we are interested in the
extent to which participating actors offer alternatives to global capitalism. As in the critique
against post-development discourse, we hold
that this question remains paramount in our
evaluation of anti-globalisation organisations
and movements - whose identity is first and
foremost determined by their reaction against
global capitalism. To echo Jan Nederveen
Pieterse (2000: 188; 1998: 366) on post-development discourse, our problem is likewise not
the critiques, with which one can easily enough
sympathise. However, our question is also what
alternatives are offered, what positive programme, what construction beyond the critique.
Should the anti-globalisation movement, generally speaking, not be criticised for presenting a
193
single, narrow and conventional view of capitalism and globalisation? As Nederveen Pieterse
(1997: 380) elsewhere argues:
A shortcoming in most debates is that they do
not sufficiently address the diversity within contemporary capitalism, the variety of capitalisms,
in view of diverse historical itineraries, geographical locations and cultural antecedents...
The more constructive engagements with the
futures of capitalism... hinge on some form of
global regulation.
It is at this point of the discussion that we
would like to introduce Manuel Castells’
notions of resistance and project identities to distinguish between reactive and proactive social
movements in the contemporary context of
global capitalist society.
Resistance identities could be regarded as the
most important type of identity-building in
contemporary society, according to Castells
(1997: 9). Social movements captured by this
identity can be described as reactive movements
that - under the combined assault of technoeconomic forces and transformative social
movements - build communities of resistance
on behalf of God, nation, ethnicity, family and
locality (Castells 1997: 2). They construct
“forms of resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression, usually on the basis of identities
that were, apparently, clearly defined by history,
geography, or biology” (Castells 1997: 9). In all,
“they barely communicate”, and certainly not
“with the state, except to struggle and negotiate
on behalf of their specific interests/values”. But
also, “(t)hey rarely communicate with each
other because they are built around sharply distinct principles, defining what is “in” and “out””
(Castells 1997: 356).
Project identities are distinct from, but not
unrelated to, resistance identities. For such
proactive movements, “the building of identity is
a project of a different life, perhaps on the basis
of an oppressed identity, but expanding toward
the transformation of society as the prolongation of this project of identity, as in the... example of a post-patriarchal society, liberating
women, men, and children, through the realization of women’s identity” (Castells 1997: 10).
Thus, these movements do not merely resist the
new global order (cf. Castells 1997: chap. 2). As
194
the environmental movement well illustrates,
they display “an ambiguous, deep connection
with science and technology”. While criticising
the domination of life by science, ecologists also
“use science to oppose science on behalf of life.
The advocated principle is not the negation of
knowledge, but superior knowledge: the wisdom of a holistic vision, able to reach beyond
piecemeal approaches and short-sighted strategies geared towards the satisfaction of basic
instincts.” (Castells 1997: 123).
Of particular importance for us, then, is that
Castells’ evaluation of both types of social movements presents a counterpoint to our question
on constructive alternatives to global capitalism.
He argues that from an analytic perspective,
there is no such thing as “bad” and “good”, progressive and regressive, social movements. “They
are all symptoms of our societies, and all impact
social structures, with variable intensities and
outcomes that must be established by research.”
While we may have a disregard for the violent
and fundamentalist nature of certain social
movements, they remain “meaningful signs of
new social conflicts, and embryos of social resistance and, in some cases, social change”
(Castells 1997: 70; italics added).
Thus, Castells implies that to judge anti-globalisation organisations and movements on
whether or not they propose alternatives is misplaced. To confine these organisations within the
notion of resistance identities because they appear
not to offer constructive alternatives, would not
diminish their significance as actors in the social
movement landscape. As Castells claims, in
today’s global capitalist society, resistance identities seem rather to be the source of new project
identities. Project identities no longer seem to
emerge from identities of the industrial era’s civil
society, which is disintegrating, as socialism did
on the basis of the labour movement. Castells
(1997: 11-12, 357) elaborates:
Thus, social movements emerging from communal resistance to globalization, capitalist
restructuring, organizational networking,
uncontrolled informationalism, and patriarchalism - that is, for the time being, ecologists, feminists, religious fundamentalists, nationalists,
and localists - are the potential subjects of the
Information Age. (Castells 1997: 361)
This analysis implies we should consider the
potential that anti-globalisation actors may collectively become a very meaningful, forceful
project identity in contemporary society. Yet,
and this is for us a decisive point, Castells, like
us, concedes that “the emergence of project identities” ultimately becomes the key issue in the
search for social change. That is, project identities are “potentially able to reconstruct a new
civil society of sorts, and, eventually, a new
state” (Castells 1997: 356). Clearly, for Castells,
too, the most important issue is how and
whether the resistance identities of particular reactive social movements can be transformed into
proactive project identities. While many of today’s
resistance identities provide the seed-beds, the
realisation of a new civil society ultimately
depends on the construction of strong project
identities.
And so we remain biased towards project identities as social movement actors that are more
proactively posing a comprehensive transformative challenge to the current neo-liberal dominated global capitalist order. Indeed, it is also in the
fourth generation perspectives by Korten and
other writers that we recognise an elaborate
claim to such an identity and role. Many social
movements are project identities and innovative
actors. As futurist scholar Hazel Henderson
(1993: 323, 327) maintains, there are certainly
many citizen organisations and movements who
“can be destructive and retrogressive, or led by
demagogues”. But many “are often a priceless
social resource offering new paradigms to society
stuck in old ways or trapped, as Western industrial societies are, in wasteful consumption and
production habits and obsolete technologies that
are proving unsustainable”.
The point here is that proactive social movements and their associated organisations should
not only be appreciated for their role as “symbol
mobilizers” of alternative values and culture (see
Castells 1997: 361). They are also valued for
being, potentially and actually, significant
sources of alternative economic and technological models and practices in the first place (see
e.g. Ekins 1992: chap. 5-7; Henderson 1993:
326-331; Trainer 1995: chap. 17). And, they
are valued as political actors that are central to
the challenge of creating a new and alternative
system of global governance (see e.g. Coate,
Alger and Lipschutz 1996; Falk 1987; 1994;
Henderson 1993: 331-333; Korten 1995: chap.
23-24). At stake is not whether social movements are creative and concrete innovators, but
mainstream forces’ discrimination against them:
Social innovations pioneered by citizens’
movements are usually resisted by the dominant
culture and media as ‘impractical’, or frivolously portrayed, unlike those innovations in technology, production and marketing in the private
sector which are usually hailed as progress. This
contrast is stark but understandable, since private sector innovations arise in businesses for
competitive and profit motives highly approved
in all Western cultures. Such business sector
innovation is routinely ‘hyped’ in advertising
and marketing and also supported by government subsidies (including contracting of
weapons research and procurement of high-tech
corporations) and by grants to universities,
research laboratories and think tanks.
(Henderson 1993: 326-327)
An Ecological Revolution as grand
alternative
Korten’s notion of an ecological revolution in
the making represents a grand and synthesising
alternative to the current social order, and perhaps offers the best summary of the claims made
on behalf of project identities and the fourth
generation perspective (see Korten 1995: chap.
21 and 24). As Henderson (1993: 325) confirms, “(a)t all levels, from local to global, citizen’s organizations arise around the social and
environmental costs of existing policies and
industrial technologies”. Korten (1995: 271), at
this point, again goes further by understanding
the “formative ideas of the Ecological
Revolution” as the collective product of social
movements and scholars:
They are articulated in countless consensus
documents and declarations of citizen movements and they find theoretical grounding in
the intellectual treatises of scholars from a
diverse variety of academic disciplines - including history, sociology, ecology, economics, biology, physics, general systems theory, and ecological economics.
195
Korten advances elaborate critiques of the economic growth paradigm of development (see
Roodt 2001: 475), which he sees as culminating
in “economic globalisation” (see Korten 1995:
12-13). These negative appraisals are expressed
in his theories of “people-centred development”
(Korten 1995a; 1990; 1984) and “of sustainable
societies” (Korten 1995: 6). For Korten the economic growth paradigm is responsible for a
“threefold crisis” in contemporary society: of
ongoing and escalating poverty, environmental
destruction and communal violence/social disintegration (see Korten 1995: 18-23, 261-262;
1995a: 165-167; 1990: 13-16).
In essence, the economic growth paradigm
promotes a functionalist approach to planning
and economic organisation that shows little loyalty to either place or people. The emphasis is on
economies of unlimited scale that transcend
national/local interests, are primarily profit-oriented, and find their ultimate expression in the
transnational corporation (Korten 1995: 9-13,
249-257; 1995a: 170-171; 1984: 306; Korten
and Carner 1984: 208).
In contrast to such a functionalist approach,
Korten argues that the Ecological Revolution is
to be build on a territorial approach to planning
and economic organisation (see Korten 1984:
306-308; Korten and Carner 1984: 208-209).
Korten draws here on a tradition of thinking that
alternative development theorist John
Friedmann terms “agropolitan development”
(see Friedmann 1996; 1984). It also finds expression in the work of various alternative economist
and development writers (see e.g. Hettne 1995:
56-73; Kothari 1995: 128-131; Trainer 1995:
chap. 7; Schumacher 1993: chap. 13; Korten
and Carner 1984; Morris 1984; Omo-Fadaka
1975). Like these writers, Korten (1984: 307)
argues for a development model based on the
logic of local self-reliance, that is, “the logic of
place, people, and resources bound into locally,
self-sustaining human ecological systems”. He
substantiates his argument by a rich compilation
of concrete alternative policy proposals.
The structural alternative, according to
Korten, is “a global system of interlinked diversified local economies that are largely economically and ecologically self-reliant in meeting
their own basic needs but also function as ele196
ments of a larger whole” (Korten 1995a: 180).
Differently put, it will be “a market economy,
composed primarily, though not exclusively, of
family enterprises, small-scale co-ops, workerowned firms, and neighborhood and municipal
corporations” (Korten 1995: 213).
This alternative is elsewhere defined by
Korten as an equity-led sustainable growth strategy of development (see Korten 1990: 72-82),
but the essential logic is the same: a “choice of
priorities for the sequencing of development
interventions” (Korten 1990: 81). The aim here
is to radically revert the sequence followed in conventional export-oriented growth strategies. It
implies that domestic markets are to be created,
not by foreign demand for the products of lowcost labour, but by increasing agricultural productivity and industrial diversification in decentralised locations with an emphasis on labourusing and capital-saving technologies (Korten
1990: 76; Friedmann 1984: 217; cf. Kothari
1995: 125-131). The emphasis is thus on a
broadly based integrative approach to development, in which various stages of rural development are prioritised. Urban industrialisation
and export promotion only represent the last
stages in the development process, due to substantial increases in rural productivity, incomes,
and industry (Korten 1990: 72-82).
In accordance with the discriminatory strategic perspective, Korten maintains that the above
development model ultimately depends on a
global institutional transformation. He says that
he is “among those who seek to transform the
global to empower the local” (Korten 1995: 6).
A crucial aspect in this strategy is the removal of
global corporations from the political sphere, to
cut them down to human scale (Korten 1995:
309, 317). The agenda set by Korten, of global
restructuring and alternative policy legislation,
compares well with other radical academic writings (see Henderson 1993: 331-332; Amin
1995; Giddens and Hutton 2001). Similar
notions emerge in various academic projects
(such as the World Order Models Project; see
e.g. Falk 1994) and campaign documents (such
as the “Fifty Years Is Enough Campaign” - see
Korten 1995: 310; Amin 1995). Like these writings and documents, Korten makes very concrete
proposals about alternative global financial reg-
ulation, international debt reduction, and alternative economic governance. A transformation
of the Bretton Woods institutions in favour of a
new United Nations system is especially high on
the agenda (see Korten 1995: chap. 23 and 24).
think global, act global. While IFIs and TNCs
may have branches everywhere and headquarters
somewhere, they have global strategies. In consequence, opposition to them assumes the same
organisational form, albeit with a radically different structure. But the reconstruction of the
local as the global is also partly due to the effects
of globalisation itself. As Robertson (1991)
implies, in a globalised world the self increasingly has to be constructed by reference to
humanity as a whole.
2. Understanding of the movement remains
fragmentary, however. In the social scientific
research of social movements, a study of antiglobalisation organisations as a distinct movement has been rather neglected up to this point.
A research agenda that must now unfold is for a
study not only of the movement in isolation,
but also of its interrelationship with other issuebased movements. A question is whether the
movement is not giving important expression to
these other movements, and indeed to the
notion of a global people’s movement (Korten)
and a global civil society in the making.
3. The movement appears to meet Korten’s
strategic orientation, at least partly. Our research
so far suggests that the movement constitutes a
loosely connected global network that links a
great diversity of organisations. The organisations do mobilise collectively and interact at
times. But - in accordance with Castells’ notion
of resistance identities - they more often also
appear not to interact and communicate with
each other.
In some ways anti-globalisation organisation
is both contained and yet extends beyond
Korten’s conceptualisation of fourth generation
strategies. For example, Korten does not appear
to anticipate fully the fluidity of organisation
that marks the anti-globalisation movement. As
we have seen in 3.2 and 4.3, mobilisation for
events at Prague through the Initiative against
Economic Globalization and at Seattle via
Direct Action Network demonstrates a modular
form of organisation with attendant informational appendages that comes into existence for
that demonstration only. The preference for a
networked form of organisation recalls not only
Korten’s concepts but also Castells’ notions of
resistance and project identities.
Anti-globalisation as a fourth
generation people’s movement:
provisional conclusions
In the concluding section we demonstrate
how Korten’s concepts of fourth generation
strategies, voluntary and people’s organisations
as well as Castells’ notions of resistance and project identities could be used to evaluate the antiglobalisation movement.
1. The magnitude and phenomenal growth of
the movement over recent years suggest that it is
an important manifestation of a counterpoint to
the contemporary global capitalist society.
Indeed, among the contemporary social movements it represents one of the strongest expressions of discontent against globalisation and
capitalism. Some commentators imply that
more than demonstrating the extent to which
transnational linkages have been established
within the movement, events like Seattle actually represent “a watershed towards the creation of
a global citizen-based and citizen-driven democratic order” (Shiva 1999). Albert (n.d.) claims
that the global perspective that underpins the
anti-globalisation movement calls for “a growing
solidarity even across countries and whole continents”.
On closer inspection the idea of locality itself
has been redefined by the actions of the antiglobalisation movement. Local translates into
political autonomy, but not into a single geographic location. The ease with which protesters
from London can demonstrate their opposition
in Prague, or those from Johannesburg in
Washington, points to an emergence of self-consciously global citizens. For them locality is anywhere and everywhere, and their loyalty is likewise to others around the world who oppose the
same system. This projection of the local over
long distances is partly due to the globality represented by their opponents. To oppose the
global, you have to organise globally. Put differently, participants in the movement have to
197
The movement seems to combine a number
of sub-networks, some which are stronger (i.e.
more densely linked) and others weaker. What
transforms these networks into a global force, is
the ability to mobilise groups from all over the
world for protests in one locality (e.g. Seattle),
but also for events that occur in different localities around the same issue on the same day (e.g.
May Day protests). For participants victory can
be achieved by combating global institutions
directly or indirectly (e.g. by pressurising local
institutions which support IFIs). Global Trade
Watch, for example, favours “a unified international NGO campaign which can be implemented in each country with country-based
coalitions holding their specific government
accountable” (Global Trade Watch n.d.).
Otherwise, they are rather bound together by
their focus on a common ‘enemy’, by a similar
politics of ideas and worldview. But not too
much should be made of commonalities. Naomi
Klein, for example, denies that “there is one ideology that will reach around the world. We need
to find a belief system that rejects that sort of
“one-size fits all” ideology systematically.” On
the other hand “we can agree that we have the
right to the basic level of self-determination and
democracy” (BBC 2000a). Their actual connection is not so much through shared physical
location but through cyberspace. They present a
particularly good illustration of a movement
that uses communication and information technology to network and mobilise. Klein agreed
that new technologies could be used to promote
grassroots democracy. She said that without “the
Internet and cell-phones”, “(p)rotests like we
saw in Seattle and Prague... could not have happened in the way that they did” (BBC 2000a).
4. A special trademark of the movement
appears to be the extensive diversity of its composition. Not only do left- and right-wing
organisations make room for themselves under
the anti-globalisation banner, but so too do
those that are non-violent and those that may
embrace violence as a means, or as an end.
Participating organisations are also diverse in
terms of categories such as class, age, and causes, as we outlined in section 4. The diverse character suggests the importance of the movement.
It is able, perhaps more than any other force, to
198
bring various issue-based organisations and
movements together to fight against common
foes. Under the anti-globalisation banner these
organisations loose their particularity to such an
extent that an integration of different issues
takes place. Environmentalists, human rights
advocates, developmentalists are collectively
mobilised to fight a common cause, so giving
some expression to Korten’s ideal of a global
people’s movement.
5. The movement favourably meets Korten’s
notions of voluntary and people’s organisations
as we indicated in section 5. Organisations and
people within the movement seem to be driven
less by professionalism than by particular issues,
values and ideological convictions. They comply
with Korten’s description of social movements
motivated not by money or organisational structures, but by ideas and a vision for a better
world. Essentially financially self-reliant, the
democratic principle of people’s radical participation appears to define their nature. They are
membership organisations, generally without
prominent leaders that operate through the consensus politics of their members.
6. Although the movement constitutes an
important sign of resistance (Castells) against
capitalist oppression and inspires the idea of a
global people’s movement in the making, it
remains to be seen whether it will achieve success. There is no clear indication of real victory
except disruptions of capitalist activities. The
neo-liberal global capitalist paradigm appears as
strong as ever today. Sections of the movement
engage in very little - if any - constructive dialogue with the ‘enemy’. This is, for example,
suggested by Cansa’s interaction with World
Bank president Wolfensohn as pointed out in
4.2. Anti-globalisation organisations’ demand
that capitalists must “keep out”, does not mean
that they in fact do “keep out”. But others do
engage, as Global Exchange’s participation in
the Seattle WTO meeting demonstrates; Global
Trade Watch is another example (see 3.2 and
4.4).
Yet the prolonged and frequent protest actions
worldwide appear to have had some impact on
the structures and rhetoric of IFIs. Evidence
includes replacing the IMF’s Structural
Adjusment Plans with Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs). And the Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) that provides loans to up to 80 countries, was renamed
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF) in 1999. PRSPs are supposed to be
“drawn up in consultation with civil society”.
But according to Martin Khor (2000) of the
Third World Network, “PRGF conditions are
almost identical to the old ESAF conditions”,
while PRSPs “closely resemble SAPs. The names
may have changed but the economics has stayed
the same”. The World Bank attempted to reach
out to NGOs through its Global Development
Gateway, and published a report admitting the
social cost of Russia’s transition to capitalism
(Schifferes 2000).
But just how deep these changes run is as yet
uncertain. Some argue that the movement has
succeeded in slowing “the momentum for global integration - particularly in relation to trade
talks”. The evidence is the lack of enthusiasm
“for trying to restart a new global trade round”.
The Bank and the IMF in principle “agreed to
introduce debt relief for at least half of the 40
highly indebted countries.... after a highly publicised campaign by aid groups”. Both institutions provided non-governmental organisations,
which were with access to meetings. “But the
fundamental issue - that the voting rights in
these organisations are weighted towards the
rich countries, with the US enjoying a blocking
majority - was not addressed.” (Schifferes 2000)
7. We now turn to the question of the extent
to which the movement reveals more of a resistance or a project identity.
From one perspective the movement appears
to comply most strongly with the notion of a
resistance identity. The description of different
anti-globalisation organisations in this paper
suggests little otherwise. These organisations
certainly have a clear mission and a clear enemy.
They vigorously oppose global capitalism, its
institutions and leaders. Some, like the Black
Bloc, justify violent action to achieve their goals.
Here there is more indication of reactive gestures than constructive engagement or communication with the enemy (Castells). This point
of view is clearly shared by commentators such
as the CSIS and other observers (see 3.3 and
4.1). SANE’s Aart de Lange’s comment on the
Cansa conference stated in 4.4 is a further good
example. This does not mean that the question
is not asked by certain individuals, who might
play an important future role in stimulating this
aspect within the movement (cf. e.g. Naomi
Klein’s suggestions on the Internet and
Zwelinzima Vavi of COSATU’s proposal for an
alternative development strategy in 4.4).
Certain initiatives have also engaged in activities
of a more proactive nature, such as Jubilee 2000
and SANE, the latter searching for alternative
economic models (see 4.2).
From the same perspective the movement as a
whole seems somewhat distant from the growing
theories on alternative economic and social models, some of which we have touched on in this
paper. Its mission for now, at least, is to oppose
and dismantle the institutions of global capitalism, as revealed in names of websites such as
Destroy IMF, and echoed in statements by various
networks and organisations (see 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).
Critics may argue that the achievement of an alternative social order will only become a real possibility when actual alternatives are offered. On the
other hand, and following Castells, such a critique
does not mean that the anti-globalisation movement is not to be valued as of great significance. It
signifies the meaningful sign (Castells) of a global
civil society’s growing discontent with an oppressive capitalist order. Resistance is indeed crucial to
overturning the current order.
Yet, and following Castells, to ask whether the
anti-globalisation movement exhibits resistance
or project identities is to oppose a set of alternatives which are actually related. The scale of participation in the anti-globalisation movement,
like the divergent foci of participating groups
themselves, suggests that the movement as a
whole encompasses both resistance and project
identities simultaneously. For some groups in
the movement, resistance to global capitalism
and its supporting institutions clearly represents
an objective in itself, whether or not an alternative can be defined. Metaphorically, the one
wing of the movement has a more definite
shape, opposing and offering alternatives to that
which is opposed. The other side of the same
movement streams out in more undefined,
resisting forms. In between lie variations that are
more or less articulated.
199
The anti-globalisation movement contradicts
and extends Castells’ theoretical concepts. For
example, resistance identities supposedly defend
God, nation, ethnicity, and locality (Castells
1997: 2). Yet, while the objective of defending
the autonomy of the local appears to ring true
for most participating groups, only those on the
right of the movement would agree that this is
done on behalf of God, nation, or ethnicity.
And, while the centre would rally the nationstate against corporations, the left views the
nation-state as colluding with Big Business and
Big Capital - hence the preference for flat, cooperative structures. Particular groups can be
classified as exhibiting both resistance and project identities, demonstrating that Castells’ ideas
should be viewed as a continuum. Progression
from a resistance identity towards a project
identity, or in the opposite direction, may or
may not be possible along this continuum.
The key challenge to the anti-globalisation
movement now is to develop a stronger project
identity.
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204
Awakening leadership in NGO’s and non-profits
By Dave Yaffey*
T
*The Global Thinking
Group
00 41 78 707 1364
[email protected]
The Global Thinking
Group, UK
26a Albemarle Street
London W1S 1RR
00 44 845 303 0444
info@globalthinkingroup.
com
Transnational Associations
3/2002, 205-207
he leaders of the world are creating more
mess than ever before. They have the power
to make massive changes, for the better, but
their understanding of the deeper causes of the
world’s problems is just not sufficient to achieve
this. Dave Yaffey looks at the leadership crisis,
what’s needed to get us out of the mess and the
place of third sector leadership in the next
decade.
In just the first two years of the new millennium we have witnessed numerous events which
indicate that an increasingly complex set of
problems are facing our world’s leaders. It seems
that their responses to these challenges are reactive, usually fragmented and all too often
designed with self-serving political outcomes in
mind. What we need more of from our leaders
is solution-focused wisdom and long term, integrated approaches. Forget it – let’s go without
them!
If you consider how many NGO’s are operating in the Palestinian territories, for example,
how many different sets of objectives exist, how
many interpretations of the problem there will
be and how many aid agencies are tripping over
each other to bring their solution, you may
realise that we sometimes add to the problem
while intending to solve it. The complexity of
international relations in the Middle East is
undoubtedly great, and this complexity calls for
equally complex ways of thinking about the current problems. Politically aligned thinking is
part of the problem; it’s the “I’m right, so you
must be wrong” thinking of many of the leaders
in the situation that sustain the situation. This is
just one example of how our current leadership
brains are creating more mess, while the purpose
of leadership is to think us towards a healthier
future.
In the contexts of sustainable development,
humanitarian aid and environmental protection, an understanding of what is really going on
is crucial for success. What is really going on is
fuelled by the core drivers of human nature and
the interplay between these and the circumstances of the moment. We are now able to
recognise the deepest components operating in a
situation and from this to map out the consequences of a variety of interventions. These are
the activities of leadership, and while the politi-
cal leaders fail to do it, the leaders of all ‘third
sector’ organisations, have the chance to, and
need to, step into the world leadership vacuum
and deliver some much needed solutions
through more effective organisations. The
empowering of the entire NGO sector is needed, but don’t look to governments for help. The
changes we need will come as NGO’s empower
themselves with new thinking and utilise their
existing resources differently. In the great
scheme of things, while the governmental leaders stall in their evolutionary journey, the leadership of NGO’s and not-for-profits needs to
accelerate. The alternative is unthinkable.
The rough guide to leadership
People gravitate into private companies, public institutions or into NGO’s because of the
personal values they hold, usually unconsciously. The structures, the purposes and rewards are
very different across the three sectors and these
reflect the basic values represented in the three
sectors. The leadership aims and management
styles are also different across the three and this
is something we need to know about because
some cross-fertilisation would be useful. Here’s a
rough guide to the sector values and the leadership focus of each:
NGO’s in the future: achieving
more and more connected
You might look at the table above and see how
some of the private sector values would make a
positive difference in the third sector. It must be
possible to improve the effectiveness of any
NGO or charitable organisation and some of
the improvement methods would come straight
out of the corporate world, performance management for example, or continuous improvement principles. The methods are already available to everyone, what stops them being transferred across the sectors is the core values. While
the purpose and people of the third sector
remain stuck in a liberal and humanitarian values set, not many of the benefits of business-like
thinking will enter in. The leaders of NGO’s are
beginning to realise, however, that the aims and
values of their organisations are not threatened
205
Typical Values
Leadership Focus
Private
Self-oriented, pursuit of more, sales-driven,
excellence, innovation, performance, efficiency, results, achievement, personal energy,
opportunity, change is normal
Reducing costs, competitive advantage,
profit as the bottom line, quick decision
making, power relationships, creating the
future
Public
Service-oriented, maintenance of the system,
procedures, doing the thing right, things
take time, average is normal, admin, hierarchies, unquestioning
Securing the budgets, not rocking the boat,
delivering adequate service, accounting for
everything, steady promotion, enforcing
rules, maintaining the present
NGO’s
present
Others first orientation, equality, fairness,
consensus, people’s feelings, diversity,
humanitarian issues, avoiding conflicts,
intention more important than results
Change the world purpose, finding funding,
influencing the powerful, coping with diversity, agreement and consensus, changing the
present and the future
NGO’s
future
Optimising resources, achieving purpose,
depth understanding, learning, competence,
integrated approaches to the whole, system
sensitive interventions, sustainable healthy
change, interdependency, effectiveness
Big picture views, systemic thinking, placing
the best people in the right place, doing the
right thing, connecting with other organisations, aligning purposes and resources, not
either/or but ‘and’ logic
by private sector values and methods, but
instead the effectiveness of NGO’s can be
enhanced by adopting the methods without the
values from the private sector. Think about
achieving more of your aim, not compromising
the purpose or people, but doing things slightly
differently and achieving more of the purpose of
your organisation.
There is one core value that has to be adopted
from elsewhere in order to gain these potential
benefits – flexibility. An open mind is the prerequisite for these gains. Do what you’ve always
done, and don’t expect different results. The
entrepreneurial spirit that drives much of private
business can also be at home in your organisation. It’s about time that the third sector had its
share of creative, results-oriented, financially
aware individuals trained in business and influencing skills. These types won’t fit in everywhere,
the paradox of the values difference is that you
can’t always cope with what you need most, but
NGO leaders should be looking at ways of
bringing these characteristics inside their organisations. The CEO of an educational trust in the
UK once told me, “It’s easier to be charitable
from a business than to be business-like in a
charity.” I suggest that being business-like in the
206
NGO sector just means optimising the achievement of your goals while staying true to your
principles. It’s the optimisation part of this formula that we need help with, the principles we’re
famous for!
WWW - the shape of things to come
The number of NGO’s and not-for-profit
organisations is growing. We are increasingly
aware of the needs that these organisations work
to meet but the matching of needs with sheer
numbers of groups to help doesn’t necessarily
lead to success in the purposes of sustainable,
worldwide health, poverty reduction, conflict
resolution and the rest. There are the obvious
dangers of duplication of effort, competition for
grant aid, interference of methods on the
ground and destructive ‘rescuer’ jealousies. The
growth of the third sector needs to be looked at
as an evolution in the ways we solve our problems but it also needs to be managed.
From a global perspective, it’s not OK to just
create yet another charitable organisation with a
uniquely defined purpose and set of allegiances.
There is an increasing need to connect some of
these groups, to start aligning to common pur-
poses and optimising the use of collective
resources. This is a healthy integration target;
the global equivalent of the improved organisational effectiveness that we suggested is possible
for internal affairs. As an organogram, the super
structure of these thousands of organisations
might look like a cobweb, a giant filamentous
network covering the globe. At the intersections
of the filaments, a node of activity, a group, a
project, a mission or headquarters. To be really
effective, to beat problems the size of AIDS for
example, the people-oriented and group values
of the third sector need to turned outwards so
that boundaries of all sorts dissolve and the
higher power of the human bond can be
released. This is future think here but the agenda is on the table. Leaders need to think about
organising on the scale that is needed, and in the
ways that are best suited to the situations, to
bring more success in our purposes. Again, flexibility will be an asset, the shape and modus
operandi of the NGO’s of the future will not
remain fixed, they will need to flex and flow
around the givens of complex and changing circumstances in order to achieve.
ways about the consequences of our actions, use of
resources, our relationships with each other and
the planet will become the norm in the leadership
brains of the future. The focus for leaders has to
shift to the fourfold bottom line of purpose, profit, people and planet. Again, the alternative is
unthinkable, but there are ways to get there.
The minds of leaders have to evolve in order
to fulfil the purpose of leadership, namely, solving the problems of today and preparing organisations for the problems of tomorrow. There is
no end state, no final utopia where all problems
are solved. Instead we are all engaged in an evolutionary journey in which the complexity of
our problems increases at each turn. As we solve
one set of problems the next set emerges. In
order not to be overwhelmed by our problems,
we need to evolve our problem solving capacities
and this means the development of new ways of
thinking. In today’s political climate, the problems we face have very serious consequences,
like war, millions of migrants, starvation, ecological devastation and continuing poverty for
the majority of the world’s inhabitants. These
issues are misleadingly separated by our descriptions of geography, race, budget headings and
grant aid rules. They are all connected at a deeper level and we are all dealing with something
more fundamental than we fully understand.
The value dynamics of what is really going on in
the world is what future leaders need to understand if they are to support progress towards a
healthier planet. Nothing less will be sufficient
as the complexity and interconnectedness of all
our problems and solutions grows to overwhelm
us. There are ways of understanding the deeper
dynamics of what’s going on and ways of evolving our leadership thinking.
Connecting complexities through
leadership
The value dynamics within an organisation are
not the only thing the NGO leader has to consider. There is widespread acceptance now that ‘everything is connected to everything else.’ This cliché
represents the systemic nature of problems and
solutions over time and ‘systems thinking’ is as
much in vogue in corporate boardrooms and governments think-tanks as in university ivory towers.
Thinking with the bigger picture and in complex
207
Civil society’s
big challenge is ending impunity
by Paul Sanders*
T
*This paper is derived
from the researches at the
Kenya Human Rights
Commission, several
human rights scholars and
international human rights
organisations including
Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch. It
previously appeared in
Chemchemi, March 2002,
The Active Non-Violence
Movement in Kenya.
Transnational Associations
3/2002, 208-212
hough criminal trials for human rights violations can be conducted by individual
countries, it can also be done through an
international criminal court like was the case in
Nuremberg, Tokyo, Rwanda and Yugoslavia.
International courts better convey the notion
that mass human rights abuses will not be tolerated by the international community.
There is no doubt that the question of
impunity is of great concern in Kenya today. Yet
this is not a problem that is characteristically
Kenyan. History is replete with examples where
violators of human rights are not apprehended,
a fact that has brought to the fore the issue of
criminal accountability.
Achieving criminal accountability for gross
human rights violations can provide justice to
the victims and deter future violations. The
world is now becoming intolerant to gross
human rights violations. Over the past two
decades, criminal trials have been instituted
against leaders suspected of gross human rights
violations. Former Yugoslavia’s Slobodan
Milosevic, notwithstanding the questions raised,
and Chad’s Hussein Habre are classic examples.
The international community, on its part, has
displayed solidarity in censuring tyrannical governments, to the extend of occasionally imposing
economic sanctions. Truth Commissions are also
becoming increasingly popular in the healing and
reconciliation process following gross human
rights violations. Equally significant is the role
played by the civil society in the fight against
impunity. Under civil society leadership, the citizens of the Philippines, Yugoslavia and Poland, for
example, have engaged in peaceful mass action,
successfully dethroning dictatorial regimes.
Though criminal trials for human rights violations can be conducted by individual countries,
it can also be done through an international
criminal court like was the case in Nuremberg,
Tokyo, Rwanda and Yugoslavia. International
courts better convey the notion that mass
human rights abuses will not be tolerated by the
international community.
The advantage of an international court is that
it is more impartial and less punitive than
domestic courts. Also important is the notion
derived from the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war
criminals that not only governments but also
208
individuals can be liable under international law
in the case of massive human rights violations.
Finally, in the event that the perpetrators of the
atrocities flee the nation in which they have
committed abuses, it is easier for an international court to obtain physical custody and extradition than it is for a national court.
The Nuremberg Trials were significant
because they broadened the scope of international criminal law by imposing criminal sanctions for the German government’s treatment of
its own citizens during the dark years of the
Second World War. The Allied powers won
jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals on several
grounds. First, an international court was able
to punish crimes against humanity because the
nature of the conduct essentially offended
humanity itself. In this case, natural law transcended municipal law and the Allies used this
argument to dismiss accusations of the victor’s
justice.
The trials were not without criticisms,
though. Although the Nuremberg and Tokyo
war-crimes trials set important precedents in
international human rights law, little and often
ineffective effort has been made to address the
foundational problems that lead to atrocities
such as genocide. Indeed, the chairman of the
Kenya Human Rights Commission, Prof.
Makau Mutua contends that it is doubtful that
even a permanent international criminal court
would deter and serve as an effective forum for
the punishment of offenders given the large
scale of abuses and the reluctance of individual
states to punish offenders.
He further asserts that addressing large-scale
human rights atrocities must remain at the
national level. He concedes that an international court would lend credibility to the criminalisation of internal atrocities, but explains that the
various hatred - racial, religious, and gender cannot be isolated in an international courtroom.
However, one must note that the modern-day
International Criminal Tribunals of Rwanda and
Yugoslavia can be seen as an improvement over
Nuremberg and Tokyo in that international tribunals are no longer perceived as a prosecution
of the losers by the winners, but a legitimate
international exercise with its staff supplied by
nations not party to the criminal activity.
That notwithstanding, both the Rwandan and
Yugoslavian tribunals have been subjected to
some criticisms. The purpose of both the
Rwandan and Yugoslavian tribunals was to end
serious crimes such as genocide and to take measures against the culprits. According to Prof.
Mutua, these goals are unrealistic and the UN
tribunals will have little or no effect in addressing human rights violations of this magnitude.
He contends that the purpose and design of
these tribunals are to deflect responsibility from
the western nations concerning the atrocities
and to ease the conscience of the nations that
were unwilling to stop genocide in Rwanda and
Yugoslav even though they had the knowledge
and means. He further ontends that atrocities
must be addressed at the national level and an
international criminal tribunal may only be
effective as part of a broader comprehensive
solution that addresses the foundational problems that led to the genocide in the first place.
It suffices to look at the Ethiopian example for
illustrative purposes. In 1991 the bloody
Dergue regime of Haile Mariam Mengistu was
deposed by the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).
The following year, the new government of
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi established the
Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) to investigate
and prosecute those responsible for the widespread human rights abuses that were perpetrated by the Dergue. Although the government
used some foreign help, it mostly used its own
laws and its own judicial system. The charges for
atrocities were brought under the penal code
enacted by Emperor Haile Selassie in 1957.
Girma Wakjiri, the Special Prosecutor said “We
are using our national law, national courts, prosecutors and defence lawyers for all the cases.
This process is the basis for an established
sequence of state accountability.”
However, the trials of the top 72 ranking
Dergue officials including Mengistu, (who fled
to Zimbabwe) for crimes against humanity were
still pending by late 1999. For the majority of
those detained, it was not until 1997 that the
SPO formally charged them with criminal
offences. In 1997, a total of 5,198 were charged,
2,246 of which were already in detention. Many
defendants, including Mengistu, were charged in
absentia. Most defendants were charged with
genocide and war crimes (which is very difficult
to prove as genocide means attempting to eliminate a certain group, not just the murder of large
numbers of people), or in the alternative aggravated homicide with wilful injury. An Ethiopian
Judiciary crisis left the court with a backlog of
thousands of cases, resulting in long delays and
many efendants were in pre-trial detention for
six years before being brought to court.
The SPO subdivided the defendants into
three categories based upon responsibility: First
were the policy and decision-markers; second
were the intermediaries who relayed orders, but
made some decisions on their own; and the
third lot were those directly involved in committing the crimes. The SPO structured the
prosecutions by committee; there was no special
tribunal hearing the Dergue cases and it prosecuted the perpetrators in the regions in which
they committed the crimes.
Human Rights Watch raised concerns about
the way the SPO was conducting the trials, citing delays, execution sentences in absentia and
lack of due process. Mengistu still hides in
Zimbabwe under the protection of President
Mugabe; although a formal request for his extradition has been made. He is now wanted in
Ethiopia for the murder of over 200,000 people.
The South African case ushered in a new way of
handling human rights abuses, the Truth
Commissions. By definition, Truth Commissions
are bodies established to investigate past human
rights violations in a given country, which may
include investigations of the government, military, or opposition forces. Some truth inquiries
have been extremely successful in obtaining a full
and fair account of a long -silenced history of
abuse and in some cases, such inquiries have had
a positive effect on the societies in which the
abuse has occurred. However, some have been
unsuccessful and extremely limited in their quest
to bring out a fair account of the past.
Contemporary human rights discourse
demands that the truth commission contain the
following four elements. First, it must focus on
the past and not the present or future. Second, it
endeavours to paint an overall picture of human
rights abuse over period of time as opposed to a
specific event. Third, it usually exists temporari209
ly for a pre-determined period of time and ends
with a submission of a report of its findings.
Fourth, the sponsor of the commission must
vest authority within it so that it is able to gain
Ending Impunity: The Challenge That Faces
Civil Society From page 7 late sensitive subjects,
and have a greater impact with its submission.
There have been many instances of NGO’s conducting truth commission-like functions, without the authority of a sponsor. These endeavours
have often been instrumental in providing alternative forms of documentation that have also
been influential.
Usually truth commissions are established at a
time of political transition with the purpose of
exposing past human rights abuses and promoting national reconciliation. A truth commission
is different from an ordinary legal system in that
it does not necessarily lead to prosecution and
conviction.
Due to its usually narrow mandate, the decision on whether to prosecute violators is normally political and thus out of the commission’s
sphere, even though it may recommend prosecution. The only exception was the 1983
Argentina Commission that produced a significant amount of information, which was later
used to prosecute violators. In this case, “the two
processes complemented each other.”
The purpose of a truth commission is to
establish an accurate record of past violations
thus safeguarding history, and allowing society
to learn from its past mistakes and avoid repetition. Many times the affected population is clear
on what violations occurred and exactly who
carried them out. Therefore, truth commissions
are most helpful in acknowledging the truth.
Official acknowledgement of abuse is often
necessary in order to begin the healing process.
It can also provide a forum for victims and their
families to tell their stories, which becomes part
of the official record; thus obtaining a degree of
societal acknowledgement. The truth commission can also open room for compensation of
the victims.
An aspect unique to truth commissions unobtainable by criminal courts is a thorough analysis of the broad context in which atrocities
occurred. The structure of the government, its
security forces, and the cultural practices that
210
led to a pattern of violations can be documented and contextualised. In addition, unlike criminal tribunals, which may take years to get a
conviction, a truth commission can be organised and undertaken promptly.
In the alternative, when a government is
under enormous international pressure it might
set up a corrupt truth commission in order to
manipulate public perception by creating a
more favourable view of its human rights policy.
In addition, because a commission only investigates the past, a new government may not be
subject to the commission’s mandate, thus continuing human rights abuse unabated. For
example, Idi Amin Dada in Uganda set up a
commission in 1974 under international pressure, but disregarded its report and continued
with abuse. In Chad, the government was
accused of using the commission in order to
whitewash its own abuses.
Although it is not assured, the primary intent
of a truth commission is to lessen the likelihood
of future human rights abuses. A truth commission can also contribute to future prosperity by
making recommendations for reform based
upon its findings. Only that, usually, it is not
mandatory that these recommendations be
implemented, but it provides the capacity for
the international community and civilian population to lobby for future change.
There is debate as to whether truth commissions promote national reconciliation or
whether they merely create resentment and
exacerbate old wounds. The truth is that no
truth commission yet has worsened a situation.
Even with extremely explicit reports, the impact
of truth commissions has been quite positive;
increasing national reconciliation, as well as
encouraging respect for human rights issues
among the general population and political
leaders.
Truth commissions are inherently limited by
political considerations. For instance a commission’s structure, sponsorship, mandate, support,
the sensitivity of issues, and the impact of the
final report can all be negatively influenced by
political forces during its creation. There can be
many challenges facing truth commissions
including a weak civilian government and a
strong defiant military; an uncooperative gov-
ernment only beginning to move toward
democracy; ethnic populations threatening to
move toward violence; or a timid population too
intimidated by the government to testify about
human rights abuses.
Again, the work of the commission is often
closely scrutinised, and can be discredited by
very powerful interested parties who have a
stake in the outcome. Therefore it is important
to have an organised opposition force or human
rights activist coalition in order to support and
encourage the commission and combat some of
the limitations.
But a key weakness is normally its mandate.
The terms of reference, often set up by an executive decree, define investigative powers including defining the exact abuses and individual perpetrators a commission can reach; the timeline
and geographic scope of its mandate; and when
and to whom the final submission will be submitted. Also terms of reference may specify
exactly what kinds of recommendations can be
made, as well as whether or not names of perpetrators can be included. Agreeing upon a mandate is an integral part of the entire process that
may determine whether or not a truth commission will be successful.
The terms of reference must be adequately
broad in order to expose the entire scope of
human rights abuse. For example, the El
Salvador Commission was able to investigate
“serious acts of violence,” left to be interpreted
by the commission itself. Having such broad
guidelines made for a more successful commission. On the other hand, the Uruguayan
Commission was designed only to investigate
disappearances. As a result, it was unable to
expose instance of illegal detention and torture,
which constituted the majority of abuse that
occurred.
Rarely does the public have say in the terms of
reference of a truth commission, though this is
against the position favoured by most human
rights groups. And, still, the commissioners may
be forced to impose severe limitations upon themselves. This may be as a result of time constraints,
limited resources, lack of access to integral information or the avoidance of certain sensitive.
In order to be successful, a commission must
be formed with the aim of making it impartial.
It must operate independent of any political
ambitions, and have unobstructed access to all
relevant information in order to conduct an
investigation as fully as it finds necessary. It
must be implemented as shortly after the end of
the conflict or political transition as possible,
and only for a limited amount of time.
While the time period may be extended based
upon prior agreements, it must never be openended otherwise resolutions may never come.
Included in its mandate should be the power to
make recommendations that will be given serious considerations. If possible it is favourable for
the government in question to agree to mandatory implementation of the commission’s findings like in the case of the El Salvador commission. The final report should be published
immediately and made accessible to the public.
At this stage, the story of the fight against
impunity in Uruguay is key because it is a good
example of civil society taking up the challenge
where politicians have failed. A long and brutal
military dictatorship in Uruguay, wrought with
widespread human rights abuse, came to an end
in 1984 largely due to the efforts of civil society.
With the return of democracy came the return
of political parties who negotiated a transition
settlement with the military called the Pact of
the Naval Club. It concluded that there would
be no punishment of human rights violators.
This point marked a shift of initiative from civil
society to the political parties. It turned out that
the new regime was not willing to honour the
commitments made, where human rights
groups accepted a generic statement to the effect
that the new government would see that all previous crime committed would be investigated
and judged, vetoing the legislation adopted by
the National assembly. As the human rights
movement grew, so too did its demand for truth
and justice for all crimes against humanity.
A debate emerged as to which philosophy best
suited Uruguay. The official discourse asserted
that the past should be forgotten in order to
pacify the nation. It also emphasised the threat
of destabilisation of the new democratic institutions in order to insure that the repetition of
abuse would never occur again.
Eventually the government submitted legislation based upon the pact that prosecution for
211
crimes committed by the military or police personnel prior to 1985 had expired. This absolved
all human rights violators who committed crime
throughout the dictatorship. The bill passed in
both chambers.
Fortunately, the Uruguay Constitution contained a form of direct democracy whereby the
signatures of 25% of the nation’s registered citizens could submit a law to a popular referendum. It was decided that the Commission
Nacional Pro Referendum (CNR) (which was
the group intended to organise the referendum
campaign) would have a broad leadership with
representation from the social and political spectrum. In addition, it would be a highly organised and regulated structure, an entity “constituted, independent of any political party interests by persons representative of the various sectors of national activity, led only by their free
civic conscience.”
The popular reaction was fast and enthusiastic. Hundreds of committees were organised
within Uruguay and abroad. The CNR designed
its signature campaign to appeal to Uruguayans’
sense of democratic responsibility, as opposed to
bringing to justice those accused of committing
212
human rights violations. After a year, through
arduous means of dissemination, and despite
the lack of support from the mass media, the cochairs of CNR managed to gather over 630,000
signatures, more than the 500,000 signatures
required by the constitution.
The verification process administered by the
electoral court was wrought with obstacles and
obstructions to validating the signatures. A
problem arose that the electoral court needed
36,000 people to reaffirm their decision under
nearly impossible conditions. Again, against
heavy pressure from the military, the CNR
accomplished a major feat by mobilising thousands of people to ensure that the decisions in
question were reaffirmed.
Finally, it was announced that the signatures
were valid, and a referendum would occur. In
campaigning for the referendum, the CNR
opted for a democracy if the law did not pass. In
April 1989, 57% voted to pass the law on
expiry, and 42.5% voted to derogate it.
Intimidation and warning of dire consequences
wore out. Although the Law of Expiry passed,
NGO’s and civil society of Uruguay accomplished an enormous organisational feat.
Document
Droits économiques, sociaux et culturels
Le document qui suit est la déclaration écrite présentée conjointement par le Center Europe-Tiers
monde, l’Association américaine de juristes, le Centro de Estudios Europeos, la Commission pour la
défense des droits humains en Amérique centrale, la Confédération mondiale du travail, le Conseil
mondial de la paix, France libertés : Fondation Danielle Mitterrand, International Educational
Developement, la Ligue internationale des femmes pour la paix et la liberté, la Ligue internationale
pour les droits et la libération des peuples, le Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les
peuples, le Mouvement indien «Tupaj Amaru», l’Union des juristes arabes, ONG dotées du statut
consultatif, à la Sous-commission des droits de l’homme des Nations unies le 5 juillet 2002. Cette
déclaration prétend apporter un éclairage sur les activités et les méthodes de travail des sociétés transnationales. Y sont abordés la définition juridique des sociétés transnationales et le rôle des Etats, dans
le contexte de l’imbrication croissante entre le pouvoir économique et le pouvoir politique et des
confusions qu’elle risque de susciter entre les deux pouvoirs. Elle se conclut sur des propositions et
recommandations pour responsabiliser les sociétés transnationales en matière de droits de l’homme.
Les sociétés transnationales et les
droits de l'homme
dans d’autres organismes internationaux ou par
des moyens politiques, militaires et autres).
5. L’activité réellement productive est parfois
déléguée à des sous-traitants alors que la société
transnationale se réserve le « know how », la
marque et le « marketing ». Leurs activités
embrassent différents territoires nationaux. Elles
changent rapidement et fréquemment de lieu
d’implantation en fonction de leur stratégie
basée sur l’objectif du bénéfice maximum.
6. Le caractère transnational de leurs activités
leur permet d’éluder les lois et les réglementations nationales et internationales qu’elles considèrent comme défavorables à leurs intérêts. Les
sociétés transnationales s’adonnent aussi à des
activités illicites et/ou dans une zone grise entre
légalité et illégalité.
7. Les sociétés transnationales bénéficient dans
toutes ces activités du soutien actif et serviable
des gouvernements d’une poignée de pays riches
qui représentent et partagent leurs intérêts.
B. Effets des méthodes de travail et des activités des sociétés transnationales
8. Les méthodes de travail et activités des
sociétés transnationales sont déterminées par un
objectif fondamental : l’obtention d’un profit
maximum en un minimum de temps. Cet
objectif fondamental n’admet aucun obstacle et,
pour l’atteindre, les sociétés transnationales, surtout les plus grandes, n’excluent aucun moyen :
a) la promotion de guerres d’agression et de
conflits interethniques pour contrôler les ressources naturelles - particulièrement les réserves
énergétiques et les minerais stratégiques - de la
planète et pour favoriser l’expansion et les bénéfices de l’industrie militaire ;
Effets des activités et des méthodes de travail
des sociétés transnationales sur les droits de
l’homme
Associations transnationales
3/2002, 213-216
A. Que sont les sociétés transnationales ?
1. Les sociétés transnationales sont des personnes juridiques de droit privé avec une
implantation territoriale multiple mais un
centre de décision unique.
2. Les sociétés transnationales sont actives
dans la production et les services - pratiquement
dans toutes les sphères de l’activité humaine - et
également dans la spéculation financière.
3. La masse énorme de capital qu’elles concentrent leur confère un pouvoir sans précédent
dans l’histoire. Le chiffre d’affaires des plus
grandes sociétés transnationales est équivalent
ou supérieur au PIB de nombreux pays et celui
d’une demi-douzaine d’entre elles est supérieur
aux PIB des 100 pays les plus pauvres réunis.
4. Elles peuvent fonctionner avec une société
mère et des filiales, constituer des groupes au
sein d’un même secteur d’activité, des conglomérats ou coalitions ayant des activités diverses,
s’unifier par le biais de fusions ou d’absorptions
ou encore constituer des ensembles financiers
(holdings). Ces derniers possèdent seulement un
capital financier en actions avec lequel ils
contrôlent des entreprises ou groupes d’entreprises. On peut toujours identifier la nationalité
de la société transnationale dans le sens où il y a
un Etat qui la soutient et qui défend ses intérêts
(à l’OMC, au FMI, à la Banque Mondiale et
213
b) la violation des droits du travail et des
droits de l’homme en général ;
c) la dégradation de l’environnement (y compris de l’atmosphère, de l’eau et des sols) et en
particulier l’opposition active et financée par la
Global Climate Coalition, composée entre
autres de Ford, General Motors, Mobil et Union
Carbide, avec l’aide du gouvernement des EtatsUnis, à toute réglementation des émissions de
gaz à effet de serre (au Protocole de Kyoto par
exemple);
d) la corruption de fonctionnaires pour s’emparer des services publics essentiels par le biais
de privatisations frauduleuses et préjudiciables
aux droits des usagers actuels et potentiels, particulièrement des moins fortunés (par exemple
l’approvisionnement en eau potable);
e) l’appropriation - qu’elle soit formellement
légale ou illégale - des connaissances ancestrales,
techniques et scientifiques qui sont par nature
sociales ;
f ) la corruption des élites politiques et intellectuelles ainsi que des dirigeants de la « société
civile »;
g) la monopolisation des principaux moyens
de communication, transmetteurs de l’idéologie
dominante et des produits culturels de masse, ce
qui leur permet de manipuler et de conditionner
l’opinion publique ainsi que les habitudes et
comportements des gens ;
h) le financement de coups d’Etat, de dictatures et d’autres activités criminelles.
9. De telles méthodes sont en contradiction
avec le respect des droits de l’homme en général,
y compris le droit à l’autodétermination des
peuples et le droit au développement.
C. Confusion entre pouvoir économique et
pouvoir politique
10. On constate, dans les dernières décennies,
un processus d’imbrication croissante entre le
pouvoir économique et le pouvoir politique, qui
mène à la confusion voire à la fusion des deux
pouvoirs. Ce processus est en traind’éroder jusqu’aux aspects formels de la démocratie représentative et au rôle des institutions politiques,
tant nationales qu’internationales, en tant que
médiateurs - ou supposés médiateurs - entre
intérêts différents ou contradictoires. 11. Le cas
exemplaire de cette relation entre pouvoir économique et pouvoir politique est celui des Etats214
Unis, où la majorité des plus grandes sociétés
transnationales du monde ont leur siège principal et où plusieurs d’entre elles sont directement
représentées dans le gouvernement actuel.
12. Cette confusion entre pouvoir politique et
pouvoir économique se manifeste également aux
Nations Unies par le biais du « Global Compact »
et dans l’Union européenne par la collaboration
étroite entre la Commission européenne (qui
émet des directives qui dépassent ses attributions)
et de la Table Ronde des Industriels Européens
(ERT), composée entre autres des sociétés transnationales Volvo, Olivetti, Siemens, Unilever.
Recommandations et propositions pour
responsabiliser les sociétés transnationales
13. Dans un Etat de droit, les sociétés transnationales, comme toutes les personnes, sont
responsables tant civilement que pénalement en
cas de violation des normes en vigueur (aussi
bien des normes internationales, dont les principales sont applicables en droit interne, que des
normes nationales).
14. Les codes de conduite volontaires ne peuvent se substituer aux normes édictées par les
organismes étatiques nationaux et les organismes interétatiques internationaux. Les codes
de conduite volontaires ne sont pas de véritables
normes juridiques, obligatoires et dont le nonrespect entraîne une sanction.
15. En outre, l’expérience et les études réalisées
indiquent que les codes volontaires sont incomplets, que leur application est aléatoire parce
qu’elle est laissée à la discrétion de l’entreprise et
qu’il n’existe pas de véritable contrôle extérieur
indépendant. Par exemple, une entreprise de
consulting mandatée par la société transnationale elle-même, c’est-à-dire payée par elle, ne
constitue pas un contrôle extérieur indépendant.
16. Il est donc nécessaire de proposer des solutions
pour l’encadrement juridique des sociétés transnationales qui partent de certaines prémisses de base:
a) Les communautés nationales et la communauté internationale sont régies par des normes
juridiques qui forment la base d’un Etat de
droit. Il est « essentiel que les droits de l’homme
soient protégés par un régime de droit…
(Préambule de la Déclaration universelle des
droits de l’homme).
b) Ces normes juridiques sont obligatoires
pour les personnes physiques et morales et leur
violation entraîne une sanction pour celui qui
les a enfreintes.
c) Les sociétés transnationales sont des personnes juridiques et, en tant que telles, sujets et
objets de droit. Les normes juridiques en
vigueur sont donc obligatoires pour les sociétés
transnationales, comme pour toute personne
physique ou morale. L’égalité de toutes les personnes devant la loi est clairement établie dans la
Charte internationale des droits de l’homme
(Déclaration universelle et Pactes internationaux
des droits civils et politiques et des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels).
17. Dans l’application de ces normes, on doit
partir du principe que les droits de l’homme sont
au sommet de la pyramide normative, c’est-à-dire
qu’ils ont la priorité et prévalent sur les autres
droits, comme celui de la propriété intellectuelle.
18. Les normes existantes devraient être complétées sur les plans national et international :
a) En rappelant la notion de service public,
particulièrement en matière de santé, d’alimentation (y compris l’eau potable), d’éducation, de
logement, de communication et d’information
sous toutes ses formes et supports, en prévenant
et empêchant la formation d’oligopoles et de
monopoles privés dans ces sphères.
b) En renforçant les mécanismes d’application
des instruments spécifiques se référant aux sociétés transnationales, comme la Déclaration de
Principes Tripartite sur les Entreprises
Transnationales et la Politique Sociale adoptée
par le Conseil d’Administration de l’OIT en
1977 (qui, dans son amendement de novembre
2000, se réfère à 30 Conventions et 35
Recommandations de l’OIT) et les Directives de
l’OCDE (texte révisé en juin 2000) , bien
qu’elles ne fassent qu’adresser des recommandations aux entreprises.
c) En établissant des codes de conduite obligatoires pour les sociétés transnationales, comme
l’ont réclamé dans la Déclaration et le
Programme d’Action du Forum du Millenium
(Nations Unies, New-York, 26 mai 2000, point 2
de la Section A de la Déclaration) plus de 1000
organisations non gouvernementales de 100 pays.
Ces codes de conduite devraient inclure la question du transfert de technologie.
d) Les Etats qui ne l’ont pas encore fait
devraient incorporer à leur législation la responsabilité pénale des personnes juridiques.
e) Il n’existe pas de juridiction pénale internationale compétente pour juger les personnes
juridiques privées. Le Statut de la Cour pénale
internationale, adopté à Rome et en vigueur à
partir du 1er juillet 2002, ne prévoit pas le jugement des personnes juridiques ni des délits
contre les droits économiques, sociaux et culturels. Pour l’heure, il n’y a pas pour autant à écarter la possibilité d’utiliser cette Cour pour informer le procureur (les particuliers ne peuvent pas
dénoncer et encore moins porter plainte devant
cette Cour) des violations des droits humains
commises par les sociétés transnationales afin
que celui-ci décide d’inculper les responsables. Il
conviendrait cependant de promouvoir la réforme du Statut de la Cour pénale internationale
afin d’y inclure les délits contre les droits économiques, sociaux et culturels et la responsabilité
pénale des personnes juridiques privées.
f ) Pour le moment, les tribunaux nationaux
sont les seuls qui peuvent recevoir des plaintes et
des demandes contre les sociétés transnationales
et leurs dirigeants, avec l’ampleur permise
aujourd’hui par l’application croissante du principe de juridiction universelle.
g) Il y a aujourd’hui de nombreux procès en
cours contre des sociétés transnationales et leurs
dirigeants responsables, devant différentes juridictions nationales, pour des violations de plusieurs catégories de droits de l’homme : dommages à l'environnement, violations du droit du
travail, complicité dans la persécution et l’assassinat d'activistes syndicaux, crimes contre l'humanité, etc. Parmi les entreprises en cause il y a
plusieurs partenaires du « Global Compact ».
h) Finalement, on devrait étudier la possibilité de créer un tribunal international pour les
sociétés transnationales, sur le modèle du
Tribunal International du Droit de la Mer, établi par la Convention sur le Droit de la Mer
(Montego Bay, décembre 1982).
Responabilité des Etats
19. Le droit au développement et à la jouissance progressive des droits économiques,
sociaux et culturels comportent l’obligation,
215
pour les Etats, de faire le maximum d’efforts
pour promouvoir le progrès économique, social
et culturel de leurs peuples.
20. Les Etats ont, en matière de droits économiques, sociaux et culturels ainsi qu’en matière
de droit au développement, non seulement des
obligations envers leurs propres peuples mais
aussi, en tant que membres de la communauté
internationale, envers les autres Etats et l’humanité en général. Il s’agit de droits appelés « droits
de la solidarité » (art. 1, al. 1 de la Charte des
Nations Unies, art. 22 de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, art. 2 du Pacte
international relatif aux droits économiques,
sociaux et culturels, Déclaration sur le droit au
développement, - particulièrement ses articles 2
à 6 -, etc).
21. Les Etats sont également responsables,
quand ils ont manqué à leur devoir de vigilance,
des violations (sur leur propre territoire ou
216
transfrontalières) commises par des particuliers
(y compris les sociétés transnationales) qui se
trouvent sous leur juridiction, comme l’ont établi des sentences arbitrales et de nombreuses
Conventions internationales, en particulier
celles relatives à la préservation de l’environnement.
22. Les Etats sont internationalement responsables de l’application des normes internationales fondamentales dans leur droit interne.
23. Pour remplir leurs obligations, les Etats
ont le droit et le devoir de protéger et de garantir le droit de leurs peuples à disposer librement
de leurs richesses et ressources naturelles et ils
doivent faire en sorte que leurs peuples ne soient
pas privés de leurs moyens de subsistance (article
1, paragraphe 2 des Pactes internationaux relatifs aux droits civils et politiques et aux droits
économiques, sociaux et culturels et de la
Déclaration sur le droit au développement).
Document
Involvement of civil society organizations other
than NGOs and the private sector in technical
cooperation activities: experiences and prospects
of the United Nations system*
D
*Summary of a report
prepared by Francesco
Mezzalama, Joint
Inspection Unit, United
Nations, Geneva, February
2002.
uring the past several years, due to the
increasing role of Civil Society
Organizations (CSOs) in the technical
cooperation activities of the United Nations system, Member States have repeatedly called for the
development of a policy framework and an appropriate mechanism at the regional and national
level for collaborating with CSOs, in order to
enhance their involvement and participation.
Member States also came out strongly and advocated through Agenda 21 the need for new forms
of participation in support of a common effort for
sustainable development. In addition, other developments such as the globalization of trade, the
progress of democratization and good governance,
the advance of communication technologies, the
request for a clear recognition of economic and
social rights and entitlements, the eradication of
poverty, just to mention a few topical issues, have
opened the way to a more active presence of Civil
Society.
The growing awareness of Member States of
these new realities, compounded by the recognition of the United Nations system organizations,
has brought to light the important contribution
being made by CSOs in an effort by the system
to build up the capacity of developing countries.
This scenario underlines the emergence of Civil
Society as a powerful actor on the national and
international scene and highlights the need to
face this factor with different approaches, proposals and solutions, based on a meaningful tripartite cooperation of governments, United
Nations system organizations and CSOs.
The report focuses on this new evolution of
partnership, the opportunities it offers for a forward-looking approach, the obstacles involved
in the process and how to handle them. After
the introduction to the report, chapter I
attempts to define the notion of Civil Society
and CSOs vis-à-vis the other non-State actors,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
the private sector, by demonstrating the specificity and capabilities of CSOs. Apart from the
private sector, until recently there has been a
tendency to identify CSOs with NGOs while
distinct typologies are emerging within the former which deserve separate definition and consideration, hence an approach of their own. The
report endeavours to clarify the existing haze
between the two organizations.
In chapter II, the report concentrates on the
relationship of CSOs with the United Nations
system organizations at the operational level. It
examines the existing ways and means for cooperation which need to be revisited and perfected
in order to recognize that CSOs are not only the
end beneficiaries of social and economic projects, but have become increasingly identified as
partners and players along the process of design,
implementation and evaluation of technical
cooperation programmes as well as in implementing rehabilitation projects in post-conflict
situations. If this assessment is correct–and consensus was expressed to the Inspector in his
round of contacts–the United Nations needs to
be better equipped conceptually and operationally, and to develop its outreach strategies to
involve CSOs. It is also particularly important
that the relevant legislative organs provide policy
guidance and that secretariats establish directives and a flexible ad hoc framework in order to
give the process an appropriate momentum.
Chapter III explores the role of CSOs in capacity-building, taking into account the tripartite
nature of the cooperation (governments/United
Nations system organizations/CSOs) by clarifying
the role to be assumed by each party in order to
promote and strengthen collaboration and further
enhance the effectiveness of technical cooperation.
Against this background, the following conclusions
and recommendations are introduced.
Transnational Associations
3/2002, 217
217
La contribution de l’observatoire européen des
phénomènes racistes et xénophobes, à la
promotion du caractère multiculturel des sociétés
européennes
par Petros N. Stangos*
*Professeur – Chaire Jean
Monnet, Faculté de droit,
Université Aristote de
Thessaloniki (Grèce)
Vice-président du Conseil
d’administration de
l’Observatoire Européen
des phénomènes racistes et
xénophobes (Vienne)
Associations transnationales
3/2002, 218-220
1. L’Observatoire Européen des phénomènes
racistes et xénophobes (EUMC), est un organe
independant de l’Union Européenne, créé en
1997 par le règlement du Conseil no. 1035/97.
Son siège est à Vienne. L’EUMC est
devenu « opérationnel » à partir de 1999.
La « raison d’être » de l’EUMC, repose sur la
conviction de ses « fondateurs », de son personnel et de son organe directeur que l’avenir de
l’Europe se fonde sur la diversité culturelle, ethnique et religieuse. Le racisme, la xénophobie et
l’antisémitisme sont autant de phénomènes qui
s’opposent diamétralement à ces principes. Ils
constituent de menaces, qu’il appartient à tous
de combattre dans toute l’Europe. Par ailleurs,
l’Union Européenne considère que l’une de ses
missions est d’élaborer des mesures concrètes de
lutte contre ces tendances, en définissant une
stratégie globale. Telle est la mission confiée à
l’EUMC, qui « observe » l’ampleur et le développement des phénomènes racistes, xénophobes et antisémites dans l’Union et soumet
aux institutions communautaires et aux Etats
membres des informations objectives, fiables et
comparables, y compris des analyses de leurs
causes, conséquences et effets, exemples de
bonnes pratiques et propositions de mesures
spécifiques à prendre ; ces informations sont
recueillies sur la base de données fournies par un
réseau d’ONG, nommé « RAXEN », qui sont en
coopération avec l’EUMC, ainsi que sur la base
de recherches scientifiques et empiriques,
menées sous les auspices de l’Observatoire.
2. Au cours de trois premières années de son
existence, L’EUMC a lancé plusieurs projets de
recherche, parmi lesquels figurent ceux qui portent, par excellence, sur la reconnaissance et la
promotion du caractère multiculturel des sociétés européennes.
Il en est ainsi, en premier lieu, du projet qui
porte sur le racisme et la diversité culturelle dans
les médias. Les médias sont considérés comme
l’agent exerçant la plus grande influence
218
sur l’opinion publique. Leur attitude envers ce
qu’ils observent, ignorent ou marginalisent est
reconnue comme ayant une incidence décisive.
Les médias peuvent prendre des initiatives en
vue de promouvoir la diversité culturelle. De
même qu’involontairement, ils peuvent apporter
leur soutien à une opinion publique raciste, soit
en devenant un forum de discussion public pour
l’extrême-droite soit en prenant pour thèmes de
discussion les immigrés et minorités en tant que
« problèmes de société ».
Le projet lancé par l’EUMC en l’année 2000,
s’est concentré sur les résultats de recherches
menées sur les médias pendant la période 19952000. Il a été réalisé par le Contre de Recherche
Européenne sur la Migration et les Relations
Ethniques de l’Université d’Utrecht. Son objectif consistait à décrire le type de recherche
médiatique effectué en ce qui concerne le racisme, l’antiracisme et le multiculturalisme, ainsi
que leurs principaux résultats.
Pendant l’année en cours, un atelier sera fondé
par l’EUMC sur la base des résultats obtenus par
le projet sus-mentionné, afin de développer des
stratégies de mise en oeuvre de bonnes pratiques, d’établir un dialogue interculturel entre
les chercheurs, les scientifiques et les médias et
de développer des stratégies de formation pour
les étudiants en journalisme et médias.
D’autre part, au cours de l’année 2000,
l’EUMC a commandé une étude sur les initiatives concernant la compétence interculturelle.
L’étude a été effectuée par la Maison d’Anne
Frank à Amsterdam. Elle comprend une sélection de projets et d’initiatives dans le domaine
de la formation interculturelle. Elle englobe un
guide de références pour les enseignants, les éducateurs et le public, permettant d’accéder aux
documents et aux sites web concernés.
L’inventaire comprend également une liste restreinte des centres d’expertise, des produits existants, des programmes et des principaux experts
dans le domaine de l’éducation interculturelle et
vise à sensibiliser les enseignants et autres formateurs. A notre avis, il représente un outil précieux pour l’enseignement, la recherche, les
contacts et sert à fournir une vue d’ensemble des
bonnes pratiques dans les Etats membres et le
reste du monde. Les différentes approches de ce
sujet sont présentées en incluant des définitions
divergentes de l’« éducation interculturelle »,
complétées par des références à des méthodes
intermédiaires telles que la médiation et la gestion des conflits.
La préoccupation de l’EUMC en matière de
l’éducation interculturelle se confirme à nouveau, par l’organisation, durant l’année en
cours, d’une nouvelle étude scientifique comparative, qui sera conduite sur la base des données
sur l’éducation collectées par le réseau RAXEN.
Cette étude portera sur deux aspects
principaux : le premier, est en relation avec la
discrimination raciale/ethnique des individus et
groupes dans l’éducation ; le second, est en relation avec la sensibilisation et la formation professionnelle dans le domaine de l’intégration, de
la diversité culturelle et sociale.
Révélons, enfin, un autre projet de recherche,
lancé par l’EUMC en 2001, portant sur les communautés islamiques vivant en Europe.
Concrètement, il s’agit d’une étude analytique
transnationale sur la situation des communautés
islamiques dans cinq villes européennes : Arhus
au Danemark, Bradford au Royaume-Uni,
Mannheim en Allemagne, Rotterdam au PaysBas et Turin en Italie. L’étude a visé à identifier,
rassembler et comparer l’approche des villes
dans le domaine de la lutte contre la discrimination religieuse. Il évoque les bonnes pratiques et
vise à produire des résultats contribuant à la promotion de la tolérance et de l’égalité de traitement sur la base de la religion dans des aspects
clés de la vie publique tels que l’emploi, les services publics et l’éducation. L’étude a été réalisée
par l’Europees Centrum voor Werk en
Samenleving, de Maastricht, au Pays-Bas.
L’approche de l’étude s’est basée sur des activités de collecte des données effectuées au niveau
local, donnant lieu à cinq rapports locaux de villes
partenaires (en coopération avec les parties intéressées) et, au niveau transnational, débouchant
sur un rapport cumulatif, comparatif et transnational, accompagné de recommandations.
Ce projet, sera suivi, en l’année 2002, par un
atelier, qui sera créé par l’EUMC. L’atelier aura
une large portée, puisqu’il portera non seulement sur l’approche des autorités locales vis-àvis de la promotion de la tolérance des religions,
en particulier l’islam, mais aussi sur l’observation du rôle que les autorités locales jouent, peuvent jouer et vont jouer dans l’intégration des
immigrants, en garantissant la non-discrimination dans des secteurs tels que l’emploi, le logement, l’éducation et les services publics, et en
soutenant la tolérance et la diversité dans leurs
communautés. Pour cet atelier, la collaboration
avec le Comité des Régions de l’Union permettra de développer, autour d’un projet concret, les
relations avec le Comité en vue de renforcer le
travail de l’EUMC avec les autorités régionales
et locales. La Cellule de Prospective de la
Commission Européenne sera également impliquée dans cet atelier.
3. Les activités de recherche de l’EUMC qui
vient d’être décrites, centrées sur le multiculturalisme et les relations interculturelles au sein
des sociétés européennes, nous les considérons
comme étant susceptibles d’afficher la volonté
de cette institution de contribuer à une reinvention du multiculturalisme en Europe, à la lumière de la démocratie et de ses composantes : de la
liberté et de l’égalité.
En effet, en Europe, comme à l’échelle mondiale, il y a un débat pléthorique sur le multiculturalisme. On a même parfois l’impression qu’il
s’agit là d’un terme particulièrement génial, dont
l’invocation permet à certains d’agir beaucoup
moins que d’en discuter. Il convient cependant
de se demander s’il y a ou non une valeur intrinsèque que ce terme tente de mettre en évidence ;
si oui, il convient de se demander comment
peut-on prendre cette valeur au sérieux. Une
hypothèse peut –de prime abord légitimementêtre formulée : l’idée du multiculturalisme fut
générée par une exigence impérative de résoudre
de conflits ethno/culturels surgis au sein d’une
entité étatique donnée, conçue comme étant une
entité unique du point de vue culturel. Si on
admet cette hypothèses, l’idée du multiculturalisme s’enfermera, d’un côté dans une conception
frivole d’un « culturalisme multicolore », de
l’autre côté dans un « problème politique
urgent », susceptible d’être analysé comme pro219
blème de stabilité sociale et/ou d’intégrité étatique (ou nationale). Dans l’un comme dans
l’autre cas, toute tentative de parler au nom du
multiculturalisme sera vouée en échec.
Nous considérons que le concept du multiculturalisme sera enrichi si nous allons l’approcher
non pas comme un concept « nouveau », imposé par un univers « externe », mais plutôt comme
une reinvention d’une idée très ancienne. Les
problèmes nés de la coexistence des cultures différentes, antagoniques, au sein des sociétés européennes, surgissent non pas parce que certains
être Humains ou certaines communautés, qui
pour de diverses raisons se situent dans la zone
grise de la vie nationale, sociale et politique, ont
décidé de se voir, en eux-mêmes, « différemment ». Les problèmes surgissent parce que, à un
moment donné, nous avons pris conscience que
les valeurs auxquelles nous croyons être toujours
attachés, nous les appliquons, pourtant, d’une
manière déficitaires. La dimension la plus critique du problème du multiculturalisme, s’identifie donc avec la reconnaissance et l’application
déficitaires de la démocratie et de ses deux composantes : de la liberté et de l’égalité. Bien que
les déplacements des populations « étrangères »
de la périphérie au centre du globe ont joué un
rôle important à notre manière de voir les
« autres », bien que ces déplacements sont généré de tensions qui nous ont obligé à mieux cerner les problèmes, il est désormais essentiel d’ad-
Sources bibliographiques E.U.M.C.
mettre que le multiculturalisme, en tant qu’une
valeur et non pas une « donnée », se dote d’un
sens issu de principes que nous considérons toujours comme étant de principes suprêmes.
La reinvention du multiculturalisme à la
lumière de la démocratie, des principes de la
liberté et de l’égalité, n’est pas destinée à simplifier les choses. Au contraire, elle représente un
cadre d’analyse extrêmement fécond. De cette
analyse, nous pouvons légitimement attendre
que les deux idées y seront issues enrichies.
Néanmoins, on ne dispose pas de recettes
faciles. La démocratie est souvent conçue par
certains comme une « institution nécessaire », et
ceci non pas dans le sens qu’on a de préférences
pour d’autres types de régime et qu’on tolère
simplement la démocratie, mais dans le sens que
l’essentiel de la démocratie s’épuise dans son rôle
de régulation des rapports sociaux. Cette
conception de la démocratie est préjudiciable :
au delà du fait qu’elle suggère une lecture erronée de la manière dont la démocratie fonctionne, elle amène à une aliénation des ressources
qui sont vitales pour la communauté en question. L’idée du multiculturalisme est un espace
de mise en valeur d’une conception approfondie
et enrichissante de la démocratie. Si nous parvenons à reconnaître le fondement essentiel et
valorisant de la démocratie, le sens de vie qu’elle donne à tout être humain, le concept du multiculturalisme sera mieux perçu et saisi.
EUMC, Racism and cultural diversity in the mass
media. An overview of research and examples of good
practice in the EU Member States, 1995-2000,
Vienna, 2001.
EUMC, Situation of Islamic Communities in five
European Cities, Vienna, 2001.
Le website de l’EUMC : http://eumc.eu.int
EUMC, Diversité et égalité pour l’Europe. Rapport
Annuel 1999, Vienne, 2000.
EUMC, Diversité et égalité pour l’Europe. Rapport
Annuel 2000, Vienne, 2001.
EUMC, Programme de travail 2002 (doc. interne),
Vienne, 5.11.2001.
220
Association News
Vie associative
ONG-SMN :
Plus de 200 partenariats public-privé
L’ONU a approuvé et publié
plus de 200 partenariats entre
entreprises, ONG, institutions
internationales et Etats, qui visent
à réaliser des actions de développement durable. Chaque partenariat
associe plusieurs acteurs et est piloté par l’un d’entre eux. Shell lance
ainsi un projet d’exploration gaziè-
re aux Philippines, Axel Springer
(le groupe de presse allemand qui
édite, entre autres, le quotidien à
grand tirage Bild), un programme
pour limiter la pollution dans
l’impression de journaux, E7 (un
réseau de grandes compagnies
électriques), un projet d’énergie
renouvelable dans des villages
indonésiens, Croplife International
(groupe d’entreprises phytosanitaires et d’OGM), un programme
de formation à l’usage des pesticides. Nombre de ces 200 projets
existaient déjà avant le sommet.
Contact : www.johannesburgsummit.org
Source : Le Monde, 01.09.02
Siège du FMI, Washington
Une douzaine de représentants
d’ONG provenant de huit pays se
sont rendus au siège du FMI le 12
juin dans le cadre d’un programme international parrainé par la
School for International Training
(Vermont, États-Unis).
Ils ont également rencontré
d’autres représentants d’ONG ainsi
que des membres du Congrès et
d’organisations internationales
ailleurs à Washington, ainsi qu’à
New York. Ils ont eu l’occasion de
s’entretenir avec plusieurs membres
des services du FMI du rôle de
notre organisation dans la lutte
contre la pauvreté, du rôle du
Bureau d’évaluation indépendant
ainsi que des contacts entretenus
par le FMI avec la société civile. Ils
ont enfin rencontré des économistes
travaillant sur leurs pays respectifs.
Une réunion préparatoire organisée le 19 juin a abordé les
détails d’une réunion de haut
niveau des représentants du FMI,
de la Banque mondiale et des syndicats (ICFTU, WCL, AFL-CIO)
qui aura lieu à Washington en
octobre.
Depuis les réunions de printemps d’avril, les services du FMI
ont rencontré les ONG afin de
discuter de diverses questions, y
compris une proposition du FMI
visant à mettre en place un mécanisme de restructuration de la
dette souveraine, les rapports du
Bureau d’évaluation indépendant,
le DSRP et la mise en vigueur de
l’Initiative PPTE, ainsi que des
questions ayant trait à des pays
particuliers comme l’Ouganda, le
Malawi et la Gambie.
Source : Lettre d’information
trimestrielle du FMI à l’intention des
organisations de la société civile,
juin 2002
La FIFA remporte un grand prix de la santé.
La Coupe du Monde sera sans tabac
Le prix de l’Organisation mondiale de la Santé pour la lutte
antitabac sera remis à la
Fédération internationale de
Football Association (FIFA) en
récompense de son action dont le
point d’orgue a été la décision de
bannir le tabac de la Coupe du
Monde 2002. Le prix sera remis le
28 mai 2002 au cours du
Cinquante-troisième congrès de la
FIFA à Séoul (République de
Corée). « Le sport et le tabac ne
font pas bon ménage. Nous avons
un but commun : le tabac doit
être banni de tous les sports, a
221
déclaré le docteur Gro Harlem
Brundtland, Directeur général de
l’Organisation mondiale de la
Santé. La décision de la FIFA de
soutenir notre grande cause représente une étape importante dans
la poursuite de notre objectif. Le
tabac a désormais disparu de la
plus grande manifestation sportive
du monde. » « Nous espérons que
notre message commun sera
entendu avec force par toutes les
organisations sportives, tous les
amateurs de sport et tous les athlètes du monde entier », a-t-elle
ajouté. Le Prix du Directeur général est attribué à des personnalités
ou à des organisations qui ont fait
preuve d’un courage ou d’une
vision exceptionnelle dans la lutte
antitabac. Dans la liste des anciens
lauréats, on peut citer le Roi de la
Thaïlande, le Ministre actuel des
Affaires étrangères d’Afrique du
Sud et l’ancien Attorney General
du Minnesota (Etats-Unis
d’Amérique). Le coup d’envoi sera
lancé le 31 mai, qui est aussi la
date retenue par les 191 Etats
Membres de l’OMS pour marquer
la Journée mondiale sans tabac
afin de sensibiliser les pays et la
communauté internationale à la
lutte antitabac. Conformément à
l’accord de coopération signé
entre l’OMS et la FIFA, il n’y
aura ni publicité, ni promotion
du tabac sur les sites de la Coupe
du Monde et le tabac ou ses produits dérivés ne seront pas en
vente lors des matchs en Corée et
au Japon. Il sera interdit de fumer
dans les lieux publics. Les zones
réservées aux fumeurs seront peu
nombreuses, clairement délimitées
et mises à l’écart afin de lutter
contre le tabagisme passif. Au
cours des compétitions, des
annonces informeront fréquemment le public de l’action menée
contre le tabac. De surcroît, une
annonce publique sur la Journée
mondiale et le Sport sans tabac
sera diffusée au cours du match
d’ouverture. Ces spots feront partie du matériel remis aux organismes de radiodiffusion internationaux et ils seront retransmis
dans le monde entier. Comme
l’explique Keith Cooper,
Directeur de la Communication à
la FIFA : « Depuis 1986, la FIFA
et d’autres organismes parrainants
ont exclu les cigarettiers du groupe des sponsors officiels de la
Coupe du Monde ou de toute
autre compétition de la FIFA.
C’est pourquoi nous avons collaboré très volontiers avec l’OMS
afin de tirer le meilleur parti de la
Coupe du Monde pour diffuser
les connaissances modernes sur les
dangers de la consommation du
tabac ».
(Communiqué OMS/41,
www.who.int/tobacco, 23 mai
2002
Des ONG s’attaquent à la FIFA
Certains articles
estampillés FIFA seraient
produits dans des
conditions intolérables.
La Déclaration de Berne,
Action de carême et Pain pour le
prochain demandent donc à la
FIFA de «s’engager à respecter et
faire respecter des règles du jeu
équitables pour toutes celles et
ceux qui fabriquent les articles de
sport dans le monde».
Les ONG citent plusieurs
exemples tirés d’enquêtes récentes
en Indonésie et en Chine. Des
fabriques qui ne respecteraient pas
les standards minimaux préconisés
par l’Organisation mondiale du
travail (OIT). A savoir un salaire
décent, un horaire de travail
acceptable, la liberté syndicale
et l’interdiction du travail des
enfants.
(Source : L’observatoire des transnationales, B.P. 96, 13693
Martigues, France)
http://www.transnationale.org/for
ums/tiersmonde
__zones_franches/showmessag
L’Association mondiale de psychiatrie : droits de
l’homme et transcuturalité
Le XIIe congrès mondial de psychiatrie, qui s’est tenu à Yokohama
du 26 au 29 août, a permis d’entériner un souci croissant de ses
membres d’un retour à la clinique,
au rapport entre soignant et soigné,
alors que leur discipline a tendu,
depuis plusieurs années, à se focaliser sur le médicament en éclipsant
le rôle du psychothérapeute, fondé
222
sur la relation au malade. L’élection
à la présidence de l’Association
mondiale de psychiatrie (AMP) du
docteur Juan-Enrique Mezzich, actif
partisan de ce retour à la clinique
contre le puissant “lobby” des laboratoires, est symptomatique de cette
volution. M. Mezzich, américain
d’origine péruvienne, prendra ses
fonctions dans trois ans.
La création, au sein de l’AMP,
d’une section “psychanalyse en
psychiatrie”, sur l’initiative du
Français Daniel Kipman qui la
préside, est également significative
de ce que le président sortant de
l’AMP, Juan Lopez-Ibor, qualifie
de “rééquilibrage” d’une approche
trop biologique de la maladie
mentale. La création de cette section témoigne également du poids
plus grand de la psychiatrie française au sein d’une instance où sa
présence a longtemps été discrète.
Ce congrès, qui était le premier à
se dérouler en Asie, a attiré plus de
6 000 participants, dont la moitié
d’étrangers venus de 111 pays.
Riche du point de vue scientifique,
avec plus de 2 000 communications
prononcées au cours de 270 symposiums, il a permis d’établir ou de
renforcer des liens entre les psychiatres d’une partie du monde où,
avec l’Afrique, la moitié des nations
qui la composent ne disposent pas
de structures d’accueil et de formation psychiatriques adéquates.
Ethique et politique
Dans un souci de déstigmatiser
la maladie mentale, la société
japonaise de psychiatrie et de neurologie a modifié la traduction
jusqu’à présent littérale de la schizophrénie, qui était demandée par
l’Association des familles des
malades mentaux.
En Asie orientale, un séminaire
inattendu était par ailleurs consacré à la réception de la psychanalyse lacanienne, auquel ont participé des Japonais et des Coréens.
Le congrès de Yokohama a également été marqué par l’intérêt porté
au champ nouveau de la transculturalité, c’est-à-dire des variants socioculturels des maladies mentales tant
en ce qui oncerne leurs symptômes
et les manières particulières de les
exprimer que les traitements.
La question de la classification
des maladies et de l’équilibre entre
des références globales et des spécificités culturelles est l’un des grands
débats au sein de la psychiatrie
mondiale. Elle est aussi au centre
de la question de l’enfermement
politique, qui se pose en particulier
en Chine, où l’AMP a décidé d’envoyer une mission d’enquête avant
mai 2003. M. Lopez-Ibor, qui a
négocié avec les Chinois le principe
de l’envoi de cette mission (dont les
modalités de fonctionnement restent à définir avec Pékin), a réaffirmé la détermination de l’AMP de
faire la lumière sur les conditions
d’internement en hôpital psychiatrique en Chine lors de la session
de clôture du congrès. Le plan d’action voté par l’AMP fait cependant
uniquement référence au cas des
adeptes de la secte Fa Lun Gong,
victimes d’internement psychiatrique : ce qui réduit considérablement la portée de ‘enquête. Tout en
exprimant la préoccupation que
suscite l’”utilisation abusive de la
psychiatrie”en Chine, M. LopezIbor a fait valoir que, depuis 2001,
à la suite de plaintes sur l’utilisation
politique de l’enfermement, des
excès ont été corrigés et que la
situation n’est pas comparable à
celle de l’ex-URSS. Il a déclaré que
l’AMP ne vise en rien à exclure qui
que ce soit, mais à faire cesser des
abus là où ils existent.
Selon Jim Birley, de l’Initiative
de Genève pour la psychiatrie, qui
a dirigé les inspections de l’AMP
en URSS en 1991, “ces dernières
années, en moyenne 3 000 personnes séjournent dans les hôpitaux psychiatriques chinois pour
des raisons politiques”. Pour
Robin Munro, principal auteur du
rapport sur les abus de la psychiatrie en Chine, la future mission
“est un premier pas. Il reste à voir
la marge de manœuvre dont elle
disposera : le cas chinois pose la
question d’éthique la plus importante à laquelle est confrontée la
psychiatrie mondiale”.
Source : Le Monde, 28 août et 3
septembre 2002
Ombudsman Slams Commission Over TABD
Secrecy
In a June 2002 decision, European
Ombudsman Jacob Söderman condemned the European Commission’s
secrecy about the Transatlantic
Business Dialogue (TABD). For over
two years the Commission has
refused Corporate Europe
Observatory access to key documents about its involvement in the
business dialogue. The Ombudsman
states that is not up to the
Commission “to say which docu223
ments might or might not be useful
for citizens in carrying out monitoring of the Commission’s exercise of
its powers.”
From: http://www.corporateeurope
.org/observer12/ ombudsman.htm
CARICOM heads and civil society meeting
CARICOM Heads of
Government recently met with
Civil Society members during the
Encounter: Forward Together.
Some 150 Civil Society representatives, 11 Heads of Government
and representatives of regional
institutions attended the
Encounter. Representatives were
present from institutions such as
the Caribbean Development Bank
(CDB), the Caribbean
Association of Industry and
Commerce (CAIC), the
Caribbean Congress of Labour
(CCL), the Caribbean Policy
Development Centre (CPDC),
the University of West Indies
(UWI) and the University of
Guyana (UG). Also present were
NGOs representing the interests
of women, youth and people with
disabilities.
The participants were able to
reach consensus on the Liliendaal
Statement of Principles on
Forward Together. This statement
affirms inter alia that a CARICOM-coordinated Task Force
should be established to develop a
regional strategic framework to
advance the work of the grouping.
The work of the Task Force
should be guided by three main
principles: Human Resource
Development with Equity, including issues in relation to Gender,
Youth and Persons with
Disabilities, Migration and the
Diaspora; (ii) Caribbean Single
Market and Economy (CSME) –
Capital Investment and requirements for competitiveness; and
(iii) Governance and
Participation. This Task Force will
be required to report to the
Conference of Heads of
Government at its next InterSessional Meeting in 2003.
(From: TRADEWATCH, July
10th, 2002)
International Sign-On Letter Against the “GATS
Attack”
Although the Battle of Seattle
was successful in preventing a new
comprehensive round of global
trade talks from going ahead, this
did not mean there would not be
trade negotiations at the WTO.
On the contrary, a whole new set
of WTO talks on global trade in
‘services’ began in February, 2000,
with formal negotiations due to
begin this spring after a crucial
stocktaking session is completed
at the end of March. These so
called GATS negotiations
[General Agreement on Trade in
Services] could have a dramatic
and profound effect on a wide
range of public services and citizens’ rights all over the world.
A statement, “Stop the GATS
Attack Now!”, has been prepared
by the US association Public
Citizen in cooperation with an
international network of civil society organizations working on
WTO issues. As with previous
initiatives like No New Round! and
Shrink or Sink!, it is hoped that
this statement will help to launch
and link together a series of coun-
224
try-based campaigns on the GATS
negotiations all over the world.
The initiative’s intention is to
collect sign-ons from civil society
organizations in as many countries as possible before formally
launching the statement in midMarch prior to the GATS stocktaking meetings in Geneva.
(From: Global Trade Watch
(GTW), a division of Public
Citizen.
http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/gat
s/Sign_on)
Le monde de l’entreprise discute avec les experts
de l’UE
Des activistes d’organisations
venant de divers pays Européens
ont conduit une action près du
Résidence Palace à Bruxelles contre
l’influence grandissante de l’industrie du service Européen sur l’enjeu
Européen lors des négociations
internationales sur l’Accord Général
sur le Commerce des Services
(ACGS). Ces négociations sont
tenues dans le cadre de l’OMC.
Malgré une préoccupation grandissante sur les conséquences possibles pour les citoyens et l’environnement, pour l’Union
Européenne l’enjeu est surtout axé
sur les intérêts du monde de l’entreprise. considèrent cela comme
une suite directe de la collaboration étroite entre les lobbies des
services et les négociateurs
Européens de l’ACGS. Ils plaident
donc que les représentants de
pouvoir public ne prennent plus
part à des réunions tel que celle
organisée hier à Bruxelles. En plus
les activistes exigent un examen
total et transparent sur les préparations des négociations sur
l’AGCS par l’Union Européenne.
http://www.transnationale.org/f
orums/institutions__commerce/sh
owmessage.as
The Convention on the Future of Europe:
involving civil society in the debate
Reactions are mixed as to the significance – and indeed relevance –
of the plenary session held on 24
and 25 June, which was devoted to
contributions from civil society.
Some sceptics wonder whether the
Convention Presidium is genuinely
involving the civil society or merely
paying lip service to it. Others criticise the manner in which the session was prepared, and organised –
at short notice and very formally.
Our assessment tends towards
the more optimistic. The EPC
contribution was not presented
until 18h30 on Monday but nevertheless there were still some 250
participants present, including the
President, Vice President and
Secretary. Some allowance must be
made for the fact that this is the
first time that the Union has prepared for an IGC in this way. It is
true, however, that there was no
real interaction between civil society representatives and Convention
members, and no “excitement”.
We believe that there was a genuine attempt to involve the civil
society, as was underlined by comments from the President, two
Vice-Presidents and members of
the Convention. There was also
recognition that they can play an
important role. The Nice
Intergovernmental Conference
(IGC) called for a deeper and
wider debate about the future
development of the EU, involving
“representatives of civil society”. It
was felt that civil society organisations should be consulted at as
early a stage as possible. The
Convention needs ongoing information from academics and
think-tanks: the generation of
ideas is important. The contact
groups are to meet again.
Stimulating national public
debates is clearly vital if EU citizens are to “buy in” to the
process. Concern was expressed
that the organisations presenting
to the plenary – mainly European
225
NGOs - do not necessarily represent national attitudes. This was
exacerbated by the short notice of
the meeting which made it much
more difficult for non-Brussels
based organisations to attend. In
fact, only half those who registered, actually attended.
The Convention is still at the listening stage. The question arises,
however, as to how civil society can
influence the Convention when it
moves from listening mode to
drafting and deciding modes. Will
the input of the different organisations be considered by the allimportant working groups? Full
involvement of civil society is highly desirable, both for its own sake
and as a building block to a public
debate in the different Member
States (and candidate countries).
So far, there has only been a debate
by the political elite in public.
Stanley Crossick
The European Policy Centre,
7/11/2002
Discount Davos?
Over 2,200 people from the corporate world, governments and EU
institutions as well as a handful of
NGO representatives attended the
second European Business Summit,
from 6-8 June in Brussels. The offi-
cial theme was “Sustainable development in an enlarged Europe”, but
the main demand coming from this
year’s EBS was for a further boost in
the powers of the European
Commission in order to speed up
the neoliberal reforms in the EU.
The Commission was not only present in large numbers but effectively
co-organised the event.
http://www.corporateeurope.org/obser
ver12/ebs2002.html
Social responsibility and the mechanical bull:
the International Chamber of Commerce Dresses
for Success
Laura Miller of PR Watch reports
on the 34th World Congress of the
International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC). Over 700 business leaders gathered for a three-day
conference in Denver, Colorado, to
discuss corporate social responsibility, partnerships with NGOs, and
the upcoming World Summit on
Sustainable Development. The main
messages from the carefully orchestrated event: liberalised markets and
‘free trade’ will save the world and
international rules on business are
not needed.
From:
http://www.corporateeurope.org/obse
rver12 /iccdenver.htm
Academia: a partner for the corporate agenda?
This article reviews two books
on EU-level business associations
by Scottish academic Justin
Greenwood.
Behind the sometimes dry
academic language in these publications there is the reality of disturbingly close connections
between academics and the
Brussels lobbying fraternity.
Greenwood is a prime example of
an academic scholar who helps to
advance the corporate agenda.
http://www.corporateeurope.org/obse
rver12/ greenwood.htm
Internet Rights
Why Civil Society should lobby and protect our
right to use the Internet
The Internet has become a
vitally important ‘commons’ for
the development of civil society
and our networks. It presents
opportunities for dialogue,
debate, participation and action
that do not exist elsewhere. We
(civil society organisations) need
to defend and promote the
Internet as an accessible and
secure global communications
medium for civil society.
The Internet is quickly becoming the most important medium
of expression in a new age. We
must be part of the process that
226
governs the way that information
will be disseminated in the future
- to encourage the free flow of
communication between all
nations and peoples!
Contrary to popular belief, the
Internet is not naturally ‘free and
open’. It was deliberately made
that way by technicians who
encouraged and valued collaboration, sharing and openness. Today,
as governments and businesses
become more and more interested
in ‘controlling’ the Internet, we
need to defend the Internet as a
secure and accessible space for
social justice, campaigning and
for promoting development. In
the next few years, crucial meetings about the ‘Information
Society’ will be held and will
define the future of the world’s
next major developmental period.
In the twenty-first century
access to information and communications technologies (ICTs)
is a basic human right, a right
which should be protected and
extended.
© Association for Progressive
Communications APC 1999 2002 - Contact APC
Les droits de l’homme en Egypte
La Haute cour de sécurité de
l’Etat a condamné, lundi 29 juillet,
le directeur du centre Ibn
Khaldoun pour les droits de
l’homme, Saad Eddine Ibrahim
(63 ans) à sept ans de prison pour
“diffamation de l’Egypte”. Trois
collaborateurs de M. Ibrahim ont
été condamnés à trois ans de prison et 24 autres à un an avec sursis. L’accusation se fondait sur les
images d’un documentaire que réalisait M. Ibrahim. Financé par
l’Union européenne, il était destiné
à encourager les électeurs à voter
lors des élections législatives pour
empêcher les fraudes. Saad Eddine
Ibrahim avait déjà été condamné
en mai 2001 à sept années de prison, puis libéré en février 2002,
quand la cour de cassation avait
ordonné un nouveau procès.
M. Ibrahim, qui a la double
nationalité égyptienne et américaine et qui est professeur de sociologie à l’université américaine du
Caire, avait été arrêté en juin 2000
à la suite de la publication par le
Centre Ibn Khaldoun d’un rapport estimant que les coptes (chrétiens d’Egypte) étaient victimes de
vexations. Il préparait aussi un
observatoire en vue des élections
législatives prévues pour fin 2000.
La presse s’est déchaînée contre
celui que certains éditorialistes ont
qualifié de “traître” ou de “vendu
aux ennemis”. A quelques exceptions près, les milieux intellectuels
se sont joints à la curée ou ont
observé le silence.
A Washington, le porte-parole
du département d’Etat a rappelé
que les Etats-Unis avaient “régu-
lièrement exprimé leur inquiétude
tout au long du processus qui a
mené à ce verdict”.
L’administration américaine et des
membres du Congrès avaient protesté à plusieurs reprises contre les
poursuites engagées contre M.
Ibrahim. L’organisation de défense
des droits de l’homme Amnesty
International a “fermement
condamné” le verdict. Pour
Amnesty, le procès visait à réduire
au silence toute contestation libérale. L’avocat Négad Al Boraï, qui
milite également pour des
réformes politiques, a estimé que
l’affaire avait prouvé que “les lois
égyptiennes étaient autocratiques”
et devaient être amendées pour
donner “des garanties aux militants des droits de l’homme”.
Source : Le Monde, 31.07.02
Water in the Middle East
Studies and statistics issued by
international and Arab non-governmental organisations and commissions indicate that the Arabs
are gradually entering a water
shortage cycle. Unless the situation is dealt with before 2010, the
problem tomay contribute
towards conflict, especially with
the continued expansion of Israeli
settlements in the occupied
Palestinian territories.
The Egyptian “al-Bank al-Ahli
al-Masri” (people’s bank) conducted a study on water in the Arab
states, which stated that most
Arab states will face severe water
shortages and increasing demand
for water for domestic, agricultural and industrial use over the next
25 years. The main reason behind
water shortage lies in the way
international rivers, such as the
Euphrates and Tigris, are shared.
227
The study recommended the
need for a joint Arab move to
develop a water security fund at
both national and regional levels. It
further called for a legal formula to
support interstate water resource
ownership rights and joint projects
between the various regional stakeholders on shared water sources,
springs, and sea water desalination.
Reference: http://www.arabicnews.com
Master Degree in International Studies in
Philanthropy (MiSP) University of Bologna
The master program is based on
the co-operation between the
University of Bologna and the
Indiana University Center on
Philanthropy. It also develops
intensive co-operation with prestigious European institutions and
foundations, in teaching courses as
well as in internship. The members
of the Faculty are among the most
outstanding scholars in different
disciplines related to no-profit studies and foundations policies, from
the most important research centers, such as Maecenata in Berlin,
the Enrico Mattei Foundation in
Milan, the London School of
Economics Center for CivilSociety.
The courses are held English
and Italian.
The MISP is the first full time
master program in Europe, which
develops a professional training
focused on the social, cultural,
political and economic role played
by philanthropy in both contemporary and historical settings, by
enhancing interdisciplinary as well
as comparative issues.
Its goal it to prepare a new generation of motivated, dynamic
and creative project managers in
philanthropy who are able to
operate across cultural, religious
and political boundaries and to
develop strategic visions of problems, at the national and the
international scale as well as to
stimulate networking processes
between private institutions and
the public sector.
The courses will start in January
2003 and end in January 2004. The
internship, which is a relevant part
of the program, will be held in prestigious institutions in Italy
(Compagnia di San Paolo,
Fondazione Adriano Olivetti,
Fondazione della Cassa di
Risparmio di Roma, Fondazione
Telethon, Fondazione Enrico
Mattei) as well as in other European
countires (European Foundation
Center, Tercentenary Foundation of
the Bank of Sweden, Bertelsman
Foundation) and in the US (Lily
Company Foundation, Indianapolis
Community Foundation).
The main patterns of the educational training are:
1) the comparison among management models in profit and not
for profit organizations. These
models will be analyzed not only
from the point of view of their
functions but also from the point
of view of their institutional and
historical evolution. A special concern will be given to the study of
management and organization of
scientific research within profit
and non profit institutions.
2) the comparison among different traditions of grant-making
foundations and their different
historical, religious, institutional
and juridical context
3) a comparative analysis of the
role of grant-making foundations
in their main fields of activity
(public health, scientific research,
education, communication, arts)
4) the definition of the specific
patterns that characterize the process
of evaluation, accountability and
management of grant-making foundations within the general framework of the third sector policies
5) the developments of specific
programs of internship in Italian
and European Foundation
228
The MA teaching is based on
1) academic lessons coursework
central to the study of philanthropy
and the role of grant-making foundation in different contexts
2) seminars and intensive training by visiting professors from
European Universities and from
Foundations. (practitioners,
experts, program officers and consultants)
3) internship in European and
American Foundations that will be
appropriately prepared by an accurate knowledge of the institutional, historical and strategic framework of the Foundation in which
the internship will be take place.
4) Bilateral convention with the
Center for Philanthropic Studies
of the Indiana University. The
convention concerns the exchange
of students on the basis of a system of credits corresponding to
the 30% of the total of the credits
of the master, including internship and the preparation of a final
thesis. The convention establishes
the mutual certification (double
certificate, signed by the
University of Bologna and by the
Center of Indiana).
The students
The students should have completed their BA in history, political sciences, jurisprudence, economics or biology They will be
selected on the basis of their previous curriculum and of a preliminary interview with the members
of the steering committee as well
as of preliminary tests in the core
disciplines. A perfect knowledge
of English (spoken and written),
and of another European language
is requested and will be evaluated
during the admission test.
The professional profile is the
training of program officers, particularly within the framework of
cultural and grant making foundations. They will develop a multidisciplinary background, in order
to develop patterns of competence
in investigating broad theoretical
issue of philanthropy and to compare different institutional, religious, legal and economic traditions. They will also receive a
complement of training in specific
topics related to economic, organizational and financial policies
which will be supported by internship in Foundations..
Educational and
training development
The Master of Arts and philanthropic studies at Indiana
University and the master in
International Studies in
Philanthropy at the University of
Bologna are the first master’s
degree programs respectively in
the U.S. and Europe to focus on
the history, cultures and values of
philanthropy. Without neglecting
technical training in economic and
juridical subjects these programs
focus on the social, cultural, religious, political and economic roles
played by philanthropy and noprofit organizations in both contemporary and historical settings.
The MA is a one year 60 credit
program that includes 12 sessions:
24 credits will be acquired at the
University of Bologna and 24 at
the University of Indiana, 12 credits are scheduled for the internships, including the credits for a
thesis on a topic approved by the
MA program advisory committee.
Indiana University
Indiana University
Human and financial resources
for Philanthropy
Gestione finanziaria e capitale
umano delle organizzazioninonprofit
History of philanthropy in the
Storia delle fondazioni e delle
West
charities in ambito occidentale
Ethics and values in philantropy
Etica economica
Legal aspects of philanthropy
Aspetti storico - giuridici: il contesto europeo
Religion and Philanthropy
Tradizioni culturali, religiose e
giuridiche nelle istituzioni nonprofit del mondo islamico
Religion and Philanthropy
Ebraismo e tradizioni filantropiche
Cross-Cultural Dimensions
Non profit e strategie di of
Philanthropy formazione in ambito
extra- europeo: aspettiComparati
Internship in philanthropic
Valutazione dei progetti e fundstudies
raising
Civil society and Philanthropy
Società civile e settore non-profit
nell’Europa orientale, in prospettiva comparata
Cross- cultural dimension
Dimensioni internazionali ed of
Philanthropy interculturali dell’azione filantropica: medicina e
sanità pubblica
The non profit Economy and
Storia e teoria del welfare
Public Policy
Philanthropy in American
Storia e cultura delle fondazioni
culture
in Europa
Equivalences
The following table shows the system of equivalence between the
Indiana university master’s courses
and the courses at the University
of Bologna
Financing
The master is organized on the
basis of a strict cooperation
between the universities and the
foundations that support its activity through grants and fellowships. The master will be also supported by the University of
Bologna and by the fees of the
students;
229
The following Foundations generously supported the master program with grants and fellowships:
Fondazione della Cassa di
Risparmio di Roma; Fondazione
della Cassa di Risparmio di
Bologna; Fondazione Istituto del
Banco di Napoli; Compagnia di
San Paolo, Torino; Fondazione
Adriano Olivetti, Roma;
Fondazione Alario Elea-Velia;
Fondazione della Cassa di
Risparmio di Forlì
For more information contact:
[email protected] or
[email protected]
www.misp.it
International Fellowship
The Center for the Study of
Philanthropy at The Graduate
Center of The City University of
New York is pleased to announce
a unique fellowship opportunity
for young scholar-practitioners in
the international NGO sector.
The International Fellows
Program provides leadership training through applied research and
professional mentorships. Selected
fellows participate in a 3-month
seminar on the US and international voluntary sectors. During
their residency, fellows learn about
the work of key agencies, meet
with foundation and nonprofit rep-
resentatives, and conduct an original research project to be presented
in the seminar.
The topic of the International
Fellows Program 2003 is community foundations, although work
on diaspora philanthropy may
also be relevant.
Candidates must be under 36
years of age, non-US citizens,
highly fluent in written and spoken English and preferably have a
strong institutional base and
demonstrated research skills.
Application proposals must be
postmarked no later than October
15, 2002.
230
For further details: www.philanthropy.org, under the heading
International Philanthropy.
Questions about the program may
be addressed directly to:
[email protected],
Contact: Barbara Luria Leopold,
Faculty Coordinator, Center for the
Study of Philanthropy
The Graduate Center, CUNY, 365
Fifth Avenue,
New York, NY 10016, USA
tel. 212-817-2013 or 817-2010;
fax. 212-817-1572
Email: “Leopold, Barbara”
<[email protected]>
New... Creations... Plans... New... Creations... Plans... New...
Protocole de Kyoto
Les quinze Etats membres de
l’Union européenne ont ratifié
simultanément, vendredi 31 mai
2002, aux Nations unies le protocole de Kyoto de 1997, donnant
une forte impulsion à l’entrée en
vigueur de cet accord international de réduction des émissions de
gaz à effet de serre, en dépit de
l’opposition des Etats-Unis.
Avec ces ratifications, auxquelles
s’ajoute celle de l’Union européenne en tant que telle, le nombre
des parties prenantes à ce protocole dépasse largement les 55, l’une
des deux conditions posées à son
entrée en vigueur. Toutefois, ces
ratifications européennes ne portent le pourcentage des émissions
prises en compte pour l’entrée en
vigueur qu’à 26,6 %, soit moins
de la moitié du total requis (55
%). Le protocole de Kyoto,
conclu fin 1997, impose des
réductions de six gaz soupçonnés
de réchauffer l’atmosphère, dont
le CO2, à 39 pays industriels en
2010 par rapport à 1990, dont
l’UE – 8 %, Etats-Unis – 7 % et
le Japon – 6 %.
Les Quinze ont obtenu le droit
de se répartir leur objectif global
de réduction de 8 % (Allemagne
–21 %, Grande-Bretagne –12,5
%, Italie – 6,5 %, France 0 %,
Espagne +15 %). Les chiffres officiels d’émissions 2000, comparés
à ceux de 1990, pointent des
situations très contrastées.
L’Allemagne (– 19,1%) et le
Royaume Uni (–12,6 %) sont en
bonne voie, la France (– 1,7 %)
table sur des difficultés malgré ses
statistiques jusqu’en 2000. A l’opposé, l’Italie (+ 3,9 %) et
l’Espagne (+33,7 %) font partie
des pays en complet dérapage.
Mais les mises en garde desti-
nées à préparer l’opinion publique
européenne à des mesures impopulaires (hausse de l’énergie et des
transports), oublient de mentionner les futures “Bourses” du CO2
(gaz carbonique) prévues par
Kyoto. Celles-ci permettront aux
mauvais élèves d’acheter des droits
d’émettre de la pollution aux premiers de la classe, qui auront des
marges sur leurs obligations. Dans
un communiqué publié le 11 avril,
le gouvernement russe calcule que
les Européens achèteront globalement chaque année, à l’horizon
2010, 147 millions de tonnes de
CO2 de droits d’émission.
(Le Monde , 31 mai 2002).
Les transports représentent un
quart des émissions de gaz à effet
de serre (ADEME, 2002). On
peut calculer les émissions de
dioxide de carbone (CO2) d’un
véhicule selon sa carburation:
GPL: consommation (en litre) au
100km * 1,6 = kg de CO2 au
100km Essence: consommation
(en litre) au 100km * 2,37 = kg de
CO2 au 100km Diesel: consommation (en litre) au 100km (2,65
= kg de CO2 au 100km).
Source : divers articles du Monde
Désarmement
Les présidents Poutine et Bush
ont signé un traité de désarmement nucléaire qui préfigure une
nouvelle relation stratégique entre
les Etats-Unis et la Russie. Les
deux présidents sont également
convenus d’agir ensemble contre
le terrorisme dans les pays d’Asie
Centrale et dans le Caucase.
http://news.ft.com/servlet/Cont
entServer?pagename=FT.com/Stor
yFT/FullStory
&c=StoryFT&cid=10219909691
00&p=1012571727092
231
Fédération
internationale de
documentation
FID’s deepening financial crisis
continues to result in mounting
debts and a failure to pay creditors,
staff salaries, and basic operating
costs. The Secretariat of The
International Federation for
Information and Documentation
(FID), which is housed at the
Royal Library of the Netherlands,
therefore closed down last month
and FID’s office furniture was publicly auctioned to go towards paying off part of the outstanding
debts. FID’s board is effectively
inactive as the terms of office of
FID’s 12 existing Council members
expired at the end of December
2001 and no elections were ever
held to replace them. FID’s archive,
spanning more than 105 years of
the history of information and documentation, will continue to be
housed at the Royal Library in The
Hague and will be safeguarded by
the UDC Consortium (also based
at the Royal Library). Finally, FID
has its legal seat in Belgium and
will continue to exist formally as a
legal entity until further notice.
Transparancy
International :
corruption
Transparancy International
vient de publier son Indice de perception de la corruption (CPI).
Selon l’ONG, le problème de la
corruption dans le monde semble
s’être aggravé : pour 2002, 70%
des 102 pays étudiés ont obtenu
une note inférieure à la moyenne
à son CPI. La France se classe,
comme le Portugal, en 25e position, avec 6,3/10.
La Finlande, le Danemark, mais
aussi la Nouvelle-Zélande et
Singapour atteignent un score de
9/10 ou plus.
http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2002/2002.08.28.c
pi.en.html
Planetism
Inspired by discussions at the
first World Civil Society Forum
and the Spiritual Caucus at the
UN, Geneva, and in view of the
World Summit on Sustainable
Development, the site
Planetism.net was created as a
non-profit platform to support
people’s individual and collective
spiritual inquiries.
The underlying philosophy is that
the world faces challenges that cannot be addressed without a major
shift in thinking, which will then
create a new way of living. This new
thinking will not be taught, but will
be discovered by people in their own
ways, in their own time. The aim is
to explore the spiritual dimension of
international cooperation and sustainable development.
Contact: Jem Bendell. Email:
[email protected]
Ukraine : demande
d’adhésion à l’OTAN
L’Ukraine lance officiellement
un programme d’adhésion à
l’OTAN. Toutefois l’adhésion
définitive ne pourra se produire
que dans un avenir relativement
long, le temps pour Kiev de remplir certains critères indispensables.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/ newsid_2005000/2005036.stm
Expiration du traité
CECA
Conclu pour une durée de 50
ans, le traité instituant la
Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier, mis en oeuvre à
partir de la proposition de Robert
Schuman, en 1950, de mettre en
commun les productions française
et allemande de charbon et d’acier
sous le contrôle d’une organisation
supranationale, la Haute Autorité,
arrivait à expiration le 23 juillet.
http://www.europa.eu.int/escs/ind
ex_fr.htm
Galileo, une déclaration
européenne
d’indépendance spatiale
Connaître sa position exacte dans
l’espace et dans le temps ; cela sera
possible avec le système de radionavigation par satellite GALILEO, initiative lancée par l’Union européenne et
l’Agence spatiale européenne (ESA).
La radionavigation par satellite est
une technologie de pointe. Elle
résulte de l’émission, à partir de
satellites, de signaux indiquant une
heure d’une extrême précision. En
outre, elle permet au détenteur d’un
récepteur de déterminer très précisément sa position à chaque instant
grâce au captage de signaux émis par
plusieurs satellites. Cette technologie, aux applications infinies, existe
aux Etats-Unis avec le système GPS
et en Russie avec le système GLONASS. Elle est à ce jour financée et
contrôlée par les autorités militaires
de ces deux pays. La continuité et la
qualité de son utilisation civile
dépendent donc de ces dernières qui
peuvent, par exemple, stopper ou
dégrader le signal à tout moment.
Avec GALILEO, développé par
l’ESA avec l’Union Européenne sur
232
la base d’un cofinancement 50-50,
c’est un système civil complet qui
doit être opérationnel à partir de
2008 et offrira au monde entier, et
en particulier aux Européens, un
moyen précis, sécurisé et certifié de
localisation par satellite.
Deux centres de contrôle GALILEO (GCC) seront installés en
Europe pour suivre le fonctionnement des satellites et gérer le système de navigation. Les données
fournies par un réseau mondial de
vingt stations de détection (GSS)
seront adressées aux GCC, via un
réseau de télécommunications
redondant. Les GCC utiliseront les
données envoyées par les GSS pour
établir les données d’intégrité et
pour synchroniser les signaux de
temps des horloges des stations sol
et des satellites. Les centres de
contrôle adresseront leurs données
aux satellites par l’entremise de stations dites de ‘liaison montante’.
Cinq stations de ce type en bande S
et 10 stations en bande C seront
installées à cet effet autour du globe.
Source : Lettre de la Fondation
Robert Scchuman, n°87
Gouvernance
économique de l’UE
Romano Prodi, Président de la
Commission, a décidé de créer un
groupe de haut niveau chargé de
passer en revue l’ensemble des instruments économiques de l’UE et
d’évaluer s’ils sont des instruments
de gouvernance économique adaptés dans le contexte de l’élargissement. Le groupe examinera la
nécessité ou non de nouvelles politiques pour garantir la croissance, la
stabilité et la cohésion.
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/
cgi/guestfr.ksh?
p_action.gettxt=gt&doc
The Union of International Associations
Founded 1910
Has decided,
in order to stress the importance of the associative phenomenon
in what is rapidly becoming a worldwide society, to award a
PRIZE
(of 6,000 EURO)
for a
DOCTORAL THESIS
Prepared on a subject concerning the life, operations or work of nongovernmental organisations seen
as central components of the international civil society. The competition is open to students of all
nationalities.
Whatever his or her specialty, the candidate must meet the conditions laid down by his or her own
University for acceptance as a thesis candidate. Subjects suggested by candidates must be approved
by a local course director and accompanied by a short note setting out the broad lines of the intended
research. Candidatures have to be received by UIA before the 30th November 2002. The UIA
Council reserves its right to accept only the more interesting or the more original subjects for competition. It will inform the candidate of its decision in due time.
The thesis has to be upheld in 2001 or, at the latest, before the 30th November 2002. Manuscripts
must be written in English or French and sent to the UIA secretariat in triplicate before 1 January
2003. The UIA Council will proceed to set up a jury of qualified persons who will have full discretion in awarding, or if necessary, dividing the prize (or withholding any award)
The official award of the prize will take place during the UIA General Assembly 2003.
All additional information may be obtained from :
The Secretariat of UIA, 40, rue Washington, B-1050 Brussels (Belgium)
Tel (32 2)640 18 08 – Fax (32 2)643 61 99 – E-mail [email protected] – Website http://www.uia.org/
The UIA is the publisher of the Yearbook of International Organizations and the Journal Transnational Associations
233
L’Union des Associations Internationales
Fondée en 1910
a décidé,
pour souligner l’importance du phénomène associatif dans une société
en voie de mondialisation rapide, d’attribuer un
PRIX
(d’un montant de 6.000 EURO)
à une
THÈSE DE DOCTORAT
rédigée sur un sujet touchant à l’histoire, à la vie, au fonctionnement ou à l’action des organisations internationales non gouvernementales conçues comme composantes essentielles de
la société civile internationale. Le concours est ouvert aux étudiants de toutes nationalités.
Quelle que soit sa spécialité, le candidat devra remplir les conditions requises par son
Université d’origine pour être admis à préparer une thèse. Les candidatures devront parvenir
à l’UAI avant le 30 novembre 2002. Les sujets proposés par les candidats devront être
approuvés par un directeur de thèse local et accompagnés d’une courte notice destinée à faire
ressortir les principaux axes de la recherche. Le Conseil de l’UAI. se réserve de ne retenir, en
vue du concours, que les sujets les plus intéressants ou les plus originaux. Il en informera les
candidats en temps utile.
La thèse devra avoir été soutenue en 2001 ou, au plus tard, avant le 30 novembre 2002. Elle
devra être rédigée en anglais ou en français et remise en 3 exemplaires au Secrétariat de l’UAI
avant le 1er janvier 2003. Le Conseil de l’UAI aura la charge de constituer un Jury de personnalités hautement qualifiées, qui aura toute latitude pour décerner ou pour partager
éventuellement le prix (ou pour n’en décerner aucun).
La remise du prix décerné par l’UAI aura lieu en 2003 à l’occasion de son Assemblée générale.
Pour tous renseignements complémentaires, prière de s’adresser au :
Secrétariat de l’UAI, 40, rue Washington , B-1050 Bruxelles (Belgique)
Tel (32 2)640 18 08 – Fax (32 2)643 61 99
E-Mail [email protected] – Website http://www.uia.org/
L’U.A.I. est l’éditeur du Yearbook of International Organizations et de la revue Associations transnationales/Transnational Associations
234
Yearbook of International Organizations
Edited by the Union of International Associations
38th edition - 2001/2002 - ISBN 3-598-23993-9
◊ Vol. 4 International Organization Bibliography and
Resources
2001/2002. ISBN 3-598-23997-1
Periodical and other major publications of international
organizations are listed by title, with an indication of the
organization publishing the item and of where the
description of that organization may be found in Volume
1. This expanded version of the index, previously published as an Appendix to Volume 1, also contains bibliographic information on research on NGOs and information derived from the Encyclopedia of World Problems and
Human Potential.
◊ Vol. 1A and Vol. 1B
Volume 1 is printed in 2 parts, thus enabling a significant
increase in information.
Organization Descriptions and Cross-references
2001/2002. ISBN 3-598-23994-7
Descriptions of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, covering every field of human activity.
Listed in alphabetical order of title.
Contents of descriptions: The descriptions, varying in
length from several lines to several pages and based
almost entirely on data supplied by the organizations
themselves, include:
organization names in all relevant languages; principal
and secondary addresses; main activities and programmes; personnel and finances; technical and regional
commissions; history, goals, structure; inter-organizational links; languages used; membership by country.
Cross-references: Integrated into the alphabetic sequence
of descriptions are cross-references to related organizations. Access is possible via organization names in
English, French, and other working languages, and via
initials or abbreviations in various languages
◊ Vol. 5 Statistics, Visualization and Patterns
2001/2002. ISBN 3-598-24036-8
The publication of this first edition of a specialized volume in the Yearbook series is in response to the many
enquiries the editors receive for statistical information on
international organizational activity. It contains: detailed
statistical tables previously included in Volumes 1B, 2, 3,
and 4; previously unpublished historical statistical summaries and analyses; statistical data on the meetings of
international organizations as published in the quarterly
International Congress Calendar; and visual representations of statistical data and networks, partly derived from
the Encyclopedia of World Problems and Human Potential.
◊ Vol. 2 International Organization Participation: Country
Directory of Secretariats and Membership (Geographic
Volume)
2001/2002. ISBN 3-598-23995-5
Countries are listed giving:
– Secretariats: the international organizations which
maintain headquarters or other offices in that country.
Addresses are given in each case.
– Membership: the international organizations which
have members in that country. For each organization listed, the international headquarters address is given, in
whatever country that is located
YEARBOOK PLUS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND BIOGRAPHIES ON CD-ROM
7th ed. 2001/2002. ISBN 3-598-40474-3
Enriched multi-lingual CD-ROM version of Volumes 14 of the Yearbook of International Organizations and Who’s
Who in International Organizations.
All 5 volumes of the Yearbook plus the complete CD-ROM
are also available as one set.
38th ed. 2001/2002.
◊ Vol. 3 Global Action Networks: Classified Directory by
Subject and Region (Subject Volume)
2001/2002. ISBN 3-598-23996-3
International organizations are listed by subject, with
general and detailed categories, according to their
principal pre-occupations. The classification scheme
highlights functional relationships between distinct preoccupations. The international organizations are also listed by subject according to the region with which they
are particularly concerned.
The index includes: keywords from organization names;
former names in various languages; alternative names/
initials in various languages; organization subject
categories in English, French German, Russian and
Spanish; names of principal executive officers; names of
founding personalities.
YEARBOOK ONLINE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND BIOGRAPHIES
The Yearbook of International Organizations, together with
Who’s Who in International Organizations, is now also available online. It provides a rapidly growing number of research
tools, including cutting-edge visualization techniques that
first appear in the new Volume 5. The organizations database
is intensively hyperlinked between organization profiles, to
organization websites, and from other UIA online interlinked
databases – notably that of the International Congress
Calendar, as well as those on World Problems, Global
Strategies and Solutions, Human Values, and Human
Development. It is updated frequently.
For more information contact:
Union of International Associations
Rue Washingtonstraat 40, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
Tel. (32 2) 640 18 08
Fax (32 2) 643 61 99
Email: [email protected]
Website: http:/www.uia.org/
235
Transnational Associations
Associations transnationales
54th year
54ème année
Forthcoming topics:
Dans les prochains numéros :
The use
and abuse
• Paul
Otlet’s
workof civil society in development
Usages
et
abus
de laOtlet
“société civile” dans le développement
L’œuvre de Paul
• Racism, xenophobia and multicultaralism in Europe
• The
firstxénophobie
African diplomat
Racisme,
et multiculturalisme en Europe
Le premier diplomate africain
• New players in international relations II
Nouveaux acteurs dans les relations internationles II
Articles appearing in the journal are indexed in PAlS (Public Affairs Information Service) and
AGRIS (International Information System for the Agricultural Sciences and Technology), FAO.
EU / UE
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An electronic version will be available free of charge for the subscribers to the magazine
Une version electronique sera disponible sans frais pour les abonnés de la Revue
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236