Mobilization
of
Interest
groups
in
the
Spanish
Parliament
Laura
Chaqués
Bonafont
Research
Fellow
at
the
Institut
Barcelona
d’Estudis
Internacionals
(IBEI)
Associate
professor
of
Political
Science
Universitat
de
Barcelona
[email protected]
Luz
M.
Muñoz
Márquez
Lecturer
of
Political
Science
Universitat
de
Barcelona
Very
first
draft
Paper
to
be
presented
at
the
General
Conference
of
the
ECPR,
Iceland
Section
61
­
Organised
Civil
Society
in
Europe
Panel
173
­
Interest
Organisation
Populations
in
Europe
August,
2011
The
goal
of
this
paper
is
to
analyze
the
mobilization
of
interest
groups
in
the
Spanish
Parliament
from
1996
to
present.
This
means
first
to
identify
and
classify
the
different
interest
groups
that
have
been
called
to
participate
in
any
of
the
hearings
(comparecencias)
of
the
Congreso
de
los
Diputados;
second,
to
analyze
to
what
extend
mobilization
of
interest
varies
across
policy
issues;
and
third,
to
test
to
what
extend
variations
on
the
mobilization
of
interest
across
issues
are
linked
to
the
changing
priorities
of
the
Spanish
government
or/and
political
parties.
In
this
paper
we
also
introduce
a
new
dataset
about
the
comparecencias
(or
hearings)
of
interest
groups,
created
following
the
methodology
of
the
Advocacy
and
Public
Policymaking
Project
and
the
Comparative
Agendas
Project,
in
order
to
capture
the
number
and
type
of
interest
groups,
as
well
as
the
issues
they
are
involved
along
three
legislatures.
This
is
a
first
step
of
what
we
hope
to
be
a
larger
research
project
oriented
to
increase
our
understanding
of
the
role
of
interest
groups
in
the
Spanish
political
system,
and
also
to
provide
a
new
instrument
to
develop
quantitative
and
qualitative
comparative
analysis
across
countries
and
policy
subsystems.
Previous
analysis
of
interest
groups
in
Spain
illustrate
that
most
of
the
mobilization
of
interest
occurs
in
the
governmental
arena
(Molins,
1989,
Pérez
Diaz,
1985;
Giner
1988,
Jerez,
1992;
Linz,
1982;
Gomà
and
Subirats,
1998).
Most
policy
areas,
especially
those
related
to
industrial
and
labor
relations,
are
governed
by
policy
communities
in
which
governmental
actors
play
a
key
role
in
front
of
other
public
authorities,
like
political
parties
or
regional
authorities
(Jordana
and
Sancho,
1999;
Sanz
1997;
Chaqués,
2002).
Access
to
the
policy
making
process
is
limited
to
interest
organizations
and
members
of
government
that
exchange
resources
and
share
responsibilities
in
isolation
from
other
policy
actors
and
the
general
population.
There
is
a
tendency
to
institutionalize
this
relationship
among
actors,
keeping
the
stability
not
only
of
the
number
and
type
of
actors,
but
also
of
the
policy
issues
and
ideas
that
are
taken
into
account
in
the
policy
arena.
Despite
this,
as
the
agenda
setting
perspective
illustrates,
no
single
institution
has
the
monopolistic
control
of
a
given
policy
issue
(Baumgartner
and
Jones
1993,
Jones
and
Baumgartner
2005).
Depending
on
the
policy
issue,
interest
groups
content
or
ally
with
other
policy
actors
across
different
policy
venues
in
order
to
have
an
impact
on
policy
outcomes.
They
are
strategically
minded
actors
that
engage
in
a
process
of
searching
for
the
venue
that
corresponds
better
to
their
way
of
thinking
about
an
issue.
The
venue
shopping
strategies
taken
by
different
policy
actors
depends
on
the
existing
political
and
institutional
context
governing
each
policy
subsystem,
but
in
general
we
should
expect
that
interest
groups
seek
to
operate
in
different
venues
in
order
to
foster
policy
change
and
new
ways
of
thinking
about
existing
policy
issues.
This
process
of
venue
shopping
is
especially
large
and
complex
in
a
multilevel
system
of
governance
in
which
different
issues
produce
a
shifting
set
of
alignments
among
national
governments,
interest
groups,
supranational
and
regional
authorities
(Beyers,
2002;
Beyers
et
al,
2008;Lowery,
2008).
In
this
paper
we
focus
on
one
venue:
the
Spanish
parliament.
Traditionally,
the
Parliament,
as
a
venue
for
interest
group
mobilization,
has
occupied
a
marginal
role
in
the
analysis
of
the
Spanish
policy
making
process,
with
few
exceptions
(Liebert,
1999).
Previous
research
suggests
that,
the
Spanish
Parliament,
as
many
other
parliamentary
democracies,
is
not
the
target
for
interest
groups
mobilization
mainly
because
it
is
seen
as
a
reactive
legislature
that
simply
responds
to
what
governments
bring
forward
(Norton,
2002).
Despite
this,
our
results
indicate
that
the
Spanish
parliament
is
an
important
venue
through
which
interest
groups
in
alliance
with
political
parties,
either
push
for
the
introduction
of
new
issues
and
ways
of
thinking
about
these
issues,
or
mobilize
to
preserve
existing
rules
and
policy
images.
Another
question
is
how
and
why
interest
groups
mobilization
at
the
parliamentary
arena
varies
across
policy
issues.
In
this
paper
we
focus
on
the
politicization
of
issues
as
a
driven
force
for
the
mobilization
of
interest,
leaving
aside
other
explanations
related
to
external
changes
in
socio‐economic
conditions
for
further
research
(Lowery
and
Gray,
2001).
Following
Baumgartner
et
al.
(2009)
we
test
whether
correspondence
exist
between
the
attention
policy
actors
give
to
a
particular
issue
(measured
by
the
percentage
of
issue
attention
of
parliamentary
and
governmental
bills
by
year),
and
the
mobilization
of
interest
groups
(measured
by
the
percentage
of
hearings
in
which
interest
groups
participate
by
year
and
by
issue).
Our
results
indicate
that
interest
groups
mobilization
varies
across
issues
depending
on
the
level
of
politicization
of
issues.
Correlation
between
parliamentary
bills
and
the
hearings
of
interest
groups
is
high
and
significant,
but
this
relationship
does
not
exist
for
the
case
of
governmental
bills.
These
results
illustrate
that
interest
groups
are
especially
active
in
the
discussion
and
analysis
of
those
issues
that
are
especially
relevant
for
political
parties,
and
this
is
partly
explained
by
institutional
factors.
Contrary
to
other
countries,
there
is
not
a
set
of
rules
that
define
their
participation
in
the
parliamentarian
arena,
neither
a
general
register
of
interest
groups.
This
means
access
to
the
legislative
process
is
filtered
by
MPs
that
have
the
capacity
to
decide
which
interest
groups
(if
any)
will
finally
intervene
in
the
discussion
of
a
particular
issue
in
the
comparecencias
(or
hearings).
In
this
context,
our
results
indicate
that
the
interaction
between
MPs
and
interest
groups
varies
across
issues
depending
on
the
priorities
of
political
parties
and
the
level
of
political
consensus.
To
answer
these
questions
we
have
created
a
database
that
contains
information
about
the
2.686
comparecencias
of
interest
groups
from
1996
to
2008.
This
dataset
captures
the
number
and
diversity
of
interest
groups
which
have
been
coded
according
to
the
Advocacy
and
Policymaking
Project
developed
by
Baumgartner,
Berry,
Hojnacki,
Kimball
and
Leech;
and
also
the
type
of
issues
in
which
interest
groups
have
been
involved
which
have
been
coded
according
to
the
methodology
developed
by
Baumgartner,
Jones
and
Wilkerson
for
the
Policy
agendas
project.
In
order
to
test
the
correspondence
between
the
comparecencias
of
interest
groups
and
the
political
agenda
we
rely
on
the
databases
created
by
the
Spanish
policy
agendas
about
the
bills
(governmental
and
parliamentary
bills)
and
speeches
of
the
Presidente
del
Gobierno.
The
paper
is
organized
as
follows.
First
we
briefly
explain
some
features
of
interest
groups
in
the
Spanish
political
system;
second
we
explain
the
role
of
the
Spanish
parliament
as
a
policy
venue;
third
we
describe
the
data
and
methods.
From
here
we
describe
the
main
results
about
interest
groups
mobilization
in
the
parliamentary
arena
and
finally
we
present
a
brief
discussion
about
the
correspondence
between
interest
groups
mobilization
and
political
parties.
Interest
groups
in
Spain
The
representation
of
interest
groups
in
Spain
follows
a
quite
stable
pattern
for
the
last
four
decades.
As
Linz
(1982)
highlights,
transition
to
democracy
lead
to
an
important
transformation
of
state‐interest
groups
relations,
eliminating
the
Franco
corporatist
model
of
interest
representation,
and
fostering
a
more
open
and
diverse
interest
group
system.
In
most
cases,
the
end
of
the
Franco
regime
was
seen
as
an
opportunity
to
challenge
the
monopoly
of
representation
of
some
interest
groups,
by
those
groups
that
have
been
persistently
excluded
form
the
policy
making
process
for
decades.
This
is
the
case
not
only
of
most
economic
and
industrial
policies,
but
also
welfare
related
issues
(eg.
Aguilar
1989,
Molins
1989,
Pérez
Diaz
1985,
Garvía,
1993,
Giner
1988).
Despite
this,
state‐interest
group
relations
were
transformed
quite
slowly,
and
most
of
the
existing
organizations
of
interests
that
were
functioning
under
the
Franco
regime,
were
not
eliminated
but
adapted
to
the
new
democratic
political
system,
keeping
some
of
their
privileged
monopoly
position
(Chaqués
2002,
Lancaster
1984,
De
Miguel
and
Rodríguez
1988).
In
some
cases,
this
privileged
position
was
the
result
of
a
historical
prerogative
regulated
by
law,
like
in
the
case
of
the
Chambers
of
Commerce,
or
the
professional
associations
like
the
Colegios
profesionales;
while
in
other
cases
the
monopoly
of
representation
is
more
related
to
the
capacity
of
some
groups
to
capture
and
institutionalize
this
privileged
position
vís‐a‐vís
some
branches
of
the
Spanish
government
without
the
need
to
enforce
it
by
law.
This
is
the
case
of
industrial
and
labor
relations
that
follow
a
neo‐
corporatist
model
of
negotiation
between
the
main
business
organizations
(CEOE
and
CEPYME),
the
main
two
unions
(CCOO
and
UGT)
and
the
Spanish
governments
(Cabrera
and
del
Rey
2000,
Martínez
1986).
The
participation
of
interest
groups
occurs
mainly
in
the
governmental
arena.
In
this
sense,
the
Spanish
case
follows
the
post‐parliamentarian
thesis
about
the
patterns
of
governance
in
advanced
democracies
(Richardson
and
Jordan
1979,
Mahoney
and
Baumgartner
2008).
Most
policy
areas
are
governed
by
policy
communities
and
networks,
which
exhibit
both
stability
in
the
relationship
among
actors,
exclusiveness
and
sometimes
highly
restrictive
access
to
policy
making.
Access
to
the
policy
making
process
is
limited
to
few
actors
that
exchange
resources
and
share
responsibilities
in
isolation
from
other
policy
actors
and
the
general
population.
There
is
a
tendency
to
institutionalize
this
relationship
among
actors,
keeping
the
stability
not
only
of
the
number
and
type
of
actors,
but
also
of
the
policy
issues
and
ideas
that
are
taken
into
account
in
the
policy
arena
(Richardson
2000;
Marsh
and
Rhodes,
1992).
This
is
especially
important
within
the
traditional
production
and
labor
relations,
but
also
for
the
case
of
welfare
policies
.
As
Garvía
(1993)
demonstrates,
welfare
policy
related
to
disabled
people
has
been
monopolized
for
more
than
five
decades
by
a
single
organization
(the
Organización
Nacional
de
Ciegos
de
España/
National
Organization
for
the
blind,
Fundación
ONCE).
This
organization
alone
employs
in
the
mid‐
nineties
more
than
40.000
paid
workers
(about
8.4%
of
all
nonprofit
employment
in
Spain),
and
with
the
Red
Cross
and
Caritas
plays
a
major
role
in
service
provision
and
financing
throughout
Spain
(Ruiz
Olabuénaga
et
al,
2000).
The
predominance
of
the
governmental
arena
is
explained
by
the
increasing
role
of
government
activity
in
a
broader
range
of
economic
and
social
sectors
(Richardson
and
Jordan,
1979;
Navarro,
2000),
but
also
by
institutional
factors,
mainly
executive‐
parliamentary
relations.
The
Spanish
parliament,
as
many
other
parliamentary
democracies,
is
a
reactive
legislature
in
the
sense
that
it
responds
to
what
governments
bring
forward
(Norton,
2000).
The Spanish government has a predominant position not only in the
definition and implementation of the political agenda, but also in the legislative process1 –eg.
adoption rate of governmental bills is 88% in front of 10% of parliamentary groups bills—,
and in EU politics, monopolizing the control over the agenda on European affairs (Moravsick,
1994; König and Mäder, 2009; Palau and Chaqués, 2011). As
a
result,
the
Spanish
government
is
the
main
target
of
interest
groups,
and
other
policy
actors
like
regional
authorities.
Despite
this,
as
Baumgartner
and
Jones
(1993)
emphasize
no
single
institution
has
monopolistic
control
over
a
given
policy
issue.
Dominant
interest
groups,
inside
a
policy
subsystem,
can
eventually
lose
out
in
front
other
organizations
who
choose
to
operate
in
1
According
to
the
Spanish
Constitution
the
executive
has
the
capacity
to
enact
decree‐laws
and
legislative
decrees,
which
represent
about
25%
and
5%
of
the
laws
passed
from
1978
to
2008.
Second,
Parliamentary
rules
give
to
the
executive
a
predominant
position
in
the
legislative
process
–
for
example,
executive
bills
have
priority
over
any
other
bill—,
and
third,
most
of
the
laws
that
are
actually
passed
by
the
Spanish
Parliament
are
initiated
by
the
executive.
different
venues
in
order
to
foster
policy
change.
Different
authors
(eg.
Richardson
2000,
Beyers
et
al
2008,
Tarrow
2005)
stress
how
major
political
transformations,
mainly
the
consolidation
of
a
multilevel
system
of
government,
have
increased
these
possibilities
of
interest
groups
to
seek
for
alternative
venues
were
policymaking
could
be
influenced.
In
a
multilevel
system
of
governance
“policy
making
within
European
states
and
at
the
EU
level
is
more
fluid
and
unpredictable
and
less
controllable
than
seems
to
be
implied
by
enthusiasts
of
the
network
approach.
Whilts
there
are
undoubtedly
policy
communities
and
networks
which
exhibit
both
stability
and
exclusiveness
and
do
control
policy
agendas,
there
appear
to
be
counter
tendencies
which
lead
to
lack
of
control,
policy
instability
and
unpredictable
outcomes”
(Richardson
2000).
The
question
we
pose
here
is
to
what
extend
the
Spanish
parliament
is
a
relevant
venue
for
interest
groups
to
promote
policy
change,
leaving
aside
other
venues
which
become
increasingly
important
in
the
Spanish
policy
making
process.
The
Spanish
Parliament
as
a
policy
venue
The
Spanish
Parliament
is
an
important
venue
for
interest
groups,
especially
those
willing
to
raise
the
public
profile
of
an
issue,
foster
policy
change
and/or
to
alter
existing
institutional
control
on
policy
issues
(Norton,
2000).
But
contrary
to
other
countries,
the
mobilization
of
interest
at
the
parliamentarian
arena
is
filtered
by
political
parties,
which
have
the
capacity
to
decide
which
interest
groups
(if
any)
will
finally
intervene
in
the
discussion
of
a
particular
issue
in
the
comparecencias
(or
hearings).
This
is
mainly
explained
by
institutional
factors:
there
is
not
a
set
of
formal
rules
that
define
the
right
and
duties
of
interest
participation
at
the
parliamentarian
arena,
neither
a
general
register
of
interest
groups
(García
Lorenzo,
2003).
Informal
forms
of
mobilization
of
interest
vís‐a‐vís
parliamentary
groups
certainly
exist.
Authors
like
Linz
(1982),
Giner
(1988)
or
Cabrera
y
del
Rey
(2007)
explain
the
connection
between
the
main
business
organizations
(CEOE
and
CEPYME)
and
conservative
parties,
or
the
main
unions,
UGT
and
CCOO
with
the
socialist
(PSOE)
and
communist
party
respectively
during
the
seventies
and
first
eighties.
Chaqués
(2002)
also
give
some
information
about
the
link
between
the
pharmaceutical
industry
and
Convergencia
I
Unió
(CIU),
a
regional
conservative
party
of
Catalonia,
where
most
of
the
larger
Spanish‐owned
pharmaceutical
firms
are
located.
By
the
same
token,
Chaqués
and
Palau
(2011)
illustrate
the
link
between
the
Catholic
Church
and
the
Partido
Popular,
CIU
and
UPN
while
discussing
moral
issues
like
abortion,
same
sex
marriage
or
stem‐cell
research,
and
Dubouchet and
Klöti (2004)
explain
the
link
between
the
PSOE
and
main
medical
organizations.
These
analyses
suggest
that
in
Spain,
there
is
a
cross
party
representation
of
interests
groups
combined
with
cross‐party
lobbying
on
the
part
of
major
interest
groups
(Liebert,
1999).
Interest
groups
contact
different
political
parties
across
time
and
across
issues
depending
of
their
preferences.
This
feature
has
been
reinforced
from
the
nineties
to
present,
as
a
response
to
the
decline
of
public
trust
on
political
parties
and
governmental
institutions
(Putnam
2000,
Salamon,
et
al,
2003).
Interest
groups,
especially
NGOs
and
major
foundations
define
themselves
as
non‐political
organizations,
highlighting
their
autonomy
from
traditional
policy
actors,
mainly
political
parties
and
the
government,
as
a
means
to
legitimate
their
position
in
front
of
public
opinion.
As
a
consequence,
despite
historical
and
ideological
links
exists
between
political
parties
and
interest
groups,
these
connections
have
been
less
evident
and
visible
for
the
last
decades.
Parliamentary
groups
invite
interest
groups
to
participate
in
the
comparecencias
not
only
according
to
their
ideological
positions,
but
also
depending
on
whether
they
suffer
a
severe
information
deficit.
For
some
issues,
especially
those
involving
a
low
level
of
consensus
like
abortion
or
same‐sex
marriage,
to
invite
interest
groups
to
the
comparecencias
(or
hearings)
could
be
a
source
to
simply
boost
the
image
of
a
political
party
in
front
of
public
opinion.
In
other
cases,
like
Assisted
Reproduction
Techniques
(ART)
the
participation
of
interest
groups
could
be
more
connected
with
the
lack
of
information
and
technical
knowledge
by
MPs.
This
is
especially
important
in
a
context
of
increasing
complexity
and
heterogeneity
of
the
issues
involved
in
the
legislative
process
that
occurs
for
the
last
decades.
From
here
we
expect
that
the
mobilization
of
interest
groups
at
the
parliamentarian
arena
will
vary
across
issues,
and
it
will
be
directly
related
to
the
preferences
and
priorities
of
political
parties.
This
is,
following
Baumgartner
et
al.
(2009)
we
depart
form
the
idea
that
the
politicization
of
issues
is
a
driven
force
for
the
mobilization
of
interest,
and
accordingly,
we
expect
to
find
a
important
connection
between
the
attention
policy
actors
give
to
a
particular
issue
(measured
by
the
percentage
of
issue
attention
of
parliamentary
and
governmental
bills
by
year),
and
the
mobilization
of
interest
groups
(measured
by
the
percentage
of
hearings
in
which
interest
groups
participate
by
year
and
by
issue).
Data
and
coding
methods
In
order
to
capture
the
participation
of
interest
groups
in
the
parliamentarian
arena
we
rely
on
the
Comparencencias
or
public
hearings
in
the
Congreso
de
los
diputados.
According
to
the
statutes
of
the
Congreso
de
los
diputados2,
these
comparecencias
are
the
single
existing
formal
venue
through
which
interest
groups
can
directly
participate
in
the
Spanish
Parliament.
They
are
always
conducted
by
parliamentary
committees
(or
subcommittees,
also
called
ponencias)
aimed
to
fulfill
three
basic
functions:
oversight
policy
implementation
by
the
Spanish
government;
to
gather
information
from
the
different
actors
involved
in
the
policy
making
process;
and
to
capture
the
existing
issue
conflict
and
ideological
positions
of
the
actors
involved
in
the
legislative
process.
Comparecencias
are
not
limited
to
the
participation
of
interest
groups,
but
also
other
actors,
mainly
members
of
the
government,
top
public
officials;
and
other
personalities
like
experts,
ex‐public
officials,
ex‐members
of
government
or/and
public
officials
in
office
of
others
levels
of
government
(regional,
local,
or/and
EU).
As
table
1
illustrates,
most
hearings
correspond
to
representatives
of
the
Spanish
government
and
top
public
officials,
but
the
participation
of
interest
groups
increases
dramatically
in
the
last
legislature,
from
15%
(1996‐2000),
to
22%
(2004‐2008).
These
results
somehow
contradict
previous
analysis
like
Liebert
(1999),
where
comparecencias
are
described
as
a
venue
restricted
to
invite
representatives
from
government
and
public
corporations,
with
the
marginal
or
null
intervention
of
other
policy
actors,
like
interest
groups.
Table
1
about
here
2
See
article
44
about
the
functioning
of
permanent
commisions,
and
articles
52.2
and
64.4
for
the
functioning
of
non‐permanent
commissions
The
source
of
the
database
is
the
Spanish
Congress
web
page3
that
contains
all
the
data
about
the
different
types
of
comparecencias.
Overall,
the
database
contains
2.686
records,
one
for
each
of
the
comparecencias
of
interest
organizations
from
1996
to
2010,
although
our
intention
is
to
go
further
back
in
time
in
order
to
cover
the
whole
democratic
period.
Following
Gray
and
Lowery
(2008)
and
the
Advocacy
and
Public
Policymaking
Project,
we
have
gathered
information
not
only
of
interest
groups
but
also
of
other
interest
organizations
like
think
tanks,
public
institutions,
or
regional
authorities.
Despite
that,
in
this
paper
we
have
only
considered
interest
groups,
leaving
aside
these
other
organizations,
which
will
be
considered
in
further
research4.
The
information
has
been
systematized
in
the
following
way:
(1)
we
have
classified
policy
actors
according
to
the
codebook
of
the
Advocacy
and
Public
Policymaking
Project5(table
2);
(2)
to
classify
the
type
of
issues
in
which
interest
groups
are
involved
we
have
followed
the
coding
system
of
the
Comparative
Agendas
Project
already
adapted
to
the
Spanish
case
by
the
Spanish
policy
agendas
project
(www.ub.edu/spanishpolicyagendas,
and
table
3).
Besides
we
have
created
the
following
indicators
for
each
comparecencia:
(1)
date
of
the
hearing,
(2)
year,
(3)
legislature,
(4)
name
of
the
expert
or
the
individual
representing
the
organization,
(5)
name
of
the
organization,
(6)
type
of
actor,
(7)
main
topic
or
policy
area
of
the
policy
actor;
(8)
subtopic
of
the
policy
actor,
(9)
name
of
the
committee,
(10)
topic
of
the
issue
under
discussion;
(11)
subtopic
of
the
issue
under
discussion.
We
have
also
created
two
dummy
variables:
one
to
define
the
type
of
committee
(whether
it
is
a
standing
committee
or
ad‐hoc
committee
created
to
deal
with
a
specific
issue;
and
another
to
capture
the
type
of
results,
this
is
whether
the
hearing
was
finally
celebrated
(or
not).
Only
609
of
the
hearings
were
never
celebrated,
about
22%
of
the
total.
3
http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Iniciativas
In
the
web
page
of
the
Congreso
de
los
Diputados
the
information
about
comparecencias
is
organized
in
four
sections:
Comaparenecias
of
government
officials;
comparenecias
of
top
public
officials;
comparencias
related
to
the
head
of
state
(the
Crown);
and
comparecencias
related
to
other
personalities.
The
database
contains
all
the
information
related
to
these
other
personalities.
5
http://lobby.la.psu.edu/
4
Table
2
about
here
Finally,
in
order
to
test
whether
the
participation
of
interest
groups
is
driven
by
governmental
activities
or/and
the
priorities
of
political
parties
we
rely
in
the
databases
created
by
the
Spanish
policy
agendas
project
about
the
Speeches
of
the
Presidente
del
Gobierno,
governmental
bills,
and
parliamentary
groups
bills.
Each bill and speech has been
coded according to a coding system based on 19 major topic categories (table 3), and 247
subtopics. This coding system first developed by the US (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Jones
and Baumgartner 2005), has been adapted to the characteristics of the Spanish political
system introducing some revisions like questions dealing with the national health system or
ETA terrorism.
Table 3 about here
Finally,
the
development
of
this
database
is
aimed
to
provide
a
new
tool
to
better
understand
the
role
of
interest
groups
in
the
Spanish
political
system.
At
present,
the
information
about
associations,
foundations
and
professionals
associations
is
highly
fragmented
in
several
registers
distributed
by
policy
areas
and
territories
(national,
regional
and
local).
The
National
Register
of
Associations
of
the
Ministry
of
Home
Affairs
(MHA)
is
the
main
register
informing
about
the
number
of
active
interest
groups
per
year
from
1985
to
present
–.
According
to
the
annual
report
of
MHA,
the
number
of
organizations
increases
from
3.310
in
1985
to
32,353
active
associations
in
2008—.
It
also
classifies
interest
organization
across
9
policy
areas
(cultural
and
ideological,
Sports,
health,
economic
and
professional,
family
related
and
elderly,
women,
education
social
and
community
organizations.
But
this
database
do
not
provide
information
about
whether
these
organizations
get
involved
in
lobbying
activities,
and
mobilize
in
order
to
foster
policy
change
across
different
policy
venues.
Our
goal
is
to
contribute
to
fill
this
gap
in
the
analysis
of
interest
groups
in
Spain.
Interest
groups
in
the
Spanish
parliament:
a
first
description
Following
Gray
and
Lowery
(1993)
we
measure
interest
groups
diversity
as
the
number
of
interest
groups
participating
in
the
comparecencias
celebrated
in
the
Congreso
de
los
Diputados
from
1996
to
2008.
As
table
4
illustrates,
855
interest
groups
have
participated
in
these
comparecencias;
most
of
them
are
NGOs
(34%),
followed
by
trade
associations
dealing
with
a
specific
economic/industrial
sector
(26%)
and
corporations
(16%).
Most
of
these
organizations
only
participate
once
(678
interest
groups)
–the
average
ratio
of
hearings
per
interest
organization
is
1,5—
with
important
differences
across
interest
groups.
Actually,
some
organizations
like
unions,
and
business
organizations
have
participated
with
more
intensity
than
the
rest
with
a
ratio
of
3.3
and
2.2
hearing
respectively.
Table
4
about
here
Table
5
shows
that
the
top
20
interest
groups
concentrate
more
than
20%
of
the
hearings,
highlighting
an
important
concentration
of
interest
representation
in
a
few
organizations
(mainly
business
organizations
and
unions).
Actually,
this
list
gives
support
to
some
of
the
existing
analysis
about
interest
representation
in
Spain:
(1)
economic
and
also
some
of
the
most
relevant
welfare
related
issues
like
pensions
are
monopolized
by
the
two
main
unions
(UGT
and
CCOO)
and
business
organizations
(CEOE
and
CEPYME)
which
capture
more
than
10%
of
the
hearings;
(2)
as
explained
by
Ruíz
Olabuénaga
et
al
(2000)
the
three
most
important
non‐profit
organizations
devoted
to
the
provision
of
social
services
–the
fundación
Once,
Caritas
and
the
Red
Cross—
with
the
CERMI
(Spanish
Committee
for
the
handicapped)
are
among
the
top
ten
interest
groups
participating
in
4%
of
the
hearings,
(3)
among
these
top
20
interest
organizations
are
also
three
farmers
organizations
(four
if
we
considered
the
top
21)
which
illustrates
the
fragmentation
in
the
representation
of
interest
in
this
sector
(Palau,
2009),
but
also
the
importance
of
agricultural
issues
in
the
political
agenda
(especially
related
to
scandals
like
the
linen‐subsidies,
or
the
mad
cow
case);
(4)
fragmentation
also
exists
in
the
representation
of
feminist
movements,
which
are
especially
involved
in
the
discussion
of
issues
like
gender
inequalities,
abortion
or
violence
against
women,
and
consumers
associations.
Table
5
about
here
Figure
1
illustrates
that
there
are
some
variations
in
the
number
of
hearings
across
time.
First,
as
expected,
the
number
of
hearings
decreases
in
election
years
(1996,
2000,
2004,
and
2008),
and
this
is
especially
the
case
in
2004,
when
the
Partido
Popular
(PP)
loose
general
elections
after
eight
years
in
government
in
front
of
the
socialist
party
(PSOE).
Among
other
things,
parliamentary
sessions
are
shorter
during
election
years,
and
once
the
new
chambers
are
constituted,
the
government
and
parliamentary
groups
need
some
time
to
introduce
a
new
bill
and,
in
the
case
of
MPs,
to
prepare
the
hearings
related
them.
Actually,
the
comparecencias
of
interest
groups
always
increases
during
the
second
and
third
year
of
the
term,
and
tend
to
decrease
during
the
last
year
(with
the
exception
of
1999).
Second,
participation
of
interest
groups
is
especially
large
in
the
first
legislature
of
José
Luis
Rodríguez
Zapatero
(2004‐2008)
with
268
interest
groups
hearings,
and
the
first
legislature
of
Jose
Maria
Aznar
(1996‐2000)
with
242,
while
the
number
of
hearing
decreases
to
168,
when
the
Partido
Popular
is
governing
under
majority,
from
2000
to
2004.
The
enlargement
of
the
database
back
in
time
will
allow
us
to
test
whether
the
type
of
government
–majority‐minority—
is
linked
to
these
variations.
Third,
there
are
important
variations
in
the
participation
of
different
types
of
actors
across
time.
Business
associations
and
corporations
decrease
their
participation
in
the
comparecencias
quite
dramatically
from
1996
to
2008,
while
the
opposite
occurs
in
the
case
of
NGOs
which
increase
their
participation
from
73
to
110,
and
trade
associations
which
increase
from
80
to
168
comparecencias.
As
we
argue
below,
these
variations
in
the
participation
of
interest
groups
are
mainly
related
to
the
prioritization
of
issues
by
parliamentary
groups.
Figure
1
about
here
Figure
2
shows
the
type
of
issues
in
which
each
interest
group
has
been
more
active.
First,
corporations
are
especially
active
in
the
debate
about
governmental
affairs
which
are
mainly
related
to
the
privatization
of
public
enterprises
(capturing
64%
of
all
the
hearings
of
interest
groups
dealing
with
these
issues);
energy
which
is
mainly
provided
by
large
firms
(61%)
and
research
and
development,
especially
related
to
the
privatization,
and
regulation
of
telecommunications
(48%).
All
these
issues
were
especially
important
in
the
political
agenda
of
the
late
nineties,
when
the
conservative
government
of
José
Maria
Aznar
engage
in
a
final
process
of
privatization
and
de‐regulation
of
public
services.
Figure
2
about
here
Second,
ONGs
are
especially
mobilized
for
the
discussion
of
rights
related
issues
(58%
of
all
the
hearings
related
to
rights)
especially
women
rights,
homosexuals,
gypsies,
and
immigration,
and
also
labour
(42%),
especially
pensions,
the
environment
(41%)
social
policy
(58%),
and
foreign
affairs,
mainly
related
to
foreign
aid
and
cooperation
policy
(34%).
Third,
trade
associations
explain
about
50%
of
the
hearings
related
to
agriculture,
housing,
commerce
and
foreign
trade,
and
about
30%
of
the
hearings
related
to
economic
affairs.
Fourth,
unions
are
especially
active
in
education
policy
(30,4%),
law
and
justice
(20%),
mainly
related
to
the
police,
and
research
and
development.
And
also
rights
issues.
Fifth,
professional
organizations
are
especially
active
in
health
related
issues,
mainly
dominated
by
medical
associations,
and
commerce
and
industrial
policy,
which
is
mainly
connected
with
property
rights
issues.
Finally,
foundations
devote
most
of
their
attention
to
social
issues
while
business
organizations
are
focused
in
the
discussion
of
labour
issues
and
commerce
and
industrial
policy.
In
order
to
measure
the
level
of
concentration
of
the
agenda
of
interest
groups
at
the
Spanish
parliament
we
have
also
computed
Herfindhal
scores6i.
As
figure
3
illustrates
some
interest
groups
–especially
foundations,
and
professional
organizations—have
participated
in
the
discussion
of
a
few
issues,
while
others
–ONGs,
unions,
trade
associations
and
corporations—
have
a
more
dispersed
agenda,
participating
to
more
or
less
extend
across
most
issues.
Most
of
the
hearings
of
interest
groups
occur
in
permanent
committees
(75%),
and
are
related
to
legislative
activities
(bill
initiatives).
Hearings
in
non‐permanent
committees
are
only
272,
and
mostly
related
to
crisis
situations
like
the
Al‐Qaeda
terrorist
attack
of
11th
of
March
2004,
the
linen
scandal
(misuse
of
EU
subvention
for
linen
production),
Gescartera
(financial
scandal),
or
the
Oil
Spill
of
the
Prestige—.
Non‐permanent
committees
also
deal
with
new
issues
that
increasingly
capture
the
attention
of
policymakers
like
climate
change,
pensions
reform,
traffic
accident
prevention,
drug‐abuse,
army
reform
or
women
issues.
In
most
cases,
the
creation
of
a
specific
non‐permanent
committee
only
lasts
one
legislature,
with
the
exception
to
women
issues
that
from
2004
is
transformed
into
a
permanent
commission
(table
6).
Table
6
about
here
Participation
of
interest
groups
is
always
more
important
in
permanent
committees
and
this
is
explained
by
the
functions
developed
by
each
type
of
committee.
Non‐permanent
commissions
are
mainly
aimed
to
oversight
the
implementation
of
a
particular
policy
by
the
government,
like
the
case
of
pensions
policy,
or
Al‐Qaeda
terrorist
attacks,
or
to
provide
information
about
issues
that
are
very
specific
and
complex
like
climate
change,
and
to
a
less
extend,
to
capture
the
different
policy
positions
about
a
specific
issues,
like
the
case
of
army
reform,
or
women
issues
(abortion).
As
a
consequence,
participation
of
members
and
ex‐
6
This
indicator
gives
information
about
the
competition
among
issues
–
how
interest
groups
attention
is
spread
among
issues—.
It
is
defined
as
the
sum
of
the
squares
of
the
agenda
shares
of
each
issue.
In
order
to
simplify
results
we
use
the
normalized
version
of
the
Herfindalh
index
that
ranges
from
0
to
1.
A
H
index
below
0.1
indicates
an
unconcentrated
index;
a
H
index
between
0.1
to
0.18
indicates
moderate
concentration;
while
a
H
index
above
0.18
indicates
high
concentration
members
of
the
government
and
top
public
officials
is
higher
in
the
case
of
non‐permanent
committees.
By
the
contrary,
participation
in
permanent
committees
is
more
related
to
the
legislative
priorities
of
either
political
parties
or
the
government,
and
deal
with
issues
that
are
more
than
one
legislature
in
the
political
agenda
(this
is
especially
the
case
of
immigration,
property
and
consumers
rights).
Interest
groups
participation
in
these
permanent
committees
is
especially
high
for
the
case
of
professional
and
trade
associations
(more
than
90%
of
the
hearings
in
which
they
participate
are
dealt
in
permanent
committees),
and
Unions
(84%).
For
the
rest
of
organizations
–ONGs,
Unions,
Foundations,
Business
associations
and
Corporations—
participation
in
non‐permanent
committees
rises
to
25%‐30%.
Figure
4
about
here
Policy
priorities
and
interest
groups
Figure 5 shows that that the mobilization of interest groups at the parliamentarian arena varies
across issues. We can distinguish among three types of issues: (1) those that capture more
than 10% of the comparecencias of interest groups like rights related issues, labor, education,
law and justice, social policy and commerce and banking; (2) those issues that capture about
5% of the comparecencias like energy, the environment, agriculture, health, transportation
and foreign affairs, and (3) issues that capture about 1-2% of the comparecencias like
housing, defense, foreign trade, the economy and governmental affairs.
Figure 5 about here
As
Table
7
illustrates,
attention
given
to
issues
in
the
comparecencias
presents
important
differences
in
relation
to
the
attention
captured
by
these
issues
by
the
government
(spechees
of
the
Presidente
del
Gobierno,
and
governmental
bills)
and
to
a
less
extend
political
parties
(parliamentary
bills).
These
differences
are
mainly
related
to
the
governmental
agenda
in
which
economic
issues,
foreign
affairs,
commerce
and
industrial
policy
and
governmental
issues
capture
more
than
50%
of
the
attention
versus
13%
of
the
comparecencias,
and
about
25%
of
parliamentary
bills.
By
the
contrary,
issues
like
labor,
education,
social
policy
and
rights
capture
and
important
share
of
the
attention
of
both
parliamentary
groups
(40%)
bills
and
comparecencias
(45%)
versus
15%
of
governmental
bills.
There
are
two
issues,
law
and
justice
and
research
and
development
that
have
a
similar
share
of
attention
in
all
venues,
and
three
issues,
health,
the
environment
and
energy
policy
that
capture
more
attention
in
the
comparecencias
than
the
rest.
Table
7
about
here
In
order
to
go
further
in
the
analysis,
and
to
test
whether
the
participation
of
interest
groups
at
the
Spanish
Parliament
is
linked
to
the
priorities
of
policy
makers
we
computed
the
correlation
between
the
percentage
of
issue
attention
of
parliamentary
and
governmental
bills
by
year,
and
the
percentage
of
hearings
in
which
interest
groups
participate
by
year
and
by
issue.
As
we
stated
above,
we
depart
form
the
idea
that
the
politicization
of
issues
is
a
driven
force
for
the
mobilization
of
interest,
and
accordingly,
we
expect
to
find
an
important
connection
between
the
attention
policy
actors
give
to
a
particular
issue
(Baumgartner
et
al.
2009).
Our
results
indicate
that
correlation
is
not
significant
and
low
for
the
case
of
governmental
bills
(.068),
and
speeches
(.255),
while
in
the
case
of
parliamentary
bills
correlation
is
high
and
significant
(,611**)
(0.1
significance).
These
first
results
suggest
that
the
participation
of
interest
groups
is
more
directly
linked
to
the
priorities
of
political
parties,
than
the
governmental
agenda.
Political
parties
devote
more
time
and
resources
to
discuss
with
interest
groups
issues
that
are
especially
relevant
to
them,
giving
less
attention
to
the
priorities
of
the
Spanish
government.
The
case
of
right
related
issues
is
a
good
example:
while
no
governmental
bill
was
introduced
to
deal
with
prostitution,
homosexuals
and
gypsies
discrimination,
attention
to
these
issues
was
increasingly
important
by
left
and
far‐left
political
parties.
These
political
parties,
in
alliance
with
different
interest
groups,
push
these
issues
into
the
parliamentary
agenda
in
order
to
promote
an
institutional
shift
and
foster
policy
change.
From
here
further
analysis
should
be
developed
in
order
to
explain
whether
interest
groups
participation
is
more
connected
to
issues
with
a
low
level
of
consensus,
like
the
case
of
abortion;
to
what
extend
the
low
correlation
with
governmental
bills
is
a
rational
response
of
political
parties
in
an
institutional
context
in
which
adoption
rate
of
governmental
bills
is
especially
high
(88%
of
the
governmental
bills
are
passed);
whether
the
type
of
government
has
an
impact
f
the
participation
of
interest
groups
at
the
parliamentary
arena;
or/and
whether
political
parties
call
for
the
participation
of
interest
groups
as
a
means
to
fill
an
information
gap,
or
by
the
contrary
to
engage
in
filibustering
practices
oriented
to
stop
the
legislative
process.
Actually,
the
fact
that
the
participation
of
interest
groups
is
so
high
for
some
issues,
like
same‐sex
marriage,
or
abortion
could
be
related
to
these
practices
by
conservative
parties
willing
to
prevent
policy
change.
Some
preliminary
conclusions
The
mobilization
of
interest
groups
at
the
Spanish
Parliament
is
especially
linked
to
the
priorities
of
parliamentary
groups
(correlation
is
high
and
significant)
but
not
to
the
priorities
of
the
Spanish
government.
Parliamentary
groups
devote
most
of
their
time
and
resources
to
discuss
and
exchange
information
vís‐a‐vís
interest
groups
about
issues
that
are
especially
relevant
for
them,
leaving
in
a
second
stage,
the
discussion
of
issues
that
are
a
priority
for
the
Spanish
executive.
We
argue
that
this
is
partly
connected
to
institutional
factors.
The
participation
of
interest
groups
is
filtered
by
political
parties,
which
have
the
capacity
to
decide
who
is
going
to
participate
in
the
comparecencias.
Despite
this
further
analysis
should
be
made
in
order
to
test
the
relevance
of
other
institutional
factors,
mainly
the
type
of
government
and
the
composition
of
parliamentary
committees.
In
this
paper
we
also
show
that
mobilization
of
interest
varies
across
issues:
interest
groups
participation
is
especially
relevant
about
right
related
issues,
energy
and
the
environment,
while
the
opposite
occurs
for
issues
like
foreign
affairs,
governmental
issues
and/or
the
economy
which
capture
an
important
share
of
the
governmental
agenda.
Differences
also
exist
across
type
of
actors
in
terms
of
issue
attention
of
degree
of
mobilization.
Mobilization
is
especially
large
for
the
case
of
NGOs
and
trade
associations
and
also
very
dispersed
across
a
wide
range
of
organizations
that
on
average
only
participate
in
one
comparecencia
or
hearing.
Despite
this,
our
results
also
indicate
that
there
are
a
few
organizations
that
participate
more
than
others
(the
top
20
interest
organizations
capture
20%
of
all
hearings),
and
this
is
especially
the
case
of
the
two
main
unions
(CCOO
and
UGT)
and
the
two
main
business
organizations
(CEOE
and
CEPYME).
Finally,
in
this
paper
we
also
introduce
a
new
dataset
about
the
comparecencias
(or
hearings)
of
interest
groups,
created
following
the
methodology
of
the
Advocacy
and
Public
Policymaking
Project
and
the
Comparative
Agendas
Project,
in
order
to
capture
the
number
and
type
of
interest
groups,
as
well
as
the
issues
they
are
involved
along
three
legislatures.
This
is
a
first
step
of
what
we
hope
to
be
a
larger
research
project
oriented
to
increase
our
understanding
of
the
role
of
interest
groups
in
the
Spanish
political
system,
and
also
to
provide
a
new
instrument
to
develop
quantitative
and
qualitative
comparative
analysis
across
countries
and
policy
subsystems.
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Tables
and
figures
Table
1:
Comparecencias
by
type
of
actor
at
the
Spanish
Parliament,
1996
to
2008.
1996‐2000
2000‐2004
2004‐2008
Type
of
actor
N
%
N
%
N
%
Members
of
1.508
32,74
1.687
40,42
1.309
32,27
government
in
office
Public
officials
in
office
2.439
52,95
1.898
45,47
1.870
46,09
Interest
groups
and
659
14,31
589
14,11
878
21,64
other
personalities
TOTAL
4.606
100
4.174
100
4.057
100
Table
2:
Advocacy
and
Public
Policymaking
Project:
Type
of
Actor
codes
Description
Code
Actor
Type
Citizen,
ideological,
or
cause‐oriented
group
2
Foundations,
non‐profit
providers,
etc.
3
Unions
5
Professional
Association
(members
individual
professionals)
6
Trade
Association
(members
corporations
or
businesses)
7
Business
Association
(such
as
the
Business
Round
Table
or
the
Chamber
of
Commerce;
business
groups
not
associated
8
with
one
particular
industry)
Corporation
–
for
profit
21
State
and
Local
Government
Official
50
Individual
Outside
Expert
54
Others
56
Table
3
Policy
Agendas
Major
Topic
Codes
1. Macroeconomics
12.
Internal
affairs
and
justice
2. Civil
rights
13.
Social
Policy
3. Health
14.
Housing
4. Agriculture
15.
Commerce
and
industrial
policy
5. Labour
16.
Defence
6. Education
17.
Science
and
Technology
7. Environment
18.
Foreign
Trade
8. Energy
19.
International
Affairs
10. Transportation
20.
Government
and
Public
Administration
21.
Public
Lands
and
water
management
Table
4.‐
Number
of
interest
groups
in
the
Spanish
Parliament
1996‐2010
Type
Interest
Number
%
Number
%
Hearings/
group
of
of
interest
groups
interest
Hearings
groups
NGOs
294
34,39
425
32,5
1,45
Foundations
48
5,61
61
4,6
1,27
Unions
57
6,67
188
14,4
3,3
Professional
72
8,42
118
9,1
1,64
Associations
Trade
associations
223
26,08
288
22,1
1,29
Business
organizations
and
chambers
of
commerce
Corporations
Total
general
25
2,92
55
4,2
2,2
136
855
15,91
173
100
1.308
13,2
1,27
100
1,53
Table
5.
Top
21
nterest
groups
Comparecencias
(%)
Comparecencias
(N)
Name
of
the
organization
3,89
3,50
50
45
1,79
1,63
23
21
1,09
14
0,78
0,70
10
9
0,70
9
0,62
0,62
8
8
0,62
0,54
8
7
0,54
7
0,54
0,47
0,47
0,47
0,47
7
6
6
6
6
6
0,47
6
0,47
0,47
6
CCOO
UGT
Confederación
Española
de
Organizaciones
Empresariales
(CEOE)
Comité
Español
de
Minusválidos
(CERMI)
Fundación
ONCE
Confederación
Española
Pequeña
y
Mediana
Empresa
(CEPYME)
Cruz
Roja
Española
Coordinadora
de
Organizaciones
de
Agricultores
y
Ganaderos
(COAG)
Organización
de
Consumidores
y
Usuarios
(OCU)
Cáritas
Unión
de
Pequeños
Agricultores
y
Ganaderos
(UPA)
Confederación
Intersindical
Galega
(CIG)
Confederación
Sindical
Independiente
de
Funcionarios
(CSIF)
Unión
Española
de
Entidades
Aseguradoras
y
Reaseguradoras
(UNESPA)
Asociación
de
Mujeres
Juristas
THEMIS
Federación
de
Asociaciones
de
Mujeres
Progresistas
Greenpeace
España
Ecologistas
en
Acción
Artistas
Intérpretes
o
Ejecutantes
Sociedad
de
Gestión
de
España
(AIE)
Confederación
de
Cooperativas
Agrarias
de
España
(CCAE)
Asociación
Agraria
de
Jóvenes
Agricultores
(ASAJA)
Type
of
actor
5
5
8
2
3
8
3
7
2
2
7
5
5
7
6
2
2
2
6
7
7
Table
6.
Issue
attention
across
legislatures
Issue
1996‐2000
permanency
in
Partido
Popular
under
the
agenda
minority
Crisis
and
Tax
fraud
focusing
events
Fraud
related
to
EU
subsidies
for
line
production
2000‐2004
2004‐2008
Partido
Popular
under
PSOE
under
minority
majority
Prestige
(oil
spill)
Gescartera
(financial
scandal)
11‐M
Al‐Qaeda
terrorist
attack
Two
or
more
Women
rights
legislatures
in
the
Immigration
agenda
Drug
abuse
Issues
related
to
the
handicapped
Aging
and
retirement
(Pacto
de
Toledo)
Nuclear
energy
Road
safety
Property
rights
Consumer
rights
Only
one
Industrial
Policy
Social
responsiveness
of
Health
reform
Corporations
legislature
in
the
EMU
Problems
related
to
Small
agenda
Labour
reform
and
Medium
Enterprises
Minority
rights
(Gipsy,
Educational
reform
homosexuals)
Police
Domestic
violence
Illegal
traffic
with
children
and
women
Army
reform
Social
responsiveness
of
Corporations
Health
reform
Prostitution
Climate
Change
Abortion
Tobacco
Pharmaceuticals
Labour
reform
Domestic
violence
Table
7.
Percentage
of
issue
attention
across
issues
in
different
policy‐making
channels,
1996‐2008
Parliamentary
Governmental
comparecencias
groups
bills
bills
speeches
Economy
2,65
4,65
18,08
14,46
Rights
12,99
10,31
4,42
5,92
Health
6,10
2,02
3,46
2,99
Agriculture
3,76
0,81
3,65
0,92
Labour
12,25
10,82
5,00
8,88
Education
10,10
7,68
3,08
7,40
Environment
6,28
2,53
2,69
1,40
Energy
3,45
0,20
1,35
0,64
Transportation
3,08
3,03
5,38
1,95
Law
and
justice
12,25
15,07
12,50
15,07
Social
policy
9,30
8,80
0,96
2,29
Housing
0,37
2,63
1,15
1,73
Commerce
and
banking
5,54
5,36
12,88
1,62
Defense
0,86
5,26
3,65
3,35
Research
and
Development
3,94
4,15
4,04
3,07
Foreign
trade
1,60
0,00
0,58
1,09
Foreign
Affairs
3,94
1,31
5,58
11,67
Governmental
affairs
1,54
13,85
8,65
14,15
Figure
1:
Number
of
comparecencias
(hearings)
per
year
250
200
Corporations
150
Business
Associations
Trade
Associations
Professional
Associations
100
Unions
Foundations
50
ONG
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
0
Figure
2.
Comparecencias
(Hearings)
by
topic
and
type
of
actor
100,00
90,00
80,00
Corporations
70,00
Business
Associations
60,00
Trade
Associations
50,00
40,00
Professional
Associations
Unions
30,00
20,00
10,00
Foundations
Economy
Rights
Health
Agriculture
Labour
Education
Environment
Energy
Transportation
Law
and
justice
Social
policy
Housing
Commerce
and
banking
Defense
Research
and
Development
Foreign
trade
Foreign
Affairs
Governmental
affairs
0,00
ONG
Figure
3:
Concentration
of
the
agenda
of
interest
groups
across
policy
issues
at
the
Spanish
Parliament,
1996‐2009
0,18
0,16
0,14
0,12
0,1
0,08
0,06
0,04
0,02
0
HerZindhal
index
normalized
Figure
4.
Participation
of
interest
groups
by
type
of
Committee,
1996‐2009
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
no
permanent
permanent
Figure
5.
Percentage
of
attention
across
issues
(Comparecencias
of
interest
groups
from
1996
to
2009)
Governmental
affairs
Foreign
Affairs
Foreign
trade
Research
and
Development
Defense
Commerce
and
banking
Housing
Social
policy
Law
and
justice
Transportation
Energy
Environment
Education
Labour
Agriculture
Health
Rights
Economy
0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
10,00
12,00
14,00
i