The mindsets of political compromise
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Citation
Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. 2010. The mindsets of
political compromise. Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 4: 1125–1143.
doi:10.1017/s1537592710003270.
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doi:10.1017/s1537592710003270
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June 15, 2017 11:05:56 PM EDT
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TheMindsetsofPoliticalCompromise
Submittedandrevised7-31-10
AmyGutmann
PresidentandChristopherH.BrowneDistinguishedProfessorofPoliticalScience
UniversityofPennsylvania
[email protected]
DennisThompson
AlfredNorthWhiteheadProfessorofPoliticalPhilosophy
HarvardUniversity
[email protected]
Acknowledgements:
WearegratefulforresearchassistanceprovidedbyEricaJaffeandSigalBen-Porath
Abstract
PoliticalcompromiseisdifficultinAmericandemocracyeventhoughnoonedoubtsitis
necessary.Itisdifficultformanyreasonsincludingtheincreasedpoliticalpolarizationthat
hasbeenwidelycriticized.Wearguethattheresistancetocompromisecannotbefully
appreciatedwithoutunderstandingitssourceinthedemocraticprocessitselfespeciallyas
conductedintheU.S.TheincursionofcampaigningintogoverninginAmerican
democracy—thesocalled“permanentcampaign”—encouragespoliticalattitudesand
argumentsthatmakecompromisemoredifficult.Theseconstitutewhatwecallthe
uncompromisingmindset,whichischaracterizedbypoliticians’standingonprincipleand
distrustingopponents.Thismindsetisconducivetocampaigningbutnottogoverning
becauseitstandsinthewayofnecessarychange,andtherebybiasesthedemocratic
processinfavorofthestatusquo.Theuncompromisingmindsetcanbekeptincheckbyan
oppositeclusterofattitudesandarguments—thecompromisingmindset—thatinclines
politicianstoadaptprinciplesandrespectopponents.Thismindsetismoreappropriatefor
governingbecauseitenablespoliticiansmorereadilytorecognizeandactonopportunities
fordesirablecompromise.Weexplorethedynamicsofthesemindsetsbyexaminingthe
processesthattheledtothecompromisesontaxreformin1986andhealthcarereformin
2010.
TheMindsetsofPoliticalCompromise
Whyiscompromiseonmajorissuessohardindemocraticpoliticswhennoonedoubtsthat
itisnecessary?Wearguethatasignificantsourceoftheresistancetopoliticalcompromise
liesinthedemocraticprocessitself.Theincreasingincursionofcampaigningintogoverning
inAmericandemocracy—the“permanentcampaign”1—encouragespoliticalattitudesand
argumentsthatmakecompromisemoredifficult.Theresistancetocompromiseisa
problemforanydemocracybecauseitstandsinthewayofchangethatnearlyeveryone
agreesisnecessary,andtherebybiasesthepoliticalprocessinfavorofthestatusquo.
Theresistancetodemocraticcompromiseisanchoredinwhatwecallan
uncompromisingmindset,aclusterofattitudesandargumentsthatencouragestandingon
principleanddistrustingopponents.2Thismindsetisconducivetocampaigningbutnotto
governing.Theresistancecanandshouldbekeptincheckbyanoppositeclusterof
attitudesandarguments—thecompromisingmindset—whichfavorsadaptingone’s
principlesandrespectingone’sopponents.Itisthemindsetmoreappropriatefor
governingbecauseitenablespoliticiansmorereadilytorecognizeopportunitiesfor
desirablecompromise.Politicalscientistshaveexposedtheharmfulconsequencesof
misplacedcampaigning,buthavenotconnectedthisproblemwiththemindsetsweanalyze
hereandtheirimplicationsfordemocraticcompromise.
Theinfluenceofcampaigningisnotnecessarilygreaterthanotherfactorsthatmake
compromisesmoredifficult,suchasincreasedpolarizationandtheimmenseinfluenceof
moneyindemocraticpolitics.Butthemindsetassociatedwithcampaigningdeserves
greaterattentionthanithasreceived,first,becauseitreinforcesalltheotherfactors.Even
sharpideologicaldifferences,forexample,wouldpresentlessofanobstacletocompromise
intheabsenceofthecontinualpressuresofcampaigning.Second,unliketheotherfactors,
campaigningisanessentialanddesirablepartofthedemocraticprocess.Itbecomesa
problemonlywhenitinterfereswithgoverning—anotherequallyessentialpartofthe
process.3Finally,ifwewanttomakedemocracymorefriendlytowardcompromisewe
needtounderstandnotonlythepartisanpositionsandpoliticalintereststhataffect
compromisebutalsotheargumentsandattitudesthatpoliticiansusetoresistorsupportit.
-2-
TwoCompromises
Tobegintodiagnosetheresistancetocompromises,weturntotwopiecesofhistoric
legislation—theTaxReformActof1986(TRA)4andthePatientProtectionandAffordable
CareActof2010(ACA).5
TheTRAwasthemostcomprehensivetaxreformlegislationinmodernAmerican
history,achievedonlyafteryearsoffailedattempts.6Thehistoriceffortbeganwithout
muchfanfare.Inhisstateoftheunionaddressin1984,PresidentReagancalledmerelyfora
studyoftheproblem,withareporttobesubmittedaftertheelection.TheCongressional
Democratsdidnotthinkhewasseriousaboutreform.WalterMondale,hischallengerinthe
election,showednointerestinmakingtaxreformanissue,especiallyaftermakinghis
commentthatwhoeverwaspresidentwouldhavetoraisetaxes.
Thehardworkonthebillbeganquietly,withexpertsmeetingsecretlyinthe
TreasuryDepartment.TheproposalsthatcameoutofTreasurywereturnedintoa
bipartisancompromise,forgedwiththesupportofPresidentRonaldReagan,Democratic
HouseWaysandMeansCommitteeChairmanDanRostenkowski,andlaterwiththehelpof
RepublicanChairmanoftheSenateFinanceCommitteeBobPackwoodandDemocratBill
Bradley.
AllsupportersoftheTRAgainedsomethingtheydesired,butallalsomade
concessionsthatflewinthefaceoftheirmostprincipledreasonsforsupporting
comprehensivetaxreforminthefirstplace.Democratswantedtoendloopholesforspecial
interestsandthewealthy,buttheyalsoagreedtoradicallylowerthetoptaxrate(from50
percentto28percent).Republicanswantedtolowermarginaltaxrates,buttheyalso
agreedtoeliminate$30billionannuallyintaxdeductions,whichresultedinthewealthy
contributingahigherpercentageofincome-taxrevenuesthantheypreviouslyhaddone.
Compromises—eventhemostsuccessfulones,liketheTRA—neversatisfypure
principles.Amajorscholaroftaxlaw,CharlesGalvin,comparestheTRAtoaseriesof
principledtaxreformplans,andfindsitlacking.Hewritesthat“Weareadvisedthatthisis
themostsweepinglegislationinfiftyyears,thatitisamodeloffairnessandequity...I
dislikebeingacynicoraspoilsport,butIamnotatallconvincedbythepropaganda.”7After
itpassed,itssupportersralliedtoitsdefense,callingitlandmarklegislation.Itwas—if
comparedtopreviousorsubsequenttaxreform.Butjudgedbytheverysamesetofmoral
principlesinvokedbyitsstaunchestsupporters,theTRAstillfellfarshort.
-3-
Nowfastforwardtotheeffortstopassahealthcarereformbillin2009-10.8The
issueplayedamajorroleinthecampaignsleadinguptoboththeDemocraticprimaryand
thegeneralelection.Mostofthemajorcandidatespresentedproposalsthatweremore
detailedthanisusualinacampaign.9OnceinofficeObamamadehealthcarereforma
priority.Atfirst,hesignaledthathewasopentocompromiseonthedetailsofhisproposal,
andthenleftthenegotiationslargelytoCongressionalleaders.(RelyingonCongressional
leaderswasessentiallythesamestrategythatPresidentReaganhadfollowedwithtax
reform).WhenCongresswasunabletoreachagreementbytheAugustrecess,thecampaign
ineffectbeganagain,withopponentstakingadvantageofthebreaktomobilizeopinion
againstthependingproposals—andoftencaricaturesoftheproposals.Theeffectwasto
endwhateversmallhopetheremighthavebeenforbipartisancompromise.Thereformers
thenturnedtothetaskofcompromisewithintheDemocraticParty,achallengethatturned
outtobenearlyasgreat.
Thefirstbillpassedwithonlyafive-votemajorityintheHouseinNovember2009.
TheSenatepasseditsownbillonthedaybeforeChristmas.AstheleadersintheHouseand
Senateweretryingtoforgeacompromisebetweenthetwosignificantlydifferentbillsearly
in2010,aspecialelectioninMassachusettserasedtheSenateDemocrat’sfilibuster-proof
majority,andcausedmanymoderateDemocratsinboththeSenateandtheHouseto
reconsidertheirsupport.Thecampaignmentalityreturnedwithavengeance.Negotiations
hadtobepostponed,thereformproposalsdivided,anunusualprocedure(reconciliation)
invoked,andthefinalresultrenderedlesscomprehensivethananyoftheoriginal
proposals.
AlthoughtheACAwasnotbipartisan,ithadthesamecharacteristicsthatdefined
theTRAandallpoliticalcompromises—mutualsacrificeandwillfulopposition.Allthose
whovotedforthisbillgaveupsomethingthattheythoughtvaluable.Everyonewhovoted
foroneofthetwobillsagreedtodisagreeovertheinclusion(orexclusion)ofapublic
option,greatercostcontrols,thekindofmandateduniversalcoverage,insurancecoverage
forabortionservices,andabortionfunding,amongotherissues.Bothsidesthoughtthe
compromisesfellshortoftheirprinciplesbecauseofthewillfuloppositionontheother
side.Althoughallwhosupportedthiscompromiseevidentlybelievedthelegislationwould
bebetterthanthestatusquo,theyalsobelievedthatthecompromisebillcouldhavebeen
stillbetterifonlytheiropponentshadbeenmorereasonable.
-4-
Thesetwohistoriceffortsvividlyunderscorehowdifficultitistoachieve
compromiseoncomprehensivereformonmajorissuesinU.S.politicalsystem.10Although
nearlyeveryoneagreedthattaxreformwaslongoverdueandhealthcareindireneedof
change,politicalleadersstruggledtoreachtheagreements,andtheagreementsfellshortof
whatreformershadsought.Bothaddressedamajorproblemthathadprovedresistantto
reformformanyyears,butonlytheTRAwaswidelyconsideredtobeasubstantial
improvementoverthestatusquo.ManysupportersoftheACAthoughtthatitwasonly
betterthannothing
Theseepisodesprovideinsightintotheobstaclestocompromise.Theyshowhow
thedefiningcharacteristicsofcompromise—mutualsacrificeandwillfulopposition—map
ontomindsetsthatfavorordisfavorcompromise.
Totheextentthatthetaxandhealthcarelegislationweresuccessful,bothsides
gaveupsomethingofvalue.Theneedformutualsacrificemakescompromisesinherently
difficult.11Citizensandtheirrepresentativeshavedifferentinterestsandvalues,and
naturallyresistgivingupsomethingtheycareabout,especiallyiftheybelievethatoneof
theircoreprinciplesisatstake.SupportersoftheTRAandACAbelievedthatthe
compromiseswouldimprovethestatusquo,buttheprincipledpositionsthatreformers
espoused—asimpleandtransparenttaxcodeoruniversalandaffordablehealthcare
coverage,forexample—didnotsurviveintactinthetangledprocessthatproducedthefinal
legislation.
Totheextentthatthesecompromisesweresuccessful,themutualdistrustsoeasily
generatedbywillfuloppositionwaspartiallysuspended.Atleastsomeoftheparties
respectedtheiropponentsenoughtomakethenecessaryconcessions.Butinbothcases,the
uncompromisingmindsetthatdistrustsopponentshungovertheprocessanditsaftermath.
Supportersaswellasopponentsofbothreformscontinuedtobelievethatthelegislation
couldhavebeenbetteriftheothersidehadbeenmorereasonable.EvenincaseoftheTRA,
theresistancewasrelentless,andthediscontentrife.Theopponents,undertheinfluenceof
theuncompromisingmindset,nearlyprevailed.Thesupporters,onlyfitfullytakingupthe
compromisingmindset,nearlyyielded.
Healthcarereformfaredworse.Boththeprocessandtheresultweremorewidely
andseverelycriticizedthananyaspectoftaxreform.Thesuspicionanddistrustthatare
characteristicoftheuncompromisingmindsetlingeredevenamongDemocrats.The
progressivewingfaultedtheirleadersandthePresidentforbetrayingtheircampaign
-5-
promises.Moderatescomplainedthattheircolleaguesdidnotappreciatehowpublic
opinionhadshiftedagainstthereform,andhowvulnerabletheywereinthecomingmidtermelection.
Tobesure,politicalpolarizationispartofthestoryofwhythiscompromisewasso
difficult.Thelowerdegreeofpartypolarizationmaywellpartlyexplainwhybipartisan
compromisewaspossibleinthecaseofTRAbutnottheACA.Butitdoesnotshedmuch
lightonwhycompromiseontheACAwithintheDemocraticPartywasatleastasdifficultas
compromiseontheTRAbetweenthetwoparties.Norisitsufficienttoaccountforthe
widespreadassumptionthatcompromiseonhealthcarereformcouldhavebeenmore
successfulifSenatorsOrinHatchandTedKennedyhadbeenabletocollaborateastheyhad
manytimesinthepast.12Polarizedprofilesdonotnecessarilypreventpoliticalopponents
fromfindingcommonground.Evenwhentheideologicalprofilesofpoliticalopponentsare
polarized,compromisingmindsetscanmakeadifference.
PoliticalscientistsdisagreeaboutthesourceofpolarizationintheU.S.—whether
onlyeliteshavebecomemorepolarized,oralsotheelectorate,andifthelattertowhat
extentelitesarethecause.13Identifyingmorepreciselythesourceofpolarizationcouldhelp
intargetingreformstoreduceobstaclestocompromise,butouranalysisdoesnotdepend
onresolvingthisdisagreement.Whateverthesourceofpolarization,understandingthe
mindsetswediscusshereisalsonecessary.Acompromisingmindsetcanmitigate,whilean
uncompromisingmindsetcanexacerbate,theeffectsofpolarizationonthedispositions
towardpoliticalcompromiseofbothpoliticalleadersandvoters.Thecharacteristicsof
thesemindsetsandtheirlinkstocampaigningandgoverningapplytopoliticalleadersor
votersorboth.
Toappreciatemorefullyhowpolarizationaffectscompromiseweneedtoconsider
itsrelationtothemindsetsassociatedwithcampaigningandgoverning.Polarizationclearly
exacerbatedthewillfuloppositionthatmadeboththeTRAandtheACAsodifficult.Unlike
agreementsconstrainedbyimpersonalforces,politicalcompromisesaretheproductof
humanwills,whicheachsidebelievescouldhavebeenotherwiseiftheiropponentshadnot
beensoobdurate.Indemocraticpolitics,moreover,theopposedwillsareorganizedinto
partiesandfactionswithinparties.Resistingconcessionsinthenegotiationsinboththe
TRAandACAwereopposingpartiesandfactionswithinpartiesthatweresuspiciousofnot
onlytheoppositionbuttheirownleadersandcolleagues.Themostpassionatesupporters
ofeachpartyandpartyfactionalsobelievedthattheirleaderscouldhavegainedmoreif
-6-
onlytheyhadbeenbolder.Thesepossibilitiesledtodistrustofmotivesanddoubtsabout
theoutcome.Thedistrustanddoubtinturnreflectedandreinforcedthepolarization.
Amongthemanydifferencesbetweentheprocessesthatledtothesecompromises
intheTRAandACA,oneisstrikinglyrelevanttounderstandingthemindsetsthatprevailed.
Taxreformwasnotanissueinthecampaignsbeforeorafterthecompromise,whilehealth
carereformwasanissuebefore(andwouldcontinuetobeafterward).Partlyasaresult,the
processthatledtotheTRAwasmoreresponsivetothecompromisingmindset,andthe
processthatproducedtheACAmoresusceptibletotheuncompromisingmindset.The
uncompromisingmindsetinherentincampaignsgainedlesstractionandthereforehadless
influenceinthelegislativeprocesslater.Furthermore,thepermanentcampaignthat
reinforcesthatmindsethasbeenmoreconspicuousinrecentyearsthaninthemid1980s
whentheTRAwasnegotiated.
Thespiritofthepermanentcampaignmaybeevenmorepervasivenowthanwhen
theClintondrivetoreformhealthcarefailed.Butthefailureofthateffortmayhavehelped
Obama:hecouldappealnotonlytothelessonslearnedbutalsotothebeliefthathis
leadershipofferedthelastchancetomakeanyprogressatallforseveralgenerations.Many
alsobelievedthatifhefailedonhealthcareinhisfirstyear,hewouldnotbeabletogovern
effectivelyontheotherissuesfortherestofhisterm.Significantlyforourargument,his
successdependedonhistiltingmoretowardagoverningmindset.Mostofhispolitical
adviserswarnedthattheunpopularcomprehensivereformhefavoredposedsignificant
electoralrisks(forhimandmoreimmediatelyforCongressionalDemocrats).His
persistence—especiallyaftertheDemocratslosttheirfilibusterproofmajorityinthe
Senate—couldplausiblybedescribedasdemonstratingagreatercommitmenttogoverning
wellthantocampaigningsuccessfully.14
Toexposemoreclearlythesourcesoftheresistancetodemocraticcompromises
exemplifiedinthesetwohistoricefforts,wefirstexplainhowthedemocraticprocessinthe
U.S.—itsdualdemandsofcampaigningandgoverning—dependsonbothkindsof
mindsets.15Thenweshowhowthelogicofthemindsetsthemselvesmakescompromise
moreorlessdifficult.Recognizingthedistinctivelogicofeachisanessentialsteptoward
makingmorespacefordesirablecompromises,andrestoringabetterbalancebetween
campaigningandgoverninginthedemocraticprocess.
-7-
TheConstraintsofCampaigning
Ifpublic-spiritedpoliticianswanttomakeapositivedifferencebylegislatingchange,why
don’ttheyanticipatethecompromiseproblemintheircampaignsandeducatevotersabout
theneedforaccommodation?Whydoevenpoliticianswhoclaimtofavorbipartisanship
campaignwithanuncompromisingmindset?Surelytheycanforeseethatthisstancewill
stiffentheoppositionandsetuptheirsupporterstoresistcompromisewhenitistimeto
govern.
ConsiderapoliticianrunningforPresidentwhodeclaresthatoneofhisprioritiesis
toreformhealthcare.Amongotherboldinitiatives,hepromisesa“NationalHealth
InsuranceExchangetohelpincreasecompetitionbyinsurers”(whichwouldincludetheso
calledpublicoption).Hestateshisunequivocaloppositiontoanylawthatrequires
everyonetobuyhealthinsurance(theindividualmandate),anapproachfavoredbyhis
mainrivalintheprimary.Hepromisesthathishealthcarereform“won’taddadimetothe
deficitandispaidforupfront.”Althoughhepresentshimselfaswillingto“reachacrossthe
aisle”andlookforcommonground,heoffersnoconcessionsatallduringthecampaign.16
ThisportraitisarecognizablelikenessofBarakObamainthecampaignsleadingup
totheelectionin2008.Butimagineamorecompromise-inclinedObama.17Insteadof
standingfirmlyinfavorofapublicoption,thisObamadecidestoeducatethepublicabout
theneedforcompromise.Whileexpressinghisownpositions,healsostatesexplicitly
whereheiswillingtomakeconcessionsandoutlinesthedealsheispreparedtoaccept.He
announcesthatheiswillingtocompromisewiththeopponentsofapublicoptionby
substitutingoptionalstateexperiments.Supposealsothatheanticipatesoneofthe
compromisesthatlaterwasofferedtotrytoresolvetheabortioncontroversy:hewouldbe
willingtogivestatespermissiontobartheuseoffederalsubsidiesforinsuranceplansthat
coverabortion(andrequireallinsurersinstatesthatdonotadoptthisbantodividetheir
subsidymoneyintoseparateaccountssothatonlydollarsformprivatepremiumscanbe
usedtopayforabortions).
Itisinstructivetoconsiderwhynocandidateislikelytocampaignasthis
hypotheticalObamadoes.First,candidatesarelesseffectiveinmobilizingandinspiring
supportersiftheytalkmoreaboutprudentcompromisesthanabouttheirsteadfast
commitments.Theirsupportandultimatelytheirsuccessinthecampaigndependon
reaffirmingtheiruncompromisingcommitmenttocoreprinciples,andondistinguishing
-8-
theirpositionssharplyfromthoseoftheiropponents.Votersneedtoseethedifferences
betweenthecandidatesasclearlyaspossible.
Second,signalingawillingnesstocompromiseonspecificpoliciesbeforeyour
opponentsofferanythinginreturnisobviouslynotastrategydesignedtoachievethemost
youcanreasonablywininthelegislativenegotiationstocome.Thisisnotonlyastrategic
imperativebutalsoamoralrequirement.Candidateshavearesponsibilitytotheirfollowers
toincreasethechancesofachievingwhattheypromise.Furthermore,theprocessof
compromiseitself,properlyconceived,involvesmutualsacrifice,whichexpressesakindof
reciprocitythatisabsentwhencandidatesmakeprematureconcessions.
Third,thetermsofcomplexpoliticalcompromisestypicallycannotbepredictedin
advanceofnegotiations.Indeed,theyshouldnotbe:themostsuccessfulcompromiseslike
theTRAoftenengagethepartiesinmodifyingtheirownviewsaboutwhatisacceptablein
theprocessofcraftingthecompromise.EvenifObamaknewingeneraltermsthathewould
needtocompromisesomeofhiscampaignpromisesinwaysthatwouldnotsitwellwithhis
base,hewouldhavebeenunwiseevenprivatelytothinkhecouldanticipatethespecific
concessionsthathewouldbewillingtomakeinordertopassahealthcarereformbill.No
onecouldhavepredictedthefinalshapeofthehealthcarereformbill,andfewpredicted
someoftheissuessuchasabortionthatwouldbecomemajorstickingpoints.
Asuccessfulcampaignstrategythusrequirestheoppositeofacompromising
mindset.Itfavorscandidateswhostandfirmlyontheirprinciples,andcondemntheir
opponents’positionsateveryturn.Candidatesmayhavetomodifytheirpositionstoreach
independents,butthatisasfarastheycango,andeventhatgesturetowardthecenteris
oftensuspectintheeyesoftheirmoreardentsupporters.
Buttogovern,electedleaderswhowanttogetanythingdonehavetoadopta
compromisingmindset.Ratherthanstandingtenaciouslyonprinciple,theyhavetomake
concessions.Ratherthandistrustingandtryingtodefeattheiropponentsateveryturn,they
havetorespecttheiropponentsenoughtocollaborateonlegislation.Intheiracceptance
speeches,manyelectedofficialssignaltheirintentiontomovetoacompromisingmindset
byvowingtobeeveryone’spresident—orgovernor,senator,orrepresentative—and
declaringnowtobethetimeforcomingtogether.
Theproblemforcompromiseisthatthecampaigndoesnotendthedayafterthe
election.InAmericandemocracy,ithasbecomeineffectpermanent.18Thisisonereason
whysomanycitizensarerightlyskepticalof“comingtogether”pronouncements.The
-9-
expectationsraisedbythepreviouscampaigncontinuetohangoverthebusinessof
governing.Evenwhenelectedleadersrecognizethedesirabilityofcompromise,their
staunchestsupportersstillwanttoholdthemtotheircampaignpromises,andbelievethat
theirpleasfortheneedforconcessionsareexaggerated.Atthesametime,thepreparations
forthenextcampaignbeginalmostimmediately.Positionsremainrigidanddifferences
furthersharpen,asbothsideslooktowardthenextelection.Individualegosplayaroletoo.
Politicianswhowantcreditforpassinglegislation(orcreditforstoppingit)mayrefuseto
cooperatewiththeirallies(ortrytounderminetheiropponents)whentheydon’tgettheir
way.
Themorethatcampaigningcomestodominategoverningindemocraticpolitics,the
hardercompromisebecomes.19Asthemindsetusefulforcampaigningovertakesthe
mindsetneededforgoverning,leaders—wherevertheystandonthepoliticalspectrum—
arelesslikelytosee,letaloneseize,opportunitiesfordesirablecompromise.AsObama
observedduringanexchangewithCongressionalRepublicans:“It’sveryhardtohavethe
kindofbipartisanworkthatwe’regoingtodobecausethewholequestionwasstructured
asatalkingpointforrunningacampaign.”20
Campaigninginanuncompromisingstyleplaysamoralaswellaspracticalrolein
democraticpolitics.Itisanecessaryelementofanelectoralsystemwithcompetitive
elections,andthereforealegitimatepartofthedemocraticprocess.Butbymaking
compromisemoredifficult,itobstructsgoverning,anothernolesslegitimateandinmany
waysmorecentralpartoftheprocess.Thatistheinternaltensioninpoliticalcompromise:
thedemocraticprocessrequirespoliticiansbothtoresistcompromiseandtoembraceit.
Theuncompromisingmindsetthatcharacterizescampaigningcannotandshouldnotbe
eliminatedfromdemocraticpolitics,butwhenitcomestodominategoverning,itobstructs
thesearchfordesirablecompromises.Itislikeaninvasivespeciesthattendstospread
beyonditsnaturalhabitatasitroamsfromthecampaigntothegovernment.
TheproblemismostpronouncedintheU.S.wherecampaignslastlongerandterms
ofmanyofficesareshorter.Butitisnotentirelyabsentinanydemocracyinwhichthe
habitsofthecampaignpersistintheroutinesofgovernment.Severalstudiesofthe
“Americanization”ofcampaignshavefoundthat,althoughthecharacterofcampaigns
variesaccordingtolocalcustomsandpoliticalculture,nearlyallarelookingmoreandmore
likethoseintheU.S.21Asthistrendcontinues,manyotherdemocraciesarelikelyto
confrontthechallengeofkeepingcampaigninginitsplace.
-10-
TheValueofCompromise
Iftheincreasingdominationofcampaigningovergoverningismakingcompromisemore
difficult,whyshouldwebeconcerned?Afterall,somecompromisesareundesirable,and
politiciansshouldsometimesstandresolutelyonfundamentalprinciplesandoppose
legislationthatviolatethoseprinciples.
Thechiefreasontobeconcernedisthatthegreatertheresistancetocompromise,
thegreaterthebiasinfavorofthestatusquo.22Littlechangecanhappenindemocratic
politicswithoutsomecompromise,andalmostnomajorchangecanhappenwithoutmajor
compromises.Withoutcompromiseonhealthcareandtaxationorothermajorissues,the
statusquoprevailsevenifitpreservesapolicythatserveseveryone’sinterestslesswell.Of
course,thestatusquocansometimesbedefendedagainstanyoftheavailablealternatives,
butageneralresistancetocompromisesimplausiblypresumesthatthestatusquoisalways
moredefensiblethanacompromiseforchange,orthatitisalwaysamistaketoyield
somethingtoone’spoliticaladversariesevenwhentheyarewillingtoyieldsomethingto
you.Privilegingthestatusquointhiswayisnotconsistentwitheitheraprincipledliberal
oraprincipledconservativestancetowardpolitics.
Theresistancetocompromisealsounderminespracticesofmutualrespectthatare
essentialforarobustdemocraticprocess.Thevalueofmutualrespectisprominentin
deliberativetheoriesofdemocracy,whereitsupportsthebasicprinciplethatlawsmustbe
justifiedbyappealingtoreasonsthatshouldbeacceptabletofreeandequalpersons
seekingfairtermsofcooperation.23Butmutualrespectplaysanimportant(though
sometimesimplicit)roleinmostothertheoriesofdemocracy.Itexpressesthefundamental
ideathatcitizensshouldbetreatednotmerelyasobjectsoflegislation,butasautonomous
agentswhohavetherighttotakepartinthemakingofthelaws.Theprocessinwhichthey
exercisethatrightpresupposesatleastaminimalformofmutualrespect,understoodasa
reciprocalpositiveregardsharedbycitizensthathelpsademocracyendureinthefaceof
irresolvablemoraldisagreement.Whenpartiesenterintonegotiationsinbadfaith,
deliberatelymisrepresenttheiropponents’positions,andrefusetocooperateevenon
mattersonwhichtheycouldfindcommonground,theyunderminerelationshipsofrespect
thatarenecessarytosustainanymorallyjustifiabledemocracyunderthemodern
conditionsofdeepandpersistentdisagreement.
Finally,politicalcompromisesneedtobeencouragedbecauseallcompromisesby
theirnatureareperpetuallyvulnerabletocriticismfromallsides.Everycompromise
-11-
sacrificessomethingofvaluetoeachside,andgivesrisetosuspicionsthatbutforthebase
motivesoftheothersidetheagreementcouldhavebeenbetter.Althoughcompromisesare
typicallyseenas(andoftenare)theproductsofunprincipledbargaining,and
reinforcementsoftheprevailingbalanceofpower,theyarealsosometimestheprimary
(andoftentheonly)meansbywhichdemocraticpoliticscanimproveuponthestatusquo.24
Compromiseisofcoursenotthepreeminentvalueofthedemocraticprocess.
Uncompromisingpoliticshasalargeandvaluableplacenotonlyincampaignsbutalsoin
socialmovements,protests,demonstrations,activistorganizationsandtheirsurrogatesin
government.Therewouldbenothingtocompromiseiftherewerenoun-compromisers.As
commentatorsnoted,liberalsneedradicals,andpresumablymoderatesneedradicalson
bothsides.25Aspoliticaltheoristsandpoliticalscientistshavelongrecognized,
contestationisatleastasimportantasconsensusinademocracy.26Contentiouspoliticsis
notanecessaryevilbutanessentialpartofthedemocraticprocess.However,thevalueof
compromiseandthemindsetthatsupportsitareespeciallyimportantinthelegislative
processforthereasonswehavesuggested,andthereforeanespeciallyimportantvirtue
thatacriticalmassoflegislatorsandleadersshouldcultivate.
Tomakedemocracysaferfordesirablecompromise,weneedtounderstandbetter
howtheuncompromisingandcompromisingmindsetsfunction—specifically,thestrengths
andweaknessesoftheargumentstheyexpressandtheattitudestheyreflect.Examining
eachinturncanalsoshowwhytheuncompromisingmindsetfitswithcampaigning,andthe
compromisingmindset,withgoverning.
TheUncompromisingMindset
Thisuncompromisingmindsethastwodimensions:principledtenacity,whichaddresses
thesacrificethatcompromiseentails,andmutualmistrust,whichrespondstothewillful
oppositionthatcompromiseinvolves.27
PRINCIPLEDTENACITY
Becausecompromisesoftenrequirebothsidestosacrificesomeoftheirstronglyheld
principlestoenterintotheagreement,theymayberesistedbecausetheyarethoughtto
violateadeeplyheldcorevalue.Takingastandagainstcompromiseitselfcomestobeseen
astheonlyprincipledposition.“Itisnottheprincipledpartisan,howeverobnoxioushemay
seemtohisopponents,whodegradesourpublicdebate,butthepreening,selfstyled
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statesmanwhoelevatescompromisetoafirstprinciple.Forthetruestatesmen...arenot
definedbywhattheycompromisebutbywhattheydonot.”28Standingonprincipleisof
coursesometimesanadmirablestancetotakeinpolitics.Burke’sspeechtohisconstituents
inBristol—inwhichhedefendedfollowinghisconscienceagainsttheopinionofhis
electors—stillhasresonance.Profilesincouragestillhavethepowertoinspireour
admiration.Thatispartofthesourceofthecontinuinginfluenceofthismindset.29Butifall
politiciansrejectedallcompromisesthatviolatetheirprinciples,thennoparticular
compromisewouldeverbeacceptable.
Howcanoneconsistentlyacceptthegeneralvalueofcompromisebutreject
particularcompromisesthatviolateone’sprinciples?Therearetwocommonanswers.The
firsttriestodistinguishcompromisesofprinciplefromcompromisesofinterest,rejecting
theformerwhileacceptingthelatter.Thesecondanswerwouldacceptsomecompromises
ofprinciple,butnotthosethatwouldviolateabasichumanvalueofsomekind.Neither
answerissatisfactory.
Principlesv.Interests
Ifwecoulddistinguishdisagreementsaboutprinciplesfromthoseofinterests,wecould
followthecommonmaxim:nevercompromiseyourprinciples,onlyyourinterests.The
difficultyofcompromisingwoulddiminish,andcompromiseswouldbemoreeasily
attained.Thedifficultyofcompromisingwoulddiminishevenfurtherifwecouldtransform
mostprinciplesintointerests.Indeed,thisapproach—distinguishingprinciplesfrom
interests,andtryingtotransformmostprinciplesintointerests—isoftenrecommendedin
theliteratureondisputeresolution.Trytoturndisputesoverprinciplesintobargainsabout
interestsbecause(itisassumed)interestsareamenabletobargainingwhileprinciplesare
not.Thedistinctionistypicallybetweenmaterialinterestsunderstoodasincome,wealth,
andthethingsthatmoneycanbuy,andmoralprinciplesinterpretedasvaluestowhich
individualsarecommittedaspartoftheiridentityoroutofstrongethicalconviction.When
interestsareatstake,itisthoughttobeeasiertofindawayforeachsidetogiveup
something.Whenprinciplesandrelatedvaluesareatissue,itoftenseemsthatoneorboth
sidesaregivingupmorethananyoneshould.
Manyscholarsaswellaspoliticianshavegravitatedtowardthisposition,perhaps
becauseitrestsonadistinctionthatseemshigh-minded—betweenmaterialinterestsand
principlesofjustice.30Thecompromise-interests-not-principlesmaximisfrequently
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invokedasthewaytoresolvethemoralambiguityinpoliticalcompromise.Michael
Ignatieff,theleaderoftheLiberalPartyintheCanadianParliamentandalsoawellknown
authorofbookson(amongothertopics)politicalethics,succinctlyarticulatesthisposition
whenhesays:“Sometimessacrificingmyjudgmenttotheirsistheessenceofmyjob.
Provided,ofcourse,thatIdon’tsacrificemyprinciples…Fixedprinciplematters.Thereare
somegoodsthatcannotbetraded.”31
Themaximisattractive,andmaywellappealtopotentialvotersonthecampaign
trail.Butneitheritsnegativeclaimthatprinciplescannotbecompromisednoritspositive
claimthatinterestscanbeeasilycompromisedissustainable.Thenearabsolutebanon
compromisebasedonmoralprincipleturnsouttoencompassalmostallofdemocratic
politics.Theprinciplesoffairnessandequitythatwereprominentlyinvokedinthedrivefor
taxreformin1986certainlywouldhaveblockedanycompromiseontaxreform,despitethe
improvementsonthestatusquothattheTRAachievedfromthemoralperspectiveofallits
supporters.Everythingatstakeincraftingacompromiseonhealthcarecouldbeassigned
toeitherthecategoryofaprincipleoraninterest,butdistinguishingthevaluesinthisway
makeslittlesense.Presumably,universalhealthcarecoverageisaprinciple,sotherecanbe
nocompromisethatwouldcoverlessthantheentireAmericanpopulation(ortheentire
citizenryiftheprincipleisthoughttoapplyonlytocitizens).Yetwhywouldn’titbemoral
(andpractical)toagreetocovermoreAmericansthanarepresentlycovered,evenifthat
entailscompromisingthemorallydefensibleprincipleofuniversalhealthcarecoverage?
Whateverouranswertothisquestion,itcannotrestonthefactthatuniversalcoverageisa
principle,notaninterest.Presumably,thecostofhealthcaretotaxpayersisaninterest,but
whywoulditbemoraltocompromiseonhealthcarereformbyagreeingtoescalatethecost
ofhealthcarebeyondwhatahealthyeconomycansustainorbeyondwhatisneededto
providehighqualityhealthcareandbetteroutcomes?Themainproblemisnotthatthe
distinctionbetweeninterestsandprinciplesisfuzzy(whichitis),butratherthatany
distinctionbetweenintereststhatmaybecompromisedandprinciplesthatshouldnotwill
condemntoomanypotentiallydesirablecompromises,mostofwhichrequiresome
sacrificeofprinciple.Alternatively,ifeverythingapoliticianwantstocompromiseis
categorizedasaninterest,thenthedistinctionjustifiestoomanycompromisesofinterests
evenwhensomecitizensareunfairlydisadvantagedorundulyburdened,orboth.
Theoperativeideabehindthepositiveclaimthatcompromisinginterestsis
acceptableseemstobethatamaterialinterest—especiallywhenitcanbeputinmonetary
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terms—iseasytotrade-off,sincemoneyissupposedlyfungiblewhileprinciplesare
presumablynot.32Aninsurmountableproblemwiththisclaimisthatfewmaterialinterests,
andalmostnoimportantmaterialinterests,presentthemselvesindemocraticpolitics
unattachedtomoralprinciples.Containingthecostofhealthcareisconnectedto,among
otherprinciples,theprincipleofprovidingallindividualswiththebasicneedsoflife.To
manypeople,satisfyingbasicneedsisacoremoralprinciple.Mostofthemajormaterial
interestsatissueindemocraticpolitics—suchasthefiscalhealthofsocialsecurity,the
extensionofunemploymentinsurance,theprovisionofforeignaid—aresimilarly
inseparablefromfairness,equity,andothercoreprinciplesofjustice.Taxationisaclear
exampleofavastsetofpoliciesthatobviouslyaffectmaterialinterests,butoneneedonly
considertheclaimsmadeindebatesabouttheestate(“death”)tax,theprogressiveincome
tax,ortaxesmoregenerallytoseethatthepoliciessignificantlyimplicatefundamental
valuesBoththeproponentsandopponentsofthesepoliciesgenerallyresttheircasein
significantpartonprinciplesofdistributivejustice.
Acceptablev.UnacceptableCompromisesofPrinciple
Considerthebestrecentattempttodistinguishacceptablefromunacceptable
compromises.33AvishaiMargalitdefendswhathecallsthe“decentkind”ofcompromise.34
Mostdemocraticcompromises,heargues,aredecentandshouldnotberejectedonthe
basisofabsoluteprinciples.Proposedagreementsshouldbecomparedtothestatusquo
andsubjecttothemorallymessyprocessesofpoliticalnegotiation.Hewouldruleoutfewif
anycompromisesthattakeplacewithintheconstraintsofaconstitutionaldemocracy.He
drawsthelineatcompromisesthat“perpetuatecrueltyandhumiliation,”whichhecalls
“rotten”(asdistinctfrom“decent”).35YetMargalitendsupadvocatingsomeviolationsof
evenhismostbasicprinciple.Hesupportscompromisesthatpermitcrueltyandhumiliation
foranentiregenerationifthelong-termbenefits(inreducingcrueltyandhumiliation)are
greatenough.Hisabsoluteprincipleturnsoutnottobeabsoluteafterall.Hisattemptto
drawaclearprincipledlinefoundersforthreereasonsthatwillalsofrustratetheuseofany
suchstandardtodetermineinadvancewhetheracompromiseisacceptable.
Thefirstreasonisthatanyunconditionalstandard(atleastanythatispolitically
relevant)willblocksomedecentcompromisesthatimproveonthestatusquo.Thisiswhy
Margalitrefusestoruleoutallcompromisesthatperpetuatehumiliationandcruelty.For
theverysamereason,undersomecircumstances,rejectingcompromisesthatperpetuate
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crueltyandhumiliationformorethanonegenerationmayperpetuateevenmorecruelty
andhumiliationforevenlonger.Theproblemwithdrivingamoralstakeinthegroundat
onegeneration—oranywhereelse—isthatitarbitrarilylimitstherangeofconsequences
thatshouldbeconsideredinassessingwhetherthecompromiseisanimprovementover
thestatusquo.
Thesecondreasonthatanyunconditionalstandardisnothelpfulistheflipsideof
thefirstreason.Standingonanabsoluteprincipletorejectacompromiseshouldnotimply
thatanyothercompromise(whichdoesnotviolatetheabsoluteprinciple)isacceptable.
Surelyweshouldwanttocriticizesomecompromiseseveniftheysatisfytheminimalist
standardofnotperpetuatingcrueltyandhumiliationformorethanageneration.36Noteven
therule“compromisewheneverthepolicyisanimprovementonthestatusquo”is
unconditional.Somecompromisesthatimproveonthestatusquoarelikelytoblockfurther
progressandsetdangerousproceduralprecedents—forexample,bylegitimatingdeception
ormanipulationbymorepowerfulandprivilegedparties.Evenqualificationstothestatus
quorulewouldbemisleadingweretheytobeelevatedintounconditionalprinciples.Itmay
bemorallypreferablenottostandunconditionallyonanypre-ordainedprinciple—whether
substantiveorprocedural.
Thethirdreasonwhystandingonunconditionalprinciples(oranypredetermined
generalprinciple)turnsouttobeuntenableforpoliticalcompromiseisthatnoonecanfully
anticipatewhatthecomplexprocessofpoliticalcompromiserealisticallycanbeexpectedto
yield.Achievingthebestpossibleoutcomewilldependinnosmallmeasureonthenatureof
thenegotiationsandtheevolvingpoliticalcontext.37Beforethefact,drivingaprincipled
stakeinthegroundandtenaciouslyrefusingtomove—ifmorethananegotiatingtactic—is
aprescriptionforthwartingprogressthatcouldbemutuallybeneficial.Evenafterthefact,
judgingcompromisesbyapre-ordainedsetofprinciplesisnotproductive.Compromises
aretooeasytocriticizesimplybecausewhateveryoneobservesaretheresults—whichare
oftenmorallyincoherent—divorcedfromboththeprocessandthealternativesthat
presentedthemselvesatthetime.
Compromisesareusuallyamélangeofmeasuresthatreflectconflictingvalues,
whichnosingletheoryorideologycouldconsistentlyencompass.TheTRAincludedtax
exemptionsandloopholesthatviolatedsomeoftheveryprinciplesthatthePresidentalong
withleadersintheSenateandHouseinvokedtodefendtheultimatecompromise.Every
healthcarereformbillthathadanychanceofgainingamajorityinCongress,letalonea
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filibuster-proofmajority,notonlyfailedtofullysatisfythecoreprinciples—universal
coverage,affordability,andcostcontainment—butalsoincludedmeasuresthatexpressed
conflictingvalues—suchasmaintainingfeeforservice,exemptingthemostexpensive
employerhealthcarebenefitsfrompayrolltaxes(until2018),andimposingcostcontrols
onmedicalprocedures.Thustojudgecompromisesasacceptableonlyiftheyareconsistent
withaprincipleorwithsomecoherentsetofprinciplesistoputthecompromise—butnot
thestatusquo—onthemoraldefensive.38
Theattempttodistinguishinaprincipledwaybetweenacceptableand
unacceptablecompromisesbackfiresnotbecauseprinciplesarethemselvesunhelpfulin
politics.Quitethecontrary,principlesareaninvaluableguidetothedirectionsinwhich
politiciansshouldwanttoheadinacompromise,andtheirsupportersshouldwantthemto
head.Everythingwesayhereaboutthelimitsofprincipledtenacityisconsistentwiththe
importanceofpoliticiansandcitizensguidingtheiractionsandassessmentsbyprinciples.39
Theproblemfordemocraticcompromise(anddemocraticpoliticsgenerally)ariseswhen
principlesaretreatednotasasetofdirectionalsignalsbutratherasaseriesofroadblocks
toallthosecompromisesthatwouldmovesocietyonlyimperfectlyandpartiallyinonly
someoftherightdirections.40
MUTUALMISTRUST
Theseconddimensionoftheuncompromisingmindset—mutualmistrust—focusesonthe
attitudeoftheagents.Politiciansspeakandactontheassumptionthattheoppositionto
whattheyadvocateismotivatedmainlybyadesiretodefeatthemandtheirprinciples.
Themostcommonformofthisdistrustisacynicismaboutthemotivesofboththe
proponentsandopponentsofacompromise.Asthecynicismaboutthemotivesof
politiciansspreadstocynicismabouttheprocessofcompromising,particularcompromises
becomeeasiertoresistandcondemn.Whenmotivesareindoubt,suspicionsthatabetter
compromisecouldhavebeenachievedcometothefore.Compromisingisafertilebreeding
groundforthesesuspicionsbecausetheprocessinvolvestheinteractionofconflictingwills
that,unlikeimpersonalforces,aresusceptibletomodification.Thiscreatesapersistent
hopeonbothsidesthatmorecouldhavebeenachievedifonlyoneortheotherhadheldout
formore.Itspawnscontinualdoubtaboutthemotivesofthosewhosettledforless.Atthe
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extremeofmutualdistrust,thecompletedefeatoftheoppositioncomestoseemtheonly
meanstoanacceptableconclusion.41
Inthehealthcaredebate,politiciansofbothpartiescontinuedinthecampaign
modeastheysoughtalegislativeagreement.Evenintheearlierphaseswhenabipartisan
compromiseseemednotoutofthequestion,bothsidesreinforcedthemutualdistrustby
accusingeachotherofbasemotives.HealthCareforAmericaNow,acoalitionofDemocratic
andlaborgroups,rantelevisioncommercialschargingthatRepublicanmembersof
Congress(notablyHouseMinorityLeaderJohnBoehner)wereopposedtochanginghealth
carebecause“theyareinthepocketoftheinsurancecompaniesandalreadyhavegood
coverageforthemselves.”42Forhispart,Boehnerwasnotabovequestioningthemotivesas
muchasthesubstanceoftheDemocrats’bill:“Forwhomwasthisbillactuallywritten?…is
itreallyfortheradicalspecial-interestandlobbyinggroupsthatinvestedmillionstoelecta
cooperativepresidentandCongress?”43Althoughthemutualdisrespectreflectedinthese
recriminationswasnotthemainsourceofthefailureofbipartisancompromise,thiskindof
motivemongeringispartoftheuncompromisingmindsetthatfacilitatescampaigningbut
certainlydoesnothelpcreateconditionswherecompromiseislikelytobeseriously
considered.
Themotivecynicismcomesfrompartisansupportersofpoliticiansasmuchasfrom
theiradversaries.Politiciansmakecampaignpromisesonbehalfoftheirpartyandtheir
ardentsupporters,butonceelectedtheyfindthattheycannotfulfillthemandthenhaveto
compromisetogetanythingdone.Theirsupportersaccusethemofsellingout,suspecting
thatthepromisesweremadeonlytogetelected.Theyareaccusedofwantingtoholdonto
officemorethantokeeptheircommitmentstotheplatformonwhichtheyran.
TheparadigmisGeorgeH.W.Bush’srenegingonhis1988campaignpromise:
“Readmylips.Nomoretaxes.”44Thepromisevividlyshowstheuncompromisingmindsetat
work.Inthecampaignitservedalegitimatestrategicpurpose.Ithelpedmobilizehisbase,
andprobablywasafactorinhisvictory.Hisstandwasclearlycalculatedtodifferentiate
himfromtheDemocraticopposition.Althoughpoliticallyconvenient,thepledgetooppose
taxincreaseswasalsoconsistentwithhisprinciples.Therewerenogroundsforanyspecific
cynicismabouthismotivesbeyondthegeneralcynicismwithwhichmanyoften—andtoo
easily—applytotheconductofallpoliticianswhoseekelection.
Onceinoffice,Bushrepeatedlytriedtocutspendingratherthanraisetaxesasa
meanstoreducethegrowingnationaldeficit.Buthecouldmakenoheadwaywitha
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CongresscontrolledbyDemocratsinboththeSenateandHouse.Ratherthanletthebudget
balloonevenfurther,heagreedtoabipartisancompromisethatraisedseveraltaxesaspart
ofthe1990budgetagreement.Hisstaunchestsupportersfeltbetrayedmorethandidhis
partisanadversaries.Hisconservativechallengerinthe1992presidentialprimaries,Pat
Buchanan,madeeffectiveuseofBush’spromisebreaking,portrayinghimasahypocritical,
purelyself-seekingpolitician.Later,inthegeneralelection,BillClintonusedBush’sreversal
ontaxestosupporttheaccusationthathewasuntrustworthy.Motivecynicismbeganto
loomlargerthanpolicycriticism.
Itisnoteasytoavoidthecynicismthattheuncompromisingmindsetcreates.If
politiciansnevermakecampaignpromises,theircommitmentsaresuspect,andtheir
campaignislikelytosuffer.Iftheyneverbreakthepromises,theircompromiseswillbe
infrequentandtheireffortstoimproveoverthestatusquoarelikelytofalter.AfterBush’s
“read-my-lips”promise,politicianshavetriedhardertoavoidmakingsuchexplicitpledges,
buttheystillrunonageneralplatform,andtheystillfallshortofachievingtheircampaign
goals.Whentheytakeoffice,andtrytogovern—withacompromisingmindset—theyare
stillvulnerabletothechargethattheyhaveabandonedthestrongcampaigncommitments
thatwerenourishedbytheuncompromisingmindset.
Butitispossible,evenforthemostpoliticallymindedpolitician,totamemotive
cynicism.Atoneofthemanymomentsatwhichtaxreformnearlycollapsedin1968,House
SpeakerThomasTipO’Neillstoodastheonlymemberwiththepowertoallowasecond
voteonbringingthebilltothefloorforavote.AgroupofRepublicanshaddefiedtheir
Presidentandvotedagainstbringingittothefloorthefirsttime.O’Neillbelievedtheir
motiveswerepurelypoliticalandforawhileconsideredretaliatingbyactingonhisown
politicalinclinations.TheDemocratshaddonetheirpart,and“ifthebillfailednow,there
wouldbenoonetoblamebuttheRepublicans.”45Hadhecarriedoutthisplan,hewould
havebecomeanotherexhibitinthepantheonofpoliticianswhopromotemutualdistrust.
Yethefinallyrejectedit,anddecidedtotrustthePresidenttohelproundupenough
Republicanvotestopassthebipartisancompromise.Itisnotthathismotiveswerenobler
thantheRepublicans.Hemaywellhaveactedlessoutofregardforthepublicinterest(or
evenpartisanadvantage)thanrespectforapersonalaideandloyaltytoChairman
Rostenkowski.Thesignificantpointisthatsettingasidedistrustofthemotivesof
opponents,whichmaybenecessarytocontinuinganegotiation,doesnotrequirepoliticians
themselvestobenoblymotivated.
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Toreachacompromise,then,politiciansmustadjusttheirwillsasmuchastheir
reason.Theymustbeabletoturnawilltoopposeintoawilltocooperate.Thatinvolvesa
psychologicalshiftasmuchaspolicychange.Toavoidthespiralofdistrustthatmotive
cynicismgenerates,Americandemocracyneedsinstitutionalchangesthataredesignedto
containtheascendancyofcampaigning.ArecentdefenseoftheACAcompromiseagainst
someprogressivecriticssuggeststhatanyonewhoseeksmorecomprehensivereform
shouldconcentrateonchangingtheinstitutionalfactsofpoliticallife—includingthe
filibuster,theaccountingstandardsoftheCBO,campaignfinanceandthe“awesomepower
ofmoneyinpolitics”—that“maketheenactmentof[moredesirable]sweepinglegislation
nightmarishlydifficult.”46Tomaketheseinstitutionalchanges,whichthemselvescould
countascomprehensivereform,wouldrequirepreciselythekindsofbroad-based
compromisesthattendtobeblockedbythemotivecynicismoftheuncompromising
mindset.Adeeperappreciationofhowdestructivetodemocraticgovernancethedynamics
ofmutualdistrustcanbe,andhowthatdynamicisfueledbymotivecynicism,itselfisa
necessaryfirststeptowardmakingalmostanymajorinstitutionalreformpractically
conceivableindemocraticpolitics.
ThepoliticianswhosupportedtheTRCin1968werenopurerornoblerofmotive
thanthosewhoopposedit,butenoughpartisansonbothsidesovercamethetendencyto
thinkonlytheworstoftheiropponents.Theoppositehappenedinthecaseofhealthcare.
Thecynicismincreasedasthenegotiationswenton.Thecompromisethatfinallyemerged
requiredashiftinattitudeaboutmotives,buteventhenonlyamongsomeCongressional
Democrats.
TheCompromisingMindset
Likeitsoppositetwin,thecompromisingmindsetalsotracksthetwodefining
characteristicsofcompromise,butitturnstheminamoreconstructivedirectionfor
governing.Thecompromisingmindseesmutualsacrificenotasanoccasiontotenaciously
standonprincipleorimprudentlyabandonprinciplesmerelytoreachagreementbutasan
opportunitytoadjustprinciplestoimproveonthestatusquo.Wecallthisfirstdimension
ofthemindsetprincipledprudence.Thecompromisingmindalsofindsinwillfulopposition
notexcusesfordistrustbutresourcesforunderstandingamongthosewhodisagree.Wecall
thismutualrespect.Togetherthesedimensionsofthecompromisingmindsetcanincrease
thechancesthatthegeneralvalueofcompromisewillplayaroleinjudgingparticular
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compromises,andthereforethechancesthatdesirablecompromiseswillberecognizedas
such.
PRINCIPLEDPRUDENCE
Principledprudenceseekstoovercometheintransigenceofstandingonprinciple.Itbegins
withapragmaticrecognitionthatcompromiseisusuallynecessaryinademocracyto
accomplishanythingofsignificance.Butitamountstomorethanmakingavirtueoutofthe
necessityofcompromise.Ithasamoralcomponentthatstandsasareminderthatthe
failuretocompromiseistoprivilegethestatusquo.Ifacompromisereallyisan
improvement,thenthecompromisingmindsetopensupopportunitiesforachievinggreater
justice.
Although(aswehavesuggested)itisamistaketotrytojudgetheoverallvalueofa
compromisebyasetofcoherentprinciples,itisstillnecessarytodecidewhetherthe
compromiseisanimprovementoverthestatusquo.Thatistheminimalconditionfor
justifyinganycompromise.Suchajustificationrequiresshowingthatthecompromiseisan
improvementfromtheperspectiveofallsides.Otherwise,theagreementisnota
compromise,butacapitulationbyonesidetotheother.
Thejudgmentthatacompromiseisanimprovementisinprinciplecontestable,
sometimesreasonablyso.Butinpracticetheobjectionthataparticularcompromiseis
worsethannothingisoftendisingenuous;itservesasacommontacticinthebargaining
process.Whentheobjectionexpressesagenuinecomparisonbetweenthecompromiseand
thestatusquo,italmostalwaysassumesthepossibilityofachievingabettercompromisein
theforeseeablefuture.Inthatcase,theobjectionisnotthattheproposedcompromiseitself
isworsethanthestatusquobutthatitisworsethanahoped-forfuturecompromise.This
wasthelogicbehindmanyoftheRepublicanobjectionstotheDemocratshealthcarereform
bills.“TheyarestilltryingtofindawaytoshovethisdownthethroatsoftheAmerican
people,”JohnBoehnercommentedaftertheMassachusettsSenateelectionthatbrokethe
Democratssupermajority:“Let’sstartoveroncommonsensestepsthatwecantaketo
makeoursystemworkbetter…NooneinWashingtonthinksourcurrenthealthcaresystem
isperfectandcertainlynotRepublicans.”47
Theproblemwithrejectingacompromiseinthehopeofabetteronetocomeisthat
therejectionitselfbecomesanobstacletoreachingthefuturecompromise.Inthiscase,
“startingover”wasnotaplausibleprescriptionforachievingabipartisancompromise
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becauseofthepolarizedpoliticsoftheCongress,andtheuncompromisingmindsetsthat
prevailed.Inallcases,thejudgmentaboutwhetheraparticularcompromiseisworsethana
hypotheticalfuturecompromisedependsonanassessmentofthepoliticalforcesinplay.
Thoseassessmentsarealmostalwayscoloredlargelybythepartisanviewsofthecontentof
thecompromisesinquestion.Theeffectthatrejectingacurrentcompromisehason
relationshipsamongtheparties,andtheirinclinationtotrustoneanotherenoughtoengage
inseriousnegotiationsinthefuture,doesnotusuallyreceivedueconsiderationinthe
assessment.Thecompromisingmindsetcannoteliminatethesebiases,butitcanhelpclarify
thevalueofthecurrentcompromisebydirectingattentiontothecriticalcomparison:does
thecompromisepromotethecoreprinciplesofallpartiesbetterthanthestatusquo?
Principledprudencealsoreversestheuncompromisingperspectiveonthe
incoherenceofcompromises.Itseestheincoherenceoftheprinciplesunderlyingmany
compromises—thefactthattheTRAcombinedconcessionsontaxloopholesandtaxrates,
andintheendwasinconsistentwithanysinglesetofprinciples—asasignofsuccess.Such
incoherencecanbeanindicationthatthedemocraticprocessrespectsopposingprinciples
andvalues.Iftheprocesshasbeenfairandtheoutcomeanimprovement,thedisarrayin
theprinciplesmaybe,ifnotcelebrated,thenatleastappreciated.
Principledprudenceshouldnotbemistakenforbeingunprincipled.Someofthe
mostsuccessfulcompromisersareaswellknownfortakingstrongprincipledstandsasthey
areformakingdifficultcompromises.BytheendofhistimeinCongress,SenatorKennedy
hadearnedaworthyreputationforalternatelystandingonprincipleandadaptinghis
principleswhennecessarytoreformcurrentpolicyinthedirectionthathiscorevalues
wouldsuggest.Hisroleinhealthcarereformisacaseinpoint.Whenhedecidedto
compromise,hehadmorecredibilitytodefendtheproposaltohisallies.Hehadstandingto
saythatthisisthebestwecanget,andheprovidedcoverforthoseinhispartywhomight
otherwisebeaccusedofsellingout.
Norisprincipledprudenceincompatiblewithpartisanship—atleastnotwithwhat
hasbeencalled“respectablepartisanship.”48Themostcogentdefensesofpartisanship
imposeonpartisansratherstrongethicaldemandsthatsupportprincipledprudence.
Partisansshouldadvanceprinciplesbutprinciplesofjusticetheybelieveotherscould
share;theyshouldstriveto“locatecommonground,”andshouldbe“asreadytopeacefully
suffer[their]lossesastoenjoy[their]victories.”49Inherastutedefenseofpartiesand
partisanship,NancyRosenblumidentifiesthe“dispositiontocompromise”asoneofthe
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threeessentialqualitiesthatpartisansmusthaveifpartisanshipistoservedemocratic
politicswell.50Whenshefirstpresentstheidea,itseemsthatpartisansneedtodisplaythis
dispositiononlytowardtheir“fellowpartisans.”Thisisofcourseimportant.Inthecaseof
healthcarereformwehaveseenjustwhysuchadispositionisimportantwithinaparty.But
encouragingitwithinthepartyisnotenoughforacompromisingmindset.Rosenblum
herselflaterextendsthedutytocompromisebeyondtheparty:partisansshouldseek
cooperation“acrosstheaisle.”51The“ethicsofpartisanship”rejectsthe“uncompromising
extremism”thatpraises“intransigenceasanavowedgood”becauseitlacksa“commitment
togettingthepublicbusinessdone.”Itrepresentsan“abdicationofresponsibilityfor
governing.”
Thepartisanshipthatisworthdefendingispracticedbythosewhoarepreparedto
makeprudentbutprincipledconcessions.Thecompromisingmindsetpermitspartiesto
maintaintheirdistinctiveidentitiesandtopresstheirpartisanagendasnotonly
campaigningbutalsoingoverning.Whiletheylegitimatelygovernwithaneyetothenext
election,theyshouldalsokeepfocusedonmakingprogressontheiragendaevenifwhen
theyhappentobeintheminority.Theaimisnottoexcludepartisanattitudesingoverning
buttomaintainabetterbalanceofmindsetsthanisevidentincontemporaryAmerican
politics.
MUTUALRESPECT
Theseconddimensionofthecompromisingmindsetaddressesthewillfuloppositionthat
characterizescompromise.Itcounselsadversariestonegotiateingoodfaithandtorestrain
suspicionsaboutulteriormotives:assumethatyouropponents’motivesaremixed,that
theyactnotonlyfortheirownpoliticalgainbutalsooutofadesiretodowhattheythinkis
right.Inthisway,withoutignoringpoliticalrealities,mutualrespectcountersthemotive
cynicismcultivatedbythemutualmistrustintheuncompromisingmindset.
Liketoleration,mutualrespectisaformofagreeingtodisagree,butmutualrespect
bringswithitmorethanthe“liveandletlive”attitudeoftoleration.Mutualrespectrequires
afavorableattitudetoward,andconstructiveinteractionwith,thepersonswithwhomone
disagrees.Itisthemindsetofindividualswhoenterintonegotiationsingoodfaith,
presumingtheiradversariesareaswellmotivatedastheyare,alsotryingtoact(atleast
partly)onprinciple.52
-23-
Mutualrespectisplainlyadesirableingredientindemocraticpolitics,avirtuethat
makesdebatemorecivilandrelationsmorecollegial.Butitismorethanthat.Inthecaseof
compromise,itplaysaspecial,morecentralrole.Toacceptacompromiseyou(andyour
supporters)havetobelievethatyouaregettingasmuchasyoucanreasonablyexpect
underthecircumstances.Youdonotwanttosacrificeyourprinciplesordisappointyour
supportersifyoucouldsecureabetter(morejust)resultbyputtingmorepressureonyour
adversaries,orbyholdingoutformoreconcessions.Thatwould,aswesaw,reinforcethe
motivecynicismthatlurksintheheartsofpoliticiansandvoters.
Thebiggestchallengeindefendinganattitudeofrespecttowardadversariesarises
fromthefactthatthepartiestoacompromisecannotbecertainthatanagreementisthe
besttheycouldachieveunderthecircumstances.Thisuncertaintyinfectsnotonlyexante
butalsoexpostjudgmentsaboutcompromises.Theanswertothequestionofwhatwould
havehappenedifone’ssidehadresistedmorestronglydependsonacomplexsetofcounter
factualassumptionsthatarehardtoassessobjectivelyatanytime.Theuncertaintyabout
theprobabilitiesisfargreaterthanthecertaintyabouttheprinciples,andthejudgments
thereforetendtobedrivenbymorebytheprinciples.(Inthisdynamic,principledtenacity
isalsoreinforced.)
Underconditionsofuncertainty,thetrustthatmutualrespectgeneratesisessential.
Itisoneofthefewresourcesonwhichthepartiestoacompromisecandrawtoassure
themselvesthattheyaregettingasmuchastheycanreasonablyexpect,andtoassuretheir
supportersthattheyarenotsellingout.Ifyouandyoursupportershavereasontobelieve
thatyouradversaryisnegotiatingingoodfaith,youcanhavemoreconfidenceindeciding
whetherandhowmuchtoconcede.Ifyouandyoursupportersbegintosuspectthatyour
adversariesareengagedinduplicitousbehavior,youarelikelytoresistacompromiseeven
ifitappearstobe(andactuallyis)animprovementonthestatusquo.Bythesametoken,
compromisebecomesmoredifficulttotheextentthatadversariestrytotakeadvantageof
thevulnerabilitiesoftheotherside,manipulatepublicopinion,orthreatenpolitical
reprisalsoutofproportiontotheissuesatstake.
Thecynicalattitudethatlooksforulteriormotivesineverymovebypolitical
opponentsisofcoursenotentirelywrong.Inpolitics,mostpeople’smotivesaremixed.
Accordingly,theprocessofcompromisesuppliesmorethanenoughevidenceformotive
cynicism.Earlyinthedebateabouthealthcarereformin2009,SenatorJimDeMint(South
Carolina)urgedhisfellowRepublicanstoworkagainstanyreformsothattheDemocrats
-24-
wouldsufferpoliticallosses.“Ifwe’reabletostopObamaonthis,itwillbehisWaterloo.It
willbreakhim.”53Eveniffewofhiscolleaguesfollowedhim,hiscallforall-outopposition
servedtostrengthenthehandsofthecynicswhobelievedthattheoppositionwaspurely
politicallymotivated.Italsoweakenedthe(alreadywavering)willofthosewithamore
compromisingmindset,whowerehopingtocraftabipartisancompromiseonhealthcare
reform.
Evenworthyattemptstokeepreachingouttoopponentswhopersistentlyrebuff
yourapproachesneednotbedrivenmainlybynoblemotives.Ifopponentsareunwillingto
concedeanythingofimportance,thisapproachmaystilloffervaluablemoral(andpolitical)
coverwhentheyfinallyhavetodrawtheline,andrejectaputativecompromisethatwould
actuallyamounttoacapitulation.Obama’schiefofstaffseemedtohavesomethinglikethis
inmindwhenheclaimedmembersoftheadministrationcouldgenuinelysaythattheytried
forbipartisanshipinhealthcarereform,buttheywerenotmethalfway.“Thepublicwants
bipartisanship…Wejusthavetotry.Wedon’thavetosucceed.”54The“try”wasnotentirely
whole-hearted;theDemocratsspurnedatleastoneoftheRepublican’splausibleoffers—
cooperationontortreform.Norwasitwithoutpoliticalintent.“Idon’tthinktheonusison
us.Wetried.Thestoryisthey[theRepublicans]failed.”55Nevertheless,bytakingthehigh
groundandreachingouttoopponents,politiciansmakeasymbolicstatementandkeep
openthepossibilityofcooperationonthebasismutualrespect.Whatevertheirintentions,
theymayfindthattheiropponentsmayeventakethemupontheiroffer.Ifitturnsoutthat
theiropponentsstillshownowillingnesstocompromise,theynotonlygainsomehigh
groundbutalsodemonstratethattheyarenottheonesblockingcooperationacross
partisanorfactionallines.
Thewindowofcompromiserarelyopenstopoliticianswhoalwaysassumethe
worstofthemotivesoftheiradversaries.Ittypicallytakesrepeatedoutreachto
adversaries,accompaniedbyatleastatemporarysuspensionofmotivecynicism,to
discoveropportunitiesforcompromise,especiallythecomprehensivekindliketheTRA.
PresidentReaganreachedouttoDemocratsaswellastoRepublicanstopulloffthe
compromisethatbecametheTRA.SodidRostenkowski,whoworkedcloselywithreceptive
membersofbothpartiesonhisWaysandMeansCommittee.Politicalmotiveswereatwork
inbothcases,buttheleadersdidnotdwellonthem.
AstrikingillustrationcanbefoundintheroleplayedbyBobPackwoodandthose
whoreactedtohisshiftsonthisissue.Whenhechangedfromopposingtosupportingtax
-25-
reformin1986,hemusthavecalculatedthatoppositiontoasuccessfultaxreformbill
wouldjeopardizehischancesforre-electionatatimewhenhisparty’spopularPresident
hadmadetaxreformachiefdomesticinitiativeforthesecondtermofhispresidency.It
wouldhavebeeneasy—andnotinaccurate—forbothsupportersandcriticsofthe
compromisetosuspectPackwood’smotives.Hecouldhavebeenportrayedasinterested
onlyinre-election,andashypocriticalforabandoninghislong-standingpositiononthe
issue.“Ontaxes,I’maspredictableasthesunrising.”Inhisownwordshehadalwaysbeen
“abig[tax]creditman.”56Belyingthepredictionofhisownpredictability,Packwood
decidedtopartnerwithDemocraticSenatorBradleytopassthetaxreformintheSenate,a
billbasedontheHouseversion,whichmanyHouseRepublicanshaddeclinedtosupport.
AccordingtoBradley’sadmiringaccount,Packwood“becameafearsomeandeffective
supporteroftaxreform.”57Thebipartisansupportfortaxreformprobablywouldhave
brokendownhadmotivecynicismratherthanmutualrespectdominatedthetaxreform
process.58
Thekindofbroad-basedmutualrespectthatemergedinthenegotiationsoverthe
TRAismoreeasilycultivatedingoverningthanincampaigning.Ingoverning,itcanproduce
legislativeresults(ifallgoeswell).Incampaigning,itisnotasusefulasmotivecynicismin
producingelectoralresults(ifallgoesasusual).Acampaignisacompetitive,zero-sum
activity.Defeatingyouradversaryisthedominantandlegitimatemotive.Themorethese
campaignattitudesinfiltratethelegislativeprocess,thelessthescopethereisformutual
respect.
Becausecampaigningfuelsmotivecynicism,itneedstobecontainedforthesakeof
democraticgovernance.Governingmustbegivenachancetocultivatemutualrespect.
Whengivenachance,thegoverningprocesshassomedefensesagainstthetendencyof
campaigningtoincitemotivecynicism.
Onedefenseis“economizingonmoraldisagreement.”59Thispracticeencompasses
severaldifferentstrategies.Asthefirststep,itwouldencouragepoliticianstofindcommon
groundbydividingissuesintomoreandlesscontentiousparts,andtoconcludedealson
thoseonwhichthereisagreement,asawaytobuildmutualtrustforagreementsovertime.
Butthisstrategyisoflimiteduseinthecaseofcomprehensivechangessuchasthose
involvedinhealthcarereform.Thepartsofthereformaretoocloselyinterconnected.
Everyonemayagreethatcostsshouldbecontainedbutmanystillresistthemandates
-26-
requiredtoachievetheuniversalcoveragenecessarytocontrolincreasesininsurance
premiums.
Amorepromisinggeneralstrategyistoseekcooperationonotherissuesonwhich
thereismorehopeforagreement.Eventhosewhodisagreeaboutabortionmaystillagree,
forexample,ontheimportanceofprovidingpregnantteenagegirlsthesupporttheymay
wantandneedtobecomemothers.Theabortioncompromiseintheheathcaredebatewas
muchmorelimited,consistingmainlyofanagreementnottoadoptanythingthatwould
changethecurrentlaw.Evenasthepartiescontinuedtheircontentiousdebateabouthealth
careinearly2010,Congressmanagedbrieflytopassamodestlybipartisanbillintendedto
createjobs,agoalthateveryoneshared.Theflameofmutualrespectdidnotshinebrightly
forlong,butitwasasignalpointingintherightdirection.
Thegoverningprocessismorelikelytoencouragemutualrespectthroughthis
other-issuetypeofcooperationtotheextentthatittakesplaceininstitutionsthatrequire
politicianstoworktogetheronacontinuingbasis,andpermitsthemtocultivate
reputationsandrelationshipsacrossoppositionaldivides.Trustismorelikelytobe
generatednotinone-timenegotiationsbutovertimeaspoliticianswhoopposeoneanother
onsomeissuesfindwaystoworktogetheronothers.Asmutualmistrustonceinplay
createsaspiralofsuspicionthatishardtostop,somutualtrustonceestablishedisselfreinforcing.60Itcanpersisteveninfaceofstrongdisagreementsandideological
polarization.Inthepresenceofmutualtrust(alongwithprincipledprudence),thestrong
ideologicaldifferencesthatcharacterizeapolarizedpoliticsneednotstandinthewayof
cooperationandcompromise.ThecollaborationsofOrinHatchandTedKennedy
(mentionedearlier)areexemplaryinthisrespect.Despitebeingpartoftherightandleft
wingsoftheirparties,respectively,theymanaged“tocometogetherinabipartisanfashion
tocraftsomeofthisnation’smostimportanthealthlegislation.”61Duringalmosttwo
decadestheyalternatedasChairmanandRankingMemberoftheSenatecommittee
concernedwithhealthcare,educationandlaborissues,theyco-sponsoredlegislationthat,
amongotherresults,providedsupportforvictimsofAIDS,createdthechildren’shealth
insuranceprogram,andestablishedprotectionsagainstdiscriminationtowardindividuals
withdisabilities.
Thethirdimportantstrategyofeconomizingondisagreementtakesforgrantedthat
thedisagreementwillpersistacrossonmostissues.Thedemocraticprocessdoesnot
alwaysorevenusuallyyieldagreement,letalonegeneralconsensus.Dealingwiththe
-27-
disagreementthatisendemicindemocraticpoliticsinarespectfulwayisessentialto
reachingdesirablecompromises,whethernoworinthefuture.Evenrhetoriccanmakea
difference.Howpoliticiansdescribenotonlythesubstanceoftheiropponents’proposals,
butalsotheirmotivesaffectsthepossibilityofmutualrespect.
Economizingrequiresaparticularkindofverbalself-restraintinpolitics:itcounsels
avoidanceofextremeexaggerationofthepositionsofopponents.SomeRepublican
opponentsoftheDemocraticproposaltofundend-of-lifecounselingfastenedonthelabel
“deathpanels,”suggestingthattheDemocrats’proposalwouldforceeuthanasiaonthe
infirmelderly.62Theymayhavesucceededintemporarilyobstructingthehealthcarereform
process,buttheyalsodemonstratedsuchdisrespectfortheiropponentsthattheysacrificed
therespectofsomepotentialallieswhowerenotamongtheircorepartyloyalists.TheViceChairoftheSenateRepublicanConferencesetabettertone:“Itdoesusnogoodtoincite
fearinpeoplebysayingthatthere’stheseend-of-lifeprovisions,thesedeathpanels…Quite
honestly,I’msooffendedatthatterminologybecauseitabsolutelyisn’t(inthebill).Thereis
noreasontoginupfearintheAmericanpublicbysayingthingsthatarenotincludedinthe
bill.”63
Conclusion
Tocampaignsuccessfully,politiciansmustmobilizeandinspiretheirsupporters.Theyhave
toarticulateacoherentvisiondistinctfromthatoftheiropponents,andpresenttheir
opponentsasadversariestobedistrustedandultimatelydefeated.Buttogoverneffectively,
politiciansmustfindwaystoreachagreementswiththeiropponents,includingmembersof
theirownideologicallydiverseparties,evencompromisesthattheirownsupportersmay
seeasbetrayals.Thistensionbetweenwhatisrequiredinademocracytowinpowerand
whatisrequiredtoexerciseitismanifestinwhatwehavecalledmindsets.Theseclustersof
attitudesandargumentsarisefromthedistinctpressuresofdemocraticcampaigning
versusgoverning,andtheyframethewaypoliticiansandthepublicviewopportunitiesfor,
andtheresultsof,compromises.Theuncompromisingmindset—markedbyprincipled
tenacityandmutualmistrust—iswellsuitedforcampaigning.Thecompromisingmindset—
characterizedbyprincipledprudenceandmutualrespect—ismoreappropriatefor
governing.Itisnotthatoneislegitimateandtheothernot.Eachhasitsplaceinthe
democraticprocess.Buttotheextentthattheuncompromisingdominatesthe
compromisingmindsetintheprocessofgoverning,compromisesthatcouldreduce
-28-
injusticeorincreasewellbeinggounrecognizedandunsupported.Whenthe
uncompromisingmindsetoverwhelmspoliticalthinkingandaction,itbiasesthedemocratic
processinfavorofthestatusquo.
Itwouldbeamistaketotrytospecifyexactlywhenaleadershouldadoptwhich
mindset.Thatwouldbeliketheattempttospecifypreciseprinciplesinadvancefor
distinguishingbetweenacceptableandunacceptablecompromises,whichwehaveshownis
boundtobeunder-inclusiveorover-inclusive,ifnotboth.Nevertheless,itisclearenough
thatthedemocraticdeckisstackedagainstcompromiseincontemporaryAmericanpolitics
(andincreasinglyindemocraticpoliticsmoregenerally).Theuncompromisingmindsetis
ascendant,strayingwellbeyonditsnaturalhabitat.Totameit,politiciansandcitizensneed
tobetterunderstanditanditscompromisingtwin.
Understandingmoreclearlythesedifferentwaysofframingdisagreementcanhelp
overcometheobstaclestoagreementandleadtomorebeneficialcompromises.Political
polarizationisofcoursealsoanobstacle,butaswehavesuggesteditisonlypartofthe
problem,andinanycasethewaysinwhichitaffectscompromisecanbeadequately
appreciatedonlybyprobingthemindsetswehaveanalyzedhere.Politicalmoderateswith
anuncompromisingmindsetarepronetoblockcompromisejustasconservativesand
liberalswithacompromisingmindsetjointogetherwhennecessarytosupport
compromise,asdidRonaldReaganandTipO’NeilltopasstheTRA.SenatorsHatchand
Kennedywerenotideologicalmoderates,buttheyadoptedthecompromisingmindsetin
ordertocraftimportantdemocraticcompromises.
Evenpoliticianswiththeappropriatemindsetsneedinstitutionalsupportto
succeedindemocraticpolitics.Institutionalreformsarethereforeanimportant
complementtorecognizingthedifficultycreatedbythedominanceofcampaigningover
governingfordemocraticcompromise.64Yetmajorinstitutionalchangethatwouldmakea
significantdifferenceitselfrequirescompromise,andtheleaderswhowouldbringitabout
willthemselveshavetosettheirmindstoit.
Politicalleadersandordinarycitizensalikecouldbenefitfromseeingmoreclearly
thestrengthsandweaknessesofthecompromisinganduncompromisingmindsets,and
howtheyinteractinthedemocraticprocess.Thewaysthatthemindsetsframe
disagreementsaresometimeslatentandoftenunrecognized.Bymorefullyappreciatingthe
verydifferentmindsetsrequiredbycampaigningandbygoverning,leadersandcitizensare
-29-
morelikelytorecognizeopportunitiestomakecompromisesthatcouldmakebetterlaws
forall.
-30-
NOTES
1.Jones1998;OrnsteinandMann2000;andHeclo2000.
2.Weuse“mindsets”torefertobothcognitiveanddispositionalstates,whichincludehow
peopletendtoconceptualizeandargueaboutissuesaswellashowtheyareinclinedtoact
ontheconceptualizations.Mindsetsmanifestaformofwhatpsychologistscallcognitive
bias,butwedonotassumethatthebiasinthemindsetswediscussnecessarilyleadsto
mistakenconclusionsoractions.Inpoliticalscience,theconceptthatcomesclosesttoour
useofmindsetis“framing,”whichhasbeendefinedas“theprocessbywhichpeople
developaparticularconceptualizationofanissueorreorienttheirthinkingaboutanissue”
(ChongandDruckman2007;andDruckman2010).Wefocusonthemindsetsofpolitical
leadersmorethanonthoseofcitizens.Politicalphilosophersgenerallyhavenotstudiedthe
contentofmindsetsbecauseitlackstherigorandscopeofatheory.But,asweshowhere,
mindsetshaveacognitivestructure:theypresupposemoralvalues,expressarguments,and
implytheoreticalcommitments.Criticalanalysisoftheirstructurescouldbenefitfrommore
normativeattentionfrompoliticalphilosophersaswellasfrommoreempirical
investigationbypoliticalscientists.
3.Itissometimessuggestedthatthequestionofwhetherthe“campaignstyleofgoverning”
isa“positivedevelopmentfordemocracy”turnsonwhetheroneadoptsatrusteeor
delegatetheoryofrepresentation.“Thetrusteepreservesthedistinctionbetween
campaigningandgoverning;delegatesaremuchlessthepurists,seekingthroughouttheir
servicetomirrortheinterestsandconcernsoftheirconstituents”(Jones2000,196-97).But
thedistinctioncannotbesosharp.Onanydemocratictrusteetheory,leadersmusttakeinto
accounttheeffectoftheirdecisionsonthenextelection;andonanyplausibledelegate
theory,leadersmusthavesufficienttimebeforebeingheldaccountabletotrytocarryout
thepoliciestheirconstituentsfavor..
4.AsummarypreparedbythestaffoftheJointCommitteeonTaxation(July14,1986)is
availableat:http://www.archive.org/details/summaryofhr3838t1486unit
-31-
5.Thehealthreformlegislationconsistsoftwoacts:theACA,theSenateversionpassedby
theHouseandsignedintolawonMarch232010,andtheHealthCareandEducation
ReconciliationAct,intendedtomeetobjectionsofHousemembersandsignedintolawon
March30.Thelatterconsistsentirelyofrevisionsandisunintelligiblestandingalone.A
consolidateddocumentincorporatingtherevisionsintotheACAwaspreparedbytheHouse
OfficeofLegislativeCounselandappearstobetheonlyfulltextofthereform,thoughit
doesnothavethestatusoflaw:Ppaca&Hcera;PublicLaws111-148&111-152:
ConsolidatedPrintavailableathttp://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/ppacaconsolidated.pdf
6.OuraccountreliesonBirnbaumandMurray1988;Strahan1989;Conlanetal.1989;and
Witte1991.
7.Witte1991,440.
8.OuraccountreliesontheStaffoftheWashingtonPost2010;Alter2010,244-66,395421;andHacker2010.
9.Obamacamelateintothisprocess,developinghishealthcareplanafterothercandidates
hadpresentedtheirs,asdescribedinStaffoftheWashingtonPost,ch.1.
10.Wearenottryingtoprovideacausalexplanationforwhythesecompromiseshappened
orwhyonewasmoresuccessfulthantheother.Neitherthemindsetsnorthepermanent
campaignarenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforthefailureorsuccessofcompromisein
thesecasesormoregenerally.Asthebestanalysesofthesecompromisesshow,thecauses
aremultipleandprobablyover-determined:BirnbaumandMurray;Conlanetal.1989;
Alter2010;andHacker2010.However,wearesuggestingthatanappreciationoftheroleof
themindsetsisimportantforunderstandingthedynamicsofthenegotiations,the
interactionsofthepoliticiansinthesecases,andtheprocessofcompromiseingeneral.
11.HenryRichardsondistinguishestwoformsthatthismutualsacrificecantake:“bare
compromise,”whichinvolvesa“willingnesstoacceptalesssatisfactorymeanstotheends
-32-
onestartedwith,”and“deepcompromise,”whichrequiresa“reconsiderationofwhatis
worthyseekingforitsownsake…achangeinone’sends”(Richardson2002,146-47,14461).Hedevotesmostofhisattentiontodeepcompromise,which(weagree)isaworthy
idealindemocraticpolitics,andthepursuitofwhichcansupportthemutualrespectinthe
compromisingmindsetwedescribebelow.Butinourviewthevalueofthe“willingness”in
themorecommonbarecompromiseisnolessimportant.
12.Alter2010,249.
13.McCartyetal.2008;FiorinaandAbrams2008;Fiorinaetal.2011;andBrownstein
2007.
14.HackeraskswhyObamausedhis“muscletoshapethebillinwaysthatmadeit
demonstrablylesspopularwithAmericans…”andsuggeststhatthe“briefestanswer”isthat
hewantedtogetgood‘scores’fromtheCBO[CongressionalBudgetOffice].Itcouldbesaid
(consistentwiththisanswer)thatwhiletheCBOapprovalwaspoliticallyimportant,his
prioritywasalsogoodgovernment(Hacker2010,23-24).{checkpages}
15.Sometheoristshaveemphasizedthatthedemocraticprocessrequiresandreinforces
compromise,andsomehavealsofoundconstraintsoncompromiseintheprocessitself.See
Kuflik1979,41-44,38-65;andDobel1990,79-99.Othershavearguedthatnegative
attitudestowardcompromiseare“rootedinthenatureofpoliticallife”(asintheproblemof
dirtyhands):Carens1979,139,123-41.Butnonehassuggestedthattheprocessitselfcan
createobstaclestocompromisebymeansofthetensionweanalyzebetweenthemindsets
ofgoverningandcampaigning.
16.ThequotesandcommentsareadaptedfromObama’sstatementsandspeechesduring
thecampaign:OrganizingforAmerica2008-2002.OnthedisputewithHillaryClintonabout
theindividualmandatesee:Factcheck.org2007.
17.InprivateObamaisreportedtohaveindicatedthatonceinofficehewouldbeinclined
tocompromiseonhealthcare.AlludingtotheClintons’failedeffort,hesaidhewouldnot
-33-
develophisownplan,dropitontheCapitolstepslikeastonetablet,andrefusetobargain.
“IfDanielPatrickMoynihanorBillBradleyorJohnChaffeecametomewiththepossibility
ofcompromising,I’mnotgoingtotellthem,‘It’smaywayorthehighway’”(Alter2010,
249).
18.Forthefactorsthatsupportthetrendtowardthe“permanentcampaign,”seeHeclo
2000.
19.Thepermanentcampaigndamagesthedemocraticprocessinotherwaysaswell(for
example,thepreoccupationwithfundraisingandtheexcessiveinfluenceofcontributors),
buttheyhavereceivedmoreattentionthanitseffectoncompromise:seeOrnsteinand
Mann2000,224-30.
20.BakerandHulse2010.
21.Plasser2002,15-106,343-52;andBlumerandGurvetch2001,380-403.
22.BradyandFiorina(2000,154-55)suggestthatthe“permanentcampaign”isnota
problemwhenvotersdonotwantCongresstoact(asduringtheperiodoflargebudget
surplusesinthelate1990s)butitbecomesaserioushindrancewhenvoters“believethe
governmentshouldtakesomeactiontoalleviateaproblem”(aspresumablyinthecaseof
healthcarereform).
23.GutmannandThompson2004,3-7,79-94,133-35,151-56;GutmannandThompson
1996,79-91.
24.ThisjustificationforcompromiseispragmaticinthebroadsensestipulatedbySimon
CăbuleaMay,whocriticizesadvocatesof“moral”compromise(includingus)forfailingto
recognizethat“moralcompromiseinpoliticallifeisonlyeverwarrantedforpragmatic
reasons”(May2005,317).Inpragmaticcompromise“moraldisagreementgivesrisetoa
reasonforcompromise,notinitself,butonlyinsofarasitiscontingentlyconnectedwitha
logicallyindependentconsideration”(320).Moralcompromise“involvesanintrinsicappeal
-34-
todisagreement:reasonablemoraldisagreementgivesrisetoareasonforcompromisein
itself,asidefromanyimpedimenttoothergoalsitmayincidentallygenerate”(320).Drawn
inthisway,thedistinctionisnothelpfulinanalyzingpoliticalcompromises,nearlyallof
whichinvolveanappealtoindependentmoralvaluessuchasjusticeorwelfare.Moreover,
pragmaticreasonstocompromise,asMayacknowledges,arenotsufficientandtypically
mustbemorallyconstrainedinvariousways(322-23).Inourview,thevalueofmutual
respectindemocracyprovidessomeofthosemoralconstraints,noneofwhichisasufficient
reasontocompromise,butallofwhichfacilitatethecompromisingmindset.
25.Kuttner2000.
26.SeeforexampleTillyandTarrow2006.Theclassictheoreticalstatementofthevalueof
contentionisofcourseJohnStuartMill’sOnLiberty(Mill1977).Somerecentdemocratic
theoristshavepresentedamoreradicalappreciationofcontentiouspolitics,orintheir
terms,oftheneed“tocometotermswith‘thepolitical’initsantagonisticdimension
(Mouffe2009,129).
27.Ourapproachthustreatscompromiseasbothaprocessandoutcome.Forananalysisof
theconceptthatbringsoutthisdualnatureofcompromiseanditsfoundationinmutual
respect,seeKuflick1979,38-65.
28.DeLay2006.
29.Deliberativedemocratictheoryissometimesassociatedwiththispracticeoftaking
principledstands,andindeeditdoesemphasizethevalueofprincipledargumentsin
politics,butmostdeliberativetheoristsnotonlyrecognizebutalsoinsistontheneedfor
andvalueofpoliticalcompromise.SeeMansbridgeetal.2010.
30.Foradiscussionthatpresentsadistinctionbetweencompromisesofprinciplesand
interests(concludingthatsomeoftheformerareacceptable),seeBenditt1979,26-37.
-35-
31.Ignatieff2007.Butheadds:“Knowingthedifferencebetweenagoodandabad
compromiseismoreimportantinpoliticsthanholdingontopureprincipleatanyprice.A
goodcompromiserestoresthepeaceandenablesbothpartiestogoabouttheirbusiness
withsomeelementoftheirvitalinterestsatisfied.”
32.Anotherreasonthatcompromisesofinterestseemmoreacceptableisthattheylend
themselvestothefamiliartechniqueofsplittingthedifference.SeeBenjamin1990.
However,thereisnoguaranteethatanyequalormid-pointdivisionofinterestsisthe
fairestavailablecompromise.Whetheritisdependsnotonlythecontentofthe
compromise,butalsoonthebackgroundconditions,includingtherelationshipsamongthe
parties(forexample,thosethatmanifestmutualrespect).Despitethetitleofhisbook,
Benjamin’scriteriaforan“integrity-preservingcompromise”refertotheattitudeofthe
partiestowardthecompromise(theircommitmenttomutualtolerance)andthe
reasonablenessofthepositionsindispute(theuncertaintyduetomoralcomplexity)(3245).
33.Margalit2009.
34.Margalit2009,39.
35.Margalit2009,2.
36.Margalit’scriteriafor“sanguinecompromises”(forexample,“recognizingthepointof
viewoftheother”)maybeintendedtoprovideawayofdistinguishingbetterandworse
decentcompromises(41-54).Butthecriteriarefertotheprocessmorethantothecontent
ofthecompromise,andinanycasetheyarenotunconditionalasishiscrueltyand
humiliationstandard.
37.Astheemphasisintheresearchonnegotiationhasshiftedinrecentyearstowardmore
descriptiveapproaches,thestudieshaveshownthatoutcomescannotusuallybepredicted
byformalcriteriasuchasPareto-optimality,andaredeterminedbyamuchwiderrangeof
variablesthanhadbeenearlierassumed.SeeThompsonetal2010.
-36-
38.RonaldDworkin’sidealofintegrity—“lawmakers[should]trytomakethetotalsetof
lawsmorallycoherent”—wouldifappliedstrictlyalsoruleoutmanydesirable
compromises(Dworkin1986,176).“Acompromisemustbeexternal,notinternal;itmust
beacompromiseaboutwhichschemeofjusticetoadoptratherthanacompromised
schemeofjustice”(179).Totheextentthattheidealissoapplied,itreinforcesthe
uncompromisingmindset.ButDworkindoesnotcarrytheidealthisfar.The“internal
compromises”towhichhespecificallyobjectsarewhathecalls“checkerboard
compromises,”inwhichasingleprincipleisaffirmedforonegroupbutdeniedforanother,
asinalawthatwouldmakeabortioncriminalforpregnantwomenborninevenyearsand
lawfulforthoseborninunevenyears(178,436n7).Incontrast,acompromisethatorders
orcombinestwodifferentprinciples,suchasalawprohibitingabortionexceptinthecase
ofrape,doesnotviolatetheintegrityideal,eventhoughitmaybeinconsistentfromboth
theprolifeandprochoiceperspectives.Foramorenuancedcriticismof“internal”
compromises,seeBesson2005,257-84.
39.Itisalsopossibleandforsomepurposesdesirabletodevelopasetofconsiderations
thatleadersshouldtakeintoaccountwhendecidingwhethertoacceptacompromise.John
StuartMillineffectdevelopedsuchasetwhenfacedwiththechallengeofapplyinghisown
principleswhileservinginParliament.Hiscriteria(withoneexception)werenotintended
toidentifyunacceptablecompromises,butrathertospecifyfactorsthatmadecompromises
moreorlessobjectionable.SeeThompson2007,166-99.
40.Oneofthedefiningfeaturesofdeliberativedemocracyinourview—theprovisionality
ofprinciples—supportsthislimittoprincipledtenacity.Theprocessofmutualreasongivingindeliberativedemocracyrequiresthatcitizensandleaderstreattheirprinciplesas
opentochange.Theyareexpectedtotakeseriouslynewevidenceandarguments,andnew
interpretationsofoldevidenceandarguments,includingreasonsofferedbytheir
opponentsandreasonstheymayhaverejectedinthepast.GutmannandThompson2004,
6-7,57-59,110-19.Thisopennesstochangeovertime,thebasisfortheself-correcting
capacityofdeliberativedemocracy,canalsohelpconstraintheuncompromisingmindset
andpromotedesirablecompromise.
-37-
41.InlightofthefactthatnotasingleRepublicanvotedforthefinalhealthcarebill,Hacker
writesthat“hadmoderateRepublicansjoinedwithDemocrats,thebillwouldhavebeen
muchclosertotheidealpointsofGOPlegislators.Butthatonlymakesitallthemore
notablethatRepublicansheldtogether,takingtheriskofabillwithastrongerDemocratic
stanceinreturnforgamblingfortheoutcometheyalmostrealized:completeandtotal
victory”(Hacker2010,28,italicsadded).
42.Seelye2009.(Seelyecalledtheads“misleading.”)
43.Boehner2009.
44.Bush1988.
45.BirnbaumandMurray,166,160-173.
46.JonathanCohn,“HowTheyDidIt:TheInsideAccountofHealthCareReform’sTriumph,
TheNewRepublic,June10,2010,25.
47.Murray2010.
48.Muirhead2009;andMuirhead2006..
49.Muirhead2009,392.
50.Rosenblum2008,361-62.
51.Rosenblum2008,401-08.Alsoseetherecentsymposiumdevotedtothisbookinthis
journal“Parties,Partisanship,andDemocraticPolitics”2009.
52.Ideally,mutualrespectincludesthepossibilityofchangingone’smindaboutthemeans
orendsofaproposedpolicy,andevenabouttheframeworkfornegotiation:seeBohman
1996,91-92,89-104;andRichardson2002,146-47,144-61.Stayingattentivetothis
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possibilityisinourviewadesirablecomponentofthecompromisingmindset,thoughnota
necessaryconditionforjustifyingacompromise,orforadoptingacompromisingmindset
53.Smith2009.
54.Lizza2009,24.
55.Ibid.
56.BirnbaumandMurray,ShowdownatGucciGulch,19,quotedinWitte,450.
57.Bradley2009.
58.Formoreonhowwhatwecallthesuspensionofmotivecynicismmayhaveworked,see
Strahan,381;andWitte,447,450.
59.GutmannandThompson1996,84-94;GutmannandThompson2004,7,85-90,92,18187.
60.Accordingtoarecentsurveyoftheliteratureonnegotiation,“mutualtrustisan
essentialingredientineffective...negotiations.”(Thompsonetal2010).
61.StatementbySenatorOrinHatchonthePassingofSenatorTedKennedyAugust26,
2009,http://hatch.senate.gov/.
62.Nyhan2010;Alter2010,257.Ontheotherside,someliberalDemocrats—“imitating
tea-partyconservatives”—turnedontheirownkindandproposedrunningTVads“against
foot-draggingmoderatestheyconsideredDINOs(‘Democratsinnameonly’)(Alter2010,
407).
63.Demer2009.
64.Forexamplesofthesereforms,seeOrnsteinandMann2000.
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