Legitimizing Military Action through 'Rape as a Weapon' Discourse in Libya and
Mali: Critical Feminist Analysis
Paper to be presented at the 2016 CEEISA-ISA Conference in Ljubljana
By Šárka Kolmašová, Metropolitan University Prague
and Kateřina Krulišová, Nottingham Trent University
Introduction
The protection of ‘women and children’ in warzones forms one of the basic building
blocks of the protectionist discourse legitimizing contemporary international
interventionism (Enloe 2000; Carpenter 2013). The conception of Responsibility to
Protect (hereafter R2P) serves as a discursive framework to justify the often
controversial use of military force to stop systematic and widespread (sexualized)
violence. Military interventions in the 21st century exhibit the very same patterns of
domination, exclusion, and exploitation typical of colonial rule, yet, their rhetorical
justification has significantly changed after the concepts of colonialism and
enslavement have been widely discredited. This paper argues that hegemonic
discourses on sexual(ized) violence as a weapon of war on the one hand, and R2P on
the other, are reproducing the Western power based international order, which
rests on the principle of the deployment of civilizing missions to third countries.
The legitimacy of contemporary interventionism is based exclusively on the
principle of protection of civilians from clearly-defined and internationally
recognized criminal-war acts, namely genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and
crimes against humanity (Evans 2009). Despite some efforts to operationalize the
R2P concept, its implementation rests on the interpretation of violence in line with
the four types, which includes systematic rape. Sexual(ized) violence in armed
conflicts perfectly serves the narrative efforts of actors aiming to legitimize a military
intervention or a peacekeeping operation. Rape, often used as a synonym for the
wider problem of sexual(ized) violence, attracts enormous attention of public, media
and policy-makers.i Therefore, the implementation of an R2P conception based on
protection from widespread and systematic sexual(ized) violence should be
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challenged through deeper analysis of the relevance and accuracy of legitimization
arguments within a given local and international context.
The article focuses on two selected case-studies ˗ armed interventions in
Libya and Mali ˗ to illustrate the process of legitimization under the auspices of R2P.
The arguments based on protection from widespread and systematic sexual violence
are critically assessed to identify the problematic aspects of the R2P framework and
its practical implementation. In line with the methodological framework (discussed
in the following section), each case is analyzed through the key texts indicating
legitimization (first level), while emphasizing concrete argumentative strategies
(second level) and their constitutive effects (third level).
The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya was preceded by intensive calls for
urgent action based on alleged systematic rape organized by the Gaddafi regime.
The case-study first analyzes the presentation of sexual violence in both official and
unofficial discourse to identify the mechanisms of legitimization through the R2P
framework. Then, the analysis shows the limitations of the dominant discourse and
the tendency to construct narratives privileging specific actors – in this case the
rebels, while neglecting more complex and deeper analysis of all committed sexual
violence.
In the case of Mali, the article focuses on the reintroduction of the conflict as
yet another ‘developing world’ civil war defined by sexual(ized) violence used as a
terror tactics and weapon of war. The main culprits here are the Tuareg rebels,
whose reactionary tradition of slavery, extremely strict interpretation of Sharia law,
and ‘rape and pillage’ tactics legitimize the interventionist arguments. The UN’s
official discourse, which focuses on these abuses, together with lengthy individual
testimonies provided by the media and NGOs, clearly led to calls for Western-led
protectionist action in the name of Malian ‘women and children’ (Enloe 2000). Thus,
a very straightforward story of savage widespread and systematic sexual(ized) abuse
creates an unquestionable sense of moral obligation to intervene and help those
soon-to-be victims.
Methodology
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The analytical part of the article is based on the method of Critical Discourse Analysis
(hereafter CDA), disseminated through the works of Ruth Wodak (1996; Wodak and
Meyer 2001), Norman Fairclough (1989; 1992; 1995; 2003) Theun van Dijk (1985;
1993; 1998) or Theo van Leeuven (1999; 2008). Despite its interdisciplinary and
pluralistic complexion (Fairclough 1995), the proponents of CDA agree on its
fundamental assumptions. Firstly, CDA is linking social and linguistic categories,
while aiming to integrate the macro-perspective of social structure and the microview of discourse. In contrast to the traditional linguistic paradigm, discourse is not a
mere verbal or non-verbal expression; rather, it is perceived as a form of social
practice that constitutes changes or consolidates social practices (Fairclough’s
dialectics of discourse and practice will be further explained). Secondly, from an
ontological perspective, CDA avoids structural or individualist determinism, while
following the social constructivist conception of mutually constitutive relations
among agents and structures (Berger and Luckman 1984). Social reality is
understood as an inter-subjective construct, which is formed by discursive practices
of actors manoeuvring within established power structures. Thus, language can be
used in particular ways to uphold political predominance. Finally, CDA rests on
multiple levels of analysis including both discursive practices and their social context,
which enable the identification of the strategic intentions maintained through the
discourse. Here, understating particular socio-political conditions of discourse is
essential for critical interpretation of arguments and their meaning.
The methodological framework is based on a three-level model of analysis
introduced by Fairclough (1989, 26), which corresponds with the above mentioned
assumptions of CDA. At the lowest micro-level, the formal aspects of the text
(depicted in official documents or formal statements of relevant organizations,
states and their individual representatives) are explored to identify the attempt to
legitimize a policy – in this case deployment of military operation. For instance,
strong modality combined with plural in person is reflecting the speaker’s effort to
convince about the necessity of an action through the formulations such as must,
need, should (in contrast to may or could). Fairclough utilises the term “categorical
modality” and argues that it becomes an effective means to justify a political
ideology as the speaker is presenting subjective opinions as an objective and given
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fact (1992, 160-161). For example, as NATO was launching its operation in Libya,
Secretary General Rassmussen issued a firm statement: “We must protect civilians in
Libya” (BBC, 14 April 2011) without any further explanation, simply as an established
fact. The verbal voice (passive or active) is also essential as it reflects the
responsibility of the speaker for the justified action (Rativoi 2008). If the speaker
wishes to present an intervention as unproblematic and generally acceptable, the
concrete actor is concealed either through the uncertain “we” or use of the passive
voice (e.g. civilians must be protected).
The identification of the legitimization efforts is followed by analysis of the
strategic discursive practices internalized by the international community. Fairclough
embraces Foucault’s term “orders of discourse” implying the systems of
communication interlinking various formulations, genres and meanings shared
within a particular social structure (1992, 180). These also include argumentation
strategies aimed to justify an action through reference to a widely acknowledged
source of legitimacy.ii Discourse analysis of the legitimization strategies of political
actors is based on foregrounding gender and gender-related attributes – in this case
female innocence, vulnerability, suffering and helplessness. As Lazar (2007, 142)
argues:
The aim of feminist critical discourse studies is to show up the complex,
subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, ways in which frequently taken-forgranted gendered assumptions and hegemonic power relations are
discursively produced, sustained, negotiated, and challenged in different
contexts and communities.
The main focus is then on language as well as orders of discourse and their
portrayal of sexual(ized) violence in a given conflict area.
The third level of analysis concerns how social context influences the
formation of discourse. Society and language are in a dialectical relation, therefore
the social conditions including the distribution of power can be revealed through
critical analysis of discursive practices (Fairclough 1989, 163) – in this case
legitimization strategies. The effects of discursive practices, which form the nondiscursive social context, are taken into account. These indicate either preservation
of existing power relations in the international order or attempts at its
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transformation. Typically, a hegemonic state or a coalition of such states uses
various legitimization strategies to justify actions safeguarding their privileged
position, yet these tend to be presented as a noble and humanitarian project (Ibid.,
166).
This universal empathy, combined with demonization of ‘third world’
masculinity as brutal and bestial, creates a perfect precondition for the successful
gendered legitimization of any mission as long as it focuses on sexual(ized) violence.
Here, the story of rape has to become central to all reporting on the particular
conflict. As soon as the rape of a young woman or girl is the main plot, accompanied
by lengthy depictions of the act and subsequent suffering, military intervention is
called for.
The narrative of sexual(ized) violence, however, does not only attract
empathy and urge for action. More problematically, sexual(ized) violence in armed
conflicts has become highly fetishized. From the boom in often insensitive research,
to rape ‘tourism’ (Autessere 2012) to the glorification and sexualization of conflictrelated sexual(ized) violence (Sjoberg 2015), studying this controversial topic
becomes increasingly ethically problematic. Like many others who are engaged in
critical feminist scholarship studying sexual(ized) violence, the authors of this article
feel unease at engaging in critical conversations about the international politics of
dealing with such a controversial topic (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013). The main aim
of this work is not to dispute the tremendous suffering of the victims, but to critically
read and interpret the dominant legitimizing discourse of deployment of
military/peacekeeping missions built predominantly on the protectionist call of duty.
As discussed in the following section, this discourse suffers from many
inconsistencies and limitations, and might, under certain circumstances, even
produce harm (Shepherd 2013). Thus, continuous critical re-reading and challenging
of the dominant discourse, however uncomfortable and uneasy that may be, is key
to the emancipatory objective of theoretical and empirical feminist research (Sjoberg
2011; Shepherd 2008).
Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts and R2P: Critical Feminist Discussion
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The current hegemonic discourse that rape constitutes a weapon of war has
been replicated not only by large number of scholars, but – and perhaps in this case
more importantly – has remained an unchallenged assumption of the majority of
policy-makers (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013). The hegemonic discourse that rape
indeed constitutes a weapon suffers, however, from several limitations and may in
reality damage those it seeks to protect. The following section of the paper critically
discusses the problems of the rape-as-a-weapon discourse in its relation to R2P. It
focuses mainly on the (falsely) gendered and neo-colonial understanding of
contemporary sexual violence in armed conflict as viewed through Western security
actors’ lenses.
The nature of the debate on sexual(ized) violence replicates notions of the
innocence and vulnerability of women and girls (Elshtain 1987; Sjoberg 2010). In
many academic and popular accounts, the biological possession of the male sexual
organ makes that individual a potential rapist. From Brownmiller’s assertion that
men rape simply because they can (1975) to more modern accounts of the
weaponization of the penis and its use as a strategic/tactical tool in armed conflicts
(Buss 2009), being a (brown) man invokes the image of sexual predator and danger
to women and children. Rape – when understood as a weapon – is a highly strategic
tool used by military units to achieve their (geo-)political objectives. Rape serves as a
tool of domination, aimed mostly at the female body, but communicates a message
of the domination of one male group over another – one that is unable to protect
‘their’ women (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013). Sexual violation of women’s bodies,
implicitly carrying the nation’s essence and culture as well as biologically
reproducing the group, is the tool aimed at spreading terror, forcing major
population displacement and leading to genocide (Card 1996). This tactical/strategic
understanding of rape is key to further debate on initiatives aimed at limiting its
occurrence or its effects. Rape-as-a-weapon is an asexual act. Drawing clear
distinction between peace-time (or so-called ‘everyday’) rape, which is classed as
being a sexual act, rape in war becomes a weapon used to inflict large-scale physical
and psychological trauma on the target group. Such understanding of the
‘strategicness’ (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013) of sexual(ized) violence clearly leads to
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the logical conclusion that rape can be eliminated or at least managed by the
international community.
This has led to the re-articulation of the aforementioned threats against
civilian populations that require a reaction from the international community. Thus,
understanding that rape constitutes a weapon/tactic of war redefined the gendered
nature of the interventionist regime based on the clearly articulated moral obligation
to protect civilians. In a majority of instances, women and children are a synonym for
“civilian”. Carpenter demonstrates how the civilian protection regime is gender
essentialist, and women and children are automatically presumed to be civilians on
the basis of sex, age and possible disability (2006, 31). Through the claim of universal
existence notions of innocence and vulnerability, together with female association
with nurturing and protection of children, women have been automatically awarded
claim to protection (Ibid.).
Ending sexual violence in armed conflict has become a contemporary policy
emblem. The shocking nature of the scale and brutality of sexual(ized) violence
reported to be present in a majority of current conflicts has created a powerful
momentum for large-scale policy initiatives to stop rape in war. The previously taboo
topic became one of the most hotly debated issues in academia and journal editorial
boards as well in national parliaments and international forums. The recent outburst
of celebrity activism has only made discussing sexual violence ‘sexy’ and trendy.
Indeed, the idea that there exists a real possibility that war-rape could be eliminated
has encouraged the call for urgent action. William Hague, then UK’s Foreign
Secretary, closed the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict in 2014 by
claiming “this was where we demonstrated to millions of people that it is possible to
succeed in defeating and ending sexual violence in conflict” (Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, 13 June 2014).
In contrast to the conflict resolution approach, which assumes various
rationales of violence, the R2P framework can be invoked namely in cases of largescale and intentional – systematic – violence against civilians. The original 2001
report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
formulated the conception rather vaguely, when proposing that “sovereign states
have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from
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mass murder and rape, from starvation” (2001, 32); but that when they are unwilling
or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of
states. According to ICISS, the nature of violence that might constitute international
action and especially military intervention (the just cause threshold) would be
indicated by (i) large scale loss of life, and/or (ii) ethnic cleansing. Particularly the
second takes gender-based violence into account, but limits the applicability of R2P
to “the systematic rape for political purposes of women of a particular group (either
as another form of terrorism, or as a means of changing the ethnic composition of
that group)” (Ibid., 33). In short, the strategic and political incentive for such
violence is a necessary precondition for any action.
The 2005 World Summit Outcome introduced four specific situations, which
constitute a universal responsibility to act: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes
and crimes against humanity (UN Doc. A/60/1.2005). These atrocity crimes were
adjusted by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 7), which
included sexual violence in the crimes against humanity, committed as part of a
“widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population” (Rome
Statute 2002, 3). Thus, sexual(ized) violence was only implicitly integrated through
the reference to the Rome Statute, at the same time preserving the exclusive
relevance of strategic and politically motivated rape.
Further operationalization of the four threshold situations followed in the
2009 Report of the Secretary General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.
The rhetoric of the report corresponds with the longer term tendency to adopt a
rather softer and more careful approach in formal declarations on the R2P. On the
one hand, the SG points out that UN Security Council Resolution 1820 maintained
that rape and other forms of sexual violence “could constitute war crimes and crimes
against humanity” (UN Doc. A/63/677, 16). On the other hand, regarding the
implementation of concrete measures in response to such situations and to prevent
sexual violence, he just very generally recommends the prosecution of offenders and
application of gender-responsive justice. The report is obviously not very progressive
concerning the fundamental question of how women should be protected from
large-scale violence and particularly systematic rape. A more fundamental problem,
however, is the lack of conceptual as well as operational clarity regarding the
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systematic nature of sexual(ized) violence committed in armed conflicts. In other
words, what are the concrete indicators that would help to distinguish politically
motivated violence (e.g. as part of ethnic cleansing) from domestic criminality and
sexually motivated assaults? As a result, despite the efforts to define the terms and
conditions of R2P implementation, the concept of protection remains rather vague
and open to manifold interpretations.
Eli Stamnes privileges, in ways similar to most R2P advocates, preventive and
state-level countermeasures. She argues that, in the context of insufficient
acknowledgement of gender-based subordination, a forcible international response
is unlikely. Stamnes also questions the potential effectiveness of such a reaction by
reference to feminist studies of militarism and its implications for women (Stamnes
2012, 195). Yet, the R2P framework has already been utilised beyond the scope of
prevention, through invoking protection from systematic and widespread
sexual(ized) violence. It has become a very powerful normative concept since the
very general idea of protection would hardly be contested – in contrast to the use of
military force – especially when advocating the safeguarding of the ‘fairer’ sex. The
argument is that regardless of insufficient confidence of whether sexual(ized)
violence in armed conflicts can be effectively prevented or stopped,iii there is an
optimistic expectation regarding the positive effects of external involvement. The
positive expectations from intervening forces are strengthened through the use of
dichotomies regarding international/Western vs. local/non-Western military
culture.iv
In addition to the false universalism of the R2P, its gender-blindness was also
critically reflected both in its exclusion of women representatives from the initial
discussions within the ICISS and its ignoring of the specifics of gender-based violence
(Davies and Stamnes 2012; Bond and Sherret 2012; Charlesworth 2010). Within
academic circles there was a very limited debate on the gender aspects of R2P and
only in the past few years have a handful of scholars critically challenged this
deficiency. In 2012, the journal Global Responsibility to Protect published a special
issue on R2P and sexual/gender-based violence. Most of the contributors concluded
that more attention should be paid to the protection of women from systematic and
large-scale violence while uncritically accepting the R2P conception (Skjelsbæk 2012;
9
Davies and Teitt 2012). In contrast to these normatively oriented studies, this article
provides a feminist critique of the discursive practices within the R2P framework,
arguing that it can be and, in practice, was misused for Western masculine
hegemony. As the case studies demonstrate, the major problem is not lack of
relevance but rather the strategic use of sexual violence to legitimize international
interventions, including highly controversial military operations. Despite the limited
positive effects on the living conditions of women in crisis situations, the
protectionist discourse belittles the outcomes and provides international legitimacy.
Libya’s Butcherv – The Framing of Sexual Violence and the Operation Unified
Protector
The 2011 crisis in Libya was unprecedented both in terms of the conclusive
interpretation of ongoing violence and the firm international response. As discussed
further, these two aspects are interrelated since the Western discourse served as a
means to legitimize the NATO military intervention resulting in the overthrow of the
Gaddafi regime and ultimately his death. The short civil war in Libya as well as the
international response have been exhaustively discussed by academics and
therefore are not dealt with in more detail.vi The case study rather focuses on the
framing of sexual violence in official (the UN, NATO, individual states) as well as
unofficial (NGOs and media) discourse, which legitimated the NATO-led military
operation. From the gender studies perspective the degree of attention paid to
sexual violence in this conflict is a positive step forward. On the other hand, the
critical feminist view reveals fundamental limitations of the sexual violence
narrative, namely (1) presentation and interpretation of rape as a weapon of war; (2)
selective condemnation of pro-Gaddafi forces responsible for sexual violence; and
finally, (3) protectionist arguments stressing the moral and material superiority of
the West. The following text is not another story of what happened since the
February uprising. It is rather a critical analysis of how specifically sexual violence
was reported and what were the implications of the particular discursive strategies.
Despite the swift reaction of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to the clashes
between the protesters and the Gaddafi forces in Tripoli, the two UNSC Resolutions
(1970 and 1973) do not mention sexual(ized) violence or even its systematic and
widespread nature. The turning-point in the official UN position was the speech of
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the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict
(hereafter SRSGSVC) Wallström, at the UNSC meeting in April 2011. She criticized the
Council for the absence of explicit condemnation of sexual violence in Libya and did
not hesitate to assess the crimes as political and security matters:
Given the way sexual violence spans the history of war, it should be
automatically and systematically included in protection measures. The
Council has recognized that sexual violence is used by political and military
leaders to advance political, military and economic ends (…). If we allow the
lack of hard data to justify inaction, it will always be too late. (…) I urge the
Council to use its influence to ensure that any ceasefire agreement reached
in relation to Libya or Côte d’Ivoire also entails the cessation of sexual
violence as a tactic of war (UN Doc. S.PV.6515, 2).
In the follow up statement on Libya, the Special Representative added a
direct appeal to the UNSC regarding response: “I would also like to recall that the
Security Council last December reiterated its readiness to consider patterns of
sexual violence when imposing sanctions against parties” (Wallström, 20 April 2011).
On the one hand, it is understandable and legitimate that the Special Representative
on Sexual Violence brings the matter to the SC table; on the other hand, her
presentation of rape as a weapon of war is automatically assumed rather than based
on any convincing data. Instead of providing some solid evidence, she refers to one
single case, which became a media blockbuster: “Although reports of rape remain
unconfirmed — and are even brutally silenced — they have arrested the attention of
the world. The name of Eman al-Obeidi is known to all” (UN Doc. S.PV.6515, 2). The
incidents of rape have been well documented by various NGOs and even by an
International Commission of Inquiry, yet, their mass scale and systematic nature
remains unconfirmed (UN Doc. A/HRC/17/44). Without any attempt to detract from
the crimes committed against innocent women, men and children, the phrase rape
as a weapon of war is a powerful formula, which legitimizes the implementation of
various forceful measures under the R2P framework. Planned systematic rape
organized by Gaddafi and his adjutants would be (and in the end actually was)
considered a clear and manifest failure of the state thus becoming a candidate for
activation of the third pillar, which includes use of military force.
In February, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a Resolution through
which it strongly condemned the violence in the country and demanded an
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immediate inquiry; the International Commission of Inquiry published its report in
June 2011. In contrast to the HRC, it paid extra attention to sexual(ized) violence
(covered in a separate chapter J and within several other sections). While the report
had a transparent methodology and open acknowledgment of its limitationsvii, the
conclusions regarding sexual violence generated confusion. The report indicated that
suggestions in the international media about the spread of Viagra pills among the
Kata’ebviii troops were “speculative”. According to the news reports, a majority of
incidents were perpetrated by Gaddafi soldiers, yet the document includes a short
section on opposition forces responsible for committing rape during raids and also
for not preventing rapes by armed civilians in opposition-controlled areas. In
general, the independent inquiry presents a more balanced picture regarding
responsibility for sexual violence. It does not advance any verified evidence for
systematic and widespread rape. Thus, it is rather surprising that the main findings
summed up in the introductory part include the following statement:
The commission has found that there have been acts constituting murder,
imprisonment, other forms of severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law, torture, persecution,
enforced disappearance and sexual abuse that were committed by
Government forces as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population with knowledge of the attack. Such acts fall within the
meaning of “crimes against humanity (UN Doc. A/HRC/17.44, 7).
The grouping of various types of violence under one classification obviously does not
take into account the cautious conclusions regarding responsibility and scale of
sexual violence described in the analytical part.ix
This interpretation of violence is crucial in the context of the international
response to the crisis. The second day after the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973
authorizing all necessary means to stop violence President Obama announced the
preparedness of the U.S. to participate in military intervention if Gaddafi continued
to commit atrocities against his own people (White House, 18 March 2011). The
same rhetoric was adopted by the NATO Secretary General Rasmussen when he
commented on the decision of NATO to launch Operation Unified Protector: “We are
taking action as part of the broad international effort to protect civilians against the
attacks by the Gaddafi regime” (NATO, 24 March 2011). The undisputed
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delegitimization of the regime served as an effective legitimization strategy of the
intervening coalition. During a press briefing, NATO military committee chairman
and commander of the OUP, Di Paola was asked by a reporter from AL Arabiya how
the NATO troops would discriminate civilians from armed forces of the conflicting
parties (NATO, 31 March 2011). The commander did not actually comment on this
fundamental issue but simply referred to the mandate of the operation based on
UNSC Resolution 1973 and stressed the primary mission to protect the victims of
attacks (Ibid.). Protectionist discourse combined with the consistent strategy of
“naming and shaming” towards Gaddafi was a typical policy asserted by most
Western representatives involved in the OUP. A logical and very effective part of that
approach was the one-sided accusation that Gaddafi and his forces used systematic
and mass rape as a weapon of war.
Despite mounting criticism of the alliance as a result of collateral damage and
unintended targeting of civilians which cast a shadow on the protectionist
arguments, Secretary General Rassmussen announced at the end of May that NATO
would continue its campaign until the defeat of Gaddafi’s forces. At this point, the
ICC chief prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo made a firm public statement during a press
conference at the UN that rapes were orchestrated by Gaddafi as part of his
repression. He indicated that the ICC would probably add new charges to those
issued against Gaddafi and his son Saif al-Islam (The Hague Justice Portal, 9 June
2011). Moreno-Ocampo was also one of the first official representatives to confirm
the use of Viagra as a tool of mass rape, comparing it to a machete (CNN, 18 May
2011). In the interview for CNN, he was mostly talking about investigating alleged
reports gained on the ground yet these were presented as verified facts. Finally, in
another interview for CNN, he argued that the most effective way to stop rapes
would be to arrest Gaddafi (CNN, 16 June 2011), thus implicitly supporting the
activities aimed to defeat the governing elite. Compared to the UN Commission of
Inquiry, he never mentioned any doubts about the credibility of the collected
information, nor did he condemn rape as a more complex phenomenon perpetrated
during the conflict by all parties as well as civilians. As the chief prosecutor
represents the authority of the ICC, his statements were crucial in the legitimization
of the international enforcement actions.
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The most active and visible were also the representatives of the U.S., who on
several occasions condemned rape allegedly ordered by Gaddafi, mainly based on
the single incident of Eman al-Obeidi and the alleged distribution of Viagra. The US
Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, condemned widespread human rights abuses
during an April UNSC meeting, where she also argued Gaddafi was supplying his
troops to encourage mass rape. During the debate, several countries and particularly
China and the Russian Federation opposed the way NATO implemented resolution
1973. There was also a debate on moral equivalence of human rights abuses
perpetrated by Gaddafi and the rebels. Obviously the U.S. Ambassador used the
argument to counterbalance any doubts about the legitimacy of the NATO response.
Also, U.S. Secretary of State Clinton made a public statement on the U.S.’s deep
concerns about the widescale rape, referring to the al-Obeidi case:
Since Eman al Obeidi bravely burst into a hotel in Tripoli on March 26 to
reveal that Qadhafi’s security forces raped her, other brave women have
come forward to tell of the horrible brutality they have experienced. (…)
Qadhafi’s security forces and other groups in the region are trying to divide
the people by using violence against women and rape as tools of war, and the
United States condemns this in the strongest possible terms (Clinton, June
16, 2011).
This statement shows an attempt by Clinton to generalize despite a lack of
concrete evidence, when she mentioned al-Obeidi and “other brave women”. When
she talks about the perpetrators, it is again Gaddafi’s forces and “other groups”,
which implies a general responsibility of the regime rather than individual soldiers
and their commanders.
To sum up, the official discourse of rape as a weapon of war fitted with the
notion of a state manifestly failing to protect its most vulnerable – women. This was
supported by the metonym “Gaddafi responsible for mass rapes”, which prevented
more complex and specific analysis of the individual responsibility for reported
crimes. The horrific nature of the organized sexual violence was demonstrated
through the reference to one name – Eman al-Obeidi. Her story provided sufficient
evidence for the perverse and barbaric practices of the regime. The following section
of the case study analyzes the unofficial discourse represented by the most
influential international media and their treatment of rape in Libya. In addition, the
14
media coverage is complemented by reports of the NGOs dealing with human rights
violations, such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International.x
Since March 2011, rape gained significant media attention due to several
shocking allegations against the Gaddafi forces. The first trigger was information
presented by Al-Jazeera,xi following reports by a Libyan doctor, about Viagra - called
a weapon of war - found in the pockets of dead soldiers. The doctor said it was
surely used to facilitate rape, while not providing any further evidence that it had
been (1) distributed in the army, (2) used on a mass scale, and (3) used specifically to
sexually abuse opposition supporters. The report then moves to the situation in
Libya more generally, openly sympathizing with the rebels, while associating the
regime with systematic violence. The Viagra “proof” was then very often used as an
argument supporting the charges against Gaddafi, especially after the ICC Prosecutor
Moreno-Ocampo announced an ongoing investigation of this suspicion.xii
The second key incident was the emotional testimony of Eman al-Obeidi in
front of international reporters followed by a series of interviews, articles and calls
for action. In particular, CNN eagerly covered the event, presenting it as a “story of a
woman in trouble”, who urgently needs protection: “(…) a desperate Libyan woman
burst into the building frantic to let the world know she had been raped and beaten
by Moammar Gadhafi's militia.” (CNN, 27 March 2011). And it was not only her: the
experience of al-Obeidi was presented as an exemplary case indicating the living
conditions of all Libyans:
(…) journalists had witnessed Gadhafi's firm and pervasive grip on Libyan
society. A woman who dared to speak against him was quickly silenced.
Journalists who dared to tell her story paid a price. It was one tale that
perhaps went a long way in illuminating the need to protect Libya's people
(Ibid.).
In the following months, the name al-Obeidi was utilized by media, NGOs and
political representatives as a symbol of oppression against an innocent woman, a
hero not afraid to speak out and resist the regime, a hunted prey seeking protection
and security (Al-Jazeera, 27 March 2011).xiii In May, when she finally escaped the
country, CNN stressed the role of the French embassy and the personal involvement
of President Sarkozy, once again, using her as a representative of opposition: ”The
lady who came to symbolize the Libyan struggle is now getting for the first time the
15
help she so long craved.” (CNN, 9 May 2011). In other words, she had to leave the
country to find shelter,xiv which was provided by the West, this time by French
diplomats, and later by the U.S., guaranteed personally by Secretary of State Clinton.
As with the Al-Jazeera report about Viagra, the story of al-Obeidi was used to
support the rape as a weapon of war narrative.xv After Moreno-Ocampo himself
used the formulation while referring to her name, it became a popular common
denominator of media reports.xvi In contrast to the report of the International
Commission of Inquiry presented to the HRC, international media never focused on
the rape incidents reported by Gaddafi loyalists or migrants, which did not fit the
frame of the oppressive state responsible for violence. Although there were longer
term patterns of sexual violence based on racial discrimination against non-Arab
populations as well as opportunistic rapes committed due to lack of police control,
those cases would have distracted from the simple, clear and attractive image of
“the Libyan butcher”. This selectivity is not coincidental after a more complex look at
the reporting of the conflict. The media were obviously interpreting the situation
with sympathy toward the opposition, thus neglecting any violent acts committed
either by the rebels or for other than political reasons. Compared to the official
representatives, journalists were using more expressive and sentimental language,
thus very effectively indicating who were the ‘good and bad guys’ in the conflict.
In general, human rights NGOs adopted a sober, more cautious approach.
Yet, by far the most active, Human Rights Watch, used similar language while calling
for international intervention.xvii After the al-Obeidi incident, HRW published a
report entitled: Libya: Immediately Release Woman Who Alleged Rape (HRW, 28
March 2011). In addition, women’s rights director of HRW, Liesl Gerntholtz gave an
interview where she referred to the al-Obedi case as emblematic of the war and
agreed there was a problem of rape used as a military weapon (HRW, 8 June 2011).
On the other hand, it did not report exclusively on the rebel victims but also
condemned violence against Sub-Saharan migrant workers facing long-term
discrimination including sexual assaults (HRW, 3 March 2011). Amnesty International
was the only NGO publically admitting that its investigation did not confirm any
indicators of rape as a weapon of war (Cockburn 2011). This corresponds with the
16
critical assessment of the International Crisis Group, in response to uncorroborated
rape allegations:
Much Western media coverage has from the outset presented a very onesided view of the logic of events, portraying the protest movement as entirely
peaceful and repeatedly suggesting that the regime’s security forces were
unaccountably massacring unarmed demonstrators who presented no real
security challenge (ICG, 6 June 2011, 9).
The analysis of both official and unofficial discourse on rape in Libya shows a
clear tendency to discredit the Gaddafi regime and present the opposition as
innocent suffering victims. Despite the repeated disavowal of a regime change
policy, the protectionist discourse in favor of Western military intervention reflected
a clear attempt to overthrow the ruling elite and support the rebels. This was
effectively implemented by NATO as well as UN representatives but even more
visibly by the Western media. At the same time, the discourse on rape as a weapon
used strategically by the Gaddafi forces and supporters served as a powerful source
of legitimacy for the military intervention. Extreme and systematic violence
exceptionally requires extreme solutions. However, the conclusions regarding
sexual(ized) violence were based on selective emotional testimonies rather than
complex and objective fact-finding missions.
And finally, there was a consistent emphasis on the sensitiveness of rapes in
the Libyan – Islamic – society due to the uncivilized and unjust treatment of victims,
which required an intervention of the Western “unified protectors”. The narrative of
Libya’s butcher was many times recreated by the media, which mainly blamed
Gaddafi’s regime for perpetration of the rapes and utilization of sexual violence as a
weapon.
Overall, the argument on widespread and systematic violence against the
most vulnerable provided a convincing justification for the NATO military operation.
Despite the emphasis put on preventive and non-military measures within the R2P
framework, the Libyan case shows the capability of Western states to interpret crisis
situations in line with their political preferences.
Mass Rape, Amputations, and Child Soldiers – A Forgotten Crisis in Mali
17
The war in Mali is often classed as one of the latest ‘forgotten conflicts’ (Al Jazeera,
September 6, 2014). Whereas the Libyan conflict received significant international
media attention, the case of Mali seems to have been far less attractive to
journalists worldwide; starting in January 2012, the Mali Civil War was followed by
French Intervention in 2013, and later coupled by the UN Peacekeeping Mission
taking over from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (Tardy 2013).
The following discussion on the case of interventions in Mali focuses on (1) it being
yet another conflict defined by widespread and systematic use of sexual(ized)
violence against civilians; (2) selective condemnation of a specific group of
insurgents, in this case the Tuaregs; (3) a call for action based on a Western-led
protectionist discourse reaffirming the moral superiority of ‘Western’ civilization.
As the conflict started in 2012, Margot Wallström, warned about the
“alarming” number of acts of sexual violence reported (UN News Service, 20 April
2012). Wallström emphasized that “allegations include abductions, public rapes and
subjecting women and girls to acts of sexual violence in front of family members”
and “acts of conflict-related sexual violence can constitute war crimes or crimes
against humanity for which combatants and their commanders will be held to
account” (Ibid.). Later, in her 2015 interview, Zainab Hawa Bangura claims that
“sexual violence is being used as a tactic of terror” as “we have seen in Mali” (UN
News Service, 14 April 2015). Here, the rhetoric, very much in line with the rape-is-aweapon discourse, is clearly visible, as Malian insurgents are named and shamed for
using rape as a terror tactic against civilian women and children requiring protection.
The most detailed reporting from the UN on sexual violence in Mali comes
from the independent expert Suliman Baldo, assessing the situation regarding
human rights in Mali for the Human Rights Council. Baldo reports that “during the
occupation of northern Mali in January 2012, armed groups committed sexual
violence, including rape, gang rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage,” which
reflects on the poor status of women in Mali and “the heritage of slavery” (UN Doc.
A/HRC/25/72, 13). Women and girls of the Bella community, regarded as
descendants of slaves of Tuaregs, have been singled out by the report as those most
often targeted. In addition, Baldo identified the use of rape as a reprisal, reporting
that “members of the “green berets” are accused of raping dozens of spouses and
18
daughters of “red berets” during the attempted counter-coup“ (Ibid.).xviii Here, the
situation seems to be even more complicated, as rape as a tactic of terror is coupled
with rape as a strategy for revenge or reprisal, in both cases a highly political action.
Overall, the strong counter-terror narrative, which highlighted the barbaric
killings of civilians and soldiers and the danger of illicit arms and drug flows, focused
on stabilizing Mali and its neighbors and, together with the fact that French nationals
were being taken hostage, served as a successful legitimization strategy for the
French. Malian rebels were depicted as savage blood-thirsty terrorists who need to
be stopped immediately. French intervention was, thus, presented clearly as a
“jihadist hunt” and anti-terror operation. Official sources, in line with the media,
exposed the danger of Malian insurgency and terrorism leading to instability in the
region and threatening French cities. Abductions and “cowardly” killings of many
French nationals only exacerbated the terrorist threat and the need to act
immediately to prevent the establishment of “jihadistan” in Mali (The Economist, 19
July 2014). Interestingly, there is no mention of sexual(ized) violence in the French
official or media discourse regarding the intervention. Any cases of rape were
possibly not significant enough to be reported.
France-led Operation Serval, launched in 2013, is largely depicted in
geopolitical and strategic scholarship as a successful military operation and blueprint
for future anti-insurgency operations (Lindley-French 2013). Both official and media
narratives focus on the threat that Islamist terror poses both to France/French
citizens and the international community. French president Hollande vowed to
“destroy the terrorists” (NTDTV, 16 January 2013), who pose a “savage threat”, and
UK Prime Minister Cameron described Mali’s insurgency as an “existential threat” to
“our way of life” – both very much in line with official War on Terror representation
(Ibid.). Hollande was also “totally determined that we [France] must eradicate these
terrorists who threaten the security of Mali, our own country and Europe” (Rice, 13
January 2013).
The media, in a similar way to French officials, portrayed the intervention as
yet another anti-terror operation. The Guardian reported that “Paris has justified the
intervention on the grounds of maintaining the stability in the region and reducing
attacks elsewhere, including France” (Hirsh and Willsher, 14 January 2013). The
19
French Defense Ministry further indicated that they were joining forces with Malian
and UN offensives to “prevent the resurgence of potential terrorist movements”
(France.24, 3 November 2013). In a similar vein, the editor of Africa Confidential,
argued that “there is a genuine fear that these people [jihadists with French
passports] could come from north Mali and set off bombs at Champs Elysees” (Ibid.).
Not only the rhetoric of UN officials differs from French war-on-terror
discourse, but also the resolutions passed by the UN on Mali also represent a
significant shift from the fairly straightforward French public rationale. Whereas
Security Council Resolutions 2056, 2071 and 2085 do not mention any concern
regarding sexual violence against civilians, Resolution 2100 establishing the mandate
of MINUSMA (The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali) strongly condemns “sexual and gender based violence” (UN Doc.
S/RES/2100, 2) and calls on MINUSMA:
To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed
conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and
Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and
gender-based violence in armed conflict (Ibid., 8).
The International Campaign to Stop Rape and Gender Violence in Conflict,
similarly to many other NGOs who focus on the sexual(ized) violence element,
reports that the resolution “condemns human rights abuses, including widespread
rape and violence against women…and calls for prosecution of the perpetrators”
(The International Campaign to Stop Rape and Gender Violence in Conflict, 15 May
2013).xix
The contrast between French and UN narratives is clearly visible in both
official and unofficial reporting. Although the UN mentions the danger of
international terrorism, the main security recipients are clearly the Malian women
and children, as rape becomes a tactic of terror. Here, terrorism is portrayed not as
primarily an international danger extending to Western civilians, but rather, through
the use of rape, as a political tactic at a local level. Before the passing of the
resolution establishing MINUSMA, UN reported on alarming numbers of rapes and
other instances of conflict-related sexual violence. Yet again, in the Mali case, rape is
automatically deemed to be widespread and systematic. How exactly rape serves the
20
terrorist tactics of the insurgents is not further specified. Stories of very young girls
being raped, abducted or sold into sexual slavery clearly dominate the reporting (UN
Doc. A/HRC/25/72), and prompt the call for international action against such
barbaric and backward practices, while other human rights abuses are often sidelined.
In a similar tone to the official UN portrayal, the media portrayed the Malian
conflict largely in terms of sexual violence. The BBC reported on the UN adopting the
resolution for military intervention with the aim to “retake the north from Islamist
extremists”, centering the legitimization of the intervention based on the account of
UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights’ Ivan Simonovic (13 October 2012).
The harsh version of Sharia law imposed in Islamist-controlled areas led to serious
women’s rights abuses, as Simonovic reports that “forced marriage, forced
prostitution, and rape were widespread, and that women were being sold as "wives"
for less than $1,000 (£620)” (Ibid.). CNN also cites Simonovic, who claims that
“radical Islamists are compiling a list of unmarried mothers in Northern Mali, raising
fears of cruel punishment such as stoning, amputations and executions,” and
highlights that “the threat is there, it's real and people live with it and they are afraid
of those lists. This could indicate that these women are at imminent risk of being
subjected to cruel and inhumane punishment” (Karimi, 13 October 2012). The
Australian The National reported that the “Tuareg insurgents in Mali raped hundreds
of women and girls,” citing the example of a 13-year-old girl, which they “offered to
pay the equivalent of $14 for. When her family said no, they took her anyway. A
week later, she died in captivity, after she was repeatedly raped by a group of armed
men” (31 January 2013). The National further explained how “acquisition of livestock
and women through raids” are traditional patterns of Tuareg warfare, where
“subjugation of people seen as low-caste is still considered acceptable among some
families” (Ibid.).
The powerful testimony of Ivan Simonovic provided the strongest case for the
media to call for action (BBC, 13 October 2012). He not only highlighted the forced
marriages and women being sold into sexual slavery, but he also anticipated mass
punishment for unmarried mothers and pregnant women based on strict
interpretation of Sharia law by the rebels. Here the threat is real and swift action
21
thus becomes necessary. This protectionist rhetoric is supported by the statistics on
rapes in numerous UN documents and reports, ranging from 80 to over 200 cases of
reported rapes by armed forces of mostly Tuareg origin (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/72).
The tradition of slavery is often highlighted by the media, who draw on
traditional tactics of the Tuaregs that consist of acquisition of livestock and women
of other, often lower-cast, people. Here, women are basically considered as less than
human (perhaps having the same or higher value than a cow) and their subjugation
is assumed to be accepted by many traditional families. Taking into account the
West’s troubled engagements with slavery in previous centuries, Mali’s colonial past,
and gender emancipatory international regimes, the slavery argument, when also
coupled with the misuse of Sharia law, strongly delineates the backwardness of the
Tuareg lifestyle. Thus, the international community clearly has a moral imperative to
intervene with force against such practices.
The human rights organisations and NGOs highlight the individual cases of
sexual violence, which often form the focal point of the reporting and call for action.
In their joint letter the Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch and the International Federation for Human
Rights (FIDH) specifically highlight sexual violence suffered by Malian civilians at the
hands of Tuareg rebels. The letter warns that there are “numerous cases” of “sexual
abuse and widespread pillage” (5 December 2012). AI highlights the “most urgent
need…for UN agencies and other relief organisations to attain immediate and
unhindered access to the conflict area in the north”, and argues that “civilians
affected by the conflict are in urgent need of assistance; victims of rape and other
sexual violence are in need of medical care” (Koettl, 17 May 2012). In a similar tone,
HRW called for action in 2012, claiming that
separatist Tuareg rebels, Islamist armed groups, and Arab militias who seized
control of northern Mali in April 2012 have committed numerous war crimes,
including rape, use of child soldiers, and pillaging of hospitals, schools, aid
agencies, and government buildings (HRW, 30 April 2012).
HRW continues to describe their fact-finding mission about a “wave of
abductions of women and girls by armed groups,” providing the example of “a 14year-old girl [who] told HRW that six rebels held her captive in Gao and raped her
22
over a period of four days”(Ibid.). The above testimonies recited by the NGOs and
humanitarian organisations certainly reveal a very disturbing trend of child and gang
rapes by the rebels and again many calls for international intervention.
Based on the international alarmism about human rights abuses in Mali, the
ICC formally opened its investigation into war crimes committed on the territory of
Mali in January 2013, as the prosecutor determined that
there is a reasonable basis to believe the following crimes were committed:
(i) murder; (ii) mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (iii) intentionally
directing attacks against protected objects; (iv) the passing of sentences and
the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court; (v) pillaging, and (vi) rape (International Criminal
Court, January 16 2013).
Immediately, the headlines such as “Hague court may probe Mali rapes,
killings” (Webb 2012) or “ICC may look into Mali rapes” appeared (News24, April 24
2012). Since then, there is almost no information on the still on-going investigation
and, needless to say, no prosecution was ever opened. However, the above-cited
statement of the Chief Prosecutor validated the claims that rape was committed on
a large scale and possibly became a weapon of war. Moreover, rape clearly
dominates the headlines, whereas other crimes are not discussed, as clearly
demonstrated by the headlines above, or statements like “the ICC said it was
considering investigating rapes and killings that had been committed since fighting
erupted in Mali's desert north in January” (McElroy, 12 July 2012).
It is very clear from the available documentation that, in the case of Mali, the
protection of vulnerable women and children is presented as a top priority of the
MINUSMA mission.xx As in other cases, the “untold stories” and silences are
highlighted as common thread in the patterns of attacks. As Rachelle Djangone
Mian, Mali director of UN Women claims, “rape is something people don’t talk about
in this area. Imagine what the actual number of women and girls raped is” (Omari
2013). According to UN Women report:
Rape victims in Gao, as in other occupied regions in Mali, are tortured by
what they have gone through. Their untold stories eat away at them…they
carry the burden of both their oppressors and that of the community which
failed to protect them from the assaults (Ibid.).
23
Many women are reportedly too ashamed to speak out about sexual violence
in the highly patriarchal Malian culture for fear of being left by their husbands or
segregated from society. Such quotes suggest that the statistics on sexual violence
acquired by the UN and other bodies need to be multiplied – but by how many times
remains unclear.
Whereas in some cases the ambiguous term “insurgent” or “official” is used,
in a majority of the cases the Tuareg rebels are singled out as the only party guilty of
crimes of a sexual nature. Both official UN documents as well as NGOs and the media
trace the cultural tradition of slavery back to Tuareg tribes and remind the audience
that capturing stock and women (in that particular order) during pillages is a
common tactic. Here, the “rape and pillage” primitive war-waging tactics clearly
show the backwardness and moral corruption of the enemy. The tradition of slavery
re-emerges, as sexual violence is mainly directed against the Bella community, the
descendants of former slaves. Clearly, Spivak’s (2010) hypothesis of the Western
logic that dictates “saving the brown women from brown men” is visible in the Mali
case. Although the Tuareg rebels are named as primary perpetrators of sexual
violence in a majority of reports, “citizens have also pointed fingers at Malian
soldiers and other foreign troops serving in the country” (Omari 2013). Here, all the
non-Western masculinity, but mainly the Tuareg tribes, seems to be corrupt and
implicated in the perpetration of horrid acts of sexual violence in armed conflict.
Conclusion
The topic of sexual violence attracts enormous international attention, but it
became a powerful discursive frame to mobilize rather controversial political actions
in response. Whereas large-scale rape in armed conflict is not a new phenomenon,
the modern (post-Cold War) conflicts are treated as largely based on employment of
sexual violence as a weapon of war or tactic of terror. The existing meta-narrative of
rape being an actual weapon of war became deeply embedded in the political
legitimization strategies for military intervention. Utilising the rhetoric to fit political
agendas and legitimizing military interventions, which in many cases fail to protect
the civilians, and in others are even covering soldiers guilty of sexual misconduct
24
themselves, represents a highly problematic development. Here, the suffering of
victims of sexual violence is sensationalized and highlighted at the expense of other,
often extremely brutal, forms of violence and human rights abuses. This is not to
claim that such accounts are not to be heard and discussed – on the contrary - sexual
abuse of civilians as well as military personnel during conflicts is indeed one of the
most pressing issues. This paper argues that sensationalizing the suffering of the
victims of sexual violence for legitimization of, in some cases highly controversial,
military interventions and peacekeeping missions does primarily serve the purpose
of making international interventions acceptable. Critical reading of the discourse is
thus very important to prevent the reproduction of simplified narratives strategically
used to legitimize political projects.
The analysis was based on the CDA, while using Fairclough’s dialectics
combined with critical feminist assumptions on sexual violence in armed conflicts.
Specifically, we have identified a set of legitimization strategies, which in practice
justify sensitive political actions rather than providing effective assistance to victims
of sexual violence. These are (i) constructing sexual(ized) violence as a weapon of
war, (ii) condemning concrete architects of the machinery (typically one of the
conflicting parties), and (iii) proclaiming the urgent need to protect the victims
through all necessary means. The discursive strategies reveal the prevailing Western
domination in the international order, reproduced through the trendy rubric of
humanitarianism. The two selected case-studies have been celebrated by academics
as the successful translation of the R2P concept into practical response actions. Yet,
a closer look at the sources of legitimacy in both cases indicates the same patterns of
manipulation and predominance displayed especially by Western media, but also
official representatives.
Firstly, from a critical feminist perspective, labelling rape as a weapon
represents a significant step from past popular understanding of sexual violence as a
side-effect and victims as collateral damage (leading to inaction). Particularly in the
context of the widely accepted R2P conception, the strategic nature of sexual
violence became a powerful push factor for external intervention. Therefore, there is
a clear tendency to interpret rape as a weapon of war while neglecting the incidents
that do not fit the popular image of one-sided politically motivated attacks. The
25
simplification and often even misperception of the real nature of sexual violence
leads to marginalization of other victims, which paradoxically contradicts the very
principles of humanitarian assistance.
Secondly, the binary understanding of the essentially uncivilized and brutal
character of the masculine society in the targeted state versus the noble intentions
of the interveners providing protection is also highly problematic. The
delegitimization of the local communities constructs the axiomatic superiority of the
West, which, especially in the military sphere, does not correspond with reality. In
both cases, the dichotomy of civilized vs. barbaric men was even strengthened by
emphasizing the sensitiveness of sexual violence in Islamic societies, which prevent
women from testifying. The problem of suppressing the information due to fear of
stigma is rather a general phenomenon typical for both secular and religious
societies.
Finally, the protectionist discourse facilitated through the R2P concept
provides legitimacy at the level of intentions (declared objectives) rather than
outcomes, which fundamentally limits the accountability of the interveners. This
goes hand in hand with the two previous strategies. While Western representatives
and media were reporting on rape as a weapon of war and accusing the targeted
state of manifestly failing to provide protection - being either directly responsible for
the violence or not willing to respond - other states with military capacities to act are
automatically presupposed to provide the protection. It was beyond the scope of
this paper to assess the effectiveness of the military operations in Libya and Mali, yet
we can conclude that there is a fundamental gap between discourse and practice.
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i
Autessere (2012, 14) notes that the emotional impact of sexual(ized) violence particularly strong as it
involves “intentionally inflicted body harm to individuals who are socially constructed as the most
vulnerable” as is viewed upon as the “ultimate violation of the self.
ii
According to Van Leeuwen (2008), it can be attributed to (i) political, legal or symbolic authority –
e.g. the UN Charter or the Red Cross (ii) rational purpose – e.g. providing security, (iii) moral principle
– e.g. assistance to those in need or (iv) historical practice – e.g. refugee protection during the second
World War.
iii
In his report the Secretary General even admits that “more research and analysis are needed on
why it has been so difficult to stem widespread and systematic sexual violence in some places”(UN
Doc. A/63/677, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 January 2009.)
iv
‘Third world’ masculinity is clearly distinguished from first world masculinity, which increasingly
wages wars in a highly civilized and technical fashion. Militarized Westernized masculinity waging
35
largely virtual war (Der Derian 2000) or practicing peacekeeping represents a new - and better - kind
of armed male. The soldier-protector is morally superior to the soldier-killer and determined to stop
the soldier-rapist from sexual violence.
v
The phrase was used in the title of the New York Times article from 22 February 2011.
vi
For a comprehensive analysis of the crisis and the NATO military response see Hehir and Murray
2013; Chesterman 2011; Pattison 2011; or Dunne and Gifkins 2011.
vii
With the exception of Eman al-Obeidi, all interviews were given by family members and other
persons rather than victims themselves. For detailed methodology see UN Doc. A/HRC/17.44, 2 and
71-72.
viii
Military units under the direct command of Gaddafi and his family members operating separately
from the state army.
ix
In March 2012, the second advanced version of the report was published, presenting a completely
opposite conclusion: “The Commission did not find evidence to substantiate claims of a widespread or
a systematic attack, or any overall policy of sexual violence against a civilian population” (UN Doc.
A/HRC/19.68, 15). This is rather paradoxical because the second Report provided more detailed
information acquired from both victims and perpetrators, however, the allegations that rape would
be used as a weapon of war by either of the conflicting parties was not confirmed during the
additional inquiry. For instance, the claims about Viagra distributed among Gaddafi forces was rather
refuted (Ibid., 143).
x
Both organizations have been monitoring and reporting human rights situation in Libya for a long
time period. For the key reports from past years see HRW 2006a; 2006 b; particularly important is the
HRW Report: Libya: A Threat to Society? Arbitrary Detention of Women and Girls for “Social
Rehabilitation” (2006).
xi
See: Al-Jazeera English, 27 March 2011.
xii
See for example ‘Libya Mass Rape Claims: Using Viagra Would Be a Horrific First,’ The Guardian, 9
June 2011 or ‘Libya: Gaddafi Investigated Over Use of Rape as a Weapon,’ BBC News, 8 June 2011.
xiii
For instance: ‘How One Voice Can Tell the Story of an Entire Movement,’ CNN, 1 April 2011.
xiv
‘Help Obeidi Out of Libya,’ CNN, 5 June 2011’, and ‘Alleged Libyan Rape Victim Comes to the U.S. to
Stay,’ CNN, 29 July 2011.
xv
Compare ‘ICC to Investigate Reports of Viagra-fueled Gang-rapes in Libya,’ CNN, 18 May 2011 and
‘Rape as a Weapon of War in Libya,’ CNN, 17 May 2011. See also: ‘Rape Is Used as a Weapon of War,’
BBC, 9 June 2011.
xvi
‘Libya: Gaddafi Investigated Over Use of Rape as Weapon,’ BBC News, 8 June 2011; ‘Libya Mass
Rape Claims: Using Viagra Would be a Horrific First,’ the Guardian, 9 June 2011; ‘Rape in Libya: The
Crime That Dare Not Speak Its Name,’ Times, 9 June 2011; ‘Libya: War and rape?,’ Al-Jazeera 19 June
2011; ‘Iman Al-Obeidi: Rape as a Weapon of War,’ Washington Post, 29 March 2011.
xvii
See for instance Human Rights Watch, ‘Hold Gadhafi Accountable for Atrocities,’ 22 February 2011.
xviii
Baldo further discussed examples of cases, such as the incident where 5 women were raped by
armed men in civilian clothing, reporting that “one victim reported that at around 4 o’clock on the
afternoon of 2 November 2013, she was on board a bus on the road between Tonka and Bouna, in
the Timbuktu region, in the company of four other women, the driver and an elderly person, when
two white vans suddenly appeared with eight armed men on board who ordered the driver to stop,
forced the five women to leave the vehicle and raped them for 5 hours. One of the victims told
investigators that she had been raped several times by three men who spoke Songhai, Arabic and
Tamasheq” (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/72, 13). In another case, “a 21-year-old woman detained in a rape
case since 28 February 2011 in Djenné prison (Mopti region) claims to have been the victim of
repeated physical and sexual violence since March 2013. The victim alleges that when she complained
to the prison director after the first rape, he told her to take contraceptive measures” (Ibid.).
xix
The most detailed reporting from the UN on sexual violence in Mali comes from the independent
expert Suliman Baldo, assessing the situation of human rights in Mali for the Human Rights Council.
Baldo reports that “during the occupation of northern Mali in January 2012, armed groups committed
sexual violence, including rape, gang rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage,” which reflects on the
poor status of women in Mali and “the heritage of slavery” (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/72, 13). The Bella
community women and girls – regarded as descendants of slaves of Tuaregs – have been singled out
as most often targeted by the report. Also, rape as a reprisal has been identified by Baldo, reporting
that “members of the “green berets” are accused of raping dozens of spouses and daughters of “red
36
berets” during the attempted counter-coup“ (Ibid.). Here, the situation seems to be even more
complicated, as rape as a tactic of terror is coupled with rape as a strategy for revenge or reprisal.
xx
Under the terms of the SC Resolution 2100, the mission would support the political process and
carry out a number of security-related stabilization tasks, with a focus on major population centres
and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions
for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of
State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections (UN Doc. S/RES/2100.
2013).
37