Marbury V. Madison (1803) Case Summary
The President of the United States has the power to appoint judges to the federal courts.
Usually, the President appoints individuals who are members of his political party or who
share his ideas about politics.
In 1800, John Adams was President. There was an election that year. Thomas Jefferson, who
belonged to another political party, got elected. There were many positions in the federal
government that were empty. Before he left office, President Adams tried to fill these
positions with people who shared his ideas.
President Adams appointed 58 new people. He asked his Secretary of State, John Marshall, to
deliver the paperwork to these people so they could start their new jobs. Marshall delivered
most of the papers. He was in a hurry, so he left some of the papers for the new Secretary of
State, James Madison, to deliver. When he came into office, President Thomas Jefferson told
Madison not to deliver the papers to some of the people Adams had appointed.
One of the individuals who didn't receive his papers was William Marbury. He sued James
Madison and tried to get the Supreme Court of the United States to issue a writ of mandamus.
A writ is a court order that forces an official to do something. Marbury argued that a law
passed by Congress (the Judiciary Act of 1789) gave the Supreme Court of the United States
the power to issue this writ. If the Court issued the writ, Madison would have to deliver the
papers. Then Marbury would become a justice of the peace.
The Supreme Court of the United States had to decide the case. The new Chief Justice of the
United States was John Marshall. He was the same person who had been unable to deliver the
paperwork in the first place!
Questions to Consider
1.Why would the President appoint people who are members of his same political party?
2.Why do you think Thomas Jefferson did not want the people Adams appointed to get their
jobs?
3.Who is Chief Justice John Marshall likely to agree with? Why?
4.If Congress passes a law that conflicts with the Constitution, which one are we required to
follow: the new law or the U.S. Constitution?
5. Which side would you take?
Marbury V. Madison Decision Summary
The Court unanimously decided not to require Madison to deliver the commission to Marbury. Chief Justice
Marshall understood the danger that this case posed to the power of the Supreme Court. Because Madison
was President Jefferson’s secretary of state and Jefferson was head of the Democratic Party while Chief Justice
Marshall and Marbury were Federalists, President Jefferson was almost certain to direct Madison to refuse to
deliver the commission to Marbury. If the Court required Madison to deliver the commission and Madison
refused, the Court had no power to force him to comply, and, therefore the Court would look weak. If the
Court did not act, it would look like the justices made their decision out of the fear that Madison would not
obey their decision.
The justices struck a middle ground between these alternatives in their opinion, written by Chief Justice
Marshall. The Court ruled that Marbury was entitled to his commission, but that according to the
Constitution, the Court did not have the authority to require Madison to deliver the commission to Marbury in
this case. They found that the Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicted with the Constitution because it gave the
Supreme Court more authority than it was given under the Constitution. The dispute centered around the
difference between the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction and its appellate jurisdiction. If the Court has
original jurisdiction over a case, it means that the case can go directly to the Supreme Court and the justices
are the first ones to decide the case. If the Court has appellate jurisdiction, however, the case must first be
argued and decided by judges in the lower courts. Only then can it be appealed to the Supreme Court, where
the justices decide whether the rulings of the lower courts were correct. Marbury brought his lawsuit under
the Court’s original jurisdiction, but the justices ruled that it would be an improper exercise of the Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus in this case.
Declaring the Constitution “superior, paramount law,” the Supreme Court ruled that when ordinary laws
conflict with the Constitution, they must be struck down. Furthermore, it is the job of judges, including the
justices of the Supreme Court, to interpret laws and determine when they conflict with the Constitution.
According to the Court, the Constitution gives the judicial branch the power to strike down laws passed by
Congress, the legislative branch. This is the principle of judicial review. Thus, it has been recognized since this
decision that it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”
Through this decision, Chief Justice Marshall established the judicial branch as an equal partner with the
executive and legislative branches within the developing system of government. By refusing to require
Madison and Jefferson to deliver the commission to Marbury, he did not give Madison the opportunity to
disobey the Court, making it look weak. And, by declaring the Court’s power through the principle of judicial
review, he made it clear that the justices did not make their decision out of fear. Instead, he announced that
the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and established the Supreme Court as the final authority for
interpreting it.
McCollough V. Maryland (1819) Case Summary
In 1791, the U.S. government created the first national bank for the country. During this time, a national bank
was controversial because people had different opinions about what powers the national government should
have. Alexander Hamilton believed that the national government had the power to create a new national
bank. Thomas Jefferson believed that the national government did not have such a power. When Thomas
Jefferson was president, he did not renew the national bank's charter. After the War of 1812, President James
Madison decided that the country needed a national bank, and he asked Congress to create a Second Bank of
the United States in 1816.
After President Madison approved the bank, many branches were opened throughout the country. Many
states did not want the new bank branches to open. There were several reasons why the states opposed these
national banks. They competed with the state banks, many national bank managers were thought to be
corrupt, and the states believed that the national government was getting too powerful.
Maryland tried closing down the Baltimore branch of the national bank by passing a law that forced all banks
that were created outside of the state pay a $15,000 tax each year. James McCulloch, who worked at the
Baltimore Branch, refused to pay the tax.
The State of Maryland took McCulloch to court saying that Maryland had the power to tax any business in its
state. Luther Martin, a lawyer for Maryland, said that if the national government had the power to regulate
state banks, then Maryland had the power to regulate national banks. He also said that the Constitution does
not give Congress the power to create a national bank.
After McCulloch was convicted of violating the tax statute and fined $2,500, he appealed the court's decision
to the Maryland Court of Appeals. His lawyer argued that creating a national bank was a "necessary and
proper" job of Congress. He stated that many of the powers of the national government are not written in the
Constitution, but are necessary for the national government to do its job. Also, he claimed that Maryland
could not place a tax on the national bank because the tax would not let the national bank do its job.
The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court's decision. McCulloch then appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States, led by Chief Justice John Marshall.
Questions to Consider
1.Why would the states feel uncomfortable with a national bank?
2.In your opinion, does the U.S. government have the power to create a national bank? Why or why not?
Examine the enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 to support your answer.
3.If the United States does have the power to create a national bank, does Maryland have the power to tax
the bank? Why or why not?
4.Why do you think the Supreme Court of the United States heard the case?
5. Which side do you support?
McCullough V. Maryland Decision Summary
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of McCulloch
and against the state of Maryland. The Court addressed two questions: 1) whether Congress had the authority
under the Constitution to commission a national bank, and 2) if so, whether the state of Maryland had the
authority to tax a branch of the national bank operating within its borders.
The justices first addressed the issue of whether the Constitution gave Congress the power to establish a
national bank. They acknowledged that it was not within the enumerated powers of Congress, authority
explicitly given to Congress in the Constitution, to establish a national bank. He also noted that there is
nothing in the Constitution restricting the powers of Congress to those specifically enumerated. Rather, only
the “great outlines” of the powers of the three branches are specified. Instead of listing every power of
Congress, the Constitution gives Congress the authority to make “all laws which shall be necessary and
proper” for exercising the powers that are specifically enumerated. This means that Congress has the
authority to pass any law that is “necessary and proper” to exercise its power as specified in the Constitution,
even if the Constitution does not explicitly give Congress the authority to pass that specific law or to regulate
that specific matter. This is the principle of unenumerated powers. The justices noted that the Constitution
expressly gives Congress the powers to “lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to
declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies.” Because a national bank would be
“necessary and proper” to allow Congress to exercise these enumerated powers, the Court concluded that the
Constitution gave Congress the authority to establish one.
The second issue the Court considered is whether the state of Maryland had the authority to tax a branch of
the national bank operating within its borders. The Court determined that it did not. In their decision, the
justices declared that “the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they
control the constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them.” In other words,
if the United States Congress passed a law within its authority under the Constitution, a state legislature could
not pass a law to interfere with that action. “The power to tax is the power to destroy,” they decided.
Allowing a state to tax a branch of the national bank created by Congress would allow that state to interfere
with the exercise of Congress’s constitutional powers. Thus because “states have no power, by taxation or
otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control” the operation of constitutional laws passed by
Congress, Maryland could not be allowed to tax a branch of the national bank, even though that branch was
operating within its borders. The law passed by the Maryland state legislature imposing a tax on the Bank of
the United States “is unconstitutional and void.”
Dred Scott V. Sandford (1857) Case Summary
Dred Scott was born a slave in Virginia around 1799. In 1830, Scott and his master moved to Missouri, which
was a slave state. Four years later, a surgeon in the U.S. army named Dr. John Emerson bought Scott and
moved him to the free state of Illinois. In 1836, Scott and Emerson moved to Fort Snelling, Wisconsin Territory.
The Missouri Compromise prohibited slavery in this territory. That same year, Scott married a slave named
Harriet. In 1838, the Emersons and the Scotts moved back to Missouri where the Scotts had two daughters.
Emerson died in 1843 and left his possessions, including the Scotts, to his widow Irene. In 1846, Scott asked
Mrs. Emerson if he could work for his freedom. According to Scott, she refused.
Scott sued Mrs. Emerson for "false imprisonment" and battery. Scott argued that he was being held illegally
because he had become a free man as soon as he had lived in a free state. He claimed he was taken to a slave
state against his will. Many slaves had sued their owners in this way and won their freedom in the past. In
1847, Emerson won in the Missouri Circuit court because Scott's lawyers failed to prove that she was holding
Scott as a slave. Scott's lawyers successfully argued for a new trial.
By the time the new case went to trial in 1850, Emerson had moved to Massachusetts leaving her brother,
John Sanford, in charge of Scott's case. The jury agreed that Scott and his family should be freed in accordance
with the doctrine "once free, always free." The case was appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court in 1852,
where two of the three judges found for Emerson and Sanford. William Scott wrote the decision of the court,
stating that states have the power to refuse to enforce the laws of other states.
Sanford was legally recognized as Scott's owner in 1853. Sanford moved to New York leaving the Scotts in
Missouri. Scott filed a new lawsuit in federal court (the other suits had been in state court). Federal courts
settle disputes between citizens of different states. A clerk mistakenly added a letter to Sanford's name, so the
case permanently became Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sandford.
In 1854, the U.S. Court for the District of Missouri heard the case. John Sanford argued in this federal lawsuit
that Dred Scott could not sue because he was not a citizen. Judge Wells did not accept this argument, but he
did instruct the jury to apply only the laws of Missouri in its decision. The jury found in favor of Sanford. Dred
Scott then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Unfortunately for Scott, the political divisions over slavery worsened from the time his case first came to trial
in 1847 through 1857, when the Court finally announced its decision. Events of this period that increased
conflicts included the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act (1850), publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852),
enactment of The Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854), violence in "bleeding Kansas" (1856), and Representative
Brooks's battery of Senator Sumner in the U.S. Senate (1856). Like almost all people of their time, the justices
had strong personal views about slavery. One justice, Peter V. Daniel of Virginia, supported slavery so much
that he even refused to travel north of the Mason-Dixon line into a free state. Some historians believe that
Chief Justice Taney hoped that his decision in the Dred Scott case would help prevent, not create future
disputes over slavery.
Questions to Consider
1.Why did Dred Scott sue Emerson? What was his goal?
2.Summarize the basic argument made by Scott's lawyers in the Missouri Circuit Court (the state court). Did
Dred Scott have reason to believe that he would win his case?
3.How do you think the political divisions over slavery affected Dred Scott's chances of winning his case?
4. Which side do you support and why?
Dred Scott V. Sandford Decision Summary
In a 7-2 opinion, a majority of the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Sanford.* Chief Justice Taney wrote the
opinion for the Court. The Court first decided that African Americans were not citizens as defined by the
Constitution. They then considered the merits of the case, ruling that slaves did not become free simply by
entering a free state or a territory that had not yet become a state. This overturned the ruling of the lower
federal court, but affirmed the ruling of the Missouri Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court first concluded that African Americans were not citizens as defined by the Constitution,
and therefore, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear this case. The decision
cited Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which gives federal courts the power to hear cases “between
Citizens of different States.” To determine the definition of “citizens,” the justices considered the intent of the
framers of the Constitution. They noted that at the time the Constitution was written, people of African
descent, both slave and free, were “regarded as beings of an inferior order” and were “so far inferior that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” Believing that the Court should not “give to the
words of the Constitution a more liberal construction …than they were intended to bear when the instrument
was framed and adopted,” the Court concluded that people of African descent were not citizens, and could
therefore “claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of
the United States.” This included the ability to bring suit in federal court.
Even though the Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear this case because it did not involve
“Citizens of different States,” the justices ruled on the merits of case anyway. They first argued that the power
of Congress to regulate the internal workings of the territories that had not yet become states was limited.
They concluded that an act of Congress prohibiting citizens from “owning [slaves] in the territor[ies] … is not
warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void.” The Court thereby struck down the Missouri
Compromise as unconstitutional because Congress did not have the power under the Constitution to
determine whether slavery was allowed in the territories, even those these were not states.
In addition, the Court concluded that slaves could not be made free simply by entering a free state or territory.
This would deprive slave owners of their property without giving them due process of law as required by the
Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, “an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his
…property, merely because he … brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States” was
unconstitutional. The Court held, therefore, that Dred Scott and his family were “property” and were not
made free simply by virtue of the fact that they were brought into a free territory.
*The defendant in this case case John Sanford, but the Court record misspelled his name, and the Court
continues to call the case Dred Scott v. Sandford.
Plessy V. Ferguson (1896) Case Summary
In 1890, Louisiana passed a statute called the Separate Car Act. This law declared that all rail companies
carrying passengers in Louisiana had to provide separate but equal accommodations for white and non-white
passengers. The penalty for sitting in the wrong compartment was a fine of $25 or 20 days in jail.
Two parties wanted to challenge the constitutionality of the Separate Car Act. A group of black citizens who
raised money to overturn the law worked together with the East Louisiana Railroad Company, which sought to
terminate the Act largely for monetary reasons. They chose a 30-year-old shoemaker named Homer Plessy, a
citizen of the United States who was one-eighth black and a resident of the state of Louisiana. On June 7,
1892, Plessy purchased a first-class passage from New Orleans to Covington, Louisiana and sat in the railroad
car for "White" passengers. The railroad officials knew Plessy was coming and arrested him for violating the
Separate Car Act. Well known advocate for black rights Albion Tourgee, a white lawyer, agreed to argue the
case for free.
Plessy argued in court that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. The Thirteenth Amendment banned slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the
government treat people equally. John Howard Ferguson, the judge hearing the case, had stated in a previous
court decision that the Separate Car Act was unconstitutional if applied to trains running outside of Louisiana.
In this case, however, he declared that the law was constitutional for trains running within the state and found
Plessy guilty.
Plessy appealed the case to the Louisiana State Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision that the Louisiana
law was constitutional. Plessy then took his case, Plessy v. Ferguson, to the Supreme Court of the United
States, the highest court in the country. Judge John Howard Ferguson was named in the case because he had
been named in the petition to the Louisiana State Supreme Court, not because he was a party to the initial
lawsuit.
Questions to Consider
1.What law did Homer Plessy violate? How did Plessy violate this law?
2.What rights do the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments provide? Why did Plessy believe that the
Separate Car Act violated these rights?
3.What claim did Plessy make to the Louisiana State Supreme Court?
4.Do you think it is possible for two groups of people to be separate and equal? Why or why not? If so,
describe a situation where people can be separate, but equal.
5. Which side do you support and why?
Plessy V Ferguson Decision Summary
In a 7-1 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ferguson. The majority rejected Plessy’s Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendment arguments, instead putting its stamp of approval on the doctrine of “separate but
equal.” The dissent, written by Justice John Marshall Harlan, disagreed, arguing that segregationist laws
indoctrinate society with the belief that the two races are not equal.
Justice Henry Brown wrote the majority opinion, which rejected Plessy’s argument that the Louisiana law
conflicted with the Thirteenth Amendment, deeming the point “too clear for argument.” The justices then
considered whether the law conflicted with the Fourteenth Amendment. They identified the purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment as “enforce[ing] the absolute equality of the two races before the law,” but then
asserted that “it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce
social…equality.” According to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment was only concerned with legal, not
social, equality.
In addition, the justices denied the argument that separation of the races by law “stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority.” They argued instead that racial prejudice could not be overcome by “an enforced
commingling of the two races.” According to this argument, outlawing segregation would not eliminate racial
prejudice, because such societal beliefs could not be changed simply by changing the law. The Court
concluded that “if one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution … cannot put them upon the
same plane.”
The justices explained that because the Louisiana law did not conflict with the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the only remaining question was whether it was “reasonable, and … enacted in good faith for the
promotion for the public good.” Giving much deference to the state legislature of Louisiana, they determined
that the law met this requirement because it furthered “the preservation of the public peace and good order.”
Thus, so long as separate facilities were actually qualitatively equal, the Constitution did not prohibit
segregation in the view of the majority of the Court.
Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented from the majority opinion. In an opinion that later became pivotal in
the Brown v. Board of Education cases (1954), he argued that segregationist legislation, like the Louisiana law
in this case, was based on the assumption that “colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot
be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens.” These laws promoted and perpetuated the
belief that African Americans were inferior to whites, according to Justice Harlan. They must be struck down,
he argued, because the government could not “permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction
of law.” Justice Harlan believed that the constitution must be “color-blind,” and that it could allow “no
superior, dominant ruling class of citizens.” Because segregation had the effect of creating such classes, he
judged, it was unconstitutional.
Brown V. Board of Education (1954) Case Summary
In Topeka, Kansas in the 1950s, schools were segregated by race. Each day, Linda Brown and her sister, Terry
Lynn, had to walk through a dangerous railroad switchyard to get to the bus stop for the ride to their all-black
elementary school. There was a school closer to the Brown's house, but it was only for white students.
Topeka was not the only town to experience segregation. Segregation in schools and other public places was
common throughout the South and elsewhere. This segregation based on race was legal because of a
landmark Supreme Court case called Plessy v. Ferguson, which was decided in 1896. In that case, the Court
said that as long as segregated facilities were equal in quality, segregation did not violate the Constitution.
However, the Browns disagreed. Linda Brown and her family believed that the segregated school system did
violate the Constitution. In particular, they believed that the system violated the Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteeing that people will be treated equally under the law.
No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
—Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) helped the Browns. Thurgood
Marshall was the attorney who argued the case for the Browns. He would later become a Supreme Court
justice.
The case was first heard in a federal district court, the lowest court in the federal system. The federal district
court decided that segregation in public education was harmful to black children. However, the court said that
the all-black schools were equal to the all-white schools because the buildings, transportation, curricula, and
educational qualifications of the teachers were similar; therefore the segregation was legal.
The Browns, however, believed that even if the facilities were similar, segregated schools could never be equal
to one another. They appealed their case to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court combined the
Brown's case with other cases from South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. The ruling in the Brown v. Board of
Education case came in 1954.
Case Summary Questions to Consider
1.What does it mean to have segregated schools?
2.What right does the Fourteenth Amendment give citizens?
3.How did the case of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) affect segregation?
4.It is important for this case to determine what "equal" means. What do you think equality means to the
Browns? What do you think equality means to the Board of Education of Topeka?
5. Which side do you support and why?
Brown V. Board of Education Decision Summary
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Brown. The Court found the practice of
segregation unconstitutional and refused to apply its decision in Plessy v. Ferguson to “the field of public
education.” Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the opinion for the Court.
The Court noted that public education was central to American life. Calling it “the very foundation of good
citizenship,” they acknowledged that public education was not only necessary to prepare children for their
future professions and to enable them to actively participate in the democratic process, but that it was also “a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values” present in their communities. The justices
found it very unlikely that a child would be able to succeed in life without a good education. Access to such an
education was thus “a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”
The justices then assessed the equality of the facilities that the Board of Education of Topeka provided for the
education of African American children against those provided for white children. Ruling that they were
substantially equal in “tangible factors” that could be measured easily, (such as “buildings, curricula, and
qualifications and salaries of teachers), they concluded that the Court must instead examine the more subtle,
intangible effect of segregation on the system of public education.
Departing from the Court’s earlier reasoning in Plessy, the justices here argued that separating children solely
on the basis of race created a feeling of inferiority in the “hearts and minds” of African American children.
Segregating children in public education created and perpetuated the idea that African American children held
a lower status in the community than white children, even if their separate educational facilities were
substantially equal in “tangible” factors. This feeling of inferiority reduced the desire to learn and achieve in
African American children, and had “a tendency to retard their educational and mental development and to
deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school system.” Concluding
that “separate education facilities are inherently unequal”, the Supreme Court ruled that segregation in public
education denied African American children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
One year later, the Court addressed the implementation of its decision in a case known as Brown v. Board of
Education II. Chief Justice Warren once again wrote an opinion for the unanimous court. The Court
acknowledged that desegregating public schools would take place in various ways, depending on the unique
problems faced by individual school districts. After charging local school authorities with the responsibility for
solving these problems, the Court instructed federal trial courts to oversee the process and determine
whether local authorities were desegregating schools in good faith, mandating that desegregation take place
with “with all deliberate speed.”
Miranda V. Arizona (1966) Case Summary
Ernesto Miranda was a poor Mexican immigrant living in Phoenix, Arizona in 1963. A Phoenix woman was
kidnapped and raped. She identified Miranda in a police lineup. Miranda was arrested, charged with the
crimes, and questioned by the police for two hours. The police officers questioning him did not inform him of
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination or of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of an
attorney. The Fifth Amendment states that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. . . ." The Sixth Amendment states that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
As a result of the questioning, Miranda confessed in writing to the crimes. His statement also said that he was
aware of his right against self-incrimination. During his trial, the prosecution used his confession to obtain a
conviction, and he was sentenced to 20 to 30 years in prison on each count.
Miranda appealed his case to the Arizona Supreme Court. His attorney argued that his confession should have
been excluded from trial because he had not been informed of his rights, nor had an attorney been present
during his interrogation. The police officers involved admitted that they had not given Miranda any
explanation of his rights. The state argued, however, that because Miranda had been convicted of a crime in
the past, he must have been aware of his rights. The Arizona Supreme Court denied Miranda's appeal and
upheld his conviction.
The case comes down to this fundamental question: What is the role of the police in protecting the rights of
the accused, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution? The Supreme Court of the
United States had made previous attempts to deal with these issues. The Court had already ruled that the
Fifth Amendment protected individuals from being forced to confess. They had also held that persons accused
of serious crimes have a fundamental right to an attorney, even if they cannot afford one. In 1964, after
Miranda's arrest, but before the Court heard his case, the Court ruled that when an accused person is denied
the right to consult with his attorney, his or her Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of a lawyer is
violated. But do the police have an obligation to ensure that the accused person is aware of these rights
before they question that person?
In 1965, the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear Miranda's case. At the same time, the Court
agreed to hear three similar cases. The Court combined all the cases into one case. Since Miranda was listed
first among the four cases considered by the Court, the decision came to be known by that name. The decision
in Miranda v. Arizona was handed down in 1966.
Case Summary Questions to Consider
1.What rights of the accused does the Fifth Amendment protect? The Sixth Amendment?
2.If the police had informed Ernesto Miranda of these rights, do you think he might have done anything
differently?
3. Do you think the government should have to inform each individual who is arrested of his or her rights?
Why or why not?
4. Which side do you support and why?
Miranda V. Arizona Decision Summary
In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Miranda. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice
Earl Warren, concluded that defendants arrested under state law must be informed of their constitutional
rights against self-incrimination and to representation by an attorney before being interrogated when in police
custody. Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart and White dissented.
In their majority opinion, the justices explained that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is
fundamental to our system of justice, and is “one of our Nation’s most cherished principles.” This guarantee
requires that only statements freely made by a defendant may be used in court. The justices described some
of the techniques used by police officers in interrogations. They observed that “the modern practice of incustody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented,” and cited the advantage police
officers hold in custodial interrogations (interrogations that take place while the subject is in police custody).
Because of these advantages, they concluded that “the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll
on individual liberty, and trades on the weakness of individuals.”
The Court ruled that in order to reconcile the necessary practice of custodial interrogations with the
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, police must ensure that defendants are aware of their rights before they
are interrogated in custody. Because the right against self-incrimination is so important to our system of
justice, a case by case determination made by police officers of whether each defendant understands his or
her rights is not sufficient. Before interrogating defendants in police custody, they must be warned 1) that
they have the right to remain silent 2) that anything they say may be used against them in court, 3) that they
have the right to an attorney, either retained by them or appointed by the court, and 4) that they may waive
these rights, but they retain the right to ask for an attorney any time during the interrogation, at which point
the interrogation can only continue in the presence of a lawyer.
The Supreme Court reasoned that because the right against self-incrimination is so fundamental, and because
it is so simple to inform defendants of their rights, any statements made by defendants during a custodial
interrogation in which the defendant has not been read his “Miranda rights” are inadmissible in both state and
federal courts.
Justice Harlan wrote the main dissent. He argued that the newly created rules did not protect against police
brutality, coercion or other abuses of authority during custodial interrogations because officers willing to use
such illegal tactics and deny their use in court were “equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about
warnings and waivers.” Instead, he predicted that the new requirements would impair and substantially
frustrate police officers in the use of techniques that had long been considered appropriate and even
necessary, thus reducing the number of confessions police would be able to obtain. He concluded that the
harmful effects of crime on society were “too great to call the new rules anything but a hazardous
experimentation.”
Roe V. Wade (1973) Case Summary
As the sexual revolution took hold in the second half of the twentieth century, women faced great difficulty
getting abortions. At the time, many states had outlawed abortion except in cases where the mother’s life
was in danger. Illegal abortions were often dangerous because they were performed in unsanitary conditions.
As people’s ideas about sexual freedom changed, women gained greater access to birth control measures, but
public pressure to change abortion laws also increased. A number of states relaxed their abortion laws so that
women living in states that outlawed abortion could travel to another state for an abortion.
However, poor women often could not afford to travel outside their state to receive treatment, raising
questions of equality. Laws were often vague, so that doctors did not know whether they were breaking the
law by providing an abortion. In addition, some people began to question whether the government should be
able to interfere with people’s decisions in sexual matters. They believed that laws banning birth control and
abortion were an invasion of privacy.
There is no right to privacy specifically guaranteed in the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court has long
acknowledged some right to privacy, but usually associated that right with a particular location, like a person’s
home. However, during the 1960s, the Court’s position on privacy changed so that it was connected with a
person, not a location.
In the case of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), the Supreme Court ruled that a Connecticut law outlawing
access to contraception violated the U.S. Constitution because it invaded the privacy of married couples to
make decisions about their families. In that ruling, the Court identified privacy as a fundamental value for the
American way of life, and for the other basic rights outlined in the Bill of Rights.
Jane Roe, (not her real name), was an unmarried and pregnant Texas resident in 1970. She wanted to have an
abortion, but Texas abortion law made it a felony to abort a fetus unless “on medical advice for the purpose of
saving the life of the mother.” Roe filed suit against Wade, the district attorney of Dallas County, Texas to
challenge the law outlawing abortion.
Roe said that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides equal protection of the laws and a
guarantee of personal liberty, and a woman’s right to privacy implicitly guaranteed in the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The state argued that “the right to life of the unborn child is superior to
the right to privacy of the mother.” The state also argued that in previous decisions where the Court
protected individual or marital privacy, that right was not absolute. The state argued that this is a policy
matter best left to the legislature to decide. A three-judge federal district court ruled the Texas abortion law
unconstitutional, and the case was then appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Case Summary Questions to Consider
1.Do you think a right to privacy includes 1) a right to be private in a place 2) a right to establish a certain
relationship with a married partner, 3) and/or a right to privacy in most, if not all, of your personal decisions?
Explain your answer.
2.What did the Court state about the right to privacy in Griswold?
3.Do you believe that privacy is a fundamental value, necessary to secure the other rights in the Bill of Rights?
Why or why not.
4. Which side do you support and why?
Roe V. Wade Decision Summary
The Supreme Court decided in favor of Roe in a 7-2 decision. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the
majority, which recognized that a woman’s choice whether to have an abortion is protected by her right to
privacy. Justices Stewart, Burger and Douglas wrote concurring opinions. Justices White and Rehnquist
dissented.
The majority determined that a woman’s right to decide whether to have an abortion involved the question of
whether the Constitution protected a right to privacy. The justices answered this question by asserting that
the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of … liberty … without due
process of law,” protected a fundamental right to privacy. Further, after considerable discussion of the law’s
historical lack of recognition of rights of a fetus, the justices concluded “the word ‘person’, as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.” The right of a woman to choose to have an abortion
fell within this fundamental right to privacy, and was protected by the Constitution.
A woman’s right to choose to have an abortion was not considered an absolute right. The Court stated that
government restrictions on a woman’s right to choose were subject to the highest standard of review, that of
strict scrutiny. This level of review requires that in order to be enforceable, a government regulation of this
right must be shown to be narrowly tailored to a meet a compelling state interest. The justices noted that
states did have some legitimate interests in regulating or prohibiting abortions. The first interest was the
protection of the health of the mother from the dangers of abortion procedures; the second was the
protection of the life of the fetus. While these interests were not very strong in the early stages of pregnancy,
they became stronger (more compelling) in the later stages of the pregnancy. Striking a balance between a
woman’s right to privacy and a state’s interests, the Court set up a framework laying out when states could
regulate and even prohibit abortions.
According to the framework, in the first trimester (the first three months of the pregnancy), a woman’s right
to privacy surrounding the choice to have an abortion outweighed a state’s interests in regulating this
decision. In the first trimester, having an abortion does not pose a grave danger to the life and health of the
mother, and the fetus is still undeveloped. The state’s interests are not yet compelling, so it cannot interfere
with a woman’s right to privacy by regulating or prohibiting her from having an abortion during the first
trimester. During the second trimester, the state’s interests become more compelling as the danger of
complications increases and the fetus becomes more developed. During this stage, it may regulate, but not
prohibit abortions, as long as the regulations are aimed at protecting the health of the mother. During the
third trimester, the danger to the woman’s health becomes the greatest and fetal development nears
completion. In the final trimester the state’s interests in protecting the health of the mother and in protecting
the life of the fetus become their most compelling. The state may regulate or even prohibit abortions during
this stage, as long as there is an exception for abortions necessary to preserve the life and health of the
mother.
In his opposing opinion, Justice Rehnquist argued that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
intend for it to protect a right of privacy, a right which they did not recognize, and that they definitely did not
intend for it to protect a woman’s decision to have an abortion. Justice Rehnquist further argued that the only
right to privacy is that which is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures. Finally, he concluded that because this issue required a careful balance of the interests of the
woman against the interests of the state, it was not an appropriate decision for the Court to make, but instead
was a question that should have been left up to state legislatures to resolve.
Regents of U. of California V. Bakke (1978) Case Summary
Beginning in the early 1970s, the medical school of the University of California at Davis used a two-part
admissions program for the 100 students entering each year: a regular admissions program and a special
admissions program. The purpose of the special program was to try to increase the number of minority and
"disadvantaged" students in the class, so the 16 spots in the special admissions program were reserved for
"qualified" minority and disadvantaged students.
Under the regular admissions program, if a candidate had an overall undergraduate grade point average
below 2.5 on a scale of 4.0, the candidate was automatically rejected. Candidates who were not automatically
rejected were evaluated using other criteria such as math and science grades, Medical College Admissions Test
scores, letters of recommendation, and an interview.
On the application form, candidates could indicate that they wanted to be considered economically and/or
educationally disadvantaged or members of a minority group. Applications of those who did so were sent to
the special admissions program where a separate committee evaluated them. This committee was composed
mainly of members of minority groups. The applicants in the special admissions program did not have to meet
the same standards as the regular candidates, including the 2.5 grade point average cut off.
Allan Bakke was a white male who applied to and was rejected from the regular admissions program in 1973
and 1974. During those years, applicants with lower scores were admitted under the special program. After his
second rejection, Bakke filed suit in the Superior Court of Yolo County, California. He claimed that the special
admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it excluded him on the basis of race. He wanted the Court to force the
University of California at Davis to admit him to the medical school.
The university argued that their system of admission preferences served several important purposes. It
helped counter the effects of discrimination in society. Since historically, minors were discriminated against in
medical school admissions and in the medical profession, their special admission program could help reverse
that. The university also said that the special program increased the number of physicians who practice in
underserved communities. Finally, the university reasoned that there are educational benefits to all students
when the student body is ethnically and racially diverse.
The Superior Court of Yolo County, California and the Supreme Court of California both found that the special
admissions program violated the federal and state constitutions, as well as Title VI, and was therefore illegal.
The Superior Court declared that race could not be taken into account when making admissions decisions but
also ruled that Bakke should not be admitted to the medical school because he failed to show that he would
have been admitted even without the special admissions program. The Supreme Court of California, however,
determined that Bakke should be admitted to the school.
The Regents of the University of California then appealed the case to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Case Summary Questions to Consider
1.Why would a college or university want to consider race as a factor in the admissions process? Do you think
it is appropriate for a college or university to do so? Why or why not?
2.Both the California Superior and California Supreme Courts agreed on what two facts in their Bakke rulings?
3.Do you agree with the lower courts' decisions? Why or why not?
4. Which side do you support and why?
Regents of U. of California V. Bakke (1978) Decision Summary
Five members of the Court voted to require the University of California at Davis to admit Bakke to its medical
school. Justice Powell wrote an opinion in two parts, each of which received the votes of four other justices.
The Court determined that any racial quota system in a state supported university violated both the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justices Burger, Stewart,
Rehnquist and Stevens joined this part of Powell’s opinion. The Court also ruled that the benign use of race as
one of several criteria in admissions decisions did not violate either the Civil Rights Act or the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and White joined this part of Powell’s opinion.
In the first part of the opinion, Justice Powell reasoned that admissions programs that rely on a quota system,
in which a specified percentage of spaces in the class is reserved for a particular racial or ethnic group, were
always unconstitutional, regardless of the justifications offered for them. Because a certain number of seats
were reserved for applicants of a particular racial group, applicants not within that racial group could not
compete for those seats, no matter how qualified they were. Justice Powell declared that “preferring
members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake.
This the Constitution forbids.” The specific admissions system used by UC Davis was determined to be
unconstitutional because it used racial quotas.
Justice Powell further concluded that even though admissions systems relying solely on racial quotas violate
the Constitution, the Constitution does not prohibit any consideration of race in admissions decisions. He
acknowledged that a state may have legitimate interests in considering the race of an applicant during the
admissions process. These interests included increasing the racial diversity of the student body to increase the
proportion of minorities in medical schools and in medical professions, to “counter the effects of societal
discrimination,” to “increase the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently
underserved,” and to “obtain the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body.”
In order to use race as an element in making admissions decisions, a state university must be able to justify
the use under the standard of strict scrutiny. This means that admissions programs that consider race must be
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest in order to be constitutional.
The Court found that UC Davis’s admissions policy was not narrowly tailored to a compelling government
interest. Basing admissions decisions solely on race, as in UC Davis’s quota system, was not an effective way
of furthering their interest in a diverse student body. The majority opinion said “the diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial
or ethnic origin is but a single … element.” Other elements include “exceptional personal talents, unique work
or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, [and] a history of
overcoming disadvantage,” among others. Race can only be considered a “plus factor” in a particular
applicant’s file, along with these other factors. Only then would an admissions program be deemed narrowly
tailored to the compelling state interest of achieving diversity in the admitted class.
Because UC Davis’s admissions program relied solely on racial quotas, a majority of the Court ruled that it
violated both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A
majority of the Court also agreed, however, that race could be considered in admissions decisions, but only as
a “plus factor” among other factors, rather than as the determinative element. The Court thus ruled that
Bakke must be admitted to medical school at UC Davis.
New Jersey V. T.L.O (1985) Case Summary
In 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in New Jersey found two girls smoking in a restroom. One of the
girls was T.L.O., a freshman who was 14 years old. Smoking in the restrooms was a violation of school rules
(but was permitted in other areas of the school). The teacher took the two girls to the principal's office, where
they met with Assistant Vice Principal Theodore Choplick. The second girl admitted that she had been
smoking. T.L.O. said she had not been smoking and said that she did not smoke at all.
Choplick took T.L.O. into his office and instructed her to turn over her purse. He opened the purse and found a
pack of cigarettes. He took the cigarettes out of the purse and showed them to T.L.O. He accused her of
having lied about smoking in the restroom. As he removed the cigarettes, he noticed a package of cigarette
rolling papers. He believed that cigarette rolling papers were a sign of involvement with marijuana. Therefore,
he decided to search further in T.L.O.'s purse. He found the following items: a small amount of marijuana, a
pipe, empty plastic bags, a significant amount of money in one-dollar bills, a list of students who owed T.L.O.
money, and letters implicating T.L.O. in dealing marijuana.
Choplick then called T.L.O.'s mother and the police. The mother came to the school. The police asked her to
take her daughter to the police station. Choplick gave the items from the purse to the police. At the police
station, T.L.O. admitted that she had been selling marijuana at school. As a result of her admission and the
evidence from the purse, the State of New Jersey brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex County.
T.L.O. tried to have the evidence from her purse kept out of court, saying that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment. She also argued that her confession should be suppressed, because it resulted from the illegal
search. The juvenile court turned down her Fourth Amendment arguments, although it did agree that the
Fourth Amendment applies to searches by school officials. However, it held that a school official may search a
student if that official has a "reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the process of being
committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain school discipline or
enforce school policies."
The juvenile court concluded that Choplick's search was reasonable. Choplick was justified in searching the
purse, the Court said, because of his reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had violated school rules by smoking in
the restroom. When he opened the purse, evidence of marijuana use was in plain view. This justified the
further search of the purse. T.L.O. was found to be a delinquent and, in January 1982, she was sentenced to
one year of probation.
In 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certiorari. In
1985, the Court handed down its decision.
Case Summary Questions to Consider
1.Read the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Using the words of the Amendment, try to make an
argument that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.
2.Now try to make an argument that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to students in public schools at
all.
3.Under the circumstances outlined above, does the search of T.L.O.'s purse seem "reasonable" to you? Why
or why not?
4.What procedures are in place in your school governing searches of students? Could a search like the one in
this case happen in your school?
5.How should the Supreme Court of the United States rule in this case?
New Jersey V. T.L.O Decision Summary
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of New Jersey and the school, and against T.L.O. Justice
White wrote the majority opinion. The majority concluded that school officials do not need a warrant to
justify a search as long as the search was reasonable under the circumstances. Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Stevens dissented.
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to public school
officials because they act under the authority of the state. In addition students have a reasonable expectation
of privacy for the property they bring with them to school. They have not “waived all rights to privacy in such
items merely by bringing them onto school grounds.”
However, the justices said the privacy interest of students must be balanced against the interest of teachers
and school officials in maintaining order and discipline in school. Trying to achieve a balance between these
interests, the Supreme Court ruled that school officials should not be required to obtain a warrant to conduct
a search of a student suspected of breaking school rules because this would “unduly interfere with the
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”
The Court decided that schools officials do not need to have probable cause to believe that a student has
violated school rules in order to initiate a search, even though probable cause is required for police to initiate
a search of children or adults outside of school. Instead, school officials are only required to have a
“reasonable suspicion” that a student has violated school rules in order to search that student. A search will
be deemed reasonable if, when it is started, “there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will
turn up evidence that the student has violated … either the law or the rules of the school.” In addition, the
scope of the search must be “reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive
in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” The Court concluded that “the
legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of
the search.”
Applying this standard to T.L.O., the Court ruled that the search was reasonable. It was reasonable for the vice
principal to believe that T.L.O. had been smoking in the bathroom in violation of school rules because a
teacher witnessed it. Thus the vice principal had adequate grounds to search T.L.O.’s purse for cigarettes.
While doing so, he came across evidence suggesting that T.L.O. was selling marijuana in the school. This gave
him grounds to search the rest of her purse for drugs.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan first argued that the same probable cause standard that is applied outside of
schools should be applied inside schools. The Fourth Amendment states that “the right of the people to be
secure … against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.” According to Justice Brennan’s
interpretation, the Fourth Amendment explains what it means by “unreasonable” by specifying that “no
Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause.” Thus, searches that take place without probable cause,
including those based only on “reasonable suspicion,” are unreasonable, and violate the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Stevens also dissented. Like Justice Brennan, he believed that the Court’s new standard of “reasonable
suspicion” was inappropriate. Instead of allowing school officials to search a student based on the reasonable
suspicion that the student was breaking a school rule, Justice Stevens would require that the student be
suspected of “violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of school order, or the
educational process.” Smoking in the bathroom was not a “violent or disruptive activity,” he argued, so an
immediate search was unnecessary.
Hazelwood V. Kuhlmeier (1988) Case Summary
In May 1983, students in the Journalism II class at Hazelwood East High School in St. Louis, Missouri, created
the final edition of the school paper, the Spectrum. Before publishing the paper, they submitted it to their
advisor, Howard Emerson, so he could review it. Emerson was new to the job, so he followed the procedures
of the previous advisor. Those guidelines required him to give Principal Robert Reynolds, the opportunity to
review the paper before it was published.
When Principal Reynolds reviewed the paper, he found two articles that concerned him. The first dealt with
the issue of teen pregnancy. It included comments from pregnant students at the school. To protect their
privacy, names were not given. However, when Reynolds read the article, he realized that the details in the
article would make it easy for other students to identify the pregnant teens. The second article addressed the
issue of divorce. Like the first article, this one included personal articles. One student, whose parents were
divorced, made negative comments about her father. She said that her father was always out with the guys
and that her father didn't spend enough time with the family. Principal Reynolds was troubled by the fact that
the father had not been given a chance to defend himself by responding to his daughter's comments.
Reynolds wanted the journalism students to modify the articles. However, it was almost the end of the school
year. If they took the time to revise, they would miss the deadline for publishing the newspaper. If that
happened, the other students might never get to read the paper. He felt like he had to act quickly, so he told
Emerson to delete the two pages with the offending articles and publish the rest of the Spectrum. He told his
supervisors about this decision and they agreed with him.
The students had worked hard on the paper and felt that they had followed proper journalism procedures. If
they had been approached about the problems, they may have been able to correct them. They were upset to
find out instead that two pages, which included a number of nonoffensive articles, had been deleted. They felt
that their First Amendment rights had been violated. They took the case to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri.
The Court did not agree with the students. In the ruling, the judges said that school officials may impose limits
on students' speech in activities that are "an integral part of the school's educational function" as long as their
decision "has a substantial and reasonable basis." In other words, the Court felt that if the school has a good
reason to do so, it can place limits on curricular activities, such as the publication of the school newspaper.
Unhappy with the outcome, the students appealed their case to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Court. This court reversed the decision of the lower court, saying that the students' First Amendment rights
were violated.
The school appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States agreed
to hear the case.
Case Summary Questions to Consider
1.What concerns did Principal Reynolds have regarding the two articles? Were these legitimate concerns?
Were there other ways that the principal could have handled the situation?
2.Do you think Principal Reynolds was justified in deleting the two pages of the paper? Should a principal be
able to censor student newspapers? If so, under what conditions?
3.What rights did the students believe had been violated?
4.Should a principal or other school authority be able to silence other forms of student speech? If so, under
what conditions?
5. Which side do you support and why?
Hazelwood V. Kuhlmeier (1988) Decision Summary
The Supreme Court ruled against the students in a 5-3 decision. Justice White wrote the majority opinion,
concluding that the First Amendment does not prevent school officials from exercising reasonable authority
over the content of school-sponsored publications.
The majority opinion first considered whether school-sponsored student newspapers are public forums. If
they were public forums, school officials would not be allowed to exercise editorial control over the content of
the paper. Referring to Supreme Court precedent, the decision noted that school facilities are only considered
to be public forums when school authorities have “’by policy or by practice’ opened those facilities ‘for
indiscriminate use by the general public.’” If the facilities are used for other purposes, however, they do not
constitute a public forum, and “school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students.”
The school newspaper in this case was not open to the unlimited contribution of students, teachers and other
members of the community, but was instead published as part of the curriculum of a journalism class.
Therefore, its primary function was for educational purposes, and the newspaper did not constitute a public
forum.
The Court then addressed the question of whether the First Amendment “requires a school affirmatively to
promote particular student speech.” They concluded that it does not. The First Amendment rights of students
in public schools are not necessarily equal to those of adults outside of schools. “A school need not tolerate
student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission, even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school.”
The Court decided that the issues involved in this case differ from those the Court ruled on in Tinker v. Des
Moines. In that case, the Court questioned whether school officials could “silence a student’s personal
expression that happens to occur on the school premises.” Hazelwood, however, forced the Court to consider
the extent of school officials’ control over “school-sponsored publications … and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the [approval] of the
school.” Tinker asked whether schools must tolerate certain student speech, while this case questioned
whether schools must endorse student speech.
The Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment does not force schools to endorse student speech in
their school-sponsored publications. School officials have authority and control over these publications in
order to ensure that “participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views
of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.” Therefore, as long as the editorial
control of school officials was “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” such as those
mentioned above, it did not offend the First Amendment.
Justice Brennan disagreed. In his dissenting opinion, Brennan acknowledged that inside public schools,
students’ rights are not necessarily equal to those they enjoy outside of school, but he also argued that as the
Court said in Tinker, “students in the public schools do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’” There must be a balance struck between the free expression
rights of students and the interests of schools officials in maintaining order and discipline, he declared, and
that balance was already struck in Tinker. School officials must refrain from interfering with student speech
unless it causes a “material and substantial disruption.” Justice Brennan concluded that the Tinker standard
should have been applied in this case, and that the Court should have ruled in favor of the students because
“public educators must accommodate some student expression even if it offends them or offers views or
values that contradict those the schools wishes to inculcate.