THE Upsilonian
UPSILONIAN
The
Upsilon-Upsilon
Chapter
Upsilon-Upsilon Chapter
Phi Alpha
AlphaTheta
Theta
DepartmentofofHistory
Historyand
andPolitical
PoliticalScience
Science
Department
University of the Cumberlands
University of the Cumberlands
Williamsburg, Kentucky
Williamsburg, Kentucky
Vol.Vol.
XXIIXXIVSummer
Summer 2011
2013
The front cover contains a picture of the Bennett
Building, home of the Upsilon-Upsilon Chapter
of Phi Alpha Theta and the History and Political
Science Department of University of the
Cumberlands. Built in 1906 as part of Highland
College, University of the Cumberlands assumed
ownership in 1907. The building underwent
extensive renovation in 1986-1987.
COPYRIGHT © 2013 by University of the Cumberlands
Department of History and Political Science
All Rights Reserved
Printed in the United States of America
Journal of the Upsilon-Upsilon Chapter
of Phi Alpha Theta
THE UPSILONIAN
Editor
Andrew Wolfe
Board of Advisors
Christopher Leskiw, Ph.D., Chairman of the Board of
Advisors, and Associate Professor of Political Science
Oline Carmical, Ph.D., Professor of History
Kimberlee Farr, student member of Upsilon-Upsilon
Bruce Hicks, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science
Al Pilant, Ph.D., Professor of History
M.C. Smith, Ph.D., Associate Professor of History
Table of Contents
iii
Comments from the Editor..................................Andrew Wolfe
iv
Comments from the President...........................Elizabeth Davis
v
Comments from the Advisor..................................Eric L. Wake
vi
The Authors
Articles
1 “Khrushchev and the Legacy of Stalin”.......Amanda Sickman
9 “Throwing the Hedgehog: Khrushchev’s Motives in the
Caribbean Crisis”........................................... Allyson Blessman
19
“Leonardo Da Vinci: Observations
Applied to Art”................................................. Ashleigh Collard
ii
COMMENTS FROM THE EDITOR
The utmost congratulations and praise must go out to Allyson
Blessman, Ashleigh Collard, and Amanda Sickman whose research
papers are featured in this year’s edition of The Upsilonian. All three of
them in their own unique way looked back at the vast portrait that is the
human experience and found a story they felt would be interesting to tell
the world. They tell these stories in a way that is both informative and
highly entertaining. The writing of history is not an easy medium to
conquer, but these three historians did it with flourish and grace. We
would be amiss if we didn’t also thank all the historians who submitted
papers not chosen in this year’s edition. To them, we encourage a
continued pursuit of the lessons and stories the past has to offer.
We would like to extend sincere thanks to everybody who
worked so hard to make The Upsilonian possible. The annual publication
of this esteemed journal would not be possible without continued
guidance and dedication from Dr. Eric Wake, Chairman of the
Department and Advisor of the Upsilon-Upsilon chapter. We can’t begin
to thank him enough for everything he does. A huge thank you goes out
to the Department’s Faculty and students who helped read and select the
published papers. We would like to especially thank Dr. Christopher
Leskiw, this year’s Chairman of the Board of Advisors. Finally, a special
thank you goes to Mrs. Fay Partin, the Department’s Administrative
Assistant. This journal’s publication is largely due to her unwavering
assistance and hard work.
A final Hurrah goes out to the Department’s graduating seniors.
We wish God’s Blessings on all your future endeavors both in and out of
the field of History. All your hard work and dedication to the Department
will be missed by everybody. To everyone who will have the
unmitigated delight of reading the stories contained within this 24th
edition of The Upsilonian I hope you are both entertained and inspired to
look into the past and find your own unique stories to tell.
Andrew Wolfe
Editor, Upsilon-Upsilon
2012-2013
iii
iii
COMMENTS FROM THE PRESIDENT
This year has been another great year for Phi Alpha Theta.
Members and faculty did a wonderful job in all the activities we were
able to host. To start the year, we hosted our first lecture with students
from UC’s campus sharing their journeys on Summer Missions. This was
followed by The Great Debate with Dr. Broome and Dr. Hicks helping
students to understand election politics. Dr. George C. Wright, President
of Prairie View A&M explained his life as a black child in Kentucky,
and finally a mixture of professors sharing what it was like “back in the
day” at Cumberland College. All of our lectures were exemplary and saw
some of the largest attendance sizes in years. This year, we also hosted
many gatherings, including a cook-out with Dr. Smith’s amazing
barbeque, a pizza party, a Christmas get-together with the English
department, and an end-of-the-year picnic. Along with our busy
schedules, we were still able to find time to orchestrate two book and
bake sales which helped provide funds to send two members to the
Regional Conference where both presented papers. Overall it has been a
magnificent year. We inducted five new members this spring, which
makes for a very promising and exciting year to come
I have truly enjoyed being president of Phi Alpha Theta this year
and am enthusiastic to see what new surprises next year will have to
offer. However, this past year and the years to come would not be
possible without our advisor, Dr. Eric Wake. We cannot express our
gratitude enough for all of the work he puts in to making this honor
society what it is. Our deepest thanks must go to Ms. Fay Partin, though.
Her countless hours working on organizing the locations and times for all
of the lectures, bake sales, events, and Best Chapter registration is
outstanding. Her passion for the students in the society is unparalleled
and we truly appreciate it. We would also like to thank the entire faculty
in the History and Political Science department for all they do for their
students.
Enjoy reading this year’s submissions to the Upsilonian. I know
this year’s entries are entertaining as well as insightful.
Best wishes,
Elizabeth Davis
President, Upsilon-Upsilon Chapter
2012-2013
iv
iv
COMMENTS FROM THE ADVISOR
I have been the advisor of our Upsilon-Upsilon Chapter since
1985. Some years have been easier than others because we have had
large numbers and students eager to carry on the work. But this year our
numbers were small. We did not have a fall initiation because no one
qualified. This has been the only time in my tenure as advisor that this
has happened. But we had a good spring initiation and these students
will return next year. And to top it off, this year’s group had a difficult
time finding a business meeting time. One semester we had to meet at
8:00 a.m. in the morning and you know how students love to go to
meetings at 8:00 a.m. During the spring semester we met on Sunday
afternoon, perhaps the only worst time than 8:00 a.m. These students,
however, gave me a great sense of pride because they knew that there
was work to be done, and they were determined to get it done.
This year our lectures were packed. The lowest number was
somewhere around 75. A couple of the lectures averaged around 200 or
more. We had a special guest lecturer, Dr. George Wright, a noted
African-American scholar and President of Prairie View A&M College.
He presented two lectures to large crowds. And then we had our socials.
I always say that we are the best fed department on campus. And
although it rained on the picnic forcing us to move it inside, we still had
a great time.
We will lose three of our members this year. They will go on to
start their careers as they should. We know that they will be successful,
and they will remember that they are always a part of the UpsilonUpsilon tradition. Those of us who remain will carry on the tradition as
we know that our alumni expect it.
Eric L. Wake, Ph.D
Advisor, Upsilon-Upsilon Chapter
v
v
Authors
Amanda Sickman was a May 2013
graduate with an area in social studies.
The original draft of her paper was written
for the Russia course.
Allyson Blessman was a May 2013
graduate with majors in history and
political science. The original draft of her
paper was written for the Russia course.
Ashleigh Collard was a May 2013
graduate with majors in history and
political science. The original draft of this
paper was written for a course entitled
Renaissance and Reformation.
vi
Khrushchev and the Legacy of Stalin
By Amanda Sickman
Khrushchev and the Legacy of Stalin
By Amanda Sickman
In the early hours of the morning on February 25, 1956, Nikita Khrushchev
delivered a smashing criticism of previous Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Never before had
anyone dared to so openly criticize the Soviet leader. This address, despite being known
as the Secret Speech, had far reaching and public effects. It indicated openness to reform
and relaxation of international tensions, but on both counts lasting change was constricted
by the rigidity of Soviet ideology.
The death of Stalin in March of 1953 left a gaping hole in the picture of Soviet
leadership. For years, he had been the ultimate determiner of Soviet policy, and although
publicly the government espoused the idea of “collective leadership,” it was recognized
to have no correlation to reality; Stalin was the leader of the Party and ran the country. 1
Khrushchev was appointed chairman of the funeral commission. Over the following
months Khrushchev was fully solidified in the top position. On September 8th he became
the First Secretary.
The death of Stalin encouraged hopes of relaxed tensions, internationally and
domestically. 2 In fact, Khrushchev’s far more yielding and agreeable nature made him a
natural follow up to the years of oppression under a cold and ruthless leader such as
Stalin. 3 The fear that had been endured, even at the highest levels of power, had been
severe. Soviet politician Nikolai Bulganin divulged to Khrushchev, “Sometimes when
you go to Stalin’s, he invites you as a friend. But while you’re sitting with him, you
don’t know where they’ll take you afterward: home or to prison.” 4
Interestingly enough, Khrushchev engaged in some terror of his own to solidify
his grasp on power following the death of Stalin. Lavrenti Beria had served as the head
of the Interior Ministry. This powerful position put him at the head of the notorious
Gulag, the Soviet system of forced labor camps, and in charge of the overall system of
punishment and control. Though he had held this position at the bidding of Stalin, the
great power he wielded was a personal threat to the Presidium, the central governing
body of Party leadership. One of Khrushchev’s advisors, Fedor Burlatsky, recalled
hearing Khrushchev say of Beria, “As long as the bastard’s alive, none of us can feel
safe.” 5
Khrushchev sought to organize with other Presidium members against Beria.
Having secured the aid of a dozen senior military men, the plan to take down Beria was
set in motion. At a joint meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and the
Party Presidium, Khrushchev leveled a slew of accusations: Beria conspired with British
intelligence, served as a spy for the Caucasian Muslim opposition, undermined Soviet
unity, doubted the future of socialism in East Germany, and interfered in the Party affairs
of national republics. 6 In conclusion he sweepingly declared, “Beria is no Communist.”7
Khrushchev proposed that Beria be removed from all of his positions. Then,
Georgi Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, called in the army
men who took Beria into custody. Beria spent his time in prison furiously putting pen to
paper, addressing many of his former colleagues and pleading for the possibility of still
serving the Party.
The case was opened for debate in a special plenary meeting of the Central
Committee. It lasted for a total of five days, with Malenkov presenting the case. Once
again Beria was accused of various crimes and abuses, including placing the Ministry of
1
1
2
2
the Interior above the Party. His surveillance on Presidium members was also raised.
Khrushchev, who opened and chaired the session, then spoke for an hour. While Beria
had been close to Stalin, in his speech Khrushchev deflected criticism from Stalin by
portraying Beria as a cunning man who took advantage of an aging and ailing Stalin. 8 He
also, like Malenkov, questioned the broad powers of the Interior Ministry. The Ministry
was known to completely fabricate charges, and had also made use of special boards,
extra-judicial bodies with broad penal powers.
The closing speech was delivered by Malenkov. He roundly condemned the cult
of personality which surrounded Stalin. “We do not have the right to hide from you the
fact that such a deformed personality cult led to arbitrary individual decisions and that in
recent years this began to cause serious harm to the business of leading the Party and
country.” 9
In late 1953 Beria was tried at a Special Judiciary Hearing. It was a lengthy
process and questionable evidence was presented indicating his contact with anticommunist intelligence. 10 The trial also delved into Beria’s alleged sexual promiscuity
and violence. Numerous names of women he assaulted or raped were submitted.
Eventually Beria confessed to all the charges made against him and desperately pleaded
for his life. But his pleas fell on deaf ears. He was sentenced to the supreme capital
penalty, death by shooting, and immediately removed to a bunker and shot. 11
The removal of Beria freed Khrushchev to act more confidently in his position of
leadership. It was not long then, before he turned to the issue of Stalin’s legacy. Indeed,
the need for some sort of discourse on Stalin was about to become incredibly apparent.
Thousands of people sentenced to lengthy exiles during Stalin’s reign were reaching the
end of their sentences and filtering back home. With them traveled their stories and
allegations of wrongful imprisonment. In particular, hundreds of thousands who had
been sentenced to ten years at the end of the Second World War were set to be released in
1955.
With them came the need for rehabilitation into mainstream Soviet society.
Regardless of the justice of their sentences, they faced discrimination for having once
been labeled “enemies of the people.” 12 Rehabilitation would extend far beyond merely
including them once again in society, but would imply their innocence. 13 Further
demonstrating the need for a reassessment of Stalinist imprisonment practices were the
piles of requests flowing in for case reviews. 14
Khrushchev also believed that the truth was not necessarily something to be
feared. Instead he trusted that facing the reality of the past would strengthen the party’s
authority. There also was an element of power politics at play. Many who were in the
leadership of 1956 had been senior to Khrushchev during the bloodiest years of Stalin,
thus they held greater responsibility for what had taken place. 15
Khrushchev was motivated by moral reasons as well as political in his decision to
face the truth about Stalin. Speaking in private he shared, “I have blood on my hands up
to my elbows…This is the most terrible thing that burdens my soul.” 16 The memory of
what he had participated in as a supporter of Stalin haunted him. He recalled that the
night before delivering the Secret Speech he could still, “hear the voices of comrades
who perished.” 17
Khrushchev firmly believed that in order to move forward, it was first necessary
to deal with the past. He saw the terror of Stalin as damaging to the “revolutionary
legality” of the Soviet Union, and wished to repair this and get back to the core of “Soviet
3
3
socialist democracy.” 18 In an effort to deal with this legacy, Khrushchev established a
commission for the express purpose of investigating Stalin’s activities. It was to be
conducted as quietly as possible and focus on the violations made against socialist
legality. After facing some protest, the commission moved into action and generated a
report on Stalin’s violations. It was approved by Khrushchev and then issued to the
Presidium.
The report served as a forum for comparison, setting the example of Lenin in
contrast to the practices of Stalin. While Lenin had attacked only “genuine class
enemies,” Stalin had pursued an “arbitrary terror.” 19 The responses were initially
mixed, which is understandable considering that many of the readers had been part of
Stalin’s apparatus of repression. 20 If the analysis went too far they could be implicated.
Moving forward in his dealing with the past, Khrushchev determined to take the
report to the Twentieth Party Congress. The gathering opened on the 14th of February,
1956. Khrushchev requested that a vote be taken amongst the delegates whether to hear a
report from him. It was approved, and the big unveiling of Stalin’s abuses was set to
occur.
Khrushchev, however, was not the first to address party leadership on the failings
of Stalinist rule. Prior to his “Secret Speech,” Anastas Mikoian, the first deputy premier,
made reference to the cult of personality and to people being wrongfully declared
enemies of the people. Still, he did not make as bold and direct a reference to Stalin as
Khrushchev would a few days later. In fact it is possible that he delivered his statements
in order to test the waters before Khrushchev delivered his blow to the memory of
Stalin. 21
As the Twentieth Party Congress drew to a close on the 25th, Khrushchev began
his four hour long speech detailing the cult of personality and its repercussions. With the
intent to keep the matters discussed Party business only, the speech was delivered in a
closed session. No foreign guests or journalists were present and the floor was not
opened for debate following the address. 22
As Khrushchev spoke he damaged the reputation of Stalin, focusing largely on the
repressions which had been carried out against leading party officials. This focus would
serve to make his speech more appealing, while simultaneously giving assurance that
these repressions would not be repeated. 23 Various abuses of Stalin’s were drawn out.
Among these were the use of beatings to force confession, the killing of people who
recanted their forced confessions, the massive arrests and deportations, and executions
carried out without a trial or normal investigation. 24 He pointed out the use of the term
“enemy of the people” as a means of engaging in violent repression without factual
justification. 25 Khrushchev refused to surrender the legacy of the past to silence. This
view was not widely shared. Many in the audience would have been content to simply
“leave the horrors of the past in the past.” 26
Though his speech was bold in its questioning of the justice of Stalin’s actions
and policies, it was limited in its ability to affect far reaching reform. In fact, the limited
focus on Stalin’s wrongdoing limited the good such an analysis of the past could do.
While abuses of power were cited, the speech did not constitute a serious examination of
the ideological and structural basis of Stalin’s reign. 27 Additionally, though similar
terrors had occurred during the time of Lenin, these were not referenced. To have dug
deeper into the legacy, questioning the principles which the Soviet system centered on,
4
4
could have ended up constituting a challenge to the legitimacy of the entire Soviet
system. 28
Though Khrushchev was able to recognize the brutality against fellow
communists as wrong, he was not yet ready to look into the issue more deeply. He still
had much praise to offer for Lenin, the Party, and the general Bolshevik system. But
what he failed to see was that by defending the memory of Lenin he was in essence
preserving Stalin. 29
Khrushchev did not wish to bring about the end of communism in Soviet Russia.
In fact, at the conclusion of the Secret Speech he emphasized a return to true Leninist
principles. 30 Neither did he question the rightness of violence between classes. While he
promoted the possibility of peaceful coexistence between states with different social
systems, this applied only to states. 31 Thus he was supportive of wars of national
liberation in ex-colonial developing countries. He also believed that different paths could
be followed to socialism. 32 Unlike Stalin who supported a “my way or the highway”
vision of socialism, Khrushchev did not object to nations adapting the system to their
particular conditions. He also asserted that the transition to communism could be
achieved through peaceful means; precipitating violence was not necessary. 33
It is important to note that Khrushchev, despite all his words condemning the
excesses of Stalin’s leadership, had been a fully integrated part of the Stalinist
government for years. He zealously executed whatever course Stalin willed, all the while
managing to escape the purges. He was a leader in the typical Stalinist mode: minimally
educated, energetic, and blindly trusting of Party instruction. 34 Stalin in fact, did not
consider Khrushchev as a serious possibility for his successor. While forthright, he was a
“peasant leader,” not cunning top job material. 35 This contributed to his preservation
during all of the purges. His image of simplistic, blind faith kept him from being seen as
a threat.
At a Moscow Party meeting on August 22, 1936, Khrushchev had fiercely
advocated Stalin’s sharp tactics against political enemies. “Just as Comrade Stalin, with
his sharp Leninist eye, has always accurately pointed out the path for our Party, as for the
whole of the construction, so he has pointed out the corners where vermin can crawl out.
We have to shoot not only this scum, but Trotsky should also be shot.” 36 Similarly, he
spoke of “finishing off the enemies” in the Ukraine. 37 Khrushchev was equally zealous
in the so called “reconstruction” of Moscow, proudly supporting the tearing down of old,
historic monuments. So while he would condemn Stalin after the fact, during his reign he
was a zealous and committed servant of the Party.
Khrushchev does not deserve to be condemned though, for the rigidity of his
philosophy. Khrushchev’s belief in the Soviet system of government ran deep. His
entire life had served to make him receptive to a belief in the communist ideals of Karl
Marx. He was born in 1894 in the village of Kalinovka, located in Kursk province on the
border of Great Russia and the Ukraine. It was a region of rich agricultural opportunity,
but suffered from overpopulation. 38 His family, like many in the region, was of the
peasant class forced by necessity to seek seasonal industrial work in other regions.
From an early age Khrushchev was expected to contribute to the family’s
survival. Until the age of fourteen he did this by tending livestock and shepherding. At
that time he then moved to Donbass, the industrial region of Southern Ukraine and took
up work in a mine alongside his father. Ivzovka, the company town where they resided,
like others in the region, was a filthy and miserable place. It was here that he became
5
5
aware of the backwardness of Russia and of the great need for economic development; it
was also here that he developed a distaste for capitalism. 39
During his years in industrial Donbass he came across the works of Karl Marx for
the first time. The combination of his ongoing personal toil and struggle and communist
ideology proved deeply influential. The circumstances described by Marx were a
personal reality every day, and his ideas seemed to offer the direction to a better way of
life. 40 Khrushchev himself, reflecting on this first encounter stated, “When, later on, I
listened to lectures on political economy…it seemed to me as though Karl Marx had been
at the mine where my father and I had worked.” 41 With the promises of communism
swirling about in his head, Khrushchev then became sympathetic to the rising Bolshevik
Party, though he would not officially join their ranks until after the 1917 revolution.
Despite the veracity of Khrushchev’s past commitment to Stalin, and the essential
limitations to reform imposed by the limited scope of his assessment of Soviet history,
the Secret Speech did bring about some tangible results. In Tbilisi, Georgia riots broke
out on the anniversary of Stalin’s death. Special tribunals by security services were
abolished, and workers’ councils were instituted on an experimental basis in some
factories. Overall, people felt freer to voice their thoughts on political leadership; writers
began addressing topics which formally were strictly off limits. 42 Criticism even began
to extend beyond the Stalin legacy to the larger failings of the system. Thus the process
of dethroning the Stalin mythology threatened to also turn into anti-Soviet criticism. 43
Greatest of all the results though, was the acceleration of the rehabilitation
process for gulag returnees. Ninety special commissions were set up to re-examine the
convictions of those still serving sentences. The numerous people who had been
wrongfully sentenced to work camps were now freed to find their place in Soviet society.
Another important aspect of his time in power was the relationship of the Soviet
Union to the United States. Khrushchev was hopeful for improvements in Soviet and
American relations. 44 Still, the rigidity of the Soviet ideology and the unswerving
American commitment to capitalism and democracy made this difficult. It is notable that
even after the Cuban Missile crisis heightened tensions almost to the brink, Khrushchev
and John F. Kennedy were still committed to avoiding nuclear war. 45
Even with all of these positive developments, the impact of the Secret Speech was
limited. There was considerable pushback against such frankness on the grounds that
such talk constituted, “spitting on the history of our country.” 46 Others saw the opening
of anti-Stalinist sentiment as a means of questioning the Soviet regime, and thus as a
threat to Soviet rulers. In other situations, the criticisms were permitted, but only
alongside praises. So while the Central Committee criticized Stalin’s repressions and
theoretical mistakes in its resolution, “On Overcoming the Cult of Personality and its
Consequences,” it also defended his achievements, such as his war time leadership. 47
Even Khrushchev himself followed this pattern in the Secret Speech, simultaneously
calling out Stalin’s excesses and his achievements. 48 Also demonstrating the limits to
reform was Khrushchev unwillingness to grant freedom of expression to artists. He
viewed the arts as inseparable from political expression. 49
Khrushchev also continued to pursue a hard line against political dissidents.
When the Polish communist leader Boleslaw Bierut died, internal disquiet followed,
including the organization of a strike. The Soviet expectation was that these events
would be blamed on evil western influence and swiftly ended. Instead the Polish
authorities referred to the social and economic conditions of the region as the
6
6
provocation. They even made efforts to ameliorate the problem and improve standards of
living, making financial concessions. Upset by this seemingly unfavorable turn of
events, officials from Moscow, including Khrushchev, arrived uninvited in Warsaw,
Poland. 50 Khrushchev, taking things a step further, backed up this appearance with force,
as word arrived of western units of Soviet tanks headed toward the city. 51 The
burgeoning conflict was peacefully concluded when the Soviet leaders were assured the
transition of leadership in Poland would not alter the Polish-Soviet relationship. 52
The Secret Speech and its results did not even satisfy all the hopes of Khrushchev.
As his son Sergei wrote of his father, “The problem of political power greatly disturbed
Father.” 53 Even after being in power and addressing the abuses of power of Stalin, he
still worried about what could happen in the future. 54 It remained unknown who would
succeed him and by what manner they would succeed to power. And it still remained to
be answered how future governments would guarantee that a concentration and abuse of
power would not reoccur.
Interpretation of Stalin’s legacy was far from ended after the Secret Speech. Even
today Russians continue to be divided in their interpretations. Do they see the speedy
industrialization and victory over Nazi Germany, or do they see the crimes and victims? 55
Still, the Secret Speech was the opener of this great debate, with Khrushchev setting an
important example.
Endnotes
1
Dmitri Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire: The Seven Leaders Who Built the Soviet
Regime ed. and trans. Harold Shukman (New York: The Free Press, 1998), 181-185.
David Reynolds, Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century (New York:
Basic Books, 2007), 163-179.
2
3
Volkogonov, Autopsy for Empire, 181-185.
4
William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W.W. Norton,
2003), 272.
5
Volkogonov, Autopsy for Empire, 186.
6
Ibid., 186-193.
7
Ibid., 187.
8
Volkogonov, Autopsy for Empire, 186-193.
9
Ibid., 191.
10
Ibid., 186-193.
11
Ibid.
7
12
William J. Tompson, Khrushchev: A Political Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1995), 154-159.
Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power trans.
Andrew R. Durkin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 13.
13
14
Volkogonov, Autopsy for Empire, 194-196.
15
Tompson, A Political Life, 154-159.
16
Stephen F. Cohen, The Victims Return: Survivors of the Gulag After Stalin (Exeter,
NH: PublishingWorks, 2010), 92.
17
Taubman, Man and His Era, 276.
18
Volkogonov, Autopsy for Empire, 201-209.
19
Ibid., 203.
20
Ibid., 201-209.
21
Tompson, A Political Life, 154-159.
22
Volkogonov, Autopsy for Empire, 201-209.
Tompson, A Political Life , 154-159.
23
24
Taubman, Man and His Era, 270-277.
25
Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1970), 566.
26
Tompson, A Political Life, 157.
27
Ibid., 154-159.
28
Ibid.
29
Volkogonov, Autopsy for Empire, 208.
30
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 617-618.
31
Taubman, Man and His Era, 160.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Volkogonov, Autopsy for Empire, 181-185.
7
88
35
Ibid., 170.
36
Ibid., 183.
37
Ibid., 184.
38
Tompson, A Political Life, 1-12.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid., 8.
42
Ibid., 161-163.
Polly Jones, ed., Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social
Change in the Khrushchev Era. (London: Routledge, 2006), 41.
43
44
Nikita Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev ed. Sergei Khrushchev, trans.
George Shriver (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 294-297.
Vladislov Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From
Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 236-238.
45
46
Cohen, The Victims Return, 127.
47
Tompson, A Political Life, 164-167.
48
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 613-616.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Volkogonov, Autopsy for Empire, 201-209.
52
Tompson, A Political Life, 164-167.
Sergei Khrushchev, Khrushchev on Khrushchev: An Inside Account of the Man and His
Era ed. and trans. William Taubman (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1990), 23.
53
54
Ibid.
55
Cohen, The Victims Return, 125-127.
Throwing the Hedgehog: Khrushchev’s
Motives
in the Caribbean
Throwing the Hedgehog:
Khrushchev’s
MotivesCrisis
in the Caribbean Crisis
By
Allyson
Blessman
By Allyson Blessman
In 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev launched a covert operation to place
nuclear missiles, aimed at the United States (US), on the island of Cuba. His action
kicked off the nuclear confrontation known as the Cuban Missile Crisis in the US, and the
Caribbean Crisis in the former Soviet Union. Fifty years later, the motive for
Khrushchev’s action, remains unclear. Khrushchev consistently maintained that his
highest objective was to defend Cuba, a claim that remains accepted in Russia to this
day. 1 The US dismissed Khrushchev’s explanation as nothing more than Communist
propaganda. The prevailing view in the US today is that Khrushchev’s motivation lay
purely in the “balance of power.”
Although from a western point of view Khrushchev’s explanation is hard to
comprehend, in the context of Khrushchev’s political objectives, it is conceivable that his
primary goal truly was Cuban defense. That is not to say that the balance of power had no
bearing on his final decision. Undeniably, Khrushchev appreciated the strategic
implications of his decision. It is also unlikely that he was motivated purely by a moral
drive to correct an international injustice. In examining Khrushchev’s statements on the
matter, it seems that his primary motive for placing nuclear warheads in Cuba was to
protect the vulnerable, socialist nation from US aggression, in advancement of his
political strategy of “peaceful competition.”
“To interpret Soviet decisions is to interpret Khrushchev. He alone decided on
policy.” And “[he] made decisions largely on his own.” 2 Khrushchev’s past, especially
his climb to prominence through the ranks of the Communist Party, reveals much about
his values and objectives. His deep understanding of the Russian people, and his
revisionary application of Marxist-Leninist ideology are exemplified by his actions.
These factors undoubtedly influenced his subsequent foreign policy.
Little is known about Khrushchev’s early life other than what he himself related
in his speeches. 3 Even in his multivolume memoirs he mentioned very little about his
childhood. 4 He described himself as, “the son of a working man, [and] the grandson of a
serf.” 5 He was born on April 17, 1894, in the Russian village of Kalinovka. According to
Khrushchev he started working very young. When he was fifteen he found work in a
German factory, and eventually took a job as a miner and ironworker. His employment in
that necessary field kept him from being drafted into the Red Army during World War I.
He did, however, still gain some military experience when he joined the Bolsheviks in the
Russian Civil War. 6
After the war was over he returned to the mines, working in the Donbass region of
the Ukraine. 7 As a reward for his work in the Communist Party, he was selected to attend
one of the Schools the Party had established to train Party members to become leaders in
industry. He took advantage of the educational opportunity, and attended school in
Yuzovka (Stalino), where he studied math and physics. He soon worked his way up the
party structure. 8
Khrushchev skillfully judged the political climate around him. After Lenin’s
death in 1924, when Stalin arose as the new leader of the Party, Khrushchev managed to
remain afloat in the turbulent political waters that sank so many of his peers. By 1934 he
had risen to the position of First Party Secretary in Moscow, the most politically
influential city in the Soviet Union. 9 He was eventually appointed First Secretary of the
99
10
10
Central Committee, a position that allowed him to hold cooperative leadership after
Stalin’s death in 1953. 10 He again employed his political wiles, and in 1957, he
eliminated his competition and assumed the primary leadership position. 11
When Khrushchev emerged as the head of the Soviet Union, he had to deal with
the turmoil left behind by Stalin’s regime. The Soviet Union had been racked by war and
its people had lived on the edge of starvation for far too long. In a speech made to the
assembly, Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s despotic abuses and pledged to reinstitute the
Leninist ideal of “democratic centralism.” 12 He vowed to continue the pursuit of
Socialism by a peaceful means.
Khrushchev abandoned the Leninist principle that a violent war was necessary for
communism to defeat the imperial capitalists. He also publicly condemned Stalin’s
repressive actions and pledged to promote communism peacefully. 13 Khrushchev wrote
in the introduction to the English edition to his book For Victory in Peaceful Competition
With Capitalism, “War and aggression are alien to the very nature of the socialist
system.” 14 Through his strategy of “competitive coexistence,” he waged a passive
aggressive attack against the US and shifted tactics from traditional military might,
toward the use of wit and wiles. When Khrushchev rejected the possibility of an armed
conflict, based on his belief in the doctrine that the capitalist world would “of itself turn
to Socialism,” emphasis was shifted away from traditional military and focused more on
intelligence. 15
In 1960, relations between Cuba and the United States grew increasingly sour.
The Cubans seized several American owned ranches and nationalized US owned
industries. Meanwhile, Cuba’s relationship with the Soviet Union grew closer.
Diplomatic relations between the two countries was established in May of that year, and
was followed by several trade and defense agreements. In July Khrushchev stated,
“Speaking figuratively, in case of necessity, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban
people with rocket fire….” On July 12th Khrushchev declared that the “the Monroe
Doctrine” was “dead,” and promised to help Castro force the United States to withdraw
their Naval forces from Guantanamo Bay. 16
After that, a series of events began that rapidly increased the ties between Cuba
and the Soviet Union. On July 29, Cuban Economic Minister “Che” Guevara announced
that Cuba would adopt the Communist economic system. By November of 1960, the US
government reported that Cuba had received at least twelve shipments of arms and
ammunition from the Soviets, totaling about 28,000 tons. 17 On December 19, Cuba
officially allied itself with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and aligned itself with the Soviet Union’s
domestic and foreign policies. 18 On January 3, 1961, the United States and Cuba
discontinued diplomatic relations.
On April 3, the United States issued a pamphlet stating its intention to support
future democratic government in Cuba, and called on the Cuban people to disassociate
with the Soviet Union. Soon after that President Kennedy promised that, under no
circumstances, would the US endeavor to overthrow Castro by military force. His
promise was broken shortly thereafter; from the 17 through 19 of April the United States
backed Cuban Exiles in their attempted “Bay of Pigs” Invasion. The attack failed and
strengthened Castro’s regime. 19
At this juncture, in an attempt to solidify Soviet support, Che Guevara declared
Castro’s revolution to be “the first socialist revolution in Latin America.” 20 On December
7, 1961, Fidel Castro declared his acceptance of the Marxist Ideology stating, “I believe
11
11
absolutely in Marxism…. I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be a Marxist-Leninist until the
last day of my life.” 21
Disturbed by Soviet intervention so close to their southern coast, the US dealt
harshly with Cuba. On February 3, 1962 President Kennedy placed a trade embargo
against Cuba encompassing all goods except for medical supplies. In September, Cuban
exiles requested that the US government support another invasion attempt. Khrushchev
received word through secret channels about operation MONGOOSE, a second US plot to
unseat Castro’s government. 22 Khrushchev warned the United States that any attack on
Cuba or Soviet ships headed for the island, would result in nuclear war.
Khrushchev predicted all nations would forsake capitalism for communism as
Cuba had done. US interference with Cuba’s voluntary adoption of Communism was not
fair play according to Khrushchev. Therefore Khrushchev decided to restore order, by
doing exactly what the US had done to Russia in the case of Berlin. Undoubtedly,
Khrushchev thought that employing the United States’ own tactics against her was poetic
justice, but the balance of power was second in Khrushchev’s mind to ensuring that the
peaceful Communist revolution was allowed to occur.
In his memoirs, Khrushchev stated that the idea of placing nuclear missiles in
Cuba first occurred to him while he was on tour in Bulgaria. Looking back on the event
years afterward he stated, he was convinced that the Americans would not allow Cuba to
remain a socialist nation. He wrote, “an action had been taken that could have deprived
the Cuban people of all their revolutionary gains; it could have meant the loss of the
possibility of building socialism in Cuba.” 23 The failed Bay of Pigs invasion would be
followed by additional attempts. He noted that the Americans “feared, as much as we
hoped, that a Socialist Cuba might become a magnet that would attract other Latin
American countries to Socialism.” 24
Khrushchev saw Castro’s regime as a foot in the door to a Socialist Latin America
and he believed that it was in the interest of the Soviet Union to prevent the United States
from slamming that door shut. “We had an obligation,” Khrushchev explained, “to do
everything in our power to protect Cuba’s existence as a Socialist country and as a
working example to the other countries in Latin America.” 25 The question of what the
Soviet policy toward Cuba would be was “constantly” on his mind. 26 He needed to think
of a way “to establish a tangible and effective deterrent to American interference in the
Caribbean.” 27 He eventually came to the conclusion that, “The logical answer was
missiles.” 28
Khrushchev saw that his planned course of action had the “additional” benefit of
equalizing the “balance of power.” 29 In response to Soviet action in Berlin, the US had
stationed Jupiter missiles in Turkey pointed at Soviet cities. 30 This advantage, as he
stated it, was only a secondary motivator. Khrushchev thought it was only fair for the
Soviet Union to react to a similar situation in a similar manner. “Why not throw a
hedgehog at Uncle Sam’s pants?” 31 He asked Soviet Minister, Rodion Malinovsky. 32
Apparently he could not think of a reason, for by May of 1962 the Presidium had
unanimously voted to put Khrushchev’s plan into action.
Khrushchev’s stated motivation is supported by the text of the Draft Agreement
between Cuba and the USSR on Military Cooperation and Mutual Defense, signed in
August of 1962. The document stated the USSR would supply Cuba with troops and
weapons for defense. The preamble stated repeatedly that the preservation of peace was a
priority. 33
12
12
The mission to defend Cuba included a complex plan of deception to keep the US
from discovering their plot until the missiles were in place. The mission’s name itself was
part of the deception campaign. The Soviets assigned the mission the code name of
34
OPERATION ANADYR after a river in a region of Siberia. It was their thought that if the
United States intercepted documents dealing with the mission they would assume that the
Soviets were preparing to ship supplies to that region rather than to the Caribbean. 35
In the first wave, the Soviets shipped twenty-four mobile launchers with thirty-six
missiles designated R-12, (SS-4). The Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), could
strike eleven hundred miles of the US South. Later shipments included sixteen fixed site
launchers with twenty-four R-14 (SS-5) missiles, which are a type of Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missile (IRBM). The missiles had a predicted range of twenty-two hundred
miles meaning they could strike anywhere except the far northwest corner of the United
States. The total from all the shipments equaled forty launchers and sixty nuclear missiles
with an explosive yield of two to eight hundred kilotons, ten to forty times the power of
the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. 36
This was not the first time Khrushchev had used his nuclear capability as a
negotiating technique. Interestingly enough Khrushchev had threatened to put missiles in
Cuba as early as the summer of 1960. 37 This time, however, the results of his strategy
were disappointing. Before Khrushchev stationed the missiles in Cuba the US did not
seem to take his threat seriously. 38 Throughout this period, Kennedy had maintained that
Cuba did not posses any “offensive” weapons that directly imperiled the United States
and therefore military action on the part of the US was unnecessary. His policy was
derogatorily dubbed his “do nothing policy.” 39 It would not be long, however, before
Kennedy was forced to act.
On October 14, 1962 American U2 spy planes photographed what appeared to be
Soviet missile bases on the nearby island nation of Cuba. By the 16th the images were
confirmed to be of missile bases and President John F. Kennedy’s administration was
faced with making the next move. On October 22 Kennedy related the situation to the
public. 40 The next day he enforced his “quarantine,” preventing all ships from entering
Cuban ports. 41
In order to decide the best plan of action the administration tried to figure out
what motivated Khrushchev to take such extreme action. Kennedy and his Executive
Committee (ExComm) came up with several theories in an attempt to explain the Soviet
leader’s drastic move. They speculated that it could have been:
A quick and inexpensive way to increase Soviet strategic missile strength; a
bargaining chip to be traded away in exchange for Western concession regarding
the status of Berlin; a diversion which would allow the Soviets to take unilateral
action on Berlin; a way to end the double standard which allowed the United
States to deploy IRBM’S on the Soviet periphery but not vice versa’ or a test of
US resolve which would demonstrate US irresolution and thus advance Soviet
geopolitical power. 42
Kennedy was convinced the incident involved Berlin, which had been the
dominant diplomatic issue up to that point. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, a member
of Kennedy’s Executive Committee, disagreed with the theory that Khrushchev’s actions
had anything to do with Berlin or the Jupiter Missiles in Turkey. “The important thing for
13
13
Khrushchev,” he thought, “is to be able to say: I saved Cuba. I stopped an invasion.” 43
Thompson had just returned from his tour as ambassador to the Soviet Union; among the
members of the committee he was probably the most qualified to speculate about
Khrushchev’s reasoning. 44 The other members remained skeptical.
Still unsure of Khrushchev’s motives, Kennedy’s administration continued to
negotiate with Soviet ambassadors. They hoped to be able to find a peaceful resolution to
the conflict. For his part in the negotiations Khrushchev repeatedly stated that the
missiles were there to defend Cuba. On October 26, news correspondent and ExCommSoviet go-between, John Scali, submitted his notes from a meeting with Soviet embassy
counselor, Alexandr Fomin. During the meeting Fomin stated that Soviet “bases would
be dismantled under United Nations supervision and Castro would pledge not to accept
offensive weapons of any kind, ever, in return for a US pledge not to invade Cuba.” 45
That same day Kennedy received a letter from Khrushchev formally stating those same
conditions for conflict resolution. 46 Before Kennedy could accept, he received another
letter demanding that in addition to Cuban security the Soviets also wanted the Jupiter
missiles removed from Turkey. 47 Exactly why the Soviets increased their demands at
that point is still uncertain. Kennedy responded by agreeing to the terms of the first
letter. In his reply letter to Khrushchev on October 27, Kennedy wrote that the US would
lift the “quarantine” and publically pledge never to invade Cuba again. 48 To sweeten the
deal Kennedy entered into secret negotiations about the removal of NATO missiles in
Turkey in response to the demands in Khrushchev’s second letter. 49
Kennedy’s acceptance of the terms in Khrushchev’s letter marks the beginning of
the end of the crisis. The fact that, except for Khrushchev’s second letter, the only
demand Khrushchev made was for US assurance of Cuban security supports the theory
that Khrushchev’s primary motive was what he claimed. Mutual disarmament was
obviously more advantageous to the Soviet Union than Cuban defense. Had the balance
of power been his primary motive he would have dropped the façade of protecting Cuba
when negotiations first began. Furthermore, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet in
December 1962, Khrushchev gave the same explanation of his motivation for placing the
missiles into Cuba to the committee. He said that his action was simply in defense of
their Soviet brother from the inhumane actions of the United States. Khrushchev felt the
US “quarantine,” or “blockade” as he called it, was an unjust attempt to “Starve a whole
nation.” 50 Despite his repeated explanation western scholars remain skeptical of
Khrushchev’s stated motivation.
Part of the skepticism is based on the assumption that Khrushchev lacked
confidence. Max Frankel demonstrates this view. In his book on the crisis he wrote “As I
first sensed in reporting from Moscow at the height of Khrushchev’s power, his
pugnacity was born of a typically Russian insecurity. His most aggressive actions against
the west tended to mask a deeply defensive purpose. The evidence now available, though
still debated shows that it was to offset a debilitating weakness, not to imperil America
that Khrushchev careened into the crisis.” 51 This commonly held American evaluation of
the Soviet leader seems largely unfounded.
Throughout his life Khrushchev frequently defied the odds. His success in
working his way up through the ranks of the party was remarkable. His political as well
as physical survival during the Stalin era, and afterward, alone was an incredible
achievement. His perseverance in the party would have been enough to build his selfconfidence, but he had the added self-esteem boost of seeing many of his organizational
14
14
reforms result in major improvements in efficiency of production. It hardly seems
reasonable to say that Khrushchev suffered from chronic insecurity. Not that he was
without worry, but overall, Khrushchev seems to have been a confident individual. If
anything Khrushchev appears to be overconfident to the point of recklessness. He was
impulsive and willing to take a gamble to achieve his objectives. 52
Khrushchev stated repeatedly that his sole intent was to defend the newly
established Communist nation from the unprovoked aggression of the United States. He
spoke frequently of “peaceful coexistence.” 53 By that he did not mean that the conflicting
ideologies of Capitalism and Communism could be allowed to coexist, but rather
capitalism would eventually be defeated through peaceful competition in each individual
state. Khrushchev expected that the fall of Capitalism would likely involve some violence
on the local level as each people rose up to topple their country’s capitalist structure. His
end goal was the peaceful coexistence of people in all states living in a Communist
system. 54 He wrote “society as a whole, must strive to find ways not only of postponing
war, but also of abolishing it forever.” 55 Khrushchev’s positioning of missiles in Cuba
was not warmongering, it was insurance. He may have achieved peace by the threat of
war, but he achieved it nonetheless.
Khrushchev thought if he committed only troops and lesser weapons to Cuba’s
defense, the US would not be effectively deterred. 56 By upping the ante to the threat of
nuclear war, US invasion was prevented. Khrushchev was an excellent judge of
character. His evaluation of Kennedy was that he was a man he could reason with.
Khrushchev was counting on the fact that Kennedy wanted to avoid war as much as he
did. 57
In light of his stated aversion to war, American scholars and officials often
wonder why Khrushchev employed such drastic measures if his primary concern was
truly to deter a US attack. Khrushchev explained that he thought “if the United States
discovered the missiles were there after they were already poised and ready to strike, the
Americans would think twice before trying to liquidate our installations by military
means.” 58 In Khrushchev’s mind, his extreme measure was the best way to “peacefully”
defend Cuba. Khrushchev stated, “When we put our ballistic missiles in Cuba, we had no
desire to start a war. On the contrary, our principal aim was only to deter America from
starting a war.” 59
One of the reasons that American scholars reject Khrushchev’s statement of
motivation is that he is generally viewed as a pragmatist rather than an ideologue. 60 He
was adept at navigating his way through political situations. 61 He was a good judge of
character and would often say whatever was necessary to achieve his goal. This
interpretation of Khrushchev’s personality has led many to dismiss his explanation of
Cuban defense as pure propaganda. It is true that Khrushchev frequently made use of
propaganda when he saw that it would advance his cause. In this case, however, the tale
of how he defended Cuba from an unprovoked attack by a greedy imperialist nation fit
neatly into Khrushchev’s arsenal of propaganda. Considering Khrushchev’s policy of
peaceful competition, his belief in the inevitability of socialism, and his high level of self
confidence, it is likely that Khrushchev saw defending Cuba as part of his policy’s
fulfillment.
15
15
Endnotes
Robert A. Devine, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Markus Wiener
Publishing, 1988), 102.
1
2
Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House
During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1997), 668.
3
N.H. Mager and Jacques Katel, ed. Conquest without War: An Analytical Anthology of
the Speeches, Interviews, and Remarks of Nikita Khrushchev, with Commentary by Lenin, Stalin,
and Others (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), 17.
4
Nikita Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev Vol. 1: Commissar, 1918-1945. ed.
Sergei Khrushchev, trans. George Shriver (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1999), 7.
5
Mager and Katel, Conquest without War, 16-17.
6
William K. Medlin, “Khrushchev: A Political Profile: I,” Russian Review, Vol. 17, No. 4
(Oct., 1958): 281.
7
Ibid., 278.
8
Ibid., 279.
William K. Medlin, “Khrushchev: A Political Profile: II,” Russian Review, Vol. 18, No.
1 (Jan., 1959): 31.
9
Alexander Werth, Russia under Khrushchev (New York: Hill and Wang, 1961), 13.
10
Medlin, “Khrushchev: A Political Profile: I,” 278.
11
12
Abraham Brumberg ed., Russia Under Khrushchev: An Anthology From Problems of
Communism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc. 1962.), 115.
Frank Gibney, The Khrushchev Pattern (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1960), 3-
13
7.
14
Nikita Khrushchev, For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism (London:
Hutchinson of London, 1960), viii.
Gibney, The Khrushchev Pattern, 182.
15
16
David L. Larson, ed.“Cuban Crisis” of 1962: Selected Documents and Chronology
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), 298-299.
Larson, “Cuban Crisis,” 300-301.
17
Ibid., 302.
18
16
16
19
Keith Eubank, The Missile Crisis in Cuba (Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company,
2000), 28.
20
Larson, “Cuban Crisis,” 303.
21
Ibid., 304.
Sergei N. Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower, trans.
Shirley Benson (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University, 2000) 482.
22
23
Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev and Sergeĭ Khrushchev. Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev.
Volume 3, Statesman,1953-1964 (n.p.: Pennsylvania State University, 2007), 320.
Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. ed. Edward Crankshaw, trans. Strobe
Talbott (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1970), 492.
24
25
Ibid., 324.
bid., 493.
26I
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid., 494.
Max Frankel, High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile
Crisis (NewYork; Ballantine Books, 2004), 8.
30
31
May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes. 674.
32
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble:” Khrushchev,
Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997), 171.
Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh ed. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National
Security Archive Documents Reader (New York: The New York Press, 1992), 64-66.
33
34
Frankel, High Noon in the Cold War, 13.
35
Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” 191.
36
Frankel, High Noon in the Cold War, 14-15.
37
Harry Overstreet and Bonaro Overstreet, The War Called Peace: Khrushchev’s
Communism (New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc.,1961), 11, 44.
38
Larson, “Cuban Crisis,” 307.
39
Ibid.
17
Ibid., 41-46
40
Ibid., 55-57
41
James A. Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martins
Press, 1992), 137.
42
May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes, 667.
43
44
Abram Cheyes, The Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crisis and the Role of Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 14.
John Scali’s notes on first meeting with Soviet embassy counselor and KGB officer
Alexandr Fomin, October 26, 1962, in Chang and Kornbluh, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 194.
45
46
Khrushchev letter to Kennedy, October 26, 1962, in Chang and Kornbluh, The Cuban
Missile Crisis, 195-198.
Khrushchev’s Message to Kennedy, October 27, 1962, in Eubank, The Missile Crisis in
Cuba, 204.
47
48
A Message From Kennedy to Khrushchev, October 27, 1962, in Eubank, The Missile
Crisis in Cuba, 204.
Eubank, The Missile Crisis in Cuba, 88.
49
Devine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 102-108.
50
Frankel, High Noon in the Cold War, 5.
51
Nathan, Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, 179.
52
53
Nikita Khrushchev, For Victory in Peaceful Competition With Capitalism (London:
Hutchinson of London, 1960), xi.
Mager and Katel, Conquest Without War, 3-7; Nikita Khrushchev, For Victory, 12.
54
Nikita Khrushchev, For Victory, 12.
55
Khrushchev Letter to Kennedy, October 26, 1962, in Chang and Kornbluh, The Cuban
Missile Crisis, 195-198.
56
Frankel, High Noon in the Cold War, 5.
57
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. 494.
58
59
Ibid., 495.
18 18
William K. Medlin, “Khrushchev: A Political Profile: IV,” Russian Review, Vol. 18,
No. 3 (Jul., 1959): 181.
60
61
Medlin, “Khrushchev: A Political Profile: I,” 278.
Leonardo Da Vinci: Observations Applied to Art
Ashleigh
CollardApplied to Art
Leonardo DaBy:
Vinci:
Observations
By: Ashleigh Collard
The Renaissance was home to many great artists who created changes and
techniques with their masterpieces and studies. One of these artists was Leonardo da
Vinci. Da Vinci did more than create paintings; he also studied the natural world and
earned the title of scientist. He believed that painting was the best form of art because it
was grounded in mathematics and visual experience. 1 He also believed that science and
art were inseparable and used each to enhance the understanding of the other. His need to
understand how everything worked affected his artwork and helped create his artistic
techniques. It also made him the leader in some aspects of studies in nature and the
human body. His studies were grounded in nature and harmony; his studies of rocks,
plants, light, anatomy, human expressions, and many other subjects in nature led to
improvements in realistic paintings and scientific studies of nature.
Da Vinci viewed painting as a science and art as a way for scientists to visually
improve their studies of the world. 2 His studies of the human body as a scientist and artist
increased the understanding of man’s structures, portrayal of emotions, and movement.
His studies were based on visual observation, and he found that people could only gain
knowledge by visually studying objects. This belief led to his conclusion that the best
way to inform people of his findings was through his paintings. 3
Da Vinci’s main focus, as both an artist and a scientist, was on the study of
nature. 4 His art was used as a way to better study and understand nature, while his
scientific studies were used to also improve his art. As an artist Da Vinci wanted to
represent nature’s beauty as accurately as possible and as a scientist he wanted to learn
the universal laws that affected how all things took place within nature. He respected that
people were able to be a part of nature as well as observe and reflect on it creatively. He
possessed an infinite amount of curiosity about the world and his artwork became a way
to study things with more focus and detail to discover how they worked, such as the
movement of water. 5 Da Vinci used his studies of the world in an attempt to find a
unifying principle that would connect all things. He was fascinated by the way elements
interacted with one another and how those relations influenced the natural world. 6 Da
Vinci was mesmerized by geology, the structure of the earth, and how water shaped that
structure. 7 His studies led to the detailed constructions of landscape in his artwork.
He created an understanding of the characteristics of rocks and how they were
created with his artistic and scientific studies in geology. He may have been the first
person to study and accurately depict rocks. 8 He studied how they were created and used
his art to show in detail how they truly appeared in nature. His understanding of geology
and the arrangement of landscapes is noticeable throughout his paintings. 9 However, he
did combine his knowledge with his imagination to create landscapes that were
completely unique, but appeared realistic. Such as with mountains, which he would
accurately sketch during his scientific studies, but would sometimes distort when he used
them in the background in his paintings. 10
Da Vinci was also a botanist, someone with the scientific knowledge of plants. He
studied the growth of plants, the effect water had on them, and how the sun affected
them. His determination to portray plants as similar to how they appear in nature led to
his intense study of plant life. Before his studies of plants, drawings of plants did not
accurately represent the flora because artists avoided details, such as overlapping leaves,
in order to show all the parts. Da Vinci’s drawings accurately depicted the correct
19
19
20
20
placement and number of leaves. 11 His use of light was one of his most impressive
techniques in his studies; he created the illusion of light on the curved surfaces which was
contrasted by darkness on other parts. 12 Most of his drawings from his studies of plant
life were used for figures to enhance the settings of his paintings. 13 His accurate drawings
illustrate his sense of proportion and visual perception, and his willingness to change a
plant’s appearance at times to create harmony within his painting. 14
Da Vinci wrote about techniques he believed a master artist should have in
regards to nature. He instructed artists to combine their observations of nature, reasoning,
and imagination to produce new artwork. 15 He also believed that artists should refer to
nature when they were creating works of art. He expected them to understand how light
could create a sense of a three-dimensional space in art, as well as how colors were
changed by the atmosphere. Leonardo da Vinci believed a true artist should understand
that all things in life are unified and created harmony. 16 He supposed that the human
body, growth of trees, and flight of birds were connected by the principles of
proportion. 17
According to his journals he expected a master artist to understand how the eye
worked and know the math to judge distance. Understanding optics was important to Da
Vinci. He expected artists to take into account how the hue and point of view would
affect the painting. His own studies of optics led to notes in his journal of how distant
objects appeared to intersect and disappear at a vanishing point. This concept helped him
express depth with balanced reduction in the size of objects to create a sense of
distance. 18
He studied light closely because it stimulated sight and used it as a physical
element as well as a figurative representation of mind and spirit in his art. 19 Leonardo da
Vinci did not separate his study and artful use of light from dark because he realized that
they were dependent on each other. 20 The use of light and shadow, as well as something
between the two, was used to create depth within his paintings. This understanding of
depth led to his mastery of sfumato, a technique used to create a three-dimensional
illusion by using restrained tone, color, and making objects seem more distant by making
their edges hazy. 21 He was also intrigued by the color of the atmosphere; he realized that
the light of the sun and air created the blue of the sky as well as other colors in his
paintings. Da Vinci studied the effects of atmosphere on color, light, and shade. 22 His
study of the atmosphere helped him perfect his use of sfumato as he realized that its
density affected how distant things appeared. He was able to portray mists through which
shapes were barely discernable, such as mountains and valleys during a storm. 23 His use
of light and shade eventually led painters away from the clear tones and linear method
used before his time. 24
Da Vinci also created a science called chiaroscuro, which was used to make
artificial images appear natural through the arrangement of light and dark areas. While it
does not affect the color used he did not consider them separate; instead they were used
to complement each other and make the painting more realistic. 25After finding how to
represent color changes caused by light he came to the conclusion that light created color.
This idea was developed as he noticed that color seemed to disappear due to the amount
of light the object received. This technique was used throughout his paintings to add
depth and a realistic quality to the subject.
Leonardo da Vinci’s study of shadow also led to better understanding of
techniques used in art. He found that the use of copying shadows from direct light to
21
21
create subjects in art caused the forms to be distorted. 26 He realized that this old method
caused forms to be elongated instead of maintaining a more natural appearance. 27 It was
very rare that he found an object and its shadow that were equal in size and shape. 28 From
his scientific observations da Vinci concluded that every shadow was distorted in some
way. His explanations of shadows led artists away from the contemporary process of
copying shadows to create forms in paintings. Da Vinci’s observations also led to more
artists studying the effect light had on an objects shadow and more attention to recreating
realistic shadows within paintings.
Leonardo da Vinci was devoted to the study of human anatomy and
physiognomy, facial features which can also indicate character and emotion. These
studies of man put his understandings of the body three-hundred years ahead of the
medical community of his time. 29 He would study the human body at all stages, from the
smooth shape of children to the faces wrinkled from old age. In his notebooks he used his
study of the human body to show his students what areas to portray and in what condition
for the different ages. He also described how an artist should portray people during
movement. He encouraged painters to study gestures and body language so they could be
better able to portray movements and convey the emotions in their art. By conveying the
subject’s feelings the artwork becomes a narrative. 30 Da Vinci would closely observe the
people with which he had contact. There were times that he would become fascinated by
someone’s appearance on the street and would follow them. 31 He would observe their
gestures and structure until he was able to go home and draw the person as if they were
with him. 32 This intense study of individuals helped him learn to convey the emotions of
his subjects through his paintings.
Da Vinci’s need to perfectly illustrate and understand all things led to his
anatomical studies of the human body. He was the first artist to study the human body to
better portray it, as well as the first to use art to depict the human anatomy. 33 Marc
Antonio della Torre, a famous anatomist during the Renaissance, helped him in his
research. 34 Leonardo da Vinci’s early studies of the human body had been hindered
because he had trouble finding bodies. In 1510 he began working at the medical school at
the University of Pava, where he had more access to corpses. 35 His admiration of and
need to understand the living world led to his dissections being systematic and his
illustrations of the bodies being clear and precise. 36 His understanding of perspective
allowed him to recreate a three dimensional view of the organs in his drawings, which
made the representation more accurate. 37 Through his dissections da Vinci was able to
combine his understanding of dexterity, physical structure, with his artistic talent. 38 His
study of the eye and vision helped him master perspective, representing a threedimensional world on a one dimensional surface.
Da Vinci viewed painting as a science, where objects are created in permanent
forms. He considered painting a way for the scientist to use precise theories to recreate
beauty and better understand nature through its use. 39 He also insisted painters should
have a strong understanding of mathematics. During the Renaissance mathematics was
the basis of perspective, defined at the time as the representation of recreated objects. 40
Da Vinci mainly focused on the use of geometry in correlation with the proportion of the
human body. He considered harmony could be found in comparing geometric forms to
nature. He formed basic laws based on his observations of symmetry found in plant life,
diffusion of light, and sedimentation. 41 He believed the body was the measure of all
things; therefore the perfectly formed man’s proportions were reducible to mathematical
22
22
terms. The physically perfect body should be related to shapes such as squares and
circles. 42
Da Vinci followed this geometric idea of the physically perfect body when
creating the heads in his paintings. He would create heads using two intersecting circles,
the lower circle created the curved mouth and the upper circle created the hairline. 43
Where the circles intersected he placed the corners of both the eyes or of the eye closest
to the viewer if it was a side profile. 44 When creating the heads of men he would usually
use a square as his geometric design. 45 He also created the Vitruvian figure as a way to
show these ideal anatomical proportions. 46 The Vitruvian is an ink drawing of a man
standing in two positions. The man whose legs are together represent that his outspread
arms are the same length as his height. 47 The other figure represents the rule that “if you
open your legs so much as to decrease your height by 1/14, and raise your outspread arms
till the tips of your middle fingers are level with the top of your head, you will find that
the center of your outspread limbs will be the naval, and the space between the legs will
be an equilateral triangle.” 48 The man’s naval is the center of the circle of which he
stands. The Vitruvian Man also shows the tension between the workings of the bones and
dynamics of the muscles within the human body. 49
Leonardo da Vinci’s study of the natural world cannot be separated from his
artwork. Each of his paintings involved a new aspect not used before, such as a new
technique or interpretation. 50 Three of his masterpieces, the Adoration of the Magi,
Virgin of the Rocks, and The Last Supper, represent his different studies and techniques.
In the Adoration he created contrast by placing a group of figures in light and another
group in almost complete darkness. These two dynamic groups were balanced by a single
focal point. In this painting his study of movement and physiognomy was very important;
it was how he expressed the differences in emotions and age throughout the artwork. 51
He worked on this piece for a year before he left Florence to move to Milan. Virgin of the
Rocks was the first painting he did in Milan. 52 In this painting he combined his study of
nature with his own imagination. He created the landscape as a “timescape” and his
detailed rocks led to new understanding of geology. 53 Virgin of the Rocks surpassed any
of his earlier artwork because it combined his technical skills with the bold sfumato
technique. 54
Leonardo da Vinci started The Last Supper in 1495 for the convent of Dominican
Friars at Santa Maria delle Grazie, Milan. 55 Da Vinci’s Last Supper is different from
other representations that have been created because his contains unity and drama that the
others do not. 56 As in the Adoration he created two dynamic groups with a single balance
point, the two groups of six apostles on either side of Jesus, who is the focal point. 57
While he was painting The Last Supper, he increased his studies of how emotions
affected the form, attitudes, and expressions of man. 58 The Last Supper is viewed as a
drama because the actions, expressions, and costumes he used were chosen to suit the
subject, not for their picturesque effect as earlier representations were. 59 Each gesture
given to the disciples is enhanced by contrast, such as Peter, who seems to be eagerly
declaring his innocence, is contrasted by St. John, who sits quietly. 60
Leonardo da Vinci transformed science into an art and created harmony between
inner and outer experience through his studies and artwork. 61 Da Vinci believed that
science and art were inseparable, each used to enhance the understanding of the other.
His studies were based on visual observation, and he found that people could only gain
knowledge by visually studying objects. This belief led to his conclusion that the best
23
23
way to inform people of his findings was through his paintings. 62 His need to understand
how everything worked affected his artwork. It led him to create techniques in art that he
was later noted for, and also made him a leader in some aspects of studies in nature and
the human body. His studies were grounded in nature and harmony; they led to
improvements in realistic paintings and scientific studies in nature.
Leonardo da Vinci’s study of the natural world cannot be separated from his
paintings, as each was used to test new techniques he had discovered as well as illustrate
the different findings of his studies. His art was used as a way to better study and
understand nature, while his scientific studies were used to also improve his art. Da
Vinci’s studies of nature led to the detailed structures of landscapes in his artwork. The
use of light and shadow, as well as a shade between the two, was used to make his
paintings appear three-dimensional. Da Vinci’s study of the human body led to his
understanding on how to best portray age, movement, and emotions. He believed that
painters should have a strong understanding of mathematics, especially geometry,
because this comprehension helped to better recreate the human body. Leonardo da Vinci
wanted to raise the status of the artist with his artwork and teachings by conveying the
idea that an artist was insightful and understood the world around them. 63
Endnotes
1
Claire T. Farago, “Leonardo’s Color and Chiaroscuro Reconsidered: The Visual Force
of Painted Images,” The Art Bulletin 73 (March 1991), http://www.jstor.org/stable/3045779,
under “Leonardo da Vinci,” (accessed November 19, 2011).
2
Mihai Nadin, “Science and Beauty: Aesthetic Structuring of Knowledge,” Leonardo 24
(1991), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1575471, under “Leonardo da Vinci,” (accessed November
11, 2011).
Robert Squeri, “Leonardo da Vinci: Innovator,” Art Education 14 (Dec., 1961)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186858, under “Leonardo da Vinci,” (accessed November 18, 2011),
15.
3
Barrington Barber, Through the Eyes of Leonardo Da Vinci (New York: Gramercy
Books, 2004), 17.
4
5
William Wray, Leonardo Da Vinci: In His Own Words (New York: Gramercy Books,
2005), 10.
6
Barber, Through the Eyes of Leonardo Da Vinci, 17.
7
Marc Rosci, Leonardo (Danbury, Connecticut: MasterWorks Press, 1984), 88.
Othmar T. Tobisch, “Connections between the Geological Science and Visual Art:
Historical Perspectives and Personal Expression in Artwork,” Leonardo 16 (autumn, 1983), under
“Leonardo da Vinci,” http://www.jstor.org/stable/1574953 (accessed November 18, 2011).
8
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
24
24
Barbara Hochstetler Meyer and Alice Wilson Glover, “Botany and Art in Leonardo’s
“Leda and the Swan”,” Leonardo 22 (1989), under “Leonardo da Vinci,”
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1575144 (accessed November 11, 2011).
11
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Wray, Leonardo Da Vinci: In His Own Words, 24.
16
Ibid., 20.
17
Ibid., 10.
18
Richard McLanathan, Images of the Universe; Leonardo da Vinci: the artist as a
scientist (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966), 73
19
Wray, Leonardo Da Vinci: In His Own Words, 30.
Giancarlo Maiorino, Leonardo Da Vinci: The Daedalian Mythmaker (University Park,
Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 23.
20
21
Ibid.
22
Farago, “Leonardo’s Color and Chiaroscuro Reconsidered,” 66.
23
Wray, Leonardo Da Vinci: In His Own Words, 54-55.
24
Kenneth Clark, Leonardo Da Vinci: An Account of His Development As An Artist
(Cambridge England: University Press, 1952), 111-112.
25
John Shearman, “Leonardo’s Colour and Chiaroscuro,” Zeitschrift fur Kunstgeschichte
25 (1962), http:// www.jstor.org/stable/1481484, under “Leonardo da Vinci,” (accessed
November 19, 2011).
26
Edward J. Olszewski, “Distortions, Shadows, and Conventions in Sixteenth Century
Italian Art,” Artibus et Historiae 6 (1985), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1483262, under “Leonardo
da Vinci,” (accessed November 18, 2011).
27
Ibid., 101.
28
Ibid., 108.
29
Squeri, “ Innovator,” 9.
30
Maiorino, Leonardo Da Vinci, 57.
31
Wray, Leonardo Da Vinci: In His Own Words, 84.
25 25
32
Ibid.
33
McLanathan, Images of the Universe, 74.
34
Wray, Leonardo Da Vinci: In His Own Words, 14.
35
Martin Clayton, and Ron Philo, Leonardo da Vinci: The Mechanics of Man (Los
Angeles: Getty Publications, 2010), 8.
36
McLanathan, Images of the Universe, 169.
37
Ibid., 73.
38
Clayton and Philo, Leonardo da Vinci: The Mechanics of Man, 8.
39
Nadin, “Science and Beauty,” 70.
40
Clark, Leonardo Da Vinci: An Account, 73-74.
41
Squeri, “Leonardo da Vinci: Innovator,” 15.
42
Ibid., 76.
43
Maurice Goldblatt, ed., Leonardo Da Vinci (New York: The Citadel Press, 1961), 63.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Maiorino, Leonardo Da Vinci, 180.
47
Charles Nicholl, Leonardo da Vinci: Flights of the Mind (New York: Viking Penguin,
2004), 247.
48
Ibid.
49
Maiorino, Leonardo Da Vinci, 189.
50
Squeri, “Leonardo da Vinci: Innovator,” 9.
51
Bruno Santi, Leonardo Da Vinci (New York: Riverside Book Company, 1990), 16-17.
52
Ibid., 31.
53
Maiorino, Leonardo Da Vinci, 76.
54
Rosci, Leonardo, 88-89.
55
Clark, Leonardo Da Vinci: An Account, 90.
56
Ibid., 94.
26
57
Ibid., 94-95.
58
Clayton and Philo, Leonardo da Vinci: The Mechanics of Man, 15.
59
Clark, Leonardo Da Vinci: An Account, 96.
60
Ibid., 97.
61
Squeri, “Leonardo da Vinci: Innovator ,” 15
62
Ibid, 9.
63
Wray, Leonardo Da Vinci: In His Own Words, 104.
26