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The German Occupied Zone after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
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A Change Of Heart:
Soviet Reasoning Behind The Abandonment Of Their SelfDetermination Policy At Brest-Litovsk
Brandon McWaters
Brandon, from New Orleans, Louisiana, graduated Summa Cud
Laude in December of 2012 with a Bachelor of Science in History/
Pre-Law and a minor in Psychology, being awarded the President's
Medal for completing his undergraduate career with a 4.0 GPA. In
the fall of 2013, he will be headed to University of Virginia School of
Law to pursue his Juris Doctorate. He served as President of the Tau
Sigma Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta for three consecutive semesters,
edited the twentieth volume of this journal, and is a member of both
Pi Sigma Alpha and Alpha Chi. His accomplishments include
winning the Dean's Award for Outstanding Research his Sophomore
year, and participating in the Southwest Model Arab League two
years in a row, winning Outstanding Delegate in 2012. He has
presented at both the Phi Alpha Theta Oklahoma Regional
Conference and the 2012 National Conference in Orlando, FL. This
paper was written for his senior thesis and continues from research
started in his last submission, “Reaction and Response: The ‘Polish
Question’ and the Russian Provisional Government's Reasoning for
Declaring Poland's Independence.”
Napoleon once said, “The Polish question is the key to the European
vault.”1 This apt description of the geographically significant country from one of
history’s greatest generals sums up the importance Poland played in the peace
talks at Brest-Litovsk from December 1917-March 1918. In its infancy, the
Soviet government of Russia held to a strict policy of self-determination of
nations and firmly believed in the right of nations to govern themselves. This
belief was grounded in Marxist and Leninist doctrine and was enforced by Lenin
1
Edward H. Lewinski, The Political History of Poland (New York: The Polish Book
Importing Company, 1917), 568.
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himself in the first years of the communist regime. Dealing with the Polish
question of independence, however, the Soviets sacrificed this principle in the
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk when they allowed Germany and Austria-Hungary to
effectively take over governance of Poland, both the nation and the state.
Although they would later retract this allowance and return to their original
stance, it would only be after Germany and Austria were on the brink of defeat at
the hands of the Triple Entente. The reason for the Soviet abandonment of selfdetermination is multifaceted, created by an interwoven tapestry of the German
stubbornness on the terms of the treaty combined with the failure of several
Soviet goals to come to fruition.
Since the late 18th century, Poland had been dominated by its neighbors
Russia, Austria, and Prussia, each vying for the largest amount of influence on
the Slavic state for over one hundred thirty years. Several reasons explain why
the third largest state, in terms of landmass, in Europe became the puppet of
larger powers. First, the “Golden Age” of Poland had long since passed and by
1770 her king, government, and constitution were all controlled by Catherine of
Russia. Second, Poland, while large from a territorial standpoint, did not have a
large national population, that is, the “nation” of Poland was not large, while the
“state” of Poland was. The result was a territory that could not govern itself
without influence from the outside. Third, Poland had recently ceded away a
large part of its own influence over protectorate states, opening the door for
Russia, Prussia, and Austria to walk in, resulting in partitions of the country that
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took place throughout the late 18th and early 19th Centuries.2
The four partitions of Poland leading up to WWI gradually took land
away from the puppet government and gave it outright to its land-hungry
neighbors. In 1772 the First Treaty of Partition was signed between Russia and
Prussia, with the later addition of Austria, under the pretense that Poland would
have fallen into anarchy without the division and subsequent rule of the more
powerful and more organized surrounding states.3 In 1793, another partition
occurred through use of force on the part of Russia, which invaded the country
after their constitutional reforms following the influence of the French revolution
threatened Russian dominance. A Second Treaty of Partition was signed in 1793
between Russia and Prussia only and was forced on the Polish state, now
completely dependent on Russia for governance and protection.4 The Polish
revolted once more in 1794 with Prussia and Russia combining to re-conquer the
country, resulting in the Third Treaty of Partition in 1795, which included all
three major powers. During the Napoleonic wars, Napoleon set up the Duchy of
Warsaw which fought in Napoleon’s war against Russia, but played no
significant role in the independence of Poland, except to heighten the already
intense hatred between Russia and Poland. The last partition occurred in 1815
with the end of the Napoleonic wars and permanently divided Poland into
distinctions of German, Austrian, and Russian Poland with “Congress Poland”
2
M. B., “The Partitions of Poland,” Bulletin of International News 16, No. 21
(October, 1939): 4.
3
Ibid.
4
Peter D. Stachura, Poland, 1918-1945: An Interpretive and Documentary History
of the Second Republic (London: Routledge, 2004), 9.
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designated as an independent state, although in practice it was a protectorate of
Russia. Theoretically, all the individual Poland’s were independently ruled, but
only Austrian Poland received any grant of autonomy, and even then, only after
1867. This arrangement lasted until WWI with brief periods of home rule in
Congress Poland, but never for long before Russia reasserted its dominant ruling
position over its suzerain province.5
Given their historical bondage to the countries that surrounded them,
generations grew up in Poland with no memory of what self-governance looked
like, an important underlying motivator in their desire for independence. For over
one hundred years Poland played the role of political lackey to the surrounding
powers. Russia, in particular, constantly harassed and meddled in Polish political
affairs, actions that garnered the eternal hatred of the Poles. The continual
dominance of neighboring countries led many political thinkers of the time to
conclude “that only a cataclysm like (WWI) in which the three powers that tore
Poland asunder were arrayed on opposite sides, could liberate the nation from its
political bondage.”6 In essence, many believed that the only way for Poland to
become a liberated nation would be for the status quo between their masters to
change, allowing Poland to become a bargaining chip in the preceding
negotiations. The unrelenting reality of war added to the problems the Polish
people faced. The Poles could only watch their country become a major field of
battle in the First World War as German and Austrian forces marched across the
5
6
Stachura, 8-10.
Lewinski, 570.
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territory conquering the areas formerly under Russian dominance.7 Edward Carr
affirms, “Poland was by this time wholly under German occupation and the
Central Powers were already offering independence to a puppet Polish state.”8
When Germany and Austria were the first two countries to promise their
partitions of Poland freedom and autonomy, they had a few goals in mind. If, by
chance, their generous offer of freedom caused Poland to lean more toward the
Central Powers instead of Russia and the Triple Entente, they would gain
leverage in ending the war and keep the Eastern Front occupied, as Russia would
now have to fight their way through Poland to reach the Central Powers. This is
why the Russian Provisional Government (RPG) quickly moved to issue a
statement that blamed the Tsarist government for Russian dominance of Poland
and declared their solidarity behind Polish independence. Kerensky, leader of the
RPG, wanted to make certain that if Poland was to gain independence, the road
would lead through Russia so the new democracy would not have to worry about
an imminent threat from a historically hostile country. The Polish response to the
Russian declaration for independence was positive, responding to the RPG’s
proclamation “with a feeling of deep joy.”9 The Poles were wary of the German
and Austrian governments’ plan for independence because they were dealing
with the same governments that had dangled self-governance before them in the
7
Lewinski, 570.
Edward Hallett Carr, A History of Soviet Russia, Volume 1 (London: Macmillan,
1950), 287.
9
A Dispatch from the Poles,” Izvestiia no. 13 (March 12, 1917): 4, quoted in Robert
Paul Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky, The Russian Provisional Government: 1917,
Volume 1 (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1961).
8
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past. Hope filled the Polish people when the new Russian Provisional
Government, a government founded on the very principles they prized, promised
to make an independent Poland a priority in the new administration. In theory,
Kerensky’s plan was well thought-out and grounded in good political philosophy;
however it would be derailed by the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917.10
Once the second revolution occurred in Russia, the Polish Question came
once again to the forefront of international relations. The Soviets, interested in
ending the war as quickly as possible to fulfill their “campaign promises” to the
Russian people, and the Central Powers, eager to demilitarize the eastern front to
bring much needed resources and troops to the west, initiated peace talks in the
winter of 1917. The Brest-Litovsk peace talks, as they came to be known, lasted
on and off until March of 1918 with the surrender of Lenin and the Russians to
the Central Powers. Both parties went into the convention with mutually
exclusive goals; a fact that determined an outcome that would result in the
dashing of one side’s objectives.
The Soviet government’s policy toward Polish independence originally
paralleled that of the preceding government. In many of his statements and
writings, V.I. Lenin strongly supported a nation’s right to determine its own
government and to rule itself, believing “Freedom to unite implies freedom to
10
Brandon McWaters, “Reaction and Response: The ‘Polish Question’ and the
Russian Provisional Government’s Reasoning for Declaring Poland’s Independence,”
Oklahoma Christian University Journal of Historical Studies 20 (Spring 2012): 125.
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secede.”11 This statement works back to Lenin’s fundamental belief that all
countries have a right, a freedom, to unite together in the global communist
regime that he believes will inevitably come about. If all countries have a right to
unite, then, to Lenin, this means that all countries have the subsequent right to
either leave the agreement or simply deny union to begin with. A parallel
example can be found in the arguments surrounding the American Civil War.
Southern states believed that since they had voluntarily ratified the Constitution,
they had a right to disunite from the country at large and be on their own. The
same concept is at work in Lenin’s ideas about self-determination. He even goes
on record declaring, “If the Soviet takes over power tomorrow… we shall then
say: Germany, get your troops out of Poland.”12 Lenin believed in this doctrine so
strongly that he placed it at the core of his political philosophy writing “Only the
recognition by the proletariat of the right of nations to secede can ensure
complete solidarity among the workers of the various nations to help bring the
nations closer together on truly democratic lines.”13
Lenin’s attitude on self-determination was reflected in the initial
statements of the Soviet government following its rise to power after the October
Revolution. Writing in 1918, Charles Fenwick recounts, “In November the new
Bolshevik government announced the radical policy of recognizing ‘the right of
11
V.I. Lenin, “Speech on the National Question,” V.I. Lenin: Selected Works,
Volume 2 (New York: International Publishers, 1917), 107. All of Lenin’s primary
source material in this paper comes from this volume. In future reference, the book
publication information will be set aside and the title of his work will be reported.
12
Lenin, 109.
13
Ibid., 111.
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the peoples of Russia to free self-determination.’”14 At the opening of peace
negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks declared self-determination of
nations and anti-annexation polices would be the guiding principles of the
conference and would dictate Russian policy when concluding peace with the
Central Powers.
This belief in self-determination on the side of the Soviets went deeper
than a surface platform used to set the stage peace negotiations. Lenin and Leon
Trotsky, one of Lenin’s right hand men and prominent Soviet leader, firmly
believed in the inevitability of a proletariat revolution in Germany, and hoped
that through their promotion of the “right to succeed” the German socialists
would feel the time had come to initiate the revolution.15 To Lenin, the main
object was not a shortsighted goal to simply end the war and provide selfdetermination to all people, but rather to end the war so that Soviet Russia could
stand as a beacon to other nations to start their own revolutions based on the
practice of self-determination. While Lenin and Trotsky did want to promote the
doctrine of self-determination, their principle aim was the end of their part in the
war, which they hoped would bring about the other. Lenin articulates this point in
his 5th “Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate
Peace”:
All these circumstances taken together are such as to make it perfectly
clear that for the success of socialism in Russia a certain amount of time,
several months at least, will be necessary, during which the hands of the
14
Charles G. Fenwick, “The Russian Peace Treaties,” The American Political
Science Review 12, no. 4 (Nov., 1918): 706.
15
Carr, Volume 3, 20.
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socialist government must be absolutely free to achieve victory over the
bourgeoisie first in our own country and to launch far-reaching mass
organizational work on a wide scale.16
The circumstances to which he is referring are the looming domestic problems
facing the new Russian government.17 In order to face these with the proper
attention and thoughtfulness, Lenin believed that peace should be the first
priority, the attainment of which would lead to the broader aims of the Soviet
Union.
If the Soviet plan worked as they wanted, Trotsky would delay the
Germans and Austrians at Brest-Litovsk long enough for a revolution to break
out in those countries and make the need for peace obsolete:
The hope that underlay Trotsky’s tactics during the ensuing days was
transparently clear. It was time to assume the role, which he had
announced five weeks earlier to the Petrograd Soviet, of ‘prosecutor’ in
the indictment of imperialist diplomacy… If he could sufficiently show
up the insincerity of German professions, and if he could drag out the
proceedings long enough, the eagerly awaited revolution might break out
in Germany before any critical decision had to be taken by the Soviet
Government.18
These designs were not built on empty hopes and vague idealism, but rather in
the fact that Bolshevik agents had been at work in the enemy armies as the
Russians “looked to the establishment of the ‘proletarian revolution’ everywhere.
The propaganda of the soviet agents in the armies of the Central Powers, and
even among their work-people, had been so strong as to be occasion for treaty in
16
Lenin, “Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate Peace,”
17
Lenin, “The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It,” 213.
Carr, 31.
528.
18
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the terms of peace.”19
Germany and Austria-Hungary had vividly contrasting goals with the
Soviets entering the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. From the outset of
WWI, the Germans and Austrians longed for Poland, and revealed it as one of
their primary aims of incorporation during the course of the war. Unabashedly,
Bethmann Hollweg, the Chancellor of Germany through much of WWI, made it
known, “His chief goal throughout the war was a German Mitteleuropa
surrounded by willing vassal states which would include Belgium and Poland.”20
The Kingdom of Saxony, a vassal state in the German Confederation, “expressed
interest… in acquiring title to land in the east, in Poland, and Lithuania.”21 In
addition to the political reasons for the acquisition of Poland, Germany’s leading
military generals, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, desired the territory for military
purposes. “Hindenburg… believed that, in the interest of strategically
maneuverability, the Reich must acquire Poland and the Baltic States.”22
Ludendorff threw his opinion in the mix during a December 1917 meeting with
the Emperor and Foreign Secretary in which he describes the necessity of the
Germans to make it clear to the Russians that a peace treaty would not be
19
“Continental Europe,” Political Science Quarterly Supplement 33, no. 3
(September, 1918): 54. Part of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk included a provision
prohibiting the Russians from disseminating propaganda.
20
Gordon A. Craig, Germany: 1866-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979),
365.
21
Ibid., 359.
22
Craig, 363.
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concluded without at least the German annexation of western Poland.23
In addition to Germany’s war aims, Austria-Hungary had separate
reasons to desire the annexation of Poland. For their part, Austria-Hungary’s
previous relations with the Poles during the first four partitions were relatively
kind, even granting them some semblance of self-determination. In 1867, Poles
were able to rise economically, educationally, and socially within the AustriaHungarian empire, aspects that had been denied them up to that point,
particularly with the issue of education.24 During the course of the war a few
events happened which shaped their war policy, as Clifford Wargelin explains:
“Two previously neglected facts shaped the war aims that determined AustriaHungary's destiny in the crucial winter of 1917-18: namely, the acute shortage of
food in Cisleithania (the Austrian half of the Monarchy) and the demands of the
military alliance with Germany.”25 Wargelin continues his analysis by stating that
Austria’s interest in Poland can be explained by,
…The privileged position of the Poles who lived in Galicia in the
Habsburg ethnic hierarchy. The loyalty of Galicia's Polish Aristocracy to
the dynasty stemmed from its recognition of Polish political and
economic dominance over the Ukrainians of the eastern part of the
province. The acquisition of Congress Poland was thus conceived as a
token concession to nationalism that might strengthen Cisleithania by
23
Craig, 389. It should be noted here that when Ludendorff mentions the western
half of Poland, he is not meaning the western half owned by German before the war, but
the western half of Congress Poland, the partition left for “self-governance” by the Poles
themselves. This also does not mean Germany wanted to leave any part of Poland to selfgovernance as they planned on leaving the eastern partition of the territory to the disposal
of Austria-Hungary.
24
M.B., 8.
25
Clifford F. Wargelin, “A High Price for Bread: The First Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
and the Break-up of Austria-Hungary,” The International History Review 19, no. 4
(November, 1997): 758.
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weakening the obstructionist Czechs without provoking the Magyars in
Hungary.26
Combined, these caused Austria-Hungary to make the acquisition of Congress
Poland one of their primary war aims as early as the autumn of 1914.27
The Central Powers wanted an end to the war on the Eastern front so
they could redirect those forces into the fray in the west, where they were in
desperate need of reinforcement. For their part, Germany and Austria had
conquered all of Congress Poland and all of Russian Poland as well, leaving
Russia in an interesting bargaining position, to say the least. With what little
Russia had gained during the course of the war re-conquered by the Central
Powers, the war was effectively over in the East, but troops could not be
remobilized to the western front until an actual peace treaty was signed and
adhered to by both parties. Germany and Austria found themselves wasting
valuable manpower fighting a war already won and now faced a Russian
delegation at Brest-Litovsk advocating a position that would lead to them losing
most of the territory gained.
Ostensibly, Germany had been in favor of Polish independence since the
partition of 1815 when they promised German Poland the right to selfgovernment, in line with the similarly empty promises made by Russia and
Austria-Hungary. This façade of democratization for Poland claimed by the
26
Wargelin, 760 The history of the Magyars interest in self-government goes beyond
the scope of this paper; however it is important to note that the relationship between the
Magyars and the Austrian-Hungarian ruling class is one that plays into the Austrian
decision to not formally acknowledge a policy of self-determination with the Poles during
Brest-Litovsk.
27
Ibid.
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Central Powers continued into the 20th Century, particularly after the conquest of
all of Poland and the fall of the Tsarist regime in Russia. In November of 1916,
both the German and Austrian Emperors released the following manifesto
regarding their stance on Polish independence:
Inspired by firm confidence in a final November 5, victory of their arms
and prompted by a desire 1916 to lead the Polish territories, wrested by
their armies under heavy sacrifices from Russian domination, toward a
happy future, His Majesty the German Emperor and His Imperial
Majesty the Emperor of Austria and Apostolic King of Hungary have
resolved to form of these territories an independent State with a
hereditary monarchy and a constitutional government. The exact
frontiers of the Kingdom of Poland will be outlined later. The new
Kingdom will receive the guarantees needed for the free development of
its own forces by a union with the two allied Powers. The glorious
traditions of the Polish armies of the past and the memory of the brave
Polish comrades in arms in the great war of our days shall continue to
live in your own national army. The organization, instruction and
command of this army will be arranged by common agreement.28
Whether or not the emperors actually would have acted in accordance with this
proclamation is doubtful for a few reasons. First, nothing in the history of Austria
and Germany’s interaction with Poland lends any credence to this particular
manifesto. The partitions of Poland among Russia, Austria, and Prussia described
earlier are clear evidence as to the condescending view those countries had
toward the Poles and their right to self-govern. Second, the actions of Austria and
Germany after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, namely the fact that
they took away the right of the Poles to choose their own government through a
plebiscite, shows that they had no intention of fulfilling any promises made to the
Polish people. In fact, by May of 1918 the “Colonization Committee of the
28
Lewinski, 603.
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Prussian Bundesrat” advocated in favor of “a resolution… calling for
expropriation and German colonization in Prussia’s Poland province.”29
In addition to the German, Austrian, and Russian stances on Polish
Independence, the Triple Entente had two distinct aims: first, the proclamation of
Wilson’s 14 points and second, the possible conclusion of a separate peace treaty
with Austria-Hungary, both of which contributed to the Allies eventually
declining to attend the Brest-Litovsk conference.30 Wilson’s thirteenth point
stated:
An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be
assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and
economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by
international covenant.31
This announcement by America came directly in the middle of the Brest-Litovsk
peace talks and was, of course, accepted with much excitement by the Poles.
Russia extended an offer to open up the Brest-Litovsk talks with the Entente so
as to bring a quick end to the war. Things were looking incredibly favorable for
the development of an independent Poland by the end of the year: they had a
powerful ally in Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary had released a statement
not more than a year and a half ago stating their commitment to an independent
Poland, and now the United States boldly declared that for them to accept peace,
a free Poland would have to be included. In addition to the American stance on
29
“Brief Peace Notes,” The Advocate of Peace (1894-1920) 80, no.5 (May, 1918):
150.
30
Wargelin, 761.
Woodrow Wilson, “14 Points,” The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. A.S. Link
Volume 40 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966-98), 538.
31
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Polish independence, Great Britain, in a note to the Russian Provisional
Government, stated their solidarity with Russia’s attitude in favor of a free
Poland declaring “These are the aims for which the British peoples are
fighting.”32
In December of 1917, an official armistice was signed between Russia
and the Central Powers that would allow for the imminent peace talks to occur
without needless bloodshed on the front lines.33 From this point, the negotiations
moved forward with Trotsky playing his self-appointed role as “prosecutor” and
Count Ottokar Czernin and Minister Kuhlmann representing the capitalistic
countries of Austria-Hungary and Germany respectively. Although Czernin and
Kuhlmann initially agreed with the Russian policies, they never really intended
on following through with the policy of self-determination for a couple reasons.
First, if Czernin were to open the floor to talks of “self-determination of nations”
for the Poles, he would have to acknowledge the long-standing request of the
Magyars for national autonomy as well, something he could not do.34 Second, the
Germans were quite set off by Wilson’s assumption of America’s role in the
conflict, particularly Wilson’s 13th point that addressed the Polish Question.
German Chancellor Count Georg von Hertling responded to Wilson’s proposal in
a positive manner, but specifically pointed out the president’s failure to
understand the depth of the conflict between Poland and her neighboring
32
“Note from the Russian Provisional Government and the British Reply Respecting
the Allied War Aims,” The American Journal of International Law 11, no. 4 (October,
1917): 174.
33
“Continental Europe,” 53.
34
Wargelin, 767.
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superpowers. He addressed the German Reichstag in the following manner:
I will say a word regarding Poland, in behalf of which the Entente and
President Wilson have recently appeared specially to interest themselves,
as a country liberated from oppressive independence of Tsarist Russia by
the united forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary, for the purpose of
establishing an independent State, which, in unrestricted development of
its national culture, shall at the same time become a pillar of peace in
Europe.
The constitutional problem - in the narrower sense the question what
constitution the new State shall receive - could not, as is easily
understood, be immediately decided, and is still in the stage of
exhaustive discussions between the three countries concerned.35
In the rest of his speech, Hertling makes it clear that he believes Wilson to be
thoroughly undereducated in European history, politics, and ethnic issues and
that American intrusion on this particular concern is unwelcome.
Lenin, who at this point still believed in an imminent revolution in
Germany, allowed the Soviet Government to send a request to the Allies to
participate in the peace talks. In the interim, Czernin and Kuhlmann accepted the
Russian doctrine of self-determination, but only on two conditions: first, the
allied powers would have to follow the principle of self-determination
themselves and apply it to their own annexed territories. This included the
nations of Ireland, Egypt, India, Mesopotamia, Madagascar and Indo-China.
These countries were all colonies of Great Britain or France that had strong
nationality movements for independence and self-government that had been
ignored by their suzerain masters for, in some cases, hundreds of years. And
35
Count Georg von Hertling, "Count Georg von Hertling on President Wilson's
Addendum to the Fourteen Points, 25 February, 1918," First World
War.com, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/fourteenpoints_hertling2.htm (accessed
December 21, 2012).
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second, the question of self-determination would be treated as an internal
question to be dealt with by the state and not by an international body. These
terms were unacceptable to the Allies and so they declined to enter into the talks
with Russia and the Central Powers. The rejection of the Allies to travel to BrestLitovsk for peace negotiations signaled a major turning point for the policies of
the Soviets. Edward H. Carr states,
The failure of the peace decree to evoke any response from the western
allies and the pressing need, in spite of this failure, to end the war with
Germany first forced on the Soviet leaders the conception of a policy
directed to meet the national interests and national requirements. From
this point onwards, a certain duality appeared in Soviet foreign policy.36
The insistence of the Austrian delegation to stand by their German partner
actually came as a bit of a shock to the Allies as they had planned on attempting
to settle a separate peace agreement with Austria-Hungary in an attempt to
undermine the power base of the Central Powers. Wargelin writes, “As late as the
first months of 1918, the US, British, and French governments assumed that
Austria-Hungary could be coaxed out of its alliance with Germany with offers of
a separate peace and territorial gains.”37 With the breakdown of these talks and
Austria’s continued cohesive relationship with Germany, the Allies permanently
exited of this round of peace talks.
A bleak outlook on the Brest-Litovsk talks fell upon the Russian
delegation at the news of the Allied refusal to attend the conference, but it was
about to get worse. While Germany and Austria had played their cards regarding
36
37
Carr, 20.
Wargelin, 761.
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the Allies, they had yet to fully reveal their demands and designs for Poland. Carr
posits, “It was not till January… that the blunt but intelligent soldier Hoffmann
cut short the talk by placing a map on the table. It showed a blue line behind
which the German armies had no intention of withdrawing until Russian
demobilization was complete. The line virtually left the whole of Polish…
territory on the German side.”38 When Russia realized the intensity of the
German war aims, Lenin and Trotsky were forced to rethink their own approach
to the problem. This resulted in Lenin’s publication of the “Theses on the
Question of Conclusion of a Separate Peace,” in which he systematically goes
through all the events leading up to the demands of the Central Powers and
discusses the options available. His 7th Thesis details the dawn of comprehension
that hit Lenin once the real game plan of the Central Powers was revealed:
The peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk have by now – January 7, 1918
– made it perfectly clear that the war party has undoubtedly gained the
upper hand in the German Government and has virtually already
presented Russia with an ultimatum (and it is to be expected, most
certainly to be expected, that any day now it will be presented formally).
The ultimatum is as follows: either the continuation of the war, or a
peace with annexations, i.e., peace on condition that we surrender all the
territory we have occupied, while the Germans retain all the territory
they have occupied and impose upon us an indemnity…39
The Soviets quickly found themselves between a rock and hard place after their
issued statements regarding the self-determination and anti-annexation clauses
they required in exchange for peace. This caused Lenin great grief, because he
did not want to go against the principles he believed were foundational to
38
39
Carr, 31-32.
Lenin, 528-529.
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socialism, but at the same time he believed that in order for socialism to flourish,
a strong example was needed for the world to follow. Lenin’s utilitarian approach
to the problem is clearly seen in his rationale for eventually accepting the
German terms and giving up the Russian claim to Poland. His 14th and 15th
Theses reveal a downtrodden Lenin, faced with the reality that his troops would
not be able or willing to launch another attack against the Germans in the eastern
front.40
The Russian plan for the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference could not have
gone worse for the Soviet delegation. Not only did the Allies not enter into the
talks to give the Russians a much-needed military presence, their plan for a
democratic peace based on national self-rule was a complete failure, along with
their attempt to spark the international fire of revolution. Carr sums up the Soviet
fallings, “The German Government, like the allies, had rejected all proposals for
a ‘just, democratic peace’: and the German soldiers, far from rising against their
masters to consummate the proletarian revolution, were preparing to march
obediently against revolutionary Russia.”41 Russia found itself alone in its
negotiations with the Central Powers because Count Czernin had stipulated that
if the Allies did not agree to his terms, the talks would continue without Russian
allies. This forced Lenin to conclude, that “to make peace at whatever cost would
in the long run be the best advertisement for world revolution: ‘The example of a
socialist Soviet republic in Russia will stand as a living model for the peoples of
40
41
Lenin, 531-532.
Carr, 32.
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all countries.’”42
New terms were issued from Germany that included a disbandment of
the Russian army, the immediate docking of her entire naval fleet, and the
unfettered agreement to give up her claims to Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and
portions of Livonia and Estonia.43 The Bolsheviks responded with the position,
“The Soviet Socialist Republic cannot wage a war when the obviously
overwhelming majority of the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers who
elect deputies to the Soviets are against the war.”44 On February 18, 1918, Lenin
drafted a message to the German government that read: “The Council of People’s
Commissars expresses its readiness, if the German Government should formulate
its precise terms, to reply within 12 hours whether or not these terms are
acceptable.”45 On March 3rd, a peace agreement was finally signed, and the war
between Russia and the Central powers was over.46
The Germans and Austrians were more than ecstatic, accomplishing all
of their aims in the eastern front, including gaining the ability to govern the
prized territory of Poland. In his history of Germany, Gordon Craig details the
elation of the Central Powers at the news of the victory at Brest-Litovsk:
The Supreme Command had its way… at Brest-Litovsk, where the terms
imposed upon the Bolsheviks… were such as to satisfy the wildest
dreams of the Fatherland party. Russia lost Poland, Lithuania, Courland,
and western Livonia with Riga and the islands, and was forced to
42
Carr, 34.
Fenwick, 708.
44
Lenin, 557.
45
Lenin, “Draft Wireless Message to the Government of the German Reich,” 553.
46
“Continental Europe” 53.
43
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evacuate parts of the Caucasus and the rest of Livonia, Estonia, and
Finland and to recognize the anti-Bolshevik government that had been
set up in the Ukraine.47
Although the treaty specifically stated, “Russia refrains from all interference in
the internal relations of these territories. Germany and Austria-Hungary purpose
to determine the future status of these territories in agreement with their
population,”48 Craig posits, “it was clear that there was little likelihood of their
enjoying real independence if Germany won the war.”49
Ultimately, the policy pursued by Lenin and Trotsky in their attempt to
globalize the Soviet movement failed because of a few key factors. First, they
overestimated the “ripeness” of Germany for a social revolution. This was
perhaps their key mistake as their entire plan depended upon the overthrow of the
German bourgeoisie and a war of social revolution to take over Central Europe.
Second, their armies were too weak and too unprepared to instigate this war of
social change let alone hold the line of the Eastern front. Thirdly, Lenin followed
a utilitarian policy that put the survival of Russia over the importance of the
“right to succeed” of other nations because he firmly believed that Soviet Russia
had to continue in order for others to follow her path. His gamble, however, did
not pay off. Poland was annexed into Germany and Austria, Russia was forced to
disband her army, and there was no sight of any social revolution on the horizon.
In August of 1918 the Soviet government made one last attempt to promote self-
47
Craig, 391.
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Article III.
49
Craig, 391.
48
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determination and issued a decree that stated:
All treaties and acts concluded by the government of the former Russian
Empire with the government of the kingdom of Prussia or of the AustroHungarian Empire concerning Poland, in view of their compatibility with
the principle of the self-determination of nations and with the
revolutionary sense of right of the Russian people, which recognizes the
indefeasible right of the Polish people to independence and unity, are
hereby irrevocably rescinded.50
Strongly worded, this decree came only after Germany and Austria could no
longer mount a retaliatory attack against Russia for her arrogance and really
meant nothing other than a moral victory for Lenin. The stubbornness of the
German and Austrian delegations against the Russian “demands for peace” and
the failure of the Soviet strategy to pan out led to the stark change in Soviet
policy away from the traditional doctrine of self-determination of nations.
50
Carr, Volume 1, 287.
168