THE NEXUS BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND EXTREMIST GROUPS IN LATIN
AMERICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ACQUISITION
by
Jenna R. Frost
A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
[Subject]
Committee:
A. Trevor Thrall, Director
Suzanne M. Robbins, Committee Member
Jimmie Jacobs, Committee Member
A. Trevor Thrall, Program Director
Deborah Boehm-Davis, Dean, College of
Humanities and Social Science
Date:
Spring Semester 2014
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
The Nexus Between Criminal and Extremist Groups in Latin America: Implications for
Unconventional Weapons Acquisition
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University
by
Jenna R. Frost
Doctor of Chiropractic
Texas Chiropractic College, 1981
Director: A. Trevor Thrall, Professor
Biodefense
Spring Semester 2014
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
This work is licensed under a creative commons
attribution-noderivs 3.0 unported license.
ii
DEDICATION
This is dedicated to my wonderful husband Richard for whom no amount of appreciation
is enough for his complete love, understanding, and patience. This dissertation is also
dedicated to my mother Jeneva Akin Lewis, PhD who instilled in me the value of
learning and education, and my father Joseph Lewis who taught me the importance of
persistence and dedication. I would like to thank Dr. Denise Baken who has provided me
with invaluable guidance and support throughout this process. No amount of words can
adequately describe the appreciation I have for her assistance.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Drs. Thrall, Robbins, and Jacobs for their guidance and counsel.
You were invaluable to me throughout this process.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
List of Tables .................................................................................................................... vii
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. viii
List of Equations ................................................................................................................ ix
List of Abbreviations .......................................................................................................... x
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ xiii
Chapter One: Introduction .................................................................................................. 1
Chapter Two: Literature Review ........................................................................................ 4
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 4
Theory and Framework ................................................................................................... 6
Factors Influencing Interest in Unconventional Weapons .............................................. 8
Extremist Groups' Interest in Unconventional Weapons .............................................. 10
Collaborative Relationships .......................................................................................... 15
Business Needs Promoting Collaboration ..................................................................... 17
The Collaborative Incubator of Latin America ............................................................. 18
Collaboration within the Drug trade.............................................................................. 19
Collaborative Criminal Activities ................................................................................. 20
Specific Cases of Criminal Group Involvement in Smuggling and Trafficking ........... 21
Social Network Analysis ............................................................................................... 27
Chapter Three: Methodology ............................................................................................ 30
Principles of Social Network Analysis ......................................................................... 30
Networks ....................................................................................................................... 32
Components for Analysis of Social Networks .............................................................. 33
Representation of Social Network Data ........................................................................ 34
Network metrics ............................................................................................................ 36
Analysis of Criminal and Extremist Networks ............................................................. 39
Population...................................................................................................................... 41
v
Data Collection .............................................................................................................. 43
Research Design ............................................................................................................ 45
Chapter Four: Results ....................................................................................................... 51
Extremist capability....................................................................................................... 51
Criminal-Extremist Relationships ................................................................................. 55
Pathways........................................................................................................................ 64
Critical Entities.............................................................................................................. 73
Chapter Five: Discussion .................................................................................................. 81
Findings and Discussion................................................................................................ 81
Interest ........................................................................................................................... 82
Critical Entities.............................................................................................................. 87
Limitations of the Study ................................................................................................ 88
Direction for Future Study ............................................................................................ 89
Chapter Six: Conclusion ................................................................................................... 92
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 92
Findings ......................................................................................................................... 92
Implications ................................................................................................................... 93
Contributions of the Study ............................................................................................ 96
Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 96
Appendix One: Actors and Affiliations ........................................................................ 97
Appendix Two: Extremist Affiliations ........................................................................... 102
Appendix Three: Criminal and Extremist Organizations and Affiliations ..................... 105
Appendix Four: Definitions ............................................................................................ 109
References ....................................................................................................................... 113
vi
LIST OF TABLES
Table
Page
Table 1 Network Analysis Levels ..................................................................................... 34
Table 2 Sociomatrix Example ........................................................................................... 36
Table 3 Common Network Metrics .................................................................................. 37
Table 4 Common Node Metrics ........................................................................................ 38
Table 5: Characteristics of Selected Extremist Groups .................................................... 41
Table 7 Examples of Data Types Collected ...................................................................... 44
Table 8 Category Type and Information Collected .......................................................... 45
Table 9: Actor and Entity Relationship Weights .............................................................. 46
Table 10 Cluster Composition Resulting from Newman's Clustering Algorithm ............ 57
Table 11 Criminal and Extremist Illicit Activities by Cluster .......................................... 59
Table 12: Cohesion by Cluster .......................................................................................... 60
Table 13 High Betweenness Actors to Other Clusters ..................................................... 62
Table 14 Pathway Scores .................................................................................................. 67
Table 15 Al Qaeda Direct Contact and Criminal Intermediary Pathways ........................ 68
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
Page
Figure 1 Centrality, Closeness: Agent x Agent ................................................................ 53
Figure 2 Centrality, Eigenvector: Agent x Agent ............................................................. 55
Figure 3 Composition of Cluster Actors from Newman's Grouping Algorithm .............. 56
Figure 4 Centrality, Betweenness: Agent x Agent........................................................... 61
Figure 5: Centrality, Betweenness: Entity x Entity .......................................................... 62
Figure 6 Centrality, Eigenvector: Agent x Agent ............................................................. 63
Figure 7: Centrality, Eigenvector: Entity x Entity ............................................................ 64
Figure 8: Entity-to-Entity Criminal Network ................................................................... 65
Figure 9 Centrality, Betweenness: Entity x Entity............................................................ 66
Figure 10 Centrality, Total Degree: Entity x Entity ......................................................... 74
Figure 11 Centrality, Betweenness: Entity x Entity.......................................................... 75
Figure 12 Criminal Pathways............................................................................................ 76
Figure 13 Pathways with Harb and Makled Removed ..................................................... 77
Figure 14 Pathways with Harb, Makled, and Da Costa Removed.................................... 78
Figure 15 Pathways with Bout Removed.......................................................................... 79
Figure 16 Pathways with Barerra-Barerra Removed ........................................................ 80
viii
LIST OF EQUATIONS
Equation
Page
Equation 1 Betweenness Centrality .................................................................................. 40
Equation 2 Closeness Centrality ....................................................................................... 40
Equation 3 Eigenvector Centrality .................................................................................... 40
Equation 4 Degree Centrality............................................................................................ 41
ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia..............................................................AUC
Central Intelligence Agency.........................................................................CIA
Drug Enforcement Agency...........................................................................DEA
Drug trafficking
organization..................................................................................................DTO
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna.................................................................................ETA
Federal Bureau of Investigation....................................................................FBI
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia..........................................FARC
National Liberation Army.............................................................................ELN
x
ABSTRACT
THE NEXUS BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND EXTREMIST GROUPS IN LATIN
AMERICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ACQUISITION
Jenna R. Frost, Ph.D.
George Mason University, 2014
Dissertation Director: Dr. A. Trevor Thrall
This dissertation reveals relationships between criminal and extremist groups in
Latin America to determine which relationships enable extremists to acquire
unconventional weapons or weapons material using criminal network pathways. The
research is based on a holistic approach to examine proliferation pathways enabled
through networked relationships. Social network analysis is used as the methodological
approach to identify key relationships in the network. Data collected for the study were
obtained from journal articles, congressional testimony, U.S. government reports, U.N.
documents, and news sources for the time frame covered in the dissertation 1998-2013.
This research shows the importance of understanding the ramifications of relationships
between criminal and extremist groups in Latin America and their impact on security
issues for the United States.
xiii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Latin America is a microcosm of unlikely alliances between indigenous and
transnational non-state groups and their global networks. A myriad of indigenous and
transnational criminal and extremist groups take advantage of the ineffective security in
the region and the endemic corruption of public officials to engage in profitable illicit
activities as a means of financial support. Engagement in the same activities and use of
the same facilitators serve as avenues for contact and collaboration. Conventional
wisdom states that collaboration between criminal and extremist groups is unlikely
because criminal groups are profit driven and extremist groups are politically driven (L.
Shelley & Picarelli, 2002). However, open source literature indicates that collaboration
does occur, initiated by world events.
With the conclusion of the Cold War, extremist groups were compelled to identify
alternative funding mechanisms and seek collaborative relationships capable of providing
reliable streams of income. No longer were extremist groups' state sponsors reliable
economic backers (Cornell, 2007). Following the events of September 11, 2001 the
international community instituted programs to impede state sponsors' ability to provide
funding avenues to their proxies, further exacerbating extremists' abilities to procure
income (Cornell 2007). As a result, extremist groups expanded beyond their traditional
sources of income through unconventional funding mechanisms and relationships. By
1
collaborating with criminal groups, extremists gain access to sustainable funding sources
and opportunities to acquire other commodities.
They also gain access to criminal groups' networks of members and contacts.
Some of these criminal groups have been known to traffic in unconventional weapons
material through attempted sales or by adding weapons material to their list of acceptable
commodities to traffic. Using criminal groups' established and trusted collaborative
relationships, extremist groups gain opportunities to use the services of criminal groups'
global networks for financial gain or for acquiring commodities to further the groups'
short- and long-term goals.
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the implications of criminal and
extremist groups' business relationships in Latin America and the way in which those
relationships contribute to acquisition of unconventional weapons materials. Social
network analysis served as the methodology employed to examine this issue. Through
social network analysis, one may identify key groups and relationships, and determine
which illicit activities are causes for concern. Three main arguments developed through
this methodology comprise the dissertation. First, extremist groups' capability to acquire
weapons materials should be based on the groups' organizational and military abilities, in
addition to the groups' religious ideologies and stated expression of intent of weapons
usage. Second, drug trafficking is the key illicit activity used to establish relationships
between criminal and extremist groups; those relationships are at the group rather than at
the individual level. Third, drug trafficking has a role in the pathway for extremist to
acquire weapons materials using criminal groups' global networks. The arguments show
2
that drug trafficking is not just an illicit, profitable activity but has implications for
diverse relationship development and can result in engaging in activities with security
consequences. Finally, the dissertation seeks to determine which extremist groups in
Latin America are the most capable of acquiring weapons materials using their business
relationships with criminals to access criminal groups' global networks.
3
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter contains an overview of the literature surveyed for the study,
beginning with the introduction to the problem, which gives rise to the theories servings
as a framework for the dissertation. Next is the review of the literature used to examine
extremist interest in unconventional weapons or weapons materials, collaborative
criminal and extremist group relationships, illicit activities in which criminal and
extremist groups engage, and criminal group involvement in trafficking cases.
Concluding the chapter is an overview of the use of social network analysis by the law
enforcement and intelligence communities.
Introduction
World leaders have been concerned about the possibility of extremist groups
gaining access to unconventional weapons and weapons materials at least since the
1990s. Dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s not only affected citizens within the
country but resulted in unease among global leaders about the security of the former
Soviet Union's unconventional weapons, materials, and stockpiles. Their concern was
that the turmoil created by the dissolution would distract Russia and their former satellite
states' from properly safeguarding their extensive biological, chemical, and nuclear
weapons and stockpiles (Rensselaer Lee, 2003). Because Russia and its former Soviet
4
states had conducted research into the development of unconventional weapons, global
leaders were concerned on two fronts. They were concerned (a) that the materials and
stockpiles would be targets for diversion or theft by criminal or extremist groups and (b)
that criminal groups would obtain the materials or weapons and transfer them to
extremist groups for construction of unconventional weapons (Grier, 2001). Criminal
cases involving nuclear and radiological trafficking cases were validation of the global
communities' fears (P. L. Williams, 2005). These trafficking cases served to focus the
global communities' concern that criminal groups could directly or indirectly facilitate
acquisition of materials or weapons and provide them to extremist groups (Auerswald,
2007).
The global communities' disquiet, which continued well after the Soviet Union's
dissolution, has grown in recent decades. On September 28, 2001 the U.N. CounterTerrorism Committee met to observe the 10th anniversary of the Security Council's
passage of resolution 1373. With this resolution, the Security Council called for
measures to combat global terrorism highlighting the U.N.'s apprehension about criminal
acquisition of unconventional weapons and weapons' materials (Nations, 2001b). In their
statement on the observance of the passage of the resolution, the committee expressed its
concern about the existence of “the close connection between terrorism and transnational
organized crime, including trafficking of illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms
trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially
deadly materials.” (Nations, 2001a). More than a decade later, the worry expressed by
the committee has aligned with a greater anxiety among the global community about the
5
implications of relationships between criminal and extremist groups. President Barack
Obama addressed these concerns in his speech to the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in
Seoul, South Korea, stating that progress was being made on preventing nuclear
proliferation. However, he also expressed concern that extremists and criminals were
continuing to pursue nuclear material ("President notes progress on anti-nuclear terror
efforts," 2012).
The implications of criminal and extremist relationships for weapons acquisition
have continued to vex researchers because of the limited data available exploring
criminal group involvement in trafficking cases and the limited literature indicating
criminal groups assist extremist groups in acquisition. The data that are available have
been sufficient for some researchers to conclude criminal group involvement in
trafficking cases. However, data to indicate that criminal groups have provided
extremists with any type of weapons or weapons materials has been limited. Because no
available research or data directly links criminals providing extremist groups with
unconventional weapons or weapons' materials, authors and researchers have had to
formulate theories based on prior research and available data.
Theory and Framework
The theory used to ground this dissertation and serve as a framework for the
study was derived from the literature and limited prior research concerning the main
arguments employed in this study. A survey of the literature revealed an extensive body
of literature and theories on criminal and extremist group collaboration. Opinions
differed as to the characteristics of their collaborations. For example, some of the authors
6
subscribed to the theory of "confluence and convergence", others believed that the groups
morph from one group type to another (Hubschle, 2011). Despite these differences in
opinion, the one main consensus among the authors was that collaboration does exist,
with Latin America frequently mentioned by authors as an example of a region where
significant collaboration in illicit activities occurs. Collaboration in illicit activities can
be an initial step in collaboration into other more serious realms with national security
implications. The literature and data contained information on criminal group
involvement in unconventional weapons material trafficking cases and details of criminal
and extremist group collaborations in a multitude of illicit activities, resulting in some
researchers theorizing that criminal groups are likely pathways or facilitators for
extremists' access to unconventional weapons or materials. The literature on criminal
extremist relationships and the potential for criminal group involvement in trafficking
cases also resulted in some authors hypothesizing that criminal groups are likely
facilitators for unconventional weapons or materials acquisition because the criminal
groups surmise that the profit potential is high. Although no evidence was found to
document this facilitation, some authors theorized that engagement in common illicit
activities and the opportunities for financial gain can potentially encourage new areas of
collaboration.
Extremist groups engaged in collaborative illicit activities require sufficient
infrastructure and organizational capacities to operate their illicit businesses profitably.
These groups could conceivably use these operational elements to gain access to
unconventional weapons or materials. Limited research existed on extremist group
7
characteristics influencing their decision to acquire and deploy unconventional weapons.
However, one recent study on factors affecting groups' decisions revealed that the groups'
military and organizational structure plays more of a role in their decision making
processes than does religion, as had been previously thought (Asal, Ackerman, &
Rethemeyer, 2012).
These theories served as the basis for development of the framework for this
study in which Latin America was shown as being a base for diverse groups to intersect
through criminal activity, giving impetus to collaboration in a host of illicit activities.
Illicit activities, especially the drug trade, have offered opportunities for criminal and
extremist groups to engage in those high-profit activities that ensure steady income
streams. Extremist groups choosing to engage in illicit activities have not been limited
by their ideologies and have understood that by engaging in high-profit illicit activities,
they can perpetuate their groups and, thus, fulfill their goals and objectives. Engagement
in high-profit illicit activities has also necessitated that these groups have established
organizational structures sufficient to ensure the full functioning of their business
activities. As criminals and extremists engage in illicit activities, especially the drug
trade, they have become part of a community in which the players and their levels of
knowledge and skills are known. This greater community has afforded opportunities for
collaboration in their respective areas and for extremist groups to tap into a global
network of contacts they can use to accomplish their groups' objectives.
Factors Influencing Interest in Unconventional Weapons
8
The literature showed that one should consider a number of factors when
examining the potential for extremist groups to use unconventional weapons, and any
combination of which may affect these groups' decision. Many experts believed that
religion is a factor in determining if an extremist group will seek to acquire material or
weapons and to what degree they will do so (Parachini, 2003). However, in a study by
Asal, Ackerman, and Rethemeyer conducted to determine which influential factors affect
an extremist group's decision to use unconventional weapons, they found that religious
ideology does not forecast an extremist group's pursuit or use of such a weapon (Asal et
al., 2012). The authors concluded the size and capability of an organization have more
impact on such decisions (Asal et al., 2012). Asal et. al (2012) drew on data obtained
from the Monterrey WMD Terrorism database on extremist groups who have used or
attempted to use unconventional weapons during 1995-2005.
The data showed that three religiously centered ideological groups (Al Qaeda,
Hamas, Hezbollah) and two politically centered groups (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna [ETA]
and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia [FARC]) had used or tried to use
unconventional weapons. According to the database, ETA, FARC, and Hamas had
effectively used unconventional weapons; Al Qaeda and Hezbollah had attempted to use
unconventional weapons (Asal et al., 2012). Perhaps with the exception of ETA, the
other significant extremist groups in the database Al Qaeda, FARC, Hamas, and
Hezbollah have the size, infrastructure and organizational capacity to acquire and deploy
unconventional weapons.
9
Both Kibaroglu and Parachini argued interest in unconventional weapons is only
one indicator and should not be the sole identifier of an extremist group's potential to use
unconventional weapons or the threat they pose (Kıbaroğlu, 2009; Parachini, 2003).
Extremist groups might deliberately hide their desires to use unconventional weapons to
conceal their true motives or to avoid drawing undue attention to their actual desires or
capabilities. Additionally, extremist groups that initially eschewed the use of
unconventional weapons might change their tactics and decide that the use of
unconventional weapons may be needed to fulfill their goals. Kibaroglu posited that the
capability to use unconventional weapons is derived not only from an extremist group's
known intent but also from its military capabilities. He argued that basing their
capability solely on known intent may result in obfuscating the groups' true capability
(Kıbaroğlu, 2009). Parachini, whose views align with the findings of Asal et al. (2012),
noted that additional factors for determining the use of unconventional weapons are the
views held by the group and the group's technical ability (Parachini, 2003).
Extremist Groups' Interest in Unconventional Weapons
Examination of the existing literature revealed documentation of extremist groups'
interest in acquiring unconventional weapons and material. Al Qaeda was identified as
one such group. Its interest in unconventional weapons and material has been well
documented and extensively explored beginning, with Osama bin Laden's proclamation
in 1998 that it was his duty to obtain and use a weapon of mass destruction (MowattLarssen, 2010):
10
"Acquiring [WMD] weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I
have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I
seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims
not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on
Muslims." (Auerswald, 2007).
Hamas and Hezbollah issued similar statements when they declared that these
weapons are acceptable if used to destroy Israel (Friedman, 2012). Land reported that
individuals with differing theological and ideological affiliations who met together
agreed with the acceptability of using any form of unconventional weapon and of
associating with any type of individual as long as those individuals could facilitate jihad
(Land, 2003). Bin Laden held the similar belief that these types of weapons offered the
chance to destroy the West's domination and global influence to enable the establishment
of a caliphate (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). The literature suggested that Bin Laden
attempted to carry through with his goals to secure material and build a weapons
program.
The focus in the bulk of the literature was Al Qaeda because that group has
expressed a desire for unconventional weapons and has shown its capability to conduct
lethal and high-profile attacks. Reports from the CIA and others indicated that Al Qaeda
pursued the goal of purchasing material and strengthening the group's weapons programs.
Both Gunaratna and Perl stated that Al Qaeda made several attempts to buy enriched
uranium, including attempts to purchase uranium from South African sources (Gunaratna,
2002; Perl, 2003). Its weapons program was not limited to research involving biological
11
and chemical agents; it also included nuclear and radiological research and development.
Al Qaeda pursued research and development of dirty bombs and of ways to increase
lethality using a combination of explosives and radiological material (Perl, 2003).
Gunaratna stated that Al Qaeda actively sought to recruit individuals with science and
technical training to assist its nuclear weapons program (Gunaratna, 2002). One such
effort to engage individuals with technical abilities involved the attempted recruitment of
an Egyptian scientist for research on construction of a nuclear bomb (Gunaratna, 2002).
These attempts at recruitment and research showed a high level of intent and capability;
however, other extremist groups' intents and capabilities were not as clearly understood.
Many authors pointed to Hezbollah as another group with the capabilities to
conduct lethal and high-profile attacks. In July 2012, Matthew Olsen, Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center, stated that given Hezbollah's global operations and its
connections with Iran and its leaders, the group should be considered a threat on par with
Al Qaeda (Levitt, 2013). This sentiment has begun to take hold with authors such as
Arena and Rudner who noted Hezbollah's global reach and military capabilities. (Arena,
2006; Rudner, 2010). These two authors believed that because of its financial, logistical
and military acumen, Hezbollah is very capable of deploying unconventional weapons
should they choose to do so (Arena, 2006; Rudner, 2010). Arena proffered that
Hezbollah is one of a handful of extremist groups with the resources, capability, and
global reach to direct and perpetrate an attack on any worldwide target (Arena, 2006).
Hezbollah's military capabilities, according to Rudner, have dramatically increased with
the group's purchase of advanced rockets and surface-to-air missiles (Rudner, 2010).
12
These factors show that Hezbollah's pronouncements and activities deserve to be
examined closely.
Parachini argued that extremist groups from Africa, Eurasia, Latin America, and
the Middle East should be evaluated for their intents and capabilities (Parachini, 2003).
In Latin America, he specifically cited FARC and Hezbollah as targets for extensive
review (Parachini, 2003). Cronin, and Schmid and Wesley concurred that further
scrutiny of groups such as FARC, Hamas, and Hezbollah should be undertaken because
these groups, like Al Qaeda, have the requisite networks of contacts, funds, and
organizational capacities to acquire materials and deploy weapons (Cronin, 2002; Schmid
& Wesley, 2006).
Experts believed that FARC is attempting to expand its arsenal by searching for
asymmetric weapons; these experts felt that FARC is likely to use unconventional
weapons in light of the expansion of "their goals, tactics and methods" (Russell & May,
2008). This concern was validated in 2008 when the Colombian military raided a FARC
camp and found an email in one of the computers they seized that stated FARC had
acquired 50 kilograms of uranium ("Colombia Seeks to Keep Nuke Material Out of Rebel
Hands," 2010). Reports indicated Raul Reyes, a senior FARC member, traveled to
Romania in 2008 to purchase enriched uranium from a representative of Semyon
Yukovich Mogilevich, a leader of Solntsevo, a Russian organized crime group ("FARC
Seeking Uranium for a Dirty Bomb," 2008; Galca, 2008).
FARC was suspected in two other cases of using forms of unconventional
weapons material. In the first case, FARC was thought to have equipped its weapons
13
with some form of chemical agent (Bartolome & Espona, 2002; Parachini, 2003). In the
second case, FARC was suspected of attacking a police installation with hand grenades
equipped with explosives and cyanide (Bartolome & Espona, 2002). In conducting
autopsies on the decease policemen, authorities determined that the officers died from
pulmonary edema associated with chemical exposure (Bartolome & Espona, 2002).
These incidents served to underscore the need to examine extremist groups beyond those
with known or stated intent that have the capabilities to obtain unconventional weapons
or weapons materials.
The literature included only limited information on Hamas' interests in chemical
weapons and did not include information on the group's interest in other types of material
and weapons. Stern highlighted Hamas' interest in chemical weapons based on reports
from the CIA that stated Hamas was continuing to improve its ability to handle chemical
weapons and its deployment capability (Stern, 2001). As the existing research showed,
researchers and policymakers argued that attention needs to be directed to other extremist
groups, both Islamic and non-Islamic, that have similar interests in weapons material or
deployment capabilities (Parachini, 2003).
The literature also indicated that the intelligence and law enforcement
communities must not focus solely on one extremist group. Rather, they must expand
their examination to include those organizations with financial and organizational
capabilities, the types of groups that are likely to engage in collaborative relationships
with criminal groups that can be of financial and logistical assistance.
14
Collaborative Relationships
Researchers have thoughtfully examined the degree to which criminals and
extremists are likely to interact and/or collaborate in activities given their divergent
interests. Traditionally, criminals were thought to be profit driven and did not want to
draw undue attention to their activities from law enforcement. Extremists, on the other
hand, had political or ideological objectives to seek better representation of their
constituencies or the replacement of established governments with ones that share their
political objectives or religious beliefs. Although some researchers argued that
extremists will not participate in criminal activity, Fosson argued that extremists use
"taqiyaa" to justify their engagement in criminal activities (Fosson, 2008). A sanctioned
practice "taqiyaa" refers to lying to advance Islam or to keep Muslims from harm.
Extremists use this practice to conceal their true actions, thoughts, and feelings from
those outside their group to accomplish objectives that belie their true selves or motives
(Fosson, 2008). Extremists who practice "taqiyaa" believe God judges them for their
true feelings, not by their actions or behavior, permitting them to engage in illicit
activities to further their cause (Fosson, 2008). In addition, extremists who engage in
"taqiyaa" may collaborate with criminal groups as long as they do so for the purpose of
their greater goals. Nonetheless, extremists might be disinclined to collaborate with
criminal groups because of deeply held ideological reasons or because they have met
their financial needs through charitable donations or state sponsors (Perri & Brody,
2011). Those who do decide to collaborate might do so because they need to sustain
themselves financially or supplement their incomes.
15
Some extremist groups who have transitioned the structure of their organizations
from hierarchical to cellular must sustain themselves by engaging in criminal activity
(Stern, 2003). Because cellular organizations must finance themselves, they might turn
to crime as a means to fund their groups and future attacks. The cell responsible for the
Madrid bombing was frequently cited as an example of a cellular group that used
proceeds from criminal activity, specifically the sale of hashish, to fund its attack
(Gartenstein-Ross & Dabruzzi, 2007; Jacobson & Levitt, 2010). Other groups, such as
Hezbollah, engaged in criminal activity to supplement their incomes to purchase
sophisticated weaponry and to fund future attacks (Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007;
Kaplan, 2005). Incentives for criminals to collaborate were similar to those of extremists.
The quest for profits has become the motivation for extremist groups' associations
with criminal groups. David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs within the U.S. Department of
State, proffered that collaboration can be summed up as largely profit driven (Johnson,
2010). Some criminals might be unconcerned with who their associates are as long as the
profits are high (Johnson, 2010). Others might see collaboration as an opportunity to
charge higher than normal fees for their services because providing services to extremist
groups is deemed high risk (Johnson, 2010). However, criminal groups might also shy
away from collaboration because the potential profit may not be commensurate with the
risks associated with collaboration (Perri & Brody, 2011). Criminal groups might be
unwilling to risk disrupting their relationships with corrupt government officials who
16
may view those collaborative relationships as indirect assistance to extremists (Perri &
Brody, 2011).
Business Needs Promoting Collaboration
Illicit operations have similar business needs to those of licit operations. Thus,
extremist and criminal organizations could be motivated to collaborate because of their
business and skill set needs (Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007; Lal, 2005; Makarenko, 2004;
Perri & Brody, 2011). For example, just as businesses need to ensure they are
functioning optimally and may seek relationships with other businesses or organizations
that can assist them, extremists may need criminals to provide them with access to black
market contacts to acquire unconventional weapons or they may need the services of
trusted institutions to hide the source of their money (Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007; Lal,
2005; Makarenko, 2004; Perri & Brody, 2011). Several authors identified logistical
assistance as a key incentive for collaboration (Fosson, 2008; Lal, 2005; Makarenko,
2004; Perri & Brody, 2011). According to Fosson, such assistance provided by
transnational criminal organizations is invaluable to extremist groups (Fosson, 2008).
Because many criminal groups' operations involve the covert movement of illicit
commodities through established smuggling routes or front companies, extremists can
take advantage of these avenues to move weapons to their members or to move
operatives into the United States (Farah, 2007). Collaborative relationships based on
logistics and skill set needs have been seen most often in regions with ineffective law
enforcement and government oversight.
17
The Collaborative Incubator of Latin America
Collaboration between criminals and extremists has often been observed in
nations or regions with significantly lax law enforcement and endemic corruption,
conditions that exist in much of Latin America. In many of these regions, large
underground economies or illicit markets controlled by criminal groups have emerged,
encouraging collaboration so that extremists can obtain access to potentially closed
markets (Berry et al., 2003; O'Malley, 2006; L. Shelley, 2005). These nations have
frequently evidenced ineffective enforcement of their existing laws and endemic
corruption of law enforcement and government officials, factors that result in
environments in which criminals and extremists can operate without fear of reprisals and,
in some instances, with the assistance of government and law enforcement officials
(Berry et al., 2003; O'Malley, 2006; L. Shelley, 2005). Hutchinson and O'Malley, as well
as a number of other researchers, identified Latin America, specifically the tri-border area
(TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, as a region exhibiting such factors
(Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007). The TBA is infamous for its ineffective law
enforcement and thriving licit and illicit business climate. Both of which are attractive to
criminals and extremists seeking a conducive business climate (Hudson, 2003).
Hutchinson and O'Malley posited that the hospitable conditions within the TBA have
resulted in a myriad of criminal and extremist groups using the region to conduct
business. These groups might also develop cooperative relationships in this region based
on business and financial needs (Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007). Other countries in Latin
America, such as Mexico and Colombia, have had similar problems with corruption
18
among their government officials and the enforcement of their laws. The extensive
production of cannabis, cocaine, and heroin and geographical proximity to important
markets have also been factors in attracting drug trafficking and transnational criminal
and extremist groups to these countries where they form bases and then being forging
cooperative relationships with one another (Hudson, 2003).
Collaboration within the Drug trade
Chawla et al. (2011) asserted that the drug trade is the vehicle that serves to bring
together disparate groups of drug traffickers and criminal and extremist groups (Chawla
et al., 2011). According to the 2011World Drug Report issued by the U. N. Office on
Drugs and Crime, traffickers and criminal groups work cooperatively to establish global
networks to facilitate the buying, selling, and transporting of drugs in multiple countries
and continents (Chawla et al., 2011). Extremists have become engaged in drug
trafficking activities because of their high profit potential. Jacobson and Levitt, citing
statistics from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), stated that 19 of the 43
groups designated as terrorist groups are involved in the global drug trade (Jacobson &
Levitt, 2010). The statistics also revealed that up to 60% of extremist groups with no
official terrorist designation are involved in the drug trade in some capacity (Jacobson &
Levitt, 2010). Al Qaeda, FARC, and Hezbollah have been cited frequently as having
varying degrees of participation in drug trafficking (Gartenstein-Ross & Dabruzzi, 2007;
Hudson, 2003; Jacobson & Levitt, 2010). All three groups initially became involved in
drug-related activities by providing security for drug shipments (Cornell, 2007; Jacobson
& Levitt, 2010; Steinitz, 2002; E. Thomas, 2001).
19
Several authors believed that FARC and Hezbollah were more extensively
involved in drug-related activities than other extremist groups in Latin America
("Authorities After FARC Leaders Involved in Drug Trafficking," 2010; Dishman, 2005;
Jacobson & Levitt, 2010; Steinitz, 2002). These two groups began producing drugs and
conducting their own trafficking operations (Jacobson & Levitt, 2010; Sanderson, 2004;
Steinitz, 2002). Daremblum and Ehrenfeld contended that FARC, Hezbollah, and other
drug trafficking Islamic groups seized on opportunities resulting from their drug-related
activities to establish cooperative relationships with Latin American drug trafficking
groups (Daremblum, 2011; Ehrenfeld, 2006). Drug trafficking organizations, especially
those with global networks, provided extremist groups with an array of opportunities to
increase their access to more drug markets, and to establish contacts for their black
markets (Ortiz, 2002). Once these relationships were established, cooperation in other
illicit activities could occur (Berry et al., 2003).
Collaborative Criminal Activities
Shelley et al. contended that three general areas besides drug trafficking are the
impetuses for criminal and extremist group being introduced to one another and
developing collaborative relationships: the production of fraudulent documents, use of
arms suppliers, and the use of financial specialists and institutions (L. Shelley et al.,
2005). Fraudulent documents are an important tool used by criminals and extremists to
avoid proper identification, to escape government watch lists, and to conceal the nature of
cargo (Gartenstein-Ross & Dabruzzi, 2007). Arms suppliers are typically well connected
and are willing to provide weapons or weapons-related materials to any type of client,
20
including extremist groups (L. Shelley et al., 2005). For example, Mohammad bin Saleh
bin Hmeidi, the leader of a Balkan crime group, willingly supplied weapons to criminal
groups and to diverse extremist clients, including the ETA, Irish Republican Army (IRA),
and Islamic extremist groups (L. Shelley et al., 2005). Similarly, the Italian crime group
Camorra, was willing to enter into an agreement with the ETA to obtain drugs in
exchange for missile launchers and ammunition (L. Shelley et al., 2005). The third area
of likely introduction is the use of the same financial specialists and institutions (L.
Shelley et al., 2005). These individuals and institutions are known for their skill and
discretion in hiding and legitimizing ill-gotten profits making their services highly prized.
Some of the literature suggested that collaboration between criminal and extremist
groups is increasing. Shelley et al. asserted that such collaborations are, "growing deeper
and more complex" (Fosson, 2008; Perri & Brody, 2011; L. Shelley et al., 2005) Fosson
attributed the increasing collaboration to high profits and sustainable income acquired
through criminal activity and drug trafficking. Because of the profitability of criminal
activities and the unabated appetite for drugs, diminished cooperative relationships must
be considered unlikely.
Specific Cases of Criminal Group Involvement in Smuggling and
Trafficking
A review of the literature on trafficking on unconventional weapons materials
shows the majority of cases concern nuclear and radiological materials rather than
biological or chemical. The two cases of biological and chemical trafficking mentioned
in the literature occurred in the former Soviet Union republics (Ouagrham-Gormley,
21
2007). In the first case, individuals in Ukraine attempted to traffic a nonpathogenic form
of the Ebola virus in 2002 (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007). The second case involved
mustard gas trafficking in Georgia in 2003 (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007). Because of
insufficient information, whether the perpetrators were amateurs or members of criminal
groups could not be determined (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007). Determining interest in
biological or chemical materials or a market for such materials exists has also been
hampered by the limited data available, including few reports of incidents involving such
materials.
Reviews of nuclear and radiological trafficking in which criminal groups were
involved were more numerous. Two important reviews examined trafficking incidences
to determine criminal and extremist groups' interest in nuclear and radiological material
(Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007; Zaitseva, 2007). The authors reviewed pre and post-9-11
nuclear and radiological incidents to identify the type of perpetrators involved and the
types of material smuggled. Their data sources included the Database on Nuclear
Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources and three publications by the Center for
Nonproliferation: the NIS Export Control Observer, the International Export Control
Observer, and the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Abstracts (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007;
Zaitseva, 2007). Most of the cases documented involved inexperienced smugglers who
stole low enriched uranium, radioactive isotopes and scrap metal for the value of the
metal housing the material (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007). Both Zaitseva and OuagrhamGormley concluded that criminal groups did have interest in nuclear and radiological
materials and were involved in trafficking of those materials (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007;
22
Zaitseva, 2007). Although criminal groups' involvement in these cases was small, it was
not insignificant. In their review and analysis from the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Schmid and Wesley confirmed Zaitseva's and Ouagrham-Gormley's conclusions
(Schmid & Wesley, 2006).
The literature reflected debate concerning the beginning and degree of criminal
group involvement in trafficking incidences. Most of the literature contended that
criminal groups did not show interest in involving themselves in nuclear and radiological
trafficking in the 1990s at the height of the Soviet Union's dissolution (Schmid &
Wesley, 2006). Some researchers believed that criminal involvement was limited to
inexperienced and opportunistic individuals (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007; Schmid &
Wesley, 2006; Zaitseva, 2007). However, based on their analysis of trafficking cases
during 1999-2005, Schmid and Wesley concluded involvement was small (Schmid &
Wesley, 2006). One concrete example of criminal group involvement was the Italian
mafia's attempted sale of a 10-kilogram fuel rod in 1998 (Measures to Prevent, Intercept
and Respond to Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources, 2001).
Two of the leading agencies collecting data and maintaining databases on
trafficking incidences were the IAEA and Interpol. The IAEA, a United Nations
affiliated organization, has been monitoring use of nuclear-related technology to ensure
the technology is not used for nefarious purposes. The IAEA Incident and Trafficking
Database contains 2,331 incidences of "unauthorized possession and related criminal
activities" between1993 and 2012 related to nuclear or radiological material smuggling or
trafficking (Matishak, 2011; Webb, 2013). The IAEA broadly deemed the incidences as
23
"unauthorized possession" or loss by theft or poor inventory record keeping (Webb,
2013). However, some of the incidents revealed the involvement of sophisticated nuclear
traffickers rather than amateurs seen in some of the smuggling cases (Webb, 2013).
The Interpol database, Project Geiger contains 115 incidents of uranium or
plutonium theft or loss, as well as cases involving theft or loss of similar unconventional
weapons material ("Illicit Trafficking of Nuke Materials Documented: Interpol Chief,"
2012; Lippert, 2008). The agency has documented 30 cases involving radiological
trafficking linked to organized crime (Lippert, 2008). The involvement of criminal
groups in these trafficking cases has resulted in increasing alarm concerning their roles in
the process.
Several authors described the trafficking process as entailing three stages, each
with a distinct role. The first stage is that of the supplier, the individual with access to the
materials and the ability to acquire them (Hastings, 2012; Zaitseva & Hand, 2003).
These individuals may be current or former military members, civilian employees, or
individuals with access to facilities where the material is available (Hastings, 2012;
Zaitseva & Hand, 2003). The second stage is that of intermediary between the supplier
and buyer, a role associated with criminal groups (Hastings, 2012; Zaitseva & Hand,
2003). The third stage is that of buyer or "end-user" for the material, which may be a
nation, or an extremist or separatist group (Hastings, 2012; Zaitseva & Hand, 2003).
Although all of the roles in the process affect material acquisition; the criminal
groups' roles as intermediaries serve several functions. Lee and Hastings provided
perspectives on the functioning of the intermediary. Both noted the importance of the
24
role in the acquisition process but differed on the functioning of the role. Lee believed
the intermediary's role is more than a simple broker for transactions; the intermediary can
actually be the driving force behind the theft or diversion of material (Rensselaer Lee,
1997). Hastings believed intermediaries are more likely the logistical coordinators of the
illicit material black market (Hastings, 2012). He compared their function to individuals
involved in arms and drug trafficking networks in which coordinators or brokers know
the locations of safe smuggling routes (Hastings, 2012). As logistical coordinators, these
individuals have trusted relationships in place that are willing to facilitate the covert
transportation of illicit commodities regardless of their true nature (Hastings, 2012).
Other researchers offered different opinions on criminals' roles' as intermediaries and
their motivations for becoming involved. Shelley and Orttung and Williams contended
criminals are more directly involved in trafficking the material themselves, considering
nuclear or radiological material as just another commodity with a high profit potential (L.
Shelley & Orttung, 2006; P. Williams, 2007). In a paper issued by the Institute of
International Affairs, London, England, Schmid and Wesley, reached the same
conclusion (Land, 2003; Schmid & Wesley, 2006). The paper suggested that another
reason for criminal groups' more direct role is the perception that nuclear and radiological
material is easily disguised and transported (Land, 2003). On the other hand, Schmid and
Wesley believed that criminal groups may be dissuaded from involvement if the risks for
detection are greater than trafficking any other illicit material (Schmid & Wesley, 2006).
However, the profit potential for trafficking in these commodities may outweigh any
potential risks.
25
The literature showed support for the contentions of several authors that criminal
groups view nuclear and radiological trafficking as another commodity they can add to
those they already traffic (Rensselaer Lee, 2003; L. I. Shelley, 2006; P. Williams, 2007).
Some extremists groups may be enticed to traffic in these types of material because of
their profitability, ease of transport, and lower risk of detection by corrupt or underpaid
security and border guards ("Islamists and the Russian mafia," 2002; P. Williams, 2007)
Lee noted that many of the criminal groups involved in nuclear trafficking are
concurrently involved in arms and drug smuggling. Ouagrham-Gormley and Zaitseva
highlighted this assessment by providing instances of nuclear and radiological trafficking
cases in which authorities also seized arms and drugs (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007;
Zaitseva, 2007). Additional instances of nuclear smuggling were detected in areas that
contained established smuggling routes for arms, cigarettes, and drugs (L. Shelley &
Orttung, 2006). According to Johnson, criminal groups, especially those with
sophisticated smuggling and trafficking networks such as arms dealers and drug
traffickers are inherently suited to trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials
because of their financial means and organizational capacities (Johnson, 2010). Lee and
Williams explored two cases of nuclear and radiological trafficking by Russian and
Turkish trafficking groups. In both cases, the groups were established traffickers in other
commodities: the Russian traffickers were known to traffic precious metals and
radioactive material; the case Turkish traffickers were deeply involved in trafficking
antiquities and nuclear material (R. W. Lee, 1998; P. Williams, 2007).
26
Established networks of criminal and trafficking groups have been necessary for
the movement and dispersion of commodities, including nuclear and radiological
material. The Royal Institute of International Affairs issued a paper on criminal groups'
involvement in nuclear and radiological trafficking, highlighting criminal groups'
adeptness at bringing together diverse groups and individuals to facilitate their interests
(Land, 2003). This adeptness has been especially evident in individuals and groups
involved in the drug trade. Shelley and Orttung maintained the drug trade is the common
activity that serves as the link for groups involved in smuggling and trafficking in arms,
metals, cars, and other commodities (L. Shelley & Orttung, 2006). Because many of
these groups are transnational, they have found it advantageous for their organizations to
form collaborative ties with one another. These forged relationships have enabled the
groups to facilitate their operations by managing drug routes, moving drugs, and
brokering business arrangements with other criminal groups (Bulgaria Extradites 2013,
Mexican Cartel 2008, Nicasio 2008). One example of this type of cooperation was the
collaboration between Camorra, an Italian crime group, and the Mexican Los Zetas drug
trafficking organization to acquire drugs and negotiate drug transport (Dudley, 2012).
Thus, criminal groups have benefited from cooperative relationships both in terms of
business acumen and the contacts and opportunities afforded through collaboration with
diverse groups.
Social Network Analysis
To appreciate these relationships fully, researchers must use appropriate
methodologies to assist with their understanding. Social network analysis has been
27
widely employed in the social sciences as an important tool to identify key actors and to
gain insight into the way relationships function (van der Hulst, 2009). Some authors have
recognized its utility for use in other disciplines, believing it could be used as an
accompaniment to traditional methodological approaches (Perliger & Pedahzur, 2011).
Sparrow has often been cited as one of the first researchers to understand the merit of
using this methodology in criminal and intelligence research (Koschade, 2006; Sparrow,
1991). Krebs has been widely recognized as one of the first researchers to use social
network analysis to study extremist networks using a real world example, the Al Qaeda
cell responsible for the attacks on September 11 (Koschade, 2006; Krebs, 2002). In his
study, he used the methodology to examine the groups' structure and identify key players.
Thus, social network analysis has been used increasingly by the intelligence and law
enforcement communities to study the functioning and destabilization of extremist covert
networks and to forecast likely outcomes of extremist interactions (Carley, Dombroski,
Tsvetovat, Reminga, & Kamneva; Dombroski, Fischbeck, & Carley; Koschade, 2006).
In identifying these key elements through social network analysis, the intelligence
community and law enforcement has gained direction for targeting actors who warrant
further examination (Koschade, 2006; Schwartz & Rouselle, 2009; van der Hulst, 2009).
Another important function provided by social network analysis has been the
ability to map actors and their relationships, creating a roadmap not only identifying
obvious relationships, but also uncovering unexpected relationships (Klerks, 2001). With
this mapping function, investigators have been able to determine which actors have
28
relationships, access to certain resources and information, and the activities in which the
actors and their ties engage(Klerks, 2001; Krebs, 2002).
29
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
The chapter is a description of how the research was conducted, including data
collection techniques, selection of the population to be studied, and discussion of the
research design. This chapter begins with an overview of social network analysis to
familiarize the reader with the methodology and its foundation principles. The chapter
also contains a description of the components in social network analysis and the process
by which the data is represented in social networks. This includes an exploration of the
use of centrality metrics to analyze the relational data in social networks. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of the use of social network analysis in this study.
Principles of Social Network Analysis
Social network analysis is a quantitative and qualitative methodological approach
to evaluate social networks that incorporates elements from the academic disciplines of
sociology, social psychology and anthropology (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Social
network analysis is based on the premise that a network contains entities that have
relationships between and among themselves (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Emanating
from these relationships, and expounding them are relationships with different entities,
resulting in a social network formed by actors and their relations (Knoke & Yang, 2008;
Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
30
Social network analysis is employed to examine the relational structure of actors
and their relationships or ties: a fundamental principle emphasizing that social networks
consist of relationships patterns among the entities present in a network (Knoke & Yang,
2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Although individual actors' attributes are of secondary
importance in network analysis, they can be used to gain insight in identifying the
patterns and composition of the actors' relationships (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005;
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In this study, the researcher collected data on the
relationships of the identified population to measure the actors' network ties (Hanneman
& Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
The collection of network data also includes structural and compositional
variables. Structural variables were used to provide insight into understanding the
entities' actions rather than their attributes and thus to measure the specific ties between
pairs of actors and to identify the most appropriate measures for the study (Knoke &
Yang, 2008). Compositional variables, such as an actor's age or religious affiliation were
used to measure the attributes of the individual actors, not their relationships (Wasserman
& Faust, 1994). These variables were standard types of descriptive information used in
the social and behavioral sciences (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
Social network analysis assumes the importance of relationships in networks and
that relationships can have wide-ranging impact on an entity's social network. For
instance, relationships may affect an entity's decision making and beliefs, or facilitate
actions (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Network relationships can
affect a myriad of actions. Relationships can facilitate the flow of information and
31
movement of resources throughout a network, thus facilitating a network of entities that
attain collective interests and goals (Knoke & Yang, 2008).
Networks
Three important elements comprise the fundamental building blocks of social
networks. First, a network must contain actors and the ties among all of the actors.
Second, it must contain a representation of the actors and their links in either a sociogram
or a graph. Third, it must contain a sociomatrix that represents the value of the actor ties.
Sociomatrices are an additional way to represent network data, allowing researchers to
conduct mathematical matrix calculations (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Mathematical
calculations, such as transposing a matrix or matrix addition are useful to researchers in
identifying patterns among the actor ties and in simplifying multiplex relations
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
A node in a network may be defined as either an individual or a collective entity.
Examples of collective entities are businesses, groups, and nations. The types of
relationships that can exist between actors or collective entities are wide ranging and are
characterized by the context of those relations. Most relationship may be categorized into
one of the following: emotion (likes/dislikes), communication, affiliation, family, role
(boss/employee), and transactions (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
Because networks are reflective of the relationships between and among entities, a
network can be based on friendship, family, or group affiliation. Some or all of these
types of networks may exist in a studied population. Thus one must note that the
32
relationship connecting a pair of actors is the property of those actors and may disappear
if the actors dissolve their connection (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
Networks can be complex and convoluted. Network analysis allows for this in
that not every actor has to have a direct link to every other actor in the network. In some
networks, few or no links may exist between some pairs of actors (Knoke & Yang, 2008).
Thus, networks may reflect a wide range of structure, from dense networks with all
entities connected to sparse networks with few connections among the entities (Knoke &
Yang, 2008).
Components for Analysis of Social Networks
Data for these kinds of studies must be collected from the specified population for
the relationship studied. The relationship serves as the context in which the population is
analyzed. For instance, if individuals are asked to name their most immediate and more
distant relatives, the context of the relation is family. However, instances arise in which
one or more relationships warrant analyzing. In such situations, for example, the network
may have two individuals who are brothers, involved in a business partnership. In
analyzing such a scenario, researchers might explore the effect of family relationships on
business decisions.
The focus of the research informs the network level to be analyzed. Researchers
may begin at the level of the actor and of all the actors to which the individual is directly
connected. They may then analyze dyads, triads, actor subsets or the whole network
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). See Table 1.
33
Table 1 Network Analysis Levels
Measurement level
Definition
Application
Individual
Used to strength of actors' relationships with other
actors in the network and to provide information
about a network relative to the networks size,
density, and centrality
Dyad
Pair of actors
Used for identifying the existence of a relationship
between a pair of actors and characterizing the
relationship (i.e., strong, lengthy)
Triad
Three actors
Used to measure balance and transitivity
Subset
Subset of actors in a
network
Used to measure distance, cliques, and cohesive
subgroups
Network
All entities and their
relations
Uses all possible relations in the network to explain
network structure and to identify important roles
and patterns in the network
Actor
Note. From Introduction to Social Network Methods(p.), by R. A. Hanneman and M. Riddle, 2005, Riverside:
University of California; Social Network Analysis (p.), by D. Knoke and S. Yang, 2008, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; and
Social Network Analysis Methods and Applications (p.), by S. Wasserman and K. Faust, 1994, New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Representation of Social Network Data
Researchers must construct a representation of relational social network data
using graphs and matrices. Graphs, the most basic method of representing social network
data, indicate actors as nodes and actor relations as edges when used to model social
network data (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In graphs, an
edge may be directed from one node to another, may indicate mutuality, or may simply
represent a co-occurrence or co-present between a pair of actors (Hanneman & Riddle,
2005). An edge represented by a line with or without arrowheads indicates the presence
of a connection between nodes. No arrowhead pointing to a direction, suggests the
presence of a relation between two nodes and is a non-directed graph (Knoke & Yang,
2008). When an arrowhead is present, the representation is a directed graph that shows a
34
node is directing the relationship (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). For
instance, in a friendship network, if Mary chooses Jim as a friend, the arrowhead points
to Jim. Mutuality of edges is represented with arrowheads on both ends of the line
indicating the existence of two directed ties. Mutuality of ties indicates that a pair of
nodes chooses each other (Knoke & Yang, 2008). In the previous example, a friendship
network is present if both Mary and Jim choose each other as best friends.
Although directed ties are useful in indicating which nodes choose others, they do
not fully capture all of the data. This is rectified by assigning values to the relationships.
Researchers may assign a number of values to relationships to indicate the type of
relationship that exists. For example, an edge may be signed to indicate a negative tie
(i.e. one node dislikes another node), a positive tie (i.e. one node has a favorable opinion
of another node), ordinal (i.e. indicates the level of the tie intensity) or valued (i.e.
assessed at the interval level (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).
Graphs are very useful to researchers in visualizing data about a studied
population. Through visualization, researchers can obtain concrete pictures of actual
network structure and identify patterns that exist in the networks. However, one of the
limitations of graphs to conduct mathematical calculations on graph data (Knoke &
Yang, 2008). Thus, matrices are used more commonly for representing network data.
Matrices contain the same information graphs contain but are better for handling
complex levels of analysis, including the accommodation of mathematical computations,
such as algebraic notation (Knoke & Yang, 2008). However, matrices are considered by
many to be less "user-friendly" (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
35
A matrix is a table in which the same sequences of actors are recorded in both the
rows and columns. Actors in the rows are the senders of the relationships; actors in the
columns are the recipients of the relationships. A matrix becomes a sociomatrix when
relational details are added, as shown in Table 2. The relational data are recorded as
numerical values in the cells of the sociomatrix (Knoke & Yang, 2008). Binary metrics
are the most basic type of numerical values recorded in sociomatrices (Wasserman &
Faust, 1994). Binary data represents the presence or absence of relationships and are
coded as one if a relationship is present or zero if a relationship is absent (Wasserman &
Faust, 1994). Data may also be recorded in the sociomatrix cell relative to the value of
the relationships. Values may be assigned based on the strength of the relationship. For
example, data may be collected about the frequency with which actors meet, the number
of emails exchanged, or the strength of friendship. The values vary from zero, indicating
ambivalence to negative values, indicating dislike.
Table 2 Sociomatrix Example
Mary
Tom
Alice
Mary
0
1
0
Tom
1
0
1
Alice
0
0
1
Note. Based on binary data with 1 = presence of a tie and 0 = absence of a tie.
Network metrics
A number of metrics are applicable for analyzing social network data (see Table
3). Depending on the goals of the study, researchers may use network metrics to study
36
individual actors, trace network changes over a specified time frame, identify actor's
network positions, identify network clusters, or to analyze networks as a whole (Hansen,
Shneiderman, & Smith, 2011). With some network metrics, researchers may examine
that actor's connections to others in the network. For instance, centrality and its variants,
closeness, betweenness, and degree are commonly used metrics in social network
analysis to identify important actors in a network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). These
metrics are also applicable at the group level to compare networks to identify key actors
and the "heterogeneity" of the network actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
Table 3 Common Network Metrics
Metric
Definition
Application
Describes the degree to which
nodes are connected in the
network and the degree to which a
network is centered on one actor.
Identifies cohesive
subgroups.
Centrality
Describes the degree to which the
network is centered on important
identified nodes.
Identifies the manner in
which the network structure
enables an actor to gain
importance.
Walk
A series of nodes and lines in
which each node is incident to the
line before and after it in the
series.
Enables the calculation of
distance between two actors
(nodes).
A walk where all nodes and lines
are different. A path may be
shorter than a trail.
Examines the connectivity of
a graph and identifies which
nodes and lines are important
in that connectivity. Enables
the calculation of distance
between two actors (nodes)
A walk where all lines in the
network are different.
Examines the connectivity
of a graph and identifies
which nodes and lines are
important in that
connectivity.
Density
Path
Trail
37
Geodesic distance
Identifies the shortest path
between two actors and issued for
identifying the diameter of the
graph.
Examines the connectivity of
a graph and identifies which
nodes and lines are important
in that connectivity.
Identifies cohesive
subgroups.
Identifies the diameter of a
graph.
Note. Created based on information from Analyzing Social Media Networkds with NodeXL: Insights from a Connected
World (p.), by D. L. Hansen, B. Shneiderman, and M. A. Smith, 2011), Amsterdam, Netherlands: Morgan Kaufman;
Social Network Analysis (p.), by D. Knoke and S. Yang, 2008, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; and Social Network Analysis
Methods and Applications (p.), by S. Wasserman and K. Faust, 1994, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Graph metrics have a number of applications for appraising network structures
(see Table 4). As in matrices, graphs can indicate measurements of the various levels of
actor, dyad, triad, subgroup or the whole network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Density
is defined by the number of ties that are present in a graph; this measurement is useful for
representing simple networks and for estimating subgroup cohesiveness (Wasserman &
Faust, 1994). Walks, paths, and trails are important metrics in identifying the proximity
of actors to other actors in the network. With these metrics, researchers may identify
favorable avenues among the nodes for communication flows or resource transfer.
Table 4 Common Node Metrics
Metric
Betweenness centrality
Closeness centrality
Degree centrality
Definition
Measures the degree to which
a node is closest to two other
nodes.
Measures the distance a node
is to each node in the network.
Measure for the cumulative
ties to a node.
38
Application
Forecasts brokers,
gatekeepers; identifies
power and accessibility.
Indicator of tie strength.
Forecasts time of
movement of ideas,
resources, and so forth,
from an actor through
the network.
Forecasts amount of
movement of ideas,
resources, and so forth;
ability to influence.
Eigenvector centrality
Clustering coefficient
Identifies the important node
by assigning scores to the
other nodes in the network.
Measures the probability that
two acquaintances of a node
are in fact acquaintances of
one another.
Identifies popular actor;
identifies midpoint of
large cliques.
Identifies how
connected is the node's
network.
Analysis of Criminal and Extremist Networks
Social network analysis is a mathematical methodological approach by which
researchers can diagram actors and their relationships and apply metrics to those
relations. The methodology has a myriad of applications, including the study of
communication flows within organizations and identification of key players in
businesses, and co-authorships among academics. Social network analysis also has
become an investigative tool in the fields of terrorism and criminology (Carley; van der
Hulst, 2009)(Carley; van der Hulst, 2009). By applying this method to terrorism and
criminology, researchers may aid in uncovering and identifying key actors and their
patterns of behavior and interaction among other actors. By discovering key actors,
analysts or researchers may identify the appropriate metrics needed to disrupt networks of
extremists and crime groups.
In this study, social network analysis and statistics of central tendency and
dispersion were the methodological approaches used to identify three things: (a)
extremist actors capable of acquiring material to be used in the construction of
unconventional weapons, (b) relationships between criminal and extremist actors that
could be used as pathways to weapons material, and (c) criminal actor pathways through
39
which extremist groups could access crime groups' global network to acquire weapons
material. The four centrality metrics employed in this study to identify key actors were
consisted of betweenness, closeness, Eigenvector, and degree. The formulae for these
metrics are shown in Equations 1-4. Centrality metrics are the basic measurements used
in network analysis for analyzing organizations and social networks (Borgatti, Carley, &
Krackhardt, 2006). Central actors reside at key points within the network and are, thus,
able to direct communication, move commodities, or liaison with other actors
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
Equation 1 Betweenness Centrality
From Social Network Analysis Methods and Applications, by S. Wasserman and K. Faust, 1994, New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Equation 2 Closeness Centrality
From Social Network Analysis Methods and Applications, by S. Wasserman and K. Faust, 1994, New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Equation 3 Eigenvector Centrality
40
From "Some Unique Properties of Eigenvector Centrality," by P. Bonacich, 2007, Social Networks, 29, 555-564.
Equation 4 Degree Centrality
From Social Network Analysis Methods and Applications, by S. Wasserman and K. Faust, 1994, New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Population
The population used in this study consisted of indigenous and transnational
criminal and extremist individuals and organizations with ties to Latin America. Ties
were defined as having operational functions in Latin America through business dealings,
business or social contacts, physical operations, or members in residence. Criteria for
criminal and extremist group selection included having business relationships with other
criminal and/or extremist groups in Latin American countries, having global contacts,
having members present in Latin American countries, and having a demonstrated interest
in or capability to acquire or use unconventional weapons. As shown in Table 5, three of
the extremist groups had a religious affiliation and three were politically active.
Table 5: Characteristics of Selected Extremist Groups
Group
Al Qaeda
Religious affiliation
Politically motivated
Indigenous to Latin
America
X
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
X
Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarios de Colombia
(FARC)
X
41
X
Hamas
X
Hezbollah
X
Irish Republican Army (IRA)
X
Extremist groups used in the study had varying interests in biological, chemical,
or nuclear material (Gunaratna, 2002; Perl, 2003; Stern, 2001; G. Thomas, 2008a;
Turbiville, 2004). As shown in Table 6, Al Qaeda appeared interested in all three types
of materials. The other groups had more limited interests. Although Hezbollah was not
considered to have sought unconventional weapons material, the group is frequently
mentioned as one of 50 extremist groups with the military and organizational capability
to deploy a nuclear weapon (Allison, 2010). Thus, Hezbollah was included in the study
based on their significant military and organizational capabilities.
Table 6 Extremist Groups’ Interest in Unconventional Weapons Materials
Weapons material
Group
Al Qaeda
Biological
Chemical
Nuclear
X
X
X
Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna (ETA)
X
Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarios de
Colombia (FARC)
X
Hamas
X
Hezbollah
X
42
Criminal individuals and groups chosen for this study appear to have
demonstrated interest in nuclear material or were known to have trafficked in nuclear
material. The researcher could not find an instance in the open source literature of
criminal trafficking in biological or chemical material. Table 6 lists the criminal entities
involved in the sale and trafficking of nuclear material.
Data Collection
The researcher undertook an extensive review of available primary and secondary
open source English language literature, supplementing this material with Spanish
language literature. Literature for the data collection was not limited to Latin Americancentric sources and was broadened to include sources from and about other countries and
regions. The purpose of broadening the search was that many of the reports concerning
both of interest unconventional material and weapons and attempt to obtain them
occurred outside of Latin America. Additionally, because many of the criminal and
extremist individuals and organizations were transnational, having global networks and
reach, accessing as many sources of literature as possible was imperative to obtain
pertinent data. Thus, data were collected on criminal and extremist individuals and
organizations that might not have had direct ties to Latin America, but that might have
had ties to actors or organizations that did and that could play pivotal roles in providing
pathways to unconventional material or weapons acquisition.
Many of the literature sources, especially journal articles, did not contain useable
data. The most useful data were obtained from government sources, such as witness
testimony before Congressional committees, court documents, and indictments. Other
43
sources with relevant and timely data were found in news sources and news aggregator
sites. Much of the literature used for the study contained data from the years 1998-2005.
The data from this time period were still relevant because the selected actors and groups
chosen for inclusion in the study care were still pertinent and involved in their respective
communities. However, the researcher continued to collect data until 2013 to ensure that
current data were considered in the study.
The researcher obtained an exhaustive collection of descriptive data on actors,
organizations, relationships, activities, and resources that were used in the construction of
adjacency matrices (see Table 7 for the types of data collected). Data on individuals and
organizations, as well as on any organization to which they were affiliated were collected
to obtain the names of individuals and groups that might be tied through activities, such
as trading weapons for drugs or facilitating shipment of commodities. Additional
descriptive information was obtained to identify the types of relationships that existed
between actors, actors and organizations, and organizations (e.g., Was the relationship an
authority relationship of leader operative or a relationship of co-conspirator? See Table
8). The relationship served as a basis for establishing existing ties between the actors and
organizations.
Table 6 Examples of Data Types Collected
Category
Examples
Actor
Names of members of crime or extremist groups. Names of individuals who
may be facilitators, sympathizer, etc. for crime or extremist groups.
Organization
Names of crime or extremist groups.
Activity
Activities engaged in by crime or extremist groups, by group members or by
individuals who may be facilitators or sympathizers, etc. of those groups.
44
Table 7 Category Type and Information Collected
Category
Information
Actor–actor
Relationship type
Actor–organization
Actor role; relationship type
Actor–activity
Activity type (e.g., drug trafficking, money laundering)
Actor–resource
Possession/sale/trafficking/training/program oversight of biological,
chemical, nuclear material
Organization–organization
Role; relationship type
Organization–activity
Activity type
Organization–resource
Possession/sale/trafficking of biological, chemical, nuclear material
The initial data collection resulted in a large network of ties between actors;
actors and organizations; and organizations. The researcher conducted a preliminary data
review to eliminate duplications. A second data review was conducted to refine the data
set by eliminating actors and organizations with limited ties to other actors and
organizations. The resulting data from these reviews were used for construction of
matrices in social network analysis.
Research Design
In this relational study, social network analysis was conducted using the refined
data collected through the data collection process. The data served three purposes. First,
the data were used to identify ties between actors to determine which actors were the
most capable of acquiring unconventional material or weapons. Second, the data were
used to identify the crucial criminal and extremist business relationships that could be
45
used to obtain material or weapons. Third, the data were used to identify how essential
criminal groups were to the acquisition process. Actor and organization relationships
were weighted according to the strength of each relationship type (see Table 9). For
example, the weight might reflect authority relationships of leader operative or the coconspirator relationship of two actors in an extremist plot.
Table 8: Actor and Entity Relationship Weights
Relationship
Weight
Relationship
Weight
Relationship
Weight
Family
.9
Peer
.54
Transportation
.45
Leader
.8
Friend
.53
Trainer
.44
Member
.7
Finance
.52
Enforcer
.43
Planner
.6
Broker
.51
Advisor
.42
Coordinator
.59
Facilitator
.50
Teacher
.41
Recruiter
.58
Supplier
.49
Host
.40
codefendant
.57
Specialist
.48
Sympathizer
.39
Partner
.56
Logistics
.47
Associate, affiliate, ally
.55
Security
.46
Collaborator,
conspirator,
The collected data were then used to construct two adjacency matrices containing
information about actor ties, and actor and organization ties: an actor-to-actor matrix and
an entity-to-entity matrix. The entity-to-entity matrix contained data on the relationships
between criminal and extremist actors, organizations, and actors and organizations. The
researcher then obtained the core networks using ORA to calculate centrality metrics.
46
Centrality metrics of boundary spanner, betweenness, closeness, and degree are
applied to the two matrices to obtain the core networks. The purpose of using these
metrics was to avoid bias in the selection of actors, organizations and their ties for
inclusion in the study.
Three research questions were developed to test the hypothesis that criminal and
extremist groups in Latin America have business relationships that enable extremist
groups to obtain unconventional weapons or weapons materials using criminal groups'
global network:
1. Do extremists involved in criminal activity in Latin America have the
capability to acquire unconventional weapons or weapons materials?
2.
Do business relationships exist such that extremists could obtain
unconventional weapons or weapons materials through criminal groups'
global network?
3. Do business relationships exist such that extremist groups could obtain
unconventional weapons or weapons materials through criminal groups'
global network?
To address the first question, an adjacency matrix was constructed consisting only
of extremist actors. This was accomplished by partitioning the criminal and extremist
actor-to-actor core network using the attribute partition tool in Organizational Risk
Analyzer (ORA). Closeness and Eigenvector centralities were then applied to the
extremist actor-to-actor network.
47
Closeness centrality was used to identify the extremist actors most capable of
acquiring biological, chemical, or nuclear material. This metric is a measurement of the
geodesic distances of actors to identify the proximity one actor has to all other actors in
the network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Short distances indicate the quickness with
which an actor can converse either directly with other actors or indirectly through a
limited number of liaisons (Knoke & Yang, 2008). Close proximity to others enables the
actor to identify contacts quickly for material acquisition, giving the actor an advantage
over other actors. Closeness centrality resulted in identifying those extremist actors
closer to actors that had knowledge of sources for weapons material.
Eigenvector centrality was used to measure an actor's direct and indirect
relationships with other actors and to assign relationship weights based on the centralities
of other actors in the network (Bonacich, 2007). Actors who ranked highly in
Eigenvector centrality were influential because of their associations to highly connected
actors. This metric resulted in identifying those actors with sufficient social capital to
effectuate transactions for weapons material.
The second question designed to test the hypothesis concerned determining the
criminal and extremist relationships based on mutual engagement in illicit activities. To
address this question, two adjacency matrices, an actor-to-actor matrix and entity-toentity matrix were constructed consisting of criminal and extremist ties. The entity-toentity matrix was partitioned using the attribute partition tool in ORA to construct a
network composed of criminal and extremist actors and organizations. The purpose for
48
the creation of these different matrices was to determine whether business relationships
existed at the actor-to-actor or the entity-to-entity level.
Newman's clustering algorithm contained in ORA was applied to the actor-toactor network to determine the existence of communities of criminal and extremist actors.
Newman theorized that networks are composed of groups that, if broken apart, will be
partitioned along lines of commonality, thus forming communities around the coalesced
nodes (Newman, 2006). The application of the algorithm resulted in clusters of actors
based on the denseness of their ties to one another (Newman, 2006). Denseness is used
to identify actors who have something in common, such as memberships in the same
organization or participation in the same activity (Newman, 2006).
The clustering algorithm uses the modularity method to find clusters based on the
actual clusters' ties subtracted from the anticipated number of ties present in a similar
group of ties projected to be present in a similar group (Newman, 2006). Large positive
modularity values indicate cluster presence in the network (Newman, 2006). Cohesion
within the clusters was determined once actors were grouped into clusters. Clusters that
are cohesive have numerous, frequent, or intense ties between actors when compared to
non-members (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
Centrality metrics of betweenness and Eigenvector were then applied to the actorto-actor and entity-to-entity networks to identify key criminal actors or entity
relationships essential for providing extremists access to criminal groups' local and global
networks. Betweenness centrality resulted in identifying those criminal actors serving as
connectors between clusters. These actors were influential to the extent that within their
49
positions they function as brokers for transactions between actors in the clusters giving
them power to either enable or to impede a transaction. Eigenvector resulted in
identifying criminal actors with sufficient influence to provide avenues for extremist
actors to access criminal groups' local and global networks.
The third research question concerned determining whether criminal and
extremist groups' business relationships enable extremist groups to use criminal groups'
global network to acquire unconventional weapons and weapons materials. To address
this question, the entity-to-entity matrix was partitioned using the attribute partition tool
in ORA to obtain a core network consisting only of criminal actors and organizations.
Betweenness centrality was then used to identify criminal entities that served as
middlemen in the acquisition pathway.
50
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
This chapter contains the analysis of the results of the study to determine whether
the hypothesis was valid and whether the questions served to test the hypothesis properly.
The research had three goals: (a) to determine which extremist organization or
organizations have the capability to acquire unconventional material and weapons, (b) to
determine which criminal and associate relationships are essential to extremist
organizations for material or weapon acquisition, and (c) identify those criminal and
extremist organizations' relationships that are crucial for the acquisition pathway. The
study revealed that the hypothesis was correct and resulted in the identification of several
extremist groups besides Al Qaeda that are equally capable of acquiring unconventional
weapons and materials. The findings showed that although criminal and extremist
business relationships occurred, they are based on organizational levels of actor- togroup and group-to-group, not on an actor-to-actor level. The results also indicated that
through those relationships, extremist groups gain access to criminal groups' global
networks.
Extremist capability
The study revealed that indigenous and transnational extremist groups with
operations in Latin America have the capabilities to acquire unconventional material and
51
weapons. The top ranking actors were either members or individuals who held leadership
positions with extremist groups Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, FARC and Hamas, respectively.
Hezbollah had more members ranking in the top 20 than did the other groups.
Results of applying closeness and Eigenvector centralities to the extremist actorto-actor network indicated little variance from the mean.
Closeness centrality revealed that the top 20 high-ranking actors were members of
Islamic groups Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, or Hamas or of non-Islamic extremist groups FARC
and ETA. The top six highly ranked actors had relationships with both Hezbollah and Al
Qaeda. Of interest was that Hezbollah, an extremist group infrequently considered to be
interested in unconventional weapons or material, scored higher for closeness centrality
than Al Qaeda, a group whose views on the acceptability of unconventional weapons use
is well known.
Scores for Hamia, a member of Hezbollah, and Al-Salam, a member of Al Qaeda
were close (0.261 and 0.257, respectively), highlighting the capabilities of both groups'
members. Sergei Malyschew, a member of Al Qaeda, scored well below Hamia and AlSalam. Malyschew, believed to be an expert in handling chemical weapons for Al
Qaeda, scored lower than the other actors, perhaps because his organizational position
may not afford him as many opportunities to make contacts to acquire chemical material
("Chechen and Colombian rebels said settling in Spain," 2006). The actors ranking
higher than Malyschew were either leaders or held similar high ranking positions in their
organizations. Because of their high ranking positions, they are more likely to have
access to important information by virtue of their leadership positions. Actors proximally
52
nearer to other actors in the network had quicker access to important information
traversing the network or were able to identify useful contacts quickly.
In Figure 1, Actors 7, Barakat, through 20, Torres, scored from 0.185 to 0.179,
respectively, for closeness centrality. This close ranking suggests all these actors have
similar access to contacts for weapons material acquisition.
Figure 1 Centrality, Closeness: Agent x Agent
Eigenvector centrality resulted in high scores for 17 FARC members possibly
reflecting their extensive contacts within and outside Latin America. Saenz (1.0) and
Escobar (.94) were almost evenly divided in their rankings. Saenz and Escobar's higher
scores in comparison with the other actors associated with FARC may reflect their
leadership roles: Saenz is the commander in chief of the entire organization; Escobar is
FARC's global representative. Silva, a secretariat of FARC, who met with a
representative of Sermon Mogilevich to negotiate the purchase of uranium, ranked in the
53
middle (G. Thomas, 2008b). His lower score, as compared with Saenz's and Escobar's
scores, may reflect his lower organizational position within the group. As top leader of
his organization, Saenz can maintain contact with equally high ranking actors and
develop relationships with such actors. As FARC's international representative, Escobar
has access to leaders and influential members of international groups.
All of the top ranking actors were members of FARC with the exceptions of
Abelrahman, Barakat, and Issa. These actors all have relationships to Islamic extremist
groups. For example, Barakat, a leader of Hezbollah, has relationships with Al Qaeda,
al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, and FARC ("About 50 Alleged Extremists Were Investigated in
the Triborder Region," 2005). Of interest is that although Abelrahman and Barakat also
have relationships with FARC, Issa is the only actor whose relationships are solely with
Islamic extremist groups.
The results from closeness and Eigenvector metrics (Figure 2) suggest that both
Islamic and non-Islamic extremist groups have similar access to weapons material. Six
actors scored highly in both closeness and Eigenvector centralities. However, Barakat
outranked them all. This may reflect his extensive collaborative and financial
relationships with Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, al-Gama'a Islamiyya, and FARC, which afford
him proximity to these organizations and influence within them.
54
Figure 2 Centrality, Eigenvector: Agent x Agent
Criminal-Extremist Relationships
Criminal and extremist actors engage in a myriad of illicit activities from drug
trafficking to counterfeit goods. The study revealed five clusters of criminal extremist
relationships. Drug trafficking was the only illicit activity in which all five clusters
engaged. All of the clusters were cohesive, indicating that links among the actors within
the cluster were stronger than links to actors in other clusters.
Application of Newman's grouping algorithm to the actor-to-actor network
resulted in the division of the network into five clusters as displayed in Figure 3. Most of
the actors in the clusters were associated predominately with one or more groups;
however, the study showed actor associations with other groups: for example, although
Cluster 1 contains actors associated with Hezbollah or members of Hezbollah, actors
associated with Al Qaeda and the Zaiter Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) were also
present. Cluster 2 consisted predominately of actors associated with FARC or its
55
members. Cluster 3 was composed of actors associated with Al Qaeda or its members.
Cluster 4 was consisted of criminal actors associated with the Los Zetas DTO and Oficina
da Envigado, and Cluster 5 consisted of both criminal and extremist actors associated
with Mexican DTOs and the extremist group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).
Figure 3 Composition of Cluster Actors from Newman's Grouping Algorithm
Yellow represents Hezbollah; blue is Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC), green is Al
Qaeda, red is Los Zetas Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) and Oficina da Envigado, and aqua is Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia (AUC) and Mexican DTOs.
56
Tables 10 -11 show the categorical data related to the criminals and extremists in
each cluster and the activities engaged in by both types of actors. Percentages based on
the categorical data were calculated using ORA to identify the number of actor types in
each cluster. The sums of the percentages for Clusters 2 and 5 did not equal 100%
possibly because the actors may have had multiple values (e.g. an actor engaged in both
arms and drug trafficking).
Table 9 Cluster Composition Resulting from Newman's Clustering Algorithm
Cluster
Actor types
Group association
No. of
members
%
criminals
%
extremists
FARC, Islamic Jihad, ETA,
PIRA, Hezbollah, AQIM,
Da Costa DTO, North Valley DTO,
Los Rastrojos, Italian mafia,
1
Criminals,
extremists
Russian crime groups, Harb drug
trafficking and money laundering
network, Oficina da Envigado,
Colombian DTO, Solntesvo
55
40
60
54
40
59
17
0
100
5
10
0
Al Qaeda, AQIM, FARC, AUC,
Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad,
al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya,
2
Criminals,
extremists
Mexican drug cartels, Italian
mafia, Colombian DTO
Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, FARC,
al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya,
3
Extremists
Al-Mukawama, Hamas
Los Zetas DTO, Joumaa
Money laundering network,
Oficina da Envigado,
4
Criminals
Colombian DTO
57
5
Criminals,
extremists
Mexican DTO,
AUC
3
66
33
Illicit money laundering and trafficking in arms and drugs were the main illicit
activities in which cluster actors engaged as shown in Table 11. Drug trafficking was
only illicit activity in which all cluster actors engaged. Cluster 1 consisted predominately
of extremist actors. Those actors engaged in seven different types of illicit activities, the
greatest activity being money laundering. Cluster 1 criminal actors were more heavily
involved in drug and arms trafficking, followed by money laundering. Cluster 2 was
almost evenly divided between criminal and extremist actors. These actors were engaged
in five activities, with drug trafficking being the greatest illicit activity for both criminals
and extremists, followed by arms trafficking. Cluster 3 consisted entirely of extremist
actors engaged in drug trafficking and forged documents, with forged documents being
the greater of the two. Cluster 4 consisted solely of criminal actors who engaged in drug
trafficking and money laundering. Cluster 5 consisted of both criminal and extremist
actors who engaged in drug trafficking.
58
Drug
trafficking/supply
(%)
Counterfeiting (%)
Forged documents
(%)
Money laundering
(%)
Piracy (%)
40.00
60.00
27.27
0.00
72.72
9.09
9.09
9.09
9.09
6.06
13.63
24.20
0.00
12.12
0.00
3.03
—
—
Criminal
Extremist
38.88
42.58
66.66
21.73
66.66
60.86
—
—
0.00
4.34
33.33
4.34
—
—
—
—
4.76
0.00
Criminal
Extremist
0.00
100.00
—
—
0.00
5.88
—
—
0.00
11.76
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Criminal
Extremist
100.00
0.00
—
—
60.00
0.00
—
—
—
—
40.00
0.00
—
—
—
—
—
—
Criminal
Extremist
66.00
33.00
—
—
100.00
100.00
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Stolen goods (%)
Human smuggling
(%)
Arms
trafficking/supply
(%)
Criminal
Extremist
Type
% of membership
Table 10 Criminal and Extremist Illicit Activities by Cluster
Cohesion in the study was determined by using the External-Internal (E-I) index
in ORA after completion of clustering using Newman's grouping algorithm. The E-I
index for each cluster was calculated using the number of links outside the cluster less the
ties inside the cluster divided by the total of both the external and internal cluster ties
(Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). The index values can range from 1, indicating all of the ties
are internal, to -1, indicating all of the ties are external (Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). All
of the clusters showed cohesion indicating the ties between the actors were numerous or
frequent. Cohesion was highest in Clusters 1 and 2, clusters associated with Hezbollah
and FARC, respectively.
59
Table 11: Cohesion by Cluster
Cluster
Internal link count
External link count
% internal links
1
1178
196
85.74
2
1175
199
85.52
3
96
81
54.24
4
5
4
55.56
5
3
2
60.00
Centrality metrics of betweenness and Eigenvector were then applied to the actorto-actor and entity-to-entity networks. Closeness centrality had only a slight deviation
from the mean indicating the mean was not adversely affected by the outliers.
Eigenvector centrality had very little deviation.
Betweennness centrality revealed those criminal actors serving as connectors
between clusters in the network. Actors scoring highly were essential liaisons for
information or knowledge who were dispersed throughout the network (Wasserman &
Faust, 1994). Because of their ability to connect with other actors, these actors could
identify sources for material or direct an actor to a knowledgeable source. As expected,
actors ranking highly in betweenness centrality--Mehri, Harb and Barakat--served as
connectors between clusters. The only exception was Fontan, whose position lies within
Cluster 2, which was predominately associated with FARC. His geographic location lies
on the largest number of paths through which an actor must pass. Because of his location
within the cluster, he appeared to be the broker for the actors within the cluster to the rest
of the network.
60
Figure 4 Centrality, Betweenness: Agent x Agent
Betweenness centrality for the entity-to-entity network ranked actors Mehri,
Fontan, Harb, and Barakat highly. A comparison of the results for the entity-to-entity
and actor-to-actor networks, Barakat's and Fontan's rankings were reverse. This probably
reflects the addition of the organizations and their ties. The highest ranked organizations
were FARC, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda, followed by ETA. Barakat established
relationships with FARC, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda, all of which scored higher in
betweenness than ETA, indicating that the organizations lay on the shortest paths to the
other nodes in the network. Although Fontan had relationships with FARC and ETA, he
had only one relationship with an organization that scored highly for betweenness.
61
Figure 5: Centrality, Betweenness: Entity x Entity
Table 12 High Betweenness Actors to Other Clusters
Name
Actor type
Cluster
Connects to cluster
Mehri
Extremist
1
2, 3
Fontan
Extremist
2
1
Harb
Criminal
1
2, 4
Barakat
Extremist
1
2,3
Eigenvector centrality revealed the identity of actors whose influence was
sufficient to facilitate current or future business relationships. Actors connected to other
highly connected actors had influence because of their associations with other highly
influential actors, enabling them to have access to a broader level of trusted contacts that
could possibly provide avenues for access to criminal groups' local and global networks.
62
Barakat, Harb, and Makled, in order of descending importance, scored highly for
Eigenvector centrality in both the actor-to-actor and entity-to-entity networks. Barakat's
score is understandable given his associations with the high profile extremist groups
Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and FARC and to the criminal groups Oficina da Envigado, the
North Valley, and Colombian DTOs. Makled's slightly lower score reflects his ties to
fewer actors who are predominately associated with FARC and Hezbollah.
Barakat's and Harb's higher scores for betweenness and Eigenvector centralities
reflect the number of ties to other influential actors and their abilities to access more than
one cluster in the network. With their access to other parts of the network, they have
entree to the wider community of actors, thus increasing their potential to forge business
relationships.
Figure 6 Centrality, Eigenvector: Agent x Agent
63
Figure 7: Centrality, Eigenvector: Entity x Entity
Pathways
A review of all available pathways for the groups revealed that most groups
needed one contact and one to two intermediaries. Pathways allow extremist groups to
utilize their relationships with criminal groups to acquire nuclear material. Although Al
Qaeda and FARC both had direct contacts with procurers, Al Qaeda had more direct
contacts than did FARC. The remainder of the extremist groups--ETA, Hamas, and
Hezbollah--required one contact and one to two intermediaries to reach their procurers.
64
Figure 8: Entity-to-Entity Criminal Network
To identify criminal actors and entities with the abilities to function as
intermediaries, betweenness centrality was applied to the entity-to-entity network. The
results showed minimal deviation from the mean, indicating the mean is not adversely
affected by the outliers.
65
Betweenness centrality revealed two criminals, Harb and Da Costa, and four
criminal groups--'Ndrangheta, Russian and Italian mafias, and Colombian DTOs -ranked highly for this metric. Harb scored significantly higher than the second ranked
actor Da Costa. Harb's higher score probably reflects his position in the network, where
he serves as the liaison for the two large clusters to the criminal network. In contrast, Da
Costa only serves as the liaison between one large cluster and the criminal network. The
criminal groups' higher rankings in comparison to the other criminal and drug trafficking
groups is understandable given their geographic position within the criminal network.
Figure 9 Centrality, Betweenness: Entity x Entity
Pathways allow extremist groups to take advantage of criminal groups' global
networks of contacts. The pathways most likely involve relationships based on trust. For
example, FARC is more likely to utilize its established criminal business relationships to
66
acquire nuclear material than it is to use untested and potentially untrustworthy
relationships. In the present study, the researcher constructed a chart to illustrate the
extremist criminal procurement pathways. The chart showed the number of
intermediaries extremists needed to reach criminal entities with procurement capability.
The researcher then assigned a score to each procurement pathway according to the
number of intermediaries needed. Rankings ranged from .98 for those with no access to
nuclear material. Table 15 shows the pathways.
Table 13 Pathway Scores
No. of intermediaries required
Score
0 (direct source)
.98
1
.97
2
.96
3
.95
4
.94
5
.93
6
.92
No pathway
.91
Tables 16-25 show the rankings and summaries for criminal intermediary
pathways for Al Qaeda, ETA, FARC, Hamas, and Hezbollah, respectively.
67
Table 14 Al Qaeda Direct Contact and Criminal Intermediary Pathways
Direct contact
Intermediaries
Procurer
Score
Chinese mafia
—
—
.91
Mehri
Chiriboga
Harb
Colombia DTO
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
.94
.94
.94
Abadia
Bout
DaCosta DTO
Russian crime
.94
Al-Aal, Issa, Abelrahman
Alcala
Harb
Colombian DTO
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
.94
.94
.94
Fundamentalist Latin
American businessmen
Chiriboga
Harb
Colombian DTA
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
.94
.94
.94
Harb
Colombian DTO
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
.95
.95
.95
Barrera-Barrera
Da Costa DTO
Russian crime
.95
Mendoza
Da Costa DTO
Russian crime
.95
Bout
Da Costa DTO
Russian crime
.95
Barb
Colombian DTO
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
.95
.95
.95
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
.95
.95
.95
Russian crime
.95
Turkish mafia
Russian crime
Italian mafia
.95
.95
.95
Al-Aal, Issa, Abelrahman
Joumaa
Colombian DTO
Makled
Da Costa DTO
Fundamentalist Latin
American businessmen
Mexican DTO
’Ndrangheta
68
Direct contact
Intermediaries
Procurer
Score
Bout
Harb
Colombian DTO
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
.95
.95
.95
Mara Salvatrucha
Mexican DTO
’Ndrangheta
Turkish mafia
Russian crime
Italian mafia
.95
.95
.95
Colombian DTO
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
.96
.96
.96
Fundamentalist Latin
American businessmen
Mexican DTO
Italian mafia
Russian crime
Solntesvo
Mogilevich
.96
.96
.96
.96
Al-Aal, Issa, Abelrahman
Da Costa DTO
Russian crime
.96
Mexican DTO
Russian crime
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
Camorra
.96
.96
.96
.96
.96
Da Costa DTO
Russian crime
.96
Mara Salvatrucha
Bout
Chechen mafia
.98
Solntesvo
.98
Russian crime
.98
Mogilevich
.98
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Table 21: ETA Direct Contact and Criminal Intermediary Pathways
Direct contact
Camorra
Makled
’Ndrangheta
Intermediaries
Procurer
Score
Albanian mafia
Colombian DTO
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
.95
.95
.95
Da Costa DTO
Russian crime
Chechen mafia
Italian mafia
Turkish mafia
.96
.96
.96
.96
Mogilevich
.97
Solntesvo
.97
Italian mafia
.97
Turkish mafia
.97
Russian crime
.97
Turkish mafia
.97
Italian mafia
.97
Table 22: FARC Direct Contact and Criminal Intermediary Pathways
Direct contact
Makled
Mexican DTO
Intermediaries
Procurer
Score
Da Costa DTO
Russian crime
.96
’Ndrangheta
Russian crime
Italian mafia
Turkish mafia
.96
.96
.96
Mogilevich
.97
Russian crime
.97
Solntesvo
.97
Italian mafia
.97
Camorra
.97
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Direct contact
’Ndrangheta
Intermediaries
Procurer
Score
Russian crime
.97
Table 23: Hamas Direct Contact and Criminal Intermediary Pathways
Direct contact
Intermediaries
Procurer
Score
Dahroug
Panamanian Muslim
businessmen
Harb
Colombian DTO
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
.94
.94
.94
Aksu
Makled
Da Costa DTO
Russian crime
.95
’Ndrangheta
Russian crime
Italian mafia
Turkish mafia
.96
.96
.96
Mogilevich
.97
Russian crime
.97
Solntesvo
.97
Italian mafia
.97
Mexican DTO
Camorra
.97
Bin Hmeidi
Italian mafia
.97
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Table 24: Hezbollah Direct Contact and Criminal Intermediary Pathways
Direct contact
Intermediaries
Procurer
Score
Zaiter DTO
Iykeboro
Saade
Harb
Colombian DTO
Mogilevich
SoIntesvo
Italian mafia
.93
.93
.93
Los Zetas DTO
Joumaa
Harb
Colombian DTO
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
.94
.94
.94
Hijazi
Harb
Colombian DTO
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
.95
.95
.95
’Ndrangheta
Russian crime
Italian mafia
Turkish mafia
.96
.96
.96
Harb
Colombian DTO
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
.96
.96
.96
Makled
Da Costa DTO
Russian crime
.96
Mexican DTO
Mogilevich
Solntesvo
Italian mafia
Camorra
.97
.97
.97
.97
Da Costa DTO
Russian crime
.97
Mexican DTO
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Table 25 Summary of Criminal Intermediary Pathways for Five Extremist Groups
% of pathways
No. of intermediaries
Group
Direct contact
0
1
2
3
4
5
8
2
—
28
44
20
—
ETA
—
—
50
29
21
—
—
FARC
12
—
65
24
—
—
—
Hamas
—
—
46
23
8
4
—
Hezbollah
—
—
28
32
14
14
14
Al Qaeda
The pathways tables reflect the centrality rankings of Harb and Da Costa,
showing their roles in the procurement pathways. Also of note is the mirroring of the
betweenness centrality rankings relative to the importance of the criminal groups-'Ndrangheta, Russian and Italian mafia, and Colombian DTOs--in facilitating nuclear
material transactions.
Critical Entities
Degree and betweenness centrality metrics were applied to the entity-to-entity
network to determine which criminal entities' removal significantly affects the
procurement pathways network. The standard deviation from the mean was not
significant.
As shown in Figure 10, Harb scored highly for both degree and betweenness
centralities. Harb's higher rankings on both centrality metrics indicate that he can access
information and contacts and that he has sufficient influence to broker relationships. His
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removal could have a great impact on the ability of the cluster to access criminal groups,
as shown in Figures 13.
Removing Makled and Da Costa further disrupts the continuity of the network, as
shown in Figure 13. Makled's removal impacted the ties between the two clusters, but
did not have the same effect as removing Harb. With Makled's removal the two clusters
were still tied together and continued to have access to criminal groups provided by Harb.
Removal of Da Costa has minimal impact on disruption of the network because the two
clusters were still connected to the rest of the network (see Figure 14).
Figure 10 Centrality, Total Degree: Entity x Entity
74
Figure 11 Centrality, Betweenness: Entity x Entity
75
Figure 12 Criminal Pathways
76
Figure 13 Pathways with Harb and Makled Removed
77
Figure 14 Pathways with Harb, Makled, and Da Costa Removed
Despite Harb's, Makled's, and Da Costa's high rankings, their removal and the
subsequent removal of their direct and indirect links did not disrupt the network. The
network did not become disconnected until Bout and Barrera-Barrera were removed.
Bout ranked higher than Barrera-Barrera because he can maintain the continuity between
the two largest clusters and to the criminal entities. Betweenness centrality revealed
78
removing Bout disrupted the connections between the two clusters, as shown in Figure
15. However, one cluster was still connected to the rest of the network. Barrera-Barrera
was the sole link between the remaining clusters to the rest of the network. Removing
him finally resulted in disrupting the network, as shown in Figure 16.
Figure 15 Pathways with Bout Removed
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Figure 16 Pathways with Barerra-Barerra Removed
80
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION
This chapter contains an overview of the findings obtained from the study and
discussion of the meanings of those findings in the context of potential policy
implications. Also discussed are the limitations encountered during the study. The
chapter concludes with a discussion on future research that may extend the understanding
of the topic.
Findings and Discussion
The key findings of the study indicate that business relationships result from
participation in illicit activities and link criminal and extremist groups. The resulting
relationships enable extremists to procure unconventional weapons or materials using
criminal groups' global network of contacts. These contacts acted as intermediaries
between those who want to buy unconventional commodities and those who wish to
purchase them. To get the weapons or materials they seek, extremists needed to use two
to four intermediaries to reach their procurement contact. The study also indicated that
four extremist groups in Latin America are similarly capable of acquiring unconventional
weapons or materials. These groups were characterized as subscribing to both religious
and political ideologies.
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Interest
The study showed that extremist groups with criminal collaborative relationships,
but with differing ideologies and motivations are similarly capable of acquiring
unconventional weapons and materials. Al Qaeda, FARC, Hamas, and Hezbollah all
have similar capabilities and are established groups with global networks that have
substantive financial and organizational capabilities. These groups are also key
purveyors of terrorism.
The literature reviewed contained an extensive examination of Al Qaeda relative
to its interest in unconventional weapons, materials, and capabilities to deploy
unconventional weapons. The study revealed support for such concerns about Al Qaeda'
capabilities documented in the literature. Certainly, the core of Al Qaeda continues to be
a national security threat despite the decimation of its leadership. The group also
continues to be a threat because of its ability to inspire affiliates who may express a
desire for unconventional weapons.
However, the findings underscore the need to broaden focus and scrutiny to other
extremist groups. Several key dynamics, such as groups' organizational and military
abilities, financial sustainability, and networks of contacts are worthy of exploration. All
of the groups deemed similarly capable are key purveyors of terrorism, with substantive
global contacts and engage in high profit criminal activities. Although similar in
organizational, military, and financial capabilities, these groups are dissimilar in
motivations. Three groups--Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah--are motivated by religious
ideology: one group, FARC, is motivated by politics. As indicated in the literature, this
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finding shows that religious ideology is not a sole determinant in the acquisition or usage
of unconventional weapons. The findings also suggest that, in addition to intent, a full
review of extremist groups' networks and their financial, operational, and military
capabilities is necessary to fully understand these groups' potential. Because of the
underpinnings of the factors that affect acquisition and usage of unconventional weapons
and weapons material, policy makers must avoid having tunnel vision and refrain from
focusing substantial effort and money on only a limited number of suspected extremist
groups. In addition, the findings of this study revealed a range of group characteristics
that need to be explored. By incorporating intent with groups' operational and military
capabilities, policy makers can gain a big picture view of groups' potential for
acquisition, enabling policy makers to identify and focus on those groups that pose
substantial security risks. This big picture view is especially important because extremist
groups may be able to enhance their military capabilities by engaging in activities that
result in alternative sources of income, allowing them to modify their goals and
objectives to respond to current events and government policies.
Collaborative Relationships
The study showed that criminals and extremists engage in cooperative
relationships to varying degrees in three principal illicit activities: money laundering and
trafficking in arms and drugs. Through these activities, groups could enhance their
profits and promote their respective business interests. However, drug trafficking was the
only illicit activity in which both criminals and extremists engaged.
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Criminal activity, especially drug trafficking has a three-fold purpose for
extremist groups. First, is a means to fund these groups' operational expenses to ensure
they can perpetuate themselves. Second, criminal activity, specifically drug trafficking,
is a major revenue source for financing terrorism. Third, criminal activity is an effective
non-violent way to attack the West. As shown in the literature, the finding suggests some
extremist groups, such as Hezbollah, view drug trafficking as a potent non-military
method to destroy the United States and Western countries. Through drugs, these groups
attack the citizens of these nations from within without engaging in military tactics or
risking damage to the group (Dishman, 2005). The drug trade encompasses many
components, including crop cultivation, chemicals for drug production, drug
transportation, security for drug transportation, and drug distribution. Opportunities for
collaboration can occur at any point in this process, depending on the particular business
needs of the groups involved. Because of its transnational nature, the drug trade, as the
literature suggested, has a unique effect of bringing together dissimilar groups. For
example, producing crops and manufacturing drugs in one country, then transporting
them through multiple nations and across borders for global distribution may involve
several groups, each with different skills and needs, to effectuate the process. Findings
from the study included both examples of this process and identification of the key roles
Al Qaeda, FARC, and Hezbollah play in connecting these networks. The findings
showed FARC and Hezbollah have the greatest involvement as brokers between the
overall network and criminal groups. This is understandable and is indicative of their
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degree of involvement in drug-related activities that enable the establishment of global
network of contacts.
Cooperative relationships between criminals and extremists are important to
understanding network formation and the implications of such networks. The law
enforcement and intelligence communities need to recognize how alliances between and
among criminal and extremist groups form, how these groups interact with one another,
and how they integrate to form networks. These networks of alliances are excellent
sources for supplying commodities and services, providing both criminals and extremists
with avenues to fulfill their groups' needs. This aspect of having multiple paths to find
whatever a groups needs--whether drugs or conventional or unconventional weapons--is
quite valuable.
The drug trade is very important in establishing relationships and in providing
extremists with significant funding sources. With profits from the drug trade, extremists
can finance their operational needs, acquire weapons, recruit new members, and plan and
execute multiple attacks, making it difficult for law enforcement and counterterrorism
officials to keep ahead of extremist groups' acquisitions and operations. A more sinister
consequence of collaboration, which is difficult for law enforcement and
counterterrorism officials to anticipate, is the ability of extremists to move weapons and
operatives into and out of nations and regions. The transnational nature of the drug trade
results in widening opportunities for establishing relationships between criminal and
extremist groups that can be used for current or future operational assistance.
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Effective policies to combat terrorism must include policies that address the
criminal component. Such policies must include monitoring the drug trafficking-related
activities of criminals, extremists, and their associates. Through such monitoring,
authorities can determine criminal and extremist collaboration and identify participation
in the different aspects of drug- related activities. For example, authorities can determine
how the groups are collaborating relative to shared smuggling routes, facilitators, and
coordinators for drug transactions and shipments. Once these are determined, authorities
can look for weak points to exploit and identify weak actors and relationships to target to
disrupt relationships and networks. By addressing the criminal aspect of terrorism, law
enforcement and the intelligence communities will be deterring the proliferation nexus
with terrorism.
Pathways
The drug trade has evolved from being only a means to make money through
supplying individuals with narcotics to a global industry with networks of knowledgeable
contacts able to procure any requested commodity and to address any business need.
This reach is reflected in the roles that criminals and criminal groups played as critical
elements in the proliferation pathways. The study showed that transnational drug
trafficking and criminal groups, including those indigenous to Latin America, play key
roles as intermediaries. As shown in the literature, through these pathways the drug trade
has become intertwined in economic, political, and national security issues. The breadth
of this illicit activity has implications for law enforcement and national security policy
development relative to unconventional weapons deterrence and procedures to target
86
effectively those individuals or groups that may be vulnerable in the acquisition
pathways. All of the extremist groups included in the study participate in the drug trade
to some extent. Some extremists have business relationships with more than one criminal
or drug trafficking group which provides extremists with multiple avenues for
procurement using trusted business contacts. By developing multiple relationships,
extremists provide themselves multiple avenues for procurement using trusted business
contacts which is quite important should one or more of their contacts be compromised
by law enforcement or targeted counterterrorism actions. As shown in the study, with the
exceptions of Al Qaeda and FARC, very few extremist groups have direct relationships
with criminal sources; most of them need one contact and one to two intermediaries.
This indicates that the relationships between buyers and sellers are not close; they must
rely on trusted business relationships among the network actors and criminal
intermediaries. The finding is supportive of the literature, which suggests that criminal
intermediaries are an important part of the procurement process between buyers and
sellers and serve as part of a "transactional network" of contacts with knowledge of
trusted and reliable associates who can be relied upon to procure whatever weapons and
materials that are requested (Measures to Prevent, Intercept and Respond to Illicit Uses
of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources, 2001).
Critical Entities
Criminals are an integral part of the proliferation pathway in their roles as brokers
and influencers. Critical actors provide avenues for other actors in the network. Their
removal can result in severely impairing extremists' abilities to connect with other
87
network actors, making commodity acquisition difficult or impossible. Even when
network actors can access other avenues, they may be deterred from doing so because of
the degree of difficulty.
Deterring extremists from obtaining unconventional weapons is the goal of the
law enforcement and intelligence communities. To do so, these communities need to
identify critical and vulnerable actors and relationships in the network to impair
criminals' abilities to obtain weapons and materials and provide them to extremists.
Identification of these actors is also valuable because of the information they can provide,
information regarding impending transactions or the identities of other actors in the
network worth monitoring.
Limitations of the Study
The data collection phase of the study revealed the limitations encountered in
studying covert networks. Obtaining specific data, such as the names of individuals
associated with groups, participating in activities, or collaborating with other actors or
groups, was often difficult. Because only limited data on criminal or extremist groups
and their activities were available in academic journals alternative sources for data, such
as news accounts, government documents, and think tank reports were required. The data
that were collected frequently contained information on the groups' activities, but not on
the specific actors involved. Often the literature included references to reported activities
but did not include the identities of the perpetrators, whether they were individuals or
groups. The preponderance of the literature only indicated that an individual had some
sort of relationship with a group; it did not reveal whether these were member-to-member
88
associations. These limitations could be due to the lack of specific information contained
in the sources used or to the fact that the information was simply not available. Fosson
stated that criminal and extremist groups are often compartmentalized to prevent
compromising the larger group and its goals; thus managers of cells for criminals and
extremist often do not know the real names of cell members.
Similarly, limitations existed in terms of collecting data relative to specific
criminal involvement in unconventional weapons materials trafficking. Because no
previous research on this subject existed, the researcher had to rely on the small number
of reports and news accounts available to obtain this information. Another contributing
factor limiting data collection was the restrictions on access to databases containing
trafficking cases. The researcher needed to rely on the reports compiled by researchers to
obtain information on trafficking cases.
Despite these limitations, the study was not adversely impacted. Sufficient data
were available to counter the limitations on data collection. The findings from the study
relative to criminal and extremist collaboration were convergent with the relevant
available literature. Because there is little publicly available research or limited literature
about acquisition pathways involving criminals, assessing whether data collection
limitations adversely affected the findings was difficult. However, sufficient data were
available to conduct the study appropriately.
Direction for Future Study
This dissertation showed the importance and ramifications of relationships
between criminal and extremist groups, including one example of an acquisition pathway
89
beginning with extremist intent and capability and concluding with criminal relationships
to facilitate the transaction. Therefore, this dissertation could serve as a starting point for
the examination of other extremist groups with capabilities to acquire weapons and
materials. However, as shown in the study, in future examinations of other extremist
groups, the focus should not be solely on one group, as was the case in much of the
literature focused on Al Qaeda. Instead, future research should include examinations of
politically motivated and religious groups with known intent and capabilities. As this
study showed in identifying the similar acquisition capabilities of Al Qaeda and
Hezbollah, researchers, law enforcement, and intelligence communities, must explore all
factors in determining capable extremist groups, especially when intent is unknown.
Examination of other potential acquisition pathways should be explored. In the
existing literature, which laced concrete examples, authors addressed the problem by
generally identifying potential types of groups of people and businesses that could be
involved. Although this dissertation has revealed one potential pathway, others
undoubtedly must exist. Researchers could collect relevant open source data to develop
other potential pathways using concrete examples of individuals, groups, businesses and
their attendant relationships. Researchers could map these relationships to facilitate
understanding of the magnitude of the problem.
These suggestions represented just a few avenues researchers should consider
exploring. Because the problem is complex and involves many components, each stage
and component in the process must be examined. Doing so should result in a better
90
understanding of the problem as well as the development of measures to disrupt the cycle
of proliferation.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
This chapter contains an overview of the study, including a synthesis of the
findings; policy implications resulting from the findings; and policy recommendations for
counterterrorism and counter-proliferation. The chapter concludes with an exploration of
the contributions of the study.
Introduction
The study was designed to identify business relationships between criminal and
extremist groups to determine if those relationships result in pathways to obtaining
unconventional weapons and weapons materials using criminal groups' networks of
contacts. To accomplish this, the focus of the study was on discovering which extremist
groups in Latin America had the most capability to acquire weapons and materials,
identifying criminal and extremist group relationships, and determining which criminal
relationships served to facilitate the acquisition process. Social network analysis was the
methodology used to meet these objectives.
Findings
The findings of the study were consistent with existing theory and the literature
concerning the main arguments in the study and served to elucidate criminal acquisition
pathways. The study revealed a deeper understanding of the problem in determining that
92
multiple Islamic and non-Islamic extremist groups in Latin America have similar
acquisition capabilities and by showing the implications the drug trade has beyond
revenue generation for criminals and extremists. The study showed that extremist groups'
participation in drug-related activities is central to their organization and that similarly
capable extremist groups are actively engaged in drug-related activities. These illicit
activities served as conduits for criminal and extremist interaction, information
transference, and collaborative relationships. Through these collaborative relationships,
extremists had access to avenues to acquire weapons and materials and for criminal
intermediaries to procure the commodities using trusted relationships. The study showed
extremists required one to four intermediaries to reach their procurement contacts. By
providing a deeper understanding of the problem through examination of its components,
the findings revealed a roadmap for law enforcement and intelligence communities to use
in future investigation and development of national security policy issues.
Implications
The study served to highlight the role of nations and regions with entrenched
criminal activities and illicit drug trade industries in fomenting collaborative relationships
between criminals and extremists. Many of these nations and regions have endemic
corruption and lax law enforcement, which are attractive to criminals and extremists who
use these hospitable conditions to engage in illicit activities, fundraise among the
diaspora communities, and to plan future attacks. Latin America, the case in point, has
provided a haven for an amalgamation of indigenous and transnational criminal and
extremist groups of differing ideological ilks. These groups have used the region to
93
pursue their interests, often forming cooperative relationships with one another to further
their objectives, and posing implications for U.S. national security.
Latin America has become more of a security concern because of the presence of
extremist groups with known vociferous anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments
operating in the region. These groups and their members have participated in egregious
attacks against the United States and its allies abroad and in Latin America. These
groups, which are well organized, have enhanced their military capabilities through
collaborative criminal relationships and profits derived from criminal and drug activities.
The combinations of these factors have revealed serious implications in terms of
establishing profitable revenue generators and using facilitators to provide introductions
to global networks of cooperation. These groups can leverage revenue and networks to
acquire unconventional weapons or materials or to acquire needed expertise or skill sets.
These dynamics also revealed significant concerns for law enforcement and
intelligence communities tasked with preventing future 9/-11 types of attacks in the U.S.
homeland. Extremists emboldened with significant financial capabilities obtained from
drug proceeds have developed the potential to acquire sophisticated unconventional
weapons through their criminal relationships. These relationships and networks could
serve not only as a means to purchase weapons and materials but also as avenues for their
transportation. A number of illicit transportation avenues exist, most of them previously
established criminal smuggling routes and methods. For example, weapons and weapons
materials could be transported along established smuggling routes used by drug and
human traffickers. These routes have already been vetted by the traffickers to avoid
94
confrontation with law enforcement. As another potential transportation avenue,
extremists could use front companies to transport extremists' weapons and materials
covertly in cargo by disguising them as licit commodities. An especially worrisome
possibility, weapons, materials, and operatives could also be transported through existing
or newly created sophisticated drug tunnels that run from Mexico into the southern
United States. These drug tunnels have been especially problematic because
commodities can be easily transported and disseminated throughout the United States
before they are discovered by U.S. law enforcement.
The real-life examples of collaboration and proliferation pathways studied in this
research have resulted in insight into potential avenues to explore in countering terrorism
and proliferation. Although the findings indicated potential for collaboration between
extremist and criminal groups, they did not suggest that criminals will willingly assist
extremists or that extremists will attempt to acquire weapons or materials using criminals
as their procurement contacts. Criminals could refrain from cooperating with extremists
because of fear of reprisals from local or international law enforcement authorities; they
could also refrain from assisting them for fear of destabilizing economic or population
sectors important to the bottom line of their business. Extremists, on the other hand,
might not attempt to obtain unconventional weapons or materials simply because
conventional weapons will suffice for the type of attacks they plan to execute. Rather,
the concern for the United States should be the potential threat proliferation and national
security posed by networked relationships. Thus policy makers should develop
counterterrorism and counter-proliferation policies to address the potential threat posed
95
by extremists seeking to ramp up the lethality of their attacks using unconventional
means.
Contributions of the Study
The study served as a holistic examination of the acquisition process, from
extremist group intent and capability to procurement channels. The literature surveyed
for this study was qualitative in nature and focused on the separate elements of the
acquisition process. This study was an empirical investigation of the problem of
unconventional weapons acquisition. Exploration of the problem involved the
examination of each component of the acquisition process through one real life example:
Hezbollah's use of its business relationships with Mexican DTOs to reach Sermon
Mogilevich, a Russian mobster whose representative met with FARC to negotiate the sale
of uranium. Also included was a cumulative examination of the components to
determine their implications. The study has served to add to the literature a deeper
understanding of criminal and extremist groups' roles in the acquisition process, tying the
components together using concrete examples from a very real possible situation.
Conclusion
Criminal and extremist collaborations and their contribution to network formation
have become serious security threats to U.S. national security through enhancing
extremist groups' capabilities and procurement powers. By understanding of these
implications, law enforcement and intelligence communities should be armed with
sufficient knowledge to craft effective countermeasures to thwart the potential
consequences of criminal activity and collaboration.
96
Appendix One: Actors and Affiliations
Actor
Affiliation
Abadia, Juan Carlos Ramirez
Abadallah, Ali Hassan
Abdul, Kalim Ad Raja
Abeirahman, Idriss
Aksu, Cetin
Al-Aal, Muhammad Abed Abd
Albert, Maria Remedios Garcia
Alcala, Major General Cliver
Ali, Khalid Hussein
Al Ghazi, Tareq Mousa
Al Kassar, Monzer
Al-Liby, Abu Faraj
Al-Masri, Sharif
Al-Salam, Said Jan Abd
Alvaran-Velex, Alvaro
Assad, Sheik Suhail
Ayestaran, Jose Lorenzo
FARC
Hezbollah
Al Qaeda
AQIM, FARC
Hezbollah
AQIM, Islamic Jihad, FARC
FARC
FARC
Al Qaeda
FARC
FARC, Islamic Jihad
Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda
AUC, Mexican DTOs
Hezbollah
ETA, FARC
Baez, Nestor
Ballouk, Ali
Banol-Ramos, Yarlei
Barakat, Ahmad Akraam
Barakat, Ahmad Assad
Barakat, Hassan Ali
Barakat, Hattem
Barerra-Barerra, Daniel
Becerra, Joaquin Perez
Berro, Ibrahim
Bikacem, Harouni Lotfi
Da Costa DTO
Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO
FARC
Hezbollah
Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, FARC
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
FARC, Los Rastrojos, North Valley DTO
FARC
Hezbollah
Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO
Balkan crime groups, ETA, Islamic
extremist groups, Italian mafia, PIRA
Hezbollah
AUC
AUC
Al Qaeda, FARC
FARC
Bin Hmeidi, Mohamad bin Saleh
Biro, Muhammad
Blanco-Puerta, Edgar Fernando
Borda, Christian Fernando
Bout, Viktor
Briceno, Jorge
97
Actor
Affiliation
Calle, Freddy Torres
Camorra Associate
Cano-Flores, Aurelio
Castano, Jorge
Chiriboga, Oviedo Nuria
Connolly, Niall
FARC
Camorra crime group, Mexican DTOs
Los Zetas
Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO
FARC, PIRA
Da Costa, Luis
Dahroug, Mohamed Dahroug
Damnjanovic, Tomislav
Da Costa DTO, FARC, Hezbollah, Russian
crime groups
Al Qaeda, Hamas
Italian mafia
Echeverry, Londono Rodrigo
El Din, Sheik Khaled Rezek El Sayed Take
El Shukrijumah, Adnan G.
Escobar, Rodrigo Granda
FARC
Hamas, Hezbollah
Al Qaeda
FARC
Fadel, Sheik Mounir
Fayad, Sohbi Mamoud
Fayed, Salhed Mahmoud
Fontan, Arturo Cubillas
Fundamentalist Latin American Muslim
businessmen
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
ETA, FARC
Al Qaeda, Colombian DTOs, Hamas,
Hezbollah, Mexican DTOs
Godoy, Luis Felipe Moreno
Gogeaskoetxea, Ibon
FARC
ETA
Hamajo, Maher
Hamdan, Moussa Ali
Hamia, Talal
Harb, Abbas Hussein
Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Ayman Joumaa network
Colombian DTOs, FARC, Harb drug and
money laundering ring, Hezbollah, North
Valley DTO, Oficina de Envigado
Hezbollah
Harb drug and money laundering ring
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Harb, Chekry
Harb, Dib Hani
Harb, Zacaria
Henareh, Siavosh
Hijazi, Kassem
Hodroj, Hassan
98
Actor
Affiliation
Ibarguen-Palacio, Jorge Abel
Issa, Oumar
Iyekhoro, Raymond Davies
FARC
Al Qaeda, AQIM, FARC
Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO
Joumaa, Ayman
Ayman Joumaa network, Colombian DTOs,
Hezbollah, Los Zetas, Oficina de Envigado
Kan’an, Fawzi
Karaki, Hasan Antar
Kassir, Abdallah
Khasraji, Iman Tareb
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Al-Mukawama
Makki, Bassam Gharbi
Makled, Walid
Malyschew, Sergei
Mardirossian, Paul
Marin, Pedro Antonio Marin
Marquez, Ivan
Martinez-Guillen, Hector Antonio
McAuley, Martin
Murillo, Diego Fernando
Muskhab, Abu
Hezbollah
FARC, Hezbollah
Al Qaeda
FARC
FARC
FARC
FARC
FARC, PIRA
Al Qaeda, Al-Mukawama, Hamas,
Hezbollah
FARC
Da Costa DTO
Hezbollah
Al Qaeda, Camorra crime group, FARC,
Mexican DTOs, Solntsevo
Al Qaeda
FARC, PIRA
FARC
Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic
Group, Islamic Jihad
Harb drug and money laundering ring,
Oficina de Envigado
Al Qaeda
Naboulsi, Hassan
Nasr, Jameel
Nasrallah, Hasas
Nassereddine, Abdallah
Nassereddine, Oday
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Mehri, Ali Khalil
Mendieta, Jorge Enrique Rodriguez
Mendoza, Nelson
Merhi, Moustapha Khalil
Mogilevich, Sermon Yukovich
Mohammed, Khalil Sheikh
Monaghan, Jim
Morales, Edgar Gustavo Navarro
Mukhlis, El Said Hassan Ali Mohamed
99
Actor
Affiliation
Obeid, Kais
Olaskoaga, Jose Ignacio
Omar, Midhat Mursi al-Sayid
Orozoco, Maximiliano Bonilla
Hezbollah
ETA, FARC
Al Qaeda
EIN, Los Zetas, Oficina de Envigado
Padilla, Omar Arturo Zabala
Panamanian Muslim businessmen
Paracha, Saifullah
Paz, Sheik Karim Abdul
FARC
Hamas, Hezbollah
Al Qaeda
Hezbollah
Qasmani, Arif
Al Qaeda
Rabbani, Mohsen
Ramirez, Gerardo Aguilar
Reda, Salman
Rios, Ivan
Rojas, Noe Suarez
Hezbollah
FARC
Hezbollah
FARC
FARC
Saade, Maroun
Saenz, Guillermo
Salazar, Victor Manuel Vargas
Saleh, Hassam
Saleh, Mazen Ali
Shakuri, Gholam
Silva, Henry de Jesus Rangel
Silva, Luis Edgar
Smulyan, Andrei
Hezbollah
FARC
ETA, FARC
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Qods Forces
FARC
FARC, Solntsevo
FARC
Tabataba’I, Mohsen
Tariq, Nazmut
Taruk, Zulkuf
Torres, Guillermo
Toure, Harouna
Hezbollah
Al Qaeda
Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO
FARC
AQIM, FARC
Umeh, Chigbo Peter
FARC
Wehbe, Bachar
Hezbollah
Yassine, Saleh Abdul Karim
Yousef, Jaml
Hamas
FARC, Hezbollah
100
Actor
Affiliation
Zaiter, Houssein
Zaiter, Hussein Mustafa
Zaiter, Rady
Zaiter, Raza
Zamora, Ruben
Zengotitabengoa, Andoni
Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO
Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO
Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO
Hezbollay, Zaiter DTO
FARC
ETA
101
APPENDIX TWO: EXTREMIST AFFILIATIONS
Extremist group
Affiliation
Abadallah, Ali Hassan
Abdul, Kalim Ad Raja
Abelrahman, Idriss
Al-Aal, Muhammad Abed Abd
Albert, Maria Remedios Garcia
Ali, Khalid Hussein
Al-Liby, Abu Faraj
Al-Masri, Sharif
Al-Salam, Said Jan Abd
Assad, Sheik Suhail
Ayestaran, Jose Lorenzo
Hezbollah
Al Qaeda
AQIM, FARC
AQIM, Islamic Jihad, FARC
FARC
Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda
Hezbollah
ETA, FARC
Banol-Ramos, Yarlei
Barakat, Ahmad Akraam
Barakat, Ahmad Assad
Barakat, Hassan Ali
Barakat Hattem
Becerra, Joaquin Perez
Berro, Ibrahim
Briceno, Jorge
FARC
Hezbollah
Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, FARC
Hezbollah
Hattem
FARC
Hezbollah
FARC
Connolly, Niall
FARC, PIRA
Dahroug, Mohamed Dahroug
Al Qaeda, Hamas
Echeverry, Londono Rodrigo
El Din, Sheik Khaled Rezek El Sayed Take
El Shukrijumah, Adnan G.
Escobar, Rodrigo Granda
FARC
Hamas, Hezbollah
Al Qaeda
FARC
Fadel, Sheik Mounir
Fayad, Sohbi Mamoud
Fayed, Salhed Mahmoud
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
102
Extremist group
Affiliation
Fontan, Arturo Cubillas
Fundamentalist Latin American Muslim
businessmen
ETA, FARC
Gogeaskoetxea, Ibon
ETA
Hamdan, Moussa Ali
Hamia, Talal
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Ibarguen-Palacio, Jorge Abel
Issa, Oumar
FARC
Al Qaeda, AQIM, FARC
Kan’an, Fawzi
Kassir, Abdallah
Khasraji, Iman Tareb
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Al-Mukawama
Makki, Bassam Gharbi
Malyschew, Sergei
Marin, Pedro Antonio Marin
Marquez, Ivan
McAuley, Martin
Mukhlis, El Said Hassan Ali Mohamed
Hezbollah
Al Qaeda
FARC
FARC
FARC, PIRA
Al Qaeda, Al-Mukawama, Hamas,
Hezbollah
FARD
Hezbollah
Al Qaeda
FARC, PIRA
FARC
Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic
Group, Islamic Jihad
Naboulsi, Hassan
Nasr, Jameel
Nasrallah, Hasan
Nassereddine, Abdallah
Nassereddine, Oday
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Obeid, Kais
Olaskoaga, Jose Ignacio
Omar, Midhat Mursi al-Sayid
Hezbollah
ETA, FARC
Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah
Mehri, Ali Khalil
Mendieta, Jorge Enrique Rodriguez
Merhi, Moustapha Khalil
Mohammed, Khalil Sheikh
Monaghan, Jim
Morales, Edgar Gustavo Navarro
103
Extremist group
Affiliation
Padilla, Omar Artuoro Zabala
Panamanian Muslim businessmen
Paracha, Saifullah
Paz, Sheik Karim Abdul
FARC
Hamas, Hezbollah
Al Qaeda
Hezbollah
Qasmani, Arif
Al Qaeda
Rabbani, Mohsen
Ramirez, Gerardo Aguilar
Reda, Salman
Rios, Ivan
Rojas, Noe Suarez
Al Qaeda
FARC
Hezbollah
FARC
FARC
Saenz, Guillermo
Salazar, Victor, Manuel Vargas
Saleh, Hassam
Saleh, Mazen Ali
Shakuri, Gholam
Silva, Luis Edgar
FARC
ETA, FARC
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Qods Forces
FARC
Tabataba’i-Makki, Mohsen
Tariq, Nazmut
Torres, Guillermo
Toure, Harouna
Hezbollah
Al Qaeda
FARD
AQIM, FARC
Yassine, Saleh Abdul Karim
Hamas
Zamora, Ruben
Zengotitabengoa, Andoni
FARC
ETA
104
APPENDIX THREE: CRIMINAL AND EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS AND
AFFILIATIONS
Organization
Crime group/mafia
’Ndrangheta
Albanian, Balkan, Bulgarian,
Camorra, Italian, Russian,
South American, Turkish
Al Qaeda
Chechen, Chinese, Mara
Salvatrucha, Russian,
Solntsevo
Groups
Extremist
group
Colombian, Gulf, Los
Zetas,
Mexican, Sinaloa
ETA, FARC
FARC
Colombian, Mexican,
Moroccan
AQIM
Albanian crime
DTO
Bulgarian, Camorra,
Chechen, Chinese, Italian,
'Ndrangheta, Turkish
Colombian, Serbian,
South American, Serbian
Harb drug and money
laundering ring
Colombian, Los Zetas,
Oficina de Envigado
FARC
Ayman Joumaa
Network
Hezbollah
Balkan arms
Dealers
Camorra
ETA, PIRA
Balkan crime groups
'Ndrangheta, Camorra,
Italian
Bulgarian crime groups
'Ndrangheta, Albanian,
Serbian, Turkish
Camorra
Albanian, Balkan arms
dealers, Italian, 'Ndrangheta,
South American, Solntsevo,
Turkish
105
PIRA
Gulf, Los Zetas,
Mexican
ETA
Organization
Crime group/mafia
DTO
Chaldean organized
crime group
Sinaloa
Cheaitelly/El Khasa
crime group
Colombian and Mexican
Chechen mafia
Albanian, East European,
Italian, Mexican human
smuggling rings, Russian,
Turkish
Al Qaeda
Chilean mafia
Islamic Group
Chinese human
smuggling rings
Mexican human smuggling
rings
Chinese mafia
Albanian, East European
Colombian DTOs
'Ndrangheta, Albanian,
Ayman Joumaa Network,
Cheaitelly/ElKhasa crime
group, East European, Harb
drug and money laundering
ring, Italian, Solntsevo
Al Qaeda,
PIRA
Moroccan, Serbian
AQIM, ETA,
FARC
FARC,
Hezbollah
Da Costa DTO
East European crime
groups
Extremist
group
Chechen, Chinese, Italian
Colombian, South
American
European crime groups
FARC
PIRA
ETA
'Ndrangheta, Balkan arms
dealers, Camorra
Colombian
FARC, Hamas,
PIRA
FARC
'Ndrangheta, East European,
Harb drug and money
laundering ring, Russian,
Solntsevo
Colombian, Da Costa,
Gulf, Los Rastrojos,
Mexican, North Valley,
Sinaloa, Tijuana
Al Qaeda,
AQIM, ETA,
Hezbollah,
PIRA
Gulf DTO
'Ndrangheta, Camorra,
Italian
Los Zetas
FARC
Mexican
ETA,
Hezbollah
Hamas
106
Organization
Crime group/mafia
DTO
Extremist
group
Harb drug and money
laundering ring
Ayman Joumaa network
Colombian, North Valley
FARC,
Hezbollah
Hezbollah
Ayman Joumaa network,
Lebanese, Mara Salvatruch,
Harb drug and money
laundering ring, Lebanese
Da Costa, Los Zetas,
Mexican, Zaiter
Hamas, Islamic
Jihad, FARC
Islamic Group
Chilean, Ming crime family,
Sung-I
Islamic Jihad
Italian mafia
Hezbollah
Albanian, Balkan, Camorra,
Chechen, East European,
'Ndrangheta, Russian, South
American, Turkish
Colombian, Gulf, Los
Zetas, Mexican, Sinaloa
Lebanese mafia
Hezbollah
Los Rastrojos DTO
Los Zetas DTO
'Ndrangheta, Ayman Joumaa
Network, Camorra, Italian
Mara Salvatrucha
Mexican DTOs
Camorra, Cheaitelly/El
Khasa, Italian, Mara
Salvatrucha, 'Ndrangheta,
Russian, Solntsevo
Mexican human
smuggling rings
Chechen mafia, Chinese
human smuggling rings
Mexican, Sinaloa
FARC
Gulf
Hezbollah
Mexican, Sinaloa
Al Qaeda,
Hezbollah
North Valley, Los
Rastrojos
AQIM, FARC,
Hamas,
Hezbollah
Ming crime family
Islamic Group
Moroccan DTOs
North Valley DTO
Harb drug and money
laundering ring
Oficina de Envigado
DTO
Harb drug and money
laundering ring, Ayman
Joumaa Network
107
Colombian
AQIM
Mexican
FARC
Organization
Crime group/mafia
DTO
PIRA
Balkan arms dealers,
Bulgarian, Chinese,
European
Russian crime groups
Chechen, Italian,
'Ndrangheta, Turkish
Mexican, South
American, Da Costa
Serbian DTO
Albanian
Colombian
Sinaloa DTO
'Ndrangheta, Chaldean
organized crime group,
Italian, Mara Salvatrucha
Los Rastrojos
Extremist
group
ETA, FARC
Al Qaeda,
FARC
FARC
Colombian,
Solntsevo
Camorra
Mexican
South American crime
groups
'Ndrangheta, Camorra,
Italian
South American DTO
Albanian, East European,
Russian
Al Qaeda,
FARC
Sung-I
Islamic Group
Tijuana DTO
FARC
Turkish
'Ndrangheta, Albanian,
Bulgarian, Russian, Camorra,
Chechen, Italian
Zaiter DTO
Hezbollah
108
APPENDIX FOUR: DEFINITIONS
Agent
Individual members of either a criminal or extremist group.
Arms trafficking
Engage in the illicit sale and movement of weapons into a country, region or area.
Boundary spanner
A network analysis term indicating a node is able to connect nodes or parts of the
network together.
Boundary spanner potential
A network analysis metric that indicates the potential capability of a node to connect
nodes or parts of a network together.
Broker
Individual or group acting as a middleman between individuals or groups.
Business relationship
Relationship that facilitates the business process.
Capability
Individual's or group's capacity or potential to pursue a course of action.
109
Crime
Illegal or illicit activity.
Crime group
Organizations or individual members of an organization involved in any illegal or illicit
activity.
Drugs
Illegal substance, such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin.
Drug trafficking
Engage in the illicit sale and movement of illegal drugs into a country, region or area.
Extremist
Individual or group with political ideologies that use violence to impair the activities or
policies of the current political governing system. Extremists will be defined as an
individual or group who commit violent acts to achieve their political, ideological or
religious goals or to incite fear. These actions can be committed against civilians,
governments, or property.
Extremism
Violent acts perpetrated against civilians, governments or property for political,
ideological or religious purposes or to incite fear within governments or civilians.
Facilitator
Individual, who contributes to an act or activity, provides assistance to an individual or
group provides a safe haven.
Fundamentalist Muslim Businessmen
110
Term refers to individuals but used as a collective term when referring to them.
Fundraiser
Individual who raises money to provide to extremist groups.
Group
Individuals who collectively are members of the same organization.
Intent
An individual's or group's goal or objective to pursue a course of action.
Islamic
Individual who is of Arab descent or a group whose members are composed of
individuals who are of Arab descent. An individual or group who adheres to the
teachings of Islam and who adheres to the belief that Islam should be incorporated into a
political system.
Latin America
Mexico and Central and South America.
Money laundering
Process or activity to conceal the source of money earned from an illegal or illicit
activity.
Network
Individuals, individual members of groups, or groups who conduct business, activities,
training or services with other individuals, groups or with individual members of a group.
Node
Entity comprised of an individual, groups of individuals or organizations.
111
Supplier
Individual or group who provides a service or commodity.
TBA
Tri-border region in South America comprised of the contiguous borders of Argentina,
Brazil, and Paraguay.
Training
Procedure to increase the level of expertise in an activity.
Transnational
Organization that operates globally.
Unconventional weapons capability
Demonstrated interest and/or organizational capacity to acquire, produce, purchase or
train others in the use or construction of biological weapons.
112
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BIOGRAPHY
Jenna R. Frost received her Doctor of Chiropractic degree from Texas Chiropractic
College in Pasadena, Texas. Following graduation, she was the owner and sole
practitioner of Inwood Forest Chiropractic Clinic in Houston, Texas. Her later
employment included positions with Congressman Bill Archer (R-TX), 7th District as
district representative in his Houston office before moving to Washington, DC to work in
his Washington office as a legislative aide. Upon his retirement from public office, she
assumed the position as Professional Staff Member with the U.S. House Committee on
Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security. Her subsequent employment was as
a Congressional Liaison with the Office of Legislation and Congressional Affairs for the
Social Security Administration.
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