AlAL FORUM No. 42
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECISIONS BY PRIVATE BODIES
Andrew Buckland*
Jayne Higgisson*
Introduction
It has been said that '(t)he primary purpose of administrative law ... is to keep the powers of
government within their legal bounds'.' In engaging in judicial review, the courts have
historically viewed their role in terms of the declaration and enforcement of the law which
determines the limits and governs the exercise of public power.' Accordingly, judicial review
has traditionally been concerned with the 'enforcement of the rule of law over executive
a~tion'.~
However, as government functions are increasingly outsourced to private bodies, a question
arises as to whether, and on what basis, ' p r i ~ a t ebodies
'~
can be subject to judicial review.
The Australian courts have not yet given a definitive answer to this question. In the recent
d
three members
High Court decision of NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd vAWB ~ t (NEAT),
d the Court (:dcHi;gh, Hayne and Callinan JJ) indicated that the private nature of a body is a
factor counting against its being subject to judicial re vie^,^ but refrained from answering the
general question of when public law remedies may be granted against private bodies.
Anglo-Australian courts have traditionally focussed on the source of a body's power to
determine whether the exercise of that power is subject to judicial review: power sourced
from statute will be subject to public law constraints enforceable by way of judicial review,
whereas contractual power is not so limited. Each of the judges in NEATlargely followed this
approach, with the Court dividing on the question of whether the relevant private body was
exercising 'statutory power' ori in the language of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial
Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act), whether it made a 'decision of an administrative character ...
under an enactment'.
in cases where the source of the relevant power is neither siaiiiioi); iior contractual, the
English courts have looked to the nature of the power in order to determine whether private
bodies are subject to judicial review. Where the power can properly be characterised as
'public' in nature, judicial review may be avaiiable.
Apart from a few early exceptions,' Australian courts are yet to embrace this 'public power'
test. NEAT recently presented the High Court with the opportunity to give some indication as
to whether Australian courts would follow the English lead in this area, but that opportunity
was passed up by all members of the Court except Kirby J, who gave limited consideration
to the issue.
This paper presents an overview of these two bases on which the courts have found that
judicial review of private bodies may be available - namely, where there has been an
exercise of statutory power on the one hand (see Part B), and where there has been an
*
Office of General Counsef, Australian Government Solicitor. The views expressed here do not
necessarily represent those of the Commonwealth.
AlAL FORUM No. 42
exercise of public power on the other (Part C ) ,and discusses the extent to which Australian
courts have been willing to use 'public power' as a criterion for determining whether a body
is subject to judicial review.
Although the High Court in NEATdid not indicate when (if ever) the exercise of non-statutory
powers by private bodies will be subject to judicial review, there are some indications in
NEAT, as well as in the English case law, as to when the exercise of such powers will not be
subject to review. These factors are considered in Part D.
Finally, we consider a third basis, often overlooked, on which the exercise of power by
private bodies can be limited by public law constraints. Although Anglo-Australian courts
have typically held that the exercise of contractual power is not subject to judicial review,
there is an existing body of law under which contractual power exercised by 'domestic
tribunals' and certain other bodies may be reviewed in private law actions on grounds that
are, in many respects, analogous to the common law grounds of judicial review. Part E
presents a brief overview of this body of law.
When does a private body exercise statutory power?
The conferral of a specific power by statute on a public body carries with it public law
limitations as required by the constitutionB and as implied as a matter of common law or
statutoy interpretation. The same should be true of statutory power conferred on private
bodies. However, following NEAT, it seems that a different standard applies in determining
whether a statute confers power on a private body as opposed to a public body."
Accordingly, there may be some difficulty in identifying when a power exercised by a private
body is statutory. This difficulty is highlighted by the decision in NEAT itself, where the High
Court split 3:2 as to whether review, either at common law or under the ADJR Act, was
available against AWB (International) Ltd (AWBI), a private company that was given a role
under a statutory scheme regulating the export of wheat." The Court delivered three
separate judgments, each of which took a different approach to the question of review based
largely on the statutory context in which AWBl operated. It is helpful to briefly run through
that context before considering the judgments.
-
The decisi~~3n
h NEAT what did A WBI 6CQ7
The Wheat Marketing Act 1989 (Cth) (the Wheat Act) prohibited the expofi of wheat without
the consent of the Wheat Export Authority, a statutory authority established by the Wheat
Act. In turn, the Wheat Authority could not give its consent without the prior approval of
AWBI.
AWBl was a wheat grower-owned company limited by shares and incorporated under the
Corporations Law of Victoria. Under its constitution, the business of AWBl was to be
conducted in the interests of maximising returns to growers.
The Wheat Act did not lay down any procedure to be foliowed by AWBl in giving or refusing
its approval, or any considerations that AWBl was required to take into account.
Furthermore, the Trade Practices Act 1974 did not apply to 'anything done' by AWBl under
the relevant sections of the Wheat Act. AWBl was not required to obtain the Wheat
Authority's consent in order to export wheat.
NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd (NEAT Domestic) had applied to the Wheat Authority for its
consent to the export of a bulk shipment of wheat. The Authority refused the application
because AWBl did not give its approval. NEAT Domestic sought review of AWBl's
withholding of approval on the basis that AWBl was acting in accordance with a rule or policy
AlAL FORUM No. 42
without regard to the merits of the particular application. This required first establishing that
AWBl was subject to judicial review either on the basis that it made a 'decision of an
administrative character ... under an enactment' for the purposes of the ADJR Act, or
because it was subject to common law judicial review. The Federal Court dismissed the
application by NEAT Domestic at both first instance and on appeal.
On appeal, the High Court split as follows:
o
A majority of the Court (McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ) in a joint judgment held that
public law remedies did not lie against AWBI, either pursuant to the ADJR Act or, it
seems, at common law.
e
Gleeson CJ held that, if the decision was reviewable under the ADJR Act (which he
thought it was), AWBl had not breached the relevant ground of review. Gleeson CJ did
not consider common law judicial review.
Kirby J held both that the decision was reviewable under the ADJR Act and that the
ground of review invoked by NEAT Domestic was made out. Like Gleeson CJ, Kirby J
did not consider the availability of judicial review at common law, except to note that
different, although re!ated, questions may arise in that context.
Why did the joint judges find that public law rmedies were not avaiialable?
The joint judges gave three reasons why AWBl was not subject to judiciai review in
performing the roie it did under the Act. The first was the statutory context, which was
sufficient for their Honours to conclude that the Wheat Act did not confer statutory authority
on AWBl and that AWBl did not make a 'decision under an enactment' for the purposes of
the ADJR Act. The other two reasons were the private nature of AWBl and the
incompatibility of any public law obligations with AWBl's existing private obligations. These
two considerations are discussed further in Part C below.
In relation to the first reason, three factors appeared to be relevant to the joint judges'
conclusion that AWBI was not exercising a statutory power and did not make a decision
under an enactment.'*
First, the legislation already conferred statutory power on the Wheat Authority to consent to
the export of wheat.
Second, the Wheat Authority derived its functions and powers entirely from the Wheat Act.
The power to consent to the export of wheat was conditional on approval from AWBI. Thus
AWBl's determination was characterised as only a condition precedent to the lawful exercise
of power by the Wheat Authority (the latter being the relevant 'operative and determinative'
decisiont3).
Third, unlike the Wheat Authority, AWBl did not need a specific statutory power to give it
capacity to provide an approval in writing - as a company it already had power to make a
decision and to express that decision in writing.
This analysis arguably proceeded on the assumption that only one exercise of power could
be subject to review. In this the joint judges were clearly influenced by the line of ADJR Act
cases that distinguish between a preliminary decision (which will usually not be subiect to
review) and an operative and determinative decision (which will usually be subject to
review). The joint judges did not, however, 'expressly address whether this was a case where
the statute specifically authorised an interim decision, which is a recognised exception to the
general rule that only "final' decisions are reviewable under the ADJR ~ c t . ' ~
AlAL FORUM No. 42
On the joint judges' approach, it was 'neither necessary nor appr~priate"~
to read the Act as
impliedly conferring statutory power on AWBI. It was not necessary because, unlike the
Wheat Authority, AWBI was not a creature of statute and already had power to create written
documents; it was not appropriate because the majority had already concluded that the
Wheat Authority made the relevant 'operative decision' for the purposes of the ADJR Act.
In this way, the joint judges both decided that AWBl was not subject to review under the
ADJR Act because it did not make the operative and determinative decision, and eliminated
one of the bases on which AWBl could be subject to judicial review at common law, namely,
that AWBl was exercising statutory power.16 In doing so, the joint judges drew a sharp line
between the Wheat Authority, a statutory body that exercised statutory power, and AWBI, a
private body that exercised private power.
This distinction would also seem to indicate that few statutes will ever be construed as
conferring statutory power on a private body. This is because private bodies such as
companies and natural persons normally already have the capacity to do things (such as
make decisions) which, if done by public bodies for the purposes of a statutory scheme,
would require statutory authority. It may be, however, that in the absence of a public body
such as the Wheat Authority from the statutory scheme, the Court would have been more
willing to find that the Wheat Act did confer power on AWBI.
What did Gleeson C4 and Kirby 4 say?
in coiitiasi to the majcriiij;, b ~ t hGfeeson 6 J and Kirbj; J Iookec! more broadly at the effect
given to AWBl's actions by the Wheat Act, and did not draw such a sharp distinction
between AWBl and the Wheat Authority. So, for example, Gleeson CJ noted that what AWBI
did was:
... in substance, the exercise of a statutory power to deprive the Wheat Export Authority of the
capacity to consent to the bulk export of wheat in a given case."
Similarly, Kirby J concluded that AWBl had made a decision of an administrative character
under an enactment. In doing so, Kirby J focussed less on whether AWBl's power derived
from the Wheat Act, and more on whether there was an appropriate nexus between that
power and the Wheat Act. He concluded there was such a nexus, including because:
... AWBl had conferred upon it the power to exercise a key influence on the regulatory process and
the conduct of a public authority. ... It follows that it is the wheat] Act that provides for, requires, and
gives legal force to, AWBl's "decisions" relevant to NEAT'S applications.18
WiII ii be so#icbnt if the powers are exereke6 in C P ~s t a t u t ~ yc~fifex??
Even though the majority in NEATconcluded that AWBl did not exercise statutory power, it
is clear that AWBE was exercising power in a statutory context. Whether this provided a
sufficient basis on which to subject AWBI to common law judicial review was not explicitly
considered by the joint judges.
There are, however, several decisions of State Supreme Courts that have subjected private
bodies to judicial review on the basis of the legislative context in which they operate. In
particular, there is a line of cases where the internal decisions of registered political parties
have been subjected to judicial review, on the basis that such parties are recognised by, and
registered under, the Commonwealth Electoral Act f9d8.19Review has usually been sought
on the basis that the particular party has acted uitra vires in breach of party ruies. The effect
df these decisions has thus been to give substantive legal effect to those party rules, even
though the rules are neither legislative nor contractual. This is a consequence the courts
have not explicitly recognised.
AIAL FORUM No. 42
The basis on which courts have reviewed these decisions has not been persuasively
articulated. It may be that the fact that the relevant power is exercised in a statutory context
indicates that a private body is exercising 'public power', and that the exercise of public
power is subject to judicial review. This is discussed in the following section.
Is the exercise of 'public power' subject to judicial review?
-
The Datafin principle is the body exercising 'pubiic power'?
The English courts similarly accept that judicial review will be available against a private
body where the source of the relevant power is statutory. However, they have also
recognised an alternative basis on which private bodies may be subject to judicial review,
namely, where the body is exercising 'public power'. The key authority in this area is the
decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers; Ex parte f3atafinZ0
(Datafin).
In Datafin, review was sought of a decision of the Panel on Take-over$ and Mergers. The
Panel was a non-statutory, unincorporated association with some government
representation within its membership. It had no statutory, prerogative or common law powers
and was not in a contractual relationship with the financial market or with those who deal in
that market.
One of the key functions of the Panel was to administer the City Code on Take-overs and
Mergers. kiihough the Panel iiad no power to efiforce the Code, a decision by the Paiiei :ha:
there had been a material breach of the Code could result in the imposition of various
statutory sanctions and penalties, including the exclusion or suspension of a listed company
from the stock exchange.
In considering whether decisions of the Panel were amenable to judicial review, the Court
rejected the submission that the source of a body's power is the sole test for determining
amenability to judicial review. in this respect, LIoyd LJ noted as follow^:^'
Of course the source Q! the power will often, perhaps usually, be decisive. If the source of power is a
statute, or subordinate legislation under a statute, then clearly the body in question will be subject to
judicial review. If, at the other end of the scale, the source of power is contractual, as in the case of
private arbitration, then ciea*; the arbitra?crIs net si?bjeci to judicia! review ... But in between these
extremes there b an area in which it is helpful to look not just at the source of the power but at the
nature of the power. If the body in question is exercising public law functions, or if the exercise of its
functions have public law consequences, then that may, as Mr. Lever submitted, be sufficient to bring
the body within the reach of judicial review.
The Court noted that there were a number of features of the Panel and its decisions that
indicated that it was effectively exercising 'public power'. In particular, it was clear that the
Panel performed an integral role in the government's regulation of the financial marketsz2
and made decisions that had a significant effect on a number of persons, many of whom had
not consented to its exercise of power.23Accordingly, the Panel operated as 'an integral part
of a system which has a public law character', was 'supported by public law in that public law
sanctions are applied if its edicts are ignored' and performed 'public law function^'.^^
Has Datafin been applkd h Australia?
Typing Centre of New South Wales v Toose
While Australian courts have on occasion referred to Datafin with apparent appr~val,'~
the
decision appears to have only been directly applied once, in Typing Centre of New South
Wales v Toosk6 ( Toose).
AiAL FORUM No. 42
In Toose, review was sought of a decision of the Advertising Standards Council (the ASC).
The ASC played a key role in the system of self-regulation adopted by the advertising
industry. One of its main functions was to receive and determine complaints of breaches of
advertising standards promulgated by the Media Council. Most of the proprietors of
commercial media in Australia were members of the Media Council, which was in turn a
party to the charter that established the ASC. The Media Council could impose sanctions
upon the relevant advertising agency where the ASC had found that an advertiser had
breached the advertising standards. In addition, no media proprietor would accept an
advertisement for publication following such a finding by the ASC.
The relevant decision under challenge in Toose was a finding by the ASC that an
advertisement published by the plaintiff was incorrect and misleading in contravention of the
Advertising Code of Ethics. The plaintiff sought review of the ASC's decision on the basis
that the ASC had failed to observe the requirements of natural justice.
In considering whether the ASC was subject to judicial review, Mathews J referred to the
reasoning in Datafin, noting that 'the real issue is whether it is exercising public functions, or
functions which have public law consequences, or, as Lord Donaldson would have it,
whether there is a public element in its functions'.*' Mathews J concluded that the ASC was
exercising a 'public function', and could therefore be subject to judicial review in appropriate
circumstances. In this respect, her Honour noted that the ASC had power to interpret the
various advertising codes in precisely the same way as the courts can interpret Acts of
Parliament. Similarly, it provided an alternative forum for dealing with maffers which might
otherwise need to be liiigaied iri the courts. lii addition, its jurisdiction was attracted simply
by means of the publication of a single media advertisement.
~
The decision in Toose was referred to with approval in Doff Industries Pty Ltd v ~ o o s e . 'In
an obiter statement in that case, Ryan J expressly agreed with Mathews J that decisions of
the ASC were amenable to judicial review.30
What has the High Court said about public power?
MEAT presented the Figh Court with the opportunity to expressly adopt or re!ect 'public
power' as a criterion for determining the availability of judicial review. This issue was not,
however, explicitly addressed by the majority, and rated only a brief mention by Kirby J . ~ '
tong before NEAT; and even before Datafin, Murphy 4 had employed the ianguage of 'piikdiic
power' in Forbes v New South Wales Trotting Club ~ t d . ~That
'
case concerned the
obligations of a private trotting club to accord procedural fairness before exercising the
power to warn off persons from courses under iis control. The club had conceded that it was
obliged to provide procedural fairness prior to making such a decision.33In finding that the
applicant in that case was entitled to the relief sought, Murphy J made the foliowing
ob~ervation:~~
There is a difference between public and private power but ... one may shade into the other. When
rights are exercised directly by the government or by some agency or body vested with statutory
authority, public power is obviously being exercised, but it may be exercised in ways which are not so
obvious ... [A] body ... which conducts a public racecourse at which betting is permitted under
statutory authority, to which it admits members of the public on a payment of a fee, is exercising public
power.
This passage was cited with apparent approval by Kirby J in NEAT. 35 However, his Honour
made it clear that he was not expressing any view as to 'whether o i iiiii the criterion of the
exercise of "public power" is sufficiently precise to be accepted as the basis for review of
decisions under the common law',36 notwithstanding his conclusion that 'the observations
AlAL FORUM No. 42
about the nature of public power identified in cases such as Forbes and Datafin are helpful in
analysing whether particular decisions are of an "administrative ~haracter"'.~'
While the majority in NEAT did not consider whether AWBl was exercising 'public power',
the joint judges considered that the 'private' character of AWBl as a company incorporated
under companies legislation for the pursuit of maximising returns to wheat growers, and the
difficulty in reconciling the pursuit of these 'private interests' with public law obligations, were
key reasons why judicial review was not available against AWBI. We outline these
considerations, as well as two other factors that may be relevant to determining when judicial
review will be available against a private body, in the following Part.
When will judicial review not be available?
Although in NEAT the High Court did not expressly consider any basis on which a private
body exercising non-statutory powers will be subject to judicial review, it is possible to derive
from the various judgments certain fa.dors that may indicate when judicial review will not be
available. These factors are:
*
*
compatibility with public law obligations;
whether alternative bodies are subject to review; and
whether there are alternative avenues of review.
The third factor has also been considered by the English courts.
Are public law ob!igations incompatible with a body's private obligations?
One of the reasons for the joint judges' finding in NEATthat AWBl was not subject to judicial
review at common law was that the public law obligations sought to be imposed on AWBl
were incompatible with AWBl's private interests. This was because:
*
the 'private' considerations AWBl could take into account included seeking to maximise
returns by remaining the sole bulk exporter of wheat; and
this consideration (according to the joint judges) outweighed any countervailing public
considerations that could be deiived from the legislation.
It followed for the joint judges that no sensible accommodation could be made between
AWBl's private considerations and any public considerations, and thus that AWBl could
apply a blanket policy without regard to the merits of an individual application. Inerestingly,
the joint judges did not explain why AWBl's private considerations would necessarily
outweigh any countervailing public consideration; indeed there was no express consideration
of what those countervailing considerations might be.
In our view, the majority went too far in excluding all judicial review on this basis. Even
accepting the majority's conclusion that AWBl could not be required to consider the merits of
a particular application, it would have been possible to confine the more general conclusion
that judicial review was not available to the particular ground of review sought to be invoked
in that case. This is analogous to the question of the justiciabiiity of non-statutory execiltive
action in judicial review proceedings, which is ordinarily answered by reference to the
grounds of review on which the application relies.38
In this regard, it is worth noting that English courts have often found it difficult to subject
private bodies to any ground of review other than breach of procedural fairness. This has not
stopped the courts from subjecting private bodies to judicial review and, in recognition of
AlAL FORUM No. 42
this, Lord Donaldson has suggested fashioning an 'innominate' ground of review for such
bodies3'
Are there alternative bodies to review?
Although not necessarily forming an explicit part of the courts' reasoning in decisions
regarding judicial review of private bodies, it appears that the availability of other means of
challenging an exercise of power has influenced the courts' consideration of whether judicial
review is available. Two alternatives are considered below.
First, it may be that the decisions of other bodies in the relevant scheme can be challenged.
So, for example, in NEATthe decision-making process involved two bodies - AWBl and the
Wheat Authority. Although not explicitly relied upon by the joint judges as a separate factor,
the existence of the Wheat Authority, its role in the scheme and its amenability to judicial
review appear to have been factors that shaped the conclusion of the joint judges that AWBl
was not subject to judicial review.40This is in contrast to Kirby J, who appeared to consider
that the fact that the decisions of the Wheat Authority were 'administrative' for ADJR Act
purposes only strengthened the conclusion that the decisions of AWBl should be similarly
~haracterised.~'
Are there alternative avenues of review?
Second, there may be other avenues by which the particular exercise of power can be
chailenged. The availability of other avenues has on occasion led English courts to refuse
judicial review of decisions of private bodies; conversely the absence of alternative avenues
of redress has been a factor in subjecting bodies to judicial review.42So, for example, in R v
, ~Court
~ of Appeal found that a
Jockey Club Disciplinary Committee; Ex parte Aga ~ h a nthe
decision of the Jockey Club was not subject to judicial review on the application of a member
with whom it had a contractual arrangement. However, the Court left open the question of
whether judicial review could be sought by a person with no contractual relationship to the
CIU~.~~
In NEAT, the decisions of AWBl were immune from challenge under the Trade Practices Act
1974. This may have been a factor influencing Kirby J's conciusion that AWBI was subject to
AOJR Act r e ~ i k wThis
. ~ ~ was not, however, facter explicit!^ considered by the ma!ority in
NEAT
a
Accordingly, the fact that the person seeking review is in a contractual relationship with the
re!evant body may indicate that judicial review will not be available. However, whiie judicial
review may not be available, the courts have recognised ihat private bodies may
nevertheless be subject to public law-like obligations enforceable in a private law action. We
briefly consider this form of review in the following Part.
Are contractual powers ever subject tO public law constraints? (the 'club' cases)
At the outset we noted the description of administrative law as being concerned with the
powers of government. Accordingly, it has been said that the common law of judicial review
focuses on the control of government power and that, where the source of the power being
exercised is purely consensual or contractual, judicial review will not be available. The
discussion so far has thus considered when the exercise of power by private bodies may be
subject to public law judicial review. However, it is relevant to note that the activities of
private bodies may also be reviewed in a private law action on grounds that are, in many
respects, analogous to the common law grounds of review.46
AlAL FORUM No. 42
In this final section we briefly consider this form of private law review with reference to the
'club cases'. These cases deal with private dispute resolution bodies often found within clubs
or associations, which are sometimes referred to as 'domestic tribunals'.
There are several differences, both procedural and remedial, between this form of review
and public law judicial review:
a
The relevant cause of action is different to traditional judicial review, usually being
framed as an action for breach of contract or breach of trust, or potentially for unlawful
restraint of trade, rather than an application for orders in the nature of prerogative relief,
or relief under judicial review legislation. 47
a
It follows that the remedies available also differ: prerogative relief is unavailable and,
instead, the usual relief is a declaration, often coupled with an injunction. Damages may
also be available.
The standing of a person to bring an action may also vary. So, for example, where the
action is based on breach of contract, it is necessary for the person bringing the action
to establish a contractual relationship with the domestic tribunal, or perhaps a beneficial
interest ir: the contractual right s~ughtte be enforced.48
However, whilst the form of action differs, the grounds on which such 'review' is conducted
largely mirror the public law grounds on which judicial review is conducted. Furthermore, the
reasoning in such cases often mirrors, either explicitly or implicitly, that adopted in judicial
review cases4'
Defining judicial review purely in terms of governmental power or prerogative relief thus risks
ignoring this particular area of law concerning public law-type constraints on the exercise of
power. Indeed, it may be, as Spigelman CJ has suggested, that:
what the future holds is the emergence of general principles of "institutional law", rather than parallel
principles in each of administrative law, corporations law, trade union law and the law of
association^.^^
Conclusion
As the discussion above dernanstrales, the extent !Q which decisions of private bodies may
be subject to judicial review is an issue that has not yet been settled in Australia. The recent
High Court decision in NEAT leaves a number of unresolved questions. For example, when
will a private body be taken to be exercising statutory power? To what extent wiii the
statutory context in which a body operates be a relevant consideration in determining the
availability of judicial review? is the 'private character' of the body a relevant consideration?
To what extent, if at all, will the 'public power' test developed by the English courts be
accepted as the basis for review of decisions under the common law? As governments
continue to adopt alternative means of delivering services traditionally performed by the
executive, it is likely that the Court will again be called upon to consider these issues at
some stage in the future.
Endnotes
1
2
3
4
HWR Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law(7th ed, 1994), p 5.
Seei for example; Attorney-General(NSW! v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35 - 36 per Brennan J.
Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25 at 70 per Brennan J.
We use 'private' here to mean bodies that are not generally considered to be part of government, for
example, bodies that are not the Commonwealth or an officer of the Commonwealth for constitutional
purposes, and similarly not a State or an officer of a State.
AlAL FORUM No. 42
(2003) 198 ALR 179.
See NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd(2003) 198 ALR 179 at 1511, [57]-[63].
Most notably Typing Centre of New South Wales v Toose (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 1511211988),
discussed further below.
See, for example, Plaintiff S157/2002 V Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 11021 per
Gaudron, McHugh Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ (legislation purporting to confer a totally open-ended
discretion 'would appear to lack the hallmark of the exercise of legislative power'). See also Gerlach v
Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478 at [70] per Kirby and Callinan JJ (cited in NEAT Domestic
Trading Pty Ltd v A WB Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at [66] per Kirby J). But compare the approach of Gleeson
CJ in NEAT, where his Honour appears to assume that there may be some powers conferred by statute that
can be exercised without regard to any particular considerations (see NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v
A WB Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at [ l l]).
See, for example, NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at [66]-[68], [l331 per
Kirby J; cf Gleeson CJ at [ l l ] .
NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at [54] per McHugh. Hayne and Callinan
JJ.
In contrast to the outcome in NEAT, there are several examples of State courts judicially reviewing the
power exercised by private bodies on the basis that the power is statutory. These include decisions of
officials in privately run prisons (eg Stewart v Crowley [2002] VSCA 201; Henderson v Beltracchi [l9991
VSC 135 - no issue appears to have been taken in these cases regarding the private nature of the decisionmakers); and the exercise of disciplinary power by the Queensland Turf Club (R v Wadley, Ex p a t e Burton
[l9761 Qd R 286). For an early High Court case in relation to the exercise of legislative-type power in
relation to church property by the NSW Synod of the Church of England see Fielding v Houison (1909) 8
CLR 673 at 439 per lsaacs J.
See N&4T Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v A W6 Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at f521-1551.
See Australian roadc casting ~ i b u n avl Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 336-7per Mason CJ.
See Australian Broadcastina Tribunal v Bond(1990) 170 CLR 321 at 337 per Mason CJ.
See NEAT Domestic ~ r a d iPty
i ~Ltd vA WB Cd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at 1541, emphasis added.
The approach of ihe joini judges in ?EAT illustrcites the potential for overlap between jurisdictlona_l
considerations and the scope of judicial review. At the very least, it is often the case that questions as to a
court's jurisdiction and the limits (if any) on the exercise of a particular power will overlap. For example,
where a body's power is alleged to be constrained because the power is conferred by statute, the question
as to the existence of any such constraint wit1 usually be answered in the same way, and having regard to
the same factors, as the question whether the Federal Court (for example) has jurisdiction pursuant to the
ADJR Act or s.39B(lA)(c) of the Judiciafy Act 1903 (ie whether there is a decision under an enactment or
the matter arises under a law made by the Parliament). The joint judges in NEAT went even further. In
particular, the joint judges referred to ADJR Act case law in holding that the exercise of power by AWBl was
not subject to public law remedies either pursuant to the ADJR Act or at common law.
See NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v A WB Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at [29].
See NEAT Domestic Tradicg Pty LM v P.WB Ltd(2003) 198 ALR 179 at 11191and [l211 -[123].
The line of cases begins with the decision of the Supreme Court (Dowsett J) in Baldwin v Everingham
[l9931 1 QdR 10 regarding the Queensland Division of the Liberal Party. It has been followed on numerous
occasions: Galt v FIegg [2003] QSC 290; Tucksr .Macdon~ie
[200ij QSC 296 (both cases dealing with the
wreseiection of Liberal Party candidate); Clarke v Australian Labour Party (SA Branch) (1999) 74 SASR 109
('stacking8of ALP branches); Thornley v Heffernan (unreported, NSW Supreme Cousi, Brownie J, 25 July
1995) (cancellation of endorsement as Liberal Party candidate). See also Sharples v O'Shea (unreported,
Qld Supreme Court, Atkinson J, 78 August 1999) and Liddle v Central Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid
Service Inc (1999) 150 FLR 142. These cases have ail soughi to distinguish the earlier decision of the High
Court in Cameron V Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358. See also, in relation to judicial review of Church decisions,
Scandreff v Dowling (1992) 27 NSWLR 485 per Priestley JA (Hope AJA agreeing); cf Macqueen v
Frackelton (1909) 8 CLR 673. These authorities are considered in S Gorman, 'Legislative Recognition of
Churches and the lmoiications for Judicial Review' (2002)
.
. 9 Aust Jo ofAdmin Law 84.
[l9871 1 QB 815.
R v Panel on Take-Oversand Mergers; Exparte Datafin [ l 9871 1 QB 815 at 847.
R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers; Ex parte Datafin [ l 9871 1 QB 815 at 838 per Lord Donaldson.
R v Panel on Take-Over's and Mergers; Ex parte Datafin[ l 9871 1 QB 815 at 838 per Lord Donaldson.
R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers; Ewparte Datafin[l9871 1 QB 845 at 836 per Lord Donaldson.
See, for example, Victoria v The Master Builders' Association of Victoria [ l 9951 2 VR 121 at 137 per Tadgell
J and 154, 160 - 161 and 163 per Eames J; Minister for Local Government v South Sydney City Council
(2002) 55 NSWLR 381 at 385 per Spigelman CJ; McClelland V Burning Palms Surf Life Saving Club [2002]
NSWSC 470 at [81] per Campbell J.
Unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 15/12/1988.
Typing Centre of New South Wales v Toose (unreporiea, N W Supreme Couii, i5112/1388 at 7 S).
Typing Centre of New South Wales v Toose (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 15/12/1988 at 20).
(1994) 127 ALR 654.
Doff industries Pty Ltd v Toose (1994) 127 ALR 654 at 667.
NEAT Domestic Trading Pty 4td v A WB Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at [ l ll ) - [ l 151.
AIAL FORUM No. 42
(1979) 143 CLR 242.
Gibbs J noted that this concession was 'correctly made': Forbes v New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd
(1979) 143 CLR 242 at 264.
Forbes v New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 242 at 275.
NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v A WB Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at [ l 1l ] .
In this respect, Kirby J referred to P Craig 'Public Law and Control over Private Power' in M Taggart (ed)
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 196 at 198 - 9. Other commentators have questioned the
usefulness of a test based on an amorphous concept of 'public power': see, for example, M Aronson and B
Dyer Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2nd ed, 2000) at 100; A Mason 'Australian Administrative
Law Compared with Overseas Models of Administrative Law' (2001) 31 AlAL Forum 45 at 59; see also the
commentaries referred to by Chief Justice Spigelman in 'Foundations of Administrative Law'(1999) 4 The
Judicial Review 69 at 75.
NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v A WB Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at [ l 151.
See, for example, General Newspapers Pfy Ltd V Telstra Corporation (1993) 45 FCR 164. But compare
Kirby J in NEAT, where his Honour rejected the suggestion by Gyles J in the Federal Court that AWBl
decisions could be taken 'under an enactment' in some circumstances but not others (see NEAT Domestic
Trading Pty Ltd v A WB Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at [ l 281).
R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers; Ex parte Guinness Plc [l9901 1 QB 146, at 159-160; see also Woolf
W at 193-4.
See, for example, the joint judgement in NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v A W6 Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at
[52] ('It is the authority's decision to give its consent which is the operative and determinative decision which
the 1989 Act requires or authorises'), [55] (AWB's decision was a condition precedent to exercise of power
by Authority) [59] (the Wheat Act should not be read as 'shifting' to AWB the obligation to take account of
matters of the kind which the Authority should take account of).
NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v A WB Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at [ l 071, [ l 081.
See for example R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers; Ex parte Datafin [ l 9871 1 QB 815 at 838 per
Donaldson W.
[ l 9931 1 WLR 909.
See R v Jockey Club Disciplinary Committee; Ex parte Aga Khan [:993j I WLR 909 at 324 per Bingham
MR and 930 per Farquharson W. See also McClelland v Burning Palms Surf Life Saving Club 120021
NSWSC 470 at [l 131 per Campbell J.
NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v A W6 Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at [ l 051; see also at [124]-[125]. Gleeson
CJ also referred to the exclusion of the TPA at [27].
For an early example see Dickason v Edwards (1910) l 0 CLR 243.
There have been some suggestions that an independent cause of action may exist in relation to domestic
tribunals, although these suggestions have been made in a context where it was unnecessary to decide the
point, there being a cause of action for breach of contract clearly available. See, for example, Dixon v
Australian Society of Accountants (1989) 95 FLR 231 at 236 (Miles CJ); see also Australian Football
9981 2 VR 546 at 550 per Tadgell JA ('I believe that there is no decision of
League v Carlton Football Club [l
a private or domestic tribunal with which the courts will refuse to interfere if interference be considered
necessary for the attainment of justice.').
For example, by analogy with the reasoning in Trident General Insurance CO Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd
(i988) I 65 eiFi i07.
For example, as with the debate in relation to the jurisprudential basis of judicial review, there is some
divergence in the club cases as to whether the existence of the relevant limitations on power (ie, the
grounds of review) derive from ordinary principles relating to the implication of terms into contracts or,
alternatively, from the common law - see, for example, the cases cited by Campbell J in McClelland v
Burning Palms Surf Life Saving Club [2002] NSWSC 470 at [96]-[97]. Compare also tile suggestion by
Hayne JA in Australian Football League v Carlton Footbali Club [l9981 2 VR 546 at 552 that '[ilt may be that
a decision of the AFL Tribunal which no reasonable person could reach is simply not a "decision" ... within
the meaning of the rules and regulations of the AFL' with the reasoning of the High Court in Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs V Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 and Plaintiff S157/2002 v
Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 195 ALR 24.
JJ Spigelman 'Foundations of Administrative Law' (1999) 4 The Judicial Review 69 at 85.