f. apollonio & c.
Università degli Studi
di Brescia
Dipartimento di
Economia Aziendale
Arnaldo CANZIANI
WHAT AFTER THE TSUNAMI OF 2007-2008:
RECOVERY, INFLATION, STAGFLATION?
Paper numero 123
Università degli Studi di Brescia
Dipartimento di Economia Aziendale
Contrada Santa Chiara, 50 - 25122 Brescia
tel. 030.2988.551-552-553-554 - fax 030.295814
e-mail: [email protected]
Dicembre 2011
WHAT AFTER THE TSUNAMI OF 2007-2008:
RECOVERY, INFLATION, STAGFLATION?
Or financial Causes, monetary Therapies, real Effects
by
Arnaldo CANZIANI
Faculty of Law,
University of Brescia (Italy)
paper accepted at the
3rd ALL CHINA INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE,
APEC Study Center, City University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong, December 14-16, 2009
Abstract
Since 1980, the abundance of public expenditure (in the USA also to
"solve" the crises of the '80ies and '90ies), deregulation, and disputable
financial theories as well, gave life along years i) to real changes in the
attitudes of the public towards both consumerism and debt, ii) to new risky
policies by financial intermediaries.
The new set of expectations by the public, the abundance of liquidity,
and the irresponsiveness of financial agents (from sub-prime credits to the
so-called financial "neutralization" of risk) were among the most important
causes of the Tsunami of 2007-2008, the diagnosis of which is a wellknown one spite of different political accents, weighting of factors, and the
protection of vested interest (HYYTINEN and TAKALO, 2004;
KAUFMAN and SEELING, 2002).
The crisis was "solved" once more —in the Anglo-Saxon world in
particular— by massive injections of liquidity to rescue failed banks, rotten
industrial firms and insurance companies, many of them operating borderline, or even against the law. Here too, problems, risks and consequences
are well-known ones (BERNAUER and KOUBI, 2004; BOISSAY, 2006;
CALOMIRIS and MASON, 2003).
After some wait and see, signals of recovery are at sight mid-2009.
Anyway, problems will emerge in 2010-2011: the abundance of liquidity
will be reabsorbed by Central Banks, so cutting the (potential) inflation but
blocking the recovery? Or will it remain into the system, causing both
recovery and inflation? Or even, under mixed expectations, will it act as a
silk-spin, not being able of any further pressure but giving life to
stagflation?
Summary
Prefazione....................................................................................................... 1
1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 5
2. The economic growth between the end of the Twentieth century
and the beginning of the twenty-first one due to deficit spending
and productive efficiency .......................................................................... 7
3. The crisis of 2008 and its causes, among them financiarization .............. 12
4. The "solution" of the crisis, or liquidity and debts.
The risks of both ...................................................................................... 18
5. The mid-term effects of crisis and therapies: recovery,
stagnation, stagflation? ............................................................................ 24
6. Some further reflections on liquidity, inter-bank solidarity,
and Central Banks .................................................................................... 27
7. Conclusions .............................................................................................. 30
Post-fazione .................................................................................................. 33
Bibliography................................................................................................. 35
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
Prefazione
Nelle scienze sociali, il presente continuato ingorgo di pubblicazioni —
non tutte commendevoli, anzi sempre più sofisticate e via via meno
euristiche— pare dovuto a un insieme di fattori fra i quali i) l'odierno
abbondare di truppe variamente accademiche, ii) la dispersione microanalitica ed empiricista che ci proviene dalle abitudini anglosassoni, iii) il
desiderio di emergere e la ricerca spasmodica —ahinoi— di "successo" e
di "visibilità", iv) l'infittirsi di incontri, seminarî, convegni, congressi per
ragioni tanto scientifiche quanto pubblicitarie, v) infine l'ausilio infinito di
motori di ricerca, banche-dati, documenti, articoli e working papers on line
dai quali potersi facilmente e rapidamente —diciamo così— <ispirare>.
Il modus operandi dello scienziato sociale —non certo del copista o
dell'arrivista accademico— è ovviamente altro, e Benedetto Croce ce lo
insegna dal 19061:
"... l'erudito che sa il fatto suo ... lavora spesso per anni e anni,
tacito e attento, percorrendo una congerie di libri e di documenti; e
vien fuori, in ultimo, con un libro breve o con una memorietta di
poche pagine. Ma quel libro o quella memorietta prendono la
questione al punto in cui essa realmente si trova ... e la fanno
progredire di uno o più passi.".
Così ad esempio Edmund Husserl, che era Husserl, con tutto quel che
pubblicò in vita, e di qualità sovrana, lasciò anche inediti, dei quali
evidentemente non era soddisfatto: sì, lascio 45.000 pagine di inediti.
Per qual motivo allora, con quel che si è appena detto, e con due anni di
ritardo, pubblicare il paper che segue, non solo senz'altro perfettibile, ma
anzi non-risolutivo del tema?
Le motivazioni valgono forse poco, ma sono dovute ad alcuni semplici
rilievi pratici, fra i quali i seguenti: i) il lavoro sembra esprimere una
compatta sintesi descrittiva, forse di qualche ausilio per brevità e per
complemento della vulgata; ii) le conclusioni parziali del medesimo
sembrano tuttora accettabili, anzi l'a. quasi incredulo di sè stesso crederebbe
di poter ritenere in parte valide anche le previsioni allora effettuate; iii) i dati
possono parere obsoleti, ma può facilmente aggiornarli il Lettore medesimo,
così confermando —o modificando— le ipotesi in tema di trend; iv) infine,
poiché per ragioni sia finanziarie sia organizzative il paper, pur accettato,
1
La mancanza di senso scientifico e i libri italiani di filosofia, poi in Cultura e
vita morale, Bari, Laterza, 1913, p. 76
1
Arnaldo Canziani
non venne poi presentato in corpore, era questo l'unico modo per renderlo
disponibile agli eventuali interessati (e, diciamoci la verità, per "guadagnare
punti" ai fini delle classifiche Anvur, come da bambini con le figurine).
Con queste premesse e limiti, e limitati obiettivi contingenti, se ne
propongono i contenuti al Lettore nella forma in cui esso fu scritto
originariamente, solo corretto qualche fatale refuso.
Brescia, Università, dicembre 2011
l'autore
2
"I finanzieri vivono
in un mondo di fantasie.
I 5 dollari li conteggiano
come fossero 100;
e ciò significa che ogni finanziere,
ogni banchiere, ogni operatore di Borsa
è al 95% un alienato.
Ed è nelle mani di questi pazzi
che voi affidate
il destino della vostra nazione!"
(G.B. SHAW, Discorso a New York,
11 aprile 1933)
"Financiers live in a world
of illusion.
Every five dollar they count
as a hundred dollars;
and that means that every financier,
every banker, every stockbroker,
is 95% a lunatic.
And it is in the hands of these lunatics
that you leave
the fate of your country!"
(G.B. SHAW, Address,
New York, April 11, 1933)
3
4
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
1. Introduction
According both with our experience, and every existing indicator, after
the two oil-crises of 1973 and 1980 respectively, and especially after the 1 st
USA-Iraki war of 1990, the world experimented in general —although
asymmetrically from country to country— an unexpected economic
growth.
As it appears in Figure 1, the World Gross Product 1980-2000 grew from
nearly 20 trillions US Dollars to nearly 35, with i) a sharply increasing role
for the United States of America (24,5 to 26,4 per cent), ii) a larger decrease
for Europe (31,1 to 27,2 per cent), iii) the substantial keeping the positions
by Japan (17 to 16,7 per cent) and iv) a dramatic upsurge of East Asia (3,1
to 7,4 per cent).
Figure 1 - The World Gross Product (real) 1980-2000 and its Contributors
(World Bank Data - trillions of US$)
That growth resulted in large advantages for most countries, especially
the ones capable to take part in the new directions of international trade
flows and world demand, were those ones of mass consumer-goods, HR&D
productions, (financial) services or luxury brands. Due to these reasons, for
some countries in particular —China to mention but one— the whole
process resulted in large modernization processes on one side, in the
hoarding of trade surpluses (and foreign currencies reserves) on the other.
For others countries, on the contrary, it ended with larger and larger trade
deficits, not only due to energetic reasons.
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Due to the aforementioned evolution, at world level three groups of
countries could be individuated, and broadly speaking subdivided as follows
(see Figure 2):
a. areas whose exports, mostly raw materials, represent at least 70-75
per cent of trade-flows (Africa; Latin America; Russian Federation
and others former USSR countries);
b. areas matching their trade balances, or so, in some cases with
internal differences (North America, East Asia);
c. areas whose imports account for the 70-75 per cent of trade-flows,
this being due to such factors as industrial decaying on one side,
relative strength of their currency on the other (Euro Europe).
Figure 2 - International Trade Flows (goods)
(Mo nde Diplomatique Annual 2008 – billions US$)
Anyway, paying more detailed an attention, the story of both imports and
exports is a much more interesting one, and a self-speaking one as well.
Looking in fact to Figure 3, one can appreciate the combination of the socalled key-actors in the field: i) countries exporting oil (Norway, Arab
Countries, Russia), ii) countries being heavy exporters of manufactured
goods (Japan, China, Germany), countervailed by iii) a small number of big
importers (European Union, Germany apart; Great Britain; the United States
of America on top of them).
6
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
Figure 3 - Deficits and Surpluses of the Balance of Trade (goods)
(billions of US$ - UN data from Monde Diplomatique Annual 2008 )
The most important causal factors of these dynamics, as well as their
drivers, are well-known ones in the international economic literature, spite
of the different weighting of them according to different Authors, and
national cultures. In § 2. two among them —namely deficit spending and
productive efficiency— are specially underlined, to pass rapidly in para. 3.
and 4. to the crisis of 2008 in its causes and (so-called) solutions.
2. The economic growth between the end of the Twentieth century and
the beginning of the twenty-first one due to deficit spending and
productive efficiency
The reason most commonly alleged in some Western countries for the
abovementioned growth —a true one as a matter of fact— is the coming
in power of China, its never-ending capability of selling to the world
incredible amounts of both consumer and industrial products, of growing a
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quality at any moment, its uninterrupted fast growth — a truly astonishing
one (see Figure 4).
Figure 4 - People’s Republic of China nominal GNP 1952-2005
(billions of RMB) (Hitotsubashi compilation on official China data)
This being a well-known story, and a debated topic as well, we limit
ourselves here to the following highlights: i) the development of China
springs from the "four modernizations" policy of Mr. Deng Xiao Ping in the
1980ies: central, authoritative guidance and free initiative as well; ii) that
development sprang also from the clever combination of both modern
technology and low salaries (once compared with North America and
Europe) forged in an export-lead growth model (the value of its exports
amounted to 20 percent of GNP in 2001, to 36 percent in 2007); iii) anyway,
it was also due to (large) foreign investments by Western countries and by
China itself, and strong exchanges of technology, mainly one-way.
Those successful efforts, and results, show once more the effectiveness
of technological progress and gains in productivity, once applied to serve i)
the world demand with competitive an effectiveness, ii) the internal one
with larger and larger an attention.
Anyway —as global offer needs effective demand, inventories and lags
apart— the new role played by PRC (and others countries as well, BRICs
included) within the international arena was made undoubtly possible by:
8
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
a. the growth of world trade as a whole, and the deeper and deeper
productive-commercial-financial
interaction
today
called
globalization;
b. the presence of the aforementioned <big importers>: the European
Union, but especially the United States of America as a single
country,
c. the keeping the value of China Yuan relatively low also due to the
buying of US Dollars, these ones utilized in turn to buy USA
Treasuries.
The never-ending demand for goods by Western countries has now to be
explained, enlightening its origins, as it was due to few main factors,
variously characterizing both some European countries and the USA.
For some European countries —Italy among them— it dealt in fact
with a double process of de-industrialization as well as deficit spending,
both giving life to deficits in trade balances. The same was true, at much
higher a level, for the US, this country still representing more than a quarter
of World National Product, where personal consumption continued to
represent the bulk of the GNP (the expenditure of families accounts
currently for the 70% of their GNP) (Figure 5).
Figure 5 - USA real GNP and its Components
(Cabinet Office Data)
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Arnaldo Canziani
Anyway, we consider relevant here to pay the utmost attention to the
public finance of the same countries.
In this respect, we must remember the repeated and never-ending public
deficits in both the annual accounts and budgets of most Western countries
—from the U.S.A. to Italy (and other) in particular— already before the
crisis of 2008 (US, Figure 6). Those deficits —defended in most cases
under the veil of "social progress" and/or redistribution even when it dealt
with weapons or waste of resources— were intended as a matter of fact to
follow pseudo-keynesian policies oriented on the contrary —jointly in
some cases—: i) to sustain the cycle in any case, without recurring to any
restructuring, retrenchment, or re-discussion of public deficits and the stock
of debt, ii) to favour politicians (and their re-elections), iii) to benefit social
groups linked to government deficits, iv) in some cases at least, to finance
wars here and there all over the world from Iraki to Balkans to Afghanistan.
Figure 6 - U.S.A. Deficits or Surpluses in CBO Budget and Economic Outlook
(CBO data in percentage of GNP)
These continuous balance-deficits —so effective ones in the short and
mid term to stimulate as a matter of fact the effective international demand
although in stop and go a way— were “solved” by either the printing of
currency or the emission of public bonds. These deficit policies, now so
typical for many countries as to get acquainted with them, were actuated for
larger and larger amounts: that's way the causes of growth were not simply
attributable to a new (or renewed) efficacy and efficiency of the economic
systems of many countries, exporters ones in particular (BRICs among
them): more generally, they were permitted by the inexausted public
expenditure, and state-deficits as well.
This was true in particular for the U.S.A., raising a large part of world
savings to sustain their own growth (C. Reinhart, K. Rogoff, 2008) included
10
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
their imperial role in the world, their the weapons industry, last but not least
the spending-addict mentality of their families.
This abundance of (current) public expenditure gave life in fact —along
time— to real, deep changes in the psychologies and attitudes of the public
in the U.S.A. and elsewhere: inspired by media, by models of affluent
consumes, and the commercials as well, the citizens of many countries
tended i) to acquire their own house(s), ii) to turn to consumerism (and to
hyper-consumerism especially in the fields of HI-tech, fashion, dresses,
movies, international or even exotic holydays, cars, furniture, drugs).
This way, the higher the expectations and easy life, the higher the
propensity to subscribe subprime loans and consumption ones as well,
recurring in case to debt to finance pleasant but unaffordable living
standards. In addition, this mentality expanded itself gradually outside the
U.S.A. as a contagion: masses from all over the world tended to promote
themselves into well-off life-styles also through debts: that's the burgeoning
bourgeoisie of some one-billion people which the press is speaking of.
To be true, we must anyway admit that a further, major set of actions
reinforcing or even permitting those tendencies had been especially
activated in the U.S.A.. Here in fact the Federal Reserve made along years
large injections of liquidity (M1) in order to "solve" (so to say) the crises of
the 1980s and 1990s (Figure 7). The Treasury re-financed in fact the
economy, directly or indirectly recurring to the Federal Reserve System and
to larger and larger printing of dollars as it did along the Sixties, when
President Nixon —at the end of the story, 1971— was finally compelled to
suspend the convertibility of the US dollar into gold.
Figure 7 - USA Currency Supply 1959-2007 (billions of US$ - official data)
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Arnaldo Canziani
Along time, the two classical ways to "solve" state-deficits —currency,
bonds— interacted each other and with deposits as well: money supply,
debts, deposits and quasi-money signs cumulated, especially after 1995 and
even more after 1999 (Figures 7, 8). As a result i) in the external arena the
foreign exchange of the US dollar had to front severe challenges, anyway
smoothed by actions by other Central Banks; ii) at the same time, the
abundance of currency, deposits, bonds and derivatives favoured the
aforementioned borrowing (and indebtedness) as well as the so-called
"financiarization" of the economy (§ 3.).
Figure 8 - Components of USA Money Supply 1960-2005
(billions of US$ - official data)
3. The crisis of 2008 and its causes, among them financiarization
This given, we must admit that variations in real factors were not at all
the most important feature of that period: financial variables represented the
other side of the coin, maybe the most important one in causing the crisis of
2008 and its Stock-Exchange reflects (Figure 9).
12
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
Behind the curtain, the world economiy was in fact characterized since a
long time by:
the abundance of national liquidities, giving origin to whole oceans
of international liquidity due to transmission mechanisms;
the endless creation of derivatives;
the increasing leverage of banks and the financial system in general.
Figure 9 - Dow Jones Industrial Average 2007-2009
Once we speak of liquidity and transmission mechanisms, anyway,
obviously we speak of i) bank deposits, ii) deposit multiplier. This way,
nevertheless, we speak of credit offer, the excess of credit offer included;
and this excess curiously —but not by a chance— matched with credit
demand, with its never-ending growth, with —so to say— the excess of
credit demand. This way, two pathological tendencies —of banks on one
side, of clients (families, leveraged firms and leveraged financial
interediaries) on the other— were joined, thus reinforcing that process, and
the credit multiplier as well.
The never ending growing of both M1 and M2 strongly contributed to the
growth of the system: a drogue-addicted but effective a growth, contrary to
the opinion of some scholar saying "monetary policy is the silk-spin which
can hang the economy but never expand it". Maybe this was also due to the
13
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relaxing of monetary controls in general, due to multiple special factors as i)
(excess) confidence in markets, ii) wrong theories on their self-adjustment,
iii) the will to favour the upswing of conjuncture.
This recalls to memory e.g. the old Johannes and Rasche model of
controllability of the money stock (Johannes and Rasche, 1987):
degree of control = 1 / V [ M - M* / IR ], with M* = E [ M / π, IR ],
where it is:
V the variance of the forecast error (M - M*), conditional to the
choice of both π and IR;
π, policy variables;
IR, institutional regime.
The monetary expansion of the system, anyway, was not only based on
different kinds of M, but also on bonds. The abundance of the latter ones,
added to liquidity, permitted on its turn the existence of a true bond
multiplier, i.e. the multiplying the amount of bonds via re-financing: a
generally widespread transforming of risks into paper, giving origin to new,
never-ending amounts of debits ↔ credits.
Now, as in the case of families the new social models orientated —right
or wrong— the behaviour of billions of people, so in these case —maybe
not by a chance— new theories influenced, or even gave life, to new
practices. Better, disputable theories (in this case dating back in principle to
Modigliani and others) gave life to risky (or even dirty) practices in the
banking and financial industries.
So, the wrong (even preposterous) proposal of "squeezing out the risk"
from the economic system permitted, in addition, the selling of bonds so
highly sophisticated as to be totally mysterious ones, from the hedge funds
to the categories today called toxic bonds (these facts are normally more
politely described as "the opacity of the derived securities on the balance
sheets of financial institutions", O. Blanchard, 2009). This way, a crude
definition of SDR by Jacques Rueff, the French academician advisor of
President De Gaulle (the nothing dressed in money), could have been easily
extended to derivatives (the nothing dressed in bonds), financial instruments
that, in both cases, would have met less success were the agents —and
scholars— paying more attention to reality and fairness.
As a conclusion, broadly speaking since 1980, the abundance of public
expenditure, deregulation, and disputable financial theories as well gave life
along years i) to real changes in the attitudes of the public towards both
consumerism and debt, ii) to new risky policies by financial intermediaries.
14
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
The new set of expectations by the public, the abundance of liquidity,
and the irresponsiveness of financial agents (from sub-prime to the so-called
financial neutralization of risk) were among the most important causes of
the Tsunami of 2007-2008, one of the so many in the last four-hundred
years (see Figure 10).
Figure 10 - The Financial Storm 2007-2009
(Monde Diplomatique)
The above-mentioned description of facts drives to diagnoses and
interpretations well-known in economic literature, spite of different political
accents, weighting of factors, and —in case— the protection of vested
interests (Hyytinen and Takalo, 2004; Kaufman and Seeling, 2002).
According to those diagnoses, real and monetary variables must be read
strictly together as the two faces of the same problem, the latter influencing
the former (and vice versa) in the cumulative dynamics of the last 15-20
years or so, a never-ending story of deficits and liquidity, debits and loans,
loans and growth, growth and deficits. Someone tried in fact (J.D. Hamilton,
2009) to concentrate the causal factor of the crisis in the dramatic increase
of prices of raw materials between the end of 2006 (metals) and the end of
2008 (foodstuffs, and moreover crude oil), but these fact, even relevant and
damaging ones, were only one of the consequences of the abovementioned
excess-liquidity, one among its severeal, real effects.
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Arnaldo Canziani
Practically, and as irregular as a thunder, the catalyst of the crisis was
represented by the insolvency of subprime debtors —unpredictable as far as
the very moment was concerned, but frankly predictable (obvious?) from
the systemic point of view—, following these phases later on:
1. losses for banks due to bad credits → 2. sales of assets to re-establish
capital ratios → 3. rumours stemming from both situations, causing runs by
investors → 4. credit crunch as well further sales of assets or re-financing,
but spite of them illiquidity of banks → 5. further propagation from bank to
bank within the banking system at national and international level
(Calomiris, 2008).
The crisis was "solved" once more —in the Anglo-Saxon world in
particular— by massive injections of liquidity to rescue failed banks, rotten
insurance companies (and industrial firms), many of the former ones
operating border-line, or even against the law. Here too, problems, risks and
consequences are well-known ones since decades, both in literature and in
practice (Bernauer and Koubi, 2004; Boissay, 2006; Calomiris and Mason,
2003).
To syntethize we could say that, moving from the 1980ies, the
international economic system was running faster and faster, with obvious
problems of stability. The problems of crisis (or crash) were as evident in
fact as unpredictable in time: the faster you go, the more dangerous the
situation is, but a catalyst is anyway needed to make the situation explode.
This explains the very rare warnings, sure due to widespread personal
interests, but also to the problem of individuating the very moment of the
rupture of that —anyway dangerous— "equilibrium".
After the crash of Lehman Brothers —not the only one to be
opportune, and due— the system crashed as a card-castle. Credits turned
immediately from bad to irrecoveble ones, bonds were no longer
reimbursable, banks got bankrupted and their shares lost rapidly up the 90%
of their value or even more: the system become generally illiquid in a few
weeks. After disorientation Governments —as we all know— choose to
react in totally different a way than in 1929: they re-financed the system,
recreating its liquidity via M1 (and loans) once more, and in many cases
made banks and financial companies helped, rescued, or even acquired by
the State.
Anyway, the crisis was a more serious and deep one than expected: it
progressed unexpectedly with small ups and large downs; important banks
announced large losses, every time definitive ones before the appearing of
further, larger ones; private investments in bonds and shares lost from 50%
to 90% of their market (or face) values.
16
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
As a result, panics peeped out (in most cases together with speculation),
expectations turned from bad to worse all over the world, the general
attitude towards consumes, investments, M&A and so on become wait and
see in best cases. Raw materials too, and rather obviously, registered a drop,
this being particularly true for crude oil after speculation (see Figure 11).
Figure 11 - International Prices of crude Oil, Metals, Foodstuffs
(Il Sole - 24 Ore on official data; percentage average variations)
17
Arnaldo Canziani
As a further result, at global level a drop was registered in international
trade, in 2008 diminishing its volume for the first time since decades. The
peak was maybe reached in the 1st quarter of 2009, this being true for most
Western companies and Japanese ones as well, while in other countries the
situation was in some cases a mixed one. Generally speaking, anyway,
companies presented losses (or decreases in both sales and profits) for the
1st semester of 2009, while forecasts seem to be better only with (and after)
the third quarter of the same.
This rather descriptive narration was mainly intended to introduce to the
reader some structural causal factors crossing years and therapies, and
constituting both the bulk of present problems and the conditions to make
the same therapies effective ones. As a matter of fact economic policies,
monetary ones in particular, must on one side deal with alternatives, hidden
or collateral effects, lags, reactions by actors and so on. But on the other
side they have to take into account the actual (economic and financial)
structures which they live in, as well as the "exogenous" variables which on
the contrary are, to be true, an inseparable part of the economic system.
In short, we speak here in fact of such factors as:
structural imbalances, especially in international trade and finance;
public deficits, especially in the US and in some European countries;
excess of liquidity at local-national-international-world level;
personal interests (vested ones included) of bankers and politicians;
expectations of actors, with particular regard to families and firms;
attitudes of personae within the (financial) system from the point of
view of capabilities, speculation, fairness, moral integrity.
4. The "solution" of the crisis, or liquidity and debts. The risks of both
As we remembered before, insolvencies were avoided by the massive
flows of new liquidity poured into the system, while anyway the economic
actors —families, firms, public powers too— feared multiple crashes.
As a first result, liquidity superimposed itself to i) a drop in demand due
to the worsening of expectations, ii) a large, world credit crunch, due to the
current situation of banks, iii) restructuring and retrenchment of firms due to
the crisis, these factors giving life to (large) unemployment (50-60 million
people according to estimations).
The mixed dynamic interaction among these forces on one side, the
present (and future) choices of economic policy on the other, will determine
the future state of the economy. This remains anyway suspended between
recovery and stagnation, these both in a context of price stability or, in case,
of inflation.
18
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
These broad situations have been experimented in different periods of
time all over the world in the last ninety years, from Germany Weimar
Republic to the Great Crisis (and New Deal), from Europe to South America
and East Asia in the last decades.
So, just to schematise them without recurring to boring academic lists
(anyway well-known ones), the above-mentioned situations can be resumed
in Figure 12 below.
Figure 12 - From steady State to Growth, with or without Inflation
Stable prices
Inflation
or moderate inflation
Growth
Steady State
(A)
(B)
RECOVERY
HECTIC, ASYMMETRIC
GROWTH
(C)
(D)
STAGNATION or
DEPRESSION
STAGFLATION
Presently, the picture is a rather mixed and confused one, as so many
dishomogeneous and countervailing forces are at work at the same time.
Unemployment, drop in demand, relative overcapacity (in the car
industry the potential production is esteemed to be 90 million cars per year
at world level vs. an effective demand for 60 millions), bad expectations by
firms —and others— keep prices cold, so avoiding at present inflation in
general, raw materials included (here with same exceptions anyway). The
same bad expectations by families succeed in increasing savings, anyway
directed mainly to State-bonds, so —curiously— helping the States to
rescue banks, and the economic trend in general. Due to bailouts, anyway,
the banking industry is now composed by a lesser number of banks maybe
more powerful than before, and due to this reason not only "too big to fail",
but in addition harder to be controlled by the authorities.
Anyway, credit demand is presently low due to the same reasons, while
banks keep their own behaviour causing (and pursuing) a credit crunch due
—in addition— to such factors as past insolvencies, hidden losses, fears of
run, inadequate capital ratios: as a result investments are now blocked, so
19
Arnaldo Canziani
contributing to keep inflation low but, at the same time, blocking (or at least
lagging) the recovery (see Figure 13).
This way, the abundant liquidity tends to flow into financial markets in
the form of public bonds, time deposits (and shares) —and into real estates
in some cases—, while Central Banks keep interest rates around zero both to
favour recovery and to keep the inflation low.
Figure 13 - Rate of Growth of Credits to Families and Firms within the Eurozone
(Il Sole - 24 Ore on official data)
Positive interventions by the States concerned not only the rescuing of
banks and the banking system, but also industrial incentives and tax
advantages.
This sum of public measures, a slightly better situation of savings and
Stock-Exchanges, and the pushing role typical in some case of expansive
monetary policies, brought about the first steps of a recovery, although an
asymmetric one for both countries and industries. So, China, Germany,
France, the same US, Brazil and others seem now to march on a better way,
and experts asks themselves about the U-form or the W-form of the
recovery. The situation is confirmed by the fact that some countries are still
lowering their interest rates (Brazil, Canada, Sweden), but other are slightly
raising them due to the fear of inflation, or "excess" of growth (Australia,
Israel).
So, after wait and see moments, some signals of recovery seem to be at
sight end-2009. Could this be the general future of world economy, it would
be the solution. In addition, "the growth absorbs and allows anything":
employment, investments, profits, taxes, keynesian multipliers and so on,
the absorption of extra-deficit (and extra-liquidity) included.
20
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
The crises in addition —due to uncertainty, fears, mixed or contrasting
expectations and attitudes— induced also a slowdown as far as the running
of economic time is concerned. This way, the effects of the so many public
policy actions will prove themselves —if nothing more dangerous occurs—
in 2010-2011, when the potential problems will be at sight.
In those very moments, when the economic activity will be largely
resumed, the effective problems will emerge: i) will the abundance of
liquidity be reabsorbed by Central Banks? or will it remain into the system,
causing both recovery and inflation?; ii) will the possible increases in
interests rates (to cut inflation) block this initial recovery?; iii) or mixed
expectations, unabsorbed liquidity, and negative outlooks (also due to
political and war reasons) will turn into a boom of prices of commodities
(precious metals included), so giving life to stagflation? (these are the very
cases in which unsuccessful monetary policies act as a silk-spin, not being
able of boosting but turning high-speed liquidity into high inflation).
Nobody anyway can be sure of any future result, as linked as we are to
multi-polar feeble equilibria, and to political actions as well. As a matter of
fact, various different dynamics could emerge from the same facts, where
the driving factors seem to be in principle the following ones: a) the present
productive overcapacity at world level, b) the burden of State debts, and
incentives, c) the risk of inflation; d) the problem of foreign exchange rates2.
a. Present productive overcapacity. Liquidity creation, and incentives
as well, were taken —also due to plain socio-political reasons—
especially in order to keep the cycle at the peak it had reached after
the increases (and investments) of the last twenty years. But some
authors asked themselves (W. White e.g.) if this was not a trial
impossible to be reached, and if a retrenchment —a debated, agreed,
cooperative one— was not a better solution, or at least a more
practicable one in the mid-long term: harder to suffer now, but on
the other hand not so rough later on.
b. Burden of State debts, and incentives. The reduction in public
revenues, accompanied by the costs for State incentives and stimuli,
caused a burden that public finances cannot sustain in the mid-long
term in most nations, from Spain to the U.S.A. (see Figure 14).3
2
In addition, one further relevant topic could be represented by exogenous
shock variables, like new large defaults of Anglo-Saxon banks or even independent
countries, heavy speculations in raw materials, crash of currencies, local but
relevant wars additive to the present ones, and so on
3
FIGURE 14 - Sovereign Credit Rating (Moody's, Standard and Poors)
21
Arnaldo Canziani
Stimuli were (and are) necessary to keep the cycle at present levels at
least, but the question is a simple one: how much could these ones
fall, were those incentives suspended? on the opposite side, how
could States go on sustaining those deficits, given the already
widespread amount of circulation?
The U.S.A., in particular, are nearly reaching their statutory limit to
the amount of debt they can issue, unless the Congress grants a
request to increase it; in addition, more than 40% of this debt will
mature in less than one year.
c. Risks of inflation. The burden of deficits, the new amount of
circulation, the (new) massive State borrowings to keep the cycle on
and to sustain growth could also draw governments —cynically—
to prefer inflation (or to leave it happen) to price-stability: not only
growth in fact, but inflation too "absorbs and allows anything",
especially public debts —obviously in dramatic a way for peoples
and nations, to mention but Weimar Republic—. But are we so sure
that politicians and Central Bankers will be so able on one side, so
honest on the other as to look for growth, withdrawal of deficitsliquidity-debts, and price-stability at the same time?
d. Foreign exchange rates. Near every country willing to foster
recovery thinks in addition to some downward movements of its own
currency as to favour national exports, this being particularly true for
export-led economies. In most cases this revealed itself to be a shortsighted view (at least in the mid-term), especially for countries
compelled to import raw materials from abroad. But, as a further
shortcoming, that choice could bring in case to the well-known story
of competitive devaluations, or even to some of the currency wars
the world economy already experimented so many times, since its
first financial integration and the abolition of gold standard.
Obviously this is a major problem, as i) between ⅔ and ¾ of the
world trade is still regulated today in US Dollar, ii) international
currency reserves today are mainly located in far-East Asia, China in
particular, while these countries are —at the same time— the
largest owners of US Treasury bonds (Figures 15 and 16 below).
AAA
Canada
France
Germany
United States
AAA/AAA§
AA3/AA
AA2/A+
Great Britain
Japan
Italy
22
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
Figure 15 - Level of International Currency Reserves in 2008
(Billions of US$ - Monde Diplomatique on USA Treasury Dept. data)
Figure 16 - International Investors in USA Treasury Bonds in 2008
(Billions of US$ - Monde Diplomatique on USA Treasury Dept. data)
23
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5. The mid-term effects of crisis and therapies: recovery, stagnation,
stagflation?
Regarded under the light of end-October 2009, the world economic
situation recalls to memory the observation of some neo-positivist saying
"economics isn't a science as it isn't capable of foreseeing". While this is
true for many sciences (classical physics apart), it's effectively truer in
social sciences, as linked as they are to social, cultural and personal factors.
Anyway, we are in such perfect scientific conditions as to be able to state
the critical junctions and interactions of the system, further to the driving
factors mentioned in § 4. From this point of view, the situation has to be
overviewed as regards the most important problems of key actors —we
choose here among others U.S.A., China and their mutual (dis)equilibria—.
U.S.A.
A strong role in the recent bettering of the situation was represented by
state incentives for the auto industry (cash for clunkers) and properties, with
mixed effects on the effective demand for the 3rd quarter, anyhow positive
ones on the average. But what about the state of the economy in the moment
they should end? The unemployment rate is 9%, with the probability to
reach 10%, and more. Due to this fact, and the overall psychological
climate, the expectations of families (and firms?) are not positive ones, or
rather negative in addition. That's why families are trying to increase
savings, also in order to reduce their own debts.
Under such a situation, an increase in effective demand cannot come
from the same families: they give now life to the c. 70% of GNP (see Figure
5 once more), their debts are still as high as the same GNP (95-97%
according to various estimates) — in addition, demand by families would
easily mean larger imports (in the 1st semester of 2009 the US trade deficit
with China registered a drop, but mainly —we can suppose— due to the
parallel drop in families' expenditure, see Figure 17).
On the other side, an increase in effective demand due to public
expenditure (investments, or whatever else) seems to be anyhow difficult
and uncertain, due to the levels already attained by a) circulation (Figure 7)
and debt (Figure 18 below; as far as the debt is concerned, different
estimates —IMF e.g.— speak on the contrary of some 100% in 2015-2020).
A solution —so to say— could be a (sharp) inflation either due to lack
of control of present monetary aggregates or induced by further,
incompressible deficits. An inflation, in both cases, maybe not so
unfavourably perceived by authorities, able this way to cut real debts while
going on in stimulating the economy.
24
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
Figure 17 - USA Trade Deficit with China
(Il Sole - 24 Ore on official data of Trade Dept.)
Figure 18 - US Debt as a Percentage of GNP
(Congressional Budget Office)
2008
2009
2010
2015
2019
44%
51%
61%
...
82%
But, as a matter of fact, these "clever" solutions seem not devoutly to be
wished: inflationary processes can prove self-growing in some cases; it's
doubtful they better the situation of trade imbalances, as new terms of trade
can improve exports but make imports more expensive; in addition they can
induce monetary retaliations, voluntarily or not. Moreover, they worsen the
relationships with holders of state bonds (China holds now US Treasuries
for over 800 billions US Dollars, Figure 16), these being some of the wellknown problems of a world currency (Papaioannou and Portes, 2008).
A diffeent escape, of which we got only rumors up to now, could be a
sharp increase in both efficiency and capability of US firms, as this fact
could allow first the import-substitution and, in case, an export-increase
later on.
25
Arnaldo Canziani
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
If, according to IMF, the growth of Asian economies is, globally
speaking, 2,8% in 2009, with a forecasted 5,8% in 2010, the growth of
China is strongly higher: 6,1% in the first quarter of 2009, 7,9% in the
second quarter, with a further increase afterwards, up to an estimate —
according to September data, and forecasts— of 8,9% for the whole 2009.
These figures are reputed to be near optimal ones, as international
institutions keep in their mind that China needs an annual increase of c. 9%
in order to avoid unemployment and —in worst cases— slumps in the
cycle.
To this end, both public incentives (586 billion dollars) and new credits
were optimal choices, accompanied anyway —as always— by some
classical risks in the mid-term:
the same sustainability of public incentives, useful ones given some
problems of exporting industries, but to be attentively weighted also
in relation to currency reserves;
the amount of credits becoming in case excess of credits (§ 3. at the
beginning), with the further risk —within negative or uncertain
expectations— to back financial and real est speculations (some
bubbles seemed recently to appear).
The role of uncertain expectations —together with the slowdown of the
cycle, and gains in productivity— seem to have played a role also in
keeping the inflation (relatively) low, even under an increased money
supply.
Without excluding the necessity of reducing the credit to the whole
economic system (e.g. imposing larger bank reserves?), the problem seems
now to reduce State aids, jointly promoting the demand by families (passed
from the 67% of GNP in 1981 to 48% in 2007 due to massive exports).
Alternatively, the (one?) way could be to increase exports once more,
anyhow with well-known problems of trading and financial surpluses.
Two further intricacies consist i) in the amount of currency reserves in
US dollars, a problem so well-known by Chinese authorities that various
trials to smooth that relevance are under way in these very months (see
below), ii) to the internal migration processes, the urban migration from the
countryside to cities and towns (and from West to East and South-East), the
amount of which is esteemed about 80 120 minnion people per year, while
even China seems to be hardly permitted to suffer such a conorbation from
the social as well as infrastructural point of view.
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What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
CIRCULAR (DIS)EQUILIBRIA BETWEEN CHINA AND USA
The basic problem now —and since the 1990ies— is a well-known one,
squeezable under the following heading: "USA buy Chinese exports, China
buys US Treasuries: can they continue round and round?".
As a matter of fact, this sentence resumes some of the factors underlined
in § 4 and above:
U.S.A. will be doubtely able to expand their effective demand; in
case they do, it shall be due to families (with further increases in
imports?) or even to public administration (with further increases of
debt, and circulation);
China —together with BRICs— will be charged by the burden of
sustaining the world economic recovery, but through a hard choice
between the demand by families (will it be possible to amplify it in
the near future without inflation?) and a new increase in exports (and
imports and so on), but increasing present imbalances;
both countries, one of them in particular, have to control their
monetary aggregates.
A solution (a largely hypothetic one, a hard one to be found?) could be
the loosening of the ties which trap international exchanges, replacing the
US Dollar with a basket of international currencies. But this project
obviously faces some difficulties, and intricacies as well, from the political
point of view (the interests of the USA at world level, the somehow
fragmented political will backing the Euro), not to mention its feasibility, as
currency-baskets too registered a long story of proposals but not as many
cases of success.
6. Some further reflections on liquidity, inter-bank solidarity, and
Central Banks
The analysis of these events enables us to focus on three distinct groups
of problems especially related to banking, in order i) to reflect on the way
they occurred, ii) to interpret them in the light of contemporary theories on
the subject. These groups of problems regard —respectively— a) banking
liquidity, b) inter-bank solidarity, c) the functions of Central Banks.
A) Liquidity. The first problem relates to liquidity, a very real and
insurmountable factor for the survival of every bank. In order to secure it,
competition arises regarding the choice of portfolios, the turnover of loans,
the stability of deposits, financial strategies and, unfortunately, also rumours
27
Arnaldo Canziani
and, potentially, “bank runs”, either induced or accentuated —more often
than it might be imagined— by avid but short-sighted forms of competition.
At every time, moreover, the problem of the lack of liquidity is addressed
with standard choices: the search for its additional, or sometimes new,
forms. Within these situations, unfortunately, no any measure is taken to
restore liquidity which can attack the causal factors of liquidity absorptions,
shortages, insufficiencies. Indeed, it could be questioned whether —at some
points at least— the problem grows to such an extent that it even becomes,
at two stages, a more general problem of liquidity for the entire system
(Calomiris, Mason, 2003; Diamond, Rajan, 2005).
This issue (for reasons of space we will only skim the subject here) raises
various theoretical as well as practical questions:
1. How much liquidity does the system generally dispose of? (a rather
unquantifiable and mysterious issue); how did Central Banks behave in
the past, both in general and from the point of view of supervision and
reserves in particular? had there been perhaps an excessive level of
liquidity, producing an "excess-demand for credit" (Demaria, 1974,
1998)? In other words: did inflationary speculation date back to different
phases during precedent periods (Flannery, 1996)? How much liquidity
was recently created through M1 and, consequently, how much bank
circulation? Through which channels did it flow? Towards which
businesses and jobs? What effect did it have on active and passive
interest rates?
2. In the particular cases of the most important US (and British) banks,
what provisions did they adopt in order to cope with withdrawals, or
bank runs, by depositors? And how did the Central Banks react to those
provisions, in their various technical forms? How did they behave in the
meantime? Probably they were strictly informed of events, so, did they
limit themselves to verbally suggesting <prudent behaviour>? Did they
provide at times for eventual restrictions of reserves and discount
(Bernauer, Kobi, 2004)? More precisely, what reserve policy —general
and special ones— was being employed (Sellon, Buskas, 1999)? Is it
possible that reserves (and reserve requirements) were so scarce in the
past as to encourage beyond caution the risk-taking by commercial
banking? as to overcome its (even large) structural limits? In other
words, were the Central Banks themselves a victim, a de facto conniver,
a reluctant accomplice, or even, at some stages, an executioner? (bearing
in mind that these roles were not mutually exclusive ones).
28
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
B) Inter-bank solidarity. A second group of problems relates to the
solidarity (also in terms of strategic complementarities and critical
interactions), which —more than in any other sector— acts to bind together
all the banks operating in the system, and in addition links them to the
Central Bank, with well-known effects on circulation, credit, savings,
investments and interest rates.
The uncertainty about which bank(s) could (should) be rescued was
maybe due to this issue of solidarity? as well as the indecisions whether to
act in one way or another? Central bankers in fact —and politicians as
well— were undecided between direct advantages and systemic problems,
generally to avoid the development of attacks, alliances, press campaigns,
threats, financial and political pressures (and extortions?) which could affect
other banks, and so the system in general (reputation, Corbett, Mitchell,
2000; contagion, Giannetti, 2003; Hyytinen, Takalo, 2004).
At the same time, however, it was necessary to face the problem of how
to carry out and finance the rescue-operations by creating further liquidity:
what effects (Boyd, Chang, Smith, 2004), and above all, what costs
(Kaufman, Seeling, 2002) would such a plan entail? Clearly, politics played
its own role in this, particularly through governments and parliaments:
crises —like wars, clear ones in their beginning but largely mysterious in
their end— confirm the Faustian desire for power, which in many cases
stretched far beyond the financial realm (Peek, Rosengren, 2000).
The problem could also be analysed in the light of asymmetric
information models: given that this type of theory is a well-known one, its
application will be left to the reader’s imagination, limiting us here to
underline that, in that particular context, the information was highly
asymmetrical due to the presence of a small number of incumbent banks
(Eisenbeis, 1997; Hainz, 2005; Mishkin, 1994).
C) Functions of the Central Bank. A third group of problems relates to
the duties and functions of the Central Bank and, in particular, its behaviour
before, during and after financial crises.
They revolve around the problem of the role it played (Humprey, 1989;
Corazza, 2001), its degree of independence, the duties and functions
assigned it by regulations, rules and culture. They also refer to the role of
politics in a broader sense, and therefore the way individuals —within
economic ministries, large banking, and above all the Central Bank—
interpreted those duties and functions, in ways that could be described
variedly as neutral, agnostic, physiological or even pathological ones, bent
only on perpetuating their own “power”.
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Arnaldo Canziani
In general, therefore, we need to re-examine the methods of banking
supervision (Hutchison, 1997; Miller, 2000; Baker, Collins, 1999) and, in
particular, the well-known alternative <rules v. discretion>, also because
various recent studies argue that risk cannot be fully eliminated but only
redistributed in the system (Eisenbeis, 1997; Jordan, 1999), and therefore
that a Central Bank may not (know) how to avoid a crisis, and might
possibly even create greater damages through its own actions (Bensaid and
Olivier, 2000).
The <post-crisis monetary policy> (Gruben, Welch, 2001) should lay in
fact in i) re-establishing price-stability, ii) encouraging investments but, first
of all, iii) settling markets.
This stresses once more —for a Central bank— the development of its
appointed tasks as lender of last resort, sole issuing bank, supervisor of
banking activity with regulatory powers, in the context of economic systems
more and more organized every day (C. Goodhart, 1988), also to avoid that
they act only to postpone problems (Lahiri and Vegh, 2003).
7. Conclusions
Speaking of crises, recovery, speculation and derivatives, we speak of the
financial system at large. Within this, big business, banks, the banking
system and the Central Bank are substantially, inextricably linked not only
each other but —in addition— with politics and inherent in it. The financial
system (including money and banking) is therefore constituted by important
exogenous elements connected with the political behaviour —always
affected by vested interests, or so— of i) public institutions and the people
operating them, ii) their public and private rivals (Patinkin, 1944, 1965II).
To be more precise, these are "institutions, organisms, material or
spiritual forces aimed at conserving or modifying specific positions of
control in the economic, or extra-economic, world at a national, or even
international, level" (G. Demaria, 1974).
So, we refer here in particular to the relationships i) between
international, institutional (including economic policy), psychological and
labour variables on one side and strictly monetary ones on the other; ii)
between monetary and financial theories and the behaviour of monetary,
banking and financial systems; iii) between the interests and abilities of the
key-players in the monetary-banking-financial system and their operating
choices. Furthermore, we refer to the delays of both monetary policy
interventions and their effects.
In any case, these events remind us above all the role of politics in
guiding the economic policy and, in particular, in handling bank crises and
30
What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
rescues. But these events also serve to remind us that the stability of the
banking system and the control of circulation are major responsibilities of
the Treasury. Therefore, the problems we bring up here regard such issues
as public trust, the banking industry, its role vis-à-vis the financing of the
economy.
In previous pages, in addition, a well-known history was narrated
regarding i) economic policy in general, ii) the behaviour of economic
actors from families to (banking) firms and the State, iii) the question about
which behaviours can —in some moments of time— give life to expansion
and booms or to panics and crashes.
But at the end of the story we are speaking of some among the major
elements of economic life: i) the today habit of deficit spending, a
widespread one all over the world; ii) the money supply and its influences
on psychologies and prices; iii) the structure of international trade and the
countervailing powers matching each other at world level.
This way, the tough tsunami of 2007 concerns at the end —in its
premises, therapies and consequences— the equilibrium itself of the world
economic systems from both the financial and real point of view and,
nevertheless, the social and international stability of our political systems.
31
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What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
Post-fazione
In larga misura, le dinamiche ricordate nella prima parte del paper che
qui si presenta paiono mantenere la propria continuità non solo ex se —si
tratta in larga misura di constatazioni di mero fatto—, ma soprattutto nel
montaggio che l'autore ne ha compiuto, il quale esprime peraltro anche
precise scelte descrittive e interpretative (per non sprecare l'aggettivo
ermeneutiche).
Le conclusioni erano certamente perfettibili, e certo un poco
indeterminate: error artis, o error artificis? senz'altro il secondo, anche se
ricordava già nel '700 La Bruyere che l'economia opera con uno scalpello
affilatissimo e un bisturi scheggiato, dimodoche scanna a perfezione il
morto, e ammazza il vivo.
D'altra parte qualcosa si è successivamente definito, ma a oggi —
dicembre 2011— molto rimane ancora incerto:
a due anni-data l'area europea, che sembrava in ripresa, dopo la crisi
della Grecia, (dell'Italia) e dell'Euro attraversa momenti di grande
incertezza, specialmente la Gran Bretagna, con la sola (relativa)
eccezione della Germania;
gli indicatori macroeconomici statunitensi vorrebbero sembrare
positivi, peraltro in uno stop-and-go relativo tanto ai settori quanto
alle prospettive macroeconomiche, quanto infine alle relazioni fra la
presidenza e il congresso;
l'espansione cinese continua, peraltro in un contesto di minore
smalto e di temuta inflazione.
Pare concorrere a tale incertezza —anche se poco ne accennano sia i
media sia i pubblicisti in servizio permanente effettivo— la guerra delle
monete in corso da qualche anno, i cui elementi strutturali vennero
presentati ai §§ 4. e 5. e tuttora permangono, relativi dunque in particolare:
al ruolo di valuta mondiale del dollaro statunitense,
progressivamente inflazionato (la guerra in Irak sembra essere
costata 900 miliardi di dollari, quella in Afghanistan soltanto 500) e
tuttavia moneta di regolamento e di investimento, e inoltre
rappresentativa (finora) del massimo sistema economico mondiale,
ricco di risorse naturali e protettivamente rinserrato fra due Oceani;
ai problemi dell'Euro, valuta super-imposta a unificare Stati
nazionali anche profondamente differenziati per storia economicopatrimoniale, politiche economiche, struttura industriale-bancariafinanziaria-distributiva, dinamiche di sviluppo e altro ancora;
all'eventualità —attualmente appannata— che l'Euro potesse
divenire valuta di riserva a scapito del dollaro statunitense, nell'attesa
di divenire anche valuta di regolamento, dunque ai non disinteressati
interventi (indiretti) di potenti lobbies anglosassoni;
33
Arnaldo Canziani
e ai problemi conseguenti di tipo finanziario, monetario, produttivo,
commerciale e di bilance dei pagamenti.
Concorre inoltre a tale incertezza
—oltre a note ragioni
macroeconomiche, bancarie, finanziarie (fra queste le problematiche
generali già sintetizzate or è due anni nel § 6.)—, anche l'instabilità politica
del Vicino Oriente largamente indotta dalla politica estera degli Stati Uniti
d'America, nonché le future dinamiche dell'Estremo Oriente, dalla
successione politica in Corea del Nord alla nuova "area monetaria"
progettata da Giappone-Cina.
Le dinamiche prossime venture dunque —se non vi saranno terribilità
belliche nel Vicino Oriente, rialzi nel prezzo del petrolio, crashes valutarî di
vario genere— potranno risultare migliori ove l'Asia del Sud-Est prosegua
nei suoi trends espansivi e ove altri BRICs —Brasile e India in particolare,
ma già si affaccia l'Indonesia— mantengano gli attuali, elevati saggi di
sviluppo.
Prospettive dunque migliori, ma migliori in primo luogo per gli Stati
interessati anche quali drivers per l'economia mondiale, e infine per le
economie nazionali che sappiano esportarvi, o investirvi, mentre la
situazione di alcune nazioni europee —in particolare l'Italia— parrebbe
avviata a una sostanziale stsagflation dopo le più recenti provvidenze
dell'esecutivo attualmente in carica.
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What after the Tsunami of 2007-2008: recovery, inflation, stagflation?
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Further Bibliography — Papers of the Department of Economia
Aziendale of the University of Brescia
R. RUOZI, P. FERRARI, Il rischio di liquidità nelle banche: aspetti economici e
profili regolamentari, febbraio 2009
G. PROVENZANO, Crisi finanziaria o crisi dell‟economia reale?, maggio 2009
A. PORTERI, La crisi, le banche e i mercati finanziari, aprile 2010
R. RUOZI, P. FERRARI, Verso la “deglobalizzazione” del sistema bancario
internazionale?, dicembre 2010
37
38
DIPARTIMENTO DI ECONOMIA AZIENDALE
PAPERS PUBBLICATI DAL 2008 AL 2011 :
74- Giuseppina GANDINI, Raffaella CASSANO, Sistemi giuridici a confronto: modelli di
corporate governance e comunicazione aziendale, maggio 2008.
75- Giuseppe BERTOLI, Bruno BUSACCA, Michela APOSTOLO, Dominanza della
marca e successo del co-branding: una verifica sperimentale, maggio 2008.
76- Alberto MARCHESE, Il ricambio generazionale nell‟impresa: il patto di famiglia,
maggio 2008.
77- Pierpaolo FERRARI, Leasing, factoring e credito al consumo: business maturi e in
declino o “cash cow”?, giugno 2008.
78- Giuseppe BERTOLI, Globalizzazione dei mercati e sviluppo dell‟economia cinese,
giugno 2008.
79- Arnaldo CANZIANI, Giovanni Demaria (1899-1998) nei ricordi di un allievo, ottobre
2008.
80- Guido ABATE, I fondi comuni e l‟approccio multimanager: modelli a confronto,
novembre 2008.
81- Paolo BOGARELLI, Unità e controllo economico nel governo dell‟impresa: il
contributo degli studiosi italiani nella prima metà del XX secolo, dicembre 2008.
82- Marco BERGAMASCHI, Marchi, imprese e sociologia dell‟abbigliamento d‟alta
moda, dicembre 2008.
83- Marta Maria PEDRINOLA, I gruppi societari e le loro politiche tributarie: il dividend
washing, dicembre 2008.
84- Federico MANFRIN, La natura economico-aziendale dell‟istituto societario,
dicembre 2008.
85- Sergio ALBERTINI, Caterina MUZZI, La diffusione delle ICT nei sistemi produttivi
locali: una riflessione teorica ed una proposta metodologica, dicembre 2008.
86- Giuseppina GANDINI, Francesca GENNARI, Funzione di compliance e
responsabilità di governance, dicembre 2008.
87- Sante MAIOLICA, Il mezzanine finance: evoluzione strutturale alla luce delle nuove
dinamiche di mercato, febbraio 2009.
88- Giuseppe BERTOLI, Bruno BUSACCA, Brand extension, counterextension,
cobranding, febbraio 2009.
89- Luisa BOSETTI, Corporate Governance and Internal Control: Evidence from Local
Public Utilities, febbraio 2009.
90- Roberto RUOZI, Pierpaolo FERRARI, Il rischio di liquidità nelle banche: aspetti
economici e profili regolamentari, febbraio 2009.
91- Richard BAKER, Yuri BIONDI, Qiusheng ZHANG, Should Merger Accounting be
Reconsidered?: A Discussion Based on the Chinese Approach to Accounting for
Business Combinations, maggio 2009.
92- Giuseppe PROVENZANO, Crisi finanziaria o crisi dell‟economia reale?, maggio
2009.
93- Arnaldo CANZIANI, Le rivoluzioni zappiane— reddito, economia aziendale — agli
inizî del secolo XXI, giugno 2009.
94- Annalisa BALDISSERA, Profili critici relativi al recesso nelle società a
responsabilità limitata dopo la riforma del 2003, luglio 2009.
95- Marco BERGAMASCHI, Analisi ambientale della Cina e strategie di localizzazione
delle imprese italiane, novembre 2009.
96- Alberto FALINI, Stefania PRIMAVERA, Processi di risanamento e finalità
Serie depositata a norma di legge. L’elenco completo dei paper è disponibile al
seguente indirizzo internet http://www.unibs.it/dipartimenti/economia-aziendale
39
d‟impresa nelle procedure di amministrazione straordinaria, dicembre 2009.
97- Riccardo ASTORI, Luisa BOSETTI, Crisi economica e modelli di corporate
governance, dicembre 2009.
98- Marco BERGAMASCHI, Imitazione e concorrenza nell‟abbigliamento di moda:
un‟interpretazione economico-aziendale della normativa vigente, dicembre 2009.
99- Claudio TEODORI, Monica VENEZIANI, Intangibile assets in annual reports: a
disclosure index, gennaio 2010.
100- Arnaldo CANZIANI, Renato CAMODECA, Il Bilancio dello Stato nel pensiero degli
aziendalisti italiani 1880-1970, febbraio 2010.
101- Giuseppe BERTOLI, Bruno BUSACCA, Roberto GRAZIANO, La determinazione
del “Royalty Rate” negli accordi di licesing, marzo 2010.
102- Antonio PORTERI, La crisi, le banche e i mercati finanziari, aprile 2010.
103- Elisabetta CORVI, Emozioniamoci! L‟imperativo del terzo millennio?, maggio 2010.
104- Sergio ALBERTINI, Caterina MUZZI, Innovation networking and SMEs: Open
communities and absorptive capacity. Two case studies along a continuum in the
innovative process, ottobre 2010.
105- Guido ABATE, Lo sviluppo e le prospettive delle SGR immobiliari italiane, ottobre
2010.
106- Ilaria GREZZINI, Il bilancio d‟esercizio e la fiscalità asincrona: norme civilistiche,
eterointegrazione, Ias, ottobre 2010.
107- Ilaria GREZZINI, Finanziamento dell‟economia e <partite incagliate>: la Comit
1933-1935 nella perizia di Gino Zappa, ottobre 2010.
108- Mario MAZZOLENI, Elisa CHIAF, Davide GIACOMINI, Le cooperative
mutualistiche tra eccellenza economica e sociale, novembre 2010.
109- Annalisa ZANOLA, The Annual Report: an Interdisciplinary Approach to a
„Contaminated‟ New Genre, novembre 2010.
110- Elisa CHIAF, Le imprese sociali di inserimento lavorativo e la creazione di valore:
uno studio di casi, dicembre 2010.
111- Francesca GENNARI, Luisa BOSETTI, La governance delle agenzie di rating: prime
considerazioni alla luce delle riforme, dicembre 2010.
112- Roberto RUOZI, Pierpaolo FERRARI, Verso la “deglobalizzazione” del sistema
bancario internazionale?, dicembre 2010.
113- Paolo BOGARELLI, L‟apprezzamento dell‟economicità nelle cooperative sociali: il
caso della cooperativa di Bessimo, dicembre 2010.
114- Annalisa BALDISSERA, Continuità d‟impresa e soci recedenti nella S.r.l.:
convenienze antitetiche delle aziende di produzione e familiari, dicembre 2010.
115- Sonia Rachele PIOTTI, On the Trail of the Vocabulary of Mathematical Science in
Early Modern English, giugno 2011.
116- Alberto MAZZOLENI, Elisa GIACOSA, Il progetto di risanamento dell‟impresa in
crisi: la recente esperienza italiana, giugno 2011.
117- Isabel COSTANZI, Paul Karl Feyerabend (1924- 1994) filosofo della scienza,
settembre 2011.
118- Valentina COSTA, Carlo GOBEO, Introduzione a Paul K. Feyerabend, settembre
2011
119- Giuseppina GANDINI, Luisa BOSETTI, Orientamento al mercato e sostenibilità
futura nelle aziende di pubblica utilità, dicembre 2011.
120- Giuseppe BERTOLI, Bruno BUSACCA, Celebrity endorsement, brand extension,
brand loyalty, dicembre 2011.
121- Anna CODINI, Strategie di servitization e valore per il cliente: una proposta
metodologica, dicembre 2011.
122- Arnaldo CANZIANI, I Consigli di Amministrazione delle Società per Azioni fra
mitologie romantiche e patologie sempiterne, dicembre 2011.
40
f. apollonio & c.
Università degli Studi
di Brescia
Dipartimento di
Economia Aziendale
Arnaldo CANZIANI
WHAT AFTER THE TSUNAMI OF 2007-2008:
RECOVERY, INFLATION, STAGFLATION?
Paper numero 123
Università degli Studi di Brescia
Dipartimento di Economia Aziendale
Contrada Santa Chiara, 50 - 25122 Brescia
tel. 030.2988.551-552-553-554 - fax 030.295814
e-mail: [email protected]
Dicembre 2011