White Russia –
Xenophobia, Extreme Nationalism and
Race Radicalism as Threats to Society
Henrik Kjölstad
FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-funded agency under the Ministry of Defence. The core activities are
research, method and technology development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and
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FOI-R--2592--SE
ISSN 1650-1942
User Report
April 2009
Defence Analysis
Henrik Kjölstad
White Russia –
Xenophobia, Extreme
Nationalism and Race
Radicalism as Threats to
Society
Titel
Det vita Ryssland – främlingsfientlighet, extremnationalism
och rasradikalism som hot mot samhället
Title
White Russia – xenophobia, extreme nationalism and race
radicalism as threats to society
Rapportnr/Report no
FOI-R--2592--SE
Rapporttyp
Report Type
Användarrapport
User Report
Månad/Month
April
Utgivningsår/Year
2009
Antal sidor/Pages
55 p
ISSN
Kund/Customer
Forskningsområde
Programme area
Försvarsdepartementet
1. Analys av säkerhet och sårbarhet
security, safety and vulnerability
Delområde
Subcategory
11 Forskning för regeringens behov
11 Policy Support to the Government.
Projektnr/Project no
A12001
Godkänd av/Approved by
Eva Mittermaier
FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut
FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency
Avdelningen för Försvarsanalys
164 90 Stockholm
SE-164 90 Stockholm
Sammanfattning
Rasistiskt eller etniskt baserat våld i Ryssland och Östeuropa har ökat
kraftigt de senaste åren. Rapporter om större grupperingar, nätverk och
politiska partier med extremnationalistisk agenda menar att detta blivit
ett problem som nu måste tas på största allvar. Högt uppsatta politiker,
däribland Vladimir Putin själv, har uttryckt att rasismen i Ryssland är
ett hot gentemot landets säkerhet. Samtidigt visar vittnesrapporter och
uttalanden att det verkar finnas skäl att tro att rasismen blivit så pass
institutionaliserad att det finns kopplingar till högre ort, och en del
menar att åtaganden och uttalanden som regeringen gjort kan tolkas
som ett steg mot ett mer nationalistiskt och främlingsfientligt
Ryssland.
Denna rapport gör en presentation av rasradikala grupper och uttryck
för främlingsfientlighet i Ryssland, vad dessa gruppers mål och
ideologi består av, vilka metoder de använder sig av och hur de
påverkar såväl det ryska samhället som det globala fenomenet
rasradikalism i övrigt.
Nyckelord:
Rasism, Ryssland, extremnationalism, främlingsfientlighet, rasradikalism
3
Abstract
Racial and ethnic violence in Russia and Eastern Europe has increased
drastically in recent years. Reports indicate that large groups, networks
and political parties with a national extremist agenda have become a
severe challenge to society and must be taken seriously. Prominent
Russian politicians, including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, have
recognised that racism in Russia poses a threat to the country’s
security. However, statements from witnesses and reporters show that
racism now appears to be so institutionalised that structural
xenophobia exists even within organised contemporary politics in
Russia, while actions and statements expressed by the government
could lead to even greater nationalist and xenophobic feeling in the
country.
This report examines the goals, methods and ideology of race radical
and xenophobic groups in Russia, their influence on Russian society
and the links to the global phenomenon of radical racism.
Keywords:
Racism, Russia, xenophobia, extreme nationalism, race radicalism
Foreword
There have been many reports in the media recently about the increase
in xenophobia, racism and radical nationalist extremism in Russia.
This report analyses this phenomena within the theoretical concepts of
human and societal security.
The report was produced at the Division of Defence Analysis, Swedish
Defence Research Agency (FOI), and the work was carried out within
the Russian Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Project (RUFS)
during autumn 2008. The author is a Master’s student at the University
of Uppsala. The report was scrutinised within the RUFS project in
November 2008. Special thanks to Ingmar Oldberg, senior researcher
and Russia specialist at the FOI, who read the manuscript in different
versions and contributed to its improvement.
Stockholm, April 2009
Jakob Hedenskog
Deputy Research Director and Project Manager
5
Table of contents
1
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................ 7
2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................. 9
2.1
2.2
3
LIMITATIONS AND SOURCES................................................................. 12
3.1
4
4.3
THE XENOPHOBIC TRADITION IN RUSSIA ................................................. 16
XENOPHOBIA, EXTREME NATIONALISM AND RACE RADICALISM IN THE
1990S ...................................................................................................... 18
CONTEMPORARY RACE AND ETHNIC EXTREMISM: AN OVERVIEW ........... 21
REACTIONS.................................................................................................. 33
5.1
5.2
5.3
6
DEFINITIONS........................................................................................... 12
THROUGH THE AGES: RACISM IN RUSSIA ........................................ 16
4.1
4.2
5
HUMAN SECURITY ..................................................................................... 9
SOCIETAL SECURITY ................................................................................ 10
FROM RUSSIAN POLITICIANS ................................................................... 33
REACTIONS TO THE VIOLENCE IN THE RUSSIAN RACE RADICAL AND
EXTREME NATIONALIST SCENE ................................................................ 34
REACTIONS BY WESTERN COUNTERPARTS .............................................. 35
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION .................................................................. 39
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
NATIONALISM AND RACIALISM: A SLIDING SCALE? ................................ 39
HUMAN SECURITY AND CAUSES OF XENOPHOBIA AND VIOLENCE ............ 39
SOCIETAL SECURITY ................................................................................ 41
XENOPHOBIC, EXTREME NATIONALIST AND RACE RADICAL
ORGANISATIONS ...................................................................................... 42
POSSIBLE AUTHORITARIAN CONSEQUENCES ............................................ 44
SPILL-OVER EFFECTS ............................................................................... 45
7
CONCLUDING REMARKS......................................................................... 46
8
LIST OF SOURCES ...................................................................................... 47
6
1
Introduction
Over the past few years, there have been increasing numbers of reports
regarding racist activity in Eastern Europe, Russia in particular.
According to Amnesty International, the situation regarding racially
motivated violence is severe and has been categorised as "out of
control".1 Individuals living in Russia have been the objects of violent
attacks, some of them fatal. An estimated 83 people were killed in such
attacks in 2007 and 59 were killed in the first half of 2008.2
Foreign Ministry spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenko explained his
concern during an open address to the media, stating that "the problem
of skinheads is common to both Russia and other countries, and we
should fight it together".3 During his presidency, Russia’s Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin urged the Federal Security Service (FSB) to
combat all racism in Russia, not only when it comes to violence. He
appears to view the very ideas of racism and xenophobia as threats to
Russian society.4
Racism is not a problem specific to Russia. There are groups,
organisations, parties and individuals in almost every European
country that belong to this ideological category. However, the Russian
and East European manifestations of the trend have become
increasingly violent and extreme. To date, their Western counterparts
have not been as outspoken and have not used as extreme methods of
violence to achieve their goals. Even so, the white supremacy
movement is by no means bound by existing national borders, but is
continuing to expand globally due to better communication and
international establishment of ideological affinities and alliances. The
1
BBC News online (2006) “Putin faces up to racist scourge”, published 7 May,
2006, accessed February 4, 2008 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4755163.stm)
2
Lasseter, Tom (2008) “Hate crime killings in Russia on the rise”, McClathy
Newspapers, published 13 July, 2008, accessed September 10, 2008
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/world/v-print/story/43927.html
3
CNN.com (2002)“Russia pledges action on skinheads”, published 19 May 2002,
accessed September 10, 2008
(http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/05/19/russia.skinheads)
4
Moscow Times (2007) “FSB told to stop political extremism”, The Moscow Times,
published 1 Feb. 2007, accessed February 8, 2008
(http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/02/01/012.html)
7
main questions are whether the violence apparent in Russian
xenophobia can cause a spill-over effect to its Western counterparts,
and whether extreme right wing groups in the East and West are
achieving an increased degree of cooperation.
While acknowledging that racism in Russia has become an escalating
problem, the question arises as to whether this specific phenomenon
should be labelled a threat to security, as Vladimir Putin states, and if
so, what degree of security threat it can pose. Are there existing
theories of security that can explain the problem and if so, can they
serve as comprehensive theories that cover all its vital aspects of
modern extremism?
There are several reasons why xenophobia, extreme nationalism
and race radicalism can be regarded as a threat to security:
•
From a human security perspective: The racially motivated
violence in Russia may have reached a level that is
undermining security for sections of the Russian population.
•
From a societal security perspective: Radical nationalism,
here represented by several of the race radical groups, may
permeate into organised political parties and groups that could
gain sufficient popularity to create violent governments, the
agendas of which could develop into 'traditional' hard security
threats.
•
From a trans-national security perspective: The prominent
violence carried out by race radical groups in the East may
spread to their Western counterparts. Radical racism is not
limited to national borders. Race radicals world-wide are
creating networks and establishing contacts and partnerships
with each other.
8
2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The debate among academics and researchers dealing with security
studies is diverse, to say the least, when it comes to defining a security
threat or issue and establishing the criteria that should be fulfilled for a
certain issue to be incorporated within the boundaries of security.
However, this report does not go further into that debate. The research
presented here is first and foremost based on the empirical issue of
contemporary xenophobia, extreme nationalism and race radicalism in
Russia and therefore, existing theory is applied in a specific way. The
prime focus is on human and societal security factors. The transnational security factor and international and regime security
perspectives are mentioned, but are not applied as theoretical tools in
this research. The theoretical concepts of human and societal security
are used as guidelines to investigate whether race radicalism should be
classified as a security threat, and if so, within which of the theories.
An extended concept of security, as opposed to the traditional realist
and neo-realist definition, should cover a range of issues and not only
those primarily or previously regarded as military threats.
2.1 Human security
Human security as a concept concentrates on conflicts within states
themselves and the consequences they may have for the residents in
the countries concerned. It is worth noting, however, that this does not
challenge the frameworks of a more state-centred nature, but can be
seen as a complement to it.5
However, the term human security itself is defined differently within a
range of topics. A narrow school of human security focuses on threats
of violence, a broader school focuses on threats based on
underdevelopment and a very broad school is concerned with threats of
an even greater scale to human freedom. A way to combine the schools
of human security is based on the idea of using violence as a dependent
5
Kerr, Pauline (2007), “Human security”, taken from Collins, Alan et al,
Contemporary Security Studies, Oxford University Press, printed in Great Britain,
page 91
9
variable, whereas human development can be regarded as an
independent variable.6 This method is used partly in the present
analysis.
According to the United Nations Development Program definition of
human security, there are sub-categories relating to the term. These are
economic, food, health, environmental, personal and community
security. The focus in this report is on two of these, personal and
community security.
"Personal security — Personal security aims to protect people from
physical violence, whether from internal or external states, from
violent individuals and sub-state actors, from domestic abuse, etc. For
many people, the greatest source of anxiety is crime, particularly
violent crime."7
"Community security — Community security aims to protect people
from the loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian
and ethnic violence. Traditional communities, particularly minority
ethnic groups, are often threatened. About half of the world’s states
have experienced some inter-ethnic strife. The United Nations declared
1993 the Year of Indigenous People to highlight the continuing
vulnerability of the 300 million aboriginal people in 70 countries as
they face a rising spiral of violence."8 It should be pointed out,
however, that this concept overlaps with the theory of societal security,
as discussed in the following section.
2.2 Societal security
In this case, society refers to the idea of identity, the perception of
collectives and individuals who identify themselves as members of a
specific collective. As such, individuals refer to themselves as being
part of a larger group. The idea of a collective can take several shapes
and forms. The first thing that comes to mind is probably the
identification with a specific national group, but there are other ways
of expression: sub-cultures, communities based on regionalism, race, a
6
7
8
Ibid. Page 99
UNDP (1994) Human Development Report, United Nations Development Program
Ibid.
10
common language, etc.9
In his paper Societal security, Paul Roe addresses extreme cases of
societal insecurity at the edges of internal conflicts, between rival
collectives, and lists as examples the Hungarian minority in Romania
and their troublesome integration with the rest of the country, the
clashes between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, and the
wars in the former Yugoslavia.10
The concepts of ethnicity, nationality, and culturally tinged identity are
complex and have been the subject of much academic debate. In the
context of this report, the question of societal security refers to the
theoretical community/collective of the race radicals, the possible
collective of non-Slavs as a threatened group, and the identity of other
Russians.
The societal security theory is used as a way of examining the possible
threats to Russian society as a whole, and as a way of analysing
whether xenophobia, extreme nationalism and pro-white race
radicalism pose a threat to non-Slavic Russians in particular.
9
Roe, Paul (2007) “Societal security”, taken from Collins, Alan et al, Contemporary
Security Studies, Oxford University Press, printed in Great Britain, pages 164 - 179
10
Ibid.
11
3
LIMITATIONS AND SOURCES
This report is based on academic literature in the shape of previous
scientific research, but due to the nature of the subject, scientific
analyses of this issue are scarce. Therefore, the material also includes
newspaper articles, reports and interviews. In addition, it includes the
author’s own interviews with experts on the subject, excerpts from
internet discussion boards and the race radicals’ own published
material and statements.
Much of the material was collected from the SOVA Centre, an
organisation in Russia focusing on xenophobia, hate crimes and human
rights. However, it must be noted that the work of the SOVA Centre
has been criticised. Maria Engström, a Swedish researcher who has
focused upon the New Right movement, represented in Russia
primarily by Aleksandr Dugin, has accused the SOVA Centre of
having a Western-orientated bias and of overestimating incidents of
ethnic hatred and the importance of race radical groups.11
When presenting the different race radical groups and organisations,
several groups were omitted due to time and space limitations. The
groups omitted are similar in ideology, formation and nature to those
included, but were considered either too small in terms of organisation
size or to have too little influence in the race radical scene. The same
selection principle was applied when analysing statements by race
radicals. All statements and opinions presented here are not necessarily
shared by all individuals and organisations in the race radical scene.
3.1 Definitions
One of the problems when approaching the subject of xenophobic
activity is its many definitions. Many of the different labels that have
been used to describe the phenomenon tend to overlap. Incidents that
have taken place in Russia or globally and that can be said to have
links to, or roots affiliated with, racism of some kind are defined by
11
Engström, Maria (2008), Author’s interview, 29 Oct. 2008
12
researchers as e.g. racist, Nazi, neo-Nazi, extreme right wing,
extremist, Fascist or xenophobic actions. This point is made since
some of the material used for this report might seem confusing at a
first glance.
The individuals and groups involved in xenophobic activities and
organisation seldom speak openly about being neo-Nazis themselves,
but use other forms of categorisation such as pro-nationalist, racist,
patriot, pan-Slavist, pan-Germanist, radical, white power advocate, etc.
The views and issues of organised racial radicalism are not always
logical. Examining the primary sources of racial radicalism, there are
for example white power groupings world-wide that label themselves
"nationalists" while at the same time plotting with outside or "foreign"
interests to overturn the elected government. Due to the overarching
goal of survival of the white race, these groups see themselves as
partners.12
Even within the East European white power organisations there is no
homogeneous view of who are 'friends' or ' enemies'. For example,
there are links, via the pan-European right wing group European
National Front, between the Russian organisation Russkii Obraz and
the Bulgarian National Alliance, which would make one believe that
they are tied together and united. However, the internet debate forum
'White Power – Bulgaria' contains fierce attacks by Bulgarian radical
racists on Slavs in general and Russians in particular, labelling
Russians 'untermensch' and 'dogs ', who have ' nothing in common
with proud Bulgarian Aryans '.13
Race radicalism: "A view which holds that members of a race are
organically linked together and by nature share certain inherited
physical and mental features that separate them from other races."
Race radicals are not by definition racists, as they do not necessarily
view races in terms of superior or inferior.14
12
Whitelaw, interview (2001), Resistance Magazine, issue 16, 2001, pages 38-40
White Power – Bulgaria (2008), published 26 August 2008, published 26 Aug.
accessed Sept. 3, 2008 http://bg-nacionalisti.eblahfree.com/Blah.pl?b-26/m1219779324/.
14
Gardell, Mattias (1998), Rasrisk, Natur och Kultur, Stockholm, pages 13-22, 149183
13
13
Extreme or illiberal nationalism: "Aggressive, exclusive nationalism,
often connected to ideals of past national glory, social cohesion, order,
and stability in society".15
Xenophobia: "A fear of, or aversion to, not only persons from other
countries, but other cultures, subcultures, subsets of belief systems; in
short, anyone who meets any list of criteria about their origin, religion,
personal beliefs, habits, language, orientations, or any other criteria".16
From the author’s point of view, labelling all groups and organisations
presented in this report 'xenophobic' would perhaps be the simplest
way to limit inaccurate ideological definitions. However, it would not
be the most correct. As mentioned above, all actual racists are race
radicals as they share the opinion that race is essential to human
relations, but far from all race radicals are racists. The same goes for
xenophobia; to label all xenophobic groups 'racist' or even 'race radical'
would be as inaccurate.
It is necessary to understand that Russian xenophobia, extreme
nationalism and race radicalism are to some degree connected, but are
not always one and the same. They may cross and intersect. All are
mentioned here, but the focus is primarily on race radicalism. In
several cases xenophobic groups abandon one ideological
classification in favour for another, either because they have had a
genuine ideological change or because of PR-related issues in attempts
to appeal to broader audiences. In Sweden, this is best exemplified by
the political party Sverigedemokraterna (the Sweden Democrats)
which changed its earlier outspoken racist agenda to a more moderate
nationalist approach while still keeping xenophobic tendencies.
It should be noted that the rising political extremism in Russia is not
only of a race radical nature. The scene is somewhat complex, as there
are organisations that may share common elements and outlooks but
should not necessarily be labelled 'racist'. For example, the
organisation National Bolsheviks, on their own website, have images
of swastikas along with Vikings (a popular motif in Western neo-racial
15
Taras, Ray (2002) Liberal and Illiberal Nationalisms, Palgrave Macmillan, printed
in Great Britain, page 37
16
Chapman, James P. (1975), Dictionary of Psychology, Dell Publishing, printed in
New York
14
radical spheres too), but also pictures of Trotsky and Lenin, along with
anti-American slogans and a sceptical view of the current Russian
leadership. According to one researcher on the subject, this example of
anti-democratic tendencies should be regarded as a sign of youth
seeking alternative, authoritarian political stances regardless of their
other political agendas.17 These include the National Bolsheviks with
their authoritarian features, the Pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi, which
is distinctly nationalist and loyal to government in character, yet
openly hostile to outspoken race radicalism, and the Eurasian Union
which represents the anti-liberal and anti-Western 'new right' phalange.
Even though these groups share traits of nationalism, they do not
adhere to either the same extreme or illiberal nationalism principles or
race radicalism as represented by the groups presented in this report.
Analysing in detail the degree of racism or xenophobia held by a
certain group or organisation is therefore next to impossible, unless the
group openly describes itself as such. Simply focusing on the official
material of an organisation is not reliable for a full-scale analysis of its
character. A group such as the Movement Against Illegal Immigration
(MAII) is careful not to present itself as a race radical organisation,
even though it has assisted in racial violence and counts a number of
race radical members within its ranks.
For this report, a modified version of the Library of Congress version
of Russian transliteration into English was used. Certain names have
been left with an alternative spelling due to their established use in
English, such as 'Yeltsin', 'Joseph', 'Yabloko' and 'Pamyat'. English
translations of the names of the race radical groups are used, and thus
the abbreviations are in English even though some of the groups might
be better known by their Russian abbreviations, such as the Movement
Against Illegal Immigration, MAII (in Russian DPNI).
17
Waksberg, Arkadij (2005), ”Rysslands politiska kamp tillbaka på gatan”, Svenska
Dagbladet, published 22 Oct. 2005, accessed 10 February, 2008
http://www.svd.se/dynamiskt/kultur/did_10829816.asp.
15
4 THROUGH THE AGES: RACISM IN
RUSSIA
4.1 The xenophobic tradition in Russia
Russia has had a long tradition of xenophobia, ranging from religious
issues such as fear of the Western, and in the Orthodox Christian view
corrupt, Catholic Church 18 to anti-Semitism in Tsarist Russia 19, and to
ethnic issues such as a hostile view of Chechens in contemporary
Russia.
The Russian Federation is a multi-ethnic federation that contains many
ethnicities within its borders. The early Soviet Communist regime
under Vladimir Lenin and later Joseph Stalin addressed this question
and called it a "nationality question". Before the revolution, Lenin had
addressed nationalism as a possible threat to Communism, as he saw it
as a competing element and ideology to socialism. This movement was
seen by Lenin to hold such power that it could not be wholly stopped.
A political strategy to counter this issue involved creating different
nationality-based federal republics within the Soviet Union (such as
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, etc.) and also partly
within the Soviet Russian Socialist Republic (such as ChechnyaIngushetia, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, etc.). This in turn was
intended to guarantee the different nationalities the possibility to
develop an ethnic identity but within the boundaries of Communism,
and thus a peaceful way to meet the threat of nationalist ideology was
believed to be established.20
Even so, the different ruling elites of Russia throughout history have
launched a number of attacks on its own people. Before the Bolshevik
revolution and the establishment of Communism, there were repeated
18
Bodin, Arne (1998), Ryssland och Europa, (Natur och Kultur, Borås), pages 7275.
19
Jenssen, Hans et al (1991), Antisemitismen, (Natur och Kultur, Stockholm), pages
70-71.
20
See Kolstö, Pål (2000), Political Construction Sites, (Westview Press, USA),
2000.
16
pogroms, slanders and attacks on Jews. In the late 1800s, the infamous
falsified document entitled the 'Protocol of the Elders of Zion' was
published in Russia and was used as a reason for attacking Jews.
The Black Hundreds (Chiornaia sotnia)
As a starting point for organised Russian extremism, the Black
Hundreds group was established in the early 1900s. Its political
programme does not appear to have been directly specified, but its
interests lay foremost in counteracting the Revolutionary movement
within Russia. Its loyalty thus lay with the Tsarist regime and it stood
out as a strongly conservative political assembly. Orthodoxy,
autocracy and national character were important factors in its ideology,
and its members consisted of landowners, merchants, the bourgeoisie,
artisans and others with an interest in keeping the established order
intact. Its conservatism also included xenophobic activity, especially
anti-Semitism, maintaining the afore-mentioned Russian Orthodox
tradition of hostility towards Jews.21
The anti-Semitic tradition survived during the Stalinist era of the
Soviet Union, where a state campaign was launched in the early 1950s
blaming Jewish doctors for an assassination attempt on Joseph Stalin.22
Ethnic discrimination in the Soviet Union has been a debated issue,
especially because of state-sponsored russification, making Russians
the 'first among equals', with Russian the official language of the
Soviet Union and Russian and Slavic culture holding a leading position
in regard to other the cultural contributions of ethnicities. For example,
in Russia there has long been a view of differences between Slavs and
Caucasian people. Slandering of Chechens did not start with the
labelling of the Chechen people as Nazi-collaborators during World
War II, but with the Russian colonisation in the 18th and 19th century.
It also played a prominent role in Russian literature, such as in Leo
Tolstoy’s book Prisoner of the Caucasus.23
21
See Laqueur, Walter (1993), Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in
Russia, (HarperCollins Publishers Ltd).
22
Ibid. pages 106-111.
23
See Evangelista, Matthew (2002), The Chechen Wars - Will Russia Go the Way of
the Soviet Union?, (Brookings Institution Press).
17
As mentioned previously, definitions of terms associated with the topic
of xenophobia and right wing extremism tend to be somewhat vague.
Due to this, it is hard to actually pinpoint a date when modern Russian
racism was born. Researcher Stephen Shenfield argues that it cannot be
said that there has existed an explicit tradition – at least not within the
borders of the country itself – of actual organised Fascism or Nazism
in Russia. Rather, the movements of Russian Fascism were created
outside the country’s borders by Russian immigrants influenced by
Western European Fascist movements. Many ideological elements that
bear a resemblance to Fascism nonetheless appeared in other
movements during the 1900s, but cannot be said to have achieved any
ideological breakthrough. Due to the devastating war against Nazi
Germany and subsequent Soviet propaganda labelling all right wing
movements Fascist, there has been an aversion in Russia to adopting
such a label.24
4.2 Xenophobia, extreme nationalism and race
radicalism in the 1990s
With the exception of anti-Semitism and a sceptical view of Central
Asians and Caucasians, outspoken racism was a rare phenomenon
within the Soviet Union, but a foundation of xenophobia was laid,
upon which organised pro-Slavic ethnic extremist groups could
develop. Two of the most important of these are presented here.
Pamyat
This group was not started in the 1990s but in the late 1970s, but its
influence on the more modern scene of extreme nationalism and race
radicalism in Russia cannot be underestimated. This organisation gave
rise to the off-shoot group Russian National Unity (RNU), which is
regarded as the most important organisation for the new wave of right
wing extremism in Russia. Pamyat ('remembrance' or 'memory ') had
its early roots under the name Vityaz, which was sponsored by the
Soviet Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural
24
Stephen D. Shenfield (2001), Russian Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies,
Movements, (Armonk, M. E. Sharpe) pages 32 – 35.
18
Monuments, with the aim of assembling people with some academic
background who could contribute to the preservation of Russian values
and culture. The group later took the name Pamyat and split into
several factions in the mid-1980s, when their material became public.
Some of their material was tinged with anti-Semitism, in the tradition
of the Black Hundreds.25
In a report by the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews (UCSJ) from
1999, the most acute problem in the 1990s was identified partly in the
rising masses of racialist skinheads, which certainly alarmed many
people, but also in the anti-Semitism that was suddenly openly
propagated by accepted parties and representatives in the Duma and
other forums. The UCSJ named the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the RNU but also
the Russian Orthodox Church as being responsible for rising antiSemitism.26
Anti-Semitism at first did not seem to exist on a broad scale within the
Russian race radical skinhead scene, or at least was not regarded as an
important issue. Instead, this was something that Russian skinheads
'learned' via contacts and influences from the Western counterparts.
While people with Asian and African features remained evident targets
for persecution, Jews evolved into a group suspected to be more of a
'behind the curtain'-type, conspiring against Russia.27 28
25
See Korey, William (1995), Russian Anti-Semitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology
of Zionism, (Harwood Academic Publishers).
26
UCSJ (1999), Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia and Religious Persecution in Russia’s
Regions 1998-1999, Union of Councils for Soviet Jews (UCSJ), pages 13-32.
27
Tarasov, Aleksandr, Youth Human Rights Group (2005) “Nazi Skinheads in
Modern Russia”,Youth Human Rights Group, published Oct. 18 2005, accessed
Sept. 20 2008, http://right.karelia.ru/eng/index.php?razdel=articles&page=2005101850.
28
Matyhl, Markus, Stephen Roth Institute (2001) “The Rise of Political AntiSemitism in Modern Russia”, published 31 May, 2001, accessed September 20,
2008 http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw99-2000/mathyl.htm.
19
Russian National Unity (RNU) (Russkoie Natsionalnoie Edinstvo
(RNE))
In the 1990s the RNU gained enormous influence in what was to
become the Russian race radical scene. Its numbers of members were
estimated at most at around 70 000, and it not only united skinheads,
but also youth with leisure activities, camping and outdoor life, all
under the banner of Nationalism.
The RNU was by no means a secret organisation, even though it acted
somewhat less publicly than for example the Communist Party or the
Liberal Democrats. It was open about its activities and at times was
even endorsed and used by local politicians. Its ideology was based on
four main influences: German Nazism, Italian Fascism, Romanian
Fascism and the Black Hundreds legacy. Its membership numbers are
said to have peaked in 1999 at around 100 000 members. The group
later lost its dominance after a split.29
A rumour developed that the RNU’s leader, Aleksandr Barkashov, was
part of the Supreme Soviet coup attempt in the Russian White House
in 1993 against ex-President Boris Yeltsin’s forces. Whether he
actually took part in the fighting is debated, but he was indeed
persecuted for the insurrection, only to be granted amnesty in 1994 by
the newly elected Duma. Some time after this, the RNU distanced
itself more from Pamyat, to adopt a more elaborate form of Fascism. It
created an emblem that was a merger between a swastika (in Russian:
kolovrat) and the 'Star of the Mother of God', which adorned members’
uniforms. Members also used the greeting 'Slava Rossii' (Glory to
Russia) and stretched their right arm from the chest into the air, in a
'Sieg heil' manner, as a symbol of ranking spiritual matters over
material indulgence. The goal of the RNU was to form a 'strong
Russia', in which an aggressive form of nationalism based upon
ethnicity and race rather than culture was the ideology, as opposed to a
more diffuse 'patriotism' based on allegiance to the Russian state. An
anti-Semitic version of Orthodox Christianity mixed with elements of
spiritualism, Buddhism and New Age was adopted. The RNU showed
29
Shenfield, Stephen (2001), Russian Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies, Movements
(Armonk M.E. Sharpe), pages 113-128
20
strong resentment towards Jews and Roma, with the possible hint of a
future extermination of the two peoples.30
The views about the RNU were mixed; some saw its members as
vigilantes and to some degree as protectors of safety and order in a
turbulent time. Some viewed it as a very positive force, as it managed
to gather restless and troubled youth to a more meaningful existence.
In the words of a young woman active in the RNU, "In the USSR,
there was the Komsomol, in the West there are the Scouts. And here (in
Russia) there is the RNU." 31
The Duma parties of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Communist
Party, along with certain parts of the Russian Orthodox Church, fuelled
anti-Semitism. The conflicts in Chechnya and Georgia helped to
reinforce a negative view of both North and South Caucasians among
politicians and in most parts of Russian society. In addition to this, the
massive rise in the RNU and xenophobic tendencies met little or no
resistance from the authorities. The situation in the 1990s may have
created a basis of institutionalised xenophobia and racism, paving the
way for the current situation.
4.3 Contemporary race and ethnic extremism:
An overview
Much of the ethnically motivated violence and attacks on non-Slavs in
contemporary Russia consists of incidents carried out by more or less
pronounced racist groupings. Examples of these include Format 18, the
DPNI and the Slavic Union. However, as we shall see later on,
hostility towards non-Slavs appears to have some links with statements
originating from individuals in top positions in Russian society today.
Violent race radicals in Russia have attacked and targeted in particular
people from the Caucasus, people of Central Asian descent, black or
coloured people and religious groups such as Muslims and Jews. The
reason for these specific targets for attack stems from the conception
that Russian race radicals have referred to Central Asian peoples as
30
Ibid.
UCSJ (1999), Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia and Religious Persecution in Russia’s
Regions 1998-1999, Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, pages 14-16
31
21
'Russia's blacks', often paperless guest workers from former Soviet
Republics, which make them 'easy targets' as they are likely to be
treated badly by the authorities and viewed as 'illegal immigrants'.
Reports show that many non-Slavs, especially people from the
Caucasus, perceive themselves to live in danger.32
Two of the most remarkably violent attacks were made public in 2004
and 2007. In 2004, a 9-year Tajik girl, Khursheda Sultanova, was
stabbed to death by alleged skinheads. In 2007, a film clip of the
beheading of two men, of Tajik and Daghestani descent, respectively,
was spread over the internet. Film clips showing assaults on random
inhabitants of non-Slavic descent have become widely used by Russian
race radicals, such as the group Format 18. In an interview with one of
Moscow’s skinhead gangs conducted by TV reporter Ross Kemp, a
spokesman for the group claims that this is indeed an important tool,
and that they "...do not practice unarmed combat for sports or selfdefence purposes... but for street fighting. We want people to be
inspired"33. These clips have been available on many Russian racist
websites, but also more publicly on sites such as youtube.com.
Hostility towards Africans or people with dark skin seems to be
escalating, based upon reports made by the BBC. People have been
killed in so-called 'race riots' in St Petersburg, and slandering and
offences against immigrants appear to be part of everyday life. This is
not only a problem in big cities, as life also appears to be harsh for
dark-skinned people in smaller towns. Russian intellectuals seem
concerned that these attacks are likely to prevail in the long-term future
and see this activity as a legacy from the Soviet Union, where the risk
of being punished for offending other persons was very low.34
Another of the most widely used methods of recruitment to these
organisations is spreading propaganda with the help of so-called white
32
Jackson, Patrick, (2006) “Living with race hate in Russia”, BBC News Europe,
published 24 Feb. 2006, accessed September 15, 2008
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4737468.stm.
33
Kemp, Ross (2006), On gangs, BAFTA Documentary TV series for Sky One,
season 2, episode 2, 2006
34
Jackson, Patrick (2006), “Living with race hate in Russia”, BBC News Europe,
published 24 Feb. 2006, accessed September 15, 2008
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4737468.stm.
22
power music or white noise, which preaches white supremacy. The
music may take several forms of tonal expression, but is characterised
by its pro-white racism. One of the biggest international publications in
this genre is the US-based Resistance Magazine, founded by the then
race radical George Eric Hawthorne (now George Bundi), who also
started a record company under the same name. Resistance Magazine
contains interviews, articles and other content promoting white
supremacy ideology. This magazine has been helpful for Russian and
other eastern European race radicals aiming to establish themselves in
a global white power community. The number of Russia-based bands
and organisations has grown steadily, along with other East European
racist groupings.35
Russian race radicalism has taken hold outside of Russia too. Many
white power-activists world-wide see Russia as the 'future for the
white race'. The spread has been diverse. One of the more spectacular
expressions can be found in Israel, where Russian race radical
immigrants have organised and have terrorised citizens of the country,
not only Jews but all groups deemed racially inferior. Reports show
that there is a link between Russian racist groups operating outside of
Russia, and groupings within their native country.36
Many of the groups in Russia gather on the day of the 'Russian March',
which has become a rallying point of manifestation of Russian right
wing extremism. In 2007, the SOVA Centre reported that the annual
demonstration was attended by a number of race radical and extreme
nationalist organisations, including the Movement Against Illegal
Immigration (MAII), the National Imperial Party of Russia (NIPR), the
Russian Order Group, the Slavic Union (SU), the 'Rus' Party in
Defence of the Russian Constitution (PDRC), the National Socialist
Society, the Union of Orthodox Gonfalon Carriers (UOGC), the Union
of Russian People (URP), the Colonel Kvachkov Support Group, the
Russian National Bolshevik Front (Ivan Strukov’s RNBF), the Pamyat
National Patriotic Front, the National Union, the Russian Community
of the Crimea, the Lukashenko-2008 Group, and the Russian Public
35
See Resistance.com.
Galili, Lily, (2003) “Anti-Semitism, right here at home”, Haaretz.com, published
23 May, 2003, accessed February 12, 2008,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=296114&sw=neo-Nazi.
36
23
Movement (RPM). Unofficially, the march was attended by members
of other groups, including supporters of N. Kuryanovich and Russian
All-National Union (RANU).37
The Union of Councils for Soviet Jews has stated that it believes that
the chance of any racial extremist organisation gaining actual political
power in the Duma is fairly small. However, the chances are that in
smaller regional and republic assemblies of the Russian Federation, the
influence of xenophobic extremism might become significantly greater
than on a federal basis.
It is worth mentioning that xenophobia, hate crime and racial extremist
organisations have not decreased in Russia over a ten-year period.
Some might argue that economic decline in the 1990s during the
Yeltsin era created a basis for this kind of activity and ideology. This is
probably true, to some extent. One might then expect that with an
increased standard of living and a better economic forecast,
xenophobic tendencies would decrease over time. However, there
appear to be no statistics or evidence supporting this. Instead, we find a
steady increase in hate crimes, and networks of nationalist extremists
appear to be attracting ever greater numbers.
Movement Against Illegal Immigration (MAII) (Dvizhenie Protiv
Nelegalnoi Immigratsii (DPNI))
Today, MAII is one of the most important xenophobic organisations in
Russia, and differs from many of the other active ideologically similar
groups in the country. In one way, it can be said to represent a modern
type of xenophobia, which may be a greater threat to human and
societal security than many of its counterparts. This will be explained
later on.
MAII gathers a large amount of demonstrators and supporters, and has
overcome many of the 'childhood diseases' of organised Russian
37
SOVA Center, Kozhevnikova, Galina (2007), Autumn 2007: Nazi Raids, Russian
Marches, and Putin as Schtirlitz, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis,
http://xeno.sova-center.ru/6BA2468/6BB4208/A886251.
24
xenophobia.38 By doing so, it has obtained closer ties with the
European scene, making open collaborations with ideologically similar
groupings in other parts of Europe.39
The ideology of MAII is, as the name suggests, centred on combating
immigration, but is in reality based on a pro-Slav/pro-Russian
xenophobic perception which has advocated both violent and nonviolent activity, and which has functioned as an umbrella organisation
for different skinheads and assisted them with legal aid. Its structure is
not hierarchal, but rather takes the shape of a network. There appears
to be no real focus on other political questions besides combating
immigration, which in turn makes it 'easier' for it to define itself, as
there is no need to specify itself further.40 The multi-faceted outlook
may have made it easier for even the pro-democratic group Yabloko to
cooperate with it under a united banner during the 2007 elections.
As mentioned previously, earlier Russian traditional xenophobia was
tinged with severe anti-Semitism, a prominent feature during the
1990s too. However, with MAII anti-Semitism has faded away, at
least to some extent, from organised Russian xenophobia – not least
because the leader of the organisation, Aleksandr Potkin, is reported to
be of Jewish descent, something which he himself does not deny but
responds to with a rather noncommital approach.41
People’s Union (Narodnii Soiuz)
The People’s Union advocates the ideas of Russian nationalism and
Orthodox monarchism, sporting the imperial flag colours, black,
yellow and white in its party symbol. It refers to its view of ideal
nationalism as 'popular socialist'. It was formerly called People’s Will
and had an ideological foundation based upon imperialism and
38
Rosalskaia, Maria SOVA Center (2008), Moscow, author’s interview (by
telephone), 26 September 2008.
39
An example of this is an open letter to the Italian group La Falange, in which the
DPNI gives its support for its activities and hopes for an immigrant-free Italy.
40
SOVA Center (2008), Rightwing Organizations and Groups in Russia and their
symbols, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, Moscow, pages 1-2.
41
See Stormfront Discussion Board for an internet racialist discussion on the subject.
http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php?p=5944720.
25
militarism.
The group considers itself a serious political party and as such
distances itself from outspoken racist extremism, but assumes
patronage over individuals charged with crimes of a xenophobic
nature. People’s Will participated with the group Rodina in the 2003
elections and gained 8 mandates. However, in the 2007 elections, it
was discarded by the Central Electoral Commission.42
Great Russia (Velikaia Rossiia)
Categorising Great Russia is problematic, as its material, statements
and affiliations contain different and at times even contradictory
ideological traits. To label it race radical would be inaccurate, as it
claims that Russia holds a voluntary coalition of peoples. It officially
distances itself from racial nationalism, but claims that Russians have
specific characteristics not found anywhere else in the world, and that
this involves a desire for autonomy, creativity, indulgent but hard
nationalism, tolerance and generosity.43 However, it does not renounce
anti-Semitism except in its more radical and violent manifestations.
Instead, its official line is that Russian nationalists must not focus
solely upon the "Jewish question" or the "Masonic conspiracy".
Neither should "domination and violence be the purpose of Russians,
but may be necessary in the context of self-protection and selforganisation". (Manifesto of the Revival of Russia). Great Russia also
openly sympathises with MAII and participates in the Russian March.
Great Russia, like the People’s Union, wishes to see the establishment
of an Orthodox superpower, based upon what it refers to as the
"Russian doctrine", an ambiguous vision of a coming Russian golden
age, where the 'Third Rome' will regain its former glory and stand as a
solid guardian of true values among global moral decrepitude. The
group is thoroughly anti-liberal and is trying to establish itself as a
political party and attempted to be registered as such to participate in
42
SOVA Center (2008), Rightwing Organizations and Groups in Russia and their
symbols, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, Moscow, page 4.
43
Velikaia Rossiia official website, http://www.velikoross.ru, accessed November 2,
2008
26
the 2007 elections, but to no avail. It is reported to have a rather low
level of activity as of today. Its leader is Andrei Saveliov.44
The People’s Nationalist Party (PNP)
(Narodnaia Natsionalnaia Partiia (NNP)
As an openly neo-Nazi party and thus racist, the PNP traces its roots
back to 1994 and has ideological traits with a reference point back to
the previously mentioned Black Hundreds. The party was started by
Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevskii and soon gained a strong influence
and increased its membership size. It has an estimated number of
regional departments of 47 division groups. However, the organisation
split into two factions after it was attacked in 2003 and Sukharevskii
was injured. The two groups share same name, but have two different
leaders.45
Russian National Unity (RNU) (Russkoie Natsionalnoie
Edinstvo (RNE)), present organisation
The RNU was previously mentioned as the most important extreme
nationalist organisation in Russia during the 1990s, and one gets the
impression that it remains thoroughly active due to the number of
articles and amount of material written about and by the group. Some
of its local divisions also stand out as some of the few extreme
nationalist and race radical groups that have been declared extremist by
the Russian government. However, times have changed, and the RNU
today has lost much of its former influence and power and has become
rather fractured. It still exists, but its activity has diminished. Rather
than being the most powerful group, its importance is more historical,
as being the 'founding' racist group encompassing racist skinheads,
ordinary youth and extremist activity. Today, the RNU has fully
embraced the Orthodox identity.46
44
Ibid, page 1.
SOVA Center (2008), Rightwing Organizations and Groups in Russia and their
symbols, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, Moscow, page 3.
46
Official Russian National Unity website (2008), http://rne.org, accessed 10
September 2008.
45
27
The Slavic Union (SU)( Slavianskii Soiuz (SS))
The SU group is an off-shoot from the Moscow delegation of the
RNU, fronted by Dmitrii Demushkin. Among the RNU and MAII, this
organisation stands out as one of the most internationally featured
outspoken race radical groups, which regards survival of the white race
as the most important issue.47 SU has been subjected to much media
coverage but according to a spokesperson for the SOVA Centre, the
group is not as big as it would like the public to believe.48 Its outlook
specialises in a kind of neo-paganism under the name "Russism" and it
has rejected the Orthodox identity of Pamyat and parts of the RNU,
and as such appeals to many young and violent skinheads. Nowadays,
it tolerates Orthodoxy among its representatives.49 In an interview,
Demushkin has stated that he does not distance himself or the SU from
violence, but encourages people to act on their own, so that there can
be no link between the organisation and violent activities.50
The National-Socialist Society (NSS) (Natsionalsotsialistsheskoie Obshestvo (NSO))
As an off-shoot from the Slavic Union, the NSS organisation is one of
the more openly self-proclaimed neo-Nazi race radical formations, also
sporting a NSDAP-like swastika in its emblem. Reported to be a small
organisation, it is nevertheless militarised and violence-orientated. It
had, or has, a direct link to the even smaller group Format 18, which
will be described more thoroughly later on, which was part of the NSO
until September 2007. The group is split in two directions but is
nonetheless still active.
It is hard to keep an active track of the smaller groupings in the race
47
Schweitzer, Daniel (2005) White Terror, Dschoint Ventschr Filmproduktion AG,
Germany
48
Rosalskaia, Maria SOVA Center (2008), Moscow, author’s interview (by
telephone), 26 September 2008.
49
SOVA Center (2008), Rightwing Organizations and Groups in Russia and
their symbols, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, Moscow page 14.
50
Schweitzer, Daniel (2005) White Terror, Dschoint Ventschr
Filmproduktion AG, Germany.
28
radical scene. A common feature both in the Western and Eastern
extremist scenes, not only on the right wing political scale but also on
the left and in the religious sphere, is that with few exceptions – if any
– organised groups want to be recognised and stand out among the
others. The problem with this is not only that they may be very small,
but the information about them may not always be reliable. With the
help of the internet, a lonely individual without actual support but with
some skills in webpage design can easily create a website for a
supposed 'organisation' which in fact may not exist other than by its
name. In addition, individuals can act upon their own initiative without
help, references or orders from a higher ranking individual in an
organisational hierarchy. It should be noted that the persons presumed
responsible for the previously mentioned video of two men being
beheaded claimed to be part of an organisation called the 'Nazi Party
of Russia', but the SOVA Centre claims never to have heard of the
group.
Apart from the facts mentioned above, another problem with
identifying minor organisations is that they often tend to be shortlived. If one group does not get the attention it seeks, it may change its
name, disband or in some cases, if it finds itself in trouble, either legal
or with other groups in its scene, it may simply go underground and
stay active but away from the public eye. In some cases, the latter may
actually pose a greater threat than groups that strive for media
attention. Professor of religious history Mattias Gardell found in his
field studies among race radical groups in the USA that some of the
most militant groups were devoid of active public recognition.51
Some groups have been omitted from this report even though they
have gained reputations and have been called "some of the most
popular skinhead groups in Russia"52, since they are based in local
regions and operate in specific areas, such as Blood & Honour Russian
Division, Skin Legion and United Brigades 88, which are primarily
Moscow-based. St Petersburg has its own gangs, such as Russian Fist,
51
Gardell, Mattias (2008), author’s interview, Uppsala, 23 September 2008.
Ocran, Sydney (2008), (Liberian Ph.D Candidate living in Moscow ),
conversation with the author, 10 Oct. 2008.
52
29
while Nizhnii Novgorod has the North group, and Yaroslavl’s group
White Bears.53
Format 18
Given a public face by its member Maxim "Tesak" Martsinkevich,
Format 18 is a clearly racist organisation and became infamous in
Russia and abroad for being among the first racist groups to use multimedia in its violent activity, by attacking people of non-Slavic
appearance, filming it and later posting it on the internet.
Martsinkevich was convicted of incitement of racial hatred in 2008,
while three of his associates were convicted of the murder of an Antifa
(left-wing group) activist. The Format 18 website has now been closed
by the Antifa, but there still exists active support for the group and
there have been campaigns such as "Free Tesak", vocal martyr among
race radicals, that present him as a victim of violation of freedom of
speech.54
The Ryno Group / White Brotherhood (Beloe Bratstvo)
In July 2008, this group gained world-wide news coverage as one of
the most violent and ruthless race radical groups in Russia. Headed by
two 18-year-old men, Artur Ryno and Pavlev Skachevskim, it stands
accused of 20 racially motivated murders and has claimed
responsibility for even more murders and fatal violence.55
There is not much information available on the group as such, even
though it has gained media coverage, as its organisation appears to be
rather loose – with no political manifesto except for stating that
53
RIA Novosti, (2003) “Skinheads In Russia: Who Are They?”, Pravda.ru,
published 6 Aug. 2003, accessed Oct. 4 , 2008.
http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/87/345/10666_skinheads.html.
54
Grishin, Anton (2007), “Skinhead Russia”, Moscow News, published 6
Sept. 2007, accessed 4 Oct. 2008
http://www.mnweekly.ru/national/20070906/55273681.htl.
55
Ermakova, Nataliia (2007) “Beloe bratstvo” obedelos na skinkhedov”, Gazeta.ru,
published 2 Aug. 2007, accessed 5 Oct. 2008,
http://www.gazeta.ru/2007/08/02/oa_245939.shtml.
30
"Moscow must be purified". As its members face prosecution, the
group is likely to remain inactive or disorganised. However, there
remains a possibility of copycat activity.
Schultz 88
This group could have been omitted since it is primarily based in St.
Petersburg. However, it is included due to its internal structure, which
is of importance. Reported to be one of approximately 50 active
skinhead groups in Russia, Schultz 88 claims to be a representative of
the "white man’s jihad" and that the race radical movement has begun
to divide itself into cells and into an al-Qaeda like structure. This kind
of formation can also be seen in the West as with the Swedish network
Fria Nationalister (Free Nationalists), acting in small but effective
groups with little or no direct links with each other, which makes their
actions and members harder to trace. A representative of Schultz 88
claims that the group has "sent several hundred people to hospital", and
sports Western white racist terrorists Timothy McVeigh and Robert
Jay Mathews as role models. The group does not consider itself as
necessarily Russian, but rather "belonging to the white race".56
‘Rus’ Party in Defence of the Russian Constitution (‘Rus’ PDRC)
(Partiia zashchity rossiiskoi konstitutsii (‘Rus’ PZRK))
Based on the remaining active fragments of the Russian National
Unity, Rus PDRC is now the most active organisation to have risen
from the RNU’s ashes. The ideology of the organisation is somewhat
hard to determine, but has been labelled 'ultra-right'. Its members range
ideologically from Nazis, to extreme Nationalists and sympathisers of
Italian Fascism. It was denied registration as a party in 2007. One of its
characteristics is that even though it is headed by a man named Yurii
Vasin, the group is not led by a specific individual, but run as a
56
Zarakovich, Yurii (2004), “From Russia With Hate”, TIME Magazine, published
1 Aug. 2004, accessed September 22 2008.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,674718-2,00.html.
31
collective.57 Its official statements praise constitutionalism, social
justice and even democracy, but at the same time claim that the party,
in its activities, is based on traditional national values inherent to the
Russian people and other indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation
and promotes their national revival, and also advocates "traditional
Cossack law" to protect the borders of Russia. It warns against foreign
threats such as NATO in the West, the economic power of China and
Japan in the East, and active development of Islamic states in the
South.58
57
SOVA Center (2008), Rightwing Organizations and Groups in Russia and their
symbols, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, Moscow, page 10.
58
official website, pzrk.ru, attained 10 November, 2008
32
5
REACTIONS
5.1 From Russian politicians
The Russian government has, on various occasions, raised voices of
concern regarding racism in the country. Vladimir Putin has stated that
"race-motivated crimes undermine the security of the state". Different
politicians, such as in the Leningrad region, have also condemned
racism and claimed it to be a serious threat to public safety.
One could argue that the early state sponsoring of Nashi was, and still
is, a way of combating xenophobia. Its establishment was launched as
a reaction to the rapid rise in racist skinhead and RNU membership
numbers, along with a growing concern from the government
regarding the National Bolsheviks. However as noted, regardless of its
original purposes, Nashi’s ideology and activities appear to have
adopted a nationalist character which, if not wholly in line with the
previously mentioned race radicals, still bears a resemblance to
patriotism of a fanatic kind.
However, it appears that the government has not acted forcefully
enough, as the number of reported incidents is still high, and not much
seems to have changed. There is new legislation on hate crimes, which
is a step forward (Law on Combating Extremist Activity, Article 116,
Paragraph 2, Part (c) of the Russian Criminal Code). It remains to be
seen whether this legislation can bring any real change to the situation.
Reports from the Moscow-based SOVA Centre claim that criminal
prosecutions of individuals who have been involved in hate crime of a
violent nature have decreased, whereas the number of attacks is still
alarmingly high.
Racist violence continues to grow at a high rate, including, in addition
to neo-Nazi skinhead attacks, numerous everyday violent conflicts
driven by ethnic and racial hatred. In contrast, criminal prosecution of
individuals who have committed violent crimes has decreased for the
first time since 2003.59
59
Kozhevnikova, Galina (2008), Autumn 2007: Nazi Raids, Russian Marches, and
Putin as Schtirlitz, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis
33
Various reports show that local policemen dealing with these issues
have acted in a negligent way, remaining uninterested in actually
dealing with the problem, either by refusing to classify race or ethnic
motivated attacks as crimes, instead calling assaults and violence as
bland "hooliganism", or in some cases actually taking part in the
hostilities themselves or refusing to act.60 61
Format 18’s website was closed down by the Russian Antifa, and not
the authorities. The government does not support the autonomous
groups combating race radicalism, as they are seen as equally
unpredictable, unstable and directed towards hooliganism.62
5.2 Reactions to the violence in the Russian
race radical and extreme nationalist scene
Russian xenophobia, race radicalism and extreme nationalism have
manifested themselves in forms from violent street activity to
propaganda posted on websites on the internet. The xenophobic
spectrum is not homogeneous, as it expresses itself in a myriad of
ways, ideologies and opinions. The organisations listed in the previous
chapters are not necessarily the best of friends with each other, as their
methods, outlook and goals differ. However, analysis of material such
as interviews, propaganda, material and opinions posted by Russian
race radical organisations and independent individuals themselves
http://xeno.sova-center.ru/6BA2468/6BB4208/A886251.
Griffiths, Emma (2007), “St. Petersburg - Hate Crimes”, Journeyman TV for
ABC, broadcasted: 20/03/2007, accessed 26 Sept. 2008
Transcript available at http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2007/s1906862.htm.
61
UCSJ official site (2008), “Russian policeman sentenced for hate speech
distribution”, Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union (UCSJ),
published 5 September 2008, accessed 10 Sept. 2008,
http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/090508Russ3.shtml.
62
Grishin, Anton (2007), “Skinhead Russia”, Moscow News, published 6 Sept. 2007,
accessed 27 Sept. 2008,
http://www.mnweekly.ru/national/20070906/55273681.html.
60
34
reveal a common feature: very few of them denounce the street
violence and random attacks. Even when asked about the murder of 9year-old Sultanova, at least two racist skinheads interviewed replied
that "it may have been regrettable that a child died ... but if she had
lived, she would have grown up to be our enemy anyway ".63
5.3 Reactions by Western counterparts
Compared with Western race radicalism, the East European rising
wave of extremist xenophobia appears in general to be more brutal and
violently orientated. Whereas Western racial radicalism often leans
towards a 'peaceful' discourse/rhetoric, often claiming self-defence as
its prime vehicle for violence, 64 many of the East European
counterparts have advocated a rhetoric based upon a more active use of
force and have encouraged people to take part in violent attacks on
people of non-Slavic descent. Large, organised right-wing extremist
parties and organisations in the West tend to distance themselves from
street attacks and violence towards random targets, as such activities
may damage their outlook, cause, reputation and image.65
Western race radicals are not as homogeneous in their reactions as the
Russian individuals and organisations. An easy way to get a glimpse of
international debates on the issue in the racist scene is via the internet
discussion board Stormfront.org, used by race radicals on a large scale,
and with contributors from around the world. Under the forum thread
"Russian Skinhead Video", one user has posted links to violent video
clips created by Format 18, the content of which is much the same as
previously mentioned – random attacks and persecution of Russian
63
Griffiths, Emma (2007), “St. Petersburg - Hate Crimes”, Journeyman TV for
ABC, broadcasted: 20/03/2007, accessed 26 Sept. 2008
Transcript available at http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2007/s1906862.htm
64
However, there are exceptions to this: recent investigations in Sweden by a
magazine specialising in reports on xenophobic activity, Expo, reported a rise in
extreme right wing violent crimes. However, the primary focus for these groupings
appear to be rival extremists on the left political scale such as Anti-Fascistisk Aktion
(AFA), Revolutionär Front (Revfront) and the Young Syndicalists SUF,
(Syndikalistiska Ungdomsförbundet).
65
Kemp, Ross (2006), On gangs, BAFTA Documentary TV series for Sky One,
season 2, episode 2
35
citizens with a non-Slavic appearance.66
The statements selected here are all from Western countries, as the aim
is to find out their reactions to the Russian race radical methods. There
are a range of opinions on a sliding scale. While some Western radicals
are directly offended by the content of the films, others have another
approach, justifying the methods.
Some of the debaters with the most negative view of the videos and
methods used by Russian skinheads claim that this way of supporting
the cause of white supremacy does not serve it, as people outside the
movement will look at these and find race radicalism offensive, and
they will scare away people who otherwise may be interested in
joining the white supremacist movement. Others have a more positive
view of the material, saying that "if this is the Russian way of handling
things, it is their business … we who do not live there have no reason
to give opinions on what is not our country". In other words, some
advocate the principle of "whatever method that suits the environment
is best, and as we do not live there we should not denounce it". Other
voices have a directly appreciative view, claiming that "the Russian
skinheads are the SA [Sturmabteilung, the Nazi German stormtroopers
in the 1920s and early 1930s] of today. They do their job well; a lot of
foreigners are now scared to live in or visit Russia. The message has
been sent; they are not welcome". The most outspoken supporters of
the methods see no problem with engaging in the fighting and would
wish to see the same methods applied in their native countries,
labelling the denouncers of violence as "battle scared desk nationalists
who do not understand the seriousness – this is war and war demands
bloodshed".67
Even race radicals who have no record of violence but who have rather
placed themselves among the intellectuals, such as David Duke in the
US, have started to look upon Russia as some kind of a role model for
how the race issue should be treated. In his article "Is Russia the key to
66
Stormfront Discussion Board, postings from September 2006 to October 2006,
accessed 13 October 2008,
http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php/russian-skinhead-video262952p7.html.
67
Ibid.
36
white survival? ", Duke argues that "the white race faces a world-wide
genetic catastrophe" but that "Russia has a greater sense of racial
understanding among its population than does any other predominantly
white nation" and that while earlier white nations face degeneration,
Russia and the Eastern bloc have understood things better than the
West. He refers to the Soviet era as "the Jewish-Bolshevik" age, which
(white) people have now acknowledged as alien and negative. Other
race radical groups and individuals have also stated their admiration
for Russia, much along the same lines as David Duke.68 69
It is not certain whether the admiration is equally mutual. Professor M.
Gardell argues that even though the Russian race radicals in their
formation period were to a large extent heavily influenced by the
Western racist scene, this interest has calmed down, as the Russian
race radicals see themselves as leaders of the global scene. The
Western radicals have faced a lot harder opposition to their cause, as
Western government laws are much harder on hate crime and racist
organisations. The Eastern, and in particular Russian, skinhead groups
and organisations have been able to form, act and build up their
movement without disturbance from the state.70 However, MAII at
least has written an open letter to its Italian counterpart and stretched
out an open hand for cooperation, while representatives from the
Swedish group Nationalsocialistisk Front (NSF) have partaken in
Russian race radical demonstrations. Even the RNU holds a Swedish
division, operating from Stockholm. A Moscow division of the
originally English organisation Blood & Honour (B&H) also exists,
though it is claimed by the SOVA Centre that it is not regarded by the
international B&H as an official branch.
According to the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO), connections
between Swedish and Russian race radicals at least appear to be loose
and few. A small division of the RNU is active in Stockholm, but apart
from this the only real activity seems to be a few participations in
68
Info 14 (2005), (Swedish race radical site), “Ryssar fördrev zigenare “(translated:
“Russians evicted gypsies”), posted 23 Feb. 2005, accessed 8 Oct. 2008
http://www.info14.com/2005-02-23-ryssar_fordrev_zigenare.html.
69
Schweitzer, Daniel (2005), White Terror, Dschoint Ventschr Filmproduktion AG,
Germany.
70
Gardell, Mattias (2008), author’s interview, Uppsala, 23 Sept. 2008.
37
demonstrations such as the annual Swedish Salem March and the Hess
March in Wunsiedel in Germany.71
71
Hagström, Ahn-Za, SÄPO, author’s interview (e-mail correspondation),
Stockholm, 11 November 2008.
38
6
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
6.1 Nationalism and racialism: A sliding scale?
Much has been written about the question of nationalism in Eastern
Europe, and recently perhaps even more so about nationalism in the
former Soviet republics. In the latter case, nationalism can be viewed
as either a positive or a negative factor, but almost without exception
as a necessary part in shaping national identity. The rising interest in
the Orthodox Church in Russia after the demise of the Soviet Union
suggests that religion has been an important point of focus of a
collective Russian identity. This goes for both Russian citizens in
general, but also for great parts of the right wing extremist groups such
as the RNU.
Labelling all extremist nationalism in Russia as an outlet of violent
skinhead aggression is a grave mistake. Demonstrations held in various
parts and cities of the country show that nationalist supporters have
many different features. Film clips of nationalist demonstrations spread
on the Internet as propaganda and documentation show that even
though there are sometimes undeniably large amounts of short-haired
people in classic skinhead outfits, the majority of the demonstrators
appear to be 'ordinary' people without any special characteristics.72
6.2 Human security and causes of xenophobia
and violence
As mentioned previously, the narrow school of human security focuses
upon threats of violence. In larger cities of Russia today in particular,
there are a number of groups which face severe threats to their safety,
due to their skin colour, descent and religion. This shows a real threat
to human security.
The broader school is more focused upon underdevelopment.
72
Griffiths, Emma (2007), “St. Petersburg - Hate Crimes”, Journeyman TV for
ABC, broadcasted: 20/03/2007, accessed 26 Sept. 2008
Transcript available at http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2007/s1906862.htm.
39
According to the idea of combining schools of human security, as such
pointing to underdevelopment as an independent variable for
explaining outbursts of intra-state political violence, there is reason to
believe that there is a connection between unemployment, a decreased
standard of living and possibly the identity void left by the dissolution
of the Soviet Union and the rise of political and racial extremism in
Russia and the violence that has followed. Frustration among
unemployed, disillusioned and violent young people might have
triggered part of the current racist violence. According to a Moscow
racial radical spokesperson, many of their gang members have a
previous record within the army and now, with nothing to do, have
become restless. 73
The current picture of Russia is seldom associated with great
improvements in building a fully functioning welfare state. Common
explanations of growing xenophobia are usually found in decreased
standards of living, economic deprivation and downturn, mass
unemployment, etc. However, even though factors like these certainly
may have helped to establish ethnic hatred in Russia during the
turbulent 1990s, they do not fully explain the situation of today. With
an overall growing standard of living in Russia, we would have
expected a decline in race radicalism and ethnic hatred, but the
situation does not appear to be improving and, if not growing in
numbers, radicals seem at least to be staying on a large scale,
concentrated to larger cities such as Moscow and St Petersburg.
Another problem is that racialist or xenophobic ideals also seem to be
anchored in higher political institutions and administration.
Even though Vladimir Putin has expressed concern about racist
activities with the Russian Federation, other parts of his political
discourse and practice do little to put some actual weight behind his
words. At a summit for the Organisation of Islamic Conferences in
Malaysia in 2003, he stated that "all attempts to provoke islamophobia
in Russia have failed".74 This statement seems to bear little
73
Kemp, Ross (2006), On gangs, BAFTA Documentary TV series for Sky One,
season 2, episode 2.
74
Pravda (2003), “Islamophobia in Russia”, Pravda, published 16 Oct. 2003,
accessed 5 Feb. 2008, http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/terror/16-10-2003/3864islam-0.
40
resemblance to the situation of many Muslims living in fear in Russia
today.
The violent acts committed by the racialist groupings and individuals
do not appear to be isolated events. In my opinion, this violence should
generally be regarded as being based upon political initiatives, even
though this might not be an appropriate explanation for all of the
events (delving deeper into this, one might argue that some of the
reported incidents may be more of a ' hooligan' type of crime with little
political motive).
The very broad school of human security is concerned with threats to
human freedom. So far, there is little actual evidence that xenophobia,
extreme nationalism and race radicalism advocated by the groups
presented in this report have managed to threaten human freedom, as
they have too little influence on the mainstream political agenda. There
might be concerns about implicit effects on political freedom, a matter
elaborated on later in this discussion.
6.3 Societal security
An active rise in xenophobia can pose a threat to societal security by
provoking violence and threatening parts of a country’s population,
thus causing severe separation, fear and alienation. Discrimination,
intimidation and harassment might also evolve into escalating ethnic
hatred, especially if the threatened part of the population recognises the
threat and decides to retaliate. Can Russian pro-white race radicalism
cause this within the Russian Federation?
A spontaneous answer to this question would be 'probably not', as
active race radicalism plays a relatively small role as regards the whole
of the Russian population. Unfortunately, however, this is also what
keeps it from receiving proper attention.
Even though the question of national issues tends to play quite a
central role within the boundaries of societal security, it is hard to
claim with absolute certainty that the theoretical concept of societal
security could or should be applied to the phenomenon of race
radicalism, even in Russia. The reason for this goes back to the earlier
discussion of the definition of the phenomenon or objective of research
in this report. The concept of 'nation' is complex, and may be even
41
more so in Russia, since the Russian Federation’s borders hold a
myriad of different nationalities. Even though there should be no doubt
that violent extremism poses a threat to individuals belonging to
certain ethnic groups, it is far harder to claim that we can see a rising
threat of violent ethnic conflict on a larger scale, such as the examples
given by Paul Roe (Hungarians and Romanians in Romanian
Transylvania, or the collision between Catholics and Protestants in
Northern Ireland).
As stated previously, the label that race radicals choose for themselves
is by no means logical, except perhaps for the concept of 'white power'.
Thus, their 'enemies' or objects for hatred do not belong to a specific
group, even though certain ethnicities face a broader challenge and
threat than others (such as Jews, people from the Caucasus and Central
Asia).
The concept of societal security holds, to a certain degree, the
prediction that the perceived threatened group may find a common
threatening object or group. Even though race radicals are threatening,
they simply do not fit the same role as a rival ethnic group in an ethnic
conflict (such as Poe's examples) due to their differences. Likewise,
the threatened group or groups are probably too diverse, as they range
from ethnic to religious minorities and have few things in common
apart from their non-Slavic appearance.
On the other hand, a greater societal threat is more likely to emerge
based upon further conflicts of a state-centred nature. As conflicts
between Russia and other states have shown, the Russian state appears
to be likely to use ethnic discrimination as a tool for pursuing its
agenda, as with the Russian-Georgian case. As these ethnic groups are
more distinct, they are probably more likely to view themselves as
targeted homogeneous collectives.
6.4 Xenophobic, extreme nationalist and race
radical organisations
The fact that MAII is the most successful of these organisations is
alarming. Under the banner 'illegal immigration', MAII has not only
managed to unite many previously divided groups and individuals, but
has also made it easier to connect with the West, as it is addressing the
42
'same issues’ as many of its Western counterparts. This might be
recruiting rhetoric in line with the current debate on illegal
immigration within the European Union and in the United States of
America.
Where Russian race radicalism is heading is hard to foresee. The
movement as such is younger than its Western counterparts, which
means that we still might not have seen its final transformation.
Modern Russian xenophobia, extreme nationalism and race radicalism
cover a large area of outlooks and ideology. There has been a
transformation in a short period of time from a state-sponsored idea of
'cultural heritage', Vityaz, possibly tinged with anti-Semitism, to a
more organised form of group, Pamyat, which in turn via the RNU
gave birth to the radical movement that is around today. Apart from
these groups, anti-Semitism has manifested itself on a broader scale via
the Orthodox Church, the Communist Party and the Liberal Democrat
Party. Organised Russian xenophobia then emerged during the late
1990s and created several ideologically different branches, ranging
from xenophobic interpretations of the Orthodox faith, as in the case of
the RNU, to the early neo-pagan identity of the racist group the Slavic
Union.
The Orthodox identity may have been important as a 'rallying point',
and may have created an easy focus for unity among different race
radicals and extreme nationalists within Eastern Europe. Serbian,
Ukrainian and Belarusian radicals have united under the banner of
Orthodoxy, which can be an indication that it can serve as a traditional
identity, the history of which can be of fundamental value, along the
same lines as modern nation-building adopting symbols of a golden
age. However, continuing with the Orthodox identity may alienate
other race radical and extreme nationalist groups and create splits
between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Slavic groups and individuals.
The demise of the RNU may suggest this, as it appears to have lost
much of its former attraction.
It serves the race radical movement to be vague and sometimes opaque
in its visions. As long as there is no fully clear view of what the aim
really is, as in specifying state structure, economics, etc., there is no
special need for an ideological division among different groups. Of
43
course, rivalry may emerge due to other causes such as personal issues
and power struggle among groups.
The broad variety of Russian race radicalism of today may decline if
the organisations lay ideological and different views of identity aside,
to focus upon uniting towards a common goal. The success and large
membership of MAII may be an indication that this is happening.
With the Internet site youtube.com and similar sites, race radicals and
extreme nationalists now have a more public platform, making
propaganda and hate speech more accessible than before. With this
medium, race radicalism is not limited to obscure mail order firms and
websites. Many race radicals engage in discussion boards available on
the site, commenting on the film clips.
6.5 Possible authoritarian consequences
The implementation of extremist laws by the Russian government has
so far not had a considerable effect on race radicalism, xenophobia and
hate crime. The criteria for what actually defines extremism appear
rather dubious, as the prohibition of the National Bolsheviks suggests.
The authorities have verbally been tough on hate crime, xenophobia
and racism as threats to societal security, but not in action. The few
examples of actually addressing the subject are limited to the banning
of a few local divisions of the RNU, a few persecutions of incitement
of racial hatred (often in connection with more serious crimes) and the
possible shutdown of websites preaching white supremacy and posting
racist material. It is not necessarily a good way to handle hate groups
by labelling them extremists and outlawing them, but as the law
functions today, this could be done without serious effort, as with the
case of the National Bolsheviks and the various Islamic organisations.
A problematic but possible side effect of the current official way of
dealing with the problem could paradoxically be a strengthening of
authoritarianism and a loss of democracy. Xenophobia, extreme
nationalism and race radicalism have grown into such serious problems
in Russia from a human security perspective, addressed not only within
the country’s borders but also abroad, that the issue could function as a
legitimate argument for taking 'extraordinary measures' on combating
the racialist groups. The authorities may then, as is already done to
44
some degree, continue to label unwanted dissidents as extremists and
by doing so, easily silence political opposition. The ban on the
National Bolsheviks could be an alarming example of this possible
outcome.
6.6 Spill-over effects
There is little solid proof that the Russian violence is spreading
towards the West. The most probable area where this is happening
appears to be in Eastern Germany, where MAII has been actively
making ties and promoting its interests. Eastern Germany also contains
some of the most violent race radical groups in Western Europe.
However, as argued by Mattias Gardell, Russian race radicals appear
in general less interested in the West. The judicial systems of Western
countries create, at least for now, too many obstacles for organised
violent race radicalism. Furthermore, according to SÄPO, the level of
co-operation appears to be low.
However, it is alarming that only a few Western race radicals actually
condemn the racist violence and attacks on lonely, unarmed and
vulnerable individuals in Russia. This is a grave change from the
rhetoric used by Western race radicals in the 1990s, where much
emphasis was laid on arguing from a self-defence perspective, and
where it was claimed that the government and the invisible 'ZOG'
(Zionist Occupation Government, the old anti-Semitic conspiracy
theory claiming that Jews control global society) were the real
enemies.75
75
For example of rhetoric and goals in the Western race radical scene in the 1990s,
both black and white racialists in the US have collaborated together for a common
cause - racial separatism - something very unlikely to occur in Russia.
45
7
Concluding remarks
•
The Russian authorities do not seem to take the threat of racism
seriously, despite vocal condemnation. The law on combating
extremism appears to be misused and so far has not brought
much change to racist issues. Instead, it may be used to silence
opposition groups.
•
The easiest way for Russia’s race radicals to lay aside their
differences appears to be under the banner of combating
immigration.
•
There is no hard evidence to suggest that Russian race
radicalism has influenced its Western counterparts significantly
or will do so in the future.
Russian racism has been allowed to grow strong without
significant interference since the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Xenophobia has also been prominent in Russian history
for a much longer time.
•
•
Little suggests that race radicalism and xenophobia in Russia
are about to decline. Real change would require considerably
more attention to the problem, both from the Russian
authorities and from abroad. The current economic crisis may
foment even more ethnic tension.
•
The Russian authorities have not managed to secure the safety
of a large fraction of the Russian population.
46
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February, 2008 http://www.svd.se/dynamiskt/kultur/did_10829816.asp.
Whitelaw, interview (2001), Resistance Magazine, issue 16, 2001.
White Power – Bulgaria (2008), published 26 August 2008, posted 26
Aug. 2008 accessed Sept. 3, 2008 http://bg-nacionalisti.eblahfree.com/Blah.pl?b-26/m-1219779324/.
Young, Cathy (2007), “Putin’s young ‘brownshirts’”, The Boston
Globe, published 10 Aug. 2007, accessed 5 Oct 2008,
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/20
07/08/10/putins_young_brownshirts/.
Zarakovich, Yurii (2004), “From Russia With Hate”, TIME
Magazine, published 1 Aug. 2004, accessed September 22 2008.
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A selection of FOI reports on
Russia and the CIS
Anderman, Karin, Hagström Frisell, Eva and Vendil Pallin,
Carolina (2007) Russia-EU External Security Relations: Russian
Policy and Perceptions, FOI-R—2243—SE, February 2007.
Arbman, Gunnar and Thornton, Charles (2003) Russia’s Tactical
Nuclear Weapons. Part I: Background and Policy Issues, FOI-R—
1057—SE, November 2003.
Arbman, Gunnar and Thornton, Charles (2005) Russia’s Tactical
Nuclear Weapons. Part II: Technical Issues and Policy
Recommendations, FOI-R—1588—SE, February 2005.
Hedenskog, Jakob (2008) Crimea after the Georgian Crisis, FOI-R-2587—SE, November 2008.
Hedenskog, Jakob and Larsson, Robert, L. (2007) Russian
Leverage in the CIS and Baltic States, FOI-R—2280—SE, June 2007.
Hedenskog, Jakob and Lavrenyuk, Viktor (eds.) (2007)
Comparing the Baltic and Black Sea Regions: Regional Security,
Energy Security and Euro-Atlantic Integration, FOI-R—2281—SE,
June 2007.
Hedenskog, Jakob (2006) Ukraine and NATO: Deadlock or Restart? FOI-R—2165—SE, December 2006.
Hedenskog, Jakob (2004) The Ukrainian Dilemma: Relations with
Russia and the West in the Context of the 2004 Presidential Elections.
FOI-R--1199--SE, March 2004.
52
Holmberg, Carl (2008) The Struggle for Bureaucratic and Economic
Control in Russia, FOI-R—2504—SE, April 2008.
Holmberg, Carl (2008) Managing Elections in Russia – Mechanisms
and Problems, FOI-R—2474—SE, February 2008.
Johansson, Andreas (2003) Whither Moldova? Conflicts and
Dangers in a Post-Soviet Republic, FOI-R—0990—SE, November
2003.
Kjölstad, Henrik (2009) White Russia – Xenophobia, Extreme
Nationalism and Race Radicalism as Threats to Society, FOI-R—
2592—SE, April 2009.
Knoph, Jan T. (2004) Civilian Control of the Russian State Forces: a
Challenge in Theory and Practice, FOI-R—1175—SE, February
2004.
Larsson, Robert L. (2007) Nord Stream, Sweden and the Baltic Sea
Security, FOI-R—2251—SE, March 2007.
Larsson, Robert L. (2006) Russia’s Energy Policy: Security
Dimensions and Russia’s Reliability as an Energy Supplier, FOI-R1932-SE, Stockholm: FOI, March 2006.
Leijonhielm, Jan and Westerlund, Fredrik (eds.) (2007) Russian
Power Structures – Present and Future Roles in Russian Politics,
FOI-R--2437—SE, December 2007.
Leijonhielm, Jan and Larsson, Robert L. (2004) Russia’s Strategic
Commodities: Energy and Metals as Security Levers, FOI-R--1346—
SE, November 2004.
Leijonhielm, Jan et al. (2005) Russian Military Capability in a TenYear Perspective: Problems and Trends 2005 – Summary and
53
Conclusions from a Study for the Swedish Ministry of Defence,
Stockholm, FOI Memo 1369, June 2005.
Malmlöf, Tomas (2006) The Russian Population in Latvia –
Puppets of Moscow?, FOI-R—1975—SE, May 2006.
Niklasson, Charlotte (2008) Russian Leverage in Central Asia,
FOI-R—2484—SE, April 2008.
Oldberg, Ingmar (2007) The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation:
Powerhouse or Paper tiger, FOI-R—2301—SE, June 2007.
Oldberg, Ingmar (2006) The War on Terrorism in Russian Foreign
Policy, FOI-R—2155—SE, December 2006.
Oldberg, Ingmar (2004) Membership or Partnership: The Relations
of Russia and Its Neighbours with NATO and the EU in the
Enlargement Context, FOI-R—1364—SE, October 2004.
Oldberg, Ingmar (2003) Reluctant Rapprochement: Russia and the
Baltic States in the Context of NATO and EU Enlargements, FOIR--0808—SE, February 2003.
Paznyak, Vyachaslau (2003) Belarus Facing Dual Enlargement:
Will the EU squeeze harder?, FOI-R—0859—SE, May 2003.
Sandström, Emma (2005), Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan and
Armenia – a Security and Political Assessment, FOI-R—1351-SE,
May 2005.
Sandström, Emma (2003), Afghanistan and Central Asia after
September 11 – the Security-Political Development, FOI-R—0821-SE,
March 2003.
54
Unge, Wilhelm et al. (2006), Polish-Russian Relations in an
Eastern Dimension Context, FOI-R—2008-SE, June 2006.
Vendil Pallin, Carolina (2005), Russian Military Reform: A Failed
Exercise in Defence Decision Making, FOI-R-1777-SE, November
2005.
FOI reports can be ordered by:
E-mail: [email protected]
Telephone: 08-555 030 51
Internet: http://www.foi.se
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