Plato and the "Socratic Fallacy"
Author(s): William J. Prior
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 43, No. 2 (May, 1998), pp. 97-113
Published by: Brill
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Plato and the "SocraticFallacy"
WILLIAM J. PRIOR
ABSTRACr
Since Peter Geach coined the phrase in 1966 there has been much discussion
among scholars of the "Socratic fallacy." No consensus presently exists on
whether Socrates commits the "Socraticfallacy"; almost all scholars agree, however, that the "Socraticfallacy" is a bad thing and that Socrates has good reason
to avoid it. I think that this consensus of scholars is mistaken. I think that what
Geach has labeled a fallacy is no fallacy at all, but a perfectly innocent consequence of Platonic epistemology.
The "Socratic fallacy" arises from the "Priorityof Definition" principle (PD).
Plato is committed to (PD) in the Meno. The Meno also contains a famous discussion of the difference between episteme and doxa (97a ff.). If we understand
what Plato meant by episteme we can see that he must be committed to (PD);
but we can also see that (PD) has none of the harmfulconsequences Geach attributes to it.
Geach's view is indebted to Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. (PD) is
implausibleon this readingof the verb "to know," but not on Plato's. Plato claims
that a demand for an explanation is appropriatewherever a claim to knowledge
is made. Plato links the concept of episteme explicitly with the concept of logos;
the connection between the terms may have been analytic.
It does not follow from the Platonic conception of knowledge, as Geach
argues, that it is "no use" using examples to establish general definitions. All that
follows is that one cannot know that an alleged example of a term T is a genuine
example until one has a general account of what it is to be T. Withoutthe stronger
conclusion, Geach cannot establish that the "Socratic fallacy" is a fallacy.
I. Introduction
Since Peter Geach coined the phrase in 1966 there has been much discussion amongscholarsof the "Socraticfallacy."Accordingto Geach,this
fallacy consists of two propositions:
(A) that if you know that you are correctlypredicatinga given term
"T"you must "knowwhat it is to be a T," in the sense of being
able to give a generalcriterionfor a thing's being T, and
(B) that it is no use to try and arriveat the meaningof "T"by giving
examplesof things that are T.'
Accepted September 1997
I P.T. Geach, "Plato's Euthyphro:An Analysis and Commentary,"The Monist 50
(1966), 371.
? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 1998
Phronesis XLI1112
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98
WILLIAMJ. PRIOR
Geachbelievedthat"(B) in fact follows from(A)."2He believedthatthese
two propositionsconstitutea fallacy because they present an incorrect
view of knowledge:
We know heaps of things without being able to define the terms in which we
express our knowledge. Formaldefinitionsare only one way of elucidatingterms;
a set of examples may in a given case be more useful than a formal definition.3
Geach also believedthatSocratesis committedto the "Socraticfallacy"in
the early dialogues of Plato.
Geach has had many respondents.All have wanted to show that the
Socratesof the early Platonicdialoguesis innocentof Geach's charge.In
general their strategyhas been to argue that Socrates is not committed
to Geach's principle(A), which has come to be knownas the "Priorityof
Definition"principle(PD). This task is made possible by the fact that
Plato nowhereputs (A), in so manywords, into Socrates'mouth.He says
many things that suggest that he believes in (A), but Robinson speaks
correctlyof "the impressionvaguely given by the early dialogues"4that
he accepts it. Gregory Vlastos, who believed that the early dialogues
representthe views of the historicalSocrates, argued that the principle
only emerges in a set of "transitionaldialogues"in which Plato's views
were supplantingthose of Socrates.5Otherscholarshave arguedthat the
Socrates of the early dialogues is committednot to (PD) but to some
weaker principleor principlesthat do not have the epistemologicalconsequences of (PD).6Some scholarshave also arguedfor a distinctionin
two kindsof knowledge:for Vlastos,the distinctionwas between"certain"
and "elenctic"knowledge;for Woodruffand Reeve, it is between "ordi-
2
Ibid.
I Ibid. I think that the general view of knowledge underlying Geach's position,
which I shall discuss furtherbelow, bears some resemblance to the view Protagoras
defends in the "GreatSpeech" (Protagoras 320c-328d), especially at 327e-328a, where
he indicates that eveiy Greek has sufficient knowledge of the Greek language to be
able to teach it. I don't mean to suggest that Protagoras'sview and Geach's are identical, however, or that they have the same roots.
4 Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford 1953), 53.
Gregory Vlastos, "Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge,"Philosophy 35 (1985), 2326, esp. nn. 54, 56 (which refers to 1, n. 1), 60, and 65.
6 For example, Gerasimos Santas, "The Socratic Fallacy," Journal of the History
of Philosophy 10 (1972), 127-141; Alexander Nehamas, "Socratic Intellectualism,"
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquiumin Ancient Philosophy 2 (1986), 275-316
(cf. esp. 277-293); and John Beversluis, "Does Socrates Commit the Socratic Fallacy?," American Philosophical Quarterly24 (1987), 211-223.
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PLATO AND THE "SOCRATICFALLACY"
99
nary" and "expert"knowledge. Given this distinction it is possible to argue
that (PD) applies only to claims of certain or expert knowledge; Socratic
claims of ordinary or elenctic knowledge do not succumb to the "Socratic
fallacy."7
All of these strategies have been challenged. The most thorough discussion of (PD) is Benson,8 who concludes that the best explanation for
Socrates' acceptance of principles weaker than (PD) is his acceptance of
(PD). Benson also questions the strategy of restricting (PD) to the transitional dialogues. Lesher9 has criticized the strategy of granting to Socrates
two kinds of knowledge or two senses of "knowledge." No consensus presently exists on whether Socrates commits the "Socratic fallacy"; almost
all scholars agree, however, that the "Socratic fallacy" is a bad thing and
that Socrates has good reason to avoid commitment to (PD).'0
I think that this consensus of scholars is mistaken. I think that what
Geach has labeled a fallacy is no fallacy at all, but a perfectly innocent
consequence of Platonic epistemology. If we understand what Plato meant
by episteme we will see that he must be committed to (PD); but we will
also see that (PD) has none of the harmful consequences Geach attributes
to it. I hope to show both of these things in this paper.
II. Interpretive Strategy
Before I begin discussion of the "fallacy" itself, however, I want to note
a limitation that all of the above strategies share. They attempt to remove
the "fallacy" from the early dialogues, or at least from the pre-transitional,
Vlastos, op. cit., 1-31 (cf. esp. 23-26); Paul Woodruff,"ExpertKnowledge in the
Apology and Laches: What a General Needs to Know," Proceedings of the Boston
Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1987), 79-115, and "Plato's Early Theory
of Knowledge," in Stephen Everson, ed., Epistemology (Cambridge 1990), 60-84; and
C.D.C. Reeve, Socrates in the Apology (Indianapolis 1989), 37-62.
8 Hugh H. Benson, "The Priorityof Definition and the Socratic Elenchus,"Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 8 (1990), 19-65.
9 James Lesher, "Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge," Journal of the History of
Philosophy 25 (1987), 275-288.
10 See Beversluis, op. cit., 212, who describes the result of accepting Geach's
premises as "a hopeless epistemic impasse," Woodruff, who writes that "the trouble
with believing in priorityof definition is that it would paralyze inquiry if it were true"
("Expert Knowledge," 91; Woodruff may only be interpretingGeach, not endorsing
his conclusion; however, he says Geach "representsa fairly broad consensus") and
Santas, op. cit., 129. Exceptions to this general rule are Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral
Theory (Oxford 1977), 40-41, and Benson, op. cit.
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WILLIAMJ. PRIOR
elenctic dialogues, but not from the transitionaldialogues, the dialogues
in which, accordingto a common account,Plato first introduceshis own
views throughthe characterof Socrates.This strategyis one of isolation
and containment:it attemptsto keep the Socratic dialogues free of the
philosophicalassumptionsthat give rise to the "fallacy."It attemptsto
remove the fallacy from the elenctic dialogues, and thus from Socratic
philosophy,only to inflict it upon Plato. It attemptsto save Socratesfrom
an infectionthat Plato carries.
Now I have little sympathywith the projectthat underliesthis strategy,
the projectof isolatinga "pureSocratic"phaseof thoughtwithinthe early
dialoguesthat is free from epistemologicaland metaphysicalassumptions,
whetheror not that firststage is takento be a faithfulrecordof the views
of the historicalSocrates." But even if we accept the assumptionsthat
markthis project,it is hard to imagine a scenariothat offers a convincing explanationof how Plato could have come to commit the "Socratic
fallacy" in some dialogues but not in others. If commissionof the "Socraticfallacy"is a blunder,how could Plato have carefullyavoidedcommittingthis blunderin the early, elenctic dialogues(while assertingthings
very much like it), only to embraceit in the transitionaldialogues?Even
if his role in composing the early dialogues was more that of Socrates'
biographerthan thatof an originalphilosopher,is it reasonableto assume
that Plato simply recordedthe views of Socrateswithout understanding
them? If Socrates avoided (PD) because he realized that its adoption
would have the disastrousepistemologicalconsequencesGeach claims it
has, is it reasonableto think that Plato did not realize this, and that, like
a fool, in the transitionaldialogueshe rushedin where his angel had previously fearedto tread?Given what we know aboutPlato's philosophical
abilities,this seems highly unlikely.
Now it seems clearthatPlato is committedto (PD) in theMeno.Beversluis distinguishestwo forms or aspects of Geach's (A):
(Al) If you do not know the definitionof F, you cannotknow thatanything is an F, and
(A2) If you do not know the definitionof F, you cannot know anything aboutF (e.g. that F, say Justice,is Y, say beneficial).'2
I
I find the critique of this project found in Charles H. Kahn's classic essay, "Did
Plato Write Socratic Dialogues?," Classical Quarterly 31 (1981), 305-324, and later
works completely convincing, though I do not agree with his alternative account of
the relations among the dialogues or his chronological placement of the Gorgias.
12 Beversluis, op. cit., 211-212; cf. Benson, op. cit., 20, n. 2.
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PLATO AND THE "SOCRATICFALLACY"
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At Meno 71b Socrates states, "I have no knowledge about virtue at all.
And how can I know a propertyof somethingwhen I don't even know
what it is?" The questionclearly invites a negativereply; and, a negative
reply would commit Plato to Beversluis' (A2). He is not so clearly committed to (Al); however, as Benson has put it, the best explanationfor
his acceptanceof (A2) is his acceptanceof (PD). WhetherSocratesin this
dialogue representsthe historical Socrates, Plato, or a combinationof
both, he seems committedto the principlethat gives rise to the "Socratic
fallacy."
The Meno also containsa famous discussionof the differencebetween
episteme and doxa (97a ff.), which I shall discuss below. It seems reasonable to assume that the concept of episteme Socrates employs when
he denies that he has any knowledgeof virtueis the same as that he uses
when he distinguishes episteme and doxa, and that therefore we may
use the later discussion of knowledge to illuminatehis meaning in the
former.'3That is what I shall attemptto do below. It is possible that Plato
wrote both passages without connecting them to each other; but this is
unlikely in so careful a writer as Plato. Even if he were unawareof the
connectionbetween the two passages, however, we can fairly take both,
occurringas they do within a single dialogue,as indicativeof his thought
on the "Socraticfallacy" at a certainperiodof his life.
It seems to me, then, that if the "Socraticfallacy" is indeed a fallacy,
it is committedin the Meno. If the person who commits it is Plato and
not Socrates,that really doesn't matter;what mattersis the commission
itself. If these principlesreally do constitutea fallacy, they undermine,or
at least threatento undermine,some centralaspects of Plato's epistemology. Let us consider,then, whetheror not this patternof reasoningreally
is a fallacy.
13 Irwin has used the distinction between episteme and doxa,
thoughwithout specifically invoking the Meno passage, in developing his own answer to Geach's problem.
Irwin accepts the standard English translations of these terms as "knowledge" and
"belief"; his solution is, in a nutshell, that Socrates denies he has knowledge but not
true belief. This solution is, of all the published responses to Geach I am aware of,
the closest to the one I propose below; unlike Irwin, however, I have serious reservations about the adequacy of the usual translations,and as will become clear below I
do not accept the claim that the alternative to Platonic episteme is a cognitive state
similar to what we would describe in English as true belief. Beversluis (op. cit., 217ff.)
discusses the Meno passage in the course of a critique of the "true belief" theory; his
discussion is an excellent example of the project of purifying the early dialogues from
the epistemology of middle Platonism. Since this paper concems a dialogue in which
that epistemology emerges, his comments do not have a direct bearing on it.
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J. PRIOR
III. Knowledgeand Definition
First of all we must ask what Geach means when he labels (A) and (B)
a fallacy. I think he does not mean what logicians mean by a fallacy,
namelyan invalidpatternof argument.For,thoughGeachthinksthatthere
is an inferencefrom (A) to (B), he does not thinkthat the inferenceis invalid, for he states that (A) entails (B). Rather,I thinkthatGeachregards
(A) and (B) togetheras expressing a false conceptionof the natureof
knowledge, a "style of mistaken thinking"about knowledge. As noted
above, Geach'sresponseto the "Socraticfallacy"is to claim thatwe know
"heapsof things"we can't define.
Geach's view is indebtedto Wittgenstein'sphilosophyof language,and
is based in parton the Wittgensteinianclaim that one need not have explicit knowledgeof the definitionof a termto be justifiedin one's use of
that term. Accordingto the slogan that once characterizedthis position,
"meaningis use." This slogan conceals an ambiguity,however. It may
mean that in orderto be justifiedin saying that a is F one need not have
definitionalknowledge of F-ness, but only the ability to apply the term
"F" to various objects in various situations.In this case what we know,
in Geach's terms,is how to apply "F";and this might be a skill that has
no explicit knowledge of a semantic natureattachedto it. This skill is
hardlydifferent,if it is differentat all, from the practicalability to identify F things.It is semanticknowledgeonly in a very minimalsense. Alternatively, the slogan might mean that in orderto be justified in applying
the term "F" to various things one must be able to give an account of
how "F"'is used, but that this accountneed not take the form of an explicit definitionor a set of necessaryand sufficientconditionsfor its applications.The secondclaim is less radical,and perhapsthus moreplausible,
than the first. I suspect, however, that the first, strongerview is behind
Geach's objection.
Philosopherswho accept this dictum and the philosophicalframework
out of which it ariseswill thinkthatPlato has made a straightforward
and
simple errorin demandingexplicit definitionalknowledgefrom his interlocutors.They may also arguethat the erroris not simply an errorin the
philosophicaltheoryof meaning,however,but an errorin the philosophical conceptionof knowledge. It is then open to them to claim that, as
Wittgenstein'spredecessorsin the English-speakingphilosophicalcommunity shareda mistakenunderstandingof the ordinaryuse of "knowledge"
in English,so the Greekphilosophersshareda mistakenunderstanding
of
the ordinaryuse of episteme. Thus, the issue becomes not simply one
involving the use of certainGreekor Englishterms,but one of the legit-
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PLATOAND THE"SOCRATIC
FALLACY"
103
imacy of certainepistemic criteria.Followers of Wittgensteinmight also
argue that the enormousinfluence of the Greek philosophers,including
Plato, on later philosophyis partiallyresponsiblefor the perpetuationof
this erroneousview.
Geach's labelingof (A) and (B) a fallacy is thus tendentious:it depends
on the correctnessof the Wittgensteiniansemanticsand epistemologythat
underlieit. These were far from universallyacceptedwhen Geach wrote
in 1966, and they are less so today. But if the Wittgensteinianview, or
somethinglike it, is not correct,it may not be the case thatwe know heaps
of things we can't define; and if that is so, the Socraticview would not
be a fallacy. It would not be a mistakenaccountof criteriafor knowledge
of the meaningof terms, whetherwe are speakingEnglish or Greek. In
otherwords, (PD) is implausibleonly on a certainreadingof the verb "to
know";if we have reasonto thinkPlato was committedto (PD) we have
reason to think that he did not understandthe correspondingGreek verb
in that way.'4
Now it is temptingto respondthat Plato was not talkingaboutknowledge but about episteme, and that neither Plato nor the Greek philosophers
in general thoughtthat we can have epistemeof things we can't define;
and thatindeedwill be partof my responseto Geach.I want to say something about the general problem,however, that does not depend on the
peculiaritiesof the Greek terms Plato uses.
An examinationof rival philosophicalaccountsof meaningand knowledge is beyond the scope of this paper(and beyond the competenceof its
author).I do want to note, however,thatthe Wittgensteinianpositiongains
credibilityas the explicitness and precisionof the knowledge demanded
by rival theoriesincreases.It is not plausiblethata mathematician'sknowledge of the natureof the number2 is requiredfor an English speakerto
claim justifiablythat he or she knows that certain sentences containing
thattermare true(for instance,that2 + 3 = 5). On the otherhand,it seems
reasonableto demandsome accountof the meaningof a termor the truth
of a statementcontainingthat term from a person who claims to know
that the statementis true. That is, to use a Socratic example, if Laches
claims to know that this person or that type of conduct is courageous,it
seems reasonableto ask him what he means by "courage"and what he
takes the conditionfor the ascriptionof courageto be.
This, at any rate, is the way Plato and his Socratesunderstandthe matter.They assumethata demandfor an explanationis appropriatewherever
14
I owe this formulationof the point to Hugh Benson.
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WILLIAMJ. PRIOR
a claim to knowledge is made. That is, when someone claims to know
that a is F, they thinkthat it is always in orderto ask for generalcriteria
for the applicationof F, or for a generalaccountof the meaningof "F."
This is the substantiveissue on which Geach disagreeswith them. Geach
need not reject the idea that any account is inappropriate,but he must
reject the idea that a general semantic account is always in order. He
might say, in other words, "yes, it's appropriateto ask someone how he
or she knows that a is F, but it isn't appropriateto ask for a definitionof
'F'." This responseis quite reasonablein those cases wherewe are thinking of perceptualor memoryknowledgeof particularstatesof affairs.The
rightresponseto the question"How do you know it's raining?"mightbe,
"I'm looking out the window at the rain coming down right now." The
right response to "How do you know Susan lives on this street?"might
be, "I've given her a ride home dozens of times."
These responsesaren't appropriatein the cases that Plato is interested
in, however.As Socratespoints out in the Euthyphro(7b ff.), the knowledge he is seeking concernstermsaboutwhich thereis disagreement,and
for which thereis no universallyrecognizedmethodfor resolvingthe disagreement,terms of moralevaluation(right and wrong, noble and base,
good and bad, and the names of the various virtues). As the early dialogues demonstraterepeatedly,it is not possible to give an ostensivedefinition of any of these terms.Piety and courageare not transparentmoral
properties,which only need to be observedin a select numberof cases in
orderto be understood.Thus, it would seem that the Socraticmethodof
seeking an accountof the natureof these termsis well founded.
Let us consider the matter from a slightly differentperspective.On
Geach's view it is possible for a personto say, correctly,"I know how to
use the word X but I don't have any idea how to define X, or say what
X essentiallyis." For some terms,such as color termsand termsfor combut even
mon substancessuch as water or salt, this seems unproblematic;
here we mustbe awareof the problemof the borderlinecase. Is thatcolor
a darkshade of yellow or a light shade of orange?The liquidin the glass
looks like waterand tastes like water,but how can we be sure it is water?
How can we answer such questions if we lack criteriafor determining
where yellow leaves off and orangestarts,or what water is? If one can't
deal with the contentiouscases, the borderlineor disputed cases, it is
temptingto think that one doesn't know how to use the term in question
afterall, or at least thatone's knowledgeis incomplete;and if that is true
in the case of termslike "yellow"and "water,"it would seem a fortiori to
be true of terms like "brave"and "holy."Indeed, even if one finds the
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PLATO AND THE "SOCRATICFALLACY"
105
problemof borderlinecases unconvincingin the case of physicalconcepts,
one might find it persuasivein the case of moral concepts, such as those
with which Plato is concerned.
Geach might respond that his point holds at least for obvious and
uncontroversialcases of the term in question.Wittgensteinnotes that the
answerto the question"How do I know that this colour is red?"may be
"I have learntEnglish."'5It is possible to respondthat,until one is in possession of explicit criteriafor the applicationof a term,one cannotbe certain of its applicationin apparentlyclear cases. This response has little
plausibilityin the case of termslike "red"but somewhatmore in the case
of terms like "brave,"where the applicabilityof the term dependson the
attributionto some agent of a psychologicalstate he may or may not possess. Laches may be unableto tell whethera given hoplitewho standshis
groundin battle is trulybraveunless he can determinethathoplite's motivation for so standing.'6I don't want to push skepticismabout examples
this far, however. Doubtless it was fear of reachingjust such a conclusion that led Geach to object to principle(A) in the first place. Nor do I
think that Plato would want to do so. Though he might harbordoubts
about the ordinaryhoplite, I'm sure he would agree with Laches that
Socrates'behaviorin the retreatfrom Delium was brave, and thatwe can
be certainit was (cf. Laches 18la-b). The questionhe would raise in such
situationsis not whetherthe concept applied to the case but whetherthe
cognitive certaintyon the part of the observeramountedto knowledge.
Now if we take seriouslythe accountgiven in the Meno of the distinction betweenknowledgeand rightbelief, I thinkit is clear thatwhat Plato
requiresfor knowledge is somethingvery close to what Geach attributes
to him in (A). Accordingto Meno 97e-98a, what convertsright opinion
into knowledgeis the "tethering"of opinion,its stabilization,by a reasoning out of the explanation(aitias logismoi). In other words, the person
who has knowledgeis able to offer a reasonedexplanationof the item in
question,whereas the personwith true opinion is not. As the Meno indicates, the opinionsof this personare no less truethan those of the person
with knowledge,and no less reliable a guide to action. Plato might have
added that the person with right opinion might be no less certainof the
truth of a given judgment than the person with knowledge. Though he
generallythoughtthat opinion was less stable than knowledgebecause it
'' Ludwig Wittgenstein,Philosophical Investigations,3d ed. (New York 1958), Part1,
para. 381, 117e.
16
1owe this point to Roslyn Weiss.
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WILLIAMJ. PRIOR
was subjectto persuasion,whereas knowledgewas not, there is nothing
inconsistentin a personwith trueopinionstubbornlystickingto thatopinion throughall attemptsto persuadehim to changehis mind.Whatmakes
for knowledge,then, is not certaintyor practicalreliabilitybut the ability
of the personwho has knowledgeto give a reasonedexplanationof what
he or she knows. If the knowledgewere knowledgeof the meaningof a
term (the case with which Geach is dealing), this explanationmight very
well involve the ability to give criteriafor the applicationof the term in
question.Thus, Plato's own accountof the differencebetweenknowledge
and right opinionwould seem to commit him to Geach's (A).
Is this requirementa reasonableone? It seems to me that it is, at least
if we confine it to those cases of knowledgethat don't admit of demonstrationthroughsome simple methodlike ostension.It can easily be made
to seem unreasonableby placing various constraintson the natureof an
acceptableaccount. Socrates says in the Euthyphro(6e) that he is looking for somethinghe can use as a standardto judge all cases of piety,
and this soundsvery much like what Geach describesin (A). But he also
says there(6d) that this standardis a form;and, thoughscholarsdifferas
to whetherthat term commits Socratesto a theory of Forms,there is no
doubtthat Plato does develop such a theoryin the middledialogues,and
that in the Phaedo he explicitly invokes Forms as principlesof explanation. The Meno passage links the ability to give an account with the
Doctrineof Recollection(98a). Althoughearlier in the Meno Plato suggests that the specification of a distinguishingmark is sufficientfor a
definition(as at 75b, where Socratesdefinesshapeas what always accompanies color), in the Euthyphrohe rejectssuch a definitionof piety (piety
is what is dear to all the gods) because it gives only an attributeof piety,
not its essence. In the Meno, Phaedo and RepublicPlato indicatesthathe
believes that knowledge is a unified whole, so that one has adequate
knowledgeof a Formonly when he has understoodits relationto others.'7
This would mean that knowledge had to meet some prettystringentcriteria of completeness.It is one thing to say that a personwith knowledge
17 At Meno 81d Socrates states that, since all nature is akin, when one has recollected a single item of knowledge one may eventually recollect everything else. At
Phaedo lOld he suggests that the hypothesis that there are Forms is to be justified by
appeal to higher hypotheses, and that one must continue to ascend the hypothetical
ladder until one reaches "somethingadequate."In the Republic (VI, 51 lc-d) it is made
clear that the unhypotheticalfirst principle that puts an end to the ascent is the Form
of the Good.
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PLATO AND THE "SOCRAnC FALLACY"
107
must be able to give an accountof what he knows (cf. Phaedo 76b), and
quite anotherto requirecomplete knowledge, expressed in essential definitions of a Form reached throughthe process of Recollection. But it
does not follow from the fact that the metaphysicaland epistemological
elaborationPlato gives to the simple criterionmay be unreasonablethat
the criterionitself is; and it should be rememberedthat it is the simple
criterion,and not its metaphysicalelaboration,that Geach objects to.
IV. Epistemeand Logos
If it is reasonableto expect that someone claiming knowledgeshould be
able to provide some rationalexplanationof the fact known, it is even
morereasonableto expect this of someoneclaimingepisteme.The concept
of epistemeis explicitly linkedwith the conceptof logos, rationalaccount
or explanation,in Greek philosophy.Fine'8mentionsMeno 98a, Phaedo
76d, Republic VII, 53le and 534b as passages in which Plato links the
possession of epistemeto the ability to give a logos of what one knows;
and, thoughthe attemptto define epistemeas true opinionwith the addition of an account in the Theaetetusends in apparentfailure, the connection between episteme and logos seems reaffirmedin the rhetorical
questionat 202d: "how can thereever be knowledgewithoutan account?"
One may well thinkthat the connectionbetween epistemeand logos was
for Plato analytic.
Nor is Plato's connection between episteme and logos idiosyncratic.
When Aristotledefines epistemein PosteriorAnalytics2, he says that we
have episteme of a fact when we "know the cause on which the fact
depends,as the cause of that fact and no other, and further,that the fact
could not be otherthanit is." (71blO ff.) As he definesthe facultyof episteme in Nicomachean Ethics VI.3, it is "the capacity to demonstrate"
(1139b31). Aristotlelimits the scope of epistemeto necessarytruths,and
demands for these not just a rationalaccount but a demonstrationthat
shows their necessity. These restrictionsare so differentfrom those we
place on knowledgethat translatorsare prone to markthem by translating epistemeas "scientificknowledge"ratherthansimply as "knowledge."
18 Gail Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-VII," in
Stephen Everson, ed.,
Epistemology(Cambridge1990), 106. For a detailed discussion of the relation between
episteme and logos, with many additionalreferences to passages in the Platonic corpus,
see Jon Moline, Plato's Theory of Understanding(Madison 1981), ch. 2, esp. 33-43.
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This is not the place to discuss the proprietyof this translation;I simply
note that the termon which Aristotleplaces these restrictionsis the same
termthattranslatorstranslateas "knowledge"in Plato:episteme.Episteme
is the state with which Geach's principle(A) is concerned.
We are now in a position to understandwhat Plato meant to affirm
when he affirmed(A) or, more precisely,when he affirmedthe more specific statementsthathave led scholarsto attribute(A) to him. Considerthe
questionfrom the Meno:"how can I know a propertyof somethingwhen
I don't even know what it is?" (71b) What this implies in contextis that
Socrates does not believe that he can know whethervirtue is teachable
withoutknowingwhat the natureof virtueis. I suggest thatwhat this implies is that Socratesthinkshe can have no logos, no rationalaccountof
the teachabilityof virtuewithouta logos of the natureof virtue.In general,
he can have no rational account of the propertiesof an object without
having a rationalaccountof the natureof the object.
Is this a false view of the natureof knowledge?It certainlyseems to
have been a featureof ancient essentialistepistemologythat knowledge
of something begins (logically, not temporally)with knowledge of the
thing's essence, proceeds to knowledge of propertiesthat follow necessarily from the essence, and concludeswith whateveraccidentalproperties may be knowable.It does not seem to me to be a relevantobjection
to this scheme to say that there is a perfectly good use of the English
word "know"in which I can say "I know that the apple is red"without
being able to give an accountof the natureof an apple;for if a rational
accountis demandedthat explainswhy this apple, or apples of this kind,
are red, then I think I can't know what that account would be without
knowing the natureof the apple.
Similarly,it does not seem to be a relevantobjectionto Socrates'claim
that he can't know whethervirtueis teachableunless he knows what it is
that there is a perfectlygood use of the Englishword "know"in which I
can claim to know that virtuecan be taughtwithoutbeing able to give an
accountof the natureof virtue,namelythatin which I say, "I know virtue
can be taught,for I've seen it done. X passedon his virtueto Y by teaching; I don't know how he did it, but he did it nonetheless."For again,
what Socratesis looking for is a rationalaccountthatexplainshow virtue
can be taught, and it seems reasonable to think that such an account
requiresan account of what virtue is. It does not matterthat there is a
sense of "know"in English that dispenseswith the rationalaccount,for
that sense isn't the one Socrateshas in mind. He is not waiting for informationabout cases of successful teachingof virtue;rather,he is seeking
to understandhow those instancescould have taken place.
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PLATO AND THE "SOCRATICFALLACY"
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Plato restricts episteme to matters for which we possess a rational
account.Nothing in this restrictionrequireshim to deny thatwe might be
in a cognitive state, on the question,say, of the teachabilityof virtue,that
possesses many of the other featuresof knowledge.I might be, as in the
case mentionedabove, familiarwith instancesof the successful teaching
of virtue.I might thereforebe certain that virtuecould be taught.I might
be so certainthat virtue could be taught,and so certainthat the cases I
had observedwere instancesof the teachingof virtue, that I was impervious to argumentor evidence of any sort to the contrary.When Plato
denies that, for all that, the state I'm in is that of episteme,he need not
be taken to deny'that I might be in a state that English speakersmight
correctlyidentify as empiricalknowledge.I thinkthat people have found
(A) unreasonablebecausethey thoughtthat it committedPlato to the view
that we couldn't be morally certainof some featureof a thing without a
rationalaccountof its nature.19
But (A) is not a claim aboutthe certainty,20
or the empirical basis of our beliefs; it is about the kind of account
requiredto turna belief, even an empiricallygroundedand dogmatically
held belief, into episteme. It may in the end turn out to be a mistaken
principle,but it doesn't seem to me to wear its falsity on its face. It isn't
so obviously false a principlethat I'd want to label it a fallacy.
V. The Use of Examples
The readermight well object at this point that showing that (A) is not as
harmfula principleas Geach suggested is only half the battle; for it is
(A) and (B) togetherthat constitutethe fallacy, and Geach believes that
(A) entails (B). Let us turn,then, to an examinationof (B). It states "that
it is no use to try and arrive at the meaningof 'T' by giving examples
of things that are T." Now scholarshave noted that Socrates'actual practice in the dialoguesis not in accordwith this principle:he uses examples
1' This seems to be what Geach means when he suggests that the principle is
morally harmful because someone who proved unable after repeated attempts to
explain why swindling is unjust might come to doubt that it was unjust (372). It is
true that someone might come to that conclusion, but there is nothing in (A) to suggest that he or she should. Note that Socrates, who sees more definitions go down in
flames than anyone, never succumbs to such moral uncertainty.
20 As Woodruff notes, in "Plato's Early Theory of Knowledge," 65, "You can
be quite certain in the ordinaryway of any number of things, without being able to
give a Socratic definition."Note also Aristotle's claim in Nicomachean Ethics VII.3,
1146b26-7 that "Some people have no doubts when they have an opinion, and think
they have exact knowledge.
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J. PRIOR
frequently to develop, refine, and critically assess definitions. As Beversluis notes,
the dialogues of search abound with passages in which he not only unproblematically accepts examples of the virtue under discussion from interlocutorswho
manifestly lack a definition of it but heartily endorses examples as the primary
data from which the definition is to be extracted.2'
But Geach might respond, "So much the worse for Socrates' practice. If
(B) follows from (A), Socrates is not entitled to make use of examples in
any of these ways." To answer this challenge we must attempt to discover
whether (B) does indeed follow from (A). Before we investigate this question, however, I want to note that, even if some general prohibition on the
use of examples did follow from (A) that would not mean that the search
for general criteria was pointless. A process such as recollection might put
one directly in touch with general criteria, bypassing examples entirely;
and if the metaphysics of recollection seems too extravagant to offer much
hope in this regard, there might be other less implausible methods of direct
apprehension of general semantic criteria.
Still, it seems intuitively obvious that the quest for general criteria is immeasurably aided by the use of examples, so let us ask how the prohibition of the use of examples is supposed to follow from (A). Here is Geach's
argument:
If you can already give a general account of what "T" means, then you need no
examples to arrive at the meaning of "T"; if on the other hand you lack such a
general account, then, by assumption (A), you cannot know that any examples
of things that are T are genuine ones, for you do not know when you are predicating "T" correctly.22
But is Geach right about this? (A) says that one cannot know that a term
"T" is correctly predicated unless one can give a general criterion for the
correct predication of "T." When applied to examples, this means that one
cannot know that an alleged example of T is a genuine example until one
has a general account of what it is to be T. If Geach were to say only
this about examples, he would be quite correct. But he says more; he says
it is no use trying to reach a general criterionby the use of examples;
and it seems to me that this is not the case.
It is not necessaryfor me to know that an alleged example of a general termT is a genuineexamplein orderto use this examplein my search
21
22
Beversluis, op. cit., 212. Cf. Santas, op. cit., 129-134.
Geach, op. cit., 371.
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PLATO AND THE "SOCRATICFALLACY"
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for a generalcriterionof meaningfor "T."It is a perfectlyintelligibleprocedure, one followed in all forms of classificatoryendeavor,to consider
many alleged examplesof a given term in the hope of coming up with a
generalcriterionor generalcriteriaof classification.Once one has developed or discoveredsuch criteria,one can then use them to sort through
the initial set of alleged examples and separatethose that truly belong to
the class from those that merely appearto. It is not necessary to know
beforehandthat all of the putativeexamples in the initial set are genuine.
It is not necessaryto know, in the case of any particularexample, that it
is genuine. It is not even necessaryto know that any of the examples in
the initial set is genuine (thoughif one's initial choice of putativeexamples is thatunfortunatethe classificatoryprojectis unlikelyto reacha successful conclusion). All that is necessary is that one have a reasonable
amountof confidencethat at least some of the examples in the initial set
are genuine.It is the discoveryof generalcriteria,which is the aim of the
classificatoryproject,that will convertthis confidenceinto knowledge;so
it is hardto see how one could know, in advanceof the discoveryof these
criteria,that a given example is a genuine one.
I think that this is in fact the procedurefollowed by Socrates in the
early dialogues. Consideras a single example the passage in the Laches
wherein Socrates is attemptingto expand Laches' understandingof the
scope of courage.Laches had identifiedcouragewith the behaviorof the
hoplitewho remainsin his positionin battle. Socratesfirst points out that
other forms of behavior in combat may be courageous, then mentions
those
who are courageous in perils at sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again
in politics, are courageous, and not only who are courageous against pain or fear,
but mighty to contend against desires or pleasures. .. (191d-e; Jowett, trans.)
Is Socratescommittedto the claim that he knows, in advance of having
a generaldefinitionof courage,that it can be found in all these settings?
I think not. He is committedat most to the view that these provideplausible environmentsin which instancesof couragecan be sought. To pursue his investigationhe needs nothingmore than this.
As we have seen, Plato is willing to say that someone knows something only when that personis able to give an accountof what he knows.
When the case is that of predicatinga term of an alleged example, the
kind of accountrequiredis an accountof the meaningof "T,"which for
Plato means the formulationof a general criterionfor the applicationof
thatterm.If one is searchingfor such a generalcriterion,one obviouslyis
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WILLIAMJ. PRIOR
not in conscious possessionof it, and in that sense one cannotknow that
the alleged example is a genuine one. As I also arguedabove, however,
the absence of an account need not lead to uncertaintyabout the fact
in question.In this case, the lack of an accountof what makes something
a T need not producea lack of confidencein alleged examplesof T. It
certainlyneed not lead an investigatorto doubthis or her abilityeven provisionally to identifyexamplesof T.
I think that, for Geach's objectionto hold, and for (B) to follow from
(A), it would have to be the case that a lack of a general criterionfor
what it is to be a T must producein the investigatorsuch a degreeof confusion that he or she is unableeven tentativelyto identifyexamplesof T.
We have seen that this is not the case. Therefore,(B) does not follow
from (A). Plato may, withoutlogical error,make use of examplesin seeking generaldefinitionsof terms.It seems clear also that he may, without
logical error,follow anotherpracticethat he constantlyemploys in the
early dialogues:he may proposealleged examplesas counterexamplesto
definitionsproposedby his interlocutors.
The proceduresby which Socratesattemptsto discovergeneralcriteria
for the use of terms in the early dialogues are not purelyinductiveones;
he does not simply attemptto assemble a sufficientsample of instances
of the term and then abstractfrom these examples a set of necessaryand
sufficientconditionsfor the applicationof the term.Rather,examplesare
used to stimulaterationalreflectionon the natureof the thingsdenotedby
the terms in question.As the Doctrineof Recollectionhas it, examples
serve to remindus of the metaphysicaloriginalsfrom which they are derived.Thoughthe Platonicprocedurediffersfromthe morefamiliarinductivist model familiarto studentsof philosophyof science, it is a procedure
in which examples play a legitimaterole, or in fact, more than one legitimate role.
VI. Conclusion
In this paperI have arguedthat the "Socraticfallacy" is not a fallacy. I
have arguedthatGeach's (A), which has come to be knownas the Priority
of Definitionprinciple(PD), is not partand parcelof a "style of mistaken
thinking"aboutknowledgeand definitionbut a specific case of a general
Platonicprincipleof epistemology:the principlethat epistemerequiresa
logos. The fact that this principleemerges explicitly for the first time in
a transitionaldialogue,the Meno, meansthatwe oughtto be suitablycautious about attributingit to Socratesin the early dialogues.On the other
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PLATO AND THE "SOCRATICFALLACY"
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hand, I have also arguedthat Plato's acceptanceof (A) does not commit
him to (B), so that the consequencesGeach feared do not arise. Thus,
there is no reason not to use (PD), as Benson has argued,as a unifying
principle behind many specific Socratic remarksin the early dialogues
about what we can know, and underwhat conditionswe can know it.23
Santa Clara University
23 I thank Hugh Benson and Elizabeth Radcliffe for their comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.
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