1
a shifting balance
chinese assessments of u.s. power
Bonnie S. Glaser
Beijing’s assessment of the global balance of power, especially American power and the position
of China vis-à-vis the United States, is a critical factor in Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking.
As long as Chinese leaders perceive a long-lasting American preeminence—even in the face of
a temporary decline—averting open confrontation with the United States will likely continue to
define Chinese foreign policy. However, if Beijing were to conclude that the gap between Chinese
and U.S. power was rapidly narrowing and represented a more enduring geopolitical shift, Chinese
leaders might begin to challenge the United States more aggressively in order to take advantage of
the opening and make gains on securing their core interests.
China’s Dominant Security Paradigm:
Defined by U.S. Power
For several decades the Chinese have characterized the international system as “one superpower,
many major powers” (yi chao, duo qiang). This expression connotes Beijing’s consensus position
that there is a substantial disparity between the level of the United States as the sole superpower
and that of other major powers, including China, and that this is an enduring and defining feature
of the security environment.1 Although this is still considered basically valid, the Chinese have
also observed a relative U.S. decline that began with the rapid rise of other powers in the international system and accelerated with the global financial crisis and U.S. military involvement in Iraq
and Afghanistan. The critical questions for Beijing are how long this trend will last and whether it
will fundamentally shift the security environment into another phase.
Chinese researchers have in fact speculated on a U.S. decline for several decades but have
repeatedly been compelled to reevaluate their assessment or the time frame for the emergence of a
multipolar global order. Even before the end of the Cold War, scholars characterized the world as
being in a “new era” of transition that would last several decades. During this period, they predicted, great rivalries would emerge and many local wars would be fought as a “re-division of spheres
of influence” and a struggle for world leadership ensues.2 The final outcome, they predicted, would
be a “multipolar” world that prevents the United States from achieving world dominance.
1. Liao Yonghe, “The Right and Wrong of the ‘America in Decline’ Theory,” Dangdai Shijie 3 (1995).
2. Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, January 2000), chap. 1.
|3
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe, Chinese experts
engaged in a thorough reinvestigation of the international security environment. The emergence
of Japan and Germany as powerful competitors of the United States in high technology seemed to
reinforce the view that a multipolar world order was materializing. This new world order would
be characterized by a greater balance among major powers, increasing resistance toward Western
values, and a new emphasis globally on economic and diplomatic approaches over military might.3
These predictions proved overly optimistic, however. The Gulf War (1991) and other high-tech
conflicts in the Balkans (1996) and Kosovo (1999) underscored the salience of military power and
highlighted the gap between U.S. and Chinese military capabilities. Moreover, the U.S. proportion
of the world’s economy increased from 25 percent in the early 1990s to nearly 32 percent at the
end of the decade. Beijing subsequently concluded as the new millennium dawned that the United
States would maintain its sole-superpower status for the next 15 to 20 years, if not longer.4
Chinese security analysts today continue to scrupulously analyze the international situation
to identify the slightest shifts in the global balance of power. The role of these scholars is critically
important; many of them are housed in government- and party-affiliated think tanks that provide research, analysis, and policy advice to the Chinese leadership. There is no institution that is
analogous to the politically independent or nonpartisan think tanks that exist in the United States;
all major Chinese research institutions are funded and overseen by the Communist Party or State
Council at some level. Moreover, the published writings and views of key Chinese security experts
are significant because they often influence and sometimes reflect the judgments of higher-level
3. Ibid.
4. David M. Finkelstein, China Reconsiders Its National Security: “The Great Peace and Development
Debate of 1999” (Alexandria, Va.: CNA Corporation, December 2000).
4 | capacity and resolve: foreign assessments of u.s. power
officials. Debates among scholars have occasionally provided advance warning of new directions
in Chinese foreign policy.
Analysts are not simply parroting the views expressed by party officials, however. There is considerable diversity of opinion among Chinese scholars, and even those who agree on a general line
of analysis may disagree on implications or on the appropriate policy response. The “party line”—
official thinking established by the senior leadership—still has a role in shaping scholars’ views but
is more likely to define the scope of the debate on a given issue than the conclusion. Although it
must be acknowledged that even prominent scholars influence day-to-day policymaking less than
bureaucratic institutions like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the International Department, the
senior leadership has concluded that it needs access to a genuine diversity of opinion in order to
properly formulate long-term strategy.
Foreign-policy experts assess the current balance of power on the basis of sophisticated qualitative and quantitative measurements of comprehensive national power (CNP), a concept that
includes the sum total of the strengths of a country in economy, military, science and technology,
education, resources, and soft power.5 Various methodologies of calculating the CNP of the major
and emerging powers in recent years have continued to identify the United States as considerably
more powerful than any other country, with China sixth or seventh in the pecking order.6 China’s
rapid economic growth has boosted its regional and global clout, but the Chinese are keenly aware
that their country continues to lag far behind the United States in most indices of national power,
including military capabilities and soft power. Moreover, China’s internal challenges are daunting: many believe that if such problems as environmental degradation, water shortages, internal
income disparity, and corruption are not addressed, they could pose insurmountable obstacles to
China’s reemergence as a great power sometime in this century.
Security Experts: Split on U.S. Downturn
The global financial crisis and China’s relatively strong economic performance in its wake—along
with prolonged U.S. engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan—have rekindled discussion among
Chinese security analysts about the sustainability of a U.S.-dominated international structure.7 A
close reading of recent articles by leading Chinese experts and discussions with advisers to senior
Chinese policymakers suggest an ongoing debate about U.S. power, the contours of the international system, and the implications for Chinese foreign policy. Chinese experts generally agree
that the financial crisis has weakened U.S. power and constrained the ability of the United States
to unilaterally achieve its regional and global objectives—and that these problems are a result of
its own mismanagement. They also hold a common view that the strength of other countries—
including China—is on the rise and thus the United States is in relative decline. A recent article
5. China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Global Strategic Pattern—International Environment of China in the New Century (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2000); Huang Shuofeng, New Theory on CNP:
CNP of China (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1999).
6. Yellow Book of Global Politics and Security (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2010); see
also Lei Xiaoxun, “Yellow Book Ranks China 7th in Overall Strength,” China Daily Online, December 25,
2009.
7. This section draws on Bonnie Glaser and Lyle Morris, “Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Decline and
Power,” China Brief 9, no. 14 (July 9, 2009); see also Michael A. Glosny, “China and the BRICs: A Real (but
Limited) Partnership in a Unipolar World,” Polity 42, no. 1 (January 2010): pp. 100–129.
a shifting balance: chinese assessments of u.s. power | 5
published in the journal of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
characterizes the mainstream view in describing the change in the balance of power following the
financial crisis:
In terms of the strength of the major strategic forces, the comprehensive strength of the
United States remains such that it is still the sole superpower, while the combined strength of
the other world powers is increasing, and power is tending to be more evenly distributed. The
gap in comprehensive strength between the only superpower and the other powers is steadily
narrowing.8
Analysts differ, however, over the resiliency of the United States and the prospects for a nearterm shift from a system of one superpower and many major powers to a true multipolar world.
One view foresees the rapid decline of U.S. power and the concomitant rise of developing countries such as Brazil, Russia, and India, which, along with China, compose the grouping known as
the BRICs. Proponents of this view predict that current trends will inexorably lead to the disappearance of U.S. hegemony and the emergence, perhaps within a few decades, of a world in which
there are a number of nations of equivalent strengths. For these experts, the financial crisis sounded the death knell of unfettered U.S. economic predominance and accelerated the emergence of a
more inclusive and fair multipolar system. This U.S. economic downturn compounded an earlier
blow to U.S. power that was delivered in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United
States—which, according to Ma Xiaojun, a leading foreign policy analyst at the Central Party
School, rendered “the most powerful super-hegemony that has ever emerged unable to deal with
global and indeed regional problems by depending on its own strength,” and with “no choice but
to depend for support on other relatively weak international forces.”9
Li Hongmei, editor and columnist for People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese
Communist Party, in early 2009 predicted an “unambiguous end to the U.S. unipolar system after
the global financial crisis.” He argued that the financial crisis caused U.S. hegemony to be “pushed
to the brink of collapse as a result of its inherent structural contradictions and unbridled capitalist structure” and that “as a result of this decline, the international order will be reshuffled toward
multipolarity with an emphasis on developing economies like China, Russia and Brazil.”10 Gong
Li, director of the Institute for International Studies at China’s Central Party School, likewise noted
that the U.S. stake in the world economy fell from 32 percent at the beginning of this century to
approximately 24 percent in 2009—reversing the gains of the 1990s. He estimated that the “serious recession” in the United States would continue for a long time and the proportion of the U.S.
economy in the world economy would further decline. “America’s economic capabilities to maintain its hegemony has been seriously undermined, and subsequently, its capabilities to manipulate
the international situation is declining as well,” Gong wrote.11
8. Gao Zugui and Liu Yu, “The Great Financial Crisis Catalyzes Great Transformations and Adjustments,” Contemporary International Relations 20, no. 2 (March/April 2010): p. 27.
9. Ma Xiaojun, “Comment: China and the World Amid Changes in International Relations,” Xuexi Shibao Online, January 29, 2010, available in Open Source Center (OSC), document no. CPP20100104011001.
10. Li Hongmei, “U.S. Hegemony Ends, Era of Global Multipolarity Begins,” People’s Daily Online, February 24, 2009, available in OSC, doc. no. CPP20090224701001.
11. Gong Li, “International Financial Crisis and the Change of International Order,” Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi, April 20, 2009, available in OSC, doc. no. CPP20090812671004.
6 | capacity and resolve: foreign assessments of u.s. power
In addition, this group of experts maintains that the domestic and global challenges facing the
United States—including mounting U.S. debt, economic recovery, terrorism, proliferation, and
climate change—have shifted the “balance of need” in U.S.-China relations that has prevailed for
decades. In other words, Washington’s need for good relations with Beijing is now greater than
China’s requirement for cooperative ties with the United States. Gong Li voiced this view in a February 2010 interview with Wen Wei Po:
. . . as China’s national strength grows, China and the United States are gradually moving
toward balance in the power status pattern, and China’s initiative has increased. In fact, the
United States is encumbered by its current problems; domestic unemployment, deficit, toxic
assets and other economic problems await solution, while in the international field it is still
mired in the Iraq and Afghan wars, and also requires China’s cooperation in the DPRK and
Iranian nuclear issues; it can be said that the United States needs China more than China
needs the United States.12
Other Chinese experts, however, reject the assessment that the United States is in fundamental, irreversible decline, and contend that the gap between U.S. power and Chinese power is
enormous—and will remain so for a long time to come. Moreover, they warn that basing Chinese
policy on such a judgment would be dangerous. One leading skeptic of the near-term emergence
of a multipolar system is Wang Jisi, dean of Beijing University’s School of International Studies
and China’s most prominent specialist on the United States. Wang argued in 2008 that “there really
is no reliable basis for saying at this point that the United States has experienced a setback from
which it cannot recover.” While acknowledging that the invasion of Iraq damaged U.S. soft power
and legitimacy abroad, Wang maintained that he did not see any fundamental change to the global
balance of power. “To date,” Wang said, “no country has been able to constitute a comprehensive
challenge to the United States, and the current international power structure of ‘one superpower
and many great powers’ will continue for the foreseeable future.”13 In 2010, Wang similarly noted
that in the early days of the Cold War, the United States had feared being eclipsed by the Soviet
Union—but had channeled that angst into forging an ideological consensus that produced breakthroughs in education, transportation, science, and technology, and ultimately led to U.S. victory.14
Discussing the overall effect of the 9/11 attacks, Central Party School professor Zhao Lei assessed that the U.S. response demonstrated the enduring power of U.S. influence:
On the one hand, terrorism displayed its force presence in the most effective way, as they attacked the United States, regarded as the safest country in the world; on the other hand, the
United States displayed its own power in the most effective way . . . only after the United States
was attacked did the combat against terrorism formally become the main content of world
security affairs. It is evident that the United States, relying on its mighty power, turned its own
will into the common global will.15
12. Yang Fan, “Experts: Sino-US Ties Expected to Shed Their Difficulties in Second Half of the Year,”
Wen Wei Po Online, February 18, 2010.
13. Wang Jisi, “Roundtable on U.S.-China Relations,” Nanfeng Chuang, October 20, 2008.
14. Wang Jisi, “Public Outrage No Recourse to US Criticisms,” Global Times Online, March 28, 2010,
available in OSC, doc. no. CPP20100329722007.
15. Zhao Lei, “Comment: China and the World Amid Changes in International Relations,” Xuexi Shibao Online, January 29, 2010, available in OSC, doc. no. CPP20100104011001.
a shifting balance: chinese assessments of u.s. power | 7
Yuan Peng, director of the American Studies Institute at CICIR, acknowledges that the power
gap between the United States and China is narrowing and describes this process as “irreversible.”
He cautions, however, that this process is “absolutely not a short-term one.” Yuan notes that it took
the United States nearly half a century to develop from the world’s largest economic power to the
largest power in overall national strength. “Even if China develops at the same rate as it did over
the past 30 years, it will take China decades to surpass the United States in terms of the aggregate
economy. It would take an even longer time to catch up with the United States in the S&T and
military areas,” he concludes.16 Citing the Obama administration’s strategies of “smart power” and
“multi-partner programs,” Qinghua University professor Liu Jiangyong likewise admonishes the
Chinese government to not underestimate the U.S. ability of “social readjustment” and “self-resilience.” “We must not exaggerate the extent of change in the comparison of power between China
and the United States, and should be cool-headed in sizing up and handling Sino-US relations and
act within our capacity.”17
Economists, Business:
Increasingly Confident in Chinese Model
There is considerably less debate among Chinese economists and business leaders about the
current level and trend of U.S. influence in the global economy. During the past two years, the
mainstream has viewed U.S. economic influence as waning and expressed growing confidence in
China’s economic development model. Previously, the stability of the U.S. financial system, new
markets gained following the Asian financial crisis, and the U.S. economic boom led the Chinese
government to invest significant amounts of export-driven profits into U.S. financial markets
and U.S. Treasury instruments. Many Chinese reforms of the economic and financial sector were
modeled on the U.S. system—which meant that the U.S. institutional collapses in late 2008 and
early 2009 were greeted with alarm in Beijing. At Davos during the 2009 World Economic Forum,
Premier Wen Jiabao likely voiced the consensus view when he stated that the U.S. system was
culpable for the global financial crisis owing to an “excessive expansion of financial institutions
in blind pursuit of profit, inadequate government oversight of the financial sector and an unsustainable model of development characterized by prolonged low savings and high consumption.”18
Among the elites in the finance and corporate sectors in China, the financial crisis has eroded the
last vestiges of support and admiration for the “Washington consensus” and U.S.-driven international economic architecture. Reflecting this viewpoint, CICIR vice president Wang Zaibang wrote
in early 2009:
The financial crisis is also pushing the international community . . . to profoundly review defects of the US-style neoliberal market economic model, and to review government oversight,
regulation and control. The fact that developed countries—including the United States—ally
16. Yuan Peng, “Shifts in International System, China’s Strategic Options,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, November 20, 2009.
17. Liu Jiangyong, “Developed Countries’ Rise Has Changed Times, World Framework,” Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi, November 20, 2009, available in OSC, doc no. CPP20100126671001.
18. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (keynote speech at World Economic Forum, Davos Switzerland, January 28, 2009); see also Jason Dean, James T. Areddy, and Serena Ng, “Chinese Premier Blames Recession on
U.S. Actions,” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123318934318826787.
html.
8 | capacity and resolve: foreign assessments of u.s. power
with one another to bail out the market has already bid farewell to the Washington consensus
from the domestic perspective.19
Chinese economists now generally believe that a Chinese model of development based on
“state-directed capitalism” makes U.S. economic lessons less relevant. As Vice Premier Wang
Qishan pointed out in December 2008, speaking to a forum of U.S. business and government
leaders in the midst of the financial crisis: “We have learned that our teacher has some problems.”20
However, even as Chinese economic growth has rapidly resumed and once again approaches
double-digit GDP growth levels, Chinese commentators have downplayed the significance of
China passing Japan as the world’s second-largest economy. Highlighting its position as a developing economy along with the substantial gap between China and the leading developed economies
in per capita GDP, they argue that U.S. overall economic strength will continue to outstrip China’s
for many decades.21
The Chinese Public: Complex Views of U.S. Power
The Chinese public today is keenly aware of the perceived shift in the international order, and it
has a vested interest in believing that this will lead to a multipolar world—with China as one of
the poles. However, Chinese attitudes toward U.S. power are complex. Recent statistics show a
high and possibly increasing level of admiration for soft-power factors such as U.S. values, culture,
policies, and institutions. The Pew Global Attitudes Project found that the percentage of Chinese
responding with an overall favorable view of the United States stood at 58 percent in 2010—the
highest in the six years of polling and comparable with results from countries such as Spain, Indonesia, and Mexico.22 Likewise, an impressive 76 percent of respondents averred that the United
States considered China’s interests “a great deal” or “a fair amount” in making international policy
decisions, from a low a few years earlier of 44 percent.23 The biggest jump was in regard to how
much confidence respondents had that the U.S. president would “do the right thing” regarding
world affairs—from 30 percent to 62 percent with the election of Barack Obama in 2008.24 Taken
together, these would seem to indicate a renewed confidence in the reputation and influence of the
United States within the international system.
But perhaps the more dramatic—and relevant—statistics are related to public views of China’s
own power. A nearly perfect 97 percent of respondents said they had a “favorable” view of their
own country,25 while 87 percent were satisfied with China’s overall direction—an expression of
19. Wang Zaibang, “Historical Change Shows That Systematic Adjustment Is Urgent—Review of and
Thoughts on the 2008 International Situation,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, January 20, 2009, available in OSC,
doc. no. CPP20090513702014.
20. David Ignatius, “Economic Optimism for Australia’s Prime Minister,” Washington Post, March 22,
2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/20/AR2009032002772.html.
21. Li Hong, “After China Becomes Second Largest Economy,” People’s Daily Online, August 16, 2010.
22. Pew Research Center, Pew Global Attitudes Project: Opinion of the United States, http://pewglobal.
org/database. The results of a BBC World Service poll also broadly support this upturn in perspective; see
BBC World Service, “Global Views of United States Improve While Other Countries Decline,” April 18,
2010.
23. Pew Research Center, http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=4&country=45.
24. Pew Research Center, http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=6&country=45.
25. Pew Research Center, http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24&country=45. A BBC World
Service Poll showed similar results, with 81 percent having a “mainly positive” view of China’s influence; see
a shifting balance: chinese assessments of u.s. power | 9
self-confidence not matched or even approached in any other country.26 Chinese respondents
expressed similar enthusiasm about their overall economic situation and the benefits of trade.27
When asked which country is the world’s leading economic power, 45 percent responded “United
States”—roughly comparable with previous years—but in 2010, 36 percent responded “China,” up
from 21 percent in 2008.28 A 2009 poll by the Lowy Institute found that of five countries, the United States was still considered the greatest threat to China’s security—respondents cited diverse factors such as U.S. backing for separatist elements, support for Taiwan, and regional alliances with
Japan and Korea.29 At the same time, most Chinese placed domestic and regional concerns—such
as environmental issues, food and water shortages, and the prospect of Japan acquiring nuclear
weapons—as greater overall threats to China’s security than the actions of the United States.30 Here
we see the other side of the picture: a confidence in China’s rapid growth and influence, tempered
by a concern for serious and unresolved problems close to home.
There are valid reasons to be skeptical of Chinese polling—government-owned media are
as much propaganda arms as news services—but those polls that have been conducted in China
reflect similar trends. In 2005, the government-owned newspaper, Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times)
conducted one of the first rigorous surveys measuring how ordinary (urban) Chinese view the
United States. Respondents were roughly split between seeing America as a rival and as a partner.31
More than half (57 percent) believed that the United States was using its power to “contain” China,
even as 70 percent expressed satisfaction with overall Sino-U.S. relations.32 Respondents expressed
admiration for America’s culture, science and technology, legal system, and affluence, but many
also believed that the true purpose of U.S. engagement on human rights was to destabilize or
“demonize” China.33 Chinese researchers involved with the project characterized the results as
demonstrating a complex “love-hate” perspective toward the United States, with stronger affection
toward U.S. people, culture, and economic engagement than toward U.S. foreign policy.34
Recurring surveys in 2006 and 2007 revealed similar sentiments: despite lingering perceptions
of the United States as a rival, most held favorable views of the country and were optimistic about
the future of U.S.-China relations. Two trends are worth noting, however. Between 2005 and 2007,
the percentage who believed the United States and China would engage in conflict over Taiwan
rose 20 points to over 70 percent, while only 16 percent expressed that the United States would
continue to maintain its long-term status as a superpower (down from 28 percent).35 Chinese
analysts interpret these seemingly contradictory results as reflecting greater confidence in China’s
BBC World Service, “Global Views of United States Improve While Other Countries Decline.”
26. Pew Research Center, http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=3&response=Satisfied. Other regional powers such as Brazil and India come in at 50 percent and 45 percent, respectively.
27. Pew Research Center, http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=5&mode=chart, http://pewglobal.
org/database/?indicator=16&mode=chart.
28. Pew Research Center, http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=17&country=45&response=China.
29. Fergus Hanson and Andrew Shearer, “The Lowy Institute China Poll 2009: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1305.
30. Ibid.
31. Cheng Gang and Xie Xiang, “Results of Public Opinion Poll on Chinese People’s Attitudes toward
U.S [in Chinese],” Renmin Wang, March 2, 2005, available in OSC, doc. no. CPP20050303000073.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. “PRC Journal: Opinion Survey Shows Public Giving High Score to Sino-US Relations.” From Cheng
Gang on Huanqiu Shibao, in Chinese, March 30, 2007, available in OSC, doc. no. CPP20070410710005.
10 | capacity and resolve: foreign assessments of u.s. power
own power, along with a corresponding optimism about Beijing’s ability to achieve gains within
the U.S.-China relationship.36 Researcher Ni Feng opined that the Chinese population still holds a
basically pragmatic view: a perception of enduring U.S. hard power along with an overall decline
in soft power—particularly its “rallying” or “problem-solving” abilities—as a result of problems
in Iraq.37 Reading between the lines, we can see an enduring belief in the “one superpower, many
major powers” framework: China’s success calls for a more equitable relationship, but China is not
yet eclipsing the United States. (No survey results for later years have been recorded.)
Advocates of a more aggressive or critical line can certainly be found, however—and although
they are not broadly representative, these voices do signify an important movement within the
Chinese public consciousness. Particularly on the Internet—where mostly younger Chinese netizens debate political topics with less decorum and more strident nationalism—a vibrant undercurrent of anger and resentment toward China’s “submissive” posture with the United States is
evident. In October 2009, for instance, Huanqiu Shibao reported that 78 percent of those polled in
an online survey believed that trade friction with the United States would extend into the future,
and 89 percent advocated a policy of “strike back firmly” (versus 10 percent supporting negotiation) when they were questioned about how the Chinese government should respond to U.S. trade
protectionism.38 Similar sentiments are expressed about the need for Beijing to more aggressively
protect its “core interests”—including on issues of territorial integrity such as Tibet and Taiwan.39
As riveting as such discussions may be, one must be cautious in concluding that they represent
broad Chinese public opinion or strongly influence Chinese policy. First, chat rooms and Internet discussions are frequently monitored and controlled; anything considered excessively critical of China or the Chinese Communist Party is often removed, and state-employed “monitors”
frequently intervene to shape the discussion.40 Second, the Communist Party has been known to
court nationalist sentiment in an effort to bolster its own legitimacy, substituting patriotic fervor
for party loyalty. Third, the loudest or most extreme position attracts the most attention but is not
necessarily the most representative; just as in the United States, netizens in China are likely to be
more critical and express their views more strongly online than in person. Finally, there is sufficient diversity of opinion on the measure and significance of U.S. power in these discussions to
conclude that no single view predominates amid China’s online community.
Nevertheless, decisionmakers in China are said to be paying greater attention to public opinion as it is expressed in Internet forums and chat rooms. Xinhua is tasked to inform China’s top
leaders daily of the topics that are being hotly debated by netizens.41 In addition, says a report by
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), new nonofficial actors are successfully vying for influence through informal channels such as personal relationships, Internet media,
36. “PRC Opinion Poll on Sino-US Relations Reveals More Positive Feelings Towards US.” From Cheng
Gang on Huanqiu Shibao, in Chinese, March 17, 2006, available in OSC, doc. no. CPP20060412455001.
37. “PRC Journal: Opinion Survey Shows Public Giving High Score to Sino-US Relations.”
38. “Global Times Survey: 60 Percent PRC Netizens Support Current China Trade Policy,” Global Times
Online, October 30, 2009, available in OSC, doc. no. CPP20091103722006.
39. Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), September 2010.
40. A recent Global Times article admitted that even private Chinese companies are using “online pushers” to shape opinion on the Internet; see “Global Times Report: Invisible Hands Spin Online Opinion,” December 23, 2009, available in OSC, doc. no. CPP20091223722011.
41. Linda Jakobson made this point at a CSIS event on October 8, 2010, that was held to discuss the
report she coauthored with Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China.”
a shifting balance: chinese assessments of u.s. power | 11
and institutional lobbying.42 Chinese officials at every level insist that public opinion is factored
into foreign policy decisionmaking, hinting that the party’s legitimacy could be weakened if public
concerns are ignored. It remains unclear, however, how this process takes place and the extent to
which public opinion is truly taken into consideration by Chinese leaders. It also must be acknowledged that the top leadership seeks to shape as well as measure public opinion through the
party’s propaganda system—which, while far from omniscient, can be described as quietly effective in dictating what the broad majority hears, sees, and considers.
Scholarly Debate over Chinese Foreign Policy
Within the top party leadership, consideration of foreign policy or security doctrine is generally
restricted to a small nuclear core: very likely only three or four out of the nine members of the
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) are regularly consulted on strategic foreign policy discussions. Historically, strategic guidance has been the prerogative of the top leader; Mao Zedong
dictated nearly all foreign policy shifts during his time, and Deng Xiaoping similarly set the tone
or direction during his era after he consolidated power. This role is somewhat less today, and Hu
Jintao likely consults with select party leaders, retired cadre, strategic advisers, and substantive
experts before bringing a major foreign policy decision to the PBSC for discussion and approval.
The patterns of scholarly debate indicate differences of opinion within the central leadership
about how China should seek to secure its interests in the face of a rapid adjustment in global
balance of power, and particularly how China should deal with the United States. Among Chinese
scholars, a minority continues to advocate that China adhere strictly to Deng Xiaoping’s strategic
guideline issued in the early 1990s to “keep a low profile” (taoguang yanghui) and “never claim
leadership” (bu dang tou). Special importance is placed on avoiding confrontation with the United
States; China’s focus on promoting domestic development while avoiding entanglement in regional
and international problems has served Chinese interests well. Older-generation specialists on the
United States and other Western countries along with diplomats make up most in this camp.
Most foreign policy experts do not favor completely abandoning this traditional and riskaverse approach to foreign policy; instead they seek to gradually and selectively adopt a more proactive stance in the international arena—emphasizing another of Deng’s maxims that encourages
China “to get something accomplished.” Proponents for the most part do not advocate directly
confronting the United States and do not challenge the view that foreign policy should primarily serve China’s economic development. Instead, they espouse that Beijing be more assertive on
specific issues on which China has both capability and clout—such as shaping a new international
financial system—perhaps as a way to test the reaction of other nations to a more assertive China.
Those who favor a more proactive foreign policy are divided over the goal that a more proactive foreign policy should serve. Some analysts argue that China should be tougher in defending
its interests, especially to counter perceived U.S. efforts to contain Chinese influence and constrain
China’s rise. They make the case that the new situation provides China with leverage over the
United States that can be employed to more assertively defend Chinese territorial integrity and
sovereignty and other “core interests.”43 In addition, the shifting balance of power is seen as en42. Jakobson and Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China.”
43. In his remarks at the close of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2009, State
Councilor Dai Bingguo defined China’s “core interests” as safeguarding the basic system and national security, national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and sustained and stable economic and social develop-
12 | capacity and resolve: foreign assessments of u.s. power
abling China to reshape the international order in a way that is more beneficial to China and other
emerging powers.44 Other analysts propose that Beijing adopt a more proactive foreign policy that
seeks to cooperate with the United States and other nations as well as provide more public goods,
with the primary goal of reassuring other nations that China will emerge as a responsible country
and will not pose a destabilizing threat to the international system.
Scholarly support for continuing to observe the conservative advice of Deng Xiaoping while
also defending China’s core interests, contributing to international society, and improving China’s
international image was demonstrated at the spring 2010 annual meeting of China’s International
Relations Association in Lanzhou, which issued the following consensual conclusion:
. . . do not confront the United States; do not challenge the international system in general;
do not use ideology to guide foreign policy; do not be the chief of the “anti-Western camp”;
do not conflict with the majority of countries, even when we are right; learn to make compromises and concessions, and learn the game of reciprocal interests; do not compromise China’s
core interests concerning unification of the country; provide public goods in needed areas of
international affairs; and change China’s international image by taking advantage of important
global events.45
Central Leadership Testing a More Assertive
Approach
Chinese leaders have tended to be conservative and risk averse. Until recently, they resisted both
domestic pressure to pursue a more proactive foreign policy to safeguard Chinese interests and
pressure from foreign nations to assume greater responsibility regionally and globally. At the 2006
Foreign Affairs Work Conference, an important national high-level Chinese Communist Party
conclave where foreign policy guidelines were discussed, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao hewed closely
to Deng Xiaoping’s strategic admonition to avoid getting entangled in commitments overseas. In a
rebuke of the view that China was rapidly increasing its national strength and should be more proactive in its foreign policy, Wen declared that China would remain in the initial stage of socialism
for a long time to come and would persist in “not raising the banner and not taking the lead on
the international scene.”46 This pronouncement was based on the assessment that U.S. regional and
global preeminence would endure for a protracted period, as evidenced by Hu Jintao’s description
of the path toward multipolarity as “tortuous.”47
ment; see “Closing Remarks for U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” July 28, 2009, www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2009a/july/126599.htm.
44. See, for example, People’s Daily Online, “Opening New Visual Angles of International Relations
Theory,” Renmin Ribao, February 13, 2010, available in OSC, doc. no. CPP20100218702001; Jiang Lingfei,
“In Order for China To Become Powerful, It Should Dare To Take Risks,” Huanqiu Shibao, January 5, 2010,
available in OSC, doc. no. CPP20100112710010.
45. “Zhongguo Guoji Guanxi Xuehui 2010 nian nianhui zai Lanzhou zhaokai” [China’s international
relations society 2010 annual meeting in Lanzhou Review], Waijiao Pinglun 4 (2010): p. 157.
46. Wen Jiabao, “Several Questions in the Historic Tasks of the Initial Stage of Socialism and China’s
Foreign Policy,” Renmin Ribao, February 27, 2007; Bonnie Glaser, “Ensuring the ‘Go Abroad’ Policy Serves
China’s Domestic Priorities,” China Brief 7, no. 5 (March 8, 2007).
47. “Central Foreign Affairs Conference Takes Place in Beijing,” Xinhua Domestic Service, in Chinese,
August 23, 2006, available in OSC, doc. no. CPP20060823308001.
a shifting balance: chinese assessments of u.s. power | 13
In 2009, however, the leadership’s message was revised. At the 11th Ambassadorial Conference—a meeting convened every five years to discuss the prevailing international environment and the future direction of China’s foreign relations and diplomatic strategy—Hu Jintao
­enunciated a modified estimation of the global balance of power. He maintained the prospect of
global multipolarization had become “clearer” and suggested that damage to the U.S. reputation
globally was proving helpful in promoting multipolarity.48 In addition, Hu urged adopting a more
proactive diplomatic posture by stepping up efforts to exert “more influential power in politics,
more competitiveness in the economic field, more affinity in its image, and more appealing morality.” Of even greater significance, Hu issued a new formulation for Chinese foreign policy. While
continuing to “uphold” Deng Xiaoping’s guideline to “keep a low profile” in international affairs,
he called for China to “actively get something accomplished (emphasis added).” The perceived
relative decline in the power of the United States as a result of being battered by the financial crisis
and overextended in two wars in the Middle East boosted China’s confidence and served as the
basis for top-level support for a more vigorous foreign policy.49 At the same time, however, Hu did
not completely reject the traditional course of caution and risk aversion. He warned against getting
too deeply mired in overseas commitments, emphasizing that China’s priority remains focused on
developments within its borders. Moreover, Hu stressed that maintaining a stable relationship with
the United States remained critically important to Chinese interests.
A succession of events since early 2009 suggests that Beijing has been testing the hypothesis
that the relative decline in U.S. power and China’s growing strength have provided Beijing with
increased leverage over the United States. Although China denies an intention to directly challenge U.S. interests, it has shown a willingness to more assertively defend what it sees as Chinese
core national interests. In addition, the definition of China’s core national interests appears to be
in flux and may be expanding.50 Although safeguarding Chinese national sovereignty and territorial integrity has always been the essence, previously Chinese attention was paid principally
to Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. In the spring of 2010, in conversations with U.S. counterparts,
senior Chinese officials referred to the South China Sea as one of China’s core national interests
although they have not articulated this position publicly. It is also unclear whether such a stance,
if embraced officially, would include only China’s territorial claims and exclusive economic zones
(EEZs) derived from those claims, or would encompass the entire South China Sea. It is possible
that as China grows stronger—and requires more resources from abroad to sustain its march toward superpower status—its list of core interests will grow accordingly.
Evidence of China’s growing assertiveness in areas linked to its core interests can be seen in its
rhetoric and behavior in several instances:
■■ Beijing’s reaction to the January 2010 $6.4 billion arms sales package to Taiwan. In keeping with
past practice, China suspended bilateral U.S.-Chinese military exchanges and planned dialogues on nonproliferation and international security. This time, however, China also threatened to impose sanctions on U.S. companies that sell arms to Taiwan, although this was not
enforced through legal measures. China also rebuffed a visit by Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates in June 2010 although subsequently received the Secretary Gates in January 2011.
48. Bonnie Glaser and Benjamin Dooley, “China’s 11th Ambassadorial Conference Signals Continuity
and Change in Foreign Policy,” China Brief 9, no. 22 (November 4, 2009).
49. Chinese official, discussion in Washington D.C., September 8, 2009.
50. Willy Lam, “Hawks vs. Doves: Beijing Debates ‘Core Interests’ and Sino-U.S. Relations,” China Brief
10, no. 17 (August 19, 2010).
14 | capacity and resolve: foreign assessments of u.s. power
■■ Chinese harassment of U.S. ocean surveillance ships operating in China’s EEZs in the South China
Sea and Yellow Sea in the spring of 2009. In a series of incidents, Chinese naval and patrol vessels engaged in dangerous maneuvers in an effort to impede the passage of the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. China denied U.S. charges and also dismissed U.S. statements that
there was no legal basis for restricting activities by other nations’ naval vessels in a country’s
EEZ and U.S. protests that Chinese actions violated the requirement under international law to
operate with due regard for the rights and safety of other lawful users of the ocean.
■■ Chinese warnings in response to planned U.S.–Republic of Korea joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan following the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan. Prior to an
official announcement declaring the timing, location, and participating ships in military drills
in the waters off the Korean Peninsula, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, “We
firmly oppose foreign warships and military aircraft entering the Yellow Sea and other coastal
waters of China to engage in activities affecting China’s security and interests.”51
■■ Chinese actions to slow the delivery of cargo, including rare earths, being shipped from Chinese
ports to Japan after the Japanese arrested and detained the captain of a Chinese fishing vessel that
was fishing in waters claimed by Japan near the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands. Although Beijing
denied imposing an embargo on the exports of rare earths to Japan, Chinese officials admitted reinforcing customs inspections, ostensibly to counter smuggling.52 The Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesman rejected Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s statement to Japan’s
foreign minister, Seiji Maehara, that the islands fall within the scope of the U.S.-Japan security
treaty.
■■ Chinese response to the statements made by Secretary of State Clinton and representatives from
eleven other nations regarding the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi in
July 2010 Beijing viewed the statements as interference in the territorial dispute, which China
prefers to manage bilaterally with the various claimants. China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi
warned regional actors against collaborating with outside powers in dealing with the South
China Sea territorial disputes. Participants in the meeting reported that Yang told the meeting:
“China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.”
■■ Chinese actions following the announcement that the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Chinese
dissident Liu Xiaobo, who is imprisoned in China. Beijing threatened negative consequences for
countries whose representatives attended the award ceremony, suspended talks on a free trade
agreement with Norway, and canceled two meetings with a senior official from Norwegian
Fisheries and Coastal Affairs.
There is insufficient evidence to conclude, however, that new strategic calculations based on an
assessment that the balance of power is tilting in Beijing’s favor are behind China’s more assertive
pattern of behavior. Other domestic political factors could be at play, including Hu Jintao’s position amid intensified jockeying for power in the run-up to the 2012 leadership succession, tension
in civil-military relations, and an insecure leadership unsure of how to react to growing domestic
pressure to safeguard Chinese security interests.
51. Xinhua, in English, July 10, 2010, available in OSC, doc. no. CPP20100721968190.
52. “China to Normalize Stagnant Rare Earth Exports to Japan Soon,” Kyoto World Service, November
13, 2010, available in OSC, doc. no. JPP20101113969107.
a shifting balance: chinese assessments of u.s. power | 15
Analyzing the U.S. Response
If Chinese assessments of a shift in the balance of power are at least partly responsible for China’s
new assertiveness, it is possible that a firm U.S. response will prompt a recalibration of Chinese
policy. Beijing appreciates the more enduring elements of U.S. power, and the Chinese are closely
observing U.S. steps to strengthen its alliances in Asia and the Pacific, participate more actively
in institution building and architecture, and enhance its influence in the South China Sea. For
example, Secretary of State Clinton enunciated a new U.S. policy at the ASEAN Regional Forum
in July 2010, encouraging ASEAN and China to reach agreement on a binding code of conduct in
the South China Sea and offering to facilitate discussion of confidence-building measures. Clinton
also stated, “The United States has a national interest in the continued peace and stability, freedom
of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the
South China Sea.” On October 28, 2010, Secretary Clinton reiterated that the Senkakus fall within
the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and indicated that the Obama administration would attach priority to ratifying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 2011.53
The perception of a renewed commitment on the part of the United States to assert its presence in
the region could temper internal support for a bolder Chinese foreign policy. Chinese leaders are
also acutely aware of growing wariness in China’s neighborhood about Beijing’s intentions, which
has led to efforts by some nations to forge coalitions to defend against Chinese pressure that could
undermine China’s decades-long policy of reassuring the region that China’s rise would not have
negative consequences.
In what may signal an attempt to revert Chinese foreign policy to its prior emphasis on reassurance, an essay penned by State Councilor Dai Bingguo in October 2010 reaffirmed China’s
strategy of “peaceful development” and pledged to never seek world domination. Dai offered this
authoritative interpretation of Deng Xiaoping’s guideline: “China should remain humble and
cautious as well as refrain from taking the lead, from waving the flag, from seeking expansion,
and from claiming hegemony.” But Dai conspicuously avoided indicating whether Deng’s maxim
serves as a guideline for current Chinese foreign policy, noting only that it “is consistent with the
idea of taking the path of peaceful development.”54
It is also possible, however, that this adjustment of Chinese foreign policy is merely rhetorical or tactical. On the basis of judgments that China is rapidly closing the power gap with the
United States and that the development of a multipolar world is accelerating, China may continue
to pursue a more proactive and assertive foreign policy. Over time, Beijing’s growing confidence
could result in China acting more openly in ways that are not always consistent with U.S. interests.
Especially if there is a perception that the United States is challenging China’s core interests, how53. “Briefing by Secretary Clinton, Japanese Foreign Minister Maehara,” U.S. Department of State,
October 28, 2010, www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/October/20101028123524su0.6718823.
html; “Remarks on Innovation and American Leadership to the Commonwealth Club: Remarks: Hillary
Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State,” U.S. Department of State, October 15, 2010, www.state.gov/secretary/
rm/2010/10/149542.htm.
54. Dai’s article was first published as “zhonggongzhongyangguanyuzhidingguominjingjiheshehuifazhandeshiergewunianguihuade jianyi” [Suggestion from the central government to make the twelfth fiveyear plan on the national economic and social development], People’s Publishing House, October 1, 2010.
On December 6, 2010, it was published in People’s Daily and posted on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website under the title, “Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development,” available in OSC, doc. no.
CPP20101207004001.
16 | capacity and resolve: foreign assessments of u.s. power
ever they are defined, Chinese behavior could become more aggressive in the future. In addition
to showing greater assertiveness on issues that Beijing defines as its core interests, China can be
expected to seek to use its growing economic weight, financial resources, and geopolitical influence to expand its say in shaping a new international financial system. Even Wang Jisi—traditionally a proponent of U.S. power—recently postulated that as its power grows China will demand
to change the state of affairs and strive for the initiative more often. “In the Sino-US game,” Wang
writes, “China is keeping control of the ball for longer, and the ball will more and more frequently
be kicked into the American half of the field.”55
This suggests a central policy dilemma for the United States: the United States needs to show
robust strength and sustained commitment to the region to preempt a Chinese judgment that the
United States is in decline, but actions that the United States might take to remind Beijing of its
resiliency could well be seen by the Chinese as a challenge to their core national interests. This
outcome could significantly increase U.S.-Chinese tensions and, in turn, heighten the anxiety of
regional states that don’t want to be compelled to take sides. The United States must therefore be
careful to demonstrate its power in ways that do not antagonize China but instead provide incentives for Beijing to cooperate. The existence of a zero-sum competition between the United States
and China in Asia should be avoided at all costs.
Regardless of China’s short-term assessments and policies, it remains Beijing’s long-term
objective to increase its comprehensive national power and reinstate the country as a great power.
As China’s military and economic power grows, it is likely that over time Chinese leaders will
conclude that adhering to the strategic guideline of keeping a low profile in international affairs no
longer serves Chinese interests. Chinese foreign policy will almost certainly become more vigorous and assertive. It remains to be seen, however, whether China uses its growing clout to protect
the global commons, provide global public goods, and generally strengthen the existing international system, or whether it attempts to enhance Chinese security interests at the expense of other
nations and seeks to modify the international system in ways that run contrary to the interests of
the United States, its allies, and partners.
For at least the next five to ten years, Beijing likely will seek assiduously to preserve good relations with the United States. Economic ties between the United States and China run deep. China’s
economic growth model relies intensively on exports, and the U.S. market is (with the European
Union) critical in that regard. China is so deeply invested in U.S. securities that any disruption to
the value of the dollar would deal a severe blow to its own financial position. Avoiding a military
confrontation with the United States that could quickly escalate and would likely set back China’s
modernization efforts will remain a key Chinese concern. Even against the background of a relative decline in U.S. power, the United States will likely remain the only global superpower and the
leader of the Western world for the next decade, and China will be engaged in limited cooperation
with the United States in areas deemed important to U.S. interests and will manage differences so
that bilateral tensions remain under control. Above all, Beijing will seek to ensure that the United
States remains relatively friendly and does not view China as an immediate adversary, which could
result in a policy that aims to inhibit China’s rise and even to undermine Chinese stability and
Chinese Communist Party rule.
55. Wang Jisi, “It Will Be Difficult to Avoid a Major Strategic Trial of Strength between China and the United States,” Guoji Xianqu Daobao Online, August 9, 2010, available in OSC, doc. no.
CPP20100830671002.
a shifting balance: chinese assessments of u.s. power | 17
Implications for U.S. Policy
The high rate of growth forecast for China and several other emerging economies and the slow
pace of U.S. economic growth have made it inevitable that the U.S. position in the balance of
power will decline relatively. The challenge for the United States is ensuring that China and other
nations in Asia do not prematurely conclude that a relative decline in U.S. power means a weakened United States that is no longer able to maintain a forward-deployed military presence and
can no longer be the ultimate guarantor of regional peace and stability. The emergence of a multipolar world in a gradual and managed way can play to the advantage of the United States and its
allies, as well as China, and there need not be a zero-sum competition between the United States
and China.
Preserving a leadership role for the United States in Asia is key to ensuring that China’s rise is
peaceful and accomplished with as little damage to U.S. interests as possible. The majority of countries in the region want the United States to maintain a strong and active presence in the AsiaPacific region, in part as a hedge against the possibility that China’s rise will pose a threat to their
interests. Yet at the same time they are doubtful about the ability of the United States to maintain
a high level of attention and commitment to the region. Mitigating the concerns of U.S. allies
and friends in Asia while averting Chinese fears that the United States is seeking to strategically
encircle and contain China will be challenging tasks for U.S. policymakers. At the same time the
United States strengthens and broadens its alliances, builds new partnerships, and enhances the
capacity of multilateral organizations in the region, it must continue to encourage China’s peaceful
integration into the international system, even as China’s clout in that system inevitably increases.
Although maintaining U.S. military power and presence is essential, placing excessive emphasis on hard power would be a mistake. The United States should continue to employ a combination
of hard and soft power, often referred to as “smart power,” to advance its interests. Countries in the
region want U.S. military power to be present, but not menacing. Now that fears that the United
States and China would comanage the world in a Group of Two arrangement have largely dissipated, they could quickly be replaced by worries of U.S.-Chinese confrontation.
Military power and the attractiveness of U.S. values are unlikely on their own to maintain a
primary role for the United States in the greater Asian region. China’s potential bullying may be
a source of concern to the ASEAN countries, but regional economic integration with China—
including through China’s active negotiation of attractive trade agreements—is driving the region
farther from the United States and closer to China. Without a trade and investment strategy that
draws Asian countries to the United States, this trend can only continue. It may be difficult to
command U.S. domestic political support for liberalizing trade policies, but without these p
­ olicies
U.S. primacy in Asia is in serious question. The United States should develop a comprehensive
interagency trade and investment strategy and policy for the Asia-Pacific region. This will not only
benefit U.S. exporters and investors, but will also strengthen relationships with other Asian states
that want to trade with the United States, including China. Such relationships will serve to develop
greater comity and deepen interdependence in the region. Ratifying the U.S.-Korea Free Trade
Agreement, imbuing the Trans-Pacific Partnership process with genuine political capital, and
completing the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with Taiwan are three concrete steps
the United States could take to enhance its position in the region over the next five years.
The keys to maintaining peace and stability in Asia and securing U.S. interests are sustaining U.S. leadership and bolstering regional confidence in U.S. staying power. Whether addressing
18 | capacity and resolve: foreign assessments of u.s. power
terrorist threats, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, climate change, or poverty, the
United States must play an active role in helping the countries of the region enhance their capacity to succeed. By doing so, the United States can counter perceptions of a U.S. decline that could
lead to a new arms race in Asia, heightened mistrust among regional states, and even possible
­miscalculation.
a shifting balance: chinese assessments of u.s. power | 19