69
CHAPTER- II
value
"It seems reasonable, then, to consider the
proposal that to clear up our general confusion
about values we need here the same quality of
insight that has been able (for example, in
scientific research and in Helen Keller's
discovery of language) to dissolve rigid
grooving and compartmentalization of the mind.
This will allow reason to flow freely in new
ways', so that it can give rise continually to
fresh perceptions concerning value.
"To bring such an insight to bear on our system
of values, which tend to dominate us both
individually and socially, is no easy task.
Indeed, it requires an energy, a passion, a
seriousness, beyond even that needed to make
creative and original discoveries in science,
in art or in such other fields. One may readily
feel daunted by prospects of so difficult an
undertaking. Yet it is clear that unless
mankind begins to engage in this very work,
very little that anyone does can have real
meaning, at least not in the long run."
—* David Bohm, ‘On Insight and its Significance
for Science, Education and Values* in
Teachers College Record, Vol.80, Ho.3, 1979,
p.418.
Concern for values in education in whatever way
expressed - by including values in education, by making education
‘value-oriented* or by interpreting education itself as a value
concept, cannot be meaningful unless the concept of value is
clarified or defined and all facts and principles that govern
value are revealed.
An indepth study of the concept and
70
different, aspects of "value and its kinds will hot only make
clear whether values agree with education or not, but also
will reveal the basic principles of 'value education', if
there can be any such education.
Therefore/ in the first
and second seeti.cns of this chapter, attempts are made to
study the concept of value .in its different aspects and in
the third section, classification of values and detailed
study of some controversial values has been taken up.
Section - 1
The Concept of Value and Its Pre-requisites
2.1 •• 1
Evolution of the Concept and Theory of Value
The term 'value* began with simple and restricted
meanings in economics and its branch tabelled as'theory of
value* .
Value meant the worth of something in use and worth
in exchange.
Of course, the Neo-Fichtean Philosophers were •
using the word in a transcendental sense - value possessing
"an exalted
perception."
dignity transcending both nature and sense
But since, the beginning of twentieth century,
value has acquired a lot of meanings which has ecliped its
transcendental use in philosophy and its technical use in
economics.
The term value and its cognates and compounds
are now used in a widespread way not only in economics and
philosophy but also in other social sciences and humanities.
German philosophers, especially Rudolf Hermann Lotze,
Albrerht Ritschl and Nietzche began to expand the notion of
value in a much wider sense. Somehow# in nineteenth century,
it dawned upon some philosophers that a variety of questions
which philosophers from the days of Plato had discussed under
(l)
R.B. Perry, Realms of Value, 1954, p.4
71
the headings-'"Of the good, the end# the right, justice, virtue,
moral judgment', aesthetic judgment, truth etc. can find a
systematic
solution under a general theory of value.
The
conception of a general theory of value matured towards the
end of nineteenth century in the writings of Alexius
Meinong
and Christian Von Ehrenfels, both Austrian Philosophers, and
through Mgpc Schaler and Nicolai Hartmann, the German philoso­
phers.
Soon it found place in the works of British philoso­
phers like Bernard Basanquest, J. M. Mackenzie, John Laid etc.
In America, the idea was introduced by Hugo Mtfnstenberg and
W. M. Urban, and was taken up by R. B. Perry, John Dewey,
D. H. Parker, D. W. Prall etc.
In India, K. R. Shreenivasa
Iyengar gave wide thought- to value mainly in the terms of
Western Philosophy, while M. Hiriyanna tried to give an Indian
conception of value the roots of which are found in earliest
Indian philosophy.
With the attempt to have a general theory of valuq,
the meaning of the term'value* has expanded enormously. Now,
in tiie words of R. B. Perry,“It points to other pointers and
borrows the ostensive meaning of such adjectives as 'good1,
rbest‘,
‘right1,
‘ought1,
such nouns as ‘happiness*,
‘beautiful1,
‘sacred1,
‘well-being* and
‘just*, and
'
(?)
divilization."
Not only this, different theories of value have made
different uses of value, or it might have happened the other
way round. As a result> the uses of value are now various* and
conflicting.
A brief statement of different meanings and
usages of value can throw some light on the expansion of the
concept and on some theories behind it*
Value is sometimes used as an abstract noun for terms
like good, desirable, worthwhile etc. and cover the same
moaning as these do.
In a wider sense it covers all kinds
of rightness, virtue, beauty truth, holiness etc. Philosophers
(2)
R. B, Perry, Realms of vdlue, 1954, p.5.
72
like R. B. Perry, P. W. Taylor recognise morality, art,
science, religion, economics, politics, law and customs etc.
as different kinds of values.
Value is used in intrinsic and instrumental sense by
others, intrinsic value being good in itself, instrumental
value being an aid in gaining some intrinsic value*
Value is used by some as a concrete noun, as — *a value*,
to refer to some object that is valued or judged to have
value. The expressions such _as 'his value1, 'her value system',
‘the Indian values* etc. refer to what a person or a nation
thinks to be good.
The presupposition behind this widespread
usage is a theory of value which holds that nothing really
has objective value, value is conferred on certain objects by
the
individuals or a society.
Opposed to this view is the
objective view according to which values mean things that
have value or worth irrespective of Whether somebody
recognises them or not.
Value is also used as a verb;
'to value',
'valuating',
'valued* etc. are different expressions. Again 'to value' is
used in two different senses* (a) to prize, like, cherish etc.
and (b) to appraise, estimate, v&luate or evaluate. John Dewey
particularly interprets *to value' in these two ways.
In a broad sense, Hiriyanna recognises 'ista', meaning
1 the object of liking', as the Sanskrit equivalent of value.
But since man's 'liking, unlike that of animals, is characterised
by foresight, desirability etc. value proper is called
'puruiartha' or human value. ^ In modem times 'Mulya' and
its variants are also used.
(3)
(4 )
William K. Frankena, Value and Valuation in Paul
Edwards (ed) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Vol.VIII, 1967, P.230.
M. Hiriyanna, The Indian Conception of Value, 1975,
pp.2-6.
73
2.1.2
Need for a Theory of Value and its Pre-requisites
Whether the users are conscious or not, each usage
of the term, as bints have already been given, is backed
by a theory. Therefore ilucidating or defining the concept of
value without resort to theories of value is not possible.
R.' B. Perry is of the view
•
"The fundamental problem of
theory of value is to define the concept of value."
(5)
Setting
for himself the task of clarifying the concept, the researcher
feels the other way rounds The fundamental problem of
defining the concept of value is to have a theory of value,
because a definition can be acceptable only when it is backed
by a theory. But for supporting or evolving a theory,
cognizance has to be taken of all other theories, at least in
their broad categories.
There are other pre-requisites for
it also, the most important ones being clear conceptions of
the theory of knowledge and of reality. In fact, the
premature shift of emphasis from epistemology to that of
theory of value has marred the cause of value very much.
Why it so happened and with what consequences is evident
from the history of philosophy and science.
It is a fact that the growth of science and empirical•
knowledge in the West brought a shock as well as revolution
in the philosophical thought.
Philosophers engaged themselves
vigorously in the presuppositions and foundations of
knowledge. But without waiting to hear what verdict philo­
sophers* 'had on it, science went on discovering new truths.
, It became clearly known that earth was moving around the
sun and it was not the centre of the universe. Newton
propounded his law of gravitation which was accepted as an
unassailable truth even by Kant who engaged himself to know
(5)
,
R. B. Perry, General Theory of Value/ 1950, p.17.
74
how this- kind of knowledge was possible. But the theory of
knowledge, which occupied the centre of gravity in philosophy,
could not grow fast enough nor could it cane to a conclusion
with various implications, before revolutionary theories of
science about the world,
about man, and findings of psychology
etc. could do much havoc to morality that was based on theology
or some sort of loose metaphysics.
morality all were in danger.
Metaphysics, religion and
Whatever may happen to metaphysics
and religion, but how can the human civilization survive
without morality?
It is this anxiety about morality which
generated a general interest in value. The words of W.M. Urban,
one of the philosophers who worked on the theory of value first,
throw light on why values
attracted so much attention about a
century ago. He writess
"There has seldom been a time in the history of
thought when the problem of 'value1 has so
occupied the centre of attention as at present.
Fundamental changes in the actual values of
mankind, giving rise to what has been called
'our anxious morality', with its characteristic
talk of creating and conserving values, have
brought with them what may, without exaggeration
be described a gradual shifting of the philoso­
phical centre of gravity fron the problem of
knowledge to the problem of values."
Of course, there can be other reasons why the philo­
sophical centre of gravity had to shift; but justifying morality
through a more general theory that includes other values has
certainly been the main motive. But any theory of value has
produced a‘ counter theory. If a group of theories claim that
(6)
W. M. Urban, Valuation Its Nature and Law, 1909, p.l
values are objective/ the other group counters it by holding
that they are subjective.
It seems the conflict is bound to
remain unending as long as the problem in the theory of
knowledge as to whether knowledge is subjective or objective
has not been settled* Urban rightly remarks!
"The chief problem of axiology/
as for epistemolgoy#
is bound up with the distinction between subjective
and objective/ a distinction made use of in connection
with judgments of value as well as judgments of
knowledge*"
The problem in the theory of knowledge being more basic,
whether knowledge is objective or subjective has to be settled
first if any decisive result is expected concerning the concept
of value.
Although some philosophers have recognised the
importance of the theory of knowledge for the theory of value,
they have rather attached less importance to it. Realising
the difficulty in settling the issue of subjectivity and
objectivity in value, R.B. Perry wrote* "the theory of value
should for a part of its journey traverse the devious and
(8)
slippery road of epistemology."
But one finds that Peery
has travelled the road of psychology rather than that of
epistemology. Epistemology is certainly a 'devious and
slippery road* but it has to be traversed first, otherwise
the problem pf value cannot be settled at all. Human values
involve human experiences and activities* Thus Javadekar's
realization "that a proper evaluation of human activities is
not possible without an interpretation of human knowledge as
well as human ignorance, the potency of human knowledge as
(g)
well as its limitations",
is quite apt in this connection.
(7)
W. M. Urban, op.cit., pp.16-17* '
(8)
R.B. Perry, General theory of'value, 1950, p*25.
(9)
A. G. Javadekar, Approach to Reality, 1957, p.67.
7B
Further# knowing and judging the reality of value depend
upon man1 s capacity of knowing and the means or measures
he, employs for the purpose.
Thus examining the means aid
ways of knowing comes as a first step*
This task, however,
is not intended to end in scepticism or agnosticism as
some have done, but to overcome the limitations, if any, so
that one understands or advances to understand and realises.
the real value which can be nothing short of reality. Those
who have been genuinely interested in knowing the reality,
also have laid for themselves such preliminary activity with
such optimism. Javadekar writes :
"Our interest is and must be in measuring the
real, but prior to that, in relation the the real
we must measure the measure itself. And if we find
the measures .inadequate, our further object must
be to discover and develop new means of knowledge
that will adequately lead us to the knowledge of
reality* We will have to increase our powers if
we are genuinely interested in the knowledge of
reality."
Thus there is a necessity for the treatment of the theory
of knowledge, the status of human knowledge, and the human
capacity to know.
This, however, can only be done in broad
outlines and according to need.
2.1.3
Theory and the Status of Human Knowledge
How does man know? The most obvious reply for many has
been that man knows through his senses. Others of course put
their claim that man also knows through reason, and through
intuition. Anybody can claim to be knowing in any way, but
the trouble starts when the question is put: 'How does one
know that he knows the truth or reality and not appearance?'.
(10)
A.G• Javadekar. Approach to Reality, 1957, p.70.
77
x.
-Realistic and Empirical Ways of Knowing
Various views have been put forward on the issue. The naive
realists are disposed not to disbelieve the knowledge gained
through the senses. They see the sun rising in the east# traversing
the sky and setting in the west. They observe it daily# how can
they disbelieve their eyes'. What more authentic proof is required?
Therefore# for them# the sun goes round the earth. To know that the
opposite of what they hold is true# may be very difficult for them.
But they can be disillusioned about their confidence on sensory
knowledge if they go for a little observation like taking out of
water a half dipped stick that appears bend. They can see in their
very eyes that the stick is really straight.
Some of the naive realists# out of their experience and
observations might have lost their faith on sense perception
totally so as to become representative realists. Of course
representative realists might be existing on their own. hny way*- to them# reality or the 1 thing-in-itself1 remains*'unknown and
unknowable1# because man gets sense impressions of things and
sense impressions are a kind of representative knowledge received
through the mediums of air# light# nerve channels etc. Where is the
guarantee that * reality is not being perceived as some
'appearance* as the image travels through so many mediums?
Generally they give the analogy of a telephone operator who knows
the persons at other ends indirectly. If he would never come out
of the telephone exchange# he can never know the persons directly —
in their real forms and tones. Similarly the seat of knowledge
which is brain and is chained there for ever# can never know a
thing directly. Therefore#
the thing-in-itself remains unknowable
for ever.
When some talk about the reality or the 'thing-in-itself*
in metaphysical sense which means core reality or absolute reality,
underlying the heart of something# our sense knowledge is
certainly limited. It is too- shallow. There is no capacity
in the senses of man to pierce a thing or know the innermost
reality.
Most animals see in black and white# whereas man
78
.
sees colours.
Again bees are capable of seeing ultraviolet
rays# whereas man is not able to do so.
Thus construction
of sense organs and their power impose limitations in the
ability to perceivei If man possesses still more number of
senses or superior ones# there, is a possibility of seeing
more of reality. Further# man can never be sure that his
senses are capable of seeing the reality; It is for this
reason that Javadekar holds *
"We cannot suppose that reality *s exhausted in
such sensuous experience as we have of it. It is
quitecanceivable that there possibly is an infinite
richness of a qualitative nature in reality. The
'1
nature of the real is one thing for a sentient
creature having only one- sense# it is different
forthose who have more than one sense. It grows
richer in the experiences of those possessed of
two#three# four- and five senses respectively in
the biological evolution from amoeba to man* But,
if this is so# by what logic can we say that
reality exhausts its nature in the experience of
(jo)
a human being possessed of five sensesaS"
Thus the argument of representative realists remain
very strong that reality is not revealed through sense
perception. But that reality is unknowable seems untenable.
If there can be# as some claim there are# other ways of
(13)
knowing reality# it should not remain unknowable.
(11)
(12)
(13)
John Hospers# An Introduction to Philosophical
Analysis# 1977# p*381.
A. G. Javadekar - Approach to Reality, 1957# p.38.
"And if we find the measures inadequate# our further
object must be to discover and develop new means of
knowledge that will adequately lead us to the knowledge
of reality."
—- A. G. Javadekar “Approach to Reality, p.7Q»
.
79
In order to correct the erroneous sense perception
as it happens in case of naive realists and to have more
knowledge of deeper reality which is denied to representative
realists#
sophisticated empiricists use instruments# controlled
observations as well as logic and mathematics.Through this way
of knowing# many of the flaws of sense perception have been
explained and corrected.
Scientists have been able to have
indirect perceptions both in breadth and depth. They are able
to have direct or indirect perceptions of things in far off
space as well as-of particles inside the atom. Yet scientific
knowledge remains contingent.
It is at best probable. Because
scientific theories continue to be refuted. As more and more
facts are found# established scientific theories fail to
explain them. The laws of classical‘physics fail to explain
f-acts in outer space and in the micro world of atom.
Many
of the laws that hold good on earth# do not hold good there.
Thus quantum mechanics was bom. Yet#
it too confronts
uncoquered peaks. Thus V. Rydnik writess
"Isn't this reminiscent of the situation at the
turn of the century with regard to classical
mechanics'?
....Scientists at work in this field
of physics are trying either to rejuvenate it with
new content that does not contradict its basic
principles#
or to change its spirit and give it
up for more radical things. Let it be sacrificed,
they say yet none can boast of any success."
At another place Rydnik writes : "Man is able to ,
learn the laws of nature and get closer and closer to the
truth. But the process of cognition will never come to an
end. No knowledge of the world will ever be absolutely
exact."
(14)
V. Rydnik# A B Cs-of Quantum Mechanics# Translated by
George Yankovsky# 1978#pp.321-23.
(15)
Ibid, p.31^..
so
As long as we do not know that oar knowledge is exact,
how canr we be sure of its truth?
Absolutely exact knowledge
is not possible before ultimate reality is known. Discovery of
a more basic principle many a time gets a previous theory
outdated. To quote John Hospers,
"Once we have explained
A in terms of B, we can
always ask for an explanation of B.
And having
received this in terms of C, we can ask for C in
turn to be explained; and so on, indefinitely.
That is, we can ask indefinitely, but we cannot
receive an answer indefinitely.
Sooner or later
we reach the level of ultimate laws, where we
cannot explain anymore."
Once Newton's Daw of Universal Gravitation was
(17)
-thought to be 'ultimate* law.
Yet Einstein could go
still deeper* In fact Einstein spent many years on a
unified field theory with the intention to get at a more
basic principle which can explain all types of known fields.
Science has not succeeded in it still. Even if it succeeds,
we can never be sure that that will be the ultimate law.
John Hospers expresses this doubt in the words s "We cannot be
sure at any given time what the ultimate laws of the universe
are and whether the laws thus far considered ultimate are
really so."
This is how empirical knowledge lands one in inderterminign. Observation and analysis by the help of instruments,
logic and mathematic do not help in the long run, for the
instruments as well as observation and analysis can never be
free from limitations and subjective bias. Thus empirical
(16)
(17)
John Hospers An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis.
1977, p.189. w
Ibid,, p.189,
(18)
Ibid., p.189-90.
\
81
knowledge can never be totally objective. That is why Michael
Polanyi qualifies this sort of knowledge with 'personal'
meaning thereby that it can never be impersonal or objective.
(19)
Even scientists have begun apprehanding the subjactive
element in their theories.
In the face of difficult problem?
and conflicting theories/ "Physicists"# in the words of Rydnik#
“continue to argues How correct is their knowledge of the world
of ultra small things'? Do their concepts correspond to the true
essence of these entities?
Are they not mistaken in imposing on
nature theories thought up in the human mind?
And is man - a
representative of the world of large things - at all capable of
knowing things and events that occur in the microworld of atoms,
nuclei and elementary particles?"
According to A. S. Eddington :
"There are two parties to every observation —
the observed and the observer. What we see depends
not only on the object looked at# but on our
circumstances — position# motion or more personal
idiosyncrasies* Sometimes by instructive habit#
sometimes by design# we attempt to eliminate our
own share in the observation# and so form a general
picture of the world outside us which shall be
common to all observers."
Eddington further
writes : "The first step in throwing our knowledge
into a common stock must be the elimination of the
observer* The picture of the world so obtained is
none the less relative. We have not eliminated the
observer's share# we have only fixed it definitely.
„(21)
Further Eddington finds "no essential distinction
between scientific measures and the measures of the.
senses."(22)
(19)
^rS^alP^aXi6phffS2^.Kn°wledge' ^ards a PostV* Ryanxc, ABCs of Quantum Mechanics# 1978# pp.318-319*
(21)
(22)
As quoted by Javadekar# Approach to Reality# p.75-76.
Ibid*# p.76.
n
Thus# however one may try# empirical knowledge can
never be free from subjectivity. Again# "If the knower*s
object is." as Javadekar holds#
"to know reality in this
fullness then any attempt at his own elimination is suicidal."
One would rather say# knowledge is* the absence of the knower
or a subject is self“contradictory.
Thus the hope of knowing
the ultimate reality can be there only with the presence of a
knower. Yet complete knowledge is not possible as long there
is a dualistic metaphysics of the subject and object# because
this gap between a subject and an object is logically found to
be unbridgeable.
Thus# for the knowledge of ultimate reality#
one has to look forward to a way of knowing which is based on
a metaphysics that finds no difference between subject and
object in ultimate analysis.
Since there is chance of getting
distorted picture of reality by a method# instead of super­
imposing methods of approach upon reality# as Javadekar holds,
"we must allow the reality to impose an adequate method upon
11 (24)
ns.
Perhaps this truth is revealed when Aristotle
defines metaphysics as —dealing with being as being.
The intuitive way of knowing is based on a metaphysics
which finds no difference between the subject and object in
ultimate stage of knowing.
If knowledge of ultimate reality
is hoped for# it logically holds a possibility. But before
coming to the intuitive way of knowing# the possibility of
knowing reality through rational way is examined.
ii.
Rational Ways of Knowing
Logic and mathematics belong to the paradigm of
rational knowledge# and there is no doubt even by logical
empiricists that they give necessary knowledge. Given the
(23)
A. G* Javadekar# Approach to Reality, p.77
(24)
A. G. Javadekar# op.cit.# p.59.
(o3)
83
assumptions and data# they can arrive at more remote results
quickly and^ correctly.
But the dispute is about whether they
can give new knowledge or not.
In other words whether there
are synthetic necessary statements or not.
Logical empiricists
hold that there is no synthetic necessary statements and that
every alleged synthetic necessary statement on analysis become
either synthetic and contigent or necessary but analytic.
There is no need to go into arguments about it. Even if
logic and mathematics give us no new knowledge which cannot be
got empirically# they certainly give us much knowledge without
the cumbersome act of physical manipulation.
But if there are
synthetic necessary statements or in other words# if some a
priori knowledge is possible# how is it possible?
"One common
answer is#" John Hospers states# "by intuition. He intuits
( 25")
that these statements are true."
Thus the source of
•rational knowledge is not contained within itself. It has#
as Javadekar holds "an extra-logical origin."
(?6)
The concepts and categories upon which thought works on
logically or mathematically are not produced by logic and
mathematics themselves.
through senses#
They originate frcm human experiences—
sense plus devised aids or through intuition.
That is why logic and mathematics play 'a subordinate role
(27 )
in acquisition of the knowledge of the.reality.
Since
empirical knowledge is not free from error and subjectivity# the
rational knowledge built upon them are also bound to be
erroneous and subjective or at best relative like empirical
knowledge.
How far the rational knowledge, that is built upon
intuitive knowledge# is correct# depends upon correctness or
validity of intuitions.
(25)
Further, whatever knowledge is
(26)
John Hospers# An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis,
p.149.
A.G. Javadekar, op.cit.# p.88.
(27)
Ibid.# pp.88-89.
84
arrived at rationally# has to be verified through observation#
experience or intuition.
In this way# it can be said that
rational ways of knowing are just middle order activities#
the origin and end of which dor
not lie in themselves.
Whatever conclusions they give about reality ultimately# the
correctness depends upon their first source and final
verification.
iii.
Intuitive Ways of Knowing
Insight# illumination# knowledge caning all of a sudden#
knowledge dawning upon; enlightenment etc. may loe different
ways of describing how intuitive knowledge of various shades
and depths is received# but it being sudden and direct,
spontaneity and directness are said to be its chief charac­
teristics.
Radhakrishnan writes about intuitive knowledge in
the words s
"It is non-sensuous# immediate knowledge. Sense
knowledge is not the only kind of immediate know­
ledge, As distinct from sense knowledge or
pratyaksa (literally presented to a sense)# the
Hindu thinkers use the term aporoksa for the
__
_______ «_
non-sensuous immediate knowledge. This
intuitive knowledge arises from an intimate
fusion of mind with reality. It is knowledge by
being and not by senses or by symbols. It is
awareness of the truth of things by identity. We
become one with the truth# one with the object
of kn owledge.M ^ 28 )
The Jaina epistemology, like the representative
realists# would not even term sense knowledge as direct
knowledge. To them# sense perception and knowledge frem
scriptures (mati and Sruta) are indirect (paroksa) knowledge#
(28)
S. Radhakrishnan# An Idealist View of Life# 1947#p.l38.
35
where as crairvoyance , telepathy and perfect omniscience
or knowledge par excellence (Avadhi, manali-paryaya,
and
Kevala) are direct knowledge# hence may be called intuitive.
' “The Kevala-Jnana is said to be infinite in nature. It is
(29)
co-extensive with reality.”
There are believers in intuitive knowledge both in the
East and West. Sankara i in the East and Bergscaa in the West
to name only twQ regard intuition - as a superior guide to
truth.
To Mackenzie "the truth is that even intellectual
• insight depends# from this point of view# on a kind of
'developed intuition. Everything that we really know# we know
by directly looking at it# rather than by arguing about it."^°^
Intuition is also a field where mystics all over the world
(3l)
"are wonderfully in agreement."
Therefore intuition as
a possible source of knowledge cannot be neglected in
philosophy.
There is no need to enumerate persons who believe in
intuitive knowledge and how they describe their knowledge.
These abound in philosophical, religious and mystical
literatures of both the East and the West.
to
The present need is
xamine its possibility and authenticity which are generally
in question.
As regards possibility, it is believed that human self
is in link with other persons or objects at different layers#
if he can capture the glimpse of subtler layers he can know
others or the objects intuitively.
In the inner most layer,
there is no distinction between the perceiver and the perceived.
Catching a vision of the innermost
core can be nothing
short of complete identification of the subject and object,
(29)
(30)
A Chakravarty, in S. Radhakrishnan (ed) History of
Philosophy Eastern and Western#Vol.I#1952, p.147.
As quoted by A.G.Javadekar# Approach to Reality# p.54.
(31)
A.G. Javadekar# op.cit.,p.29®
86
at least for a moment.
There need not be any change in the
form of the subject and the object.
There is great movement
of electrons inside an atom, yet an object that is constituted
of atoms gives ho sign of it.
invisibly.
Gravitational force works
Why should intuitive knowledge which occurs
without leaving any trace be unbelievable just because it is
invisible?
If existence of certain things like electrons#
magnatism and gravitation etc. are taken for granted because
i
of their effect, the existence of intuition can similarly be
|
taken for granted, if it can give knowledge which is an effect, |
even if intuition as a process remains invisible, even
unexplainable.
rays.
Science tells that brain emits different invisible
Why can't it be possible that brain may be getting a
direct link with the objects through the medium of these
rays which may result in knowledge that can be called a
sort of direct or intuitive
knowledge? Has man known in toto
all the subtle rays whether of the universe or of the brain?
Has he known the capabilities and work of human brain which
is said to be a super most computor only a very small power
of which an average human being utilises?
Why can't man grow
and work in full force of his inherent capacity?
intuitive knowledge appears mysterious?
What if
Don't many works of
scientific and technological devices, like that of computor
appear mysterious?
If, without violating the theory of
evolution, man could develop'some capabilities like seeing
colour which most mammals are incapable of seeing, why cann't
man develop the power to intuit?
It is for this reason that
Javadekar writes logically* "Notwithstanding the inherent
limitations of nature and number of normal senses, we can
conceive of reality, which reveals its richness'to one who
■
(32)
is endowed with a sixth or a seventh sense."
If it is a
(32)
A.G.Javadekar,Approach'to Reality, p.39
87
fact
there exist the aboriginals of Africa or Australia
who ate so incapable, so ignorant side by side with the most
capable and enlightened scientist or philosopher, why cann't
there -exist men among us with super human powers or capabilities
like intuition?
Can an aboriginal,
still in neolithic stone
age imagine, let alone understand the capability and knowledge
of a scientist or that of a philosopher?
What if a scientist
or a philosopher fails to understand the capabilities of a
still superior man who gets knowledge intuitively?
No doubt there are claimants to intuitive knowledge who
are freuds, but that does not prove that genuine persons cannot
exist. No genuine claimant to intuitive knowledge claims to
have attained such knowledge without long practice or Sadhan'a.
The Hindu, Jaina and Buddhist as well as other mystic systems
lay down elaborate procedure for attaining higher capabilities
including intuition.
Radhakrishnan writes*
"Intuition stands to intellect in somewhat the same
relation as intellect stand to sense. Though
intuition lies beyond intellect, it is not contrary
to it. It is called Samyagjnana or perfect knowledge.
Reflective knowledge is a preparation for this
integral experience. Samkar
observes that the
fruit of knowledge is manifest to intuition
(.Anubhavarudhani Rva Ca Vidyaphalom) .He is in
agreement with Plato, for whcm the dialect is a
progressive rational inquiry which helps the mind
to direct vision of reality. In his Symposium the
prophetess Diotima instructs Socrates in the
pursuits preparatory to the apprehension of the
form of beauty." ^
(33)
S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, 1947,
pp.146-47.
88
So if intuitive capability is attained after longpreparation# why should it be impossible-? Hasn't man
developed his capability to manipulate nature and gain control
over it a great deal which seems miraculous-?
Why can't man
develop capabilities within himself to perform seemingly
miraculous acts?
Man has devised instruments# logic#
mathematics etc. to help him to understand and to do
incredible things.
Why can't the same man develop instruments
inside himself with an inbuilt system of logic and mathematics#
i.e. the brain computor to understand# know and do things
which may seem incredible? Isn't the antibodies' assuming
different forms as that of germs# mysterious and incredible?
These and many other points of the supporters of
intuitive knowledge make it very hard to disbelieve in the
possibility of such knowledge. But the question remains:
How does one .know that what he intuits is true? The intuit!1-
t
vists hold that certain things which can only be known
intuitively# e.g. 'All colours are extended'# 'All sounds
have pitch'# need no empirical evidence# they are in the
nature of things and are simply intuited# intuiticn itself
being the proof.
As regards the highest knowledge —the
knowledge of ultimate reality# -this can only be experienced(34)
_
m a non-sensuous way or intuited.
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad
States • 1 "He who knows that supreme Brahman# becomesfeat
(35)
Brahman itself."
Explaining it Radhakrishnan writes:
"Brahman# which symbolises the -absolute reality# moans also
holy knowledge# intuitive wisdom.
Intuitive wisdom becomes
personified as the first principle of the universe. He who
knows it knows the essence of the cosmos."
(34)
(35)
(36)
"Intuition is extension of perception to regions beyond
sense." — S. Radhakrishnan# An Idealist View of Life ,
1947# p.143.
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 1.4.10# as quoted by
S. Radhakrishnan# Ibid# p.128.
Ibid.# p.l28.
S9
To'Jain as the Keval a-jnana which is knowledge Par
excellence/ is "ce-extensive with reality"/ and it comprehends
(07)
"reality in its completeness and infinity.
To Buddhists
knowledge of absolute reality cannot be thought of but can be
lived into through bodhi or enlightenment. Anesaki writes:
"This bodhi amounts to realising in the spirit and in life
the basic unity of existence, the spiritual conmmian pervading
the whole ■universe."
To Bradley/ "The logical character
of reality is that it does not contradict itself/ the
metaphysical character of reality is that it is one; and the
epistemological character of reality is that it is experience."
(39)
To Bradley "The unified structure of reality is revealed more in
feeling than in thought. Bradley calls the higher unity that
where "thought/ feeling and volition are blended into a whole."
Since the ultimate reality can only be experienced/ felt
or intuited in super sensuous way, it can neither be described in
any other terms nor can be proved to others. Even ordinary sense
experience like pain can neither be described or proved to someone
who has never felt any pain. The intuitive knowledge of the
highest reality where the subject and object become one. is of
different plane or order# the laws of empirical and rational
knowledge do not hold good there just as ordinary physical laws
do not hold good in subatomic world. But any one can experience
that, feel or intuit that himself by raising himself spiritually.
If/ to know the highest laws of science so many years of
intellectual discipline becomes a necessity, what if intuition
demands long disciplined life? Something may be difficult, but
it does not mean that it cannot be attained. In the face
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
A. Chakravarty, The Jaina Philosophy, in S.Radhakrishnan
(ed) History of Philosophy Eastern and Western,Vol.I,
p.147.
As quoted by S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of I>ife,
1947, p.129.
N. Magill et al (ed) ‘Appearance and Reality' in
Masterpieces of World Philosophy, 1963, p.707.
S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p.136.
s
90
of this difficulty# Radhakrishnan "would hold — we are capable—
a few of us at least — of contacting with the absolute and
the etemal."^^
In the face of these kinds of arguments it became
convincing# that if intuitive knowledge is possible and is
t-rue# it is the best suited# nay the only suitable way of
knowing ultimate reality.
Radhakrishnan is of the view that
intellect which knows empirically and logically is ineffec­
tive to know the core of an object.
He writes* "Whatever be
the object# physical or non-physical# intellect goes about it
and about# but does not take us to the heart of it. He who
speaks about sleep and discusses its nature and conditions
knows all about sleep except sleep- itself *"
This very
well applies to knowing and describing ultimate reality. "For
Bradley# thought moves within the realm of relationships
and can never grasp or positively determine the ultimate
reality." 3^
The analysis of empirical knowledge has already revealed
that the gap between the subject and the object can never
be bridged as long as the idea of subject and object persists.
The knowledge is' bound to be relative and subjective. If one
resorts to materialistic monism# finally the gap between
subject and the object is bridged of course# but at that state
knowledge will be possible# because the knower# the subject
would have disappeared one step befpre the ultimate reality.
But in the metaphysics of the intuitionists# there is no
such difficulty# as the knower or the subject# is present
in tiie ultimate state where it sees the object as no other
than itself. Naturally# and as is known of this metaphysics#
the ultimate reality exists as pure consciousness (Sad Cit)
It knows itself-consciously• Thus if ultimate reality can be
known# intuition and the metaplysics implied by it give the
.Tiir ha given in ‘An Idealist View of Life1 in M.Magill
et al (ed) Master Pieces of World Philosophy# p.980.
(42)
(43)
. S. Radhakrishnan to Idealist View of Life# p.135.
Ibid# p.133.
no
91
only hope.
Thus/ since all theories built on empirical knowledge
are either probable or relative, since greatest part of
rational knowledge is based on sense or empirical data which
themselves may not be free from error,
since rationalists also
believe in some intuitive knowledge and since there are so many
arguments in favour of the possibility of intuitive knowledge
with many philosophers supporting it, both from east and the
west, intuition can be accepted as a way of knowing. Intuition
can be accepted as insights, conjectures hypotheses upon which
even science depends so much. But since nobody can be sure of
his power and infallibility in intuiting things to convince
himself and others (unless there is repeated success), logical
and empirical proofs cannot be dispensed with for verification
of all intuitive knowledge ‘except the final one.
Even though
the ancient Hindu philosophers believed in the intuited
knowledge of the Vedic and Hpanisadic seers, they did not accept
them totally before either being convinced philosophically or
before experiencing the knowledge themselves.
If they believed
in them, it is because, without belief in some attainable end
there may not be proper effort. The view that preparation is
needed for intuitive knowledge through cultivation of
intellect and through self-control which remove so many
distractors of true knowledge such as greed, selfishness, bias
etc. is also assuring.
In the conclusion, it can be said that those who claim
their capacity of , intuiting, should always subject the
intuited knowledge to other proofs as if it is an conjecture.
If some claim of intuiting ultimate reality, it will always
remain unproved in the sense of showing to others,
will be a personal affair.
and thus
If others believe in it, then it
becomes a matter of faith or of religion.
If others experience
the same truth about ultimate reality it becomes a proof
for them. All the journey from the belief that intuition is
possible, to attaining capability to intuit empirical, logical
truths and finally ultimate truth or ultimate reality is a
spiritual one.
92
These discussions on the different ways of knowing
and their status forms an essential base for a theory of
value and for treatment of different kinds of values/
particularly moral and spiritual which are taken up in next
two sections.
S3
Section - 2
Theory and
Concept
of
Value
"Theory is a creative and individualistic
enterprise that goes beyond the data in
distinctive ways# involving not only
generalization but postulation of
entities# deployment of analogies#
evaluation of relative simplicity and
indeed invention of new language.11 '44J
—- Israel Scheffler.
-
/
Theories of values are many# and therefore# they are
generally grouped under two categories * normative and meta­
nonnative theories*
Normative theories ask and answer questions
like what is good?*
or 'What has value?' What is bad? etc.
Metanormative theories# on the one hand# analyse 'good'#
'value'
etc., and try to show the meaning or use of these terms; and cn
the other# they ’-show
how
a value judgment is made and whether
justification can be given for value judgements and normative
theories*
Some
philosophers and social scientists offer
descriptive generalizations about what_is regarded as good or
valuable in some society or culture# and give explanatory
theories about why this is so valued.
These descriptive
and explanatory theories# in themselves# SQlong to anthropology,
psychology# and sociology, and net to philosophy or piilosophy
of education for that matter, because they say what a culture
holds to be good but do not give explanation what makes something
good or what is meant by goodness.
(44)
Israel Scheffler# Philosophical models of teaching'
in R.S. Peters (ed) Concept of Education, 1967, p.123.
94
Many analytical philosophers maintain that even
normative theories have no place in philosophy however
important they may be.^4^ This is highly contestable and will
s
be clear when analysis is advanced along with different theories.
But it can only be pointed out here that it is quite natural
for them to maintain this position in accordance with their sview
of philosophy as being only analytic in nature#
The modes of
philosophy have already been discussed,theorefore, there is no
need to go for it again. Only an illustration can be given here
'as to how they would go about the meaning of 'good* or 'value1 .
John Hospers gives an analyst's position in the words:
"We want to discover the meaning of words that are already in use
by millions of people, we are not interested in investing an old
sound with new meaning.
We are not interested in getting a
stipulative definition, but in a reportative definition, and
as clear and uniform one as possible."In sparp contrast is
R. B. Perry's view: "The fact is however, that there is no such
established or universal meaning.
things in different contexts.
Different people mean different
The problem is not to discover a
present meaning — there are only too many meanings.
The
problem is not solved, however, by simply enumerating these
many meanings. , The job is already done by the unabridged
dictionaries which list, in fine print, all varieties of meanings
which appear In literature and ordinary speech.
value is in search of a preferred meaning.
Theory of
The problem is to
define, that is, give a meaning to the term either by selecting
from its existing meanings, or by creating a new meaning."
Clearly an analyst intends to report what people mean
by good or value. But it has been argued earlier that what people
say 'good' may not be good, unless reasons are given why something
(45)
(46)
William K. Frankena, 'Value and Valuation* in Paul
Edwards (ed), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.VIII,
1967, p.23l.
An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 1977,p.453.
(47)
R. B. Perry, Realms of Value, 1954, p.2.
95
is good*
In* this sense analysts
do not answer the question
'What is good*, they rather report what people mean by good.
Of course they have reasons why they maintain these positions
which can be clear from the analysis of the theories of value*
2.2.1- Analysis of the Theories of Value * Metanormative Theories
Although it is a common practice to treat normative
theories first or to omit them, the researcher would begin with
metanormative theories first, and the reasons for it will be
clear only in the end.
The cognitivists or descriptivists in value theory hold
that terms like 'value* and 'good* stand for properties of
objects or kind of objects (including activities and experiences).
The cognitivists who are naturalists hold that the property
involved is a natural or empirical one which can be defined*
Aristotle, Von Ehrenfels and Perry etc. claim that value is a
relational property of being an object of desire or interest.
_
,
(48)
Perry gives an interest theory of value*
-Lewis and Rice
hold that value is the quality of being, enjoyed or enjoyable
in some way*
It is an affective theory of value*
Hiriyanna value is "that which is desired."
To
Of course he
soon qualities 'desire* as*human desire* and this rather
makes him belong to normativists.
'
Others hold that goodness or value is an indefinable
non-natural or non-empirical quality or property. which is
different from all other descriptive or factual ones.
philosophers are intuitionists or non-naturalists*
These
They
include Plato, Sidgwick, Moore, Ross, Laird, Scheller, Hartman
etc.
According to them value belongs to objects independently
(48)
"Whatever is object of interest is ipso facto valuable"
—R.B. Perry, Realsm of Value, 1954, P*3*
(49)
M. Hiriyanna, Indian Conception of Values, 1975, p.2.
98
whether- cne desi-rds# enjoys or values them.
called objectivisms*
They may be
In recent decades analytical philosophers as well as
existentialists hold the view that value terms do not stand
for properties - natural or non-natural#
of value is not property ascribing.
and that judgment
They are therefore called
non-cognitivists or anti-descriptivists•
Their ways are varied.
Any-way# their stand is that value judgments are wholly or
primarily embodiments of expressions of emotion# attitude or
desire and/or' instruments for arousing similar reaction in
others.
Therefore# they can be termed as emotivists.
It is clear from this brief statement of metanormative
theories of value that some are naturalists# some are
intuitionists and some are emotivists.
As it is not possible
here to analyse each theory of value individually they are
treated broadly as mentioned above.
i)
Naturalistic Theories of Value
There are variations among naturalists. Some hold that
values are properties that inhere in objects.
But the same
object is not valued by all. Even vhat is considered a value
for some# may be considered a disvalue for others. This ishows
that properties of objects are not# or are not alone responsible
for Value.
Some other naturalists find the seat of value in the
nature of man. But what is the true nature of man is difficult
to determine. Empirical generalizations about man's nature
give conflicting findings.
There can be findings like s Man
is selfish. Man is pleasure seeking. Man is rational. The same
man can behave differently at different times.
man is to be developed?
Which nature of
This question leads one to justify
that nature itself# which is beyond the scope of naturalism.
Again# man may be found to be of some particular nature# but
\
97
how can 'man is1 converted to 'man ought to be?'
pointed out this logical difficulty long back.
In fact Hume
Peters makes
the same point in the words * "The logical difficulty about all
such arguments is that answers to practical questions about what
to be done are inferred from answers to theoretical questions
about what is the case."
Man has not remained the same as he was thousands of
years ago.
perpetuated?
Why then his present state or present nature be
The psychological theories which describe ■what
man's nature generally is# therefore fail to have a philosophical
appeal in the form of what man ought to be.
Though reason,
self-consciousness etc. are strong candidates seeking development
as they are considered man's distinctive capacities over animals,
they need further justification which goes beyond naturalism.
Without this justification naturalism lands in what Moore called
'naturalistic fallacy'.
Even Perry's definition of value —*
‘whatever is object of interest is ipso facto valuable' —commits naturalistic fallacy, because it can still be asked
whether that interest is good.
Although naturalism lacks total justification, it points
towards some sort of objectivity in value and moral judgments.
Unless there is something in the object, why should it be
preferred at all?
But if total objectivity is granted, there
cannot be autonomy of value or of morality.
In other words, if
values are objective, whether due to properties of things or of
the nature of man, how can man be free to choose values? Thus,
in themselves, naturalistic theories are inadequate as theories
of value.
(50)
R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p.96
98
ii)
Intuitive Theories of Value
,
I
..............
MI.I IIIIW1 .. -■■■■■............ .»—■■■ .r- .... ...
-... ... ............. .
The intuitionists/ like naturalists/ agree ’that values
are objective. But they hold that terms like'good' and ‘ought1
etc. do not stand for observable qualities or relations-
This
implies that value inferences are not from any form of empirical
generalizations. Of course there are different forms of intuitionism
,
(51)
G. E. Moore
holds that good referes to a simple non-*natural/
unanalysable property like' ‘yellow1 which cannot be sensed but
intuited. But if what is good is apprehended directly/ why is
there so much argument about what is good?
Why all people do not
apprehend same thing as good?'
The argument of Sir David Ross that morality (which also
applies to values) are founded upon limited prima facie/ intuitive\
known obligations like'promises ought to be kept1/ fairs no
better. Keeping promises do not always prove good. Again it is
likely that 'promises ought to be kept' can be further explained*
Further/ anybody can claim anything good on the basis of intuition
for example/'Black men should be treated differently.1
The difficulty with intuitionism remains the same as was
seen in case of intuitive knowledge.
in intuitions.
Differences may be found
Intuition may be fallible.
Again there is the
difficulty of making others agree what one holds to be intuitively
good or valuable. Thus intuitionism which holds some sort of
'objectivity' lands itself in relativity or subjectivity. But
the arguments of intuitionists that all types of knowledge are
not empirical and logical/ and that intuition is also a type of
knowledge/ is very strong.
Further/ intuitionism makes a very
strong point that reasoning in value judgment is very different
in respect of its justification from reasoning about what is/
was or will be the case. Intuitionism preserves autonomy of .value.
Some hold that it sacrifices empiricism and reasoning at a point
where further knowledge is not possible through these means. But
what is the point of this demarkation ?
(5l)
G.E.Moore# Principia
190a.j
Ethica/ Cambridge University Press
99
Whatever may be the defects of prevalent theories of
this category/ they have thrown some new light on the theory
of value.
They point that certain values/ particularly the
highest value or ultimate reality can be realised intuitively
al on e •
iii)
Emotive Theories of Value
Seeing that intuitionists are blamed for arbitrariness
and naturalists for 'naturalistic fallacy*/ some philosophers
hold the view that no rational justification
of value is
possible and that arbitrariness must be in the nature of value
judgments.
They compare value judgments to judgements of
expressions of tastes or commands based on emotions.
The assumption of naturalism and intuisionism is that
terms like 'good* and 'ought* stand for some natural properties
or non-natural properties.
But it is pointed out by emotivis’
that words do not stand for properties they speak of/ they have
rather emotive meanings.
This line of thought was popularised
by Ogden and I.A. Richards by their book. 'The M*eaning of
(52 )
Meaning.1
Thus the meaning of 'good* and '.'Ought* was also
thought of in similar way.
Ayer and Stevenson
(53)
developed
sophisticated versions of this approach to ethical and value
terms like 'good* . 'This is good* was analysed by Stevenson
as 'I approve of this/ do so as well.*
This analysis deprives
'good' of any objectivity and justifiability and raiders it as
an expression of emotion and/or command.
It seems emotivists
were swayed away by some limited function of language.
No
doubt language sometimes carries emotional expressions/ but
every word does not have an emotive meaning like that of 'fie*.
(52)
New York
(53)
A.J. Ayer/ language/ Truth and logic/ 1936
C.l. Stevenson# Ethics and language# 1944.
1
Harcart Brace# 1923.
100
Words dike *ellipse*, as Perry points out are examples of
,
(54)
extreme opposite words having only a conceptual meaning.
A great number of words lie in between th'em.
Again, a word may be conveying emotional feeling,
but there may be something that arouses emotions.
The
emotive theories of value -attempt to explicate value judgment
in terms of emotions, attitudes or feelings of approval and
disapproval.
But how can these be caused without the appraisal
of something as being right or wrong?
Therefore, the
cognitive cor«* causing and-differentiating various emotions,
attitudes and commands
is always present.
This points to
inadequate concepts of emotion, ‘attitude* etc. by the emotivists.
No' doubt by their account, the emotive theories preserve
autonomy of value,but it is done at the cost of objectivity.
They are subjectivists.
The view that a person bestows
value on some object, cannot'be maintained wholly.
If a
person values a jeep over a car, there is something in
the structure and function of a jeep which causes it to be
preferred.
The value cannot be totally attributed to the
emotions or even needs of the individual., Why a person
prefers something to something else also points to the fact
that he knows something about the two things, whatever may
be the way.
The cognitive core lurks behind, even in feelings
like being happy, pleasec^ angry etc.
Thus basing value
judgments on emotions, feelings, attitudes etc., and
considering values as totally subjective or relative does
not give an adequate explanation.
However, it has to be
admitted that these theories have made an important contri­
bution by linking value judgment with feeling.
1
(54)
R. B. Perry, Realms of value, 1954, p.8.
101
Although Hume thought that all moral appraisals
derive in the end from estimates of what is useful or agreeable
to society or to the individual himself/ he held,
like others
who have advanced an emotive theory, that in the end no justi­
fication is possible for the basic moral principles*
Thus a?1
emotive theories fail to justify value judgments in the end.
They rather give in'too easily and too soon to subjectivity or
relativism in explaining value judgments.
This brief analysis of metanormating theories of value
shows their errors as well as inadequacies*
Of course,
each
of them contributes towards building a sound general theory of
value*
But before it is attempted, the analysis of normative
theories of value is in order.
2*2*2
Analysis of Normative Theories of Value
Analysis of the meta-normative theories shows that
although they explain what is meant by 'good* by * explaininrr ■i4in terms like property - natural or non-natural, expressions
of emotions,
attitudes etc. they fail to explain in the end
whether those are really 'good* or not.
In contrast, normatb’^
theories of value try to give answer to the direct questions
'What is good'.
In the narrower sense,
some normative theories address
themselves primarily to the questions What is good in itself
or an end in itself, or what has intrinsic value which can
be taken as the end of human pursuit.
that the 'good* or end is pleasure.
hedonists*
Some have answered
They are called the
Hume, Bentham, Mill Sidgwick etc. among the
westerners and the Charvakas among the Indians hold this kind
of view.
Some others hold a quasi-hedomistic view.
According
to then, it is not pleasure, but very similar to it, such as
happiness, satisfaction etc.
This kind of view can be found
in the writings of Dewey, -Lewis, Parker etc*
l
102
iJ
Hedonistic Theories of Value
■..m
......................\, ........................ .....................................■
n.......................
, . n.p,
imm.
The hedonists find no qualitative difference in different
kinds of pleasure# therefore have no conception of values as
higher or lower. But it is axiomatic'in the philosophy of
value that something is preferable to or worthier than others.
"What is meant is that there is also a cognitive core or reason
in choosing something or valuing something. No doubt pleasurable
feeling may be the reason of thinking something valuable# but
the fact that man prefers one kind of pleasure to that of others#
and -also that he prefers comparatively more permanent pleasure
to a pleasure that is momentary# reveals that the reason is not
as simple as the hedonists think.
permanent pleasure?
What kind of pleasure? How
etc. can always be asked.
A comparision of the meanings of pleasure and happiness
show that happiness is a more comprehensive term# comparatively
a more permanent state# why can't there be still some more
permanent state# suggesting therefore an absolute value which
can be the most satisfying? Again there are various ways of
getting pleasure# without some kind of principle# pleasure
seeking efforts of human beings will end in chaos# and in the
end, annihilation of human race* But unless some end is agreed
upon or justified# there remains nothing to regulate behaviour
through principles. Thus the narrower view of value as pleasure#
happiness etc. do not explain well or much of value.
ii)
Anti-hedonistic Theories of Value
The anti-hedonistic theories are of two kinds. Some agree
that in the final analysis# there is only one thing that is good
or good making# but deny that it is pleasure. Yet# different
philosophers state it as different things. To Aristotle# it is
audaemonia or excellent activity; to Augustine and Aquinas# it is
communication with God; to Spinoza# it is knowledge; to Bradley#
it is self-realization; to Nietzche# it is power; to Hindus it
is Moksa; to Buddhists it is Nirvana and to Jainas# it is Kaivalya.
103
The analysis of each of these views requires a discussion
of the metaphysical views of each philosopher or of each system
of philosophy which is beyond the scope of this work.
However/
a general conception of what can be the nature of the ultimate
value or good can be attempted briefly.
Such an attempt becomes
a necessity/ because any value/ whether considered as a property
or product of emotion etc. cannot be justified to the logical
conclusion. In other words/ any middle order value cannot be
explained in itself.
It was seen while examining empirical
knowledge that one law can be explained,in terms of another/
and that still in terms of another and so on ad infinitum.
The
same logical necessity applies to values also. No value can be
justified ultimately without reference to a norm which should
be nothing short of ultimate or absolute value.
If metanormative theories fail to justify themselves in
the end, it is because they have not gone deep.
Commenting on
experimental theory of value, which never admits any value
beyond what has been proved to be a value that works, and which
at best hangs on democratic culture, Harry S. Broudy writes:
"So long as it shies away from metaplysics and from all
absolutes, the experimentalist school, although it claims the
right to examine and criticize culture, has no adequately
grounded theoretical basis for doing so."^"^ Even R.B. Perry
sees the necessity of ultimate ‘entities or terms* in any field.
He writes: "Whatever systematic position be taken in logic ~
whether a logic of classes, relations, or propositions, whether
extensive or intensive, whether'universals' are accepted or
rejected,
and whatever position be taken in the theory of
knowledge, wh ether rationalist or empiricist,
a priori or
experimentalist - in any case, provision must be made for
/ rc j
ultimate entities or terms."
(55)
(56)
M. Hiriyanna also states of the
Building a Philosophy*of Education, 1965, p.136.
Realms of Value, 1954, p.440.
lOi
necessity of a standard which can be nothing short of absolute
(57)
perxaction.
-Thus those who want to have an adequate theory
of value* cannot but have to have a conception of ultimate value.
2.2.3
Developing a Theory of Value
.analyses of metanormative and normative theories of value
show that for a comprehensive theory of value* both normative and
metanormative considerations are required,,without a normative
~1
view the metanormative view stands rootless — ultimately
unjustifiable; and without metanormative view the normative view*
particularly the normative view of ultimate reality, seems too
;
!
I
J
grand* both for understanding and for realisation by most people. J
ThereforeAin the attempt to develop a theory of value* both the
normative and the metanormative requirements are met. Taken
together* they constitute the theory of value.
i)
The Normative View
•
Nature of Ultimate Reality or Value
It was seen in the previous section on epistemology that
empirical approach cannot reveal ultimate reality* because it
somehow
admits of an observer and an observed* and an observer's
view of the object is bound to be subjective or at best relative.
Rationality also ends in duality.
It is no wonder therefore that
great -rationalists*-ike the Buddha* Sankara etc. in the east and
Kant Bradley etc. in the west.ended as agnostics.
^ The Buddha
discouraged questions about the state of Nirvana* because it
cannot be explicated by any empirical proof or by-logic. Samkara
termed the ultimate reality 'indeterminate1 or "an incompre­
hensible mystery (Maya) "
9^Kant saw that difining the purposes
of the universe* which ultimately spring from ultimate reality.
(57)
Indian Conception of Value£*1975* p.7.
(58)
S. Radhakrishnan* The Hindu View of Life, 1931* pp.67-68
(59)
Ibid.* p.66.
105
(50)
"must always remain an endeavour rather than an achieved task.
Bradley's approach to ultimate reality amidst appearances was
finally through experience. And no basic experience can be known
in any other means other than experiencing it oneself.
and Bradley#
Samkar
although they were agnostics as regards rationalism,
tney were not defeatists.
They had provision for knowing the
ultimate reality through highest order of intuition - by becoming
the ultimate reality itself# a condition where distinction between
the subject and the object merge.
Theorotically# there is no other
logical possibility of knowing the ultimate reality.
Whether
every individual can attain it or not is a different question# as
it depends upon the individual's aspiration and effort# but that
there is a possibility cannot be denied.
The way leading to
one but final step of ultimate reality may be many - it may be
through science#
logic# religion etc. yet the final leap has to
be an intuitive experience which cannot be explained. ’
It has already been stated that .ultimate value can be
no other than ultimate reality.
If ultimate value is not ultimmc
reality# then there remains something to be known# possessed
and therefore to be valued ultimately.
All the systems of
philosophy admit this connection between ultimate value and
ultimate reality.
Radhakrishnan states this when he writes :
"The realistic systems of Hindu thought# the Nyaya
and Vais'esika# theSamkhya and Yoga#
and the Mimansa
are not in serious disagreement with the fundamental
intention of the idealist tradition of the ypanisadas#
viz. the inseparability of the highest value from
truly real. The
’
~
’ ''
# consciousness and
freedom - sat#
(60)
(61)
Humayun Kabir ‘Immanuel Kant' in S.Radhakrishnan (ed)
History of Philosophy Eastern and Western Vol.II# p.258.
An Idealist View of Life# p.16.
106
In'"the attainment of ultimate value, which is truly
(62)
’
‘intrinsic* and 1 all-comprehensive",
no activity remains,
therefore Aristotle*s ‘excellent* activity* drops behind.
The theological dualism those of Augustine and
Aquinas, and of Sankhya etc of Indian variety are also one
step behind.
It is not knowing God or Brahman, but becoming'God,
Brahman or Absolute (Tadatmata) • Among western philosophers,
only a few like Plotinus and Bradley satisfy the logical
necessity by their conception of realisation of ultimate
reality or value.
For Plotinus the ultimate reality, — whatever it may be,
can be known spiritually by being idential with it. According
to him
i
"The essence of spirit being knowing, its knowing is
/
identical with its being."
ST
<3 \
in the state of highest realise"
tion, "the identification of the seer and the seen, seeker and
the sought is so complete that it transcends the distinction
between the knower and the known....." ^4) Tj^us Pioniniis
satisfies the logical necessity of complete knowledge or
realisation of the ultimate reality.
Bradley also satisfies the logical necessity by his
concept of ‘self-realization*. It can be seen that his view
is not different from that of Advaita. He writes :
"Our true being is not the extreme of unity,
nor of diversity,but the perfect identity of both.
And ‘Realize yourself* does not mean merely *Be a
{ £1C \
whole*, but ‘Be an infinite hole*
(62)
M.Hiriyanna, Indian conception of values, p.240.
(63)
As given by M.M.Sharif, *Neo-Platonism' in S.
Radhakrishnan ted) History of Ihilosophy Estem
and Western, Vol.II, 1953, p.96.
Ibid., p.96.
(64)
(65)
F-.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, The Clarendon Press,
2nd Edn. 1952, p.74.
107
" - cQoae&vdngthe ultimate reality as Brahman# the
Brhadaranyaka upanisad states** "He who knows that supreme
•»
•
•
(55)
Brahman# becomes that Brahman itself*"
Of course the
knowing is aparoksa —
kcvala-jnana%' ""It is
through intuition or Pranja or
not superficial knowing#
i.t Mis
knowing in the sense in which Socrates held/virtue is knowledge'•
It is knowing by becoming# becoming same as reality (tadatmata)•
The view of ultimate reality and the realization of it
as the ultimate value which has emerged now# can throw some
more light on its nature.
The ultimate reality exists# it is existence absolute
(sat)# because all knowledge# all manifestions point to one most
original, the primordial .existence.
It knows itself# because
the existence of the ultimate reality cannot be accepted without
any knowledge of it in any way.
The phenomenal is tic view
against the idealistic view in the form:
'that which has
possibility of being known can exist'-# does not hold here.
Suppose# as the materialistic philosophy holds# the #iole
universe plunges into absolute matter without any trace of
consciousness remaining# who is going to know it?
possibility of it being known?
Where is the
As matter is non-conscious#
the absolute in the state of matter ceases to be known. But it
cannot be argued that nothing exists at such a time# which is
absurd.
As colour cannot be separated from extension# sound
from pitch# so also pure existence cannot be separated from
pure knowledge.
The final knowledge has to be pure self-
consciousness# it is knowing and existing at the same time.
As no cognition is free from feeling# there is also an
affective aspect of the ultimate reality or value. The feeling
of pure self-consciousness in one's pure and total existence can
(66)
Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 1.4.10.
•
•
108
be nothincj short of absolute tranquility and peace (Santi)
Although the other traditional Indian term for such feeling
is1 ananda* (loy) it does not convey.
the meaning of any kind of
sensual joy.
It is the very nature of absolute reality.
As
nothing remains to be attained/ as all activities and dualities
cease, there remains nothing but absolute peace.
And
absolute
peace
cannot
be
different
joy or a feeling of absolute freedom.
from
purest
Radhakrishnan writes?
"The absolute is reality, consciousness and freedom — Sat, cit
and ananda."
These three aspects of the ultimate reality or the
absolute is not a combination/ they cannot be separated/ they
exist at once.
The relation among the above trio can be compared
-with that among truth, goodness and beauty which as BJlyrappa
states,
"are different applications of one and the same
principle of harmony."
{g 0 J
Thus, although this view of the
Absolute or Brahman appears otherwise, in reality, it is
monistic, Advaita*
Such being the nature of ultimate reality or ultimate
value, what should it be termed, subjective or objective? If it
is the true reality in the end, then it can be called objective,
because there is no truth other than this. But as the ultimate
reality is realized intuitively, there being no other way, one
can term it subjective from the epistesnic
point of view.
Somebody else may call the ultimate reality or value as affective
also, as there is an affective aspect of it. But it would be
wrong to characterize ultimate value only as subjective,
objective or affective, it is all these at once, at the same
time.
(67)
An Idealist view of Life, p.16.
(68)
S.L. Bhyrappa, Truth and Beauty,
Correlation, 1965, p.ll.
a Study in
Now that a normative theory of value has emerged# the
highest norm being the ultimate value# the truly intrinsic and
of the nature of existence# consciousness and joy, it remains to
be seen how far it agrees with a meta-normative
theory which
also takes up justification of normative theories.
ii)
The Metanormative View
One of the main contentionsof different categories of
metanbrmative theories of value# as has been seen# centres around
the issue whether value is objective or subjective.
It has
already been shown that a person does not truly value something
unless that something contains some property or structure in it#,
which satisfies the person's emotions# needs etc. This refutes
some subjectivists' claim that value is totally bestowed upon
the object or anything of value.
Nobody can bestow the value
of food on stones subjectively# all that are called foods and are
taken as such^contain in them something# and the subjective wish
of man can do nothing with them except a few changes to suit
his needs# that too he does with help of other things. A
subjectivist cannot wish away numerous objects of the world#
some of which he certainly calls values.
objects'?
But what about other
Some others also regard them as values.
This shows that
the objects do not exist in mind only# and they contain something#
f
the core of which is difficult to know. Persons regard them as
values when they see something in objects which satisfy them.
Different persons# due to their difference in knowledge,
needs and emotions etc., can value things for different reasons.
The same person can value something at one time whereas
may not value that at another point of time.
he
Bor example# food
is valued greatly when one is hungry# when one is full# one
does not value it.
Yet the same food that is not valued when
one is full# is valued again at another point of time# when one
is hungry once again.
110
These analyses shows the role of personal factors such
aslS64ds# emotions etc. in determining what is a value and what
is not.
The subjectivists are right in pointing out these
factors, but in overdoing it, i.e. in claiming that value is
totally bestowed on the objects, they are certainly wrong.
f
Pood certainly contains something irrespective of whether one
values it or not. But can this 'something* or some property
in itself be called a value as some hold?'
In human sense,
certainly not, because in the absence of a person who values
the object or some property of it, the concept of value cannot
arise at all.
'If some insist that the object must have a value
in itself as it exists with some entities, they can only do so by
tracing some form of consciousness in the object itself.
Thus,
for a concept of value, some form of consciousness# or a knowing
agent whether inherent in the object itself or present frcm
outside is to be admitted.
An attempt at knowing the nature of
ultimate value also resulted in recognition of a pure consciousnes
of a pure existence (Cit and Sat).
The same result can be reached by analysis from another
angle.
If the metanormative theorists attempt to reveal what
is meant by 'value* or 'good', they certainly presuppose persons
whose meaning they are going to reveal.
Thus subjects are
admitted simultaneously with any question of value.
Thus, if an extremely objective concept of value devoid
of any subject is not possible, can an extremely subjective
concept be maintained ?
A subjective view fails, because, just
as pointed out a few paragraphs before, it cannot explain away
a world that exists with numerous objects.
If it is difficult
to prove the existence of some form of consciousness contained in
the objects themselves, it is more difficult to disprove the
existence of objects.
In the former case it is difficult
because all ways of knowing, except perhaps intuition, fail in
revealing the core of the object.
But
perfect intuition is
non-communicable and hence the concepts of subject and object
do not arise*
In case of an extremely subjective stand, the
Ill
visible objects are either to be taken as projections of mind
or spirit, or they have to be reduced to mind or spirit. In
both the cases the mind or spirit must contain the essences
of objects or else where from can it bring out the projections
or creations ?
In fact there have been lots of conjectures -and
hair splitting analyses regarding the nature of ultimate reality
both in eastern and western philosophies which can be connected
with the problem of objectivity and subjectivity. Pluralism,
dualism, extreme forms of materialism and spiritualism have been
the results, yet no exclusive view seems satisfactory.
It is
perhaps better to leave the ultimate reality indeterminate like
Buddha, Sankara, Kant and Bradley etc. or have a conception of
it in which the object, subject and the feeling (Sat, Cit and <
Ananda) exist at once,' without any distinction.
Such a concept
of ultimate reality is beyond the notions of exclusive objectivism
or subjectivism, because it remains indistinguishable or
indeterminate in that way.
If this be the' result when exclusive objectivism or
subjectivism is pushed to^ their logical conclusions, why not
accept the existence and contribution of both in forming the
concept of reality and of value?
Thus instead of asking whether
values are objective or subjective one should enquire : what
people mean when they use these two terms.
This can be done
through an example case as follows.
A person suffering from cold due to some bodily conditions
may say regarding a fans "The fan is of no value." Another person
feeling hot may declares "The fan is of great value." If they
stick to their exclusive positions, each will declare the
other subjective.
Yet if objectivity should be regarded synonymous
with truth what each person holds is certainly objective or true
from each person's stand point. A third person who has
knowledge about both the persons and of the fan, can hold that
a fan's use or value is relative to the persons. But suppose
some more people of the condition of the second person come and
join the contention. They will certainly declares'The fan is
of value".
Because of their number they .can hold that, what
112
they say is an objective view and what the lone person says is
subjective*
i
Even they can condemn the person as mad*
If
persons of the type of first person gather more and more and
greatly out number that of the second type, they can turn the
table and convert what is held as subjectivity into objectivity.
Thus the two terms are relative. Person A can hold person B’s
value judgment as subjective from his own stand point while
person B can do the name in respect of person A’s value judgment.
Although number of persons holding the same view generally matter,
this can never be regarded as a stable thing.
Even the theories
of science which for a time being appear unassaible, give way to
others, thus they are regarded as contingent, probable.
The same
truth holds good in case of value judgments whether they are
regarded as objective or subjective; right or wrong*
When large
number of people hold certain value judgments as right, they
hold their sway
for the time being? but they also change when
the opposite view gains ascendancy gradually.
This is how values
change in socities.
The meaning of subjectivity and objectivity can be brought
out in another way by the help of epistemology. 'The discussion
on the theory and status of of human knowledge has already
revealed-that a persons or a subject's view of some object is
bound to be affected
by the subject’s ways and means of knowing,
hence no knowledge can be said to be totally objective.
Prom
another point of view, a person can regard his perception of an
object as objective if he is convinced that he has as true and
as unbiased a perception as possible.
If there are other kinds
of perceptions, whatever be the number, the exclusive claim to
objectiveness should give way to probability and hence tolerance,
because a differing view also stands the chance of being right.
Thus both subjectivicfeyand objectivity do not have any exclusive
meaning without reference to persons' stand points and conditions.
Time also plays a great role as will be seen below.
113
A person's physical as well as mental perspective is
likely to change in different points of time.
the value judgment
i
A person holding
This fan is not of value# may change his
view in summer or when his body conditions change.
Thus before
deciding whether a judgment of value is subjective or objective#
or right or wrong# it has to be ascertained as to what point of
time one referes.
Most people give their views fran the perspe­
ctive of the present while others can take
consideration.
past and future into
Thus a person, keeping in mind past# present
and future can say:
'This fan was of value in past# it is not
valuable now#but it will be of value in caning summer.' Thus
looked from a particular point of time which gives particular
perspective of the world as well as of the person, value judgments
which are made for other times# may look subjective and wrong
if the perspectives are not known.
A person's ultimate view of the world# life etc. are also
very important as those become higher stand points or norms on
the basis of which one chooses or judges values.
Those who
believe that the world has evolved in a particular order# as
most scientists believe# are taking an objective stand.
believe that causes ' behind
They
the objects or events can be known.
Mi ether they do-or do not admit of any ultimate purpose behind
the universe or life# they cannot deny some order in their
evolution.
They can find out some cause behind everything.
But the history of the theory of value shows an irony# rather
an inconsistency when emotivists are taken into consideration.
Although most of them are positivists or are known for their
faith in science# it is strange that they do not see any
justifiable cause or reason behind the choice of values.
As
has been stated earlier# to the emotivists of extreme order
values are just expressions of emotions.
But it can be pointed
out that although they do not bother to dig the reason behind
emotions# there are certainly reasons behind particular expressions
of emotions.
Fraud and many other psychologists have already
shown reasons behind many psychological expressions which were
thought of having no reason.
It is logical that emotions should
also have causes# and expressions of emotions should have reason
!
'
'
U4
behind them whether 'justifiable or not.
Of course justification
is another thing and it requires a norm with reference to which
something is declared justified or unjustified, but that there
should be cause or reason behind every expression of emotion
and behind a choice of values can be accepted.
This thesis gets
support from physical sciences which show how there is a cause
or reason behind everything - an apple falling on earth due to
gravitation, for example.
Thus in value a 'why* can always be asked.
This "why1
means both the objective and subjective aspects of a value
choice.
First 'why this object*. And this means ~ Does this
object contain anything so as to be choosen and given the status
of a value? The second is - Why should I (or some one else)
choose it?
satisfy me?
And this means - Does it fulfil my needs?
Does it
These two kinds of cognitive cores, whether in
conscious# instinctive or intuitive form must always be present
in value choices.
A person who knows consciously why he values
something is in a better position to justify his values.
He
gives the "justification in a synthetic form like * I value
this chair because I feel comfortable on it or because it has
got a beautiful form. Other justifications likei!l'value this
chair because I value it? I value this chair because X instinc­
tively/intuitively know that it is good* etc. are either
tautologies, expressions of emotions or indistinct knowledge of
what is at the root of valuing the chair.
It is a' fact that many people value things out of emotions,
instincts etc. and do not bother to know the causes consciously,
but it cannot be regarded as ideal.
Although there are also
chances of choosing a wrong value when something is valued with
conscious reasons - after answering the *whys* both in terms
of the object and of subject — the chances of going wrong are
more in case of valuing by instinct or emotion.
That is why
ancient Indian Philosophers termed value proper as Purusartha
or human values.
What they were emphasizing on is the choice
of values by ‘reflective consciousness', for it is this which
115
distinguishes men frcm beasts# V
they held.
Reflective
knowledge^gives-better perspective and thus determines and
justifies the ends or values better.
Thus the ideal before
men in the choice of value is that they should be guided by
reflective knowledge as far as possible only to resort to other
ways when reflective knowledge fails.
It can be made clear
here that besides being logical# reflection can ;'
•always take
the empirical findings into consideration. In
fact one reflects on something on the basis of human knowledge
got out of one's own experience as well as that of others
which are stored in various disciplines.
better perspective.
Knowledge always gives
The wider and deeper the knowledge# the
broader and deeper ife the perspective# which# in turn gives
better scope for justification.
Whether he knows it or not,
every man consciously# or unconsciously# instinctively or
intuitively has a perspective# a prospect or vision of 'good'
which guides and controls his choice of values.
'How good is
this 'good' is another question which points to conception of
something still better.
Logically this vision of good should
become wider and wider till it takes into consideration every
being of the universe# nay
the whole of universe# and this
means conception of an ultimate good.
This ultimate good#
it can be recognised# is no other than the ultimate value. This
shows how metanormative considerations lead finally to a
normative conception, which is done by normative theories of
value. Although there can be normative conceptions of various
widths and depths - both proximate and ultimate - depending on
(69)
"Ahara-nidra-bhaya-maithunam Ca Samanyam etad pasubhir
naranam# Jnanaifi hi tesam adhiko vi&esah jnanena hinah
pasavo bhavanti."
*
"Hunger# sleep# fear# sex etc. are common to men and
beasts. It is Jnana (reflective consciousness# the
variant reading Dharma also means this) that specially
characterises men# and when they lack it# they became
one with beasts."
I
"~Guoted from Hitopodesa and translated by
M.Hiriyanna# The Indian Conception of Values#
p.6 *
116
the knowledge of the person or persons/ the truth that metanormative theries should finally depend upon or lead to
normative conceptions cannot be denied.
The above analyses sh’ow how values have a cognitive core
in them, and how it tallies with the findings of a normative
theory which recognised pure consciousness in the ultimate value.
Wow it remains to be seen what truth analysis reveals as regards
the issue of affection in value.
(a)
Affective, Cognive and Conative Core in Value
If the question J
'why does man value something1 is asked,-
many persons may fail to give cognitive reasons but answers in
the form of 'because it pleases me, because I like it, because it
satisfies me, because it gives me peace" etc. are sire to emerge
as first answers or as ultimate answers.
be recognised,
All of these, it can
speak of affections or feelings.
Thus there is
always ^affective motive in the choice of values.
If somebody
makes sacrifices, no doubt he does it for others' satisfaction,
yet 'others' satisfaction' also satisfies him. That is why
he sacrifices,
painful.
although the process of sacrifice may be
In fact realisation of no value is possible without
some kind of pain and sacrifice preceding^ or succeeding it,
however remote. , If an individual values music, in order to
cultivate a finer sense of music or to produce music, he has
to take pains of practising and sacrificing other values to some
extent.
Again an individual may seek his own joy, satisfaction,
happiness, peace etc. alone# or he may also think that others
should get them.
Some may claim that man is selfish by nature
and thus justify his self-centredness.
Although more about
justification of values can await, two things can be said in this
connection.
First, it is difficult to establish the thesis
that man is selfish.
Secondly even if such a thesis is
established, it cannot be recommended for perpetuation because
man also can conquer selfishness and it is justifiable that all
should be joyous, satisfied, happy, peaceful etc.
117
The ab"6ve analysis shows that values have an affective
core in them*
It can also be brought out by implication both
from facts and through logic that man wishes for greater and
longer joys# happiness etc.
Yet another conclusion is that in
one* s choice of values a person can ideally have consideration
for others' affective lives.
That affection or even cognition
involves conation in some form needs no elaboration.
Thus/ if a value has cognitive/ affective and conative
aspects/ it remains to be seen in what degrees they are pi'esent
at different times in the life of a value.
which recollects/
analyses#
It is cognition
synthesises# hypothises or
conceives a value experience.
As long as the value is not
being realised# its existence is only theoretical or mental.
Imagination of the possible value realisation or value experience
becomes a motivating factor for realising the value.
The
process of realisation is guided by knowledge and skills. Thus
cognition and conation dominate before a value is actually
realised*
Whatever affection is present# is only due to
.imagination.
The process leading to realisation of a value
also yields affection in some degree.Wfcen the value is
brought into full existence* affection becomes dominant# pushing
cognition only into a passive existence like the consciousness ‘ f am experiencing the value or I have realised the value.'
The above analysis shows that cognition# conation and
affection, form different aspects of a value experience and
all are present .at any time in the life of a value although
the degrees may vary.
This finding through metanormative way
tallies with the finding of normative theory about ultimate
value.
The only difference is that the cognition, affection
and conation are in complete balance in ultimate value whereas
there are difference of degrees of intensity in ordinary values.
118
(b)
la gtrumental, Con tributary and Intrinsic Values
Valuing or value experiences are not always as simple
or as direct as has been described above.
Certain things are
valued as they are instrumental in achieving the values or
value experiences with a clear and dominant affective aspect.
Money, for example, is regarded as an instrumental value (ista
Sadhana) because it helps or becomes instrumental to buy food
and other goods which in turn contribute to value experiences.
In itself, money has no value or very insignificant value
because of its metal or paper value.
In the ultimate sense,
of course, it cannot be said that money or rather the thing
from which money is made has no value, unless .it is proved that
they do not contain consciousness in any form.
Unlike money, there are certain things which contribute
directly to a value experience.
Food, for example, contributes
directly to the value experience found in eating.
Eating as a
value has its purposes of maintaining body energy, promoting
health, while it also, generally, yields pleasure.
But all
these do not come from food alone, the eater also has his own
contributions. Eating as a positive value experience also
depends upon the eater's body conditions, mechanisms like
salivation, amount of hunger or no hunger and above all, cn
the mental state*
If a person is already full, has no appetite,
eating is not regarded as a value for the time being.
As the
same food which is valued at a time is not valued in another
state of the body and mind, the eater's contribution'to making
a value is also clearly brought out.
This analysis also agrees
with the previous thesis that value is not exclusively
objective or subjective*
Thus food should be regarded as a contrfbutary value,
but since something is inherent in it which gives a direct
value experience it. is also known as an intrinsic value. But
'intrinsic1 cannot be understood in a sense of 1 value-in-itself1,
119
because a*value-in-itself1 does not depend upon anything else/
whereas food to be a value depends upon a person.
Looked from
Shreenivasa Iyengar's point of view/ food even may be considered
as an instrumental value/ for he writes*
"There are# we admitted/ values in the universe/ but
they are all instrumental/ rarely intrinsic."
He
further explains * "If we may use the term good as
equivalent to value/ we would say that there is nothing
good-in-itself or intrinsically good/ but what is good is
always good for something and in certain given
circumstances. Goods are causal or instrumental* they
are means to other goods which in their turn would
be means only yet for other goods and so on."^^
Due to contributariness or instrumentality and due t5 dependence
of all values# some men conceive of an ultimate value which
does not depend on or contributes to or is justified by any*
other value;
and this alone can be called a value-in-itself.
It is for this reason that Hiriyanna calls the 'ultimate
value' as 'an intrinsic value or a value in itself" and
characterises it as "all comprehensive"/
or enduring and final (atyantika)-"
"one and eternal
Of course/in a sense
pleasure/ peace etc. can be called values in themselves as
they are sought for themselves# but their transitioriness
betrays the fact that they also depend on other things. Thus
although they can be called intrinsic values# the ultimate
sense of intrinsicness is not conveyed.
(70)
(71)
K. R. Shreenivasa Iyengar# The Metaphysics of Value#
Vol.I# p.113.
M. Hiriyanna# The Indian Conception of Value© 1975#
p.239.
120
(c)
Sources of Values
*
Creativity as a Source
Analysis of the sources of value also throws some
essential light on the theory of value.
The focus here, however
is on creativity as a source of value.
Where from does man get the idea of his values'? A little
thought shows that the first source is his own experience.
Whatever gives him positive experience he values that.He longs
to repeat value experiences, desires to possess things that
contribute to value experiences, and cherishes achievements
that are useful. Man is initiated to most of his values by
the society he lives in and* by all sorts of institutions in
it.
After birth he is gradually introduced to certain types
of food, dress, other living amenities, ideas and ideals which
he begins to like and value.
cultural values*
This is also true in case of
But gradually when man comes in contact with
other societies directly or indirectly, he evaluates his own
values as well as the values of other societies*
As a result
he sometimes shuns some of his own values and adopts values of other
people, a^odific at ion in values is also seen due to cross cultural
tran sformations•
Some of the values acquired from the above sources may be
new to the person who acquires-them, but they cannot be-called
entirely new to -the humanity.
Just as new things are gifts
from creative people in other fields, new values are also
gifts from people who are creative in values or in things which
contribute towards building value concepts or experiences.
As
has been pointed out in the introduction of the first chapter,
man’s desire' to continue his life in better and better ways, his
desire to know the mysteries of life and universe, result in
new creative visions of all kinds —- physical, social, aesthetic,
intellectual moral and spiritual .Man not only creates things
which he values, but also envisions states of his being marked
by equanimity, peacefulness etc. which he strives to become.
The principles that regulate societies, the ideal states of
121
societies marked, by classlessness# democracy etc. are also
creative ideals that are highly valued. It is this capacity to
create new values which has raised man to the super most
ujJ''
position that he is in to-day in all respects.
He is not living JUlKv
in the same environment that he inherited thousands of years
ago#' he is not also continuing in the same state of his mind#
character and feeling.
He has changed the outer world# he
has also changed to a great extent his inner world.
These have
been possible mostly because of man's creative capacity.
creates ideal values which he strives to attain.
Man
As long as
the envisioned values inspire him# they remain ideal values#
when they are achieved /they become values which become facts.
In fact, it is creativity which solves many unsolved problems
in philosophy and in the theory of value.
One of these problems
such as the relation between fact and value# is immediately
taken up.
(d)
Fact and Value
Explaining the meaning of fact which also throws some
light on the issue of fact and value# R.S. Peters writes :
"JStimologically the word ‘fact’ intimates something
that is palpably done. Facts can be contrasted with
theories# with fiction# and with opinion. So presumably
the contrast arises between ‘facts' and ‘values* because
what is valuable is thought to be a matter of opinion*
But it is perfectly good English to say let us start
from the.fact that pain is evil' or ‘it is palpable
---------
fact that men ought to keep their promises." Empirical
observations# on the other hand# provide the most
obvious hard core of what is not a matter of
conjecture# fiction or opinion. So it is easy to see
how the notion of what is a matter of fact can be
(70)
sucked up into the notion of what can be observed."
(72)
Ethics and Education# 1971# pp.95-96.
^
(
122
On the light of the above analysis# fact can be said to
be that which can be observed# experienced.
Pain gives a
negative feeling; therefore it is considered as evil. Whatever
it may be# the fact that pain is evil# is based on experience.
So experience is also a proof of fact. Again that which can be
observed# must exist.
Conversely that which exists can be
observed or felt through experience;
-———
This analysis leads to
the conclusion! That which exists is fact. The concise Oxford
Dictionary also gives meanings of fact as 'occurance of event1#
1 thing certainly known to have occured or be true# datum of
experience1;
‘the true or existent# reality' etc.
Thus that
which exists and is known through observation, experience etc.
can be taken as fact*
By implication# therefore# it can be
held? that which can be made to exist# or made to occur#
made to be experienced are possible facts.
That which is a
fiction today' may turn out to be a fact# and it is well known
that many scientific fictions are realities to-day «r Many a
figment of imagination become realities due to Creative
capacity in men.
So what is not fact today# what is not observable today* may become fact tomorrow. In other words# what is an 1is-not*
today can be an ‘is* in a point of time. Similarly what is not
considered as a value today may be considered a value in a
point of time.. Man's creative ability can create facts#
therefore can create values also.
as a value
When an aeroplane is considered
it reveals that this value has been created by man.
It is not a subjective creationthat exists in mind only#
but an
creation that caters to the needs of subjects# and therefore it
is regarded as a value. But when aeroplane was first conceived#
it existed in imagination oniy# it was not a fact. Yet it could
be made to
exist# therefore is a 'fact* So an aeroplane as a
conceived something was a desired or ideal value which could
be made a value in the form of a fact. Similarly# many ideals which are not realities todajT can be attained. To the
Palestinians# establishment of a country of their own is an
ideal.
It may become a fact Independence# was the ideal of
123
Indians, it turned out to be a "fact.Equality, at least as
regards possession of wealth and necessary goods,is an ideal
before the democratic as well as communist countries. They
are not facts now, yet can become facts in future.
An ideal is that which is desirable. When equality
becomes the ideal of men it can also be expressed as;'Men
ought to be equal1•
'an is',
Just as an ideal can become a fact — -
so also an ought can become 'an is1-— a fact.'I
ought to do that!, besides expressing the desirability and some
sort of imperative, also expresses possibility in the form *1 can do that'•
Without the possibility of being achieved,
‘ought1 becomes meaningless. If something cannot be done
or achieved, what sense does it carry to say that 'it ought
to be done'?
It becomes meaningless, a contradition, if
'ought* means it 'cannot'be'. So ought means, besides other
things, 'can'.
a fact.
Therefore, an 'ought* can become'an 'is' —-
Thus values which express ideals always mean values
which can be achived or in other words which can become facts.
Thus, if a value, more rightly' a contemplated value, can
become a fact, what about the converse -prosition: ‘'Can* - a
fact become -a value-*— an, is, an ou'ght?1
’
When somebody feels hungry, he takes some food and
appeases his hunger. So food appeasing hunger becomes -a truth,
a fact for-him.
Therefore, whenever he will' feel hungry, he
can say-"I ought to/should take food."' Similarly it is a fact
that medicine cures disease. - So a patient can say,
ought to take medicine •
'I -
This ought derives its'strenth'from
of fhe'fact that medicine-is known to have cured similar
cases of disease.
Similarly, men know from'their own ''
experiences that food appeases'hunger.
All cases of'-’food
appeasing hunger-were facts which were valued.
Therefore
men take 'it for granted-that in case'of hunger in'future, the
same valued fact can occur if food is taken. ' Therefore they
124
value fOO&because of its existence as a matter of fact as
i
well as because of its’ potentiality in creating a valued
state in the individual which is experienced as a matter of
fact.
Anything occuring, which is being experienced or
observed as true is also a fact. Anything occuring may or
may not be valued because value also depends upon the
subjects condition, needs, liking
etc.
Thus a fact may or
may not be regarded as value by a particular individual.
Neither food nor the fact of appeasement of hunger is
valued by a person during the period when he is voluntarily
fasting.
Thus like any other thing that exists, a fact only
has some characteristics which may or may not be valued. At
this point it can be made clear that an event that is occuring
can also be valued or regarded as a value if the event is
liked or is approved of.
Value need not be something of the
future or some thing of opinion, it can also be something very much a live experience, something which is being
experienced or observed.
Of course the liking, the approval
of that event must be there.
Thus the above analysis shows that an ideal value or
an 'ought1 can become a fact or an *is‘* conversely a fact or
an 'is' can become a value if the 'fact' or 'is' is approved
or liked or wished to be repeated.
Like things and beings,
inumerable events occur in the universe which are observed as
facts.
Men have not understood all of than and so have not
been able to use them to their benefit.
They, therefore, like
some things, are not regarded as values, although a few have
great interest in them.
It is expected that sustained
interest and work to unxavel the mysteries behind them will
result in full knowledge about them on the light of which
they can be regarded either as values or disvalues.
The
ultimate reality can be regarded as the truth or the fact.
Whether one likes or not,the ultimate reality or fact can be
125
regarded as the value# because that is the origin# and every­
thing is supposed (like the supposition of scientists that
the expanding universe will contract to its original position
or state one day) to return- to that ultimate reality irrespective
of whether man wishes so or not.
Thus those who have no
conception of an ultimate fact which is also the ultimate value
have
no perspective to judge whether inumerable facts are
values or not. The facts that are regarded as values cannot
also be ultimately justified as values without the conception
of the highest value which serves both as perspective and as
the norm.
Thus it will be seen that a fact or anything for that
matter# in order to be regarded as a value# must be liked or
desired or approved as a value.
But all these —liking#
approval etc. whether rational or emotional are based on somekind of judgment.
Whether the judgment is conscious or
unconscious# right or wrong is a different question. Again judg­
ment is always with reference to a criterion or norm which in
turn is regarded so on the basis of the concept of
good. Thus
what guides the conception of the root concept i.e. good can be
analysed next.
(e)
The Concept of Good
In the history of the theory of value# it has already
been pointed out that the term value is also taken as a
(73)
synonym for good.
But that alone has neither served the
purpose of clarifying the concept of value nor that of good.
The only purpose this has served is the recognition of the
fact that what ancient philosophers have said about the term
good can equally apply to the term' value.
There is no need
to go to the concept of good by different philosophers. This
(73)
Good# according to Dictionary of Philosophy by
Peter A. Angels# means — 1. Any object of interest#
value or desire.
126
has already been indicated in a way while conceptions of
ultimate value by different philosophers were enlisted under
normative theories of value.
If normative theories of value
try to answer what is good, metanormative theories try to
answer what is meant by good and also
how good is justified.
In the light of the conclusions arrived at by the analysis of
the issue of fact and value, an attempt is made here to show
how normative and metanormative views of good or value are
related and what emerges in the end regarding the concept of
good or value.
Let it be clarified in the beginning that as the term
'good1 is taken in the sense of 'value', whatever applies to
'good1 will also equally apply to 'value'.
As has been pointed out earlier, in order to be a
norm i.e. in the sense of a good norm, it must be in agreement
with the concept of good. A norm must be as good as 'good1
itself in order to be regarded as a standard for the judgment of
all those which stake their candidacy to be called good.
__ ..
Thus if any concept of standard good will-be taken for granted,
any good falling short of this standard good or norm will be
considered a lower or lesser good and anything rising above the
norm will be a higher good or higher norm.
Since the concept
of standard good itself needs justification, it must either be
justified inductively from still smaller units of good, or
deductively from still higher good.
Thus in both the ways
normative considerations are involved. Pushed to their logical
conclusions one has to have either the concept of smallest unit
of good or the greatest unit of good, other wise no concept
of good can be justified at all. Seeing that there is always
a need to justify why something is considered or called good,
G.E.Moore took the concept of good as something which cannot
be defined but can only be intuited.
As others failed to
justify good ultimately i.e. taking something as good but not
justifying why that can' be called good, they were, according to
Moore* committing "naturalistic fallacy".
127
One fairs no better if one takes up the question
metanormatively viz. 'what is meant by good1; for whatever
~~
“
meaning is given# one can still ask the questions 'Why
such a meaning is given?' or 'what is the reagon of meaning
good in the way it is meant?'
Those who do not see this
point# it can be said, commit the fallacy of inconclusive
meaning. The emotivists can be said to be committing this
fallacy, because the emotive theory of ethics or of value/good#
as Peters points out ‘‘lacks an adequate concept of 'amotion'
Analysts also commit the same fallacy# because although they
try to analyse what people mean by good# they do not try
to explain conclusively why people mean so or why different
people mean different things by the term 'good'. Whatever
may be the usefulness of stating what different people mean
by good# unless the concept of the term is given a clarification
acceptable to all# the exercise cannot be said to be meaningful
ultimately.
But in order to be acceptable to all# the term
good must have one meaning.
get this meaning?
Yet where from will the analyst
What will be the criterion?
Thus it is seen that the purposes of metanormative
theory of good ultimately fails on both the fronts —- in
exploring the meaning of good and in justifing what is good;
because the need for assumption of a concept of smallest or
greatest good is always felt.
This is how the metanormative
theory cannot be delinked from normative theory in giving
the meaning of or justifying 'good' or 'value' .
Since there is always need of giving further and further
reason on all fronts whether one is stating what is good# or
what is meant by good or is ‘justifying any good# one has to
take the help of knowledge.
474)
One may follow whatever way of
R. S. Peters# Ethics and Education, p.110
128
knowing — empirical# rational or intuitive — to give
conception of good# but that can never be regarded as the
convincing conception# because every way of knowing has
difficulties with it. Therefore it will be best to approve of
the-concept of .good that is approved of by all the ways.
Whatever may be the way of knowing# whatever the system
of philosophy# nobody can deny the present# because that is
the point from where one can look back into past and look' .
forward to future.
Enquiry through any method reveals that
man lives in realities both inside and outside him.
He is
'a body-mind-feeling unit which acts and reacts to the environ­
mental realities that surround him. He does not know in ultimate
sense# the beginning of anything including himself# nor
the end#
still less the purpose of a process in which everything
appears changing.
Although there are persons in every field -
science# philosophy and religion - who claim that they know#
whatever knowledge they give regarding those truths can only
be accepted as theories# because# not only their views
conflict, but also there is no way of proving anything in a
conclusive way as there are unsurmountable difficulties in the
theories of knowledge.
Yet amidst all these# certain things
-
appear to be very clear which can be enumerated broadly as
follows.
Everything including man and other beings that are# are
products of processes. However shallow# man has already gained
some knowledge about them. He can hope to know more. Knowledge
not only satisfies him#
it also helps him to adjust# make some
changes and control certain things which fulfil his.desires.
Man can hope to gain knowledge# both as an end as well as a
means# only if he lives for the optimum time both individually
as well as in the form of humanity as a race; because as long
as individual man or humanity as a whole feels that there is
something to know and feel# continued existence upto the point
of knowing appears to be the only solution. So far man has
129
been known to have,complete control, neither over himself
nor over the universe.
Therefore, whatever man wants to know
and feel, he is to do so in an adjustive way.
An individual
has to know what he was, what he is and what he_ can be.
He
has also to have an insight into what he can know and feel.
He has to take into consideration the past,present and the
future.
He cannot neglect the past, because it gives clues
how the present was bom out of past which still goes on
influencing the present and future.
He cannot neglect the
present, because it is the time in which he not only lives
but also prepares for the future.
neglected because it is inevitable.
And the future cannot be
With all the knowledge
and experience at his command, man can try to live the present
well, envision as good a future as possible and work for it.
Exagerated stress on any period of time brings suffering
either in the present or in future; even though past is
considered dead it brings sorrow if Past mistakes are
contemplated too much.
Similarly man has to strike a balance
among or integrate his body, mind and feelings.
Another truth which is very clear by now is that man does
not live alone.
He has to strike a balance between himself,
his needs and aspirations, and those of others in society.
Reflective consciousness has already enabled man that others
are like him and he has no right to disturb them negatively,
again although he may try to uplift others to a position which
he thinks good, he can never force it on others as he cannot
conclusively prove why and how his vision of the 'good* is
to be considered really good.
Although neither majority
opinion nor what is prevalent in a society can be taken for
granted as the truth or the good, it must be recognised that
they have their own forces.
If any individual or a number of
individuals have any better conception of good for the whole,
he or they can convince others in a moral way; use of force
or any other objectionable methods such as brainwashing,
indoctrinating etc. should not be resorted to.
Similarly a
130
society or & nation cannot justify any act of severest
punishment or capital punishment because of an individual's
ideological differences.
It is here that the democracy
truimps over most other forms of government.
Keeping the above truths in mind, the individual as well
as a society can have their conceptions of good. Although
individual conceptions of good may vary according stresses on
different aspects of life and due to differing realities,
no body perhaps can neglect the body, mind and spirit to
such an extent that they became diseased.
all,is recognised as painful,
Diesease, after
and it is known by now that
disease of any aspect of man affects the other. Fulfilling
the basic needs and keeping oneself healthy, which form part of
the conceptiof good for the present, one can visualize a
higher good which he can try to achieve. Besides achievements
in outer world, man can,
in his conception of good or goods,
always keep place for his higher state of being, feeling and
knowing, because, ultimately these matter most.
Ideally,
a man should die after living a happy and peaceful life.
Since he is benefited in many ways by the society, he can
always try to contribute for the betterment of society.
Finally, he should try to know the misteries of life and the
universe which includes the search of their meaning. How
far he can go in his direction depends upon his belief, aspl'T''4""'
and the method he adopts. Whether man aspires and works to
know the misteries of life and the universe or not, no body
can live without a philosophy of life — good or bad, thought
out for oneself or accepted from others consciously or unconciously.
Han can take help from others, but one should
assimilate others thought,
so as they become parts of one's
living thought for building one's own philosophy of life.
This philosophy of life results, of course, in an overall' =
conception of good or goods, both for oneself as well as
for others.
/
m
Whether man becomes-" abl'e to know and realise the
misteries of life and universe or not# there is always justice
for existence of the society.
If any individual succeeds in
his attempts# other people also have a- right to do so.
If an
individual does not hope to succeed himself# he can hope that
any future generation may do that. If he believes that his
life continues in his successors# he can die peacefully thinking
that at whatever point of time humanity may realise the truth
or truths of life and the universe# he will also# although in
a different form# be a part of that realisation » Virtually it
seems that there can be no other ultimate justification of the
wish to continue life or lives on the surface of the earth
wheather individually or humanity as a whole.
Just like an individual# a society or a nation generally
has the conception of a social good or goods which envisage
the good of all.
All are expected to reach an ideal as well as
a® equal status.
The constitution of a country generally gives
the picture of the good or goods that a society has conceived.
.
Working principles and laws intend to ensure progress towards
achieving the social good or goods.
Since no conception of
good can be fixed for ever# there should be provision for
amendment of the constitution. Since society is due to individuals
and for the individuals* in an ideal conception of the social
goods-whether as
goals or processes -there cannot be oppression
or supression of
the individuals.
An ideal good# how difficult
it may be to conceive# must be good for all - for the individual
as well as for the society.
/
One can be agreed with Broudy on the issue of individual
and social good.
He writes:
"It is useless to try to settle the issue of priority
between the good individual and the good society,
because one cannot even be defined without reference
to the other/ the good life reveals itself in both.
132
It abuse's when the individual behaves in certain
ways toward men and when the group is so structured
(75)
as to halp him to live well."
Whatever may be the conception of good whether of the
individual or of the society, it cannot pass as ‘good1 without
justification. Although there is no end to justification till
one has a conception of ultimate good or value, the aspects
that have been pointed out above can help in justifying the
good that he conceives in his present state of being amidst
the realities he lives in.
What applies to the concept of
good applies to the concept of value also, yet the issue of
justification of value is taken up next so that some other
aspects and some principles are revealed clearly.
(f)
Justification of Value
As is evident from previous discussions# any 'good* or
'value1 can be justified only if there is seme accepted norm
which is generally accepted as the 'ideal best1•
Although
man can never have a complete idea of the 1 ideal best' or norm,
he can certainly have a conception in the light of his
knowledge.
Iyengar exposes this truth quite explicitly in
the words:
"Not that we are totally ignorant of what is thus
said to be the best.
To the extent that we know
the present fact in all its strength and weakness
we know the norm also, for without an idea of the
norm as a logical presupposition, we cannot know
either the weakness or the strength of the
present fact. But at no stage do we know the
ideal fully, for to know it fully would be to
(75)
Harry S. Brondy, Building a Philosophy of
Education, 1965, p.25.
realise it fully, and an ideal realised completely,
133
would, we have said, be no longer an ideal. As we
advance in knowledge and practice, the ideal unfolds
itself gradually# but at every stage it is
presupposed in its still higher and yet unrevealed
aspects.”^76^
As the conception of the norm go on changing with new
knowledge, experience etc., what appeared a higher norm once,
becomes ordinary or lower.
Whether the conception of a norm
or any higher value is by the individual or by any society,
the above truth holds good.
The conception of the values of
society are also by people.
Among various conceptions, the
conception that appeals to most people become pfoValonte in
a society.
Although some value supported by most people has
a kind of justification to it, the justification can never
be called final or total; because a view that is given by a
few not only stand the chance of being correct, but also may
be quite correct from their stand-point which includes their
capacities to know realities as well as needs, wants etc.
Thus although the principle of ‘greatest good of the
greatest number' practically holds good in societies, the
ideal principle of justification should be 'all good for
all people*' Another reason is that nobody can be considered
as a means to others' ends.
How justification of ends and
means is involved in the judgment of value can be clear frem
the following analysis.
Any end implies that there is a means or way of attaining
it. No end can be conceived without a means to it. Similarly
every means implies an end.
means of attaining some end.
process.
In other words, every means is a
End is the product, means is the
Thus end and means are inseparable.
The relation
between ends and means may be very remote, yet it can never
be disconnected just as the relation between cause and effect
is never disconnected.
(76)
K.R. Shreenivasa Iyengar, The Metaphysics of value,
Vol.I, 1942, p.38.
134
Although values are classified as ends i.e. intrinsic
values# and means or instrumental values# in reality values
always constitute both the ends and means.
In other words a
v value is an ends- means phenomenon. An example can make the
point clear. Enjoying food may be on end# yet there is always
a series of processes or some activities which lead to it.
The activities may be procuring food# taking it to mouth,
chewing etc.
Whether a particular means produces a desired
end or not is a different question# what is meant here is
that the conception of value as an end is impossible without
the conception of means.
If value is thus a concept constituting of an end as well
as a means# its justification needs justification of both. The
need for justification of both becomes very clear when there
appear several contesting related ends and several means to
the same end.
The higher the value the more remote it is and
therefore it becomes difficult to find the proper means to it.
When there are several means to the same end one has to choose
a means after justifying it.
Possession of wealth# for example.-
may be a value which can be achieved in various ways including
stealing and killing. Certainly all are not good means. It is
not enough that a means is efficient or it achieves the ends
quickly, the moral considerations of how one1s personal integrity
and how others are affected have to be there.
It may be one
of the reasons why Aristotle wrote* "It is not about ends but
(77)
about means that we deliberate."
What Aristotle meant#
however# is not that people are not in conflict about ends# or
that there is no higher ends# but simply that determination of
means to an end is rather difficult.
In the light of the previous discussions it can be said
that any value except the highest and the lowest can be said
(77)
Aristotle# Nicomachean Elhics# 1898# p.7Q.
135
to be a middle Order value.
If the aim of human life# human
evolution should be progress# which can be taken as axiomatic#
any value in order to be justified should be on the criterians
whether it leads to still higher ends or not#
not only for
oneself but also for others. Of course# the present cannot be
totally sacrificed for something higher or of future# because
in that case the higher value or the future value cannot be
realised at all.
Therefore# what is meant is that there should
always be an insight into a hierarchy of higher values to see
whether any particular end is condusive to them or not.
When
some body is doing it# he can be said to be engaged in ends-wise
justification.
Similarly the means part of the value should
also be justified on the criteirons whether the means or the
processes facilitate and lead to still better means or not.
This can be termed as means-wise justification.
The ends-wise and means-wise justification can be very
shallow or very deep. The ends-wise or means-wise justification-,
which take care of more and more remote ends or means —well
integrated with the present circumstances and needs etc —
can be said to be better and better. However# on how broad
a perspective one tries to justify values depends upon the
capacity and will of an individual or a society.
When a
value is personal or when it does not so much affect, others#
one may work or choose a value depending on personal justifi­
cation# but when a value is social or others are affected by it#
a social justification# which is inherent in a'constitution#
prevails.
136
2.2*4
Definition of Value
o’
Since the most important issues of value have already
been discussed and a theory has emerged which
different theories#
synthesizes
a definition of value can now be attempted
as follows?
Value is any experience, state, ideal or thing — existing
or conceived ideally# which is favoured or desired# provided
that the experience#
state#
wise as well as means-wise.
ideal or thing is justified endsTo give a short definitions
is that which is desired justifiably.
Value
If justifiability is
inbuilt in desirability# then value is that which is desirable.
In elaboration it can be said that value is a human
concept.
Persons value experiences#
things and processes etc#
desire those.
A person#
states of their being#
and this means that they favour or
for example# cannot says'I value
smiling1# unless he likes or approves of smiling.
Of course
why he likes or approves has reasons such as the joy#
exhilaration etc. it gives to him and others#
and it is not
because ’he likes because he likes* as the emotivists would
hold*
Even when an experience is continuing#
'enjoying food',
the experience is constantly being reviewed
or judged as to whether
etc* or not.
such as
that
is good# pleasing# beneficial
If the review or judgment brings an affirmative
answer# the experience is approved to continue i.e. it is
Valued so'hhdt lt"contirmes.‘'’-. If '(the- experience^.
not
approved> i*t i"B“ regarded;'as eg-, dprsvalue- apd-.i-Sg discontipued.^
IVjf"ff cthere" are some: ’experienc'e s" or thi#g^3in^.whych ,the tsuiSj'fe'dfc' doeS'~ n*dt 'Initially; irarol-svEe 'voluntarily-; cp-jcqngpiously
Wdr'e il£ always an1 apprayahcor disapprove,-!-'after- .sometime; and •
'on bile hasid^df bit, ^birch#; of-;ccnrrse/-. presupposes-gjnstiiic aticr .
the Iexpeirienc'e'''dr Tthingmis reiti¥er -regarded as .a.-Value or as
a disvalue.-
Thus one going to'-listen to., classical music for
the first., time ‘ oh request,by ; a friend may
05
may’not'Value
-
V
137
classical music*
But this judgment of value is always relative-^
to the person - his abilities,needs, interests etc. and it does
not say that it is not valuable for others who appreciate it.
that which pgsses as a value by many persons may be said to be
objective# not in the sense that it is something irrefutably
true# but as something approved by a large number of people
inter-subjectively because of reasons known to them* more or
less equally*
The above analysis of approval of something shows that
there is autonomy in value.
The degree of autonomy may vary as
it may be marked by decision# choice# voluntary activity etc.,
or merely by silent approval.
However, when the approval is
forced* the act of approving cannot be called an act of
autonomy nor the thing approved of can be called a value.
Although sometimes it is not clear, there is always an ends-wise
as well as means-wise justification when something is approved
as a value. In a simple act like 1 eating a cake' which may be
valued# the ends-wise justification or approval is given in
form of — because the cake is tasty* it appeases hunger# it
is contributary to life etc.
The manner of eating is also
approved or disapproved at the same time although it is not
so explicit.
One may take the cake to mouth by hand or spoon*
or mouth near the cake.
Although nobody bothers to go into the
reasons behind particular way of taking food# there are always
reasons.
In order to avoid washing hands before and after
food# the people of cold countries might be using spoon whereas
there may not be such consideration in hot countries.
As
things like this become part of the culture of a people# nobody
bothers to go into the reasons behind them.
When the experience becomes a bit complex* a bit remote
ends-wise or means-wise* more and more conscious justification
is needed.
An example
justification is*
of experience needing more ends-wise
‘eating cake daily1.
Here it is not pleasure
138
alone which is considered# its possible effect on health is
also taken into account.
As to the means part# one has to
judge among several choices* eating cake by preparing oneself#
by buying, by stealing etc.
The justification of the means
or way involve considerations as to which is convenient# time
saving, morally good etc.
Since valuing is characterised by purposiveness and
autonomy# choosing consciously with reason# knowing the possible
consequences and choosing oneself are likely to yield better
result.
As higher and higher values are more complex# because
of their being connected with other ends# and detailed and
diverse courses# their justification requires more complex
reasoning# far-sight etc - both ends-wise as well as means-wise.
Whatever it may be# justification cannot be separated from the
concept of value.
In fact# whether explicit or implicit# it is
built into the concept of value itself.
How this concept of
justification includes moral justification also can be seen
more clearly later when the concept of morality is analysed.
Certain things need be said about 'states* and 'things’.
A state may mean any state of affair e.g.'equal state* where
people are said to be in equal state or status as regards edonomy
availing of opportunities etc. It may also denote states of
being like 'peaceful state1 'being in equanimous state* etc.
Like experiences they also cannot be considered as values
unless justified and approved.
Things are sometimes called values# but they can be
only contributary and/or instrumental values. Sometimes some
say that 'Food is a value in itself'# but this is not correct
as food does not have a subjective part in it.
Again food is
considered valuable when it helps create some good experience#
if it creates painful or distasteful experience then it is
regarded as a disvalue. For example# 'mutton' when eaten,
may give some pleasurable or satisfactory experience to some­
body# it may cause vomiting in another fellow.
Had it been
139
good in itself# it should have given# favourable experience to
all pef-eons* * Again 'mutton1 can be considered valuable# yet
'valuable' always means valuable for something or some
experience*
Thus 'mutton1 or any food cannot be considered
as a value-in-itself# but a eontributary value or disvalue.
The only thing is that food or things like that contribute
more directly# more closely to a value experience than money
which helps to buy food.
instrumental value.
neutral.
That is why money may be called an
In fact# things in themselves are value-
They are declared eontributary or instrumental values
or disvalues depending on their use and on the purpose for
which they are used. For example# a knife is value-neutral.
When it helps in operation (which may be considered instrumental
as it cures), the knife may be called an instrumental value. Bur
if the same knife is used for killing somebody# it is considered
a disvalue# even by the same killer if the killer has to be
jailed or hanged for killing.
Now that value has been defined and the definition
has been clarified# some other definitions may be analysed.
R.B. Perry defines value as — "a thing - anything - has value _ .
or is valuable in the original and generic sense when it is the
object of an interest —* any interest. Or whatever is object
of interest is ipso facto valuable." (78 )
Anybody may take interest in anything say in an evsrd
of killing# anybody being tortured etc., yet he may not value
them at all# on the contrary he may hate them.
The interest in
the event of killing or torture might have been there in order
to know the brutalities involved which again are hated. One may
say 'I am interested in killing X*. Yet 'Killing X' can
never be considered a value# because it has very bad consequences
for the killer himself# besides for all others concerned*
(78)
RsclIttis of VciluG# 1954:#
Etymologically as well as historically, value has
a positive meaning — something that has worth which brings
some feeling of pleasure,
satisfaction or peace etc.
now no body says "I value pain."
Even
Similarly there are certain
things in which some may take curious interest, but they can
never be valued unless the person is totally abnormal.
Fire
may be an object of interest to a baby, yet when the baby
touches fire and gets a burn, it considers fire as a negative
value or disvalue.
Thus interest at times being skin-deep or
very superficial cannot claim value denoting capacity all by
itself.
In this sense the definition 'whatever is object of
interest is ipso facto valuable* tends to be’ a little emotive.
It appears as if interest gives the stamp of value to any
object,
and as if object has nothing in it. How such a stand
is not maintainable has already be pointed out in analysis
of the theories of value*
For Perry, interests have several modalities including
'positive and negative' 'playful and real'* and 'subjective and
objective' etc.
(79) Therefore he finds it fruitless to classify
values according to his interest or psychological theory of
value. He writes i
"The psychological classification, standing alone,
tends to be excessively detailed and schematic.
Interest has so many aspects and ramifications
that it is impossible to exhaust its varieties.
Classification of this type are too easy to make,
and too likely to prove barren when they are
made*"^^ But Perry also writes• "A fruitful
theory of value will accept those stable and well
marked unities in which the values of life are
already grouped. The great foci of interest are
science,conscience, art, industry, -state and
(79)
(80)
R.B. Perry, General Theory of value, 1950, p.693.
Ibid., p.694.
HI
church.
Perhaps there is no absolute reason why
this is so, but there is no denying the fact that
(0 ^
they are so”.
Thus Perry was forced to discard
a classification of value that his own theory of
value# hence definition of value suggested# and
accepted a "historical classification."
In the first place,
a theory Of. value is to give a
classification or at least explain the existing classification
and not "accept" anything unexplained.
Why are values# which
Perry's theory suggests# have not 'acquired an institxitidnal
form* or have not been of 'foci of interest'?
Although Perry
sees "no absolute reason" for it# the reason is that dubious
things, disdainful things and things of negative interest
have never been accepted as values. It shows that value
carries a positive meaning with it. When interest carries
a positive meaning# things that it denotes have been
accepted as values under classes which history shows.
If
anybody wants to give a thing of negative interest the status
of value# he has to qualify it with the adjective 'negative'
or prefix 'dis1 before value#
value* or 'disvalue'.
and have the expression 'negative
Actually these terms are already in use
and there is no need of overburdening the concept of value with
a negative sense which is confusing also.
The view that value carries a positive sense finds
support from L.a. Reid as well as from Perry's writing himself
although in yet another indirect way.
Reid writes* "The normal
use of 'valuable1 is positive rather than negative. In other
words# valuable means 'good'
'bad'#
'wrong'.
or 'right' rather than 'evil'#
But the word can be used to cover these as
well# by employing the concept of negative value. Though
philosophers sometimes use the ugly word'disvalue' instead,.
(81)
R.B. Perry# General Theory of Value# 1950, p.694
I shall here use '-value1 mainly in a positive sense/ of state
of affairs thought to be 'good'."
Why Reid calls ’disvalue'
an ugly word is a different question (if it is for the prefix
—
'dis'/ will words like dissatisfaction, disapprove, disarm etc.
be considered ugly?), but that 'value1 is taken in a positive
sense, he makes sufficiently clear.
In his work 'Realms of Value1 which Perry wrote after
twenty seven years of his first book on value — 'General
Theory of Value', one can read what he writes about the meaning
of good which he previously equated with value.
The lines run
as* "Two meanings have already been assigned to the term good.
In the most general sense, it means the character which anything
derives from being the object of any positive interests Whatever
is desired, liked, enjoyed, willed or hoped for, is thereby
good. In a special sense, 'morally good' is the character
imported to object by interests harmoniously organised."
What does Perry mean by 'positive interest'? Certainly
he does not mean "any interest" or 'only active interest'
because anything 'evil, wrong' can also be of interest or of
active interest.
Thus what he means by 'positive' is non-negative
something favoured, because of reasons of course, and the lines
quoted convey the reasons.
It is because of above reasons that Perry's definition
of value cannot be accepted as a full-fledged definition nor his
theory of value for that matter, for he writes* "The funda­
mental problem of theory of value is to define the concept of
value." ^^When one fails the other naturally fails.
(82)
Ij.a. Reid, Philosophy and Education, 1974, p.42.
(83)
Realms of Value, p.101.
(84)
General Theory of value, p.17.
143
Some other definitions also fall short of certain-
things. D.W. Prall's statement that value is “the existence of
an interest relation between a subject and its object^"
speqk neither of approval nor of justification. M. Picard's
definition: "Values are relations of interest between conscious
activity and environment",
(
)
speaks of the existence of
consciousness in a value situation, but does not speaks of
justifiability of interest. K. R. Shreenivasa Iyengar defines
value in the words: "value is the status of satisfyingness of
an object emerging out of its contemplation by a subject, both
determined by a universe of desire which is realisable by
means of the former and to which the latter is attached." (87)
Although Iyengar speaks of 'satisfyingness of an object', he
does not mention,
in his definition, state of one's being which
can be satisfying without any specific dependence on any object.
Further Iyengar speaks of a contempleted value, and nothing of
present value or fact value.
Although ’satisfyingness"
conveys a sense of justice in the form:
it is satisfying
therefore it is a value, it does not carry the full sense of
justice; for people can take satisfaction from revenge and many
morbid things.
'£>>
.
M. Hiriyanna thinks that value may be defined as
"that which is desired."
Desire alone,
like interest alone,
unless justified runs into the same difficulties as was seen
in case of R. B. Perry.
But when the definition is taken along
with other elaboration Hiriyanna makes, his real intention
becomes clear. He writes:
(85)
(86)
(87)
D.W. Prall, A Study in the Theory of Value, As
quoted by K.R. Shreenivasa Iyengar, Metaphysics
of value, Vol.I, 1942, p.53
M. Picard, Values Immediate and Contributary (p.119)
As quoted by K.R. Shreenivasa Iyengar, Op.cit.,p.53.
K.R. Shreenivasa Iyengar, op.cit., p.54.
"A knowledge of such facts may suffice/- by itself/
to satisfy our theoretic curiosity; but in everyday
life it leads,
as a rule, to action whose aim is the
positive one of securing something we like or the
negative one of avoiding something we dislike.
Either way, knowledge lights up for us the path of
action which we pursue in order that some desire
of ours may be satisfied. It is the satisfaction
of desire or achievement of ends, as a result of
knowing facts# that is to be understood as 'value' •
The Sanskrit word used for it means 'the object
of liking (ista). and the term value
may therefore be defined as 'that which is desired.*
The opposite of value or 'disvalue*,
as it is
described, may, in contrast, be taken as 'that which
is shunned or avoided’(dvista?"
Hiriyanna clearly states that the 'opposite of value'
is 'disvalue'.
So value is taken in the positive sense. He
also refers to the positive sense of value when he writes
"the aim is the positive one of securing something we like".
This 'liking* or 'satisfaction of desire or achievement of
w*:ds‘ is done as a ‘result of knowing facts' . When facts are
known,one is clear that what he desires is a positive one
which will do good or satisfy positively. Thus Hiriyanna tak?'value in the positive sense. Although he takes the meaning of
ista as 'the object of liking* the term also means "beloved,
o «
agreeable, liked, favoured, dear? approved, regarded as good;
desirable."
Cs 9
Thus ista in the sense of value, which carries
• m
a positive sense, should mean that which is regarded as good,
or that which is desirable. And this completely agrees with
the definition given in this work with support of a theory of
value.
(88)
M.H±riyanna, Indian Conception of Values, 1975, p.2
(Emphasis provided).
*
(89)
V.S. Apte”, The Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary#
1924.
155
Section - 3
Classes
2.3•1•
of
Values
The Principles' of Classification of Values s
Modern and Traditional
Value having been defined as something that is
justifiably
favoured or desired# classification of values
naturally followsfrom the universe of justified desires or
interests*
Justifiability includes positiveness# because
positiveness of desire or of interest itself serves as a
factor in favour of the desire or interest being justified*
Thus unlike Perry# one is neither unable to give a classi­
fication of values corresponding the universe of desires or
interests nor is at pains to explain why a historical classfication or any other classification can or cannot be
accepted*
fication of values will naturally depend upon our classification
(go) Although
of the dominant universe of desire in man."
Iyengar does not mention positiveness or justifiability of
desires# the list of dominant universe of desires he gives
(9l)
includes positive desires or interests only. Again# although he
(90)
The Metaphysics of value# Vol.I# 1942# p*241*
(91)
"The list includes the followings (l),The organic
interest; (2) the desire for recreation;
(3) the economic interest; (4) the hedonic or
pleasure-unpleasure universe; (5) the desire for
individual or personal eminence; (6) the social
universe; (7) the intellectual interest; (8) the
aesthetic interest; (9) the moral interest;
(10) the religious or spiritual interest."
Note —-
3*
According to K.R. Shreenivasa Iyengar# "The classi­
Although Iyengar gives pleasure-unpleasure as an
alternative of hedonic# this might be taken as a slip
as hedonic means rof pleasure1 .
/
f
V
146
does not make'clear what he means by 'dominant1 it can be
interpreted' that he means by it clearly visible/ persistent/
hence positive/ because negative desires or interests can
never be prolonged/ institutionalised for long/ socially
recognised or prized.
Further,
according to Iyengar, "The
evolution of values is basically teleological, it depends
upon the dawn of new interests and systems of desire upon
(92l
the developing mind of humanity."
Something teleological
or purposive means it should be positive on the whole, ihere
can be sporadic negative purposes, but basically purpose is
evolutionary, progressive, tending towards more and more
happiness and well-being.
The analysis of different kinds of knowledge has
showed that ultimate reality cannot be termed as pure object
or pure subject or in other words neither matter alone nor
mind or spirit alone*
They exist at once, two-in-one and are
inseparable and indistinguishable.
No querry is needed here
as how matter and spirit or body and mind got polarised, one
becoming more dominant than the other. History of the evolution
of human mind shows that it has evolved gradually from instincts,
passions etc, these being mostly controlled by body. Gradually
human mind has acquired the abilities of reflection, rationality,
farsight, consideration of consequences, power to check instincts,
passions, ability to direct oneself towards more and more
purposive works although they are connected with remote results.
Human mind has succeeded'in studying human body to a great
extent, as a result it has been possible to overhaul the body,
to ampute limbs and to transplant vital organs.
All these
show that the mind has evolved very fast, whereas the body has
not.
The body could not cater to what mind could conceive or
desire.
Therefore man created powerful eletronic microscopes,
computers,
aeroplanes, space-crafts, social institutions etc.
^’'x. R. Shreenivas Iyengar, op.cit.,
p.240
147
This gives a clear proof that progress is in the
direction of evolution of human mind.
Although- it cannot be
said that body is not evolving; it is certain that the
evolution of mind is speedier. Human mind has come to know
in an explosive way (that is why the expression- explosion of
knowledge) more and more about objects# body# and mind itself.
One can therefore speculate that, mind can# one day# gain
capacity to know the*ultimate reality and realise it as a valuein-itsc If •
An electric fan is more valued than a hand-fan as it is
advantageous# in many ways# but it could be possible as higher
laws of nature could be known.
Thus when man comes to know
higher and higher principles in physical#mental ,ahd spiritual
realms,he gets or invents more and more preferable values.
This is how higher values are possible through discoveries and
inventions —both of things and ideal concepts.
Since the term 'higher value' has already been used
which implies existence of 'lower value' also# and since taken
together they give the idea of a simple classification# attempt
f
is made hereunder to elaborate the terms a little more.
No doubt man values food# because it is very basic and
without it man cannot live. But he values gold more than food
(there can be exceptions depending on situation)# because it
can buy many other pleasures and necessities of life# including
food. Air is even more basic# but mani
does not bother about it#
because he lives in air as fish lives in water.
There is no need
to search for air, to possess it or to prefer it.
Like
economic goods that are valued at a higher price depending
on their rareness# quality# instrumentality etc#
values are also more valued than others.
wrong in the expression:
some human
If there is nothing
'An electric fan is more valuable
or commands a higher value than a hand-fan1# then there is
nothing wrong in the expressions
1 h balanced mind is more
148
valuable than a passion-ridden or ruffled mind.1 Similarly,
a man who guides himself in the principle of equality has a
higher value than one who is opportunistic, or expedient.
Sven the principle of 'greatest good of the greatest number'
can be termed as expedient, although of a higher order,
as
it also sacrifices seme good and some people. Equality is a
higher principle, a higher value, because it covers all.
«s in economics, a higher value is marked by its distinction,
rareness, quality, usefulness, besides it being more comprehensive,
more integrated, more satisfying and more lasting.
Classification of values into higher and lower is
perhaps recognised by all schools of philosophy except the
carvakas or Indian materialists,
elsewhere.
and
some counterparts
But it can be pointed out that the first axiom
of the philosophy of value is that certain things or acts are
preferable to or worthier than others, otherwise there can be
no question of choosing values.
Philosophers, whether Indian or Western, have come
to the concept of higher and lower values by other ways also.
One way is by cemparision between an animal and a man. As has
beaa already stated earlier inana or reflective consciousness,
is regarded as special in man, all other things such as hugher,
sleep, fear,
sex etc. being common to beasts and men.
Thus
1nan a is regarded as a higher value as compared to all those
like pleasure, sleep, sex, etc. or all those which cater
to these. The difinition of man in Western philosophy that
'man is a rational animal* implies the same thing.
Again the Upanisad distinguishes man from animals for
his 'self-consciousness'
criticism.
(93)
(SB)
which gives the capacity for self
Self criticism requires a standard by which one
Intra- Chapter-1
149
criticises one'self, one's wants or state of being. Yet this
concept of’”'a standard is never ending because one standard
(or norm), in order to be justified requires another higher
standard and so on till the highest standard is reached.
Thus the concept of higher and lower, and the classification
of values broadly into higher and lower can never be escaped.
Classification of values is also done on the basis
of theory of reality.
Materialists like Carvakas to whan
reality constitutes only of matter, even mind being an effect
of matter — there are only two kinds of values Kama and .
artha, in English terminology, intrinsic and instrumental
values respectively.
Others also, divide values into intrinsic
and instrumental ones, and further each into higher and lower.
There is an ontological explanation of man's being,
in the Brahma-valli section of the Taileriya Upanisad which
*
•
describes of man constituting offive kosas or 'sheaths'.
I
\
.
They are annamavkosa or material elements of the gross body
i
constituted of food/ pr5namayakosa or the living force or
organic energy; manomayakosa or human mind that is conscious;
_
I
vinj anamayakosa or higher mind which is self-conscious and
critical; and lastly an and amay akos a or a state of still higher
consciousness, the essential nature of which is bliss or
I
joy.- Hiriyanna terms the five kosas as five phases of man's
being and renders them as"his body, his subconscious, conscious
and self-conscious life"
"joy or bliss". ^
and the last being a state of
As the Kosas are said to be hierarchical, annamayakosa
being the lowest and anandamayakosa being the highest, the
values or things and activities that cater to them are also
in a hierarchy.
The lower values being artha and kama; and
the higher ones, dharma and* moksa.
This is the traditional
classification of values into caturvaraa
or four purusarthas
Generally, in English terminology artha means wealth? Kama
means pleasure; dharma means morality, righteousness,
•<9S)
and
M. Hiriyanna, The Quest After -Perfection, 195 2,
PP.1-2.
moksa
means self-perfection or spiritual freedom.
.
tf
- .
WWV
Artha and dharma are recognised as instrumental val^a>^f/
mm
n
1
inJ?
^
V*W^Q®/
-Kama and moksa as intrinsic values. Again, artha and?Kama
are regarded as basic, -secular as well as lower values Vhfece^s if 0V
Vvv '
rfSIT”
dharma and moksa are regarded as higher as well as spirituai^i-^gfj
Kama gives pleasure no doubt, but the pleasure is momentary;
it may bring pain in its train.
Moreover,
it is not full in
itself, it depends upon external objects, therefore it is regarded
as a lower value.
Moksa gives '■eternal joy, peace, therefore
it is regarded as the highest value, the only value which can be
said to be
a
value -in-itself, in the true sense.
Similarly,
artha as well as dharma, although they are regarded as instru­
mental values, dharma is considered as never failing in the
last; it is the right and the just which leadsto moksa.
It is
for this reason that dharma is regarded as higher than artha
which mostly caters to kama
and that too in an uncertain way.
Man is naturally inclined to seek wealth (artha) and
pleasure (kama); virtue (dharma) and self-perfection (Moksa)
•
are values
what
he
ought to seek.
Although philosophy
mostly concerns itself with the two higher values,
other
values being taken care of by economics, technology etc.,
also considers and criticises the lower values.
it
That is why
in India, philosophy is conceived, Hiriyanna states, "as a
(96)
—
criticism of values."
Although artha and kama are considered
as lower values they were not discouraged or despised by
Indian thinkers, for they constitute the servival or primary
values and form the very basis of all other activities. An old
maxim runs in Sanskrits
"Sariram
advam Khalu dharma sadhanam".
(95)
Based on the renderings of S.Radhakrishnan (The Hindu
view of life, 1931, pp.78-79) and M. Hiriyanna (The
Indian conception of values, 1975, p.16).
(96)
M. Hiriyanna, The Indian Conception of values,
p.16 .
1975,
^
151
which roughly morns body is the necessary precondition for
leading a virtuous life. Th«_ temporal ,and the spiritual
are bound together and separating them is considered ruinous*
This truth was realised even in the days of Upanisads, for
*
»
•
the Upanisad says*
•
"In darkness are those who worship only the world,
but in greater darkness they who worship the
infinite alone. He who accepts both saves himself
from death by the knowledge of former and attains
(97)
immorality by the knowledge of the latter."
Naturally/ annamavako&a and prenamavakofca which
constitute the material body and its functions cannot be
maintained without artha and kama, but if one confines oneself
to their fulfilment alone# one cannot rise above animal nature
for understanding and fulfilling the higher ends of life. What
is cautioned, therefore, is not their non-pursuit, but
pursuit of these alone and in whatever manner. The view is
that these ends or values lead to higher ends or values
and should be pursued through dharma or in a justified
manner. This wisdom of combining the temporal and spiritual
values is reflected in thoughts of makers of modem India,
like Nehru.
The classification of values mainly into four
categories such as artha, kama, dharma and moksa, does not
contradict the principle of classification maintained in
this work.
The highest value, it can be remembered, is
identified as the ultimate reality, thus there is nothing
contradictory if some classes of values are seen to be
corresponding to lower realities. In fact this has also been
suggested at places.
Existence of human being in the form
he is, is a reality.
In order to maintain the body and
(97)
As quoted S. Radhakrishnan,' The Hindu View of Life,
1931, pp,79-80,
(98)
"Can we ^combine the progress of science and
152
and life, men justifiably desires artha and kama, hence they
are rightly called values, although they can be termed as
lower values because of reasons already stated. But, as it
has been proved in this work that something ideally conceived
whether it is a process or an end, can also be called a value
if desired, dharma and moksa also come under the two categories
of values*
The only thing that can be pointed out here is that
the traditional classification is quite broad and thus can be
splitted into several other classes of values keeping with
modem times*
2.3*2
The Modern Classification of Values
As areas of positive desire or interest, the following
can be the major areas or classes of values.
As there is no
intention of elaborating all classes of values here except
moral and spiritual values, they are just stated with a few
words by the way of introduction.
It can be pointed out here
that the classification of values as given below is in no way
novel.
More or less similar classification can be found in the
works of, Iyengar, Broudy, Everett, Brihgtmqn
7ag)
that of Perry.
and even in
(98)
technology with this progress of mind and spirit
also? We cannot be untrue to science because that
represents the basic facts of life to-day* Still
less can we be untrue to the essential principles
for which India has stood in the part through out
—
the' ages. Let us then pursue our path to industrial
progress with all our strength and vigour and, at
the same time, remember that material riches
without toleration and compassion and wisdom may
well turn to dust and ashes."
— J.N .Nehru, India and the World, Azad Memoral
Lectures, 195 9, 1962, pp.45-46.
(99)
K.R.Shreenivas Iyengar, the Metaphysics of value,
Vol.I, p.237 ©S Harry S.Broudy, Building a Philosophy
of Education,1965, pp.140-141, W.G, Everett, Moral
values p.182.
E.S.Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, 1940, pp.84
&ffy R.B..Perry Realms of Value, 1954.
Organic or Health Values — This class of values arise
out of man's desire for self-sustenance# self-preserva­
tion etc., and include food, drink, cloths, health,
strength, and in adult life sex.
They are also called
primary or basic values, as self-sustenance and selfpreservation etc. primarily depend upon them*
Hedonic or Pleasure Values — Man desires pleasure,
satisfaction, happiness and well-being etc. Although
there can be difference as regards comprehensiveness
and duration, in essence they are similar. Thus they
can be grouped under the common concept of hedonic
or pleasure value*
Recreational Values — Man's desire and involvement'in
different kinds of play and recreation is so dominant
that although they are known for values of pleasure,
health etc., are now recognised as a distinct class of
values.
Aesthetic Values — There is in man a sense of beauty
which seems to have existed, frcm the very beginning of
mankind.
Man sees beauty in nature as well as in
things he creates.
Natural beauty gives spontaneous
joy and a feeling of wonder. But when man creates
beauty in art, music, dance drama,poetry etc. besides
giving joy to others, he also gets the joy of
*
self-expression in elegant forms.
Thus all those
things and activities which give joys of beauty come
under aesthetic values*
Economic Values — The objects that command a money
price are said to have economic value* In a broader sense,
all that have an exchange value may be said to have an
economic value. It is in this sense that the economic
values prevailed in barter system even before the concept
of money was bom. Economic values are known as instru­
mental values because they are not valued for themselves
but fgr the enjoyments they make possible*
(6)
Petsonal Values — These are the values which a person
154
desires or-'cherishes as his own. They include his joys#
ambitions# personal possessions and pursuits.
It is
supposed that in cherishing and possessing these
values he does not affect others.
(7)
Social Values — These are the values which are made
possible because of association with others. Friendship,
love, membership with institutions are instances of
social values.
Other values such as econdmic# aesthetic
etc. can also be considered as social if they are possessed
or desired jointly by a social group.
Thus it can be seen that personal and social values
are correlates and all other values can be subsumed under
them'depending upon the consideration as to how far they
are personal or social.
(8)
Intellectual Values ” Man desires to know truth in any
of its forms.
Although knowledge of truth is made use
of in various ways# truth itself gives satisfaction.
Thus all those things or activities which help finding
truth through intellectual understanding can be looked
upon as having intellectual value.
(9)
moral
values
Morality ana "Value
The most controversial among values are the moral
values.
Traditionally most of the Western philosophers#
in their theories of morality tried to determine the good
or supreme good in order to determine morality and to
justify it. Adoption of the category of 'good* or ‘goodness'
as 'the fundamental category of moral science', which
actually is fundamental category of science of value# has
created# what Shreenivasa Iyengar calls "the Great Confusion"
or "the Great Error"
Generally those who explain values
through theories of morality hold# as Atkinson doe&s "Much
of what can be truly said of morality would seem to apply
to value judgments generally."^101^ The axiologists'
complain is that many moral philosophers have "confounded
the problem of ethics with the problem of value and virtually
converted ethics into a science of value."
It seems that the controversy whether morality should
explain value/ or value should explain morality still goes
on in the western world.
In India any such controversy has
been settled quite early.
Values have been considered more
basic than ethics.
Dharma or ethics originates from moksa,
the supreme good or supreme value.
All efforts made in
epistemology, ontology, philosophy of religion etc. have
primarily aimed at determining the supreme value.
That is
why Hiriyanna is of the view that "Indian Philosophy is
essentially a philosophy of values."
Whatever it may
be, since the researcher has taken the stand that a general
theory of value can explain all classes' of values, there is
(lOO)
(102)
K.R. Sreenivasa Iyengar) Metaphysics of Value,Vol.I,
pp.3-5
R.F.Atkinson, Conducts An Introduction to Moral
Philosophy, 1969, p.58.
K.R. Sreenivasa Iyengar, op.cit., p.4.
(103)
M.Hiriyanna, The Quest after Perfection, 1952, p*2l.
(iGl)
156
no rieed of going to theories of morality, the analysis of
which bah already been done implicitly along with the
theories of value.
However, each class of values has some
specialities, hence moral and spiritual values, the two
most controversial classes of values, need seme special
probe on this ground*
It has already been seen that the concept of value
involves two kinds of justifications — ends-wise as well
as means-wise.
While ends-wise justification points to
accepted higher and higher ends, the means-wise justification
points to more and more accepted means for realization of
ends*
Both, ends and means considerations, aim at greater
and greater integration or harmonization.
Means to an end
points to the manner in which the end is to be achieved. In
fact many philosophers point out that the term morality is
derived from the Latin plural 'mores', meaning 'manners' or
.
, . (104)
—
morals .
The nearest Indian terminology is naitikata
which is derived from niti or principle.
In fact dharma
which is a more comprehensive term refers to rta having two
(105)
*
meanings, ‘course’.and ‘right1.
The Indian conception
Ap
of morality in this way points to a way or a manner of doing
things according to some principles which are well integrated
or right.
While etymological analysis of morality In Western
philosophy points to manner or "the generally accepted code
of conduct in a society or within a sub-group of society,." C X 06«)
a second meaning has also been discovered.
Bull writes*
,—.—
"But we also use the term, secondly to mean the pursuit of
the good life and that is by no means the same as following
the accepted social code.
Indeed, moral progress has always
(104)
N.J. Bull, Moral Education, 1969, p.3.
(105)
M. Hiriyanna, Indian Conception of Values, 1975, p.15 0,
(106)
N.J. Bull, op.cit., p.3.
>
been made by individuals who -have gone against the accepted
morality b£ their day# and who have generally suffered for
(i'0 7 )' ‘
doing so.\
The second meaning certainly points to a
<
morality that is based on principles and not on the whims
or norms of any individual or a group or a society which
may be very much subjective, untouched by deep reasoning or
justification. Of course, it need not be necessarily so.
More and more philosophers come to the concept of
morality which is reason based, reasoning in turn pointing
to some principle.
Peters writes• "Morality then, is
concerned with what there are reasons for doing or not doing,
for bringing into or removing from existence."
He further
adds "....principles are needed to determine the relevance
of reasons and that some principles seem more justifiable
than others."
Peters gives the example of slashing
people with razor as morally bad which points to two
principles,
‘redness in the world ought to be, minimized’
and ‘pain ought to be minimized*.
The latter is more
acceptable than the former, because ‘redness1 can mean
anything besides blood.
This shows how morality is never
free from ends or principles which mean "fundamental truth
,
.
j-ii (l09)
as basis of reasoning."
Most of the philosophers are of the view that morality
is a process. To Bradley, "Morality is an endless process..."
Perry is of the view, "Morality is something which goes an
in the world; or at any rate, there is something which goes
on in the world to which it is appropriate to give the name
'morality'".
Broudy writes, moral values "are the
satisfactions or dissatisfactions that accrue to the individual
(107)
N.J.Bull, Moral Education, 1969, p.3.
(108)
R.S.Peters, Reason and Habit! The Paradox of Moral
Education, in W.R.Niblett (ed) Moral Education in a
Changing Society, 1963, pp.48-49.
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1972.
(109)
’(ill?)
(ill)
F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 1952, p.3l3.
R.By/Perry, Realms of Value, 1954, p.86.
,,(112)
158
in the course of his attempts to make right choices*
Aristbtle uses the expression 'moral virtue* * He writes*
"While we wish for the end, we deliberate upon and choose
the means there to*
"Actions that are concerned with means, then will be
guided by choice, and so will be voluntary*
"But the acts in which the virtues are manifested are
concerned wxth means*"
Sreenivasa Iyengar writes*
"While nematics informs us what values are to be realised,
morality tells us how, in what manner, i.e* under what control
a(114)
and direction, they are to be realised.
( S’.
The analysis of the concept of value which has shown
that every value has a process or means side to it, the
etymology of morality which pointsto more or manner, and the
views of many philosophers make it clear that morality is
something concerned with means or process*
But as has been
seen earlier, any means can only be means to an end.
As
there can be so many 'means' to an end, morality then can be
termed as choosing and being engaged in the justified means
to achieve an end. But the end cannot be any end, it has
to be an approved or justified end.' 'Killing another person'
is not a justified end, because it goes against the universally
accepted principle that everyone's life is valuable*
Certain universally accepted principles are applied to
judge which is a good end and which is a bad-end.
An approved
or justified end can be termed as a morally good end.
Moral
judgment which is involved in choosing the best among means
refebs to the means for attaining a justified end.
Although
there are many ways of killing a person, a choice among them
is not a moral judgment.
(112)
(113)
(114)
Harry S. Broudy, Building a Philosophy of Education,
1965, p.141.
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1898, p.74.
K.R. Sreenivasa Iyengar, Metaphysics of Value, Vol.I,
1*942, p.487.
159
Thus# although morality is a process value# i.e.
mainly concerned with ways# it is also not free frcm judgment
of end.
An end is always qualified by a means; similarly a
means is considered just, only when the end is justified.
Both the means and ends have to be justified. Seme examples
can clarify the point better.
Suppose 'becoming rich' is an<
end. As an end# it has
various means •— becoming rich by labouring hard# by begging
by stealing# by inheriting, by cheating# by killing somebody
and taking away his property etc.
So many persons may become
rich by so many ways# they may have equal quantity of riches
also; but they are not looked upon in the same way. The way
of becoming rich qualifies each rich man differently.
That
is the reason why one rich man may be respected while the
other despised.
Thus a choice among justified means to
become rich# can only be termed as moral judgment.
a means is always qualified by an end.
Similarly
Telling truth may be
a universally accepted good way of presenting facts. But
it is not always good if it helps in harming somebody. For
example# if a bandit is running after an innocent ; -.n for
his money# a person who has seen the fleeing man cannot tell
the truth and be considered morally right.
Thus# unless the intention as to what purpose a
principle serves is known# mere use of a principle as a
moral principle may not be morally good.
The end has to be
seen; and the more ends-wise way it is seen# the better.
Moral Judgment and Moral Act
Like any value#
then# morality requires a means-wise
as well as ends-wise justification.
The emphasis may be on
means# yet the end is not lost sight of. An end that is
justified# which involves one's own future good as well as
those of other people# can be termed as morally good end.
—-------
160
Judgment of the different means and choosing one may be termed
as mqral judgment.
Exerting according to the correct way may
be termed as moral endeavour.
Completion of morally approved
act according to morally approved means may be termed as mbral
act.
Moral judgment decides what is right,
following or not
following that judgment makes one moral or immoral.
Thus
one meaning of morality is sticking to what is realised as
right.
Of course the individual sense of right and wrong will
always be limited by his/her knowledge* There can be an
individual knowledge as well as a public knowledge as to what
is right.
If the individual knowledge is same as public
knowledge,
there is. no moral conflict or value conflict. But
when the individual lags behind the public knowledge and
acts in a different way,
he is declared immoral. Of course,
the person cannot be said to have been immoral purposefully
if his knowledge is limited, or if he is handicapped by
madness etc.
n
Only when a person knows something to be wrong
and still does it he can be termed rightly immoral.
When a person's knowledge is advanced and is better
than that of a society, his acts are also criticized. But
if he can convince others,
then he is accepted.
Thus,
it
can be said that there is a conventional morality and a person
can be either below or above it.
It can be pointed out here
that Lawrence Kohlberg also (without explaining much,
particularly why it is so) divides morality into preconventional,
conventional and postconventional levels.
.
Thus,
like judgment of other values,
understanding, his standpoint,
the realities that he is in,
influence or determine his moral judgment.
of values from different standpoints
elaborately in previous section,
(115)
a persons level of
Since the judgment
has been dealt
there is no need in going
- ,
Lawrence Kohlberg# The Cognitive-Developmental Approach
to Moral Education, in Peter Scharf (ed) Readings in
Moral Education, 1978, pp.50-51.
for a similar exercise here in case of moral judgment from
different- standpoints. The general theory d£“ value explains
most of the things of morality. Thus some basic principles
161
of morality may be worth searching.
^Basic Principles of Morality
It has already been pointed out that morality, like value
in general# cannot be free frcm a purpose. But what does it
aim at?
It certainly aims at good and it has been seen
earlier that# that good can be real good which is good for
all. The ultimate good will thus satisi^ all., But since
it is incomprehensible to most#
since the ways to it
remain vague# since the views about ultimate good and the
means to it vary# people will always conceive intermediate
views of good.
Whatever these may be# what is decided or
recognised as good ultimately or proximately# generates ah
obligation to attain that.
This obligation is a necessary
conclusion.
When anybody says ‘It is good for me'# it means two
things# (a) The person is in a certain stage or position
and he lacks something;
(b) lie -sees something# some good
which he realises will raise his position# bring progress#
satisfaction or greater good.
It logically follows# therefore
that he should attain that good# because attainment of the
'good' can remove the ‘lack*. If the realisation is very clear#
if the person is sincere#
it creates an obligation which can
justly be termed as moral obligation. ‘One ought to keep
premises1 expresses a moral principle. Making a premise to do
something# yet not doing it is a contradiction. When one makes
a premise# it necessarily follows that the promise will be
kept.
It is a necessary obligation. When an aim is kept# it
follows necessarily that the aim ought to be attained. This is
also a necessary obligation. Necessary obligation means one is
logically bound to act accordingly, because one cannot contradict
oneself*
(116)
"As the concept of perfection is unclear in the initial
stages# the approach to the mind of the public# in this
directions has to be initiated with immense patience
and care."
—- Swami Krishnananda# 'The Foundations for an
Educational Career1 # in The Divine Life# Vol.XLVII#No.8#
August# 1985# p.248.
162
Tfrus* frcra the above analysis it is clear that moral
obligations are necessary obligations* they follow logically*
they are reason based. But moral reasoning always requires
two points* Cil the person^ his conditions* the realities
around him* and (ii) a good that is accepted by the individual
as the good or right.
Like mathematics and logic* moral
reasoning does not have a content of its own; when the
assumptions or pod%ilates and certain data are given, it
produces necessary knowledge in the form of moral obligations.
One may be aware of moral obligations* yet it requires will
and energy to fulfil it.
If the moral obligation concerns oneself, it can be
termed as personal morality.
is an integrated personality.
The aim of personal morality
One who thinks something*
speaks something else and does something else cannot be called
moral.
If the moral obligation is concerning others,
then it can be termed as inter-personal or social morality.
Since an individual's life* ideals* obligations* actions etc.
generally do not come to the light* people mostly emphasize
inter-personal or social morality.
But it does not mean that
social theory of morality explains everything.
It is seen
that the basic principle of morality is a feeling of
necessary obligation which -may be intra-personal or inter­
personal*
Therefore* there is no reason why the origin of
morality should be traced to social feelings alone.
That
is why Sreenivasa Iyengar writes*
(117)
"Manasyekam* bachasyekam* Karmanyekam Sadhunam _
Manasyanyad* bachasyanad, Karmanyanyad duratmanam"
— Honest persons express the same thing in mind*
speech and action, the dishonest expressess
different things in mind* speech and action.
163
"That a full moral life necessarily implies social
relationships# everybody will be prepared to admit.
But that the essence or nature of morality has an
indispensable reference to society or to social
relationship is a disputed proposition,
xxx xx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Is it not the case that the more highly the
individual conscience is developed# the greater
is the sense of self.--respect felt by the individual
so that even in a lonely world these forms would
retain their hold upon him and he would disdain
to think of behaving, even towards himself# in
ways which would humiliate him before himself?"
Something one considers basically good for oneself
or basically harmful to oneself# one should logically think
for others in the same way; because others are also individuals
like him.
Although everything cannot be generalised# right
to life, avoidance of pain etc. are very basic# therefore
can be taken as basic sources of moral principles. Realisa­
tions like this must have prompted Kant to form his
categorical imperitive* "Act only on that maxim which you can
at the same time will to be a universal law."^11^ But only
the wish for one-universal law does not explain the basic
principles of morality.
One wishing death for himself may
wish death for all# yet it cannot be morality. Morality
has to be necessarily good# it should facilitate progress
towards greater and higher good*
The conception of good that brings good to oneself as
well as others is certainly better than the good that brings
good either to oneself or to others. This is why the principle
of 'all good to all'was considered better than 'greatest good
to greatest number*.
Although it is difficult to conceive a
(118)
K.R. Sreenivasa Iyengar, Op.cit.# p.491.
(119)
As given by W.K. Frankena# Ethics# 1973# p.30.
C
164
good which is good to all/ except logically pointing to
such a possibility in ultimate good or attainment of the
ultimate value by all (Sarvamukti)-;- there has been and
will always be attempts to conceive of as all embracing
good as possible. The world was ridden with small, groups/
societies/ kingdoms etc. previously; now one sees nations
instead,
and above all there is the U.N.O. which tries to
integrate the nations in several dimensions- The aim is to
bring good to the whole of mankind.
If the U.N.O. becomes
successful, the old Indian dream of a "world as a family"
(Vasudhaiva Kutumbakarn) may come true.- The Declaration of
Universal Human Rights by DjJSf
which recognises so many
basic rights of everyman likes right to life/, right to
education etc*—can- be recognised as a basic source of
principles or fundamental truths, for moral reasoning and
moral behaviour*
Each nation has its own constitution/ and its list
of fundamental rights,
if ideaily framed/--they generally
reflect the basic values of human, life and have checks and
balances to safeguard the rights of individuals and ensure
progress.
Ideally* these are framed by wise men and experts
who have wide knowledge over vario&s fields*. - They are
based on long experiences and accumulated wisdom not only
of the framers: and of the nation* but also of the whole of
mankind..
The large bulk of common masses may not understand
the basic reasoning or justice inherent in the constitution/
yet it does not lose its truth criterion/ hence continue to
guide value Judgment, moral judgment and administration of
law# ordear and Justice*.
Dawrence Kohlberg writes about the
con stitutxon.. or U .S -if... in the words? "et the time of our
founding*- post conventional or principled moral and political
reasoning was the possession of the minority as it still is.
To-day,
as in the time of qur founding, the majority of our
adults are at the conventional level, particularly at the
"law and order" (fourth) moral stage. (Every few years the
165
Gallup Poll circulates the Bill of Rights unidentified,
and every year it is turned down.) The founding fathers
\
intuitively understood
this without benefit of our elaborate
social science research, they constructed a document designing
a government which would maintain principles of justice and
the rights of man even though principled men were not the men
in power." ^^0)
j_s -true of U.s.A. should be, ideally#
true of India ana of any other nation.
The differing stages of moral reasoning that people
are in, poses difficulties and conflicts. But when morality
is principle based, reason based, there is always hope that
others can improve their understanding and can know as to
why and how morality guides their conduct.
The complex 1-ws
of nature are beyond the understanding of the vast majority
of masses.
Just as understanding of them requires prolonged
education in natural sciences, similarly understanding of
moral principles and acquiring the capacity of good mdral
reasoning requires proper education in social sciences,
because development in any area needs exercise in the same
area.
The field of morality is quite broad. Perhaps it is
for this why Atkinson holdss "In addition to what is now
thought of as moral philosophy, it covers such human or
social sciences as psychology, sociology and economics, and
indeed the propounding of first-order moral principles too."^^l)
The maj ority of people may not understand the reason
behind certain moral practices in the same way as a philosopher
understands them, but they have their own reasoning based on
the grounds of tradition, culture, religion etc.
The reasons
of moral conduct like speaking the truth, non-killing,
(120)
(121)
Lawrence Kohlberg, The
to Moral Education, in
Moral Education, 1978,
R.P.Atkinson, Conducts
Philosophy, 1969, p.7.
Cognitive-Developmental Approach
Peter Scharf Ced) Readings in
p.44.
-An Introduction to Moral
not-stealing etc. may vary, yet they have their same
pragmatic value for all.
When the sciences, both natural
and social, have discovered and explained many truths about
the universe and human beings, -which tradition, culture and
religion tried to explain, the reasoning based on sciences
appeal the modem man better.
This should happen; but the
faith of large number of masses who derive their basic
principles of morality from their cultures and religions
should not be shaken abruptly, before they have made some
progress in scientific and philosophical reasoning. One
*
can see moral anarchy wherever such a thing has happened.
Further, Lawrence Kohlberg1s "assertion that higher-stage
reasoning is not only different, but morally better than
lower-stage reasoning",
if reasoning based on religion can
be considered lower reasoning at all, "seems to be",
(l22 )
as Fraenkel holds, "an impossible one to prove#"
The
barriers to knowledge and barriers among men of different
societies are fast breaking up. There is, as has been
pointed out earlier, a tendency towards universalisation
of concepts,
and above all the concept of man around which
the human beings revolve.
Declaration of Human Rights is
an indicationin this direction.
Bhyrappa rightly observes:
"The fundamental human rights declared by world organisation
is based on a common conception of man and a common
(123)
conception of human values."
There are various conceptions of man, there can be
many more.
Consciously or unconsciously man puts his faith
in one conception from which he derives thO basic principles
of morality.
Any conception of man can logically be
pursued to a conception of an ultimate reality.
Since it
is inevitable, it is better to be conscious of it.
(122)
Those
Jack R. Fraenkel, 'The Kohlberg Bandwagon: Some
' Reservations', in Peter Scharf (ed) Readings in
Moral Education, 1978, p.252.
(123) S.L. Bhyrappa, Values in Modem Indian Educational
Thought, 1968, p.20.
167
who do not go deep#
like the emotivists or even David Hume
have to hold, "that in the end no justification is possible
for the basic moral principles built into such attitudes*"
(124) '
Thus the roots of morality can only be traced in a full
fledged system of philosophy.
Any philosophy which falls
short of explaining the ultimate reality can have no ultimate
basis for explaining morality or any other value in a convincing
manner.
Since natural sciences and some philosophies based on
that alone/ true ,to their very nature/
can never give a conception
of ultimate reality in advance without observation and proofs/ —t r
spirituality/ religion and general philosophy/ ' whatever may
be their success or failure/ will always remain as ways of
tracing the ultimate roots of morality.
For, the trully
inquisitive can neither be satisfied with any “temporary
ultimate" nor can he pin his faith on them.
If there is so much stress on making everything reason
based,
there is no reason why reason should not be sought for
principles of morality like “Every man has right to life".
Where from does this principle spring?
Isn't it a fact
that men have killed men and are still killing? If struggle
for existence is accepted as a fact among different species,
why can’t it apply to human species?
Harry S. Broudy asks
a number of questions eloquently*
"But on what empirical knowledge can we base the
moral conviction that man ought to be treated as
an end and not as a means merely?
Certainly man
has not always treated other men in this fashion;
he has frequently found it satisfactory to regard
him merely as a means or tool for his own purposes.
Certainly the world of sub-human nature gives no
evidence for the notion that animals or plants
regard each other as ends in themselves..................
(124)
As giyon by R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education,
1971> p.113.
11 r,
v)
)
......On what empirical grounds should I feel
obligated to be intelligent in my behaviour? Why
should' I solve my problems intelligently with an
eye to the evidence and to knowledge? Is it not
conceivable that by a set of stereotyped responses
I may get greator satisfaction than by taking
thought in the matter?
Why should I realize my
own capacities beyond a comfortable degree of
adjustment that makes my life tolerably happy?"
Broudy himself answers! "If these convic­
tions are based on knowledge, it is not the
empirical knowledge with which science is concerned.
It is rather the philosophical knowledge about
the nature of man and the interpretation of his
destiny on the basis of that nature."
Further, it can be argued: If human life is not
meaningful in any ultimate sense,"as some materialistic
philosophies hold, what harm is there if an end is put to
the whole of mankind?
Those who advocate humanism from
which respect to each man's life springs, cannot but have
an implicit faith in meaningfulness of human life and human
evolution. Although they are incapable or shy of giving any
view of ultimate purpose of man and hence of mankind, their
imperative that each man should live, mankind should continue
on earth's surface, implies that there must be some reason
why they should so recommend. Evidently there is faith that
appearance of man on earth is good (for anything not good
cannot be recommended for continuance) and the faith that man
is capable of unravelling the mysteries of the universe and
life.
(125)
Harry S. Broudy, Building a Philosophy of Education,
1965, pp.272-73.
169
-Thus any conception or theory of morality# if it has
to be meaningful or justifiable# has to be linked with some
kind of conception which is purely philosophical# religious
or spiritual.
That is why Bhyrappa is of the view* "a moral
notion that refuses to recognise its own roots remains
(X26)
^
vapoury."
Judging from logical as well as practical
point of view he further writes "unless morality'matures
into spiritual perfection it cannot get its fullest justi(l27)
fication."
That is why those who do not seek the roots
of morality fail to justify any moral stand ultimately. In
an age when man tries to see reason in everything, morality
without proper justification cannot have any convincing
appe al.
(10)
SPIRITUAL
VALUES
The Highest Spiritual Value and Its Realisation
Any theory of reality cannot but logically admit of an
ultimate reality# whatever may be its hue; any theory of
knowledge cannot but admit of an ultimate knowledge# because
when there is an ultimate reality# logically its knowledge
is possible.
General theory of value also logically points
to an ultimate value on which justifiability of any value
ultimately rests.
There have been various conceptions of ultimate reality
and of ultimate value.
It has already been shown in the theory
of value that ultimate value cannot be different from ultimate
reality.
The real problem then lies on how to go about to
know it.
Different forms of knowledges empirical# rational
(126)
S.L. Bhyrappa# op.cit# p.86.
(127)
Ibid.# p.87.
170
and intuitive* can stake their claims.
The empiricists cannot
give any definite knowledge of ultimate reality in advance*
because their philosophical position does not admit of it.
It has already been shown that as long as there is an approach
to know with a distinction between subject and object* as it is
in empiricism* the ultimate
core of the object cannot be known
It is for this reason that empiricist! cannot be depended upon
for knowledge of ultimate reality.
The empiricist cannot but
have to take a position likes "We cannot be sure at any given
time what the ultimate laws of the universe are and whether
j V/-'!
(128 )
{J l
the laws thus far considered ultimate are really so."
But all are not ready to accept an indeterministic
position for ever.
Therefore* attempts have been made to know
the ultimate reality through rational and intuitive ways of
knowing.
Although rationalist! can help the conception of
ultimate reality very vaguely* it remains mere knowledge* that
too incomplete. For it has already been seen in the section H
of theory of knowledge that complete knowledge is possible
s
when there is no distinction between the subject and the
j
object* the knower and the known.
Rational knowledge cannot
do it* for to quote Radhakrishnan in this connection? "In
logical knowledge there is always the duality* the distinction
(129)
between the knowledge of a thing and its being."
Thus in intuitive experience lies the possibility of
being as well as knowing the ultimate reality at the same time.
It is for this reason that intuitive knowledge is regarded by
those who recognise it as "the only kind of absolute knowledge"
"the ultimate vision of our profoundest being."Of course*
this is the highest kind of intuitive knowledge and experience
/
(128)
(129)
John Hospers* An Introduction to Philosophical
Analysis* 1977* pp. 189-90.
S. Radhakrishnan* An Idealist View of Life* 1947*p«138.
(130)
Ibid.* p.144.
(131)
Ibid.* p.144.
^
/
which is '’possible'/ as Radhakrishnan states! "only when the
'
(132)
individual,is fully alive and balanced."
But it can be
171
'
j
^
pointed out here that those who are for the intuitive knowledge
of the ultimate reality# are not against intellectual effort,
either of empirical or of rational type for other purposes and
for paving the way for intuitive knowledge.
Knowledge of the ultimate reality is said to have been
revealed to • Saints, seers and prophets some of whom happen
to be founding fathers of some organised religions. Religions
can be recognised as complete theories on reality with a
value system and an ethical code.
Whatever may be their
success or failure, they at least try to explain the ultimate
reality and many strange mysteries of the universe, and people
get immense satisfaction and security in some faith or other.
One may try to refute the truth of any religion, but the very
act of refutation requires a theory which almost becomes a
new religion which is no less prone to refutation.
People
Vvi
like Russell may leave 'a strynge mystery" unexplained, for he
writes* "It is a strange mystery that nature, omnipotent
but blind, in the revolution of her secular hurryings through
the abysses of space has brought forth at last a child,
*
subject to her power, but gifted with sight and knowledge
of good and evil> with the capacity of judging all the works
(133)
of hxs unthinking mother"
/ but people like Radhakrishnan
"cannot leave this stupendous fact as a 'strange mystery'".
Every mystery awaits an unveiling, and agnosticism is no
answer for it; it is a kind of defeatism.
Whatever may be the fate of religions, whatever their
evolution and whatever people do with than# the nucleis of
religion -— the belief that there is an ultimate reality,
(132)
Ibid#,p.144.
(133)
B, Russell, Mysticism and Logic, 1918, (p.48) as
quoted by S. Radhakrishnan in hn Idealist view of
Life, p.56•
S. Radhakrishnan, Ibid., p.56.
(l34f)
£
a first cause* cannot be removed from the heart of man.
Everybody knows it either logically or intuitively; it does
not matter whether one"tries to explore it or leave it
(lOC )
unexplored beyond the surface level of materialism,
or ritual ridden religion.
Anything crude cannot but die,
so are dying crude religious beliefs as well as crude
materialism, with the discoveries of baffling mystries inside
man, in subatomic world and in far off space.
But if man is not going to admit defeat in knowing
the ultimate reality and in realising it as ultimate value,
he has to keep faith in intuitive knowledge and experience
which alone gives such a possibility.
This intuitive
experience can be nothing other than a spiritual experience*
for it is the innermost essence of man which goes by the name
of soul or spirit that reveals itself as itself. Radhakrishnan
writes:
\
"At the spiritual level, the individual becomes
aware of the substance of spirit* not as an object
of intellectual cognition but as an awareness in
which the subject becomes its own object* in which
the timeless and the spaceless is aware of itself
as the basis and reality of all experience. The
spirit which is inclusive of both self and object
is self-sufosistent and self-consistent. Nothing in
our experience can be said to be real or individual
without qualification except spirit.
nothing within it to divide it
There is
nothing outside
to limit it. It alone satisfies our total desire
and whole intelligence.
It is all that there is*
all being and all value...... While for the
(135)
"All degrees of atheism
the mind."
belong to the surface of .
—S.Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life*p.59.
self-condeious individual# religion is only faith in values#
j
for the spiritual being it is a total contact with reality
which is the source of all values*"That the ultimate
reality is spiritual in nature is revealed frcm it.
Has anybody attempted to gain such knowledge and
experience?
History does not lack with accounts of persons
who have made efforts# to use Bergson's words# "to strike out#
beyond the limits of intelligence# in search of a vision# a
contact# the revelation of a transcendent reality."
(I37)
Whatever the difference in detail and in symbols# there is a
broad similarity among the saints# seers and mystics who
(13Q
}
speak of experiencing an undual state of peace and bliss.
The knowledge and experience are said to be anirvacaniya#
indescribable# ’ for they transcend the concepts of ordinary
knowledge and experiences.
Plotinus perhaps gives the best
reason for it!
"The one# the ground of all beings is unknowable.
Even spirit# when it is occupied with its own intuitive
power and with spiritual world# cannot know it. But when
spirit is carried out of itself by aspiritual love then it
becomes# for the moment# that which it can never know. In
such moments# , identification of the seer and the seen# seeker
and the sought is so complete that it transcends the
distinction between the knower and the known, the question of
knowledge and knowability becomes irrelevant to it." (139)
(136)
S. Radhakrishnan# An Idealist View of Life# pp.301-302.
(137)
Henri Bergson# The Two Sources of Morality and
Religion# 1935# p.187.
"The mystics# who have ^developed# through moral and
spiritual perfection# an intuitive vision of the
real# are wonderfully in agreement."—A.G.Javadekar#
op.cit.# p.29.
As given by M»M. Sharif# 'Neo-Platonism* in
S.Radhakrishnan (ed) History of Philosophy! Eastern
and Western# Vol.Tl# 1952# p.96.
(138)
(139)
174
When knowledge becomes no other than experience# that
knowledge ceases to be ordinary knowledge; therefore# cannot
have the concepts# criteria and conditions of empirical and
rational knowledge.
It may be this reason why the Buddha
discouraged all questions on the state of Nirvana.
Although
the Hindus describe the nearest experience as Sat Cid and
ananda# existence# consciousness and bliss# the highest, the
nirvikalpa or undual state is known as anirvacaniya.
Again
as has already been seen in chapter II# existence# consciousness
and bliss are not separate#
they are one and the same at once.
Swami Krishnananda writes* "Existence# which is Consciousness#
itself is Bliss."
Verifiability of Spiritual Values
No doubt there will be believer^ as well as non-believers
in such experiences.
One has right to disbelieve as long as
one has not experienced any such thing# but to brush aside
the possibility of such experience on the grounds of verifi-
f lability is both uncharitable and unreasonable. It is an
example of dogmatic scepticism.
If the explorer of a new
region cannot be trusted fully# his accounts cannot also be
disbelieved totally*
Henri Bergson perhaps gives the best
reason for it in the words *
"In the days when central Africa was a terra
incognita# geography trusted to the account of a
single explorer#, if his honesty and competence
seemed to be above suspicion.. The route of
Livingstone's journeys appeared for a long time
on the maps and atlases.
You may object that
verification was potentially# not actually#
feasible# that other travellers could go and see
(140)
Swami Krishnananda# The Philosophy of Religion,
1985, p.65.
V
. I
1
/'Ua U
•L
\
115
if they liked# and that the map- based on the
indications of one traveller was a provisional
one# waiting for subsequent exploration to make
it definitive*
X grant this* but the mystic
too has gone cn a journey that others can
potentially# if not actually# undertake? and
those who are actually capable of doing so are
at least as many as those who possess the
daring and energy of a Stanley# setting out to
find Livingstone.,
Indeed# that is an under­
statement. Along with the souls capable of
following the mystic way to the end, there are
many who go at least a part of the way* how
numerous are those who take a few steps# either
by an effort of will or from a natural dispositioni
William James used to say he had never experienced
mystic states; but he added that if he heard
them spoken of by a man who had experienced them#
“something within him echoed the call." Most are
probably in the same case. It is no use invoking
as evidence to the contrary the indignant
protests of those who'see nothing in mysticism
but, quackery and folly. Some people are
doubtless utterly impervious to mystic experience#
incapable of feeling or imagining anything of it.
But we also meet with people to whcm music is
nothing but noise#
and some of them will express
their opinion of musicians with the same anger#
the same tone of personal spite."
(141)
Henri Bergson# Two Sources of Morality and
Religion, 1935# pp.210-11.
C *: /
is
J ' > \ ^ 0~\
/ c“
y
/
A--
\
176
\
Harry S. Brdudy, while writing about religious experience holds
the views '"The evidence must come from those who have had it
themselves-
The evidence from those who have _not is worthless."
bc t ,
Without advancing any further argument, it can be __ —
concluded that logically the possibility of realisation of the
ultimate reality or ultimate value which goes in various names- ^ «
the Absolute, God, Brahman etc. cannot be refuted.
The
conviction that there is an ultimate reality, an ultimate
value, logically points to the possibility of its realisation,
may not be by all, now, but atleast by some, at some point of
time.
But if such a realization or experience is possible,
how can man rise to such a height?
it?
What are the signs of it?
What are the steps towards
The answers to these questions
demand a definition and description of spirituality and
spiritual values in earthly terms, and this has been attempted
next.
Meaning of Spirit and Spiritual Values
The use of the terms
is not unknown to anybody.
- body, mind, life and spirit etc.
But till now, nobody has been able
to give a convincing explanation of life in terms of what it
actually is,^although everybody knows its effects in growth,
decay and death.
"The science of biology does not account for
life, but assumes it as beyond all explanation", wrote
Radhakrishnan. ^143^ Similar has been the case with mind. Except
that it is something subtler than body, and that it works In
particular ways, nobody is able to give explanations of its
origin, its relation with body etc.
Even if explanations are
attempted, they land one in subtilities of mataphysics which
remain controversial.
(142)
Building a Philosophy of Education, 1965, p.274.
(143)
An Idealist View of Life, 1947# p*252.
h(>0. &>
,
> -^ '
177
The question whether mind or spirit is the cause of matter/or
matter is thci cause of mind or spirit, is very often asked. Whatav
it may be* ,r,lhe cau-so should be at least as rich as the effect".U
Even if the theory of the materialists that mind evolved out of
matter is granted/ the matter which is capable of evolving
mind and,life certainly cannot be as crude as it is supposed
to be.
The subtilities of matter being unfolded day by day/
substance vanishing into field and field being consolidated
as mass of substance# the primordial form of matter and its
properties seem unobservable.
It is no matter whether people
v.
call it matter still or spirit.
Names# after all# make little
difference*
Whatever it may be# there is in man something very
subtle which goes by the name spirit.
Some may call it subtlest
form of matter and its forces# but as subtilities go well with •
the words 'spirit' and 'spiritual1# and as conventions and
usages have it that way# it is reasonable to call it spirit.
There is no need to define it# to tell what it exactly is#
it is enough if its forces are felt like that of mind and life
or that of magnatic force and electrons which have not been
seen# yet which are said to exist# because# it is said# their —
effects are felt*
''C'V'•
^
Finding it difficult to define spirit,S. Radhakrishnan
writes * "We know it, but we cannot explain it.
everywhere though seen nowhere*
It is felt
It is not the physical body
or the vital organism# the mind or the will# but something
which underlies them all .and sustain than.
It is the basis and
background of our being# the universality that cannot be reduced
<v(l45)
to this or that formula*
Describing it further with its
effects he further writes* "The spirit looks on disinterestedly#
its delight is pure and free; the empirical self is concerned
with the business of life.
The former is vaster# profounder,
(144)
Swami Kridmananda, Resurgent Culture# 1961# p.14
(145)
An Idealist View of Life# 1947# p.205.
/
178
truer, but it is..ordinarily hidden from our knowledge.
When
the .supreme light in us inspires the intellect we have genius,
when it stirs the will we have heroism, when it flows through
the heart we have love, and when it transforms our being, the
son of man becomes the son of God..... There is no natural
limit to its expression, it is potentially all-embracing.
Wherever there is genius, ardour, heroism, there is creative
spirit at work, in however nebulous and untried a way it may
be>ll(l46)
No doubt, the effect of spiritual force appears like
emotional and intellectual forces, but there is nothing wrong
in its appearing like those, for there cannot be any dividing
line between a continuum that ranges from the grossest to the
subtlest.
Further, emotion is defined as "stirring up,
excitement of the mind or more usually the feelings."
When spirit is said to be stirring up the mind, intellect and
feelings, very naturally these should appear like something
emotional.
Yet there is a difference.
The touch of the
spirit may make anything vigorous, yet there is calmness,
the spiritual force flows like the forceful, yet calm waters of
a river on plain land or like an uasdisturbed. electric current.
This distinction between the emotional and spiritual cannot be
said as farfetched, because-distinction is noticeable even in
different emotional states.
Bergson writes5 "An emotion is an
effective stirring of the soul, but a surface agitation is one
thing, an upheaval of the depth is another., The effect in the
first case is diffused, in the second it remains undivided."
Aristotle holds happiness as the aim of human life, yet
he calls happiness "the exercise of virtue"? virtue in turn he
terms as the "excellence of the best part of us."
'so by
il46)
S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, 1947, p.206«
(147)
Advanced Learner's Dictionary Londons Oxford University
Press, 2nd ed. 1963.
(148)
(149)
Henri Bergson, op.cit., p.3l.
Aristotle Niccmachean Ethics, X 7.1, 1898, p.337.
^
179
analysis# virtue or excellence becomes an excellent embodiment
or excellent effect of the "best part in us" which he sometimes
calls "the final faculties (or soul)".^^0^
Spirit means# according to Concise Oxford Dictionary#
among other things# "intelligent or immaterial part of man#
soul"/ "person's mental or moral nature or qualities";
j
>
t
"course# self-assertion# vivacity# energy# dash etc."; and
"mental or moral-condition or attitude; mood." These meanings
\
o
also make it clear that spirit is some subtle force in man that
shows its effects as virtues or excellent functioning of man’s
faculties.
Philosophy as a Spiritual Pursuit
Intuition may be the cultimating effect of the spiritin man# yet below it are seen excellence of intellect# reason
and all the modes of it.
To Aristotle#"happiness does not
consist in .pasttime. •• .but in exercise of virtue." "But"#
he continues# "if happiness be the exercise of virtue# it is
reasonable to suppose that it will be the exercise of the
highest virtue; and that will be the virtue or excellence of
the best part of us.
Nov/# that part or faculty - call it
reason or what you will - which seems naturally to rule and
take the lead# and to apprehend things noble and divine whether it be itself divine# or only the finest part of us is the faculty# the -exercise of which# in its proper
excellence# will be perfect happiness. That this consists in
speculation or contemplation we have already said."Further,
clarifying# Aristotle writes ;" We think too that pleasure
ought to be one of the ingredients of happiness; but of all
virtuous exercises it is allowed that the, pleasantest is the
exercise of wisdom. (Translator F.H. Peters pits in the footnote —
(150)
Aristotle^Nicomachean Ethics X 7.1# 1898# p.16/
(151)
Ibid.# pp.337-38.
180
"the contemplation of absolute truth" as the meaning of
wisdom.) At least philosophy(Peters: 'the search of thistruth1) is thought to have pleasures that are admirable-in
purity and stead-fastness; and it is reasonable to suppose that
the time passes more pleasurably with those who possess than with
those who are seeking knowledge."
Strikingly Radhakrishnan gives a high place to philo­
sophy as a spiritual pursuit.Interpreting Touchstone's querry
to Corin in Shakespeare's 'As You Like It': "Hast any philoso­
phy in thee shepherd?"/ Radhakrishnan writes: "Shakespeare means
by philosophy not a system of abstract thought or a technical
discipline of the schools/ but an attitude of the mind which
can be best described as 'idealistic*.
Have that spiritual
dimension to your being, that mood of reflective inquiry and
self-contemplation, that anxiety of mind to know the things
spiritual in which is the true dwelling place of man?
do you belong to the race of unreflective
Or
people who are
satisfied with business or politics or sports, whose life is
dull prose without any ideal meaning?
Philosophy is under­
standing, contemplation, insight and a philosopher can find
no rest until he gains a view or vision of the world of things
(
and persons which will enable him to interpret the manifold
experiences-as expressive, 'in sane sort of a purpose."
Radhakrishnan further writes: "An Idealist-view of life-only
contends that the universe has-meaning, has-value. Ideal values
are dynamic forces, they are the driving power of the universe. The
(154)
world is intelligible only as a system of ends."
A faith in meaningfulness of life and universe is then
a spiritual faith.
A quest after the highest reality which also
means realisation of highest value, is a spiritual quest.
This
faith and quest exactly characterize the men who are said to be
'spiritual minded' or spiritual.
It may be religion/ philosophy
(152)
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X.7.1* p.338.
(153)
S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life,1947, p.15.
(154)
Ibid., p.15.
I
181
(l55)
of religion, pure philosophy,
even pure, science, <social
work; whatever instills such a 'faith1 and inspires such a
'quest* and involves in activities for such goals, becomes
spiritualized*
Religion as a Spiritual Quest
Religion has been traditionally associated with a faith in •
a highest reality and a quest after that.
Its aims are spiritual*
s,The essence or core of religion is," Bertocci writes, "the
personal belief that one's most important values are sponsored by,
or in harmony with the induring structure of the universe,
(256 }
whether they are sponsored by society or not."
Whitehead
defines religion as "what the individual does with his own
(25 *j ^
solitariness."
Writing about religion S. Radhakrishnan gives
the views "
"It is an attempt to discover the ideal possibilities
of human life, a quest for emancipation from the
immediate compulsions of vain and petty moods* It
1
is not true religion unless it ceases to be a
i
'
traditional view and becomes a personal experience.
;
It is ah independent functioning of the human mind,
something unique, possessing an autonomous character.
;l
It is something inward and personal which unifies
all values and organises all experience. It is the
reaction of the whole man to the whole reality. We
seek the religious object by totality of our faculties
and energies. Such functioning of the whole man may
be called spiritual life. ..
(155)
(157)
"The object of philosophical knowledge is realization
of reality" —— A.G. Javadekar Approaches to Reality,
1958, p.80.
Peter A. Bertocci, An Introduction to the Philosophy
of Religion, 1951, p.9.
As quoted by Radhakrishnan, op.cit., p.88.
(158)
An Idealist view of Life, p.88 •
(156)
1
182
"Religion is the language of the spirit in man.
It is the urge of the soul within,
the response of
the whole that is man to the call of the Absolute,"
(159)
writes Swami JCrishnahanda.
The religious quest
culminates in realisation of the absolute.
Anybody-
admitting this, striving towards this„becomes religious,
of course in degrees.
A scientist maintaining an
. unceasing quest after highest reality is also religious
in this broadest sense.
That is why Einstein'wrotes
"The most beautiful and the most profound
emotion we can experience is the sensation
of the mystical.
science.
It is the sower of all true
He, to him this emotion is strange,
who can no longer wonder and stand rapt in
awe, is as good as dead.
To know that what is
impenetrable to us really exists, manifesting
itself as the highest wisdom and the most
radiant beauty which our dull faculties can
comprehend only in their most primitive
form — this knowledge, this feeling is at
the centre of true religiousness."
_____
In this sense perhaps that "famous scientists
are’ deeply
religious."1
/
j
What
is
there
(159) Philosophy of Religion, 1985, p.102.
(160) As quoted by Robert B. Downs, 'Albert Einsteins
Relativity* in Mirror, Vol.XXII, No.4, February,
1983.
(161) Harry S. Broudy, op.cit., p.276.
\ A )t?
A
—
183
tnen In the so called antagonism between science and religion
or spirituality?
It is certainly ignorance/ Broudy gives the
best instances of' such ignorance wnen he writes* "It is when
men begin mixing things up — fighting disease with incantations
and testing a religious experience with a slide rule — that we
t
have our best examples of both religious and scientific
yi
ignorance."
-e-
Activities and Signs of Spirituality
If a faith in raeaningfulness
of life and universe/
a quest after the highest reality and value whether intellectually/
intuitively or in one's innermost being,
^ are things spiritual/
whatever things/ activities that help one progress towards this
are also spiritual - instrumentally or intrinsically.
In
Indian philosophy, even kama or pleasure value is regarded as a
glimpse of the highest value, moksa.
Whether he knows it or
not, man has a direct or indirect yearning for the highest
reality, perfection; therefore he is spiritual. M. Hiriyanna
writes* "It is the presence within him of this idea of perfection
that makes man a spiritual being. But the awareness of it
does not necessarily mean that he will consistently work for
its realization."
In fact, individuals vary in their effort
and actual attainment of degrees of perfection or realization
of the highest value. In the discussion of the nature of the
highest value in Chapter II* it was seen that it is a state of
purest existence, purest knowledge and purest peace and bliss.
There can be no desire for any other value, for it is, to use
the words of Javadekar," an experience which is so full and so
(162)
Ibid., p.276,
(163)
"The knower does not, indeed, know reality by means
of a certain faculty, he himself as purified being is
reality...." — A.G. Javadekar, op.cit., p.184
(164)
Indian Conception of Values, 1975, p.7.
134
firm that it absolutely dispels the possibility of being
excelled* Herein is reality par excellence*"
^
If actual attainment of highest reality gives man
such feelings which are embodiment of total spirituality#
then states or things of the same nature — to be in an
unruffled# unbiased state# of body and mind; to be an
authentic knower of deeper and deeper reality; not to be
tossed by endless desires; and to feel in oneself
peace and
/ *i
\
bliss# are certainly signs of spirituality.
Of course#
their depth or degree will determine the depth of spirituality.
Attainment of relatively lesser degree of these spiritual
virtues are necessarily related to other virtues and ethical
attainments* One who has no self-control or who cannot check
temptations# whatever the kind# cannot judge or know properly.
He cannot have a peaceful mind*
Although he may get joy by
falling a prey to, temptation# it can be temporary only; for
the new desires# new temptations will assail his mind and
heart# and falling a prey to temptations may bring bad
consequences in its train# resulting in pain# remorse# repentance
and sorrow*
Spirituality and Morality Go Together
\
Breaking the principles of morality or ethical codes
may also lead one to similar undesirable states of mindo
Thus the moral and spiritual values cannot be separated. One
cannot be spiritual without being moral; similarly one cannot
be moral without being spiritual. Telling the truth# keeping
one's promises# non-stealing etc. are moral virtues# yet in
order to practice them one must have spiritual virtues like
love of truth# integrity and self-control etc.
(165)
A.G. Javadekar# op.cit.# p.185*
(166)
"A liberated sage is perfectly content# has unruffled
peace of mind# experiences deep# abiding joy and
bliss,, possesses supersensual spiritual knowledge# and
has'the ability to clear any doubt."— Swami
Sivananda# "Characteristics of a Sage' in The Divine
Life Vol.XLV! No.I# January# 1983.
185
Thus virtues, Particularly those which point to
one's state of being and which are considered good in
themselves/ are spiritual in nature, 'one should not fall
a prey to temptation', is a moral principle. By following
this principle, one forms a habit, a disposition or
Samskar.
Similarly 'telling the truth' is a moral principle,
by following it one becomes truthful by disposition. Being
truthful is a spiritual virtue. It not only leads one to
follow the moral principle 'telling the truth1, but also
gives a feeling — a feeling of being something, a kind of
person, which is good. Quest after truth,after all,is the
)
basic spiritual virtue, and attaining one's true being is
the culmination of it.
Since virtues point to certain principles according
to which man tends to work, they are called moral, but being
virtuous points to a spiritual state.
Compassion is a
moral virtue, but being compassionate, a state which gives
the feeling of compassion points to a spiritual state. But
it is difficult to maintain a distinction between moral and
spiritual virtues, because the same virtue may indicate
^
vj
morality as well as spirituality. Self-control as a virtue
indicates that the person will be capable of following moral
principles, say 'not falling a prey to temptation*.
On the
other hand, when one is said to be self-controlled, it indicates
a state of his being which is established, somewhat in his
own nature.
Swami Sivananda writes 3 "The final end of
moral discipline is self-control.
The whole nature of man
must be disciplined..... Self-control will enable the
aspirant to know the truth, to desire the good, to win the
right and thus to realize Reality
(167)
Swami Sivananda, 'Ethical Discipline' in Swami
Krishnananda (ed) Resurgent Culture, 1961,
pp.51-52.
Attainment’ of Spiritual Values
'IT -1
I
'SV'~
1
■
II — in-" T— T-
.. i
'
■'
lf- ■ - J" "lrT 1
186
-I ■
The highest spiritual state cannot be thought of as
something remaining outside of man. 'The kingdom of heaven
is within you'. Giving the theme of what Vedanta . taught and
what Samkar preached, Swami Vivekananda writes:
"The
sanction of the Vedanta is the eternal nature of man, its
ethics are based upon the eternal solidarity of man, already
existing, already attained." ^168^ What is needed is to remove
the dross, the ignorance (Avidya).
The same truth is
reflected when Patanjali holds that 'by purification of being
or removal of impurities, the knower knows his original state1.
One's original state or reality is revealed by means
of self-control, self-purification and cultivation of virtues.
That is why the whole of' Indian literature on philosophy,
religion and spirituality lay stress on these as pre-conditions
for self-realization- or realisation of the absolute. Patanjali
(170)
lays down his eight fold discipline,
the Gita advises to
give up evil traits like indolence, delusion, ignorance, error,
laziness, fear etc. (belonging to Tamas), wrath, attachment,
jealousy, egoism etc. (belonging to Rajas), while it speaks in
favour of cultivating, faith forbearance, courage, concentration
etc. (belonging to Sattva) .
spirit of endurance, equanimity
and need for emancipating the intellect from attachment and
delusion is enjoined by the Gita so that one can be fit for the
(l72l
unitary knowledge.
Plato's conviction runs in the same
vein as that of Indian thought when he says in Phaedo
about a
purified being* "the soul then reasons best, when none of
these things disturb it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain
(168)
Swami Vivekananda, Lectures from Colombo to Almora,
p.167 • (As quoted by S.L.BhyraPPa,op.cit.,P'.45)
.cf "Education is the manifestion of perfection
already in man." Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda,
Vol.IV, p.304.
\
(169)
Tada drastuh Svarupevyasthanam - Yoga Sutra 1-3.
(170)
(171)
Y ama-niyama-agana-pranayama-pratyahara-dharanadhyana-Sam3dhi-Yoga~Sutra H-29.
The Gita - Chapter-YIV.
(172)
The Gita - Chapter-Il.
187
nor pleasure' of kind,,,, but it retires as much as possible within
itself# taking leave of tne body# and# as far as it can# not
communicating with or being in contact with'it# it aims at the
(170 )
discovery of that which is."
There is hardly any need to discuss here# elaborately
the means to spiritual attainment.
On the whole# it can be
stated that moral and spiritual virtues lead one in the path of
perfection# the highest spiritual attainment.
This is the reason
why# "In all the religious literatures of the world"#
Javadekar writes#
as
"we find^almost the same virtues preached."
He further adds * "Whatever philosophical differences there may
^
be# all are at one regarding the moral and spiritual qualifications/
essential for the realization of eternal truth."
(
When one progresses in spiritual life# one becomes
enlightened# wise# contented, peaceful and joyous* Various
miraculous
powers which are more or less attributed to great
mystics are said to be attained*Patanjali enlists many such
powers like steadiness#
super normal audition# knowledge of past
and future etc. in the third chapter of his book#'Yoga Sutra*.
The Society for Psychological Research established in England
in 1882 and many parapsychology departments confirm the
1—
existence of psychic powers like telepathy# clairvoyance#
clair audience# deviation# premonition etc. Tyrrell# Richet#
He Dougall# H. Carington# Geley etc. are of the opinion that
(175)
there is conclusive evidence of such mysterious phenomena.
Taking note of these# Javadekar writes*
"The implication of
all these things could not be neglected by philosophy and
epistemology. What is important is that there are other ways
of knowing than the sensory and intellectual# and that they
are more powerful both in extensity and intensity than the
.
...
,,(176)
familiar ways."
(173)
As quoted by A.G. Javadekar# op.cit.#' p.184.
(1.74)
A.G. Javadekar#
Ibid.# 183.
(175)
(176)
Ibid.# 183.
op.cit.# p.182.
188
All these point to the possibilities of intuitive
knowledge, intuitive feeling and intuitive realization of
values. The yogic practices of dharana , dhvana and Samadhi
(collectively known as Samyama) result in intuition or
pranj a - which reveals the truth or ultimate reality and makes
one omniscient*
The above things are discussed as possibilities. What
one man attains# others can also attain. There is the same
potentiality in everyone.
When Swami Vivekananda said/ "If the
Buddha is one end of the process of change# at the other end
(178)
amoeba must have been the Buddha also"#
-he meant this
potentiality.
How many will be interested to realize their
potentialities is a different thing. If highest spiritual
values seem too lofty for many (who continuing their lives in
their offsprings may realize in a distant future when the whole
of mankind is ripe for it)#there is no reason why they cannot
feel the joys of spiritual life in some of the virtues and
states like being equanimous# peaceful etc. To quote Gordon
W. Allports "If the prejudiced style of life can be learnt and certainly it is not innate - then surely the tentative
style or in Gandhi's terms# 'the equi-minded outlook' can also
,
.
. „ (179)
be acquired."
The terms — self“integration# self-realization#
and self-actualization etc. which psychologists hold as
desirable can be termed as moral and spiritual virtues in
lesser extensity and intensity.
The virtues which humanists
(177)
(178)
Rtambhara tatra Pranja - Yoga Sutra 1.48.
As quoted by S.L. BhyraPPa# op.cit.# p.45.
(179)
Compatibility in the -Light of Social Sciences'
in A.H. Maslow (ed) New knowledge in Human
Values,# 1959# p.148.
desire to manifest in man, can be said to belong to the group
of moral and spiritual values*
To the German philosopher
Gehlens "The principle of the spiritual enables man to be
relieved from the pressure of the biological* it enables him
to remove himself from the compulsions of impulse and thereby
create the hiatus as a result of which it becomes possible to
determine things within himself.
The ability to consider
oneself and consequently to hold one's impulses in check/ the
possibility of delaying action, of renouncing it, of being
an ascetic and, from that, the development of morality
—
these must be seen as what is specifically human."
Thus
humanism cannot be devoid of spirituality.
If man has 'the
principle of‘the spiritual' in him, humanism has to recognise
it, nourish it.
All these considerations prove the existence of
spiritual values which can be realized in lower or higher
degrees depending on the knowledge and will of the persons. In
fact, knowledge lightens the path of virtue and some virtues
become preconditions of knowledge.
Even if man does not
keep any higher aim, some moral and spiritual virtues
become essential for maintaining life smoothly.
Whatever may
be the source of knowledge, whatever the way or methods to it,
knowing itself is a virtue of the spirit.
experience*
partial.
So is feeling and
Any knowledge is knowledge of reality however
Perfect intuition may be the culmination of knowing
which reveals ultimate reality, yet other kinds of knowledge
(180)
Theme of A. Gehlen's work* Anthropological
Research', as given by Kurt Aurin, 'What we
mean by Humanising school', in Education,
Vol.24. Institute for Scientific Cooperation
Federal Republic of Germany, 1981, p.106
(181)
"Virtue and Knowledge are two aspects of the same
thing as good and beauty are* No virtue without
knowledge, but also no knowledge without
virtue."
A.G* Javadekar, op.crt., p.185.
190
which reveal ^relative reality cannot be said to be existing
separately.
{l8?}
Knowledge is a continuum. '’Intuition need
not be regarded as an independent faculty of knowledge. It
xs a name for the absolutely purified^ intellect.
t
/
If"search after perfect knowledge is a spiritual
quest/ the search of any knowledge is also a spiritual quest,
although it may vary in extensity, intensity and validity.
Knowledge makes one rational, helps one to be moral and further
intensifies spirituality by deepening feeling. Similarly
positive feelings or experiences are spiritual in nature.
The only difference between ordinary feeling of joy and highest
spiritual feeling is that while ordinary feeling or experience
is chaotic and momentary, spiritual feeling or experience is
integrated and everlasting.
That is why in Indian philosophy,
Kama, the pleasure value is regarded as a glimpse of the
highest value, Moksa.
All moral and spiritual effort only
lead to expansion, intensity, integration of the chaotic
knowledge and feelings so that they become more and more
durable# at last equalling eternal time in duration.
Thus spirituality and spiritual values need not be
thought of as something alien to man.
Every knowledge, every
act, every feeling that leads one higher and higher in the
value hierarchy become steps in the spiritual ladder. One,
(182)
(183)
(184)
“...all our experience is revelatory of reality,
although all our experience is not a uniform
revelation of reality. Our experience exhibits
a scale of forms at the minimum end of which is
a revelation of reality and not something which
is totally a negation of it." Ibid, p.107.
Ibid., p.183.
"In all experience it is the real that is
revealed. In no experience could there be a
revelation of that which is altoghether unreal*
It is true that one experience may sublate the
other, and we may have a scale of values of the
different level of experience some of which are
regarded as more real and some less real."
-— A.G .Javadekar, op.cit.,pp.25-26.
191
who, keeping thfe highest spiritual goal in view,integrates
his values becomes consciously spiritual# ensuring a steady and
unceasing progress.
Those who do not keep such highest goal as
their aim may stagnate at any level.
They also do not
p
know what they are or what they do in any ultimate sense. They'',,-..,
If i l
do not know where from they come and where they go. Like
bubbles that rise from water and disolve'in water after being
swayed hither and thither; they also take birth and plod on
aimlessly and die.
One individual's birth, feelings, activities and
death seen very common, very gross like all' that happens to
a bubble in gross water.
Yet just as
water is composed of
atoms of oxygen and hydrogen, any atom having an ultra-microworld
hidden in it; however gross different aspects of man may seem,
they too have infinite mistery behind them.
Seeking the
------
ultimate roots of a bubble makes one a scientist; seeking the
ultimate roots of life, feeling, values etc. makes one a
philosopher and a spiritual person.
If the scientist# the
philosopher and the spiritualist discover the ultimate root in
each one's case as one and the same# there can be no distinction
among them.
Names# after all# make little difference*
The
„ --
success of scientists and philosophers# who generally represent
empiricism and rat±arta!i.sm (but a scientist can also take# accept
and combine rationality
and intuition as alternative or
complementary approaches to reality#
and in the same spirit can
a philosopher take empiricism and intuition# and a spiritualist#
(185)
"Who is the knower then? He is an ignorant,
imperfect man who aspires to become perfect*
Omit this aspiration and he remains on the
lowest rung of the ladder. Put in this aspiration and he is capable of climbing to the
highest rung of it. It is this urge within
him that makes of him the knower and makes
for the possibility of his getting more and
more knowledge as he goes on removing his
limitations."
A.G. Javadekar# op.cit.#p.80.
empiricism and rationalism), has been doubted on the grounds
of epistemoligy only on the face of ultimate reality. There
192
is no reason why empiricism and rationalism, and the values
they represent cannot take one to the verge of the ultimate
reality - the ultimate value.
Thus what is pleaded is not
their abandonment, but acceptance of intuition as a way of
knowing and feeling, and recognition of spiritual values as
real.
While the empirical and rational values can be
subsumed under
the intuitive or spiritual values, the
former without the latter become rootless and unmaintainable.
All have their place in the hierarchy of knowledge and values,
and therefore they must be recognised and cultivated in that
order•
2.3.3
Traditional Indian and Modern Classes of Values
Artha, kama, dharma and moksa being the four traditional
classes of values in India, they can now be compared with
modern classes of values.
Values in modern times are classified under several
heads. Since the classification that has been done in this
work is keeping with modern trend, it will suffice to take them
into consideration for comparison with traditional classes.
The classes of values arrived at in this work are (l) Organic
or health values,
(2) Hedonic
(3) Recreational values,
or pleasure values,
(4) Aesthetic values,
(7) Social values,
(5) Economic
values,
(6) Personal values,
(8) Intellectual
values,
(9) Moral values and (lO) Spiritual values.
When one
comes into individual values, there are many like! health and
cleanliness; joy and pleasure; play and amusement; art and
music; money and frugality; self-respect and fame; cooperation
and friendship; truth and logicality; honesty and truthfulness;
love and peace.
of values.
Evidently these come under different classes
Similarly the modern classes of values can be
grouped under the four broad traditional classes of values —
known as "the four supreme ends"^^6^
----- -- -- —..... *......'"TT... .
(lS6)
... .......... -... ..................... ........... *
S.' Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of life, 1931, p*78.
193
The traditional four classes of values included
every value for 'leading a full life including spiritual freedom.
Thus it can be1said that the traditional classification does
not contain less classes of valu^than the modern classification.
The modem _ classification is only a matter of further speci­
fication or demarkation# which has# perhaps resulted from tile
modem tendency of ccmpartmentalization, specialization and
specification. To give an example# philosophy as a discipline
contained within it, both pure philosophy and psychology
(in still older' times all other disciplines)# but now they
are two separate disciplines.
say that philosophy of olden
Just as it would be wrong to
days did not deal with psychology
or was oblivious of psychology# in the same way it will be
wrong to say that the four traditional classes of values did
not contain the modem classes of values* Although the
principles or criteria of classification# as stated earlier
(intra# 2.3.1)# were somewhat different# an attempt can be
made to show the affinity of modem values with the four
traditional values as followss (1)
Arth$. i.
Economic values*
(2)
Kama
iiw
iii.
iv.
(3)
■
Aesthetic values
Recreational values
Hedonic or Pleasure values
V*
Dharma "vi.
Moral values
vii.
Personal values
viii.
ix.
(4)
Organic or health values
Social values
Intellectual values.
Moksa x.
Spiritual values*
Artha to Indians not only meant money# but also
anything that can be exchanged say a thing of consumption like
food.
Pood used as an exchange value becomes artha* while it
1
\
194
is being consumed for pleasure# it becomes a thing of
kama.
Modern philosophy# in the same way# considers'education'
as an instrumental as well as an intrinsic value# because
(187)
education helps to secure wealth#
it also gives pleasure
(18 8)
while it is being pursued.
It can be said that artha
and kama represent all the lower order values — instrumental and
intrinsic respectively. In the same way# (although dharma
t
was considered as an intrinsic value in early periods by certain
schools of philosophy) it can be said that dharma represents
all the higher instrumental values which lead to the highest
intrinsic value i.e. Moksa which is described as a state of
i. ..ii.ni.... ' #"i"
non-conditional freedom and peace.
The justification for grouping personal and social
values under dharma is that they are supposed to be moral
in character — personal being intra-personal morality and
social being inter-personal morality.
Of course# personal
and social values do not refer to any specific value classes#
for when personal and social wealth are spoken of# they cane
under artha or economic value; but when personal and social
morality are considered# they come under dharma.
In Indian
system of values# dharma takes care of the conflict between
individual and society# and thus between personal and social
values through the principle of morality pr righteousness on
the criteria of the grand philosophical ideals "Sarve Bhabantu
Sukhinah11 - Let all be happy - as concerns temporal values#
and by the highest ideal of —Sarva-mukti (liberation of all)
as concerns spiritual values.
(187)
(188) '
Artha karisca vidya - Learning is instrumental
to wealth.
The expression in the Gita 1 Jnana-vinj an truptatma*
- pleased with 'knowledge' — makes_learningi_
intrinsic# but in the expression 'Sa Vidya Ya Vimuktaye'
—Learning is that which liberates — learning#
especially higher learning# is taken in an instru­
mental sense# hence can be grouped under dharma.
195
2.3.4
Conflict -Between Traditional and Modem Values
c
The consideration of the classification of values and
certain related issues has shown that there is no basic
conflict between the traditional and modern values/ but
certainly a strife is felt among than/ and this conflict/ as
can be seen under/ is over the questions "How much stress
should be given on which value?".
Traditional Indian philosophies/ as has been pointed
out earlier/ did not look down upon artha and kama or wealth
and pleasure values, but regarded them as pre-requisites for
other values and spoke of their acquisition and enjoyment in
a righteous way and as a means to higher ends of dharma and moksa.
Even wealth was considered as a means to dharmat
dhanat dharmah tato sukhah- wealth helps to acquire dharma & finally
happiness accrues. Likewise, the Indians did not despise kama
or pleasure value, rather they treated them as glimpses of
the bliss of moksa, and this may be one reason why the temples
contain beautiful art forms, even luscious sculptures, and
music and literature so rich in all sorts of tastes. But seeing
the fallibility and transience of both artha. and kama, (for
artha, the instrumental value does not always bring the
expected end, nor kama which is delightful, lasts for long
or brings good in its train), as instrumental and intrinsic
values, they conceptualized another ideal pair i.e. dharma
and moksa. Although, they gave equal importance to all values,
the final aim was realisation of the highest ideal i.e. moksa
and for this reason, different stages of life known as
aferamas were devised. Although there is difference as to when
moksa is attained, whether here while living or after death,
Advaita gives the concept of i ivnmukti, an .enlightened, blissful,
Peaceful and liberated state which can be attained here on earth,
and some other philosophies including un-orthodox Buddhist and
Jain Philosophies have similar views in their conception of
Buddhahood and arhat-ship, the highest stages attainable by
human being^ just preceding Nirvan and Kaivalva.
Thus charging
'
196
Indian philosophy and religion as other worldly is both false
and unjustified# .and this has been vindicated at several
places by leading modern' Indian Philosophers like Radhakrishnan
Hiriyanna and Raiu etc. / ^®^although there is no doubt that
Indians equally stressed moral and spiritual values.
world?
And what value is being stressed more in the present
It is-wealth (artha) and enjoyment (kama)# rather
indulgence- There is too much importance on wealth and means
of money making and that too, by fair or foul which thinkers
whether of East or West are lamenting. Radhakrishnan traced
this tendency as far back as in the twenties# and in one of his
speeches, at Manchester College# Oxford# observed/ "there is
unfortunately an increasing tendency to interpret welfare in
(190)
terms of wealth".
Among Westerners# Emerson# Erich Fromm#
Maslow etc. deplored the dehumanisation of humanity as a
(189) a. "It is generally contended that Indians were more
interested in metaphysics and religion than in
politics and human welfare. This is not quite correct.
Dharmarthakama - mokshmam arogym mulam uttamam* For
the practice of dharma# artha# kama and moksa# the
chief basis is arogya. In other words physical well­
being, positive health is an essential pre-requisite
of any other kind of development# either of spiritual
qualities or intellectual power's" - Radhakrishnan# S.
The Present Crisis of Faith# 1983# p.185.
b.-"But all the most important writers agree that the
negative attitude to the world# which has come to be
associated with Indian philosophy, is the result of a
false doctrine# which# being untrue to reality# has
produced undesirable consequences- Not only these
philosophers# but also many European interpreters
of Indian thought and culture have observed that
original writings of ancient Brahmins# both philosophical
and literary# were full of zest for life and enthusiasm
for action. Their senses were alive to the rich
variety of experience# and their minds were keen on
the values of life."
Raju# P.T.# Idealistic Thought of India# p.395.
(190)
Radhakrishnan# S. The Hindu View of Life# 1931# p.113.
197
J '
•
(l9l)
result of sub-ordiffating men to things.
Maslow saw a
“state of valuelessness" in the modern society the symptoms
of which comprise* "anomic#
amorality#
anhedonia# rootlessness,
emptiness" etc.# and one of the causes he gave is mankind's
(192)
"busyness with the superficial" •v
Why has there been so much stress on artha and kama
in modem age?
'This is# perhaps# due the influence of some
Western Philosophies which are more materialistic in their
outlook, and also due to misunderstanding of Darwin’s theory
of evolution# seme of the conclusions of which are* "struggle
for existence#
survival of the fittest". World has witnessed
much oppression, much horror is some peoples' bid to prove
themselves more fit by conquoring others, subjugating and
exploiting them by all means. The world has also seen# and
perhaps still sees# the ill effects of too much stress on
production and consumption of things# particularly of luxury
goods# by industrialization in a grand way# through capitalist
economy and uncontrolled markets.
There is now a grave
unequal state of affairs in the economy of countries as well as
(l9l)
(192^
"The other obstacles to the achievement of well-being,
deeply, rooted in the spirit of modem society is the
fact of man's dethronement from his supreme place. The
nineteenth century said* God is dead; the twentieth
century could say* Man is dead. Means have been
transformed into ends# the production and consumption
of things has become the aim of life, to which living
is sub-ordinated. We produce things that act like men
and men that act like things. Man has transformed
himself into a thing and worships the products of his
own hands, he is alienated from himself and has
regressed to idolatory# even though he uses God's
name. Emerson already saw that 'things are in the
Saddle and ride mankind' . Today many of us see it.
The achievement of well-being is possible only under
one condition if we put man back into the Saddle"•
Erich Frcmm# Values# Psychology and Human Existence"
in Maslow# A.H. (ed.)# New Knowledge in Human Value#
1959# p.164.
Maslow A.H.# Ibid.# Preface# p.VII.
198
of people*•
The gulf between the haves and have-nots has
increased sb much that in India there is now about fiftypercent people below poverty line# who find it very hard
to survive. Equality(which has been the motto of democratic'
as well as socialistic countries) and competitiveness
cannot go together.
How can the less able come up to an
equal level unless all direct or indirect controls and
exploitations are given up# and every human activity is
guided by the principle of morality and a sense of fellow
feeling which always does not demand according to ability
but also sacrifices something for others?
What is strange is that some have made Indian
Philosophies scaPe-goats by misinterpreting some of the
concepts like ‘karmabad1# ‘dharma* etc. for the economic
inequality# abj.ec£ poverty of the massess; but it can be
remembered that when Indian philosophies were in full
force# India was quite rich and there was not such grave
inequality among people.
The present state has rather
been due to long foreign rule and due to big industrialisa­
tion without proper controls# which has thrown the masses out
of jobs and has helped concentration of wealth in the hands
of a few# which helps in many direct and indirect controls
and exploitations. Of course# industrialisation cannot be
stopped# for more has to be produced for catering to the
needs of the increasing population# but it has to be seen
what is produced# whether luxury goods or basic commodities#
and by whom it is produced# by a few capitalists or by the
people themselves# otherwise things may be rotting in the
market while people will be dying without perchasing capacity.
Thus it can be seen that too much stress on any value#
without consideration of means and its interdependence with
other values can neither help in realisation of the stressed
value by all equally# nor can it foster general well-being,
V
199
for'how c^n; one think of the pleasures of life and. morality
without fulfilment of survival needs?'
How can people be
equal in economy# free in availing opportunities if some
people exploit others directly or indirectly?
Thus the
soundness of Indian Philosophy in giving justified stress
(193)
to all values
through dharma or righteousness should
appeal people once again.
Further certain values like liberty# equality#^
fraternity# justice etc. which are recognised as democratic
values and have been the guiding principle as well as motto
of Indian Constitution# might have been popularised by
Western thinkers# but they were not unknown to Indians#
rather they were the ideals explicitly or implicitly sought
by both Indian Philosophies and religions.
It is now
accepted by all philosophers that liberty or freedom is
created through discipline and adherence to certain
principles evolved by the people. Stress on dharma which
included discipline and righteoushess in everything aimed
at freedom in temporal things at personal and social level#
and final liberty or liberation at personal level in mukti#
and at social level in Sarva-mukti (mass-liberation). How
could a people aspire after eternal liberty unless they knew
the importance and taste of temporal freedom at the individual
and social level?
As regards equality# this was the conclusion of
Indian Philosophies as well as religions. Indian thinkers
regarded each individual# nay# every being as equal. Their
conception of equality is not anthropocentric as that of
western thinkers# but is biocentric which implies that every
living being contains in itself a spark of reality for the
full expansion of which it is evolving constantly# and
(193)
"Dharmartha Kama Samaneva Sevyar.** — Dharma# artha
and Kama should be enjoyed equally.
200
therefore has a right to live in its own capacity and
light of experience. Advaita
philosophy is not content in
regarding others as equals but thinks them as the very
self.
(194)
To the theistic philosophers/ every being was
equal in the eyes of God. It can be pointed out here that
equality/ as regards physical capacity/ intelligence/ wealth
etc* is not a fact/ but an ideal which the political philoso­
phies/ both democratic and socialistic are striving to
achieve. And there can be no limit to the extension of this
ideal-it may cover the whole of humanity or all living
creatures/ depending of course/ on the growth of justice
and morality of the people.
When equality is thus established/ fraternity or
brotherhood follows as a necessary deduction.
In popular
conception it requires a common parenthood for fraternity.
In Indian philosophies/ it is supplied by the conception of
prakrti and purusa of dvaita philosophy/ by the conception
of ^fevara or God by theistic or religious philosophies/ and
by the Advaitic conception of Brahman as a common source of
manifestation and desolution. Perhaps due to lack of
interpretation and popularisation for different reasons/
these values had to be borrowed from Western countries as
political ideals# but to many Indians they are not unknown
in their deepest sense. Thus these modem democratic values
are not in conflict with traditional ideology or values.
(195)
Rather they are accepted as "great ideals" •
A point may be raised whether the stress on science
and technology that is being given now is antagonistic to
traditional values. A clear understanding of them can show
the irrelevance of this question. History shows much evidence
(194)
"I believe in advaita. I believe in the essential
unity of man and for that matter all that lives"
M.K. Gandhi# Young India# 29-9*-24 As quoted
by M.S. Patel# The Educational Philosophy of
Mahatma Gandhi# 1958# p.ll*
(195)
Radhakrishnan# S.# The Modem Crisis of Faith#
198 3# pH 146.
201
that not only in philosophy/ once India was in the fore front
in science, mathematics, technology, medicine, art,
architecture, music, literature etc. also. This would not have
been possible if these values were neglected.
The thing is
that natural sciences and metaphysics do not pursue different
thingss their aim is unravelling the misteries of the
(196)
universe, explaining and discovering reality.
Whatever is
possible through observation and experimentation is well and
good, but the philosophers do not rest content without trying
to explain the unexplained by metaphysics.
Similarly,
technology is culmination of human knowledge in some
appliances as means of production of different values of
consumption.
There was no time when man did not try to
evolve better technology, however simple those may be.
Thus
there can be no conflict about it, but what is to be stressed
is that technology should not be used as means of exploitation
on the economic front, for threatening and exterminating
others in war front, and for spreading perversion in everything
and every activity that is connected with consumption.
The
Indian ideal is: better equal distribution what mankind
possesses rather than more production and sophistication of
luxury with enequality in possession and enjoyment. The Indian
view has, as already pointed out, always been: no overstress
on anything, hence not even science and technology.
Radhakrishnan rightly observes : "......
an exclusive or
one-side emphasis on scientific studies results in grave
disadvantages, power and wealth begin to exercise a kind of
intoxication on the minds of men.
succeed.
We wish to get on and
Other ends are subordinated to this one end of
achieving greater wealth and higher social status x x x
(196)
if
"Science, philosophy and religion, all attempt to reveal
the truth which is ultimately one and all inclusive. We
cannot have different truths covering the same grounds"Radhakrishnan, S., The Present Crisis of Faith, p.17.
202
we are only learned without being truly cultured#'we become
a danger to’'society# Sa - aksaro viparitative raksaso
bhavanti Dhruvam - he who is literate# when inverted becomes
a demon."^197^
The above considerations should resolve the apparent
conflict between traditional and modem values#
and the fact
of inter dependence of values and ideals for real well-being
should imply equal stress on all values.
(197)
Radhakrishnan# S. The Present Crisis of Faith# pp.147-48.
c.f. Aristotle's observations "Man when perfected is the
best of animals#, but when separated from law and justice#
he is the worst of all# since armed injustice is the more
dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms meant
to be used by intelligence and virtue which he may use
for the worst ends. Wherefore if he has not virtue# he
is the most unholy and the most savage of animals".
As quoted# Ibid# p.148.