A Conflict Analysis of the
Suez Canal Invasion of 1956
MWlianr A t Wright
Alicliael C. Slmpe
NiallA1. Fraser
arid
Keith W. Hipel
Departrnent of Systems Design Engineering
University of Waterloo
Waterloo. Ontario Canada
1.
Introduction
At dusk on October 29, 1956, an attack was launched on Egypt by the
alliance comprised of Great Britain, France and Israel. Its objective was the
occupation of the Suez Canal Zone. The attack was the culmination of three
months o f talks and negotiations instigated by Egypt’s nationalization o f the
canal o n July 2 6 , 1956. What had started as a political conflict had escalated
into a military one.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that a conflict analysis technique recently developed by Fraser and Hipel (1979) can be used t o thoroughly
study the complex Suez crisis. It is shown that accurate predictions can be
made of the possible final resolutions t o the conflict. In some conflicts or
games the participants or players may not be aware of the true situation. This
was the case for Egypt when the Western powers unexpectedly invaded the
Suez Canal. Whenever there is a mistaken interpretation of any aspect o f the
game by one or more of the players, the conflict is called a hypergame (Bennett
and Dando, 1977). The method of Fraser and Hipel (1979) can readily accommodate 3 hypergame situation such as the Suez invasion of 1956.
Following a historical description of the crisis, the Suez invasion is formulated as a hypergame consisting of players, their options and their preferences.
The game is then analyzed t o study the outcomes that are predicted as compared to the actual resolution of this example of strategic surprise.
27
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2. Historical Events
On July 26, 1956, in a speech in Alexandria, President Nasser of Egypt
announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. This action was the climax of
international tensions that have previously been studied using a game theoretic
approach by Shupe et al. (1980). By controlling the Suez Canal, Nasser anticipated that its revenue could be utilized t o assist in financing the Aswan Dam
(Bowie, 1974).
Britain and France were deeply shocked by the nationalization of the canal,
as was the rest of the world. Britain was vitally concerned over the flow of
oil from the Middle East, and because of its high investments in the canal and
its declining position in the area, it viewed Nasser’s action as a critical threat.
France considered the Suez canal as a French undertaking since its construction
was originally organized by a Frenchman, and France already viewed Nasser
with hostility because of his support of the Algerian rebels. For Britain and
France regaining control of the canal would guarantee a vital supply route and
would serve t o humiliate Nasser. Thus, Britain and France immediately wanted
urgent and decisive action against Egypt. An integrated British-Frenchmilitary
command was soon established with the British in charge.
At this stage Britain and France assumed that the U.S. would be involved
in their plans, but the U.S. had a developing and delicate position in the Middle
East and negligible investments in the Canal. The Americans were prepared
neither t o support nor to approve armed intervention. The maximum demand
from the U.S. was the efficient operation of the canal and freedom of passage
through it.
The U.S.S.R. wished t o gain influence in the Middle East because of its
concern over the West’s attempts at containment (Kanet, 1974). For instance,
the Baghdad Pact, a defence agreement betweenTurkey,Iran and Great Britain
and supported by the U.S., was designed t o protect the member countries from
the Communist threat (Glubb, 1969). Havingmade political advances in Egypt,
Russia wished t o support it in any negotiations concerning the Suez Canal.
On August 2, 1956, the British cabinet made the final decision that while
a negotiated settlement should be sought for the Suez situation, force would
be used if the negotiations failed. In France, both the right and left political
factions urged military action. The right did so because of French Algeria and
the left because of its support of Israel. Also, the French military required a
boost in morale after successive defeats in Algeria and Indo-China. Success in
Egypt would improve its military prestige.
From August 16 t o August 23, a conference of twenty-two maritime nations (Egypt was invited but did not attend) met in London t o discuss international operation of the Suez Canal. At the end, eighteen nations (with
Ceylon, India, Indonesia and the U.S.S.R. refraining) called for the operation,
maintenance, and development control t o be vested in a Suez Canal Board.
Egypt was t o be represented on the Board and was t o grant the Board all rights
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A CONFLICTANAL YSIS
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and facilities required for its function. Nasser denounced the proposal as a
plan for “collective colonialism” (Nutting, 1972).
Prime Minister Eden o f Great Britain was under the impression that the
U.S. would acquiesce t o the use of force if Nasser rejected the conference’s
proposal. Eden thought that he would have American support, whereas the
U.S. was merely playing for time. On September 3 , President Eisenhower of
the U.S. wrote t o Eden that American public opinion flatly rejected force.
Further, on a personal and professional level he did not see how a successful
result could be achieved by forcible means (Guhin, 1972).
On September 4, in a further attempt for a negotiated settlement, U.S.
Secretary of State Dulles presented a proposal t o Britain for the Suez Canal
User’s Association (SCUA). SCUA was vaguely defined as an organization
which would hire pilots, receive transit dues, and supervise the canal’s management without prejudice t o Egypt’s sovereignty. This move was seen by Dulles
as a way of further delaying armed conflict in the event that Egypt continued
not t o cooperate. Eden, however, interpreted it as a means of depriving Nasser
of the revenue from the canal by force, if necessary. On September 14, the
proposal was made public and on September 15, Nasser responded, “SCUA
would lead t o international anarchy . . . It was designed t o usurp Egypt’s sovereignty and rights t o control the Canal” (Nutting, 1972).
The U.N. Security Council debate on the Suez issue lasted from the 5th t o
the 14th of October, 1956. In spite o f apparent headway, none of the parties
was negotiating in good faith. As far as the British wereconcerned, their Secret
Service had advised them, “to discount anything agreed by Fawzi (the Egyptian
Foreign Minister) on the grounds that he was too close a friend of Hammarskjold (the U.N. Secretary General)” (Thomas, 1966). Nasser later said, “I have
n o intention o f removing the canal from Egyptian policies. We have used a
conciliatory tactic in New York, that’s all” (Robertson, 1965). Furthermore,
the British and French were in the midst of planning a secret military operation
with Israel against Egypt.
During the mid 1950’s, France had been secretly supplying Israel with
military weapons t o gain Israel’s support in the Middle East. Consequently,
in late September, France suggested to Eden the idea of an alliance with Israel.
His reaction was one of interest and caution but he let the French continue
their discussions with Israel and advised the military command t o develop a
plan. For the Israelis, there were tremendous advantages t o be gained. As
Moshe Dayan, the Israeli commander, later told his general staff, “We should
behave like the cyclist who is riding uphill when a truck chances by and he
grabs hold” (Thomas, f966).
On October 16, Eden went t o Paris t o discuss the joint operation with
Mollet, the French Premier. The military plan called for the Israelis t o launch
a major attack on the Sinai on October 29. The objective of this attack, as
described in the directives issued on October 25 by Dayan, was “tocreate amilitary threat t o the Suez Canal by seizing objectives in its proximity”(Thomas,
1966). This threat was t o provide a pretext for the British-French forces t o
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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT A N D PEACE SCIENCE
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intervene. An ultimatum would then be issued on October 30. This was t o
be sent to Israel and Egypt and would call for an immediate ceasefire which,
if not obeyed, would allow the British-French forces t o occupy the canal zone
(Beaufre, 1969).
From October 23 to the 24, the French and IsraeliPrime hlinisters,hlollet
and Ben-Gurion, and the British Foreign Minister, Lloyd, secretly met in a
private villa in France. There they signed a declaration of intent concerning
the joint operation. The leaders (althougli apparently not their aides) swore
that none would in the lifetime o f the others reveal what they had witnessed
(Thomas, 1966).
From October 16 t o 3 0 , there existed a communication blackout between
Washington and London. The British were determined t o use force and planned
to present the U.S. with a “fait accoinpli.” The US. wanted t o d o everything
possible t o avoid the use of force. The U.S. was aware by the middle of October
that the Israelis were planning some military operation. Though it was thought
that the action was t o be against Jordan, the U.S. warned Israel that it would
censure any military move. It was also apparent that Britain and France were
becoming active. In the midst of an election, the U.S. assumed that two of its
closest allies would wait.
In both Britain and France, knowledge o f the plan was severely restricted.
The British and French Prime Ministers issued explicit orders which forbade infonnation of any kind being given t o anybody who had n o direct need t o know
(Robertson, 1965). Consequently, vital information was not passed through
the ordinary channels of communication upon which NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organization), friendly military missions, and service attaches usually
relied upon for intelligence. Starting on October 22,1956, Russia wasinvolved
with the popular uprising in Hungary. The British and French were assisted
by ihis event since it focused diplomaticand publicattention on thisnewcrisis.
At dusk o n October 29, Israel launched the attack on the Sinai. When
Nasser learned of it, he thought it was an isolated action but he decided to reinforce the defences east of the canal. On October 30, Nasser received the
British-French ultimatum. At this point in time, the Israeli forces were still a
hundred miles from the canal. Since the ultimatum requested each side t o retreat t o positions ten miles east and west of the canal, it was actually demanding
that the Egyptians retreat 110 miles and the Israelis advance 90 miles. This
was so unusual that, “Nasser believed that the ultimatum must be a bluff or a
ruse t o help Israel t o achieve an easy victory in the Sinai by drawing Egyptian
forces away from the Negev border t o protect Port Said and the Canal” (Nutting, 1972). On October 31, learning of an allied air attack on his airfields,
Nasser realized he had been wrong and was in danger of having his main forces
caught cast of the Canal. Nasser gave orders for a general retreat from the Sinai.
On November 5 , the British-French forces landed at Port Said and Port Fuad.
At this time Nasser received a reply from the Soviet leader, Khrushchev,
t o his request for aid. Though not willing to physically intervene on behalf o f
Egypt and “risk getting involved in a third world war for the sake o f the Suez
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Canal” (Nutting, 1972), Russia was prepared to call for a halt to hostilities.
The U.S.S.R. sent a threatening message to London saying, “What would be
Britain’s situation if stronger governments, possessing all forms of contemporary destructive arms, attacked her? If missile weapons were employed against
Britain or France, you, no doubt, would call this a barbarous action. How,
then, is the inhumane attack made by the British and French armed forces on
an almost defenceless Egypt any different?” (Progress Publishers, 1975). Furthermore, Russian planes were detected flying over Turkey to an unknown
destination. It was thought that the planes were either carrying “volunteers”
or were bombers heading for the British-French fleet lying off Port Said. Russia
then asked Turkey for permission for a cruiser and three destroyers to pass
through the Dardanelles.
The U.S., in response to British and French requests for reassurance, said,
“The Government of the United States will respect its obligations under the
North Atlantic Treaty arrangements . .” (Robertson, 1965). This was interpreted to mean that the U.S. would support Europe in a nuclear attack but that
it would not support European forces in the Mediterranean and Egypt against
an attack from Russia. In addition, Britain’s oil supplieshad been stopped and
there was a run on the pound. Britain was in desperate need of American financial and oil support, which were denied. In order to avoid asevere financial
crisis and devaluation, Britain needed a loan of300million pounds. As a result
of this pressure from both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., a ceasefire was imposed
on the evening of November 6,1956.
.
3. The Hypergame Formulation
The modelling and analysis of the Suez hypergame is performed using the
technique of Fraser and Hipel (1979), which is an improved version of the
metagame analysis algorithm of Howard (1971). The technique models the
conflict a t a particular point in time. The involved parties or players each have a
set of options. If a player selects the options that he wishes to implement, a
strategy is formed, and when all the players choose a strategy an outcome is
created. A list of all the possible feasible outcomes is developed, and they are
arranged in decreasing order of preference for each player in a preference vector.
Then each outcome represented in the preference vector is analyzed to determine whether any player can reach a more desirable outcome by changing his
own strategy. Any outcome from which no player can improve is said to be
an equilibrium and represents a possible resolution to the conflict.
In a hypergame one or more of the players has a mistaken perception of
the actual game. For example, in the Suez conflict the Egyptians did not realize
that Britain and France were considering the secret option of invading the
canal. To analyze a hypergame using the method of Fraser and Hipel (1979),
outcomes are analyzed for stability for each player according to the manner
in which the particular player interprets the conflict. Each player knows his
own preferences regarding the possible outcomes, and these preferences are
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CONFLICThfANAGEhfENTANDPEACE SCIENCE
FALL, 1980
represented in his preference vector. Likewise, a given player has his own concept of what constitutes the preference vectors of the other players. Where
a player’s perception differs from the true preferences of another player, an
extra preference vector presenting his view is developed. The analysis of stability of an outcome for a player is done for the conflict as seen by the particular player, whereas the overall stability of an outcome is determined by examining the true preference of all the players.
4.
Options
The Suez Conflict is analyzed for the point in time shortly after the British
have been invited into the French-Israeli secret coalition in late September,
1956. At this time, Britain could join the secret French-Israeli alliance or negotiate guarantees for the Suez Canal through SCUA or Egypt. If Britain chose
to negotiate SCUA, it could also exert economic pressure and threaten military
action to force the Egyptians to accept the conditions of SCUA. Egypt did
not realize the attack option existed, but it was fully aware of the other options. Alternately, Britain could opt to do nothing. This would mean conceding the canal to Egypt and recognizing Egyptian nationalism.
France could proceed with Britain and Israel in the secret alliance or, if
Britain chose not to join, France could proceed in the alliance with Israel only.
It also had the option of complying with a negotiated settlement. Finally,
France could choose to do nothing and thereby accept Egypt’s new position.
Similarly, Israel could proceed with an alliance that included France and Britain
or just France. It could also choose to attack Egypt by itself or d o nothing.
Egypt had the choice of negotiating SCUA guarantees for the operation of
the canal or negotiating its own guarantees. It could alsochoose to do nothing
and ignore any attempts at negotiations.
The United States could pressure Egypt to accept SCUA or pressure Britain
t o accept Egyptian guarantees. It could also choose to do nothing and thereby
remain neutral in the negotiations. Regardless of the options chosen by the
U.S., it would continue to discourage Britain and France from attacking Egypt.
Since it had been doing this since Nasser had first nationalized the canal, this
action was not viewed as a decisive option.
The U.S.S.R. could either support Egypt in the negotiations or support
the decision resulting from the negotiations. Finally, the U.S.S.R. could choose
to do nothing and allow the West to settle the conflict.
When performing a hypergame analysis, one should simplify the players
and options as much as possible without sacrificing any relevant information.
First, null options (i.e., options to do nothing) can be represented by the choice
of no options at all. Also, in this case Britain and France can be combined as
a single entity. Their negotiation options were virtually identical although their
options involving the alliance were different. This difficulty can be overcome
by realizing that there was only one military option and that was an invasion
by Britain, France and Israel. The French option of proceeding only with Israel
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A CONFLICTANAL YSIS
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33
can be ignored because without Britain the two countries lacked the necessary
strength. France was able to provide only thirty percent of the men in the
allied invasion force (Beaufre, 1969). The closest base from which an allied
attack could be launched was located in Cyprus and it was a British base. Furthermore, only the British had the long range bombers required to attack the
Egyptian air fields. For these reasons, it is realistic to suggest that France
would not have proceeded against Egypt without Britain. Therefore Britain
and France can be represented as one player without distorting the analysis.
Israel can be deleted as a separate player because its only feasible option,
to attack in conjunction with Britain and France, is automatically included in
the British-French option. Israel had other possible options, including attacking with France alone and attacking by herself. The former has already been
shown to be unrealistic while the latter is even more so, since Israel could not
have launched a full scale attack without leaving itself vulnerable to an attack
from Jordan or Syria.
The options of the U.S. have n o significant effect on the conflict since
shortly after France invited Britain into the secret alliance, Britain had just
about reached a decision to ignore the U.S. Eden assumed that the U.S.would
be dormant, at least until the national election in early November(Love, 1969).
Russia’s support of Egypt was sufficiently vague so that it could also be ignored
by Britain. Since the U.S. and Russia played a largely passive role, they need
not be represented in the game. Therefore, the principle players are BritainFrance and Egypt. Their options are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Hypergame Options
B r i t a i n and France*
N e g o t i a t e Egyptian g u a r a n t e e s
N e g o t i a t e SCUA
Use economic p r e s s u r e
Threaten m i l i t a r y a c t i o n
Invade
Egypt
N e g o t i a t e SCUA
N e g o t i a t e Egyptian g u a r a n t e e s
*
I n c l u d e s Israel i f t h e i n v a s i o n o p t i o n i s chosen.
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CONFLICTMA NA CEMENT A N D PEACE SCIEh%E
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5.
FALL, I980
Outcome Removal
Any particular outcome t o the conflict can now be represented by the
players choosing a set o f the options available t o them from those shown in
Table 1. However, the options presented allow the inclusion o f a number of
outcomes which are logically infeasible or unreasonable. For instance, neither
side will negotiate Egyptian and SCUA guarantees simultaneously. The allies,
Britain and France, won’t exert economic and/or military pressure while negotiating for Egyptian guarantees, since Egypt does not need t o be coerced
into accepting its own guarantees. These and other infeasible outcomes are
shown in Table 2 and they are excluded from any further analysis.
Table 2
Logical lnfeasibilities
B r i t a i n and F r a n c e
-
- -
-
1
0
0
-
Negotiate Egyptian guarantees
1 -
N e g o t i a t e SCUA
1 - 1 - -
Apply economic p r e s s u r e
-
-
-
-
-
I
N e g o t i a t e SCUA
-
1
0
1
-
-
Negotiate Egyptian guarantees
-
0
1
0
-
-
-
Threaten f o r c e
Invade
Egypt
1 -
0 0
- 1 -
- -
0 1
In Table 2 each column represents a set of outcomes t o be removed. A
“1,” indicates that the option ischosen while a “0”means that it isnot selected.
A dash (i.e., “-”) indicates that the choice o f the option is irrelevant t o the
infeasibility of the set o f outcomes. Thus, a dash represents either a “0” or a
“1 .” This means that when there are k dashes in a column, the column contains
outcomes.
After removing the infeasible outcomes from the set of all possible outcomes, the remaining feasible outcomes are as shown in Table 3. Eachcolumn
of 1’s and 0’s represents a given outcome and each column has been decimalized to make the outcome easier t o manipulate in the ensuing analysis. To
decimalize a column, the outcome is interpreted as a binary number with the
lower order bit at the top of each column, and the binary number isconverted
t o a decimalized number. For example, the furthest left outcome inTable3 is
the situation in which Britian and France negotiate Egyptianguarantees and the
zk
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A CONFLICTANAL YSIS
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Egyptians do likewise. In decimalized form this outcome is written as 1 X 2 O +
0 x 2 ’ t 0 x 2 2 t 0 x 2 3 t 0 x 2 4 + 0 x 2 5 t 1 x 2 5 = 1t64 = 65.
Table 3
PossibIe Feasible Outcomes
Britain
-
France
N e g o t i a t e Egyptian guarantees
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N e g o t i a t e SCL‘A
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
Apply economic p r e s s u r e
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Threaten f o r c e
0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Invade
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
3J.P.L
N e g o t i a t e SCOA
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
h’egotiate Egyptian guarantees
1 1
Decimalized Outcomes
0 0 1
65 66 34
0
2 70 38
0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
6 74 4 2 10 78 4 6 14
0
unknow to Egypt
6 . Preference Vector
The decimalized outcomes from Table 3 have been put in order of preference for both parties in Table 4 with the most preferred outcome on the left and
the least preferred on the right. Two preference vectors are needed for the allies
because of their secret invasion option. One shows the possible feasible outcomes from the allies’ complete set of options. The second vector is the preference vector as perceived by Egypt. The outcomes in this preferencevector are
formulated from the set of options that do not include the invasion option,
The only difference between these two preference vectors is that the allies’
real-ohcome preference ordering includes the secret invasion option, whereas
Egypt’s view of their ordering does not. It is this use of more than one preference vector for the same player that characterizes the hypergame tableau.
Notice in Table 4 that only one preference vector is required for Egypt’s true
options and preferences.
The ordering of the outcomes in the preference vectors in Table 4 is based
upon the historical information. To interpret the outcomes in Table 4 it is
convenient to refer to the binary forms of the outcomes in Table 3. Asshown
in Table 4,the allies favour outcome 34 the most because this enables them
to ,place the canal under international control without resorting to hostile
measures, The next outcomes in the allies’ preference vector are 38,42, and
46. These outcomes involve an escalation of hostile action ranging from economic pressure to military threats in order to force the Egyptians to negotiate
SCUA. Outcomes 18, 22, 82 and 86 are concerned with a stalemate in negoDownloaded from cmp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016
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CONFLICT h f ANAGEhfENTANDPEACE SCIENCE
FALL, 1980
tiation and the allied invasion of the canal zone. Outcomes 8 2 and 8 6 involve
Egypt’s insistence on negotiating its own guarantees, while in outcomes 18 and
22 Egypt refuses to negotiate at all. Outcomes 18 and 22 are grouped together
as are 8 2 and 86. Within each group, the only difference in the allies’strategies
is the use of economic pressure in negotiations, in outcomes 22 and 86. Since
this is irrelevant to the preferences of the outcomes whose key element is an invasion, the two outcomes, 18 and 22, and the outcomes, 8 2 and 86,areplaced
under a “bridge” to indicate that under a given bridge the outcomes are equally
preferred by Britain and France. The group of four outcomes involving an
invasion is placed after the first four outcomes in the preference vectors of
Britain and France because the allies prefer to put the canalunder international
control without having to resort to force. However, the invasion outcomes
are preferred over those outcomes where the allies don’t use force and don’t
succeed. They are also preferred over a policy of not negotiating at all while
planning a secret invasion, since the allies wish to keep u p the appearance of
at least trying t o seek a peaceful solution.
Table 4
Preference Vectors
Britain and France
34
38
42 46 ‘is 22’ ‘82 86‘ 78 74 70 66 14 10 6 2 16 80 65 0
Egypt’s View of Britain and France
34
38
42
46
78
74
7 0 66
14
10
6
2
65
0
.%YE
0 65 ‘2
66’ ‘6 70’ ’10 74‘ ‘14 78‘ 34
30
42
46
The next two sets of outcomes consisting of 7 8 , 7 4 , 7 0 , 6 6 and 1 4 , 1 0 , 6 ,
2, involve a stalemate in negotiations. The allies would prefer a stalemate
whereby Egypt insists on its own guarantees (outcomes 7 8 , 7 4 , 7 0 and 66) to
a stalemate where Egypt refuses t o negotiate at all (outcomes 14,10,6and2).
Note that within these two groups, the outcomes are ordered differently than
that of the first set of four. The first set is ordered with escalating hostile action. The groups invoIving stalemates are ordered with decreasing magnitude
of hostile acts. That is, the allies would more likely be in a staIemate after
exhausting all means of coercion. The next most preferable outcome for the
allies is 16, and this outcome involves n o negotiationswhile Britain and France
plan an invasion. Outcome 16 is placed before outcome 80,whichis concerned
with the allies not negotiating while Egypt negotiates. This is due to the fact
that outcome 80 would result in more world criticism since Egypt is at least
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A CONFLICTANAL YSIS
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trying to negotiate. Both outcomes 16 and 80 are preferred overoutcome65,
where both players negotiate Egyptian guarantees because of the allies’ strong
feelings against Egypt and their unwillingness t o concede to Egyptian demands.
The last outcome is 0, which involves Egypt’s refusal to negotiate any guarantees. This was viewed as least preferable by the allies because of the possible
threat to allied shipping.
The preference vector in Table 4 for Egypt’s view of the allies’ position is
the same as the preference vector for Britain and France, except that the outcomes involving an invasion have been removed. Egypt is not aware of outcomes 1 8 , 2 2 , 8 2 , 8 6 , 16 and 80, since these outcomes are formed by the allies’
choice of the secret invasion option.
The last vector in Table 4 orders the outcomes according to Egypt’s preferences. The outcome most preferred is 0 because it gives Nasser the most
credibility. The allies concede the canal to him without protest. Outcome 65
is the next most preferred outcome since the allies negotiate an Egyptian guarantee. This concedes the canal to Egypt and also boostsNasser’s prestige. The
next eight outcomes (2,66,4,70,10,74,14and 78) deal with stalematesin negotiation. These are ordered according to an increase in threatening measures
from the allies. A stalemate is preferable to a return to the original situation
where the canal is controlled by an external agency. If Nasser allowed this,
his political standing would almost certainly be threatened. The outcomes
where this occurs, (34,38,42 and 46) are least preferred by Egypt.
The preference vectors in Table 4 are used in Table 5 to determine which
outcomes are possible resolutions to the conflict. The analysis commences by
determining for a given player the unilateral improvements (VI’s) in his preference vector. To form a UI the player under consideration changes his strategy
to reach a preferred outcome where the option choices of the other player(s) remain the same. The UI’s are listed in Table 5 below the appropriate outcomes in
each preference vector. A vertical bar joining UI’s under a given outcome indicates that these UI’s are equally preferred by the player being considered.
The outcomes for which there are no UI’s are rational and stable for the player
represented by a given preference vector. Rational outcomes are indicated by
an “r” above the outcome in each player’s preference vector in Table 5.
The outcomes which are not rational are now analyzed for stability. An
outcome is unstable for a player (denoted by a “u” above the outcome in Table
5 ) if he has a UI for which another player cannot make a subsequent improvement for himself which will result in an outcome that is less preferred than the
original one for the first player. When there are deterrents for all of the UI’s
below a given outcome, then that outcome is stable and is marked by an “s”
in Table 5 .
To analyse the outcomes in the preference vector of Britain and France
for stability, deterrents are formed by checking the preference vector of Egypt.
For instance, in Table 5 the allies have a UI from outcome 38 to outcome 34.
In Egypt’s preference vector there is a UI from 34 to 2. Returning again to
the preference vector for Britain and France, it can be seen that outcome 2 is
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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT A N D PEA CE SCIENCE
38
FALL. 1980
less preferred than 38. Hence, outcome 38 is stable for the allies since they
will be put into a less preferred position by Egypt if they move unilaterally to
outcome 34.
Table 5
Stability Analysis
B r i t a i n and France
X
X
X
X
E
E
E
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
r
s
s
s
r
r
r
r
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
X
u
34
38
42
46 '18 22' '82 86' 78
74
7 0 66
14
10
6
2
16
80
65
0
34
34
34
82
82
82
82
18
18
18
18
18
82
82
18
38
38
86
86
86
86
22
22
22
22
22
86
86
22
78
78
78
14
14
14
14
78 78
14
74
74
10
10
10
74
74
10
6
6
70
70
6
2
66
66
2
80
16
311111711111
42
70
Egypt's v i e w of B r i t a i n and france
X
X
X
X
E
X
X
X
E
X
X
X
X
r
s
s
s
r
u
u
u
r
u
u
u
u
u
34
38
42
46
78
74 7 0 66
14
10
6
2
65
0
34
34
34
78 78
78
14
14
14
78 14
38
38
14
74
10
10
74 10
42
6
70
X
70
6
66
2
80
%YE
r
r
r
0
65
'2
r
r
66' '6
r
r
r
r
70' '10 74' '14
u
u
u
u
78' 34
r
38
42
46
To analyze the preference vector of Britain and France from Egypt's viewpoint, the same procedure is followed. When analyzing the outcomes in Egypt's
preference vector for stability, deterrents are investigated by examining Egypt's
view of the allies' preference vector.
Equilibria are formed for outcomes that are stable for all of the players.
These possible resolutions to the conflict must possess either an r or s for each
player. To obtain the true equilibria the preference vectors for the allies and
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Vol. 5. No. 1
A CONFLICTANAL YSIS
39
Egypt must be compared. Whenever an outcome has either an r or s above it,
in both preference vectors an “E” is marked above the corresponding outcome
for Britain and France. Otherwise an “X” is placed above the outcome to indicate overall instability. If an outcome is unstable in both preference vectors,
stability by simultaneity must be examined by using the procedure of Fraser
and Hipel (1979).
The equilibria as perceived by Egypt can be ascertained by comparing the
preference vector of Egypt’sview of the allies to the preference vector ofEgypt.
The appropriate E and X entries are given above the outcomes in the second
preference vector in Table 5 .
From Table 5 it can be seen in the allies’ preference vector that the true
equilibria are outcomes 18,22,82 and86. From Egypt’sviewpoint the equilibria are 78 and 14. From Table 3, outcome 78 is a stalemate where the allies
are negotiating SCUA and using economic and military pressure while Egypt
is negotiating its own guarantees. Outcome 14 is the same except that Egypt
does not negotiate. As shown in the allies’ actual preference vector, Britain
and France have UI’s from 78 to the equilibria 82 or 86. Since Egypt is not
aware of the surprise invasion, it has no deterrents to stop it. Likewise, the
UI’s for the allies from outcome 14 result in an invasion of Egypt according
to either equilibrium 18 or 22.
The four possible resolutions to this conflict provided by this analysis all
involve an invasion of the canal by the allies after a stalemate in negotiations.
They differ trivially according to whether the allies apply economic pressure,
or whether Egypt attempts to negotiate Egyptian guarantees. Outcome 18,
where neither of these occurs, is the historical resolution t o this conflict.
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CONFLICTMANAGEMENTAND PEA CE SCIENCE
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