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Original: English
NATO Parliamentary Assembly
DEFENCE AND SECURITY
COMMITTEE
NATO’S NEW DETERRENCE POSTURE:
FROM WALES TO WARSAW
GENERAL REPORT*
Joseph A. DAY (Canada)
General Rapporteur
www.nato-pa.int
19 November 2016
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1
II.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM AND DEFENCE AND SECURITY
COMMITTEE RESPONSE.............................................................................................. 2
A.
REASSURANCE AND A NEW DETERRENCE POSTURE ................................... 2
B.
DETERRENCE ...................................................................................................... 2
III.
FROM WALES TO WARSAW: POST-COLD WAR ASSUMPTIONS
CHALLENGED – ADAPTATION, ASSURANCE, AND DETERRENCE .......................... 3
A.
NATO AND RUSSIA: REASSURING AND REINFORCING THE EASTERN
FLANK ................................................................................................................... 4
B.
EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE (ERI)................................................... 5
C.
INCREASED NATO EXERCISING ........................................................................ 6
IV.
ADAPTATION TO PROJECT STABILITY AND AN ENHANCED FORWARD
PRESENCE .................................................................................................................... 6
A.
NATO FORCE READINESS .................................................................................. 7
C.
DEFENCE SPENDING PLEDGE – 2&20............................................................... 8
D.
DEPLOYABILITY PLEDGE.................................................................................... 9
E.
DECISION-MAKING AT NATO .............................................................................. 9
F.
CYBER DYNAMISM AND RESILIENCE .............................................................. 10
G.
NATO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE ............................................................... 12
H.
NATO’S NUCLEAR POSTURE ........................................................................... 12
V.
RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS AND RESPONSE .............................................................. 13
A.
PERCEPTIONS, LEGISLATIVE AND MILITARY DOCTRINE CHANGES ........... 13
B.
MILITARY MODERNISATION ............................................................................. 14
C.
ENHANCING COMBAT READINESS .................................................................. 14
D.
A2/AD BUBBLES AND THE WARSAW SUMMIT ANSWERS ............................. 15
VI.
INTERIM CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................ 18
APPENDICES AND SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS .................................................... 20
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 22
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I.
INTRODUCTION
1.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in March 2014 confirmed what many policymakers already
understood: NATO faces significant challenges on two fronts. Along its long eastern flank, NATO is
dealing with a revisionist and militarily resurgent Russia bent on furthering its continental interests
via escalating brinkmanship seeking to undermine NATO cohesion through sabre rattling, coercion,
propaganda, and even exploitation of the Syrian migration crisis. To the south, a wide zone of
armed conflict and instability has drawn in foreign fighters from many NATO countries and is
creating an exodus of irregular migrants fleeing the hostilities. Non-state armed groups’ efforts to
seize territory, escalate local violence, and export their ideologies and terror globally are forcing
individual NATO member states to confront new, complex internal security challenges, wherein
new waves of home-grown extremists and returned fighters, at times using the cover of the Syrian
refugee flows, are attacking European cities and sowing fears of increased future instability.
2.
In response to the changed security environment, Allies announced two principal
deliverables at the September 2014 Wales Summit: the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and the
Defence Spending Pledge to enable implementation of emergency adaptation measures to
respond to a crisis and reassure eastern and southern flank Allies feeling the impact of the new
security environment most directly.
3.
In the almost two years since Wales, however, the complexity presented by the dual
east-south challenge has grown. Russia’s intervention in Syria, and the growing size and scope of
potential domestic disruptions, clearly demonstrate the dynamic evolution of the variables affecting
European security. NATO faces the increasingly difficult task of dividing its attention between
collective defence of its eastern territories and managing the consequences of the further
deterioration along its southern flank.
4.
At the recent Warsaw Summit in July 2016, the Alliance pledged to transition its emergency
reassurance measures into more permanent structural shifts in its deterrence posture, particularly
along its eastern flank. Given the range of threats faced to the east and south, NATO member
states set the parameters for a delicate reconfiguration of their conventional forces and nascent
missile defence system, while reaffirming their nuclear posture. The changes outlined in Warsaw
provide the Alliance with the means to present a more flexible and mobile conventional deterrent
posture, while still remaining below the level of ‘substantial’ deployments as proscribed by the 1997
NATO-Russia Founding Act. Demonstrating strong unity at the summit, Allies also sent a clear
signal of continued commitment to Article 5 guarantees.
5.
Important post-Warsaw variables remain, however, and will prove a test of the Alliance’s
continued solidarity and credibility in a new era of security challenges. One will be Russia’s
reaction to NATO’s new posture: the delicate balancing act of the subsequent reciprocal
adjustments either side will likely be a significant test of the ability to avoid taking steps that may
reinforce a perception of offensive intent. Another will be the ability to react to the likely continued
escalation of refugee flows, as conflict destabilisation will continue to disrupt the so-called “arc of
instability” enveloping the southern flank, particularly from the Aegean across the Mediterranean.
6.
At a time when defence spending is still recuperating after national economies were
devastated by the financial crisis, and where there are split threat perceptions, a questionable will
to use force, and evolving domestic security environments, the Alliance’s ability to act effectively,
credibly, and in unison, is being questioned. In short, Alliance credibility in the 21st century is being
tested as never before.
7.
The Defence and Security Committee (DSC) dedicated the majority of its reporting and
official visits over the last two years to understanding the evolving European security environment
and NATO’s response and adaptation to it. This report focuses on the collective defence-related
pledges from Wales to Warsaw, and the consequences of their implementation. It concludes with
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recommendations for consideration by NATO member state parliamentarians who will be burdened
with new funding requests and troop deployment authorisations over the coming year.
II.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM AND DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE
RESPONSE
8.
Today’s security environment, particularly in Europe, poses a complex array of security
challenges to NATO member states. In response, Allies are adopting a rapid succession of
adaptation measures. Throughout 2015, the DSC focused on the challenges of hybrid warfare
tactics used by Russia and Daesh1, debating the appropriate policy responses to both state and
non-state threats in its principal report and at its meetings in Budapest and Stavanger. In addition,
the Committee followed the debates surrounding the implementation of the RAP and the defence
spending pledge, which seek to provide NATO with the necessary tools to address the new
security environment it faces to the east and south. Committee reports identified the high hurdles
facing the Alliance in its efforts to both reassure Allies and deter potential threats, particularly given
the opposing natures of the eastern and southern-based confrontations.
9.
Committee resolutions promoted Wales Summit outcomes, including commitments made to
increase defence sector investment – the so-called 2&20 Pledge2 – to enable RAP implementation.
As was underscored in the 2015 DSC general report, the distributed range of threats confronting
the Alliance not only increases the likelihood of consultations under Article 4 of the Washington
Treaty, but also requires renewed attention to Article 3, which calls on all members to “maintain
and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”. As such, the
importance of the 2&20 Pledge cannot be overstated.
10. Recent DSC missions in 2014 and 2015 to Poland, France, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia highlighted the challenges of preparing for and responding to eastern and southern flank
threats simultaneously. Visits to these nations’ parliaments, as well as their land, air, and naval
forces, and observation of NATO’s Trident Juncture exercise provided DSC delegates with a
tangible sense of the increasingly complex security environment facing Alliance members. DSC
parliamentarians have a clear, first-hand understanding of the vital importance of highly capable
and interoperable forces, increased intelligence sharing, and enhanced cooperation with
organisations and partners both at home and abroad.
A.
REASSURANCE AND A NEW DETERRENCE POSTURE
11. At all levels, NATO is a vastly different political-military alliance today than it was during the
Cold War. Politically, the Alliance now counts 28 member states3, extending to Eastern and Central
Europe and sharing a long border with Russia. NATO member states’ Cold War experiences now
differ drastically as well – leading to divergences in threat perspective today vis-à-vis the east and
south. Eastern European Allies, especially Poland and the Baltic States, once occupied by the
Soviet Union during the Cold War, are far more likely to view Russia as the principal threat than,
for example, Italy, Greece, or Turkey, which are front line states dealing with migration challenges.
B.
DETERRENCE
12. The most essential task of the NATO alliance is to deter and defend against possible threats
to its member states’ territory. To deter an adversary from taking unwanted actions, a state or
alliance must be able to make it clear that the subsequent costs of the action (in the form of
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2
3
Arabic acronym of the terrorist organisation “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria”
The defence spending pledge, as articulated in the Wales Summit declarations, noted that member
states agreed to work toward spending 2% of their GDPs on defence, with at least 20% dedicated to
new equipment purchases and R&D.
The Alliance will move to integrate Montenegro this year, growing the ranks to 29.
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punishment or retaliation) will outweigh any potential benefits of taking such an action. The
operative mechanism to any deterrence posture, therefore, is the continued credibility of such a
threat of punishment or retaliation.
13. Militarily, the Alliance has also undergone a sea change in its deterrence posture over the
past 25 years. During the Cold War, NATO’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact was
characterised by the stationing of large numbers of troops and heavy weaponry along NATO’s then
eastern borders, all operating under the aegis of sizeable, and primarily US, nuclear forces. The
evolution of the Cold War model eventually allowed for a kind of graduated escalation between
opposing conventional forces, allowing either side a chance to step out of the fight prior to the
engagement of their respective strategic nuclear forces.
14. NATO’s contemporary deterrence model is intended to be more flexible and adaptable,
based on rapid reinforcement and mobility – as exemplified by the RAP adaptation of the NATO
Response Force (NRF) and the addition of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) –
and bolstered by persistent rotational presence of forces supported by new infrastructure in the
Alliance’s Eastern territories.
15. The realignment of NATO’s deterrence posture is the result of both deliberate policy
decisions and as constraints imposed on the Alliance by two key trends in European defence
spending over the last couple of decades. US Forces in Europe have reduced their footprint from
about 212,000 spread throughout Western Europe at the end of the Cold War to the current force
level of about 66,000, which are concentrated mostly in Germany and Italy (Lubold, 2016; Conley,
2016). The United States has also shuttered much of its ground forces’ infrastructure in Europe
(over 100 locations since 2006 alone), taking along with it the majority of its heavy equipment
(Conley, 2016). In parallel to US efforts to shift the balance of their forces abroad from Europe to
the Middle East and, subsequently, Asia, Europeans have largely failed to reinvest in their own
forces.
16. What began as the collection of the ‘peace dividend’ at the end of the Cold War turned into a
sense of complacency about the European security environment in the decades after the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The lingering inattention to military forces became the
hollowing-out of Allied forces in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The lack of European
capabilities was on display during NATO’s 2011 Libya campaign, where European forces
attempting to lead the operation soon found themselves without the necessary capabilities to
sustain the operation without significant US assistance (Daalder, 2012). Particularly lacking were
precision-guided munitions, theatre Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), heavy lift,
and aerial refuelling.
17. Despite the mixed reviews and the poor outcomes (in terms of peace and stability) of the
Libyan campaign and a long-simmering disagreement over NATO expansion with Russia, it took
the dual shocks of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, as well as Daesh’s
breakout campaign seizing large swathes of Iraq in the spring and summer of 2014 for Alliance
members to summon the necessary political will to call for and implement significant change.
III.
FROM WALES TO WARSAW: POST-COLD WAR ASSUMPTIONS CHALLENGED –
ADAPTATION, ASSURANCE, AND DETERRENCE
18. After the 2014 shocks to the international system, it was clear the post-Cold War
assumptions guiding NATO policy for over two decades no longer held. Broadly speaking, Allies
understood they could no longer count on: the nonexistence of territorial strategic threat, the
absence of peer or close-peer competitors, the guarantee of air and maritime supremacy, or the
certainty that southern partnerships will lead to political, economic and military convergence.
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19. In light of this, the range of steps taken from Wales to Warsaw aims to reassure all Allies
confronting the new European security environment and adapt the Alliance’s posture to deter
forces seeking to challenge the territorial sovereignty of Alliance members.
A.
NATO AND RUSSIA: REASSURING AND REINFORCING THE EASTERN FLANK
20. The optimal eastern flank deterrence strategy should enable NATO to achieve two goals
vis-à-vis Russia. First, deter it from any form of aggression against a NATO member state.
Second, create an environment suitable for the reengagement of dialogue between Moscow and
the West with the goal of de-escalating the current levels of tension. As many have noted in
Committee meetings, dialogue only through a position of strength should be the mantra for the
Alliance in the east.
21. Much has been written about the lack of credibility of NATO’s current deterrence posture with
regards to the three Baltic States; perhaps the most-discussed, recently being the RAND
Corporation report “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank” (Shlapak, 2016). All
reporting on Baltic state vulnerabilities focuses on the imbalance of military capabilities in the
region and the difficulty of reinforcing them in a conflict: local Allies Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia
can only muster about 30,000-40,000 troops, with no real air or naval capacity, while Russia’s
Western Military District can quickly muster a significant multiple of this with secure supply lines
into the region. In addition, Russia has significantly improved its anti-access/area denial
capabilities through the reinforcement of Kaliningrad and the areas along the eastern borders of all
three Baltic States. As such, it is reported that defence of the Baltic States in a crisis would be
difficult, and even likely fail in the event of a blitzkrieg-like action taken by Russian forces.
22. Such reporting assumes Russia’s desire to make a move in the Baltics, which is
questionable given the significantly high cost that would be incurred. Russian incursion into NATO
territory would set off an immediate escalation dynamic with NATO forces. Despite the war-gaming
indication that in-place NATO forces would be overwhelmed by a blitzkrieg strike by Russian
forces, the engagement would trigger, at the very least, a broader response by the United States,
which would not see it in its interests to have its international security guarantees trampled upon
and Russia’s ability to secure and hold such gains in the face of persistent air and maritime
measures taken by NATO forces would be very costly to the numerically inferior Russian forces in
terms of equipment. In addition, Russia would also almost certainly have to deal with a protracted
insurgency.
23. The RAND report is right, however, to point out the problems with the credibility of the current
deterrence posture as articulated by the RAP; this issue was central at the defence ministerial
meetings leading up to the Warsaw Summit. The dynamic it underscores, which is perhaps not
explicit enough, is the fact that NATO’s recent deterrence posture was moving the Alliance away
from a deterrence by denial scenario toward one of deterrence by punishment, which is far more
risky and costly.
24. It is clear that the defence and/or liberation of the Baltics will require a rotating presence of
NATO forces in the area, sufficiently sized, armed and trained to convince the Russians that they
will pay an unacceptably high price for aggression. Convincing the Russians not to attack the Baltic
States, however, will require a parallel effort by NATO Allies to convince them that they will defend
them at all costs.
25. How best to calibrate NATO’s force posture to achieve this result continues to be a central
question among Alliance members. Many member states argue credible deterring forces need to
be visible, ready, and dynamic enough to adapt quickly to challenges ranging from low-intensity
hybrid warfare to a conventional invasion (Conley, 2016). As noted in the following sections,
several steps have been taken to remedy this eastern flank dilemma: To aid the rapid transition
between different war-fighting contingencies, the Alliance as a whole has stepped in to invest in
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facilitating Alliance infrastructure and presence along the eastern flank. Initial steps were taken at
the unilateral level, which were subsequently reinforced by multi-lateral Allied efforts at the Wales
and Warsaw summits.
B.
EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE (ERI)
26. The United States announced the ERI in June 2014, just ahead of the Wales Summit.
Despite not formally being a part of the RAP, it is a key instrument to boost European defence
through forming a highly capable combined arms ground force able to respond to crises across the
European theatre. ERI funds aim to increase the flexibility, responsiveness, readiness, and
capability of NATO members as well as some partners, including Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
threatened by Russia, so that they can better defend themselves and work more effectively with
NATO forces (Brzezinski, 2015). The ERI should also enhance deterrence through guaranteeing a
quick joint response. More broadly, the United States hopes to inspire European NATO Allies to
invest more to defend their territory, and to address non-Article 5 crisis management contingencies
in their neighbourhood (Chollet, 2015; Flockhart, 2015).
27. In February 2016, the Obama Administration announced a request to quadruple ERI funding
in 2017 from USD789.3 million to USD3.4 billion, a step welcomed by Eastern European NATO
Allies, who have so far worried that the baseline 2014 ERI funding was inadequate when
compared to Russia’s massive mobilisation capabilities on its Western border (Brzezinski, 2015).
28. The increased funding is divided between: enhanced prepositioning USD1.9 billion;
rotational presence USD1.1 billion; infrastructure improvements USD217.4 million; exercises
USD163.1 million; and, partnership support USD85.5 million (US DoD, 2016). Enhanced
prepositioning equals a full 56%, a 32-fold increase from the previous ERI allocations, while
rotational presence doubles. Each of the three latter categories will see at least a 1.5 times
increase in funding from 2016. The majority of the ERI funding is directed to the US Army.
29.
The inherent advantages and highlights of each can be broken down as such:

US Army Prepositioned Stocks have declined since the end of the Cold War, thereby
presenting an undesirable hurdle to reinforcing US Forces in an emergency (Conley, 2016).
As such, heavy artillery, tanks, APCs and other weapons will flow into the existing and new
training facilities along the eastern flank; namely in Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. Prepositioned stocks for another armoured brigade, an
artillery brigade and a division headquarters will also be deployed in Germany, Belgium
and the Netherlands (Kacprzyk, 2016). The significant increase represents a major shift from
the previous, more limited, improvement of weapons storages, prepositioning of air
equipment in Eastern Europe, and providing infrastructure for presence of an armoured
brigade.

The ERI and the RAP expand both US Forces deployments and exercises in the European
theatre; the newly proposed funding will continue to do so. An additional armoured brigade
combat team (ABCT) headquartered in Poland will come into the rotational cycle in 2017,
bringing the total up to three US ABCTs in Europe at all times (technically four during times
of handover). A standard ABCT is composed of approximately 4,700 troops. As the Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) notes: USD507.2 million will be dedicated to
supporting the “ABCT presence, including heel-to-toe rotations of armoured forces coupled
with light and Stryker forces” guaranteeing a continuous presence in the Baltic States and
Poland, and a periodic presence in Romania and Bulgaria (US DoD, 2016).

The US Air Force in-theatre capabilities will continue to provide mobility, air-to-air refuelling,
crisis response, support equipment, and personnel required for deployments across Europe,
as well as airlift and ground/sea transport. Air policing missions will continue beyond the
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Baltic States, and there will be an increase in US combat air force presence, including
provisions for 5th generation war-fighting capabilities. The Navy will maintain its Black,
Mediterranean, and Baltic Seas engagements, improve its in-theatre anti-submarine warfare
abilities; and there will be an increase in the Marine Corps Black Sea Rotational Force’s
presence and engagements with other Allies from bases in both Romania and Bulgaria.

Improved infrastructure such as airfields, training centres, and ranges, will improve Allied
regional military readiness throughout Europe. The Capacity Building Initiative of NATO and
non-NATO partners (such as Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine) should
enhance defence capabilities of the respective countries and enable their participation as full
operational partners. In addition to conventional capabilities, significant resources will be
allocated to cyber security training and engagements, command and control (C2), and
intelligence. In addition to the US DoD request, the US State Department is allocating
USD953 million dedicated to “critical support” for Ukrainian, Eastern European, Eurasian,
and Central Asian efforts to counter Russian aggression.
C.
INCREASED NATO EXERCISING
30. Throughout 2015, NATO conducted around 280 exercises focusing on flexibility and rapid
response to a diverse array of hypothetical scenarios. For example, Exercise Trident Juncture,
NATO’s largest exercise in over a decade, assembled more than 36,000 personnel from over
30 nations, providing 230 units, 140 aircraft and 60 ships to test the ability to deploy at high
readiness across the Alliance in only a few days.4
31. The increased pace of exercising continues into 2016. In addition to NATO-directed
exercising, the United States has directed USD163 million to increasing the size and scope of its
regional participation for both exercising and partner engagement. 2016 will include a wide array of
exercises from Cold Response in the Arctic to Baltops in the Baltic Sea to Crisis Management
Simulation at NATO HQ in Brussels. The Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence
Capabilities (DSCFC) sent a delegation to attend the Spring Storm exercise in Estonia on 12 May
2016, which is the largest field exercise in the Baltics, combining all regional states as well as
forces from Poland, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
32. The increased tempo, size and scale of exercising have highlighted two problems that
political leaders must take into consideration. First, NATO HQ in Brussels has encountered
significant and unnecessary problems in obtaining authorisations from member states to move
personnel and equipment through their territories (Braw, 2016). Second, larger scale exercising is
costly, which has forced some states to question how the burdens of the new exercising schedule
should be shared. This is a point of consideration for parliamentary action in each respective
member state.
IV.
ADAPTATION TO PROJECT STABILITY AND AN ENHANCED FORWARD PRESENCE
33. The summits reaffirmed NATO’s three core tasks – collective defence, crisis response, and
cooperative security. In Wales, Allied leaders condemned Russian aggression in Ukraine and
initiated a Readiness Action Plan to change NATO’s strategic focus toward the new threats
emanating from the east and south; the principal outcomes being the reformed NRF with the VJTF
spearhead force, a renewed commitment to the Standing Naval Forces, and a focus on enhanced
cyber security capabilities. Warsaw confirmed more significant changes to deterrence posture and
presence via: a robust and ready NRF; a more substantial enhanced forward presence; the fusion
4
A Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation delegation observed a part of
Trident Juncture on October 28, 2015 on Sardinia. The Mission Report [267 DSCFC 16 E] can be
found on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly website.
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of crisis management, cooperative security, and maritime security - put forward as Projecting
Stability; and enhanced strategic anticipation via increased attention to situational awareness.
Alliance adaptations, as adopted at the summits, are outlined below.
A.
NATO FORCE READINESS
34. The Wales Summit introduced a series of steps to ensure that NATO disposes of modern,
robust, and capable forces at high readiness, in the air, on land and at sea.
35. The NATO Response Force (NRF) was established in 2003 as a multinational high
readiness force to react to the full range of security challenges from crisis management to
collective defence. In Wales, Allies agreed to enhance NRF capabilities and size from 5,000 to
40,000 personnel. Air, land, maritime, Special Forces, and logistics troops from across the Alliance
have been placed on a high level of readiness to support NRF. In 2016, the lead NRF
headquarters will be the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum in the Netherlands. Multiple Allies
will provide other key C2 elements: Spanish NATO Rapid Deployable Corps will cover the land
domain; the UK Maritime Force and the Italian Joint Force Air Component Command will be
responsible for sea and air respectively; Special operations will be led by the US Special
Operations Command Europe, while Poland will command the Defence Battalion of the Combined
Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Task Force (CBRN).
36. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), or the NRF ‘Spearhead’ force,
established at the Wales Summit, is a multinational brigade with up to five manoeuvre battalions
supported by air, maritime and Special Forces – totalling about 20,000, of which 5,000 are ground
troops. The VJTF participated at the major Trident Juncture exercise and demonstrated that multinational high-readiness forces can be deployed within days. The development and enhancement
process of the VJTF will continue throughout 2016 with further exercises, such as Brilliant Jump,
Trident Joust and Brilliant Capability. Spain is leading the VJTF in 2016, while France, Germany,
Italy, Poland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom will lead the force over the coming six years.
37. NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) were activated in September 2015 on the territory of
six Allied nations - Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania - two more NFIUs will
be established in Hungary and Slovakia. NFIUs will facilitate logistical networks, transportation
nodes and supporting infrastructure for VJTF and follow-on forces in a crisis. In addition, the NFIUs
are critical in supporting collective defence planning, and coordinating exercises. By 1 January
2016, the NFIUs achieved their initial capability and had reached operational capability at the time
of the Warsaw Summit in July 2016 (NATO(c), 2015).
38. Multinational Corps Northeast (MNCNE), based in Szczecin, Poland, was re-outfitted by
Denmark, Germany and Poland to provide additional high-readiness capabilities for forces
deployed to Poland and the Baltics; it assumed full operational control of the six NFIUs earlier in
2016. In addition, the MNCNE should be able to maintain situational awareness in the region and
serve as a hub for regional cooperation. An additional Multinational Division Southeast
headquarters was inaugurated on 1 December 2015 – it will execute a parallel role along NATO’s
south-eastern flank.
B.
ENHANCED FORWARD PRESENCE
39. At the Warsaw Summit, NATO members decided to establish a multinational Enhanced
Forward Presence (EFP) in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to strengthen its capability to
respond to any form of rapid-strike intervention in the region. The four battalion-sized battlegroups
consist of up to 1,000 troops each, are stationed on a rotational basis to provide a persistent
presence, and will be able to operate in concert with national forces. Canada, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States will serve as framework nations, leading the battalions in Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland respectively. In addition, Poland will host the headquarters of a
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multinational division, responsible for the command of all four battalion-sized battlegroups
(NATO(a), 2016, Gotkowska, 2016). The most updated troop commitment breakdown for each
battalion is:

Estonia - 850 troops confirmed, 500 provided by the United Kingdom, 200 by Denmark, and
150 by France;

Latvia - 600 troops confirmed, 450 provided by Canada and 150 by Poland. Additional troop
contributions will come from Italy, Slovenia and Portugal, precise numbers, however, are yet
to be confirmed;

Lithuania - 1,250-1,300 troops confirmed, 600 provided by Germany, 200 by Norway, 150
by Croatia, 150 by Belgium, 100-150 by the Netherlands, and 50 by Luxembourg (France will
contribute an unspecified number of troops for the 2018 rotation);

Poland - 1,300 troops confirmed, 1,000 provided by the United States, 150 by the United
Kingdom, and 150 by Romania (Gotkowska, 2016, Socor, 2016).
40. Too small to contain a large-scale attack, these forces will serve as “tripwire” defences,
forcing other NATO member countries to join in case of conflict. However, as indicated above, they
will be sufficiently well-equipped to deal with potential Russian hybrid warfare incursions, such as
those witnessed in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014 (Socor, 2016).
41. In addition to the EFP, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary are expected to
contribute one company each to be stationed on a rotational basis in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
respectively (Gotkowska, 2016). Romania also took the initiative to establish a multinational
framework brigade for the Black Sea region subordinated to the Multinational Division South-East
Romania described above. Poland and Bulgaria have already announced their intentions to make
troop contributions to the brigade (NATO(a), 2016, The Ministry of National Defence of Romania,
2016, Gotkowska, 2016).
42. Deployment of the new battlegroups to the Baltics is expected by May 2017. The details of
the exact configuration of the groups continue to be discussed; expectations are that the final
logistical arrangements will be confirmed at the October 2016 Defence Ministerial in Brussels.
C.
DEFENCE SPENDING PLEDGE – 2&20
43. As mentioned above, NATO’s mission will not be credible, feasible, and sustainable without a
qualitative and quantitative improvement of member states’ defence sectors. To ensure the
necessary level of combat readiness, member states need to invest in both heavy equipment and
crucial enablers, such as ISR, C2, communications, air defence systems, heavy lift and air-to-air
refueling.
44. As noted above, NATO heads of government agreed to reverse a decade-long trend of
reducing defence expenditures and to approach the target of spending 2% of GDP on defence
over the 2014-2024 period. Only five NATO members meet the requirement today: the
United States (3.61%), Greece (2.38%), the United Kingdom (2.21%), Estonia (2.16%), and Poland
(2.0%). On the positive side, thanks to recent increases in many NATO countries’ defence
expenditures, combined NATO spending grew from USD892.1 billion in 2015 to USD918.3 billion
in 2016, although still inferior to the USD942.4 billion spent in 2014. All but five Allied countries are
expected to increase their defence spending this year. The most significant growth is occurring in
the countries feeling directly threatened by Russian aggression, for example: Latvia (42.31%), and
Lithuania (34.13%). While Poland dramatically increased its defence spending by 21.7% in 2015, it
is, however, expected to show a 7.8% decrease in 2016.
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45. Several non-frontline states also registered notable increases: Italy (10.63%), and Hungary
(9.33%). Increases in defence expenditures for large Allied countries such as the United Kingdom
(7.44%), Germany (2.08%) and to a lesser degree France (0.64%) are also important to note.
(NATO(d), 2016).
46. Regarding the 20% benchmark of Allied defence expenditure on major equipment and
research and development; in 2016, only ten countries meet the requirement: Luxembourg
(32.82%), Lithuania (27.65%), Romania (26.13%), Poland (25.79%), Norway (25.6%), the United
States (25.03%), France (24.51%), Turkey (23.58%), the United Kingdom (23.41%) and Italy
(20.24%). In fact, six member states now spend less than 10% on equipment, compared to just two
in 2008. Insufficient spending on equipment complicates fulfilment of the Alliance’s current mission,
which depends upon high-tech interoperable military equipment. Obsolete and insufficient
capabilities not only decrease Allies’ ability to participate to their fullest potential in NATO’s joint
operations, but also weaken their ability for self-defence.
47. To put these numbers in a broader context, NATO member states’ defence expenditures in
2015 accounted for approximately 54% of global defence spending. China, Saudi Arabia, Russia
— countries with large defence budgets — only represented 18% of the total. However, this figure
is highly skewed by the US defence budget: China’s defence spending exceeds that of France,
Germany and the United Kingdom combined. Further, Russia's and China’s combined defence
spending outstrips that of all EU members together (Kendry, 2016).
D.
DEPLOYABILITY PLEDGE
48. In addition to monetary pledges, Allies agreed to ensure their land, air and maritime forces
meet NATO standards for deployability and sustainability. In 2014, the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly acknowledged the importance of this deployability pledge for fielding the
necessary highly capable, rapid, and well-equipped forces (NATO PA, 2014). NATO still struggles,
however, to field the necessary forces and equipment for a large and rapid deployment. As
mentioned above, the 2011 Operation Unified Protector in the poorly defended Libyan airspace
demonstrated the lack of European capabilities. Despite the experience, European Allies have
been hesitant to make concrete capability pledges for future contingencies. Short of massive US
support, NATO might be unable to meet the scale, scope, and speed needed for a large operation,
particularly against adversaries with highly advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities,
such as Russia (Glatz and Zapfe, 2016).
49. NATO members should not rely solely on the US ERI and should invest in equipment and
infrastructure such as airstrips, logistics and fuel depots, harbour modifications, and radars for
enhanced early warning (Kowalik, 2015). High-quality equipment stored and maintained on the
territory of various NATO Allies should, in scope and size, reflect the range of potential future
contingencies (Glatz and Zapfe, 2016). This committee previously warned of NATO’s inability to
reinforce host-nation defences quickly along the eastern flank and emphasised that the
preparedness of the Alliance depends upon the preparation of infrastructure, prepositioning of
equipment, and designation of specific bases for use (NATO PA, 2015).
50. The RAP and the EFP, however, clearly indicate steps being taken in the right direction; but
many member states can still step up their levels of contribution to ensure the implementation of
the new deterrence posture. Further, it is clear that as Alliance strategic thinking on the new
European security environment continues to evolve, so too must new creative ways be found to tap
the potential contribution of all 28 member states.
E.
DECISION-MAKING AT NATO
51. As this committee has highlighted in previous reports, NATO’s decision-making process is
overly cumbersome.
It reflects a bureaucratic mindset wholly at odds with the tight
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decision-making cycles demanded by the current security environment. Achieving North Atlantic
Council (NAC) consensus to deploy the VJTF will be impossible in the absence of a unified threat
assessment informed by reliable situational awareness. Russia’s hybrid tactics, and terrorist
networks’ operational techniques require rapid assessment and decision-making. Even though
hybrid tactics may complicate unified situational awareness and threat perception, they do not
obviate the need for the Alliance to find a way to achieve these ends.
52. The NAC continues to debate how much authority it should delegate to the Supreme Allied
Commander (SACEUR) along the alert, stage, and deploy continuum while maintaining its ultimate
political authority. Still, there are pre-defined scenarios and corresponding actions that can be built
into NAC processes to reduce the time needed for deliberation and enable a timely response
(Kowalik, 2015). Enhanced situational awareness through increased intelligence sharing at the
bilateral and multilateral levels, as well as joint early-warning analysis (combined human
intelligence and signal intelligence) can ensure that decision-makers will base their decisions on
comprehensive information (SWP and Chatham House, 2015). Encouragingly, the Warsaw
Summit noted a push to improve the Alliance’s capacity for strategic anticipation: the summit
declarations call for the acquisition of the means to better track and anticipate the actions of
potential adversaries, particularly through more attention to ISR capability acquisition and via
expanding the breadth and depth of comprehensive intelligence arrangements. A good example of
these new efforts is the creation of the new Joint Intelligence and Security Division, which will
oversee all of NATO’s intelligence and security activities.
53. It should also be noted that rehearsing the consultation process and decision-making
procedures of the NAC has been folded into the increased tempo of traditional military exercises at
NATO. To ensure the Alliance’s political arm can confront complex political-military strategic
challenges effectively, testing the NAC’s response time in challenging (hybrid) crises that fall below
the Article 5 threshold is essential. Such an exercise occurred from 4-10 March 2016, wherein the
scenario forced the NAC to deal with a complex scenario involving humanitarian and maritime
dimensions. The crisis scenario reflects the current realities of the Eastern Mediterranean, and
serves as a means to identify issues that might arise in political decision-making should the United
Nations request Alliance assistance or should NATO respond to an Article 4 emergency.
54.
The importance of cyber capabilities vis-à-vis situational awareness merits closer attention.
F.
CYBER DYNAMISM AND RESILIENCE
55. NATO relies on the cyber domain to operate its military systems and applications such as
Secret Wide Area Network, Integrated Air and Missile Defence System, Shared Early Warning, Air
Command and Control System, and Interim Combined Air Operations Centre Capability. These
systems are military enablers and offer tremendous advantages at all levels as they empower
commanders to make rapid decisions, communicate intent, and enable forces to deliver effects at
previously unimaginable speeds. However, this connectedness also presents a significant
vulnerability (Larsen, 2016; Ulgen, 2016).
56. NATO’s adversaries use the cyber domain to target the Alliance and its member states. In
Wales, NATO acknowledged that the threat of cyber-attack could be as damaging to Atlantic
prosperity, security, and stability, as a conventional attack. It has therefore included cyber defence
in the collective defence task. However, a decision to invoke Article 5 would be taken by the NAC
on a case-by-case basis.
57. Offense and defence are tightly bound in the cyber domain; effective defence requires
intimate knowledge of system vulnerabilities and how to exploit them. Debate about these issues
naturally includes consideration of offensive capabilities. Some observers have urged such
discussions to extend beyond hardening NATO systems against cyber-attacks by adversaries to
actually leveraging such offensive capabilities to deter or prevent attacks against NATO systems
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(Monaco, 2016). Others have mooted the potential use of NATO cyber offence capabilities in the
context of an Article 5 operation (Lewis, 2015).
58. So far, NATO has refrained from offensive cyber operations. However, as the cyber
capabilities of its adversaries grow, NATO might be forced to seek offensive cyber capabilities as
the Alliance will be forced to evolve with the changing threat landscape.
59. Clearly many hurdles remain as cyber capabilities continue to develop. The biggest
challenge lies in attack attribution. It is immensely more difficult in a cyber conflict than in a
conventional conflict to determine unambiguously the identity of the belligerent; and without this
identification, governments can hardly develop appropriate and credible retaliatory strategies. Still,
there has been some significant progress in NATO’s overall approach to the challenges of
cyber readiness.
60. A 2014 study by the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) identified
some key issues with NATO’s cyber defence situational awareness that prompted some action.
For example, the report indicated that within the NATO command structure (NCS) “there is a lack
of clarity about who is actually responsible for Cyber Defence and what information should be
shared and with whom. Currently, it appears that Cyber Defence-related information is not being
shared effectively among NCS Cyber Defence personnel, usually because personnel either do not
know who has the information or who needs it. Where lines of communication regarding Cyber
Defence information sharing do exist, these lines seem to be highly dependent on personal
relationships – rather than on a standard process – implying that such lines of communication may
be lost after personnel rotation” (NATO JALLC, 2014).
61. Such a finding clearly calls for the promulgation of cross-Alliance Standing Operating
Procedures (SOPs) for the cyber domain; it appears some efforts have been made to do just that.
NATO (more specifically, the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability or NCIRC) already
has protocols for sharing threat-related information. On 10 February 2016, NCIRC signed a
Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence that included cyber incident information sharing with its
EU counterpart, the Computer Emergency Response Team of the EU (CERT-EU) (NATO, Cyber
Defence Topic Page).
62. It is true, however, that the Alliance’s existing Cyber Defence Policy (endorsed June 2014),
must continue to evolve with the changing threat landscape. Still, establishing a Cyber Command,
emulating the command structure of other NATO domains of operations, would be a good place to
start real investment in cyber command and control.
63. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO recognised cyberspace as an official warfare domain
(NATO(a), 2016). There are two immediate implications to such a decision:

Under Article 3, Allied countries have the duty of improving the cyber defences of national
infrastructures and networks. Indeed, whereas NATO is responsible for its own networks,
member countries remain responsible for the protection of their national networks, ensuring
compatibility with NATO’s and other Allies – thus avoiding a weakest-link scenario among
Allies. In the Cyber Defence Pledge, Allied countries committed to allocating resources to
strengthen national cyber defences. Progress will be assessed annually based on agreed
metrics and reviewed at the next NATO summit (NATO(e), 2016).

A cyber-attack carried against a NATO member could now trigger the invocation of Article 5.
The elevation of cyberspace to an operational domain combined with the inherent challenges
regarding attack attribution and a lack of communication with Russia – one of the most
sophisticated nations in the cyber realm – could increase the risks of a mistake.
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64. The NAC's decision to invest in NATO Cyber Range’s technical capability and recent military
exercises such as Anakonda 2016, which included a cyber element, are signs the Alliance expects
most future conflicts to have a cyber dimension (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia,
2016). In line with its efforts to intensify cooperation with industry through the NATO Industry Cyber
Partnership, the Alliance announced investment plans ahead of the NATO Information Assurance
and Cyber Defence Symposium, held in Belgium on 7-8 September 2016. It expects to spend
EUR70 million on a cyber technology "refresher" focused on secure mobility, multi-level
authentication and security of public clouds (SC Magazine, 2016).
G.
NATO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE
65. The DSC has reviewed the various phases of the development of NATO’s attempts to merge
the missile defence assets of individual Allies into a coherent defence system able to protect
European Allies’ territory, populations, and forces against ballistic missile threats. To this end, the
United States proposed the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) in 2009, as a means of
making BMD sensors and weapons systems available to NATO Allies. The EPAA involves three
phases and includes a NATO Command Center at the US air base in Ramstein, Germany; an early
warning US Army/Navy/Transportable Radar (AN/TPY-2) based in Kürecik, Turkey; four SM3-block
missile-armed US Aegis Class destroyers based in Rota, Spain, and two Aegis Ashore installations
located in Deveselu, Romania and Redzikowo, Poland.
66. The NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Initial Operational Capability (IOC) was
announced at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. The Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania —
inaugurated on 18 December 2015 (Tudor, 2015) and providing ballistic missile coverage for
Southern Europe — along with Turkey’s early-warning BMD radar at Kürecik are the first
operational components of NATO BMD (NATO(a), 2016). Command and control of the Romanian
site was transferred to NATO in August 2016 and is now being directed from Headquarters Allied
Air Command by the Ballistic Missile Defence Operation Cell (NATO HQ AIRCOM, 2016). In
addition, in May 2016, construction began on the Aegis Ashore site in Poland (Gotkowska, 2016).
The Redzikowo site will support missile defence in Northern Europe and it is expected to become
operational in 2018 (Kacprzyk, 2016). In line with NATO's need to match the development of its
BMD systems with investments in C2 networks, the Alliance has announced plans to invest EUR3
billion over the next three years in defence technology including C2 — with half of it going into
satellite communications capability (NCIA, 2016).
67. Anticipating Moscow’s reaction to the new announcements regarding the Alliance’s BMD
system, NATO explained unambiguously in the Warsaw Declarations that the BMD was not
directed at Russia, but rather designed to defend against any threat emanating from outside of the
Euro-Atlantic area. In an attempt to assuage potential Russian concerns about system
developments, and to allay misperceptions of offensive intent in the operation of the BMD system,
the Summit declaration went so far as to declare the current system incapable of defending against
Russia's strategic nuclear forces, thus leaving the nuclear status quo unaltered (NATO(a), 2016).
H.
NATO’S NUCLEAR POSTURE
68. The risk of nuclear weapons use in the Euro-Atlantic region is perhaps at its highest level
since the end of the Cold War. Recent regional and global brinkmanship between Russia and the
United States increases the threat of miscalculation (Berls and Ratz, 2015). NATO policy notes the
likelihood of its resorting to nuclear first-use is extremely remote and, as a result, nuclear weapons
stationed in Europe are far smaller in number today than a couple of decades ago. The
United States, France, and the United Kingdom maintain their independent nuclear deterrents to
date, and they remain part of the Alliance’s broader strategic deterrence posture.
69. There are calls, however, for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s deterrence
posture (Kubiak and Meier, 2016; Larsen, 2016). Nuclear weapons modernisation should overtake
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reduction, proponents of this approach argue, and planning and war-gaming should be enhanced
to ensure credibility and competence. The most far-reaching proposals suggest changing NATO’s
deployment patterns. Currently, approximately 180 free-fall B61 nuclear bombs are maintained at
six bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. Western European members,
on the other hand, generally prefer the status quo, as they fear a nuclear arms race and worry
about provoking Russia. These states believe a radical shift in NATO’s nuclear posture would have
profound implications, particularly in the Alliance’s relationship with Russia (Meier, 2016).
70. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act reiterates that NATO has no intention to deploy
nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. Even conventional strengthening of NATO’s
capabilities on the territory of new member states is perceived as a threat by Russia (President of
the Russian Federation, 2015). Therefore, an increasingly assertive NATO nuclear policy would
make re-establishment of dialogue with Russia difficult, if not impossible (Kubiak and Meier, 2016).
71. The Kremlin, for its part, has engaged in nuclear sabre rattling. President Putin
acknowledged that nuclear forces were on alert during the annexation of Crimea (Withnall, 2015).
Meanwhile, Russian strategic rocket forces have conducted an increased number of exercises,
and bombers have probed the air defences of NATO members (Pifer, 2015). The size and
structure of Russian strategic nuclear forces, currently expanding, will affect decisions regarding
NATO’s nuclear posture.
72. In many ways, the Warsaw Summit declarations on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO
security policy change very little from the language of the 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2012
Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR). The language of the Summit communiqué notes
a few interesting things, however, for the future role, basing, and potential use of nuclear weapons.
First, Warsaw noted the need to re-examine the forward basing of nuclear weapons in Europe, by
noting the Alliance’s nuclear posture in part relies on the forward deployment of US nuclear
weapons in Europe. Second, the Warsaw declarations note a need to broaden Allied-participation
vis-à-vis nuclear sharing arrangements. Third, there is also a new tone of pessimism regarding the
potential prospects for arms control measures to eventually reduce stocks “on the basis of
reciprocity” between NATO Allies and Russia: “We regret that the conditions for achieving
disarmament are not favourable today.”
V.
RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS AND RESPONSE
A.
PERCEPTIONS, LEGISLATIVE AND MILITARY DOCTRINE CHANGES
73. Recent NATO adaptation is perceived in Moscow as dangerous and often described as
contravening international law. This has been emphasised by political, military, and expert circles
(Sikorskiy, 2015; Polunin, 2016), and articulated in the Russian 2015 National Security Strategy
(RNSS) (The Kremlin, 2015). Building on this notion of threat, there has been a call in Moscow for
a “complex response” (Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2015). The growing role of military
power in Russia’s foreign policy thinking is supported by legislative changes, for example, the 2009
amendment to the Law on Defence has expanded legal options for dispatching the armed forces
abroad beyond counterterrorism and peacekeeping to include a response to an attack on Russian
citizens abroad, and assistance to another state by request of its leadership to prevent or repel an
attack.
74. Moscow notes in its strategic defence publications and pronouncements that current and
future hybrid and conventional warfare requires well-trained, rapidly deployable forces, supported
by quick decision-making and inter-agency coordination. These developments indicate a shift from
the old focus on mass force, to a force equipped with complex systems, and capable of reacting to
a more dynamic security environment. While Crimea demonstrated Russia’s ability to deploy
Special Forces, airborne troops, and naval infantry swiftly, as well as amass between 40,000 and
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90,000 troops on the border for several months, Syria points to the ability to dispatch troops and
conduct complex, joint operations at distance from the Russian border.
B.
MILITARY MODERNISATION
75. In order to sustain this new military posture, all branches of the Russian military have
undergone significant modernisation. The 2011-2020 State Armaments Programme (SAP)
allocates USD700 billion to increase the proportion of advanced weapons in the inventory to 30%
by 2015 and to 70–80% by 20205; in 2015 Russia exceeded its interim targets (Klein, 2016;
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016). Given the current economic climate in Russia,
particularly due to sanctions and the drop in oil prices, it is likely the SAP will be underfunded, with
non-critical programmes extended beyond the 2020 period, scaled down or even cancelled
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016); a fact acknowledged even by the Defence
Minister Sergey Shoigu (TASS(c), 2015). However, even if the SAP remains unfulfilled, Russian
forces have achieved strong combat capability (Klein, 2016).
76. The Army is being equipped to operate in diverse and challenging territories from the Middle
Eastern deserts, to the post-Soviet space, to the Arctic. In addition to the heavily armoured and
highly manoeuvrable T-14 tanks (Franko and Varagis, 2015) and other high-tech vehicles,6 priority
is given to missile systems such as S-4007 (range of 400km) and the modernised Iskander-M
(range of 500km) (TASS(c), 2015), both capable of hitting targets deep in Europe (Farley, 2014).
77. Russian air forces modernisation has fielded a fleet of new fighter and bomber aircrafts, as
well as non-combat drones; special attention is given to strategic nuclear forces and air defence
capabilities (Klein, 2016). Despite technical difficulties, Russia has progressed with developing its
satellite nuclear warning United Space System.8 It has also reinforced its strategic rocket forces by
deploying over 30 road-mobile and silo-based Yars ICBMs (TASS(d), 2015; International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 2016), adding to the already-fielded Topol-M missiles. To reinforce the other
two components of the nuclear triad, ten bombers (Tu-160s, Tu-95s), and two out of the planned
eight nuclear submarines have been commissioned. These steps are presented as a reaction to
US/NATO’s implementation of the RAP, the prompt global strike concept, and an intention to place
weapons in outer space (The Kremlin, 2015).
C.
ENHANCING COMBAT READINESS
78. To achieve combat readiness Moscow is emphasising significant structural changes and
frequent training. For example, there is significant investment in modern C2 systems, and the five
reorganised military districts each include a joint operational strategic command to enhance
decision-making. The new Moscow-based National Centre for Defence is designed to provide
real-time situational awareness and facilitates centralised coordination during operations (The
Kremlin, 2014; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016). The concept of unified command
has for the first time been tested in practice during exercises near the Western border bringing
together land, airborne, naval, and infantry troops (International Institute for Strategic Studies,
2016). In a crisis, the centralised decision-making could give Russia time advantage compared to
NATO’s consensus-based decision-making structure (Klein, 2016).
79. Particular focus has been paid to western and southern borders. In 2015, the new First Tank
Army and around 30 various military units were introduced to the Western military district
(TASS(a), 2016), increasing the number of armies there to three (Ministry of Defence of the
Russian Federation, 2015). Three new divisions and related infrastructure will follow in 2016
5
6
7
8
The SAP funding breakdown by services is as follows: Air Force 24%; Navy 26%; Space and Air Defence 18%;
Army 13%; Strategic Forces 5%; Other 14%.
The T-14s have been successfully tested and are expected to be produced from 2017.
The even more advanced S-500s are thought to enter service soon.
The first satellite was launched in November 2015 and the second should follow in 2016.
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(TASS(b), 2016). Russia has also strengthened its military forces in Crimea, modernised the Black
Sea Fleet, and completed the integration of former Ukrainian military units there (International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016). These steps, explained as a response to NATO’s military
build-up in the east, indicate Russia’s efforts to enhance capabilities and readiness on its western
border (Klein, 2016; TASS(a), 2016).
80. With more than 352,000 professional soldiers (TASS(c), 2015), Russia has for the first time
achieved the ratio of 2:1 professionals to conscripts (Klein, 2016). These professionals mainly
serve in elite forces such as the airborne-assault troops, special-operations forces, and submarine
units. The number of reservists declined sharply, from 20 million in 2008 to 2 million in 2014.
Despite the professionalisation, Russia’s armed forces still could not properly function without the
draft, as conscripts perform many essential supportive and less demanding functions (International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016).
81. Frequent planned and snap exercises ensure high readiness of the modernised forces. In
2015, 30% of Russian military exercises were joint. The largest one, “Tsentr 2015,” brought
together around 95,000 soldiers, 7,000 pieces of military equipment, and 150 fighter aircraft; a
massive increase from just 9,400 soldiers exercising in 2013 (Proshkin, 2015). The trained
scenarios ranged from counter-insurgency and counterterrorism, amphibious and airborne landing,
to conducting large-scale conventional air and ground attacks. Particular emphasis was put on
enhancing strategic mobility, improving command and control, and increasing firepower (Klein,
2016).
82. Dozens of major national multi-force exercises are planned throughout 2016. The largest
one, “Kavkaz” [Caucasus], took place in September 2016. The purpose of “Kavkaz” will be to test
the joint forces’ ability to operate and move rapidly at large distances in a contested environment
(Proshkin, 2015). In addition, Russia will also organise numerous international exercises with the
Common Security Treaty Organisation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and bilateral
exercises with countries such as India, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Finally, the practice of snap
exercises will continue into 2016.
D.
A2/AD BUBBLES AND THE WARSAW SUMMIT ANSWERS
83. In an attempt to limit NATO forces’ freedom of movement along the eastern flank, Russia is
outfitting large anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) exclusion zones or "bubbles" around the Baltic
states, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Arctic. These A2/AD bubbles allow
Moscow the potential to constrain air, land, and sea access to these areas. In the Warsaw
communiqué NATO expressed its concerns over these developments, stating it would not accept
any potential adversary blocking or hindering Allied land, air, and sea forces’ ability to move to or
within any part of Alliance territory (NATO(a), 2016).
84.
Russia's A2/AD exclusion zones can be broken down geographically as such:

The Baltic Region is where Russia poses the greatest challenge to NATO Forces’ freedom
of movement, particularly to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia via Poland (Jones, 2016). NATO’s
relatively light footprint in the area and the geographic isolation of the Baltic States
accentuate this threat. Because NATO lacks significant pre-positioned stocks and forwarddeployed forces east of Germany, the Russian build-up of A2/AD capabilities in its Western
Military District, Kaliningrad, Belarus, and the Baltic Sea presents a challenge to reinforcing
the Baltic States quickly enough to prevent a rapid Russian victory, particularly via the
narrow Suwalki Gap between Kaliningrad and Belarus.

While relatively vulnerable itself, Kaliningrad is heavily militarised. The exclave hosts coastal
radars able to connect to K-300P Bastion-P shore-based mobile anti-ship missile batteries,
which launch Mach 2.5+ supersonic sea-skimming P-800 Oniks missiles (Majumbar(a),
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2016). Additionally, Kaliningrad hosts the S-400 Triumf, which has an operational range of
400km. Further defended with Pantsir-S gun-missiles, Kaliningrad’s offensive weapons
effectively render large amounts of the Lithuanian and Polish airspace de facto no-fly zones
for conventional non-stealthy aircraft (Majumbar(b), 2016). Although Russia has previously
temporarily placed the 500km-range, nuclear-capable Iskander missile in Kaliningrad twice,
officials now say the missile will be deployed there permanently by 2019 in response to the
US-supplied NATO BMD capability under development in Romania and Poland (Osborn,
2016). Should NATO wish to build up the capacity to overcome this A2/AD bubble more
quickly, the Alliance would require additional forward deployments of forces and equipment.

In the Black Sea Region, Russia has deployed a shore-based Bastion-P anti-ship missile
system on the Crimean Peninsula, equipped with P-800 Oniks missiles and S-300 PMU
anti-aircraft missile systems, all connected to coastal radars. Moscow has also deployed
Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers, Tupolev Tu-142 and Ilyushin Il-38 maritime patrol and antisubmarine aircraft to the region as well. The Tu-22M3 uses as many as 10 Raduga Kh-15
missiles or up to three Raduga Kh-22 missiles, which are designed to defeat advanced air
defence systems and have the potential to carry nuclear warheads (Manea and Visan, 2015).
Deployment has ostensibly begun, but not all sites are prepared for these installations. In
addition, in August 2016, Russia deployed S-400 missile systems to Crimea (Reuters, 2016),
furthering the militarization of the peninsula. Reinforcing its hold, Russia also has S-300
missile systems deployed at its 102nd military base in Armenia, extending A2/AD capabilities
over the eastern Black Sea, Georgia, and eastern Turkey (Abrahamyan, 2016). Russia
intends to invest an additional USD2.3 billion on the Black Sea Fleet by 2020, and 80 new
vessels should join the fleet in that time (Manea and Visan, 2015). Despite delays, the
current fleet maintains a strong A2/AD capacity through simple contact sea mines and landbased, air-launched, and submarine-based anti-ship cruise missiles. By 2018, the fleet
should receive six new Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates and six new Varshavyanka-class
submarines. Comparatively, the US 6th Fleet based in Italy has a single command ship and
four destroyers as of 2015 (Altman, 2015).

While the A2/AD bubble overlaps with Allied territory in Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania, it
would not prevent NATO from reinforcing these countries in an open conflict, as all three
could be supplied by alternative routes. Thus, Russia’s Black Sea A2/AD has strong
defensive capabilities and may politically intimidate Black Sea nations, but it does not
threaten to eliminate regional NATO defences. There have been reports, however, that
Russia has placed, or intends to place, nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in Crimea (Wilson,
2016). This is allegedly in response to the NATO BMD facility now operational (IOC) in
Deveselu, Romania; although this base still remains outside the official 500km range of the
Iskander if placed in Crimea. Should Russia choose to enhance the missile’s range to
compensate, it would be in direct violation of the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, banning all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500
and 5,500km (Felgenhauer, 2016, Woolf, 2015).

In the Eastern Mediterranean, the Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) deployed in
Syria create a surface naval A2/AD bubble in the region (Altman, 2015). Moreover, according
to Russian news, the Khmeimim Air Base acquired S-400 missile systems after the
24 November 2015 downing of a Russian jet (Russia Today, 2015). Reports also indicate
that Russia deployed at least one Iskander missile system to Khmeimim in 2016, though
there is no way of knowing whether it is the ballistic or cruise missile version (Binnie, 2016).
Since the Black Sea Fleet has relatively easy access to Tartus during peacetime and Russia
has already used its submarine-launched missiles against anti-Assad forces, the A2/AD
bubble in Syria has demonstrated to be quite capable, particularly when compared to the
relatively small NATO maritime presence in the Mediterranean.
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
Russia’s development of A2/AD capabilities in the Arctic is part of the larger initiative to
restore its military capacity in the “High North.” In December 2015, Russian news reported
the deployment of two S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile systems to Novaya Zemlya
archipelago and to the Yakutian port of Tiksi, and additional reports indicate the presence of
S-300 missiles on Franz Joseph Land, New Siberian Islands, Novaya Zemlya, and
Severnaya Zemlya (Coffey, Kochis, 2016). These sites are protected by Pantsir-S1 shortrange mobile air defence systems, which are armed with Igla-S surface-to-air missile
launchers and double--barreled Djigit 30mm cannons. Additionally, Novaya Zemlya is
equipped with Bastion-P complexes armed with P-800 Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles.
Furthermore, new forward military bases helped reestablish radar coverage for the entire
northern coast, a capability lost in the 1990s. As the Northern Fleet comprises approximately
two-thirds of the Russian Navy, the Arctic theatre also contains permanent deployments of
submarines and other maritime vessels with anti-ship and anti-aircraft capabilities, such as
the Severodvinsk nuclear attack submarine.

For now, developments in this region are of secondary importance to the Alliance compared
to similar force build-ups in the Baltic region. But Allied countries assess the threat
differently: Norway takes a stronger view and desires more NATO involvement, whereas
Canada, while sharing Norway’s concern, would prefer to approach Arctic security outside of
the NATO framework (Coffey, Kochis, 2016). Regardless, Russian forces in the region dwarf
those of all NATO members combined (Ernst, 2015), and neither the Wales nor Warsaw
Summit communiqués named the Arctic as a priority.
Warsaw Summit Answers
85. Russian efforts to build out significant A2/AD capabilities along the eastern flank have
serious strategic implications for the Alliance. The ability to move NATO forces to and within Allied
territory is the sine qua non of the continued guarantee of all Allied territorial security. As such, in
addition to the above-mentioned enhanced forward presence that will reinforce the Baltic states
and Poland with additional forces and heavy weaponry, NATO announced at the Warsaw Summit
its commitment to reinforce its ability to project stability.
86. The declarations note that the Alliance’s ability to project stability will be enhanced not only
by strengthening regional understanding and situational awareness, but also via the reinforcement
of its maritime capabilities and strategic approach to partners. The strategic role of maritime forces
in Allied freedom of movement is underscored in the 2016 Sub-Committee on Future Security and
Defence
Capabilities
report
NATO
and
the
Future
Role
of
Naval
Power
[162 DSCFC 16 E rev.1 fin]. The ability to exercise and deploy larger and more capable maritime
assets in the strategic seas along the Alliance’s eastern flank is a clear demonstration of Allied
power projection and its resolve to not be cowed by shows of force in international arenas
bordering significant portions of its territory.
87. Specifically, the Warsaw Summit cited Alliance efforts to project stability in the Aegean and
Black Seas, as well as the potential to include the Central Mediterranean; Canada, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all stepped
up their maritime contributions to these areas accordingly. In addition, the Summit declarations
noted the official transition of Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s long-standing Article 5
operation in the Mediterranean, to Operation Sea Guardian, a non-Article 5 Maritime Security
Operation. The broadening of the operation denotes an understanding of the necessity to
strengthen the role of NATO maritime assets, and thereby the security of maritime manoeuvre, in
the face of the suite of security challenges currently facing the Alliance.
88. Finally, NATO has many strategic partners along the periphery of these strategic areas
threatened by or within the potential range of these new Russian A2/AD assets. As such, the push
to develop "a more strategic, more coherent, and more effective approach to partnerships" from
17
161 DSC 16 E bis
the Arctic down to the Mediterranean over to the Caucasus. For example, the missing piece in the
Russia A2/AD bubble in the Baltic region is the Swedish island of Gotland. If Ally-friendly antiaccess capabilities were deployed on the island, it would severely limit Moscow’s ability to impose
an area denial bubble over the Baltic region, thereby preventing them from closing off the Baltic
countries from the rest of the Alliance — a crucial reason, therefore, for NATO to further its
partnership with Sweden (Krishna, 2016).
VI.
INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
89. More than any time since the end of the Cold War, NATO needs to send a strong message
that it is willing and capable of maintaining a capable and credible collective defence policy. The
credibility of NATO’s Article 5 commitment ultimately depends on the political will to use force to
defend the territory of all NATO Allies, but it also means attention to Article 3 as well. As this report
underscores, the Alliance has adapted significantly since 2014, moving from emergency
reassurance measures at Wales to a reinforced, modern, flexible and mobile deterrence system.
The post-Warsaw deterrence model demonstrates the credibility and commitment of the Alliance to
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty via a shift to a focus on robust and ready NRF forces and an
enhanced forward presence along the eastern flank.
90. Given the distributed range of symmetrical and asymmetrical threats facing the Alliance from
the east to the south, it is clear the ability to maintain a range of capabilities from conventional to
missile defence to nuclear remains essential to guarantee the territorial integrity of the Alliance and
safeguard Alliance interests. The evolving nature of 21st century threats indicates a strong need for
the kind of highly mobile, capable conventional forces to respond to threats emanating from any
direction outside of the Alliance – both Wales and Warsaw saw the Alliance push for this capability.
91. As such, it is time for the Alliance to get back to basics. Throughout the first 40 years of its
existence, NATO focused on collective defence, the following 25 years were spent honing the
Alliance’s ability to respond to crises and work in cooperation with its partners in operations in its
near neighbourhood and far from home. All the while, the Alliance grew in scope and breadth. The
current threat environment calls for the ability to do both simultaneously: collective defence and
deterrence, as well as crisis response and cooperative security. In many ways, this is what could
be referred to as full-spectrum security.
92. The steps to get there are plain to see: First, each member state must bolster collective
defence through investment in defence at home, in their region, and through their contributions to
the Alliance as a whole. This is the only way to improve readiness and resilience – through a
renewed understanding of solidarity in the face of a distributed range of challenges, affecting every
member state in different ways, but still challenging each country’s conception of peace and
stability at home.
93. Enhanced collective defence will come through increased Allied investment in their
respective defence institutions. It is clear from the four-fold increase of the US’s European
Reassurance Initiative that the United States remains invested in European security. A paralleled
American Reassurance Initiative by European member states would go a long way to demonstrate
a collective willingness to balance US goodwill with renewed European attention to hard security.
This is essential to real, sustainable, Alliance-wide readiness and deterrence.
94. Second, despite differing views on NATO-Russia policy, unity is the only way forward: we
must remain 28 Allies at the same table demonstrating that the use of force to change political
borders in Europe is counterproductive to peace and security throughout the continent. We must
keep the question of Ukraine on the agenda and find a way to reboot dialogue with Russia as a
means of not only getting it to honour its Minsk commitments, but also to reach consensus on a
18
161 DSC 16 E bis
workable way forward and to find a way to work on common global security concerns, such as the
increasing scourge of terrorism.
95. Third, there must be a collective push to build a multi-tiered, comprehensive framework for
security in NATO’s southern neighbourhood. Each member state must bring to the table fresh
ideas for better collective action to handle this range of challenges, be it through enhanced
intelligence sharing, more comprehensive partnerships with regional states and international
organisations, and concerted capacity-building efforts in places like Libya.
96. Fourth, the Alliance must continue to work to deliver on the promises made to NATO
partners at the Wales and Warsaw Summits, particularly the enhanced partnerships. In addition,
there must be a reaffirmation of the open door policy, which will send a strong signal of credibility
to both internal and external audiences.
97. All of the above recommendations underscore the most important point that must be driven
home by members of this Assembly, both to our individual constituencies and to our respective
governments at home: NATO solidarity is the only answer to 21st century security challenges.
19
161 DSC 16 E bis
APPENDICES AND SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
APPENDIX A - BREAKDOWN OF TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EFP
Framework Nation (#
troops)
Other Contributing
Nations (# troops)
Estonia
United
Kingdom
(500)
Denmark
(200)
France (150)
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Canada (450)
Germany (600)
United States
(1,000)
Poland (150)
Italy, Slovenia,
Portugal
(unconfirmed)
Norway (200),
Netherlands (100-150)
Belgium (150)
Croatia (150)
Luxembourg (50)
France (150 in 2018,
unconfirmed)
United
Kingdom
(150)
Romania
(150)
APPENDIX B - 2016 PROJECTED DEFENCE EXPENDITURES (% OF GDP, 2010
PRICES)
APPENDIX C - 2016 PROJECTED SPENDING ON EQUIPMENT (% DEFENCE
EXP., 2010 PRICES)
20
161 DSC 16 E bis
APPENDIX D - 2016 KEY DEFENCE EXPENDITURES FIGURES
Country
Albania
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Turkey
United Kingdom
Europe
Canada
United States
North America
NATO - Total
Defence Exp. as % GDP
(2016) est.
1.21
0.85
1.35
1.23
1.04
1.17
2.16
1.78
1.19
2.38
1.01
1.11
1.45
1.49
0.44
1.17
1.54
2.00
1.38
1.48
1.16
0.94
0.91
1.56
2.21
1.46
0.99
3.61
3.36
2.46
Annual real change (in
%)
+7.95
-5.30
+6.21
-8.80
+0.29
+4.32
+6.50
+0.64
+2.08
-0.07
+9.33
+10.63
+42.31
+34.13
+5.75
+2.27
+5.45
-7.80
+5.68
+6.47
+4.85
+1.46
+0.62
-3.23
+7.44
+2.97
+3.33
+2.49
+2.52
+2.65
% of Defence Exp.
Equipment
7.81
2.17
12.55
8.27
7.23
12.41
13.50
24.51
13.67
14.91
13.00
20.24
17.86
27.65
32.82
14.43
25.60
25.79
9.43
26.13
19.12
1.17
15.23
23.58
23.41
Values in bold indicate that NATO guidelines under the 2&20 Pledge are met.
21
18.06
25.03
161 DSC 16 E bis
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