Roberto Michels and the Study of Political Parties
Author(s): Gordon Hands
Source: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Apr., 1971), pp. 155-172
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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B.J.Pol.S. I, 155-172
Printedin GreatBritain
Roberto Michels and the Study of Political
Parties
GORDON
HANDS*
Roberto Michels' book Political Parties' has come to be regarded as one of the
classics of political sociology. Most recent studies of the internal government of
parties, trade unions and pressure groups take it as their starting point: it influences the kind of questions that are asked and the concepts that are
employed.2
In spite of this there is virtually no critical literature on the subject.3 The following comment made by Sigmund Neumann 25 years ago remains substantially
correct:
Whilea standardworkwithoutdoubt,it has sharedthe fate of so manyclassics- to be
widelyquotedandrarelyread.Unfortunately,littleempiricalworkhas beendonein the
field of politicalsociologyeitherin definingMichels'underlyingassumptionsor evenin
testingthe validityof his thesis.In fact it has becomean almostundisputedaxiom.4
In this paper I undertake a critical examination of Political Parties. I shall first
of all relate the central argument about democracy in parties to Michels' wider
interests, and then, working mainly at a theoretical level, assess this central argument, paying attention also to methodological and conceptual difficulties. Finally
I shall suggest that the assumption implicit in the questions Michels asks - the
assumption that the traditional terminology of democracy can be applied in a
straightforward way to the discussion of political parties - is misleading and has in
* Departmentof Politics,Universityof Lancaster.This
paperis based on a thesiswrittenfor
the B.Phil. at Oxfordunderthe supervisionof John Torrance.I shouldalso like to thankBrian
Barry,David Denver and David Miller for their criticismsof earlierdrafts.
I Robert
Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of
ModernDemocracy,translatedby E. and C. Paul, with an introductionby S. M. Lipset (New
York: Free Press, I962).
2 See
e.g. S. M. Lipset, M. Trow and J. S. Coleman, UnionDemocracy(Glencoe, Ill.: Free
Press, 1956);R. T. Mackenzie,BritishPoliticalParties(London:MercuryBooks, 2nded. 1963);
S. J. Eldersveld,PoliticalParties: A BehaviouralAnalysis(Chicago: Rand McNally and Co.,
1964); G. N. Ostergaardand A. H. Halsey, Powerin Co-operatives(Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
I965).
3 See however:C. W.
Cassinelli,'The Law of Oligarchy',AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,
XLVII
(I953), 773-84; J. D. May,'Democracy,Organisation,Michels',AmericanPoliticalScience
Review, LIX (1965), 417-29; S. M. Lipset, introduction to Michels, op. cit; J. J. Linz, 'Robert
Michels', International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Macmillan, I968); I. M. Zeitlin,
Ideology and the Development of Social Theory (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), ch. I4.
4 S. Neumann. 'Toward a
ComparativeStudy of Political Parties', in S. Neumann (ed.),
ModernPolitical Parties (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1956),p. 406.
156
HANDS
fact seriously hampered the development of a fuller understandingof the government of parties and other similar organizations.
Political Parties is a difficult book to get to grips with. This is partly due to
Michels' failure to define his terms clearly or to explain his methodology. But it is
also a result of the fact that the book is written from three differentpoints of view.
First of all, it is a straightforward study of the internal structure of political
parties, and the effects of various internal and externalfactors upon that structure.
This is the aspect of Michels' work which is of lasting value, and the one with which
I am mainly concerned here.
Secondly, it is a contribution to the contemporary debate within the German
Social Democratic Party, and indeed within the whole of the social democratic
movement, on the role which party and trade union organizations could or should
play in the achievement of socialism.5 Michels had been a member of the SPD
until I907, and PoliticalParties was to some extent a product of his disillusionment
with the socialist movement.6 I shall argue below that Michels' concentration on
the SPD led to a significant distortion of his concept of 'party'.
Thirdly, Political Parties is a contribution to the mainstream of elitist thought.
For, apart from the central argument about the government of parties, an important secondary theme of the book concerns the possibility of achieving democracy at the state level.7 This secondary theme forms the background against
which the discussion of parties takes place, and can be summarizedbriefly.
Michels starts from the assumption that if democracy is to be achieved in the
modern state it must be through the efforts of a 'democratic party'. It must be
noted that he makes no sharp distinction between two senses of 'democratic
party': (a) a party which aims at setting up, or supports, a democratic state government, and (b) a party which has a democratic internal structure.Also he seems to
neglect the possibility that democracy at the state level might be achieved by competition between parties which were not themselves internally democratic.
From considerations of the contemporary political scene, he argues that
modern conservative and liberal parties, although they often temporarily adopt
democratic policies for opportunistic reasons, are not 'essentially democratic',
and he therefore turns to the social democratic parties. The major part of the book
is then devoted to showing why these, like all other parties, are and must be oligarchic.
This secondary argument is rounded off by a demonstration that a party with
oligarchical internal organization cannot pursue a democratic policy with
respect to the state. And the final conclusion is the 'iron law of oligarchy', 'the
law that oligarchy is, as it were, a preordained form of the common life of great
social aggregates.'8
5 See e.g. C. E. Schorske,GermanSocial DemocracyI905-1917 (New York: Wileyand Sons,
I955).
6 See J.
Joll, The Second International 1889-I914 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1955),
p. 130; J. P. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), i, p. 408, n. I.
7 This element is particularlyapparentin the Preface,and at the beginningof Part 6.
8 Michels,PoliticalParties, p. 354.
Roberto Michels and the Study of Political Parties
157
It seems fairly clear from the context that Michels' intends his famous 'iron law'
to apply not only to parties and other voluntary organizations, but to all levels of
social organization including the state.9 Thus the 'iron law of oligarchy' is just a
new name for the central elitist principle that government is necessarily government by the few. However, in putting forward a detailed mechanism through
which his 'law' operates, Michels does make an important advance on the work
of Mosca and Pareto.
These three approaches, those of the sociologist, the practising politician, and
the elite theorist, are never completely separated by Michels; as the argument
proceeds different aspects are brought out. The result is an impressive richness of
argument, but also a considerable degree of confusion.
In what follows, I shall concentrate on Michels' central sociological arguments
about oligarchy in parties. I want to examine these arguments in detail, and if
possible to clarify them. I shall deal first of all with methodology and definitions,
and then go on in the next two sections to examine Michels' particulararguments.
In the last two sections I shall try to assess the argument as a whole and the influence of Michels' work.
From a methodological point of view, Michels formulates conclusions at three
levels.
First of all, he describes individual factors and mechanisms which permit, or
are used by, leaders to maintain their control. As an example of these one might
cite the arguments about membership age and turnover discussed in the brief
chapter on 'Accessory Peculiarities of the Masses'.'? These, and many other of
his observations at this level, are interesting and important.
Secondly, he formulates a number of what he calls 'tendencies'. These seem to
be frequently observed correlations of phenomena which can be backed up by a
rationale, an explanation which enables us in some way to understand the correlation and fit it in with other theories we may hold. While the notion of such tendencies, though somewhat vague, is not in principle unacceptable, when it comes
to establishing them Michels' methods are inadequate. For a supposedly 'sociological' study, PoliticalParties contains surprisinglylittle hard empiricalevidence.
Michels' method can only be described as 'proof by anecdote': in the typical
case, he simply outlines the tendency in question, suggests a rationale for it, and
then gives a few disparate historical examples in support. What is lacking above
all is any attempt at comprehensiveness, any indication of the frequency with
which the phenomena in question occur.
Finally, Michels several times refers to his principal conclusion as a 'sociological law'. The following passage contains the only explanation of this term
which he offers:
We arenow awarethatthel aw of the historicnecessityof oligarchyis primarilybasedon
a seriesof factsof experience.Likeall otherscientificlaws, sociologicallawsarederived
9 The phrase 'the iron law of oligarchy' seems to occur only once, in the title of Part ch. 2.
6,
10
Michels, Political Parties, pp. 105-6.
158
HANDS
from empiricalobservation.In order, however, to deprive our axiom of its purely
descriptivecharacter,and to conferupon it that statusof analyticalexplanationwhich
can alone transforma formula into a law, it does not sufficeto contemplatefrom a
unitaryoutlook those phenomenawhichmay be empiricallyestablished;we must also
study the determiningcauses of these phenomena.1
This is not altogether clear, but it seems to suggest that for a law, as for a tendency,
we need both empirical evidence and a rationale. The question that arises from
this however is, what is the relationship between laws and tendencies ? Is a law
just a summary of several tendencies? If so, how does one add tendencies, especially counter-acting ones ? Furthermore, Michels' use of the phrase 'iron law'
suggests that he has in mind something of universal applicability, something
more than just a tendency, something logically one step removed from tendencies.
If so, where does this extra something come from? Michels answers none of these
questions.
This brief discussion indicates, I hope, the inadequacy of Michels' explanation
of his methodology. Even more troublesome than his methodology, however, is
his failure either to define his key terms or to use them at all consistently. The best
that one can hope to do is to piece together his scattered comments, and try to
deduce some reasonably coherent meaning from them. The four most important
concepts are 'democracy', 'oligarchy', 'organization' and 'party'. I shall deal with
the first two now, and the others in the last two sections.
I have already referred to an example of Michels' lack of rigour in his failure
to distinguish the two ways in which a party might be regarded as democratic.
But in general, apart from this, he uses the term 'democracy' in three clearly
different senses.
Sometimes he uses it in an approximately Marxist manner, in which democracy
is seen as being fundamentally impossible within the capitalist state. Sometimes
this seems to be a matter of saying that the absence of the private ownership of the
means of production is a necessary practical condition for democracy; but at
other times he equates democracy with socialism. This first sense, which Michels
uses mainly in his discussion of democracy at the state level, seems to me the least
important of the three.12
Secondly, Michels uses the term in a manner which is usually traced back to
Rousseau. This is so-called 'direct democracy', in which policy initiatives come
from, and policy decisions are made more or less directly by, the rank and file.
In this sense democracy logically implies the impossibility of leadership, and perhaps also of representation. The meeting of the whole membership is seen as the
central democratic mechanism, though some form of strict delegation may also
be possible.
I Michels, Political Parties, p. 364.
12
May, however, achieves an ingeniously, though tortuously, paradoxical interpretation,
according to which Michels sees democracy and organization as fundamentally compatible,
largely by taking Michels to be equating 'democracy' and 'socialism' throughout. That such an
interpretation is untenable can be seen quite clearly, I think, by considering Michels' arguments
about representation, the stability of leadership, etc. See May, 'Democracy, Organisation,
Michels'.
Roberto Michels and the Study of Political Parties
159
Thirdly, Michels also talks of 'democracy' in a sense in which representationis
a possibility. The essential element here is seen as a certain degree of agreement
between the 'wishes' of the rank and file and the polices actually pursued by the
leadership. A system of government is democratic in this sense if it incorporates
institutional arrangementswhich ensure such agreement: for example, the determination of policy by elected representatives, or perhaps the selection of leaders
by a process of electoral competition between elites.13
It is clear, I think, that in his discussion of the internal government of parties
Michels mainly has these last two meanings in mind. The Rousseau-ian sense
comes out briefly in his discussion of representation,'4 and at one or two other
points. However in this sense the overall conclusion about the undemocratic
nature of party government become truistic and uniformative. Only in the third
sense, concerned with agreement with policies, does Michels' hypothesis become
really significant, and furthermorethis is the sense which seems to be implicit in
his central argument about the development of a professional and stable leadership. In what follows therefore, I shall assume that Michels is using the
term in this third sense, except where the contrary is specifically indicated.'5
Corresponding to the second and third senses of 'democracy' are two senses of
'oligarchy'. In the first of these, a system of government is oligarchic simply if it
gives an important place to a group of representatives: thus almost any form of
representative government would be oligarchic.
Secondly, a system is oligarchic if policies are determined by a small group
of leaders, and there is no mechanismwhich ensuresthat these policies correspond
in any way with the wishes of the members or citizens. However, when used in this
way, the term covers a number of cases which one might want to distinguish. For
example, one might want to know whether the rank and file were forced to accept
oligarchy under duress, whetherthey were manipulatedinto accepting it by means
of propaganda, or whether they were just apathetic. Or one might want to know
whose interests were furthered by the policies which resulted from the system.
Or the extent to which the rank and file actually agreed with the leaderships'
policies might be important.
Clearly, what is needed is a much more detailed typology of the possible nondemocratic varieties of government.16Michels does not attempt this, but instead
13 If a more
explicit formulationof the third sense is required,the following might be suggested:a systemof governmentmaybe describedas democraticif it provides(structural)mechanismswhichensurethatthe policiespursuedby the governmentare in accordancewith the wishes
of the citizens.This would obviouslyneed considerableclarification,but the problemsinvolved
are not, I think, insuperable.
14 Michels, Political Parties, pp. 73-7.
15 However,severalwritersconcentrateon the Rousseau-iansense. E.g.: 'In Political Parties,
Robert Michels ... laid down what has come to be the major political argumentagainst
Rousseau'sconceptof directpopulardemocracy.. .' (Lipset,intro.to Michels,PoliticalParties,
p. 15). See also Ostergaard and Halsey, Power in Co-operatives, pp. 217 ff. Cassinelli's emphasis
on the question of size might also be seen as implyingthe Rousseau-ianinterpretation.See
Cassinelli,'Law of Oligarchy'.
16 See the analysisof the term'oligarchy'in Cassinelli,'Lawof
Oligarchy,'pp. 777-80.
I60
HANDS
brings out different elements to suit his arguments. But usually when he talks of
oligarchy in this second sense he seems to have in mind a situation in which the
rank and file are manipulated into accepting policies with which they would not
otherwise agree, and which are not in their interests, or at least are primarilyin the
interests of the leadership group.
II
I come now to the central sections of PoliticalParties, the proof of the oligarchical
tendencies of parties and similar bodies. In his concluding chapter, Michels
summarizes his arguments in the following words:
The principalcauseof oligarchyin the democraticpartiesis to be foundin the technical
indispensabilityof leadership.The processwhichhas begunin consequenceof the differentiationof functionsin the partyis completedby a complexof qualitieswhichthe
leadersacquirethroughtheir detachmentfrom the mass. At the outset, leadersarise
and GRATUITOUS.Soon, however, they
their functions are ACCESSORY
SPONTANEOUSLY;
become PROFESSIONAL
leaders, and in this second stage of development they are STABLE
and IRREMOVABLE.17
As this suggests, we find two stages in Michels' exposition. The first is concerned
to explain the origins of leadership, and the second to show that leadership must
develop, becoming more and more separated from the rank and file, more and
more oligarchic.
In the first stage, Michels presents what can perhaps be described as a 'dynamic
ideal type', outlining a model process of development which he apparently thinks
most democratic parties go through. The model starts with an organization based
on primitive direct democracy and Michels describes a process in which the
problem of size, and the need for specialization and the division of labour, give rise
to rudimentaryforms of delegation and representation,and these in turn develop
into a more permanent leadership.'8 This is backed up by arguments from
psychology, designed to show that the 'masses' exhibit a 'psychological need' for
leadership, and by the argument that the 'masses' are incompetent and dependent
upon the intellectual abilities of the leaders.
Now this first stage, which superficially may seem unproblematic, is in fact
rather odd. The conclusion is reasonable enough, but it is difficult to see why
Michels should go to such lengths to demonstrate it. For it is surely a reasonable
enough proposition that organization necessarily involves leadership, and one
might go so far as to say it was logically necessary.
Perhaps the argument brings out more clearly the functions of leadership. But
apart from this, in so far as the model is intended to be historically realistic, it is
seriously misleading. Many, if not most, parties have been built up by professional organizers and agitators, rather than being the product of spontaneous
growth at the local level. And the same applies to trade unions. The evidence sug17Michels,PoliticalParties, p. 364.
18 Michels,, Political Parties, pp. 64 ff.
Roberto Michels and the Study of Political Parties
16i
gests that in the first place at least it is leadership which produces organization,
rather than vice versa.19
Given the necessity of leadership in organizations, Michels goes on in his
second stage to try to show that leadership must become oligarchic. The principal
argument is an extension of the 'dynamic ideal type' which we have just been discussing: Michels argues that 'organization' necessarily continues to develop, and
that as it does so the party graduallybecomes less democratic and more oligarchic.
Before discussing this argument in detail however, I want first of all to look more
briefly at three other types of argument which Michels employs to reinforce it.
(i) Michels presents two important arguments to suggest the sort of factors
that would encourage leaders to act oligarchically.
The first concerns the psychological effects of wielding power:
The consciousnessof poweralwaysproducesvanity,an unduebeliefin personalgreatness. The desireto dominate,for good or for evil, is universal.These are elementary
psychologicalfacts.In theleader,theconsciousnessof hispersonalworth,andof theneed
whichthe mass feels for guidance,combineto inducein his mind a recognitionof his
own superiority(realor supposed),andawakein addition,thatspiritof commandwhich
existsin the germin everymanbornof woman.We see fromthisthateveryhumanpower
seeks to enlarge its prerogatives.He who has acquired power will almost always
endeavourto consolidateit andto extendit, to multiplythe rampartswhich defendhis
position,and to withdrawhimselffromthe controlof the masses.20
This is backed up by further remarks on what Michels calls 'Bonapartism': 'the
theory of individual dominion originating in the collective will but tending to
emancipate itself of that will and to become sovereign in its turn.'21
The second argument is one which has been considerably extended by later
writers, in particular S. M. Lipset.22It concerns the effects of status, financial and
other benefits open to party leaders on their actions and policies. Michels discusses in some detail the embourgeoisementof leaders of the socialist parties
and the ways in which this might affect the parties' governmental processes.
These arguments are clearly of no small importance, but in the absence of an
estimate of the extensiveness of the phenomena in question it is difficult to say
just how much weight should be attached to them. Their importance will clearly
depend on the actual circumstances: the status of party leaders in the community,
the salaries they earn, the availability of alternative posts, etc. Furthermore,
there will be forces acting in the opposite direction. As Michels himself points
19See e.g. the evidencepresentedby H. A. Turner.The present-dayunion structurein this
countryis largelya resultof the periodof the New Unionismof the 89gos,
and the developments
resultingfrom this just before, during and after the First World War. Union growth in this
periodwas predominantlydue to the organisingeffortsof individualleaderslike JohnBurnsand
Ben Tillett, and to amalgamationsbetweentheir creations.Michels'model only finds any real
applicationin Turner'sdescriptionof the earlierevolution of the cotton unions and the NUM.
But it is interestingto note that it is preciselythese unions that have retainedtheirdecentralised
federalstructure.H. A. Turner,TradeUnionGrowth,StructureandPolicy (London:Allen and
Unwin, 1962).
20
21
Michels, Political Parties,p. 206.
Michels,PoliticalParties,p. 213.
22 S. M.
Lipset, PoliticalMan (GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubleday, I960), ch. I2 ('The Political
Processin TradeUnions').
11
162
HANDS
out, where status or remuneration are low, leaders will tend to be idealists rather
than opportunists.
(ii) In a section entitled 'Psychological Causes of Leadership', Michels discusses several factors which might make it easier for the leaders to become
oligarchic. He talks about the 'psychological need' for leadership felt by the
masses, their predisposition to hero-worship, and their tendency to excessive
gratitude. Michels shared with his contemporaries a keen interest in psychology
and the irrational, and these arguments seem to be based upon once popular
theories of crowd psychology.23However, in the form in which they are presented
they are really too vague to be of much significance.
The most interesting argumentin this section is in fact the one based on apathy
among the membership, a phenomenon which has been quite extensively studied
in recent work on participation.24But Michels does not seem to attach very great
significance to the point; he mentions it only as evidence of the rank and file's
'psychological need' for leadership, and does not elaborate any more direct connection between it and oligarchy. Much the same can be said about his interesting
observations on the high rate of union and party membership turnover. This is
presented as merely an 'accessory peculiarity of the masses'.
(iii) Michels also discusses several techniques which might be used by leaders
to maintain their control. These include manipulation of party finances, control
over the party press, the use of an extra-partypower base such as that provided
by membership of the legislature, and the 'tactic of resignation'. Clearly all of
these may be important in certain circumstances.
But the most important argument of this type is that put forward in the chapter
on 'The StruggleAmong the LeadersThemselves'. Here Michels suggests a modified version of Pareto's circulation of elites, which he terms the 'reuniondes elites':
Veryrarelydoes the strugglebetweenthe old leadersand the new end in the complete
defeatof the former.The resultof the processis not so much a circulationdes elites as
a reuniondes elites, an amalgamthat is to say of the two elements... Doubtless the
labour movementfurnishescertainexamplesof leaderswho have been deposed,who
havebeenabandonedby theiradherents.Suchcasesarehoweverrare,and onlyin exceptionalcircumstancesdo theysignifythat the masseshavebeenstrongerthanthe leaders.
As a ruletheymeanmerelythat a new leaderhas enteredinto conflictwiththe old, and,
thanksto the supportof the mass, has prevailedin the struggle,and has been able to
dispossessand replacethe old leader.The profitfor democracyof such a substitution
is practicallynil.25
Now this argument only has the strength Michels attributes to it if we use the
Rousseau-ian sense of democracy. Clearly, where such a 'reuniondes elites' does
23
On this, and the generalintellectualclimateof the periodsee H. S. Hughes, Consciousness
and Society (London: MacGibbonand Kee, I959).
24
On participationin tradeunionssee e.g.: R. L. Kahn and A. S. Tannenbaum,Participation
in Local Unions (New York: Row Peterson, 1958); W. Spinrad,'Correlatesof Trade Union
Participation:A Summary of the Literature', AmericanSociological Review, xxv (I960),
237-44. See also B. Barber,'Participationand MassApathyin Associations',in A. W. Gouldner,
Studies in Leadership (New York: Harper, 1950), pp. 477-504.
25
Michels,PoliticalParties, pp. 182, 186-7.
Roberto Michels and the Study of Political Parties
I63
occur, the old leaders may be successful in keeping their power positions. But in
most cases this will be at the cost of at least compromising their policies. If we use
the third sense of democracy, and take some sort of agreementwith policies as the
main criterion, then the argument is as likely to be favourable to democracy as to
oligarchy. In fact Michels' 'reunion des elites' becomes simply another way of
looking at one of the basic assumptions of recent elitist theories of democracy:
the idea that democracy may be the product of competition for leadership.26
III
I come now to Michels' main argument, based on his theories about organization.
This is in fact the most interesting aspect of his work, and the most widely quoted,
yet it is far from clear what precisely his arguments are, let alone what their value
is.
The problem is further complicated by the fact that Michels uses two terms,
'organization' and 'bureaucracy', without really explaining the relationship
between them. The generalfeatures of the concept he has in mind are clear enough.
For example, when he is discussing bureaucracy he lists the following factors:
'subordination, the harmonious co-operation of individual members, hierarchical
relationships, discretion, propriety of conduct'.27 And elsewhere, emphasis is
placed on the division of labour: 'The principle of division of labour coming more
and more into operation, executive authority undergoes division and subdivision.
There is thus constituted a rigorously defined and hierarchical bureaucracy.'28
Clearly, Michels' approach is closely related to that of Max Weber, though it
conspicuously lacks Weber's thorough exposition.29Also, in contrast to Weber's
view of bureaucracyas the apotheosis of rationalism, Michels concentrates much
more on its dysfunctional aspects.30
But beyond this general notion, it is never clear whether Michels wants to
make an important distinction between 'bureaucracy'and 'organization'. Sometimes he uses the terms interchangeably.On other occasions he talks as if bureaucracy were merely an advanced form of organization. And finally, he sometimes
uses the term to apply to different, though closely related, phenomena. In this
sense, 'organization'refersto the application of the principlesof division of labour,
hierarchy, etc., whereas 'bureaucracy' refers to a more or less distinct group
of personnel performing certain broadly specifiable functions within a wider
26 See
e.g. J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Unwin University Books, I954.) Pt Iv.
27
Michels, Political Parties, p. 338.
28
Michels, Political Parties, p. 72.
29
See H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, From Max Weber(New York: Oxford University Press,
1946), section viII.
30
This aspect of the theory of bureaucracyhas been followedup by severalwriters.See e.g.
R. K. Merton, 'Bureaucratic Structure and Personality', Social Forces, xvIII (1940), 560-8;
P. Selznick, 'An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy;AmericanSociologicalReview,vIi
(I943), 47-54. See also A. W. Gouldner,'MetaphysicalPathosand the Theoryof Bureaucracy',
American Political Science Review, XLIX(1955), 496-507.
164
HANDS
organization. In the discussion that follows I shall indicate those arguments in
which Michels seems to use 'bureaucracy' in this restricted sense.31
I discussed above Michels' use of a 'dynamic ideal type' to account for the
origins of leadership. In some of his arguments about the oligarchic effects of
organization he continues to use this model, suggesting that following the
establishment of leadership the level of organization will rise, and this rise will
involve increased power for the leaders.
The central element of the model here is the idea of the growth of organization.
In view of the fact that 'organization' is a multi-dimensional concept, this presents certain difficulties:what precisely is it that grows ? What criteriais one to use
to measure the growth? etc. Michels not only overlooks these problems, but he
scarcely bothers to defend his hypothesis about the growth of organization at all.
Sometimes he discusses the growth of organization as a response to the party's
(or union's) fight for power. ('Organization, based as it is upon the principle of
least effort, that is to say, upon the greatest possible economy of energy, is the
weapon of the weak in their struggle with the strong.')32Elsewherehe speaks as if
the growth of organization were an impersonal, almost a spontaneous, phenomenon, and one to which there were no very definite limits. Sometimes in fact he
seems to think that it is limitless.
Weber's analysis is much more penetrating on this point. He suggests that the
growth of bureaucraticadministration is mainly due to two factors: the quantitative growth of administrative tasks, and their qualitative development. Applying
these ideas to parties, and other similar organizations like trade unions, suggests
quite definite limits to the extent to which they are likely to become organized.
On the one hand, there have been clear indications that in stable conditions parties
and unions reach peak membership figures, beyond which they grow little. On
the other hand, the type of function performed will be largely governed by the
ideology of the institution in question. It would certainly seem that political
parties in western democracies are limited fairly much to electoral organization.
And although trade unions may offer wider social services these are usually
administratively separate from the central structure of the union, and in any case
have tended to give way to state organized schemes.
But of even greater importance perhaps is the question of finance. Parties and
unions are rarely well-off, and, in this country at any rate, posts in their organization are notoriously poorly paid.33Furthermore,the unwillingness of the rank and
file of such organizations to provide money for organizational improvements is
well known.
In the more restricted sense of 'bureaucracy' Michels presents the following
peculiar argument to account for the bureaucraticnature of modern parties:
31 Supportfor this
interpretationcan be found in the summarychartwhich Michelsincluded
in the first Germanedition. This was reprintedin the firstEnglishedition, but for some reason
has been omitted from recent Americaneditions. See Robert Michels,PoliticalParties, translated by E. and C. Paul (London: Jarroldand Sons, I915).
32 Michels, Political Parties, p. 6I.
33 See
e.g. H. A. Clegg, A. J. Killick and R. Adams, Trade UnionOfficers(Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, I961), pp. 208-I6.
Roberto Michels and the Study of Political Parties
I65
... the partyin which the circleof the elite is undulyrestricted,or in which,in other
words,the oligarchyis composedof too smalla numberof individuals,runsthe riskof
being swept away by the massesin a momentof democraticeffervescence.Hence the
modernparty, like the modernstate, endeavoursto give to its own organisationthe
widestpossiblebase, and to attachto itself in financialbonds,the largestpossiblenumber of individuals.Thus arisesthe need for a strongbureaucracy,and these tendencies
are reinforcedby the increasein the tasks imposedby modem organisation.34
The arguments outlined above seem to me to apply afortiori to this case. Indeed
it seems somewhat unrealistic to label western parliamentary parties, and
probably also trade unions, 'bureaucratic' at all.35
We see from this discussion that Michels' treatment of the question of the
growth of organization is sketchy and unconvincing. And for such an important
element in this theory this is surprising. His broad blanket statements neglect
such detailed points as the reasons for the differences in levels of organization
between different parties and unions, and the precise limits to organization. And
unfortunately, little detailed work has been done since in this area.36
Turning next to the the question of the effects of the growth of organization on
the internal government of parties, the main difficultyis again that of finding out
exactly what Michels' arguments are. There are at least two broad possibilities.
On the one hand, he sometimes seems to imply that the growth of organization
enhances the power of the leaders themselves in various ways. On the other, he
seems often to have in mind the growth of a distinct bureaucracy (in the narrow
sense) which either itself becomes dominant over both representativesand rank
and file, or is simply a tool in the hands of the leaders and allows them to increase
their control. Michels doesn't really separate these possibilities, and his more
specific arguments are not usually directed to one rather than the other. These
more specific arguments do seem, however, to fall into three groups.
(i) The first of these is the clearest and most acceptable. We saw in the previous
section that Michels describes various techniques which might be used by an
oligarchy to secure its position - the press, manipulation of finances, etc. It is
clear that these means may only become available once a certain level of organization has been reached, and that their availability and importance may increase if
and when the level of organization rises.
34
Michels,PoliticalParties,pp. 189-90.
In this connectionit is interestingto note the followingcommentof Nettl's: 'It is meaningless to talk of the pre-I914 SPD which was Michels'object of analysis,as bureaucraticin the
formalsense, since its full-timepaid staffin 1912 was less than a hundredagainsta membership
of many tens of thousands,and againstthe four and a quartermillion votes obtainedin I912.'
35
J. P. Netti, Political Mobilisation (London: Faber, I967), p. 341, note
2.
Howeversee Clegg, Killick and Adams, TradeUnionOfficers.Takingthe numberof fulltime officersin a union as the criterionof bureaucracy,they suggesta long list of factorswhich
may affect the ratio of officersto members,but to the question whether there is any underlyingpatternthey answer:'We suggestthat the answerlies in the forceof traditionand habit...
the long list of factorsjust set down determinedthe originaldifferencesbetweenunions.As time
passed,however,each union came to acceptsits own ratio as the naturalorderof thingsand put
up a strong resistanceto change, even when alteredcircumstanceswarrantedit', p. 195.
36
I66
HANDS
(ii) The second group of arguments, concerned with the relations between
leaders and rank and file, is the one which Michels uses most frequently. We have
already seen him arguing that (a) organization causes leadership to appear in the
first place, and that (b) organization has a tendency to grow. Now he argues that
as organization develops, leadership does so too, and becomes stronger and more
important:
The technicalspecialisationthat inevitablyresultsfrom all extensiveorganisationrendersnecessarywhatis calledexpertleadership.Consequentlythe powerof determination
comes to be consideredone of the specificattributesof leadership,andis graduallywithdrawnfrom the massesto be concentratedin the hands of the leadersalone.
Thus the leaders,who were at firstno more than executiveorgansof the collective
will, soon emancipatethemselvesfromthemassandbecomeindependentof its control.37
Michels apparently sees the leaders becoming more expert and professional, and,
partly as a result of the becoming irremovable, more secure and less responsive
to rank and file influence. He gives two arguments to support this view.
The first, although it is the more persuasive, is only hinted at. Michels argues
that the fact that the leaders become professionals and experts will in itself give
them greater power. Their monopoly of expertise in certain areas will mean that
the rank and file have to depend on their judgement, and that they can therefore
to some extent control the rank and file.38This may be so, but two things must be
remembered. First, the power of the experts in any particularcase will depend on
the exact structure of the organization in question. And second, the argument
may be double-edged, in that 'depth' of expertise is normally inversely proportional to its 'breadth'.
The argument needs to be more fully worked out, and it seems likely that
Michels' (implied) version is at least over-simplified.Indeed, it seems unlikely that
any simple generalization will be possible on this point. For example, an interesting example of this type of argument in another field, with much less straightforward conclusions than those reached by Michels, is the case of the effects of the
growth in the scope and complexity of administration in this country on the relations between the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and Parliament.39
The second argument is at least more explicit:
For democracy... the firstappearanceof professionalleadershipmarksthe beginning
of the end, and this above all on accountof the logical impossibilityof the 'representative' system, whetherin parliamentarylife or in party delegation.... A mass which
delegatesits sovereignty,thatis to saytransfersits sovereigntyto the handsof a few individuals,abdicatesits sovereignfunction.40
This criticismof the representativesystemis applicableabove all in our own days,in
which political life continuallyassumesmore complex forms. As this complexityinMichels,PoliticalParties,p. 70.
argumentalong these lines in his discussionof bureaucracy:Gerth and
Mills, FromMax Weber,p. 232.
39 See e.g. J. P. Mackintosh,TheBritishCabinet(London: Stevensand Sons, 1962), ch. 13;
37
38 See also Weber's
G. W. Jones, 'The Prime Minister's Power', Parliamentary Affiairs, xvII (2) (I965), 167-85.
40
Michels,PoliticalParties,p. 73.
Roberto Michels and the Study of Political Parties
167
creasesit becomes more and more absurdto attemptto 'represent'a heterogeneous
massin all the innumerableproblemswhichariseout of the increasingdifferentiationof
our politicalandeconomiclife. To represent,in thissense,comesto meanthatthe purely
individualdesiremasqueradesand is acceptedas the will of the mass.In certainisolated
cases, where the questions involved are extremelysimple, andj'wherethe delegated
authorityis of briefduration,representationis possible.But permanentrepresentation
will alwaysbe tantamountto the exerciseof dominionby the representatives
over the
represented.4'
In the first of these quotations, Michels claims that his argument is logically true.
And so it may be if he switches back to the Rousseau-ian sense of 'democracy'.
However, this gives us merely an uninteresting tautology.
But as the second quotation shows, he also intends the argument in the third
sense of 'democracy' (agreement with policies), and in fact he does make some
attempt at a more substantial attack on the theory of representativedemocracy,
quoting among others Marx and Mosca. But the arguments are never impressive,
and it is difficultto avoid the conclusion that he does little more than reiteratethe
bases of his elitist ideology.
(iii) Finally there is a group of arguments which is formulated in terms of the
restricted concept of 'bureaucracy'.
First of all there is the phenomenon known nowadays as 'goal displacement',
the discovery of which has been credited to Michels. In fact his immediate use of
the argument is not to prove that parties are oligarchic, but to show that oligarchically organized parties cannot pursue truly socialist policies:
In a party,it is far from obviousthat the interestsof the masseswhichhave combined
to form the partywill coincidewith the interestsof the bureaucracyin whichthe party
becomespersonified.The interestsof the body of employeesare alwaysconservative,
and in a givenpoliticalsituationthese interestsmay dictatea defensiveand even a reactionarypolicy when the interestsof the workingclass demanda bold and aggressive
policy; in othercases,althoughtheseareveryrare,the roles may be reversed.By a universallyapplicablesocial law, every organ of the collectivity,broughtinto existence
throughthe need for the divisionof labour,createsfor itself,as soon as it becomesconsolidated,interestspeculiarto itself. The existenceof these specialinterestsinvolvesa
necessaryconflictwith the interestsof the collectivity.Nay, more,socialstratafulfilling
peculiarfunctionstend to becomeisolated,to produceorgansfittedfor the defenceof
their own peculiarinterests.42
Michels had in mind in particular the failure of the German socialist movement
to pursue what he regarded as a truly revolutionary policy, which he attributed
to the desire of the leaders and the bureaucracynot to jeopardize the movement's
organization. Clearly such a phenomenon might be undemocratic, though in this
case it seems quite likely that the leadership's policies would have been
approved
by the rank and file.43
Considered as part of the broader argument for oligarchy, goal displacement
41
43
42
Michels,PoliticalParties,pp. 76-7.
Michels,PoliticalParties,p. 353.
See e.g. the evidence quoted by Lipset in his introductionto Michels, Political Parties,
pp. 30-I.
I68
HANDS
may be important, and clearly it may be a feature not just of bureaucracyin the
restrictedsense, but also more generallyof organization. But its extent will depend
largely on the size and extent of organization or of the bureaucracy itself, and I
have argued above that parties are not bureaucratic to the degree that Michels
implies, and that there are likely to be limits to the degree to which they become
organized.
Michels' other references to bureaucracy are not very impressive, and have
little direct relevance to the main argument. The following remarks give a fair
indication of his attitude:
Bureaucracyis the swornenemyof individualliberty,andof all bold initiativein matters
of the average
of internalpolicy.Thedependenceuponsuperiorauthoritiescharacteristic
to
in
which
and
the
presociety
employees
individuality
gives
employee suppresses
dominatea narrowpetty-bourgeoisand philistinestamp. The bureaucraticspiritcorrupts characterand engendersmoral poverty.In every bureaucracywe may observe
place-hunting,a maniafor promotion,and obsequiousnesstowardsthose upon whom
promotion depends; there is arrogance towards inferiors and servility towards
superiors.... We may even say that the more conspicuouslya bureaucracyis distinguishedby its zeal, by its sense of duty, and by its devotion,the more also will it show
itself to be petty, narrow,rigid, and illiberal.44
Of Michels' argumentswith respect to organization and bureaucracyin general,
it must be said that they are disappointingly woolly and imprecise. He presents
several lines of thought which are potentially interesting, but he fails to follow
them up with sufficientclarity, or in sufficientdetail. He fails to give any convincing analysis of the overall development of organization in parties and unions, and
his discussion of its effects on the internal structure and government of such
bodies is equally unsatisfactory.
IV
When one reads Political Parties for the first time, one is overwhelmed by the
spate of plausible arguments and illustrative examples. It is more a matter of
being taken by storm than of being persuaded by rational argument. In this
paper I have tried to provide the basis for a more dispassionate assessment of
Michels' work, by extracting what seems to be the central line of his argument
and examining in detail the main stages in it. This process perhaps necessarily
involves a degree of over-simplification, the imposition of a pattern which at any
rate is not explicit. This over-simplication has not I hope been at the expense of
distortion.
My attitude to Michels' overall conclusions will probably be clear from the
discussion so far. He gives us a number of original and interesting arguments
concerning the structure and workings of party organization and government,
many of which have been useful in later research, but that is all. There seems to me
to be insufficient evidence to establish anything like a general tendency to oligarchy, let alone a sociological law of any kind.
44 Michels, Political Parties, p. I91.
Roberto Michels and the Study of Political Parties
I69
Apart from the detailed criticisms which I have outlined, and the omissions
which I have suggested, there is also I think one strand of argument which
Michels almost completely neglects. This is, of course, the question of formal
structure. Most parties and unions have fairly elaborate governmental structures
designed to allow, or ensure, rank and file control over the leadership. These
Michels effectivelyignores. Where he does mention elections or party conferences,
etc., it is usually just to say that these obviously don't have any real effect. The
examination in Part 5 of 'Attempts to Restrict the Influence of the Leaders' is
derisory.
Now such cavalier treatment might have been justified if he had produced some
fairly conclusive argument to show that for other reasons oligarchy is likely, such
indeed as his argument from organization is supposed to be. But if this latter
argument is as weak as I have suggested, then the omission of any serious argument against the effectiveness of formal structuralcontrols is an important defect.
v
However, apart from these inadequacies in Michels' proof of his central hypothesis, I want finally to suggest another and more fundamental fault in Political
Parties. This concerns the conceptual or theoretical framework in terms of which
this central hypothesis is framed.
Michels asks whether parties are or can be democratic. Now all traditional
theories of democracy had been worked out in the context of the state, and not
with reference to associations like parties or unions. It remains to be shown in
what ways and to what extent traditional theories of democracy are relevant to the
government of parties, etc.
The origins of Michels' interest in the question of democracy in parties can be
found in the German Social Democratic Party, his principal example. In the
theories of the pre-First World War social democrats the party played an important role. It was primarily an instrument of the class war, the organization of the
proletariat. By some the advent of socialism was seen as a process in which the
party would gradually grow stronger and stronger, until the bourgeois state was
overthrown and abolished and the party took its place. Of course the question as
to the exact nature of the take-over - whether for instance it was to be legal or
violent - was highly controversial, but there was little doubt as to the importance
of the party in the process.
This explains the importance of Michels' book as a contribution to contemporary socialism, for the new state to be set up after the revolution was meant to be a
(or rather 'the') democratic state, the product of a take-over by a democratic
party. It also explains, by the way, why Michels was not particularlybothered to
distinguish between the two senses of 'democratic party' which were mentioned
above.45
Now Michels' concept of 'party' is clearly developed from this theory and the
practical application which it found in the SPD. Although as usual we are given
no explicit definition, three elements stand out in his discussion.
45 See above, p. 156.
170
HANDS
First of all, a party is seen as essentially an organization: 'What, in fact, is the
modern political party? It is the methodical organisation of the electoral
masses.'46
Secondly, a party is seen as being primarily based on its principles and
doctrines: 'A party is neither a social unity nor an economic unity. It is based upon
its programme. In theory this programme may be the expression of the interests
of a particular class. In practice, however, anyone may join a party whether
his interests coincide or not with the principles enunciated in the party programme.'47
This second element may seem to imply that parties are in some way voluntary.
However in Michels' discussion a third element, clearly derived from the
socialist theory sketched above, predominates: the idea of a party as a 'state in
miniature'. Though only appearing once or twice explicitly, this notion is fundamental to Michels' way of looking at parties and the sort of question he asks
about them.
Generatedto overthrowthecentralisedpowerof the state,startingfromthe idea that the
workingclass need merelysecurea sufficientlyvast and solid organisationin orderto
triumphoverthe organisationof the state,the partyof the workershas endedby acquiring a vigorouscentralisationof its own, based upon the same cardinal principlesof
authorityanddisciplinewhichcharacterisethe organisationof the state.It thus becomes
a governmentalparty,thatis to say, a partywhich,organiseditselflike a governmenton
the small scale, hopessomeday to assumethe reinsof governmentupon the largescale.
The revolutionarypoliticalpartyis a statewithinthe state,pursuingthe avowedaim of
destroyingthe existingstatein orderto substitutefor it a socialorderof a fundamentally
differentcharacter.4
Now it seems to me that this third element, the notion of the party as a state
within the state, is crucial for an understanding of Michels' work. It gives rise to
his main question: whether or not parties are democratic. But it also, I think,
involves certain important misconceptions of the nature of parties (and by implication of unions, and other such associations as well). For one of the most important features of the type of institution which Michels is discussing is surely that
it is essentially voluntary. One can join or leave parties at will, in a way in which
one cannot join or leave the state.
Now it follows from this that one cannot automatically apply the conclusions
reached in traditional discussions of democracy to parties. Traditional democratic
theories came to certain conclusions as to what democracy meant in terms of the
state, as to why it was a 'good thing' for the state to be democratic, and as to the
conditions that were necessary for the realization of democracy in the state. But
if, as I have suggested, the voluntary nature of parties makes them importantly
different from states then all of these questions must be re-examined.
We must ask what it means for parties to be 'democratic'. In the state democracy
is normally taken to imply some sort of control by the citizens or their representatives over all the policies and actions of the government. But, as Michels
46
48
Michels,PoliticalParties, p. 334.
Michels,PoliticalParties, p. 335.
47
Michels,PoliticalParties,p. 35I.
Roberto Michels and the Study of Political Parties
171
himself points out, parties are usually based on programmes or policies of some
sort which are fairly inflexible and change only gradually over time.
Secondly, ought parties to be democratic? One reason for wanting democracy
in the state, or for thinking it a 'good thing', is that one cannot (easily) resign
from or leave the state. But party membership is more or less voluntary. Does it
follow then that there is no need for parties to be democratic? At least it would
seem that the reasons for wanting them to be or thinking that they ought to be
must be different from those for the state.
Finally, what are the conditions for achieving democracy in parties ? One cannot simply transfer wholesale the liberal-democratic model of two-party competition worked out with reference to the state. It is necessary to start again and
construct a new model, bearing in mind not only the point about voluntary membership, but also the fact that the organization of parties is importantly affected
by their role within the political institutions of the state, and by their relations
with other parties.
It seems to me that these questions suggest a whole range of problems in the
study of political parties which Michels overlooks. And his influence has been
such that most later writers, taking over his theoretical framework, have also
neglected these problems. Little if any consideration has been given to the first
two points: the meaning of 'democracy' in the context of the party, and the justification for it. Most writers simply ignore the possibility that the term
'democracy' might raise special problems.49
But the third point seems more important. The work of such a major contributor to this field as S. M. Lipset seems to be based on the assumption that
democracy in trade unions requires two-party competition on the lines of the
liberal-democraticstate model.50And the importance attached to competition in
elections in several other studies seems to derive from a similar point of view.51
In fact one might go further and suggest that the commonly held view that
Michels' thesis, although exaggerated,is fundamentally correct, seems often to be
based on arguing back from the two-party model: because in most parties and
unions there is not competition between parties (the International Typographical
Union studied by Lipset in 'Union Democracy' being one of the few deviant cases)
it follows that most parties and unions must be undemocratic, and hence oligarchic. For the reasons I have suggested this two-party model is, I think, fundamentally inadequate, and a new model worked out with the special characteristics
of parties in mind is needed.
49 These points are touched on in G. McConnell, 'The Spirit of Private Government',
American Political Science Review, LII (1958), 754-70. See also V. L. Allen, Power in Trade Unions
(London: Longmans, 1954), pt i. However neither McConnell nor Allen seems to me to have
seen their full implication.
50 See Lipset et al. Union Democracy; Lipset, Political Man, ch. 12 ('The Political Process in
Trade Unions').
51 See e.g. J. Goldstein, The Government of British Trade Unions (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1952); J. D. Edelstein, 'Democracy in a National Trade Union: the British AEU',
Industrial Relations, iv (3), (I965), pp. 105-25; J. D. Edelstein, 'An Organisational Theory of
Union Democracy', American Sociological Review, xxxu (1967), I9-3I.
172
HANDS
In conclusion then, this paper may be seen as a plea for a reassessment of
Michels' work. His particular contributions to the study of political parties must
be acknowledged, but so must his shortcomings. Such a recognition demands a
basic rethinking of the theoretical frameworkin terms of which parties are studied,
and might lead to the progress in this field that has been conspicuously lacking
since Michels.