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THE SCHUMAN PLAN – A CRUCIAL MOMENT IN THE EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION PROCESS
Constantin Emil BUCUR, Assistant Professor, PhD, University of Bucharest
Abstact: This study intends to present some aspects regarding the implications and perception
of the Schuman Declaration in the context of the European integration phenomenon, process
initiated in the second half of the 20th Century. Necessarily, the material treats issues regarded
from the historic and international relations perspective. The stake of this research wishes to be
both to emphasize the meanings of the Schuman Plan in the dynamics of the European post World War II relations, as well as the reorientation occurred, thanks to the remodeling concept
introduced by the authors of the respective document, at the level of the decision factor, as
regards the management of European bilateral and/or multilateral relations, both from the
point of view of political aspects, and of the economic ones. Thus, I have tried to focus on the
evolution of these intra-European relations both at political and diplomatic levels, using,
particularly, the interpretation of the edited archived documents, journals and other sources of
memoirs. As far as the scientific analysis elements are concerned, I have tried to build my
vision on making use of a few masterpieces from the specialized literature. Therefore, a special
attention should be granted to the work of Simon Duke, The Elusive Quest for European
Security, from EDC to CFSP, London, MacMillan Press Publishing House, Ltd., 2000.
Not in the latest, the conclusions of this study intend to prove that the Schuman Plan
represented a real impulse for the European integration phenomenon, on one side and, on the
other side, the respective project represented a real turning point in the history of international
relations, generally, and of the European ones, particularly. Thus, by making use of it, the
European politicians and diplomats have begun abandoning, step by step, the line of conflict –
of divergences, understanding thus the fact that only through honest and transparent
cooperation, each of them was able to bring to their countries, without using the instrument of
violence in the relations between them, the benefits and advantages of the economic
development of the other.
Keywords: European Studies, European Integration, Schumann Plan, Franco-German
Reconciliation
“During a man’s lifetime, France survived three wars, instigated by her neighbour
across the Rhine. The first war ended in the mutilation of our national territory and utter
humiliation. Victorious in the second one, France recovered Alsace and Lorraine, but at the cost
of people and materials which left her heartless and ruined… The third war witnessed our army
falling apart at the first encounter, our government ready to surrender, our nation withstanding
the occupation, organized burglary, forced labour and detention of two million people.”1
In the 5th decade of the 20th century, when the European nations were just coming out
of the world war, they began showing real signs of recovery at the economic level, partly due to
the substantial financial support offered by the United States, in form of what has remained
known in history under the name of Marshall Plan. This plan would lead, in fact, to the creation
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Soon afterwards, a defensive
system, which was intended to protect the west-European countries from a possible soviet
aggression, was created, by setting up two collective security organizations: Western European
Union (WEU) and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This construction also
presented a few vulnerable points, soon noticed by the nations having sealed the agreements
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from Brussels and Washington, among which, the most obvious was, certainly, the omission to
include in these organizations, Germany, actually what had remained from the German state,
unoccupied by the Soviets, specifically the Federal Republic of Germany, country that had a
huge potential of economic development and which would have been primordially aimed for
both by the fearful and also by the possible aggression of the Red Army. Thus, the security
guarantees offered by Washington to the Europeans in the treaty signed in the capital of the
United States, on April 4th, 1949, created favourable conditions for the latter to initiate the first
meaningful gestures on political and diplomatic plans, which would lead to the onset of the
process of European integration.
The person that may be fully invested with the title of paternity for this concept and
phenomenon of European integration was Jean Monnet, who considered that the first step in
opening a new era in the political and economic relations between the European nations, a new
period of collaboration and effort coordination, in order to achieve their common interests and
to eliminate any kind of divergence, would have been a reconciliation between the big rivals of
the two world wars, which had affected the entire mankind, a historical French – German
reconciliation. Jean Monnet believed in the idea that peace and tranquillity of the European
continent might be reached by means of an alliance, limited only to economic targets, between
France and Germany.2
The Schuman Plan, presented by the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, on May
9th, 1950, envisaged an European federalist-type projection, whereas the Declaration specified,
among others, that: “The French government proposes the placement of the entire FrenchGerman coal and steel production under a common High Authority, in an organization open to
the participation of other European states.”3, and, towards the end of the document, the
fundamental target of the project was defined to be as follows: “By putting in common the basic
production and by creating a High Authority … the first concrete foundations of an European
Federation, which is indispensable in maintaining peace, shall be immediately laid.”4 In fact, an
opinion similar to the one mentioned by Robert Hostiou can also be found in one of the works
of Gérard Soulier.5
The idea, far from being just “a mass-media coup”6, as I consider that a more indicated
expression might be: a “coup d’image”, remains, in fact, in my opinion, one of the most
remarkable innovations in the domain of international relations of the 20th century, which
simultaneously fulfilled and satisfied the endemic tendencies of France, twice invaded in that
century by her neighbour across the Rhine, in providing its own security, refusing vehemently
to accept that Germany, which was under the occupation of the four allies, should benefit from
the mineral resources of the Saar and Ruhr regions, as the United States desired to rehabilitate
economically the main loser of the European war. Thus, the Schuman Declaration mentions,
among others, the following: “... The solidarity of production which shall thus be achieved shall
guarantee that any war between France and Germany shall become not only unthinkable, but
also materially impossible.”7 In addition to the fact that the Schuman Plan removed the political
dispute between the two antagonist neighbours from the Western Europe in the manner of
having control over the regions of Ruhr and Saar, the project “linked”, in the positive meaning
of the term the Federal Germany from the Western block, in the evolution of Cold War at the
geopolitical and geostrategic levels.8 The idea of Jean Monnet, as well as of many people from
his entourage, who effectively worked at conceiving the project by means of which both
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international paralysis related to the manner in which Federal Germany would be attracted on
the western side of the Cold War’s barricade, and the rivalry between France and Germany
would be defused, was simply brilliant in its simplicity. In fact, Jean Monnet mentions in his
memories that, in the eve of launching the Schuman Plan, only nine persons were aware of that
initiative. Those persons were: Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Bernard Clappier, René Pleven,
René Mayer, Pierre Uri, Etienne Hirsch, Robert Marjolin and Paul Reuter. They were joined by
Konrad Adenauer, whom Robert Schuman consulted in March 1950, and who could have been
deemed, partly, as a co-author of the Declaration of May 9th, the same year, next to Monnet and
Schuman.9
The international events shall accelerate the materialization of this idea of Jean Monnet.
On June 24th, 1950, the armed forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea started the
attack against their neighbour, the South Korea, attack that shall generate in a war in the Korean
Peninsula for three years. The Korean war, through its implications for the United States, shall
make the factors of decisions from Washington to adopt a strategy according to which it was
necessary to rearm the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and to invite it to join NATO,
considering that the Americans had required the Europeans to increase their contribution at their
own security, because the American armed forces were engaged in another theatre of operations
far beyond the boundaries of Europe.
One may say that the very discretion displayed around the drafting of the Schuman Plan
represented an important factor for its success, because the forces which were possibly hostile
to the Plan, and here I refer mainly at the French employers’ organization in the domain, were
put in front of a true fait acompli, of a major reorientation of perception, in the post-war
European policy – the only possibility for those being to adopt the vision of Jean Monnet and of
his peers. Thus, on November 13th, 1950, Jules Aubrun, President of the French Iron and Steel
Employers' Federation, sent René Pleven a letter in which he complains of being sidelined from
the negotiations on the Schuman Plan. His gesture was however late-occurring and intended to
spare some susceptibilities of the French employers from the field.10
The Schuman Plan and the creation of the Council of Europe, with the headquarters in
Strasbourg, were the first stages of the European integration process. The treaty enacting the
Council of Europe was sealed on May 5th, 1950 and foresaw that the body was made up of a
Parliamentary Assembly, which had consultative role, and an Intergovernmental Committee.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted in August 1950 a
recommendation by means of which pronounced in favour of forming an European army. Soon
after, on August 11th, 1950, negotiations regarding the European integration, inclusively in the
domain of security and defence, shall take place in a solemn session of the Council of Europe’s
Assembly; there, the discussions were about the cooperation between the members of the
organization, in the context of the existence of a strong impetus of the federalist stream. On that
occasion, the former British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, gave a speech, declaring to be:
“... in favour of immediate creation of a unified European army, under unique command...”.11
This European army that Winston Churchill imagined would be led by an European Minister of
Defence. The proposal of the former British Premier had some weak points. Thus, Churchill’s
project did not mention, for example, if the newly created European army would be put under
the control of a supranational authority, according to the model of the Schuman Plan regarding
the Coal and Steel Economic Community, or if that would benefit from an integrated command
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of the national military units. The Churchill’s project did not include his very own country,
because the Great Britain was still advocating for keeping his colonial empire and a privileged
bilateral relation with the United States, and his attitude towards the first steps of the process of
European integration was loose and eluding. In the same session of the Council of Europe’s
Assembly, on August 11th, 1950, after the speech of Winston Churchill, followed the public
address of the French socialist, André Philip, who proposed the creation of an European army
on the same principle that had enlivened the Schuman Plan, referring at the principle of
supranational control over that structure of European defence.
The United States of America, voiced by the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson,
proposed the creation of a structure within NATO, where, next to the members of the
Washington Treaty, military units belonging to the FRG should be included, which meant
granting this country the right to rearm, less than five years after the end of the World War that
the 3rd German Reich had started. This proposal was received generally favourably by the
Europeans, except for France. Though, initially, France opposed vehemently at the adhesion of
the Federal Germany to NATO and at any kind of involvement of the armed forces of this
country in the project regarding the creation of a unified European army, the decision factors
from Paris seemed to become aware in time of the fact that the rearming of the western side of
Germany could no longer be postponed without end and that it was better “if there were
German soldiers, it should not be a German army”. J.C. Masclet, in a number of the magazine
Que sais-je?, mentions, in fact, that his formula may summarize the entire Pleven Plan.12
Paris’s change of perspective was due to the warnings coming from Washington, the main pillar
in providing the European security, according to which, the United States would take part at the
defence of the continent, but they would expect a much more consistent contribution from their
European allies in the defensive against the subversion of communism.13 The American
Secretary of State had mentioned, in fact, that the assistance of his country, already involved in
the Korean conflict, directly depended on the possibility of the European partners to equip a
number of at least 60 divisions, out of which at least 10 would have been the contribution of
Germany.14
The international events evolved favourably, so that, a conference of the three ministers
of foreign affairs toot place in New York, between September 12th and 14th, 1950, where Dean
Acheson, Ernest Bevin and Robert Schuman participated, accompanied by the High
Representatives for Germany: John McCloy, on behalf of the United States, André Francois–
Poncet, from France and Sir Ivone Kirkpatric, representing the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as the Secretaries of Defence from these three countries.
This reunion preceded in fact the North-Atlantic Council’s summit. On that occasion, the three
governments harmonized their points of view as far as the rearming of the Federal Republic of
Germany was concerned, in the sense that the three ministers asserted in the press release issued
at the end of their meeting, that the Allies “would treat any attack from any direction against the
Federal Republic as an attack against them”. It was practically an extension of the principles
animating NATO at the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.15
During this conference, a few important decisions were adopted, as far as the rearming
of the FRG was concerned, specifically, the discussions were about the probability of this
country’s involvement in the production of weaponry under the strict control of the allies, the
development of a unified military force which objective would be to defend Western Europe
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and, not in the latest, matters related to the security of the Western Berlin. Dean Acheson
pleaded again in favour of the integration of the armed forces of the Federal Republic in a
unified European army, but this proposal faced the reticence of his discussion partners.16
A decision was however made at the North-Atlantic Council, which opened its works on
September 26th the same year, stipulating, in accordance with the proposal of the American
Secretary of State, that the unified pack of proposals for FRG should be “in suspension with
consolation phrases, until we would make arrangements with France, so that both would have
given up something”.17 In fact, the expression “consolation phrases”, invented by the diplomats
of the countries participating at the North-Atlantic Council, hid, in reality, the principle
agreement of all the participants in favour of the adhesion of FRG, as soon as possible, at a
structure subordinated to NATO in form of a “unified force under centralized command... in
order to prevent aggression and to provide the security of the Western Europe”.18
The North-Atlantic Council decided, at least in the version of perception of the
American representatives, to create an integrated force under the political and strategic
command of NATO, specifying that the respective project should meet the agreement adhesions
of all the allies. The Secretary of State of the United States, Dean Acheson, would specify the
following referring at the possibility of creating an European army under the auspices of the
North-Atlantic Treaty Organization: “an integrated force under a centralized command which
would hinder any aggression and would provide the security of the Western Europe.”19
To these resolutions aiming directly at his country, the Chancellor Kondrad Adenauer
expressed his support in view to co-opt FRG within an integrated force inside NATO. However,
France remained reticent as regards the rearming of the Federal Republic and the adhesion at
NATO of its neighbour across the Rhine. Thus, one of the direct consequences of this state of
fact, as far as the European political relations are concerned, might be deemed to be the
drafting, at the initiative of the French government, of the project of the European Defence
Community, as an alternative at the adhesion of the Federal Republic at NATO.
In conclusion, one might assert that the Schuman Plan represents the starting point for
the phenomenon of European integration, due to the impulse of the generous, even idealistic
idea, of the great French politician and statesman, Jean Monnet, in favour of the process of
integration at national level. On the other side, the respective moment marks, in the European
political and diplomatic relations, a small and slightly invisible change of perspective, as far as
the vision in domain is concerned, from the political realism to a harmonious union of
characteristic elements, specific to the paradigms of political idealism and realism in
international relations.
Notes:
1 Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1967, p. 719.
2 Martin Holland, „Integrarea europeană şi ideile lui Jean Monnet”, in POLIS, nr. 3/1995, p. 7.
3 Robert Hostiou, Robert Schuman et ľEurope, Paris, Cujas, 1969, pp. 137-138.
4 Ibidem
5 Gérard Soulier, ĽEurope Histoire, civilization, institutions, Paris, Armand Colin, 1994, p.
269.
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6 Ibidem
7 Documents on British Policy Overseas, Roger Bullen şi M. E. Pelly (eds.), series II., vol. I.,
The Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe and Western European Integration, London, Her
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1986, p. 3.
8 Alain Guyomarch, Howard Machin and Ella Ritchie, France in the European Union,
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 108.
9 Jean Monnet, Mémoires, Paris, Arthème Fayard, 1976, pp. 355-356.
10 Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Correspondance 1947-1953, Lausanne, Fondation Jean
Monnet pour l'Europe, Centre de recherches européennes, 1986, pp. 65-67.
11 Simon Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security, From EDC to CFSP, London,
MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000, p. 13.
12 Gérard Soulier, Op. cit., p. 279.
13 Simon Duke, Op. cit., p. 15.
14 Ibidem, p. 16.
15 Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-1953, Chicago, Henry Regenery Company, 1965, p. 284.
16 Keesing`s Contemporary Archives, vol. nr. VI., 1946-1948, Bristol, Keesing`s Publications
Limited, p. 10953 A. „Three-Power Conference in New York”
17 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, New York, W.W.
Norton and Company, 1969, p. 443.
18 Simon Duke, Op. cit., p. 16.
19 Dean Acheson, Op. cit., p. 16.
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