Dr Tatiana Majcherkiewicz
The Pedagogical University of Cracow
Department of Philosophy and Sociology
email: [email protected]
Dr Kaja Gadowska
Jagiellonian University
Department Philosophy
POLITICAL CLIENTELISM IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
A case study of institutional changes in the post-communist state of Poland*
In Poland we can still find conviction that a politician
is a patron and a civil servant is a client. When a change of
government takes place, certain civil servants know that their
future is already decided for politicians are afraid to trust civil
servants as they can politically sabotage them (Jan Pastwa, the
Chief of the Civil Service Rzeczpospolita, 11 Dec. 2002).
Abstract
In analysing political clientelism in public administration one should notice its institutional dimension
which poses particularly serious threats to the position of the state. Especially important is the vulnerability of
administration to politicization following more than forty years of its direct subordination to the communist
party.
This paper is divided into two parts. The first part presents theoretical approaches to politicoadministrative relations with reference to its applicability to the post-communist state. The second part focuses
directly on politico-administrative relations in Poland and on the issue of whether the institutional order
promotes, or rather limits, the influence of the political sphere on public administration situated below the
political sphere. The communist legacy and not completed administrative reforms were preserving and
promoting clientelism in public administration.
Keywords: public administration, civil service, models of politico-administrative relations, models of careers
and positions in public administration, communist legacy, civil service acts, clientlism, political neutrality of
civil service, spoils system.
Historical Introduction and the idea of clientelism
Since the fall of communism in Poland in 1989 there has been an economic, political and social
transition leading to be formation of a free market and the introduction of democratic institutions and rules of the
game. Ambitious reforms have led to a complete and successful transition in many areas. However, there have
also been areas where reforms have been moderate and the transition of institutions has been limited.
Politico-administrative relations and the formation of the civil service is one of the areas, where reforms
were delayed and then they proved to be lukewarm.1 An efficient, professional and politically neutral
administration is critical for the state to perform its functions. The crucial factor is preserving the political
neutrality of the administration, which should serve the state rather than the partisan interests of the party in
government. However, in Poland politics is over expanded, endangering the development of autonomous public
administration (Kamiński 2004). Political parties aim to preserve supervision over public administration in order
to subordinate it to its narrow political interests.
Due to the crucial role of the institutional setting in this article we will not concentrate in detail on an
analysis of policies and actions of particular governments after the collapse of communism in 1989 but rather on
institutional changes which were adopted during the transition. The article will focus on the absence of reform in
*
The article is based on the conference paper presented at the 13th NISPAcee Annual Conference, "Democratic
Governance for the XXI Century: Challenges and Responses in CEE Countries", Moscow, 19-21 May 2005.
1
In this article we focus on areas where efforts to reform were rather unsuccessful. However, the authors of the
article would like to emphasize that these comprise only a narrow section of the new order built since 1989. In
many areas post-communist Poland was successful in its efforts to reform. Thus, the analysis of political
clientelism should not lead to the formation of a distorted picture of Poland, in which weakness in this area and
unsuccessful reforms become generalised. This would be contrary to the intention of the authors.
1
the early nineties, the central administration reform and particularly on the Civil Service Act of 1998.2 It has to
be emphasized that the institutional order has not only been established by delayed reforms of the transition
period but also by ‘the spirit’ of communism. The political culture of that period is still alive and it continuous to
have a fundamental impact on the current state of performance and facilitates such negative phenomena as
clientelism and corruption.3
However, let us first define the term clientelism. Clientelism shows itself in different levels in all types
of societies. It occurs when individuals or groups with unequal status meet while occupying differing positions in
the social hierarchy (a perpendicular dyad). When the official formalized methods of realizing specified interests
or paths of access to desired resources are recognized as inadequate, then informal paths are activated. The
individual occupying the higher position in a social hierarchy, i.e. the patron, is capable of offering assistance
and protection to people or groups situated lower in the social hierarchy, i.e. clients. The patron expands a
protective umbrella around them in exchange for specified services. The basis of clientelistic linkages is
constituted by a feeling of personal loyalty and obligation, which is associated with an exchange of resources of
unequal character. (Zuckerman A. 1977; Gellner E. 1977; Eisenstadt S. N., Lemarchand R. 1981). The
vvoluntary character of these relations (although to some extent limited) is crucial.
In the case of Poland, one should underline the strong political pressure and fluidity of senior political
positions in public administration, especially positions of director generals, (the most senior administrative
positions supervising the performance of central or regional offices and responsible also for personnel policy in
these institutions). The relations between the minister or regional governor (wojewoda) and director generals are,
in the case of Poland, the most sensitive relations between politicians and administrative offices deciding on the
neutrality of public administration or, on the contrary, the formation of clientelist-type relations.
Proposals for reforms aimed at the reformulation of relations between politics and administration
officially formulated in Poland after 1989 are generally based on the classical nineteenth century model, which
assumes strict separation of these areas. However, this model also assumes that public administration should be
located in the organisational structure below the political sphere. In Western European countries which have
experienced long and uninterrupted democratic tradition mechanisms guaranteeing the autonomy of public
administration and stable and professional civil service corps were gradually formed 4. This occurred in Western
Europe at the time when Poland and many other countries in Central and Eastern Europe lost their
independence.5 Furthermore, the communist period was also a drawback, with extremely intensive politicization
of administration.
Thus, in post-communist Poland, contrary to the proposed model of reforms and the situation in
Western Europe, personnel policy is characterised by political purges. In 1993, for the first time since the
2
The previous Civil Service Act of 1996 had limited effect on the formation of the civil service as this reform
was stopped after the change of government from post-communist to post-Solidarity after parliamentary
elections in 1997.
3
In this short article we are not able to include the crucial role of clientelism in business, which has a serious
impact on public administration performance; for example, its effect on public administration as a result of elite
circulation between politics, administration and state-owned companies. (For more on politico-economic
clientelism see: Gadowska 2005 and Gadowska 2002).
4
During that period in other countries, ambitious public administrative reforms were taking place. For example,
in 1855 in England the Commission of the Civil Service was formed. Similarly, in France under Napoleon
Bonaparte, a stable administrative system was introduced, a main element of which was the employment of
professional administrative cadres (Burentko 2002: 11-12).
5 The weakness of the Polish state under socialism was enhanced by the negative social attitudes towards
administration and strong tradition. Its origins are in the fact that Poland lost its national independence for more
than one hundred years (1795 - 1918). The partition states (Austria, Prussia and Russia) and their administration
were seen as oppressive and alien.
Thus, it should be assumed that although under communism the animosity towards the state was very strong,
nevertheless it was a consequence of path dependence factors related to the partition period. However, there
were also some specific features of communism, that is the complete subordination of administration to the
communist party and the existence of the nomenklatura system, in which even the lowest positions in
administration were nominated based on political criteria.
To enrich this analysis it is worth making reference to early administrative traditions of the pre-partition Polish
state. In the opinion of prof. Antoni Mączak “we [Poles] had a great tradition of self-government but absolutely
no tradition of civil service” .
2
collapse of communism a post-communist government was formed and the tendency for a spoils system after
each parliamentary election was established. The senior positions in public administration are part of the spoils
system.6 Sometimes, the purges are so intensive that so-called cleaning ladies are also replaced. Official
appointments have their source in political patronage instead of professional qualifications. As a result, promoted
officials serve the interests of their patrons even if these oppose to the public interest. This state of affairs can
promote the formation of corrupt networks in which, individualistic and partisan aims replace public ones. The
type of attitudes of officials lead of distrust to state and public administration.
Recent academic literature on clientelism has begun to recognise that not only are vertical type informal
relations important but analyses should also be enriched by net-analyses. Net-analysis includes both vertical
(clientelism) and horizontal (cronyism) relations. Cronyism is defined as nets among cronies, who are located in
senior positions and support and promote each other depending on who currently enjoys power (Waterbury
1977; Sik 1994).
In public administration cronyism leads to the appointment of family members or colleagues or for
those giving favours or bribes.7 These types of practises in Poland were addressed in research by the Anticorruption Programme by the Stefan Batory Foundation. According to the research conducted in August 2004
the employment of kin or colleagues was not interpreted as negative by 30% of public administration employees.
Moreover, the Word Bank recent report suggested that the exchange of kin employment among ministries had
become popular in Poland. An extreme example of nepotism can be presented in the town of Puławy, where,
among 120 local administration employees, around 30 are connected by close family ties (Krasnowska and
Krzyżak, Wprost, 29 August 2004).
Clientelism and cronyism decrease moral standards. They facilitate corruption and control over the state
by networks of politicians, public administration officials, businessmen, and sometimes intelligence cadres or
even criminals. These type of practices lead to demoralisation of the political elite who focus on partisan
interests, overlooking public ones. In the case of their administrative counterparts, the personal interest is
achieved by state exploitation.
1. Between public administration and politics
Analysing challenges, which Poland and other Central and East European post-communist states have
to overcome we argue that they are much more serious than those of other modern countries, in which the
democratic systems have lasted without any serious interruption. In post-communist countries, in addition to the
challenges of the modern and widely expanded state there have also been challenges to how to overcome the
even more serious legacy of the communist past. In addition to the formation of an efficient and flexible public
administration able to meet modern challenges with limited financial resources, there are additional
contradictory factors, which suggest serious limitations of the new public management models in public
administration in these countries. The formation of an efficient and politically neutral civil service in Poland and
other post-communist countries, following more than forty years in which administration was subordinated to the
communist political party, suggests the adoption of a solution based on the classical career system.
Thus, particularly important is the question of what the best model of politico-administrative relations
is. Should any other factors be taken into consideration in the case of a post-communist state? In general, in
relation to modern state challenges, it is worth mentioning the impact of two factors. First is the
multidimensional (economic, political and social) impact of globalisation, which limits the role of national states
and strengthens the importance of external actors. Second, is the decentralisation of administration and the
development of self-government at local and regional levels. As part of this particular type of globalisation can
be interpreted Europeanisation of administration (its values and standards, convergence of national models of
civil service and similarity of tasks performed by national administration), (Rydlewski, The Polish Yearbook of
Civil Service 2005 p. 13).
It is also worth mentioning that the increase in tasks and competencies performed by the modern state,
leads to significant growth in the size of the administration. In consequence, the organisation of public
administration is often transformed in the direction of Public Management, with a more prominent role for
cooperation with private business. Jadwiga Staniszkis (2002 p.349) argues in this context that the “method of
control by the state centre corrodes” as tasks and public functions have gradually been taken on by the private
sector, which is difficult to supervise.
6
A toll to fight corruption can be seen in the Amendment of the Civil Act introduced on 17 June 2005. This
requires the publication of personal data for those who apply for positions in public administration and of those
who are finally selected. This should promote transparency and social supervision.
7
These practices have been popular since 1993 when the new government of Waldemar Pawlak was formed.
For example, in the office of the Council of Ministers (URM) two deputy ministers were formally members of
the Peasant party, and seven were acquaintances of the prime minister (Majcherkiewicz 2004: 96).
3
In public administration the inspiration of private business is also seen in the change of employment
policy. There is a shift from the career system (work in public administration as the choice for the whole
professional life) towards a position (open) system, which is also based on competition procedures. This policy
should lead to the employment of managers in senior positions in public administration. At the same time, the
issue of good services for citizens is raised and they are traded similarly to private business as clients.
In Poland, the usefulness of this approach for reforming public administration was advocated by Jerzy
Hausner, deputy prime minister and minister of Economic Affairs and Labour (Oct. 2001 – March 2005). In his
opinion, this approach is particularly attractive for Poland due to its institutional solution, where ministers,
instead of fulfilling political roles are engaged in administrative actions. Ministers concentrate on their branches
of the economy and there is a lack of coordination on common policy to be conducted by government. In
contrast to the traditional model of the separation of politics and public administration he sees public
management as the approach to enable some public functions to be performed by the private sector (Hausner
2002).
A completely different approach is presented by Kulesza and Izdebski (1999 p. 219), lawyers who were
actively engaged in the nineties in the administrative reform. In their opinion, the introduction of public
management in public administration, with recruitment similar to that in the private sector for shorter time spans
can lead to the politicization of public administration. Similar conclusions are drawn by Randama and Viles
(Kudrycka, Służba cywilna, 2002, no 4) on the basis of their comparative research in Central and Eastern
Europe. The authors emphasise the danger of incompetent management of public funds, corruption and
nepotism.
In the opinion of Kulesza and Izdebski, the position system, which assumes the employment in
managerial positions of people who were not working in administration before promotion, created a danger of
politicaiztion, posing a serious threat to post-communist Poland, in which the civil service tradition and its ethics
were lost during socialism. In addition, Antoni Kaminski (The Polish Yearbook Of Civil Service 2004, p. 16)
argues that although employment in public administration of contract personnel, who are directly responsible to
the minister, can lead to an increase in administrative performance, nevertheless it can also increase its
politicaiztion.
According to Jacek Czaputowicz, the deputy chief of the Civil Service (The Polish Yearbook Of Civil
Service 2005), in Poland a mixed model exists. However, the career model predominates – there is competition
for senior positions in administration and currently only people who are administrative officials can apply for
those jobs.8 Finally, it should be stressed that in the post-communist state, stability of administrative cadres,
based on the classical model, is especially crucial in the nascent stage of its formation.
2. Between politics and administration: an analysis of Poland after 1989
As already mentioned, the particular vulnerability of administration to political patronage is related to
its organisational structure. In countries, which have long and uninterrupted democratic traditions models of
separation of both spheres were formulated, mechanism of checks and balances were developed. In the case of
Poland, and this could probably also be generalised to the majority of other post-communist countries, politicoadministrative relations are still in flux, and despite the formal separation of the political and administrative
spheres, this division does not protect against political intervention and patronage.
It could be argued that the problem of political clientelism in Poland is strengthened by the expansion of
the political sphere and the underdevelopment of public administration. Eva Etzioni-Halevy (The Polish
Yearbook Of Civil Service 2004,) argues that the intensity of corruption is largely contingent on the ruling
elite’s political culture and the development sequence of the system structure. The most negative is one in which
the political sphere is deeply rooted. When an autonomous public administration has not been formed, political
corruption is favoured by the absence of a clear delineation between administrative and political elites, which
leads to constant direct interference by political interests and party considerations in administrative activity.
Thus, one can expect that a gradual strengthening of public administration has been taking place (independent of
the fact of temporary and even quite intensive attempts at politicaiztion). This will lead to a more stable division
of politics and administration which would guarantee just, fair and politically neutral state functioning.
The current politico-administrative state is the result of the legacy of the communist past and rather
moderate efforts to reform in relation to the civil service (and public administration as a whole) as well as
8
Since July 2002 recruitment has been closed, which means that candidates who wish to stand in the competition
for senior position has to be administrative officials (that means they must fulfilled professional criteria to
receive the status of official). Before that deadline, at the beginning of 2002, a high numbers who did not work in
administration stood for competition (Gazeta prawna, 20 May, 2004). The fact that competitions are now closed
is rather positive as it limits politicization, closing opportunities for promotion for those who enjoy political
patronage but do not fulfil the required professional criteria (as it used to be before).
4
unexpected side-effects of changes which took place both in politics and administration after 1989. In this article
we will mostly concentrate on the transition period. Nevertheless, the impact of communism even if only briefly
has to be mentioned. During the communist period, the weakness of the Polish state and its alienation from the
citizens were particularly strongly expressed as were its incompetence and the passivity of its administration
(which was totally subordinated to the communist party). Moreover, communism also resulted in the proposals
for these reforms not finding support or appreciation in society, which were also important for them to be
successful.9 The situation is also assisted by the low level of social trust to the state, the fact that citizens are not
interested in monitoring how the state functions which prolongs its inefficient functioning and its politicaiztion
as well as creating favourable conditions for such phenomena as clientelism, cronyism and corruption.
2.1. Transformation of the political sphere
In describing politics, particular attention should be paid to the fragmentation and fluidity of the
political scene. It seems that the pathology of the political sphere affects the proper development of politicoadministrative relations more than the underdevelopment of the professional civil service. At the same time, lack
of government stability and political fragmentation are unfavourable for conducting long-term policy and debate
on the public interest. Instead, the agenda is limited to the four-year term of parliament. The fluidity of political
aims and electoral slogans predominate. Politicians concentrate on preserving their individual and partisan
interests by increasing their influence over the economy and the administration (Wesołowski 2004).
Current politico-administrative relations are a result not only of conducted reforms but even more of
radical and unexpected changes which took place, particularly at the beginning of the nineties. The consequence
of one such unintentional event, which, however, later took the form of a rather permanent tendency, is the
strong position of political actors, who officially do not perform any prominent public function and in
consequence do not take responsibility for it.10 Particularly dysfunctional for efficient political performance has
been the fact that leaders of parties that has been members of successive government coalitions have stayed
outside it (as have parliamentary leaders of political parties forming coalitions).11 In consequence they distance
themselves from the politics of their own government and criticize it, behaving as they do during a political
campaign.
The interesting fact is that the politicaiztion of administration seems to have been intensified in the
periods when the political sphere is particularly weak and fragmented, as for example during Jerzy Buzek’s
government.12 It can be argued that politicaiztion of administration was caused by most of all by the weakness
of the political sphere. An obvious example is the accusation made in a public debate that prime minister Marek
Belka was in opposition to the party which selected him (of course the role of the president in this process cannot
be forgotten) and that he showed warm sympathy to the newly formed right-wing Democratic Party. The prime
minister publicly criticised attempts to subordinate the government to the SLD leadership in parliament.
However, this political action was assisted by contradictory personnel policy. Half of his government ministers
had also performed similar functions in the previous government of the hard-core communist apparatchik,
Leszek Miller, in relation to which he tried to distance himself publicly.
2.2 Transformation of administrative sphere
9
It is worth mentioning the low level of social knowledge about how public administration functions and what
the civil service is (and recognition that it should be the guarantor of the political neutrality of the
administration). The research entitled: “The Civil Service, how to inform and promote” by Janusz Czapiński,
conducted in October 2001, showed that only 22.5% of Poles had ever heard of the term civil servant. However,
even among those who had heard it, they could rarely define it precisely. A proper definition of the term civil
service term presented only 5% of Polish society.
10
This was due to the unstable political situation at the beginning of transition at the moment of the formation of
the first non-communist government in Central and Eastern Europe of Tadeusz Mazowiecki Lech Wałęsa, who
although unquestionable the leader of Solidarity did not perform any official function (in the period between the
formation of Mazowiecki’s government in August 1989 – until the presidential election in November 1990).
11
Only in Leszek Miller’s government in autumn 2001, the ninth government since the fall of communism in
1989, was all three leaders of coalition parties members of government. However, this proved to be a temporary
phenomenon. Miller, wishing to prolong the existence of his minority government (since May 2003) decided in
February 2004 to resign from his position as party leader, keeping only his position as prime minister.
12
For, example, Paradowska (Polityka 9 June 2001) writing on Jerzy Buzek’s government three months before
parliamentary elections, emphasized that there were three election committees, but as some of the ministers did
not made a final decision the political fragmentation could be even stronger.
5
At the same time the current shape of politico-administrative relations has been determined by partial
reforms, among them delays in the introduction of the civil service (the first Civil Service Act was introduced in
1996 and in 1998 the second Act presented a different approach). Even if the Civil Service Act of 1998 is
positively evaluated due to the high professional standards which it expects, the slow pace of its introduction
(granting civil service status to public administration employees) means that public administration is still in the
nascent stage of its formation. Thus, it is highly vulnerable to political pressure. Furthermore, the development
of the civil service depends on the changes of political group forming the government. Four main periods can be
distinguished (for more details see Majcherkiewicz 2004 and Majcherkiewicz 2005)
1. 1989–1993: Absence of a clear separation into political and administrative spheres;
2. 1993–1997: Acceptance of the spoils system, and formal demarcation of the two spheres;
3. 1997–2001: Refining the spoils system;
4. 2001–2003: Politicizing the Civil Service
At the beginning of transition in the early nineties after the first Solidarity government was formed, the
accent was on political and economic transition. Despite a certain intensity of action aimed at administrative
reforms, these issues were not widely appreciated and the instability of the political sphere with frequent changes
of governments did not create favourable conditions for reforms (their concepts of reform were completely
rejected by the post-communist government after 1993). However, it has to be emphasized that in this postSolidarity period there were two unsuccessful attempts to reform (1991 and 1993) an issue fundamental to public
administration, that is the formation of a professional civil service.
The main reform success of that period was in the formation of a politically neutral and professional
civil service was the formation in 1990 of the School of Public Administration - KSAP (modelled on the Ecole
Nationale d’Administration). The importance of the establishment of their elite type of education which was to
be the basis of the administrative elite has to be seen in the wider perspective of Poland being in the throes of the
fall of communism without any professional senior administrative cadres. The negative social attitude to the state
in general forced during the partition period when the Austria, Prussia and Russian states were seen as alien
caused the negative attitudes to administration13 to be under socialism revived and lowly paid work in
administration attracted political opportunists. This is reflected in the proverb characterising the official in the
communist system: “mean, however loyal”. Other aspect reminiscent of national sentiment were the rejection of
work in public administration.14 After the collapse of communism there was a certain change of attitude towards
administration, although this change was limited mostly to the new Solidarity national and regional elite. Senior
positions in administration were taken by new Solidarity elites, which were convinced about its reformatory
mission and the need to serve society by taking work in public institutions. However, they did not have earlier
experience of work in administration nor the relevant qualifications.
The establishment of the KSAP, which was able to preserve the high educational standards of the senior
administrative cadres, no doubt has to be appreciated in relation to the building of a professional and politically
neutral civil service in Poland. However, two critical remarks have to be made. Starting with the pros, we have to
quote the opinion of Burnetko (2002:22) that alumni of this school quickly gained professional recognition due
to their: creativity, professionalism and knowledge of two foreign languages. Nevertheless, the criticisms also
have to be raised that: first, already during the Solidarity period governments were not enthusiastic about
employment of their graduates, not to mention the post-communists after 1993. Secondly, each year there were
only about sixty alumni – so its influence was a drop in the ocean.
To sum up the role of the Solidarity period policy on the shape of institutional order, there were effects
of abandoning reformatory efforts and those few attempts which were undertaken were unsuccessful. For
example, in that period, political advisers were working on administrative positions due to the absence of
division between politics and administration. Nevertheless, there was an intention to break with the system of the
communist nomenklatura so although there were no legal regulations there was a policy not to expand the
political sphere nor to subordinate administration. Public administration was weak and vulnerable, and without
13
The exception was Prussia, where the state was efficient and a high legal culture was developed. Attitudes
were also positive among their citizens of Polish nationality, who at the same time, due to Germanisation policy,
were forbidden to work in administration.
14
These negative social attitudes towards state and administration are vividly shown in the interviews conducted
at the beginning of the nineties among members of the regional administrative elite of Upper Silesia. Despite the
fact that after the collapse of communism they decided to work in administration they still displayed
schizophrenic attitudes and they still shared negative prejudices with the rest towards administration. For
example, they declared that they felt ashamed when they had to say that they worked in public administration.
Moreover, the mayor of one of the main cities in the region praised himself for having such strong animosity
towards administration that he could not recall a visit to an administrative intuition for several years during
communism (Majcherkiewicz 2001).
6
strong professional cadres, but it was however relatively independent against politics. The sense of mission of
the new Solidarity elite led to corruption and clientlism being relatively limited in public administration.
Furthermore, the efforts to promote high professional standards of officials through the formation of the National
School of Public Administration have to be recognised. This period must be seen as a time of unsuccessful
reformatory efforts but not of spoiling the public sphere and administration as took place in the following period.
In the next period (1993-1997) power was taken by post-communist governments. This meant a
significant and radical change in the role of the state, political parties and administration as well as the way
personnel policy was conducted. Moreover, in contrast to the previous period it was a time of successful
administrative reforms of central administration and the civil service, reflecting the new vision of public
administration. In presenting the changes of that period one has to start with the administrative purges started
immediately after the formation of the government in 1993. During his first months in office, Prime Minister
Pawlak dismissed every fourth senior civil servant (Lipszyc Rzeczpospolita 30 September 1993), and within 18
months nearly ¾ of regional governors (voivodes) (Burnetko 2002: 24). Public administration, which had not
experienced any serious transition after communism and, without legal guarantees of its autonomy, found itself
in a completely new situation in 1993 of very strong and completely open political pressure. This was even
further negatively enforced by cronyism practices (for example in the office of the council of ministers (URM)
seven deputy ministers were acquaintances of the prime minister). The chief of the Council of Ministers, Michał
Strąk without any hesitation, was supporting the radical version of politicization - declaring that the dismissal of
regional govenors should accompany each change of government. Moreover, he advocated the return of former
communist apparatchik cadres (Dudek: 2002 p 364, quoting „Gazeta Wyborcza” z 23 Sept. 1994).
With the shift of power to the post-communist option the relation between politics and administration
was accompanied by the change of ruling style. Prime Minister Pawlak was replaced due to a loss of social
support that was caused among other reasons by press reports accusing him of corruption.15 Politicization was
even further intensified due to distrust between the coalition partners (post communist the Alliance of the
Democratic Left and Peasant party). The administrative purges were not only aimed at “enemies” – Solidarity
appointees - but were driven by the wish to cheat its partner by increasing its own political spoils.16 During the
rule of the last of three prime ministers Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, during that term of parliament, it was defined
which positions were formally political and which administrative. The positions of secretary and deputy
secretary of state, secretaries and in regional administration, voivodes and deputy voivodes (around 200
officials)17 became defined as political, and as political officially they would automatically hand in their
resignations with the collapse of a government, although the new prime minister would not have to accept their
resignations18 (Rydlewski 2002: 30-31).
In 1996 the first Civil Service Act was passed. In relation to senior positions, one of the criteria was at
least a seven-year term in administration, which in practice meant that post-Solidarity cadres were excluded.
Simultaneously, rapid advancement paths were closed to graduates of the National School of Public
Administration (KSAP) (Nunberg, Barbone, 1999 p. 45; Dudek 2002, p. 437). Furthermore, the introduction of
this Act was helped by the accusation of very poor quality and the politicization of qualification procedures,19
especially in relation to knowledge of foreign languages (Burnetko 2002: 28). Despite the quality of the
regulations envisaged in this Act, its real role was minimal as after the parliamentary elections the postSolidarity began development of the civil service, rejecting the concepts of its predecessors.
The most important event in the formation of the new institutional order in that period was the
constitutional obligation of the corps of civil servants to ensure a professional, diligent, impartial and politically
15
According to Dudek (2002 p. 377) the weekly Wprost accused the prime minister of giving government
contracts to a computer company InterArms, which was owned by a colleague of Pawlak.
16
In relation to the intention to hijack the pool of spoils on behalf of one coalition partner, three main actions had
to be mentioned: 1. the dismissal of regional governors by Prime Minister Pawlak, 2. purges of senior
administrative officials by Oleksy – as a result of the prime ministership position shift in the coalition from the
Peasant party to the post-communist SLD and 3. the almost complete dismissal of directors generals in regional
offices by the minister of internal affairs, Leszek Miller, in early 1997 (for more, see Majcherkiewicz 2004).
17
Article 38 of the Council of Ministers and Ministerial Terms of Reference Act from 8 August 1996 defined the
vocational status of senior office holders.
18
Article 103.1 of the Constitution of 2 April 1997 prohibited combining the position of Sejm deputy or senator
with work for the government administration, except for cabinet ministers and secretaries of state.
19
This be illustrated by the sudden shift of politicians into civil servants’ positions by resigning from party
membership before the parliamentary election in 1997 (which was expected to be lost by the post-communists).
7
neutral discharge of the State's obligations (Article 153 of the Constitution, 6 April 1997). Nevertheless, its role
only gradually began to gain prominence.20
After the parliamentary elections in 1997 and the formation of a new government by the post-Solidarity
coalition, one of the first decisions of Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek was to stop qualification procedures, which
were recognized as partial and only 109 people were nominated, mostly senior civil servants (85) – data on 31
December 1998 (Rydlewski 2001: 34-35).
The formation of this government was, for the first time, assisted by the automatic resignation from
senior positions at central and regional levels, defined as political positions (around 200 officials). However, the
scale of changes was much more radical, as the wide definition of positions as political did not limit personnel
changes conducted by that government. Paradowska (Polityka, 31 Oct. 1998) presents the extreme example of
the politicization of Łódź Regional Health Service, where politication was so intensive that it also covered
positions of porters and chauffeurs. In addition to the normal CV, it was demanded that they hand in a
recommendation letter from Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) – the main government coalition party. Another
example of politicization and breaking the principle of political neutrality by administrative officials was the
standing of a few director generals in regional office elections as party candidates.
The personnel policy of that period is often seen as the coming to power by a Solidarity elite, which did
not have sufficient professional cadres, despite its intention to conduct intensive purges in administration and
state owned-companies. During AWS electoral campaign, Kaczyński referred to the coexistence within AWS of
the political grouping of contradictory political aims – starting with conservative liberals and ending with radical
trade unionists – but standing in election together for pragmatic reasons. “Now it is f****** time for us to come
to power” became the vulgar yet popular phrase (Mikołajczyk 2002: 305). Krzaklewski (1997) openly declared
that ‘the cancerous communist tissue’ has to be cut out – through the capture of about 200 senior administrative
positions for the AWS. In consequence, long-term trade union activists took over the senior positions in state
institutions, partly due to the pressure of its echelons, but also due to the lack of its own qualified and
trustworthy cadres. One appointee became Alot, director of the pension scheme office, ‘The Office of Social
Security’ (ZUS); after a media campaign, he was dismissed. The last month of the AWS minority government
showed the full scale of AWS’s incompetence and corruption, with the minister of sport, Dębski, being killed in
mafia related business, and Wieczerzak, chairman of the State Insurance Office (PZU) Życie arrested on
corruption charges (Dudek 2002: 464 –465 and 496).
At the same time, the work on the new Civil Service Act began and was adopted on 18 December 1998.
In contrast to the previous Act all employees in public administration became members of the Civil Service
corps (this terminology could be misleading for English language speakers). The real professionals, called Civil
Servants or Civil Service officials in contrast to Civil service employees, achieved that status after being
nominated, having proved that they passed the qualification procedures in addition to fulfilling the high level
administrative qualification requirements (at least two years’ work experience, holding a master’s degree and
knowing one foreign language). There was controversy over the professional criteria, which in the opinion of
some were too high. On the one hand, this it should be positive for the quality of the Polish administration, but
on the other hand the question arises that if such criteria are necessary in all public administration positioning in
practice this would mean a very slow pace of building the civil service21 (10% of who only declared that they
would be able to fulfil these criteria in the next two years, Paradowska, Polityka nr 22).
Furthermore, a positive solution adopted in this Act has to be seen as the introduction of competition
procedures, which should enhance the political neutrality of public administration. Despite the politicaiztion of
administration under Buzek’s government and the slow pace of introduction of reform, the plan was ambitious
and the long-term prospects for the civil service were strongly positive.
The slow pace of formation of the professional Civil Service Act was also caused by the attitudes of
public administration employees themselves, who did not wish to be “over ambitious” only to find themselves
out of a job with a subsequent change of government in power (only around three hundred decided to stand for
qualification procedures each year). Despite government proposals assuming that in the period 2000-2003 fifteen
thousands would reach the specified level. In the period between July 1999 when the Civil Service Act began to
be introduced until the end of the government’s tenure in autumn 2001, only 857 people passed the examinations
and were nominated to the position of civil servants. This meant that only 0.7% of the Polish civil service were
professionals out of 116,000 public administration employees (Burnetko 2003: 35).
The parliamentary election in autumn 2001 and the formation of the Miller government meant a the new
institutional order for public administration - the division into political and administrative spheres as defined by the Civil
Service Act of 1998 was accepted, although its introduction was delayed. The Act of 1998 survived, but amendments were
20
For example, the decision of the Constitutional Court on 13 December 2002 that introduced by Leszek
Miller’s Amendment to the Civil Service Act Article 144a violated the Constitution.
21
In 2001 an attempt was made to change the Civil Service Act aimed at the introduction of an additional
category of lower category of civil servants. However, the parliamentary election halted work on that project.
8
added, spoiling and watering down the original sense – the most important of which was the amendment - article
144a adopted in December 2001. The idea of an apolitical civil service was inconvenient and difficult for the
post-communist elite to accept, as it had its political initiation under communism and was used to political
subordination of administration. Nevertheless, officially they did not reject the idea of a politically neutral civil
service.
Instead, they referred to the insufficient number of potential professional cadres and tried to slow down
the formation of the professional civil service. On 31 December 2003 there were only 1551 Civil Servants.22
However, graduates of the National School of Public Administration, for the first time in 2002, did not receive
relevant job offers in administration (the next year the situation improved). The government preferred to rely on
the political cadres of former nomenklatura (Majcherkiewicz 2005).
It should be recognised that the institutional order in which public administration functioned at that time
was such that the borderline of administration was clear and stable despite its temporary politicization due to the
amendment - article of 144a. The article enabled the competition procedure for senior positions in public
administration, which was supposed to guarantee the selection of the best candidates, to be omitted. Although it
could be assumed that during Miller’s tenure half of the senior positions in public administration were allocated
according to political credentials rather than administrative qualifications – the category of people employed by
in proxy status,23 nevertheless the mechanism defending political neutrality of administration, began to function.
The amendment of the Civil Service Act Article 144a was rejected by the Constitutional Court on 12 December
2002 as violating the Constitution by creating danger of the politication of public administration.
Finally, analysing the politicaiztion of administration during his tenure reveals the mushrooming of
corruption scandals in which members of his government and leaders of the post-communist party (SLD - the
Alliance of Democratic Left) were engaged. The scale of moral atrophy of politicians at that time is indicated by
the fact that there was only 8% support for Miller’s government in April (immediately preceding his
resignation). At the same time, the opinion polls conducted by the Research Centre of Public Opinion (CBOS)
indicated that the main cause of loss of trust was corruption and criminal affairs in which politicians of the SLD
were engaged – 66% of answers.
Conclusion
The efficient fight with clientelism requires actions aimed at the formation of an apolitical and
autonomous civil service. However, in the case of Poland the development of a civil service corps is still a
primary precondition.
Summarising the analysis of institutional changes during transition and being cautious about the current
situation we have to notice some positive reformatory changes, among which one has to mention the substantial
rise in number of those who decided to undergo the qualification procedure to apply for Civil servant status.
Furthermore, equally important, or even more important, is the change in the state of awareness of politicians.
Let us finish this analysis on a positive note and quote a letter of the current Prime Minister Marek Belka dated
30 July 2005 (http://www.usc.gov.pl/) for candidates deciding to start the qualification procedures this year, and
at the same time let us once more remind ourselves of the crucial role of civil service: “the achievement of civil
servants means not only prestige and being the elite of all public administration employees. Above all it means
responsibility for state and citizens, service based on loyalty towards the Polish Constitution, and relevant ethical
attitudes and commitment to the most highest values. It also means professionalism, reliability, honesty and
impartiality in performance. You are one of the most crucial bedrocks of the Polish Third Republic. It is obvious
that without your efficient and solid functioning of the administration there would be anarchy and state atrophy.”
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